Tsar Fyodor Alekseevich followed the teacher's advice. Tsar Fyodor III Alekseevich

The interview was conducted by T. Novgorodskaya, a special correspondent for the Science and Life magazine

"I will never forget the first demonstration flight of the Su-27 in Paris, organized by British Aerospace together with the designers and test pilots of the Sukhoi Design Bureau, - these are the impressions of the" premiere "of the fighter at the British Air Force pilot John Farlight. Viktor Pugachev made a turn on the Su-27 in 360 degrees in 10 seconds, the average speed on a turn was 36 degrees / s. And then we only hoped that our next generation fighter could reach 25 degrees / s. This is the speed with which the pilot is capable of turning the aircraft so that the entire armament complex is ready for an attack.If we assume that our new machine will meet in battle with the Su-27 in 10 seconds, it will remain, if we are very lucky, to release the landing gear and sit down. an air show can be used by a combat aircraft in real air combat. For the average viewer of the air show, only a superficial action, but if you belong to the aviation industry, then maneuvering combat m Ashin fully determine the limits in which the plane can fly. And naturally, when you see that there are no limits for the Su-27, or that the plane goes vertical, comes to a stop, falls back down, goes into a normal flight and does it not once or twice, but over and over again, then you understand that this is not an exception, not a trick, but a norm. The difficulty of this maneuver is not how to enter the mode, but how to get out of it. Usually we are not allowed to exceed the angles of attack of 20-25 degrees: if we exceed it, we lose control of the aircraft ... But the Russians carry out their maneuvers, changing the angle of attack in a wide range, while remaining confident in controlling the plane with absolutely symmetrical flow. The same goes for engines. Western engines "suffer" from severe angle of attack restrictions. In flight on our fighters, you have to think simultaneously about the enemy's maneuvers and about your own limitations from the aerodynamic point of view - about what the pilot should not do. Of course, such a situation is not very comfortable for the pilot, it is much easier for him when he can do anything in order to be able to target the enemy and pursue him. What the Russians have achieved amazed us to the core. "The Su-27, with its revolutionary design and aerodynamics, set new standards in the production of fighters. A man whose name is inextricably linked with the history of its creation - general designer Sukhoi Design Bureau OJSC, Doctor of Technical Sciences, full member of the International and Russian Engineering Academies of Aviation and Aeronautics, Hero of Russia, Lenin and State Prize laureate Mikhail Petrovich Simonov. In 1995 he was awarded the V. G. Shukhov Gold Medal, and in 1998 the editorial staff of the Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine named him the "Legend of the Year". His name is entered on the Hall of Fame Board of Fame at the National Museum of Aviation and Cosmonautics in Washington, along with the names of I. I. Sikorsky, S. V. Ilyushin and Werner von Braun. This is the first time Mikhail Petrovich gave an interview to the Science and Life magazine, although he has been reading our magazine since 1946. General Designer of Sukhoi Design Bureau OJSC M. SIMONOV answers the questions of the editors.

M.P.Simonov.

Cobra maneuver scheme.

Air combat in the "bell" mode (a - disruption of the Doppler tracking, disruption of the capture of the enemy radar station and escape from the attack; b - exit from the "bell" cut and the enemy attack; c - capture and defeat of the enemy).

Su-27 performs "Cobra". The angle of attack is 110 degrees.

Su-30 MKI. The blue color of fuel combustion in the engine afterburner indicates a high quality of the combustion process.

Air combat on a bend.

The Su-35 aircraft is performing the Cobra maneuver. The picture shows moisture condensation in the rarefied air zones above the front horizontal tail and the central part of the wing.

Experimental aircraft Su-47. At the moment of aerobatics, the vortices of the resulting moisture seem to flow down from the ends of the wings.

Mikhail Petrovich, everyone who has ever been to an air show and saw what the Su planes can do, or at least, sitting in front of the TV, watched reports from air shows, are interested in how and why such machines are created?

In the 9th grade, I read the book "Some Causes of Piloting Errors". Pilots are never immune from mistakes. Aviation has been and remains very demanding to both pilots and designers. Due to equipment failure or crew error, not only the aircraft perishes, but also the crew and passengers.

A corkscrew is one of the most difficult and dangerous phenomena. This is an almost uncontrollable mode, oriented in space in the most unfortunate way: the plane rotates with its nose down. When hitting the ground, the "air packet" explodes and the plane is blown into small pieces. It would seem that to solve the problem, it is enough to train all the pilots civil aviation how to recognize the "stall edge" after which the plane goes into a spin. I must say that in aviation there are several similar phenomena, starting with the fact that the machine rolls, but not all of them lead to a spin. However, despite the fact that all military fighter pilots are trained in the basic techniques for getting out of various types of tailspin, not all of them manage to emerge victorious from the actual situation (most often due to piloting errors, less often due to aircraft equipment failures) ... There are aircraft that, due to their design and aerodynamic features, cannot come out of certain types of spin at all.

In the operation of civil aircraft, extreme cases are not typical. But for combat aircraft, maneuverability is a condition of survival. Therefore, all design offices in the world are working on the characteristics of maneuverability. It is she who, in combination with the weapons carried by the aircraft, provides the solution to the assigned tasks.

- What are the objectives of this?

Maneuverability is the ability of an aircraft to change its position in airspace. Naturally, there must be a need to maneuver the aircraft. In a combat situation, it arises by itself: you need to take such a position in the airspace so that the enemy plane is in the range of your weapon, and your plane, on the contrary, would not fall into the aiming zone. It is clear that the winner will be the one who can turn his car first and direct it to the target. Combat vehicles of the classic type of the 40-60s of the last century experienced great difficulties in battles, since their maneuverability characteristics were rather limited. Usually air battles are conducted in large groups - twenty planes: a huge "ball" of machines is spinning in the air, and everyone wants to survive. The aircraft of the old classical designs differed little from the enemy aircraft, so the battles lasted long enough - 5-6 minutes. In this case, the engines worked at the limit modes - accordingly, the fuel consumption was high. And even after the victory, not everyone managed to fly home. Every fifth plane died after the battle due to the fact that the fuel ran out and had to "flop" wherever God sent. It's good if the pilot ejected, and if he tried to land, for example, on the highway at high speed, the outcome was a foregone conclusion. Pilots of some countries, entering the battle, knew that they could not get out of it. To fly away, it was necessary to "substitute" the "tail", and he immediately fell under the sight. Therefore, they fought to the end, and when the red light came on, they ejected from a fully operational fighter.

- ... A disposable plane?

The life of a pilot is more valuable ... But one way or another, shortcomings in maneuverability are very expensive. Therefore, a breakthrough into the field of super-maneuverability modes, when the risk to the life of the pilot and the vehicle becomes minimal, has become the number one task.

- Is it possible to predict during the development of a fighter that it will have super-maneuverability?

It is usually known "against whom" the aircraft is being created. At the time when the Su-27 was being developed, we were "friends" together with the "Warsaw Pact" against NATO countries. We needed to make an aircraft that would significantly outperform their F-14, F-15, F-16 and F-18 fighters.

In our aviation industry we are represented by the Sukhoi Design Bureau and a large number of co-developing enterprises. For example, research institutes and design bureaus make radars for us. We do not develop an engine, we say which one we need, and it is created at the A.M. Lyulka Design Bureau. Such a scientific and technical union ensures the development of each component of the fighter at the very high level... Indeed, in order for the new aircraft to be better and to defeat the enemy fighter, we must have the best engine in the world, the best radar station in the world, the best missile weapons in the world, and everything else - also the best. Working on the SU-27, we made a seemingly good aircraft, surpassing the F-15, but by much? On the "slightly". Therefore, again in the case of close combat, we can get into a complex "turntable", where the planes will have equal opportunities to die or win.

We realized that a really decisive superiority over the enemy can be obtained by allowing the pilot to maneuver not only better, but several times better. There is such a thing as the angular rate of turn to the target. In battle, the advantage is realized by the fighter that manages to deploy earlier. We came to the conclusion that if we provide our aircraft with twice the rate of turn to the target, its maneuverability can be called super-maneuverability.

Super-maneuverability is the ability of a fighter to turn on a target from any position in airspace with an angular velocity at least twice the angular velocity of the enemy aircraft.

- Probably, special requirements are also imposed on the engines to ensure extreme conditions?

First of all, they must have better traction. The modern military aircraft engine is a turbojet equipped with an afterburner. (Afterburner is an operation mode in which additional fuel is injected into the combustion chamber. This achieves a significant increase in thrust, albeit at the expense of additional fuel consumption.) A stream of gases escapes from the two engines installed on the Su-27, which pushes the car with a force of 25 tons (12.5 tons - each engine). Similar engines of American fighters at the time of creation of the F-15 developed 10.8-11 tons of thrust. There are, of course, other requirements. It is not bad, for example, to control the position of the aircraft in flight using engines, the nozzles of which can be deflected by + 15 degrees. This is especially important when an aircraft hits supercritical angles of attack while piloting in combat. The Su-27's critical angle of attack is 24 degrees. And the combat situation sometimes requires the aircraft to turn at an angle of attack of 60-90 degrees, or even 120 degrees to the direction of flight. When the pilot gives the command to the engine turn control stick, the engine should instantly deflect to the required angle.

The nozzles of the two AL-31FP turbojet engines of the Su-30 MK multifunctional fighter are capable of deflecting 32 degrees horizontally and 15 degrees vertically. Thus, the plane can do something that is not available to other machines of this class: "slow down", and then turn in place, like a helicopter.

When in 1983 we first flew to an exhibition in Paris with the conclusion of the State Institute for Testing Combat Aircraft that the characteristics of the Su-27 fighter were inferior to the American F-15, we still believed that the Su-27 was superior to US aircraft. The client found our statement too presumptuous.

American fighters have set a series of climb records. (The rate of climb is the time from the moment the aircraft starts to move from its place to reaching any altitude - 3000 m, 6000 m, 12000 m, etc.) That is, "from the spot" it must reach the altitude in the shortest time. World records were then set by the F-15 fighter.

We carried out a series of record flights on a Su-27 fighter and broke all F-15 records, thereby managing to prove that our plane surpasses the F-15 in climb rate.

- How did this happen?

The plane at the start should be motionless, like a sprinter. But in order to ensure the adhesion of tires to concrete, no brakes are enough. To keep the fighter in place, they tried to use a tank. They hooked him with a cable to the lock on the lower surface of the plane, but did not rejoice for long. A full afterburner lasted exactly a second, then there was a rattle, and the Su-27 pulled the tank along the runway. I had to look for another way out. The runway was being repaired nearby, and a huge industrial bulldozer Caterpillar was operating on it. They drove up a bulldozer, hitched a tank to it, and then a plane to the tank. Start of the Su-27 "from a place" was ensured.

The engine at the moment of start works in the limit mode. After the lock is opened, the plane takes off, takes off and goes to the vertical. While in a vertical climb, it accelerates to supersonic speed. Not a single apparatus, not a single space rocket at low vertical heights exceeds the speed of sound. This occurs only at high altitudes, where the density of the atmosphere is low. And we are already at an altitude of 2000-3000 m switching to supersonic speed.

Then, in flights at the air show, characteristics were obtained better than American ones.

In classic combat, two fighters "spin the turntable" until one of them takes position to hit the target. But if we enter the battle and at the very first moment turn the plane 90 degrees to the stream - the target is sighted, it is captured, the missile is launched and the defeat occurs. Thus, due to super-maneuverability, you can radically improve close combat and guarantee yourself victory within ten seconds (not minutes).

- They say at first they thought that the Su-27 does not come out of a tailspin?

Yes, this was the conclusion of TsAGI on tests in a wind tunnel: the plane does not come out of a spin. And if a combat plane does not come out of a tailspin, something must be done. A system for limiting the limiting modes was developed, which does not allow the aircraft to exceed the angle of attack of 24 degrees.

Not a single model of the Su-27 aircraft in the TsAGI wind tunnel came out of a spin. We fought honestly, so we made a 10-meter semi-natural model of our aircraft, hung it on a Tu-16 bomber and dropped it from a height of 10,000 m. The model was equipped with automatic system control and went to the stall angle, while, if she did not get out of the spin, the landing parachute opened. However, it turned out that in half of the modes, the large, free-flying model came out of a tailspin, and in half it did not. We could not tell the pilot: "Fly, everything is fine." Therefore, we agreed with TsAGI to put a limiter on the aircraft. It was, of course, strange: we want to work at high angles of attack, but we are not able to make an airplane for this.

The most interesting thing happened during the tests. Testing an airplane is a huge job, about 5 thousand flights, in which the aircraft is tested for aerodynamics, strength, missile launches and bombing are carried out and much more. Even before the "cobra" VG Pugachev performed access to high angles of attack. I was very worried, since by that time the American F-16 fighter had several cases when the plane reached an angle of attack of 60 degrees, but could not "get off" it - it was good that it had an anti-propeller parachute with which it was possible to escape from this angle. We ran the tests differently. We were very worried when Pugachev went to a large angle of attack, but he managed to return the plane to its original mode - everything ended well.

Subsequently, flight experiments showed that when reaching large angles of attack, the development of a spinning movement does not occur. The results showed that there is a fundamental possibility of the aircraft reaching ultra-large angles of attack with a subsequent return to the so-called operational flight modes. This opened up prospects for super-maneuverability. But 20 years ago we did not know this yet. There were only the first experimental flights.

And in one of the flights, test pilot V. Kotlov on a Su-27 with a faulty air signal system (the air pressure receiver was depressurized), having incorrect information about the Mach number M (equal to the flight speed measured at the speeds of sound) and trying to compensate "climb angle," balanced "at an altitude of 8000 m vertically and began to fall on the tail. He believed that the plane would settle into some kind of normal flight mode - instead, it "hovered" between the sky and the earth. It was so unusual and incomprehensible: the speed dropped to zero altogether, and the altitude dropped to 8000 m. He began to rush about the cockpit, removed the afterburner, and again "gave". The plane began to fall on its tail, weightlessness appeared - later this technique was called "bell".

- And all this happened in a matter of seconds?

Seconds 20. In the air - that's a lot. At an angle of attack of 60 degrees (and we only had a resolution of 24 degrees), the plane fell into a tailspin, became "nose down" and began to rotate. The pilot then realized what had happened and reported to the control tower: "Corkscrew!" Since it was believed that the Su-27 plane does not come out of a spin, the command set for the control room was "carved in granite": "Eject at an altitude of at least 4000 m."

In general, ejection cannot be called a favorite pastime of pilots, therefore, in order to avoid serious consequences, the pilot released control and began to carefully prepare for ejection. But at the last moment I saw that the plane came out of a tailspin itself and began to get out of the dive. The Su-27 was left to its own devices and itself emerged from a dangerous regime. After checking the controllability of the aircraft, Kotlov made a safe landing at the airfield.

- Maybe it was an accident?

At first they decided so. After all, there was only one such case in every 1000 application situations. By and large, it didn't change anything. But soon in the Far East there was even more incredible case... The Su-27 pilot performed an automatic interception mission. He exceeded the permissible angle of attack, as a result the plane fell into a tailspin. On command from the ground, the pilot ejected, after which the Su-27 not only got out of the spin on its own, but also continued its flight in automatic mode until it ran out of fuel. Soon in Lipetsk, a third incident occurred, like two drops of water similar to the first. This has already forced us to develop a special research program. As it turned out during the tests, the Su-27 was distinguished by a certain "instability" in entering and exiting the spin modes. It was found that the use of the most "strong" aerodynamic methods of spinning out does not always lead to its termination. And at the same time, in a number of situations, the plane itself came out of the spin when the handle and pedals were in neutral. This was due to the peculiarities of the vortex aerodynamics of the Su-27 at various angles of attack and glide.

A significant contribution to the "victory" over the corkscrew was made by a well-known specialist in the spin, Honored Test Pilot of the USSR, pilot-cosmonaut, Hero Soviet Union Igor Petrovich Wolf. He conducted spin tests and found that the Su-27 came out of all spin modes.

- Why was the opposite conclusion made when testing the models?

It turned out that it was not the layout of the aircraft that mattered, but the scale of the model (the Reynolds number Re, which connects the flight speed, aircraft size and air viscosity, is much higher for real machines than for models, all the more small).

- Super-maneuverability leads to a decrease in the "visibility" of the aircraft on radars. How?

Supermaneuverability is a system of close air combat techniques. If the pilot receives a signal that he is in the radiation zone of the enemy's radar, the first thing he needs to do is to go to the vertical. Gaining altitude and losing speed, it leaves the zone of "visibility" of Doppler radars. (The Doppler effect is the change in wave frequency observed as a wave source moves relative to its receiver. Approx. ed.) But the enemy is not a fool: he can also turn around. But our plane is moving vertically (the "bell" figure), while its speed tends to zero. And all locators see the target precisely by changing the speed (they work according to the Doppler principle). If the measured speed has dropped to zero, or at least to such a small value that the enemy's radars cannot calculate the Doppler component, we are lost for the enemy. Visually he sees us, but not on the radar spectrum. This means that if the enemy has a missile with a radar (semi-active, active) guidance head, he still will not launch it, because the missile will not be able to capture the target.

- Are there any other known ways to make the plane "invisible"?

These "ghost" planes are just beginning to appear. The greatest effect from new technology expected for all so-called fifth generation aircraft. The F-111A fighter-bomber became the first aircraft created using the "stealth" ("ghost") technology. True, the fighter never came out of it. The aircraft had a very low visibility, but poor flight properties - a kind of "faceted iron" (faceted shapes were needed so that the radar beams were reflected from the surface and directed in a completely different direction).

I read that in the process of creating a new fighter, it became necessary to radically improve the onboard radio-electronic equipment. How reliable is it in super-maneuverability modes?

In general, the world believes that "Russian" electronics does not deserve attention. I have a different opinion. We order radars from our co-developers exactly what we need. If the locator, which is on the F-15, weighs 244 kg, then our analogous one - several times more. But it doesn't upset us very much. We want the locator to provide target detection at a specific range. And we set this range long. The same can be said about the electro-optical target detection and aiming system.

When American strategic reconnaissance aircraft (SR-71) began to fly towards us "from around the corner" (from the Norwegian side. - Approx. ed.) along the entire coast to Novaya Zemlya, Su-27 and Su-30 fighters were placed to guard the northern borders. When the SR-71 once again "emerged" - ours were already in the air. We decided to outwit them and gave the command not to turn on the radar, but turn on the electro-optical system, which "sees" in the infrared spectrum and at a great distance. When SR was at high altitude, and our planes were towards him, we saw him at a great distance. Since the "American" did not violate the borders, nothing could be done with him, but we kept him at gunpoint.

So it’s impossible to say that our radio-electronic equipment is worse. It is exactly as we ordered, focusing on the machines of a potential enemy. And making an airplane that can lift our electronics is not a problem.

Is it true that a new wing design has been used to improve the aerodynamic qualities of the new generation aircraft?

In order to reduce the wave drag of an aircraft wing when moving at supersonic speeds, it is necessary to give the wing a sweep, that is, deflect it relative to the velocity vector (set at an angle). If the wing is positioned in such a way that when the wing is "bumpy" (disturbed by the flows), the wing is twisted by negative angles during its deformation, then the lift drops, but this is not dangerous from the point of view of wing destruction. If you make a reverse sweep, a gust of air deflects the wing upward - the lift immediately increases. And if the force increases, the wing deviates further, the angle increases again. Despite the danger of destruction, reverse-swept aircraft have very good aerodynamic characteristics.

The Americans had such an experimental X-29 fighter, for some reason they considered its constructive solution unprofitable. We consider the creation of such an aircraft to be a technically solvable task using composite materials. A metal wing cannot withstand divergence - the destruction of the wing from twisting. We have had cases when, during blowing in wind tunnels, the steel wings of a reverse swept model were destroyed. Today we can create a special composite structure based on carbon fiber, epoxy resin, from organic materials with a high modulus - in particular, from the very fabrics from which body armor is made.

- What are your hopes for super-maneuverability in fifth-generation fighters?

Big ones. If our "competitors" are making fifth-generation aircraft, we also need them. We can say that there is a certain law of preservation of equilibrium. We were recently at a foreign exhibition, and there the commander of the air force of one of the countries said: "We need your plane. We have different fighters, but we want a Russian to stand next to them, and with such characteristics that the enemy is afraid." This means that he did not go into conflict. This is the goal of creating a new fighter that would ensure political balance in the world.

So, the previous page concluded our acquaintance with two undoubtedly outstanding fourth generation fighters. As it is easy to see from the biography of the Su-27 and F-15 families, these combat vehicles were created and then improved over the decades, mainly to fight each other. Therefore, every normal reader inevitably raises the question: which of the fighters nevertheless won this mostly absentee (I want to say - fortunately!) Duel? Who was better and in what respect? After all, as we remember, "Eagle" was created to confidently fight against the Soviet maneuverable fighters, which showed very high efficiency during the Vietnam war. And the Su-27 from the very beginning was made with the aim of surpassing the F-15. To what extent soviet designers did you manage to solve this most difficult task?

It is quite natural that when comparing aircraft, the first impulse is to look at the performance tables. First, it is immediately clear from them that these machines are really close in size. Thus, the maximum take-off masses of purely fighter aircraft variants differ by less than 10%: for Sukhoi it is from 28,000 kg for the base Su-27 to 33,000 kg for the Su-27SK, for Needles - from 25,400 kg for the F-15A up to 30850 kg for the F-15C. The maximum speeds are also very close: 2650 km / h for the F-15A and F-15C and 2500 km / h for the Su-27. As you can see, here, too, the difference is about 9%. The maximum available overloads for the latter options are completely the same - 9 days each. The practical ceiling is also the same - 18300-18500 m.

Secondly, it is easy to see that the F-15 family machines are slightly smaller in geometric dimensions than their competitors: in the fuselage length by 2.5 m, in span - by 1.65 m, in height - by 0.7 m (compared with the Su-27UB). Accordingly, "Needles" have a slightly lighter design: the mass of the empty F-15A is 12,700 kg versus 16380 kg for the Su-27. Therefore, the Soviet aircraft is equipped with more powerful engines. If the AP-31F has 12,500 kgf thrust at full afterburner, then the F100-PW-200 has 10,630 kgf.

Thirdly, the LTH tables contain a number of lines that clearly speak of certain advantages of Sukhoi. For example, in terms of flight range without PTB, the Su-27 surpasses the F-15A by almost 2 times (3900 km versus 1970 km). The same can be said about the take-off and landing characteristics (Sukhoye fit into the runway less than 700 m long, while Iglam needs more than 1100 m). That, in fact, is all that can be said based on the analysis of tables. The question "who is the best?" and remained without a convincing answer. Well, what did we want, comparing a half dozen numbers? After all, a modern combat aircraft is a complex weapon of warfare and is characterized by many hundreds of different parameters. These include not only flight characteristics, but also indicators of on-board electronic complexes and weapons systems, information on visibility and survivability, various operational and technological characteristics, data on the cost of production, operation and combat use. The effectiveness of the aviation complex as a whole depends on how well the combination (let us emphasize - the combination) of these parameters meets the specific conditions of production and use of the aircraft. Therefore, by the way, aircraft with any one outstanding parameter, for example, the fastest or highest-altitude ones, are very rarely successful. Indeed, to dramatically improve a particular indicator, designers inevitably have to worsen many others. From this point of view, both considered aircraft may well qualify for honorary title.

By the way, when studying tables, you should always remember that in modern world the plane is a commodity, and the numbers in the tables are its advertising, so they always give a slightly more optimistic picture. Of course, there should be no doubt about the decency of respected aircraft manufacturers. These figures can be trusted one hundred percent. You just need to know what they really mean. For example, the maximum speed of a fighter is indicated. But at the same time it is silent that this speed was achieved on a specially prepared specimen, as a rule, without external suspensions and with a minimum supply of fuel, piloted test pilot the highest qualifications during a specially organized flight. And what speed will a combatant of this type develop after 10 years of operation, with weapons and a tank on an external sling, under the control of a young lieutenant, if the engines have already undergone two repairs, and the tanks are filled with non-premium kerosene? There is no such data in such tables. But it is the real operational characteristics that should interest us in the first place, if we want to more or less correctly compare the two aircraft.

These general remarks are intended to give an idea of \u200b\u200bhow difficult and ungrateful the task of comparing aircraft according to their official characteristics is. Another thing is to analyze real air battles with the participation of competing aircraft during military conflicts. In this case, the picture is close to reality. But even here an important role is played by such factors not directly related to the aircraft as the qualifications of the pilots, the degree of their determination to fight, the quality of the work of the support services, etc. Our joy, these planes nevertheless met several times in the sky during various training fights. This happened during mutual visits of pilots from Russia, Ukraine, India and the United States.

The first such visit took place in August 1992, when pilots from the Lipetsk Combat Use and Flight Training Center of the Russian Air Force visited Langley Air Force Base (Virginia), where the 1st tactical fighter wing of the US Air Force, then armed with F-15C / D, is based Major General N. Chaga, Colonel A. Kharchevsky and Major E. Karabasov. They flew in on two combatant Su-27UB, the escort group arrived on the Il-76. After a friendly meeting and a short rest, E. Karabasov proposed to conduct a demonstration air battle directly over Langley airfield in the presence of spectators. However, the Americans did not agree to this show, too militaristic, in their opinion. Instead, they offered to conduct "joint maneuvering" in the aerobatic zone over the ocean (200 km from the coast). According to the scenario, first the F-15D had to get away from the pursuit of the Su-27UB, then the planes had to switch places, and the Sukhoi had to “throw off the Eagle” from the tail. E. Karabasov was in the front cockpit of the Su-27UB, and an American pilot was in the rear. An F-15C flew out to observe the fight.

On the command to start joint maneuvering, the Eagle, turning on full afterburner, immediately tried to break away from the Su-27UB, but this turned out to be impossible: using only the minimum afterburner and maximum non-afterburner thrust, E. Karabasov easily “hung on the tail” of the American. At the same time, the angle of attack of the Su-27UB never exceeded 18 *. As we remember, in combat units, the angle of attack on the Su-27 is limited to 26 ", that is, in that fight the Russian pilot not only confidently kept the F-15D in sight, but he still had a solid reserve of available overload! changed places, E. Karabasov switched the throttle to full afterburner and began to move away from the F-15D with an energetic turn and climb. The Eagle followed, but immediately fell behind. After one and a half turns, the Su-27UB went into the tail of the F-15, however the Russian pilot made a mistake and "shot down" not an F-15D, but an observer of the F-15C flying from behind. Realizing the mistake, he soon caught sight of the two-seater Eagle. All further attempts by the American pilot to get rid of the pursuit did not lead to anything. air battle ”ended.

So, in close maneuvering combat, the Su-27 convincingly demonstrated its complete superiority over the F-15 due to the smaller radius of turns, high roll rate and rate of climb, and better acceleration characteristics. Note: not the maximum speed and other similar parameters provided these advantages, but other indicators that more deeply characterize the aircraft. According to A. Kharchevsky, the reasons for such a clear victory of the Su-27 lie in its high thrust-to-weight ratio: the Russian plane was picking up speed along the ascending trajectory faster than the F-15. The latter had to first make a kind of "step" - to fly a little horizontally to gain speed, and only then begin to climb. The Russian pilots took advantage of this, not giving the Americans time for horizontal acceleration, and immediately dragged them into a vertical maneuver.

Let's try to analyze this version more deeply - let's calculate the thrust-to-weight ratio of fighters in that departure. Since the thrust of the engines is known, for this we only need to estimate the weight of the aircraft. For F-15D: 13240 kgf - empty weight; plus 290 kgf - equipment weight, including two pilots; plus 6600 kgf - the weight of the consumed fuel (for flight to the aerobatic zone and back with a range reserve of 25%, maneuvering for half an hour, of which 5 minutes in full afterburner mode); plus 150 kgf - the weight of the PTB structure, since the required amount of fuel exceeds the capacity of the internal tanks; in total, without a combat load (shells for the gun and missiles), the takeoff weight of the F-15D was approximately 20330 kgf. At the time of the start of "joint maneuvering" due to fuel consumption, the flight weight had decreased to about 19400 kgf. When determining the corresponding values \u200b\u200bfor the Su-27UB, we will proceed from the fact that the weight of an empty aircraft is 17,500 kgf, as indicated in many publications. Having carried out a similar calculation for the "Sukhoi", we obtain its take-off weight of 24,200 kgf, and the weight to the pile of the "battle" - about 23,100 kgf.

If we now divide the table values \u200b\u200bof the engine thrust by the weights obtained, then it is easy to see that at the beginning of the fight the thrust-to-weight ratio of the Su-27UB near the ground in full afterburner mode was 1.08, and the F-15D - 1.11, that is was bigger. So Kharchevsky's version does not stand up to criticism. The point is different - the thrust per 1 m 2 midsection of the aircraft, the Su-27 is almost 20% more than the Igl (respectively, 6330 kgf / m r and 5300 kgf / m 2 ). In combination with the better acceleration of the AL-31F engine, this provides an advantage in acceleration characteristics. According to David North, deputy editor-in-chief of Aviation Week &; Space Technology, which made a familiarization flight on the Su-27UB at the Farnborough-90 air show, accelerating a Russian fighter from 600 km / h to 1000 km / h at full afterburner takes only 10 seconds. In his report, North emphasizes the good throttle response of the Sukhoi engines.

It is known that the degree of maneuverability of an aircraft is numerically expressed by the magnitude of the available overload, that is, by the ratio of the maximum lift developed by the aircraft to its weight at a given moment. As we remember, the maximum available overloads for the Su-27 and F-15 are equal. Nevertheless, in the events described, Sukhoi demonstrated a constant advantage in maneuver. This means that the point is not in the absolute value of the overload, but in something else, for example, in the time of its achievement. And this time depends on the efficiency with which the aircraft of this or that aerodynamic configuration is able to generate lift. Unlike its competitor, the Su-27 is made using an integrated circuit, in which the fuselage and the wing form a single bearing system, which provides high values \u200b\u200bof the lift coefficient during maneuver and low drag, especially at trans and supersonic speeds. In addition, the integral layout, characterized by a smooth transition of the fuselage to the wing, in comparison with the traditional layout, provides a significantly larger volume of internal fuel tanks and eliminates the use of PTB. This also has a positive effect on the aerodynamic quality of the Su-27.

The positive aspects of the Sukhoi's integral layout are greatly enhanced by its careful development. Thus, the sharpened root beads of the Su-27, in contrast to the blunt beads of the F-15, not only create a positive increase in the bearing properties at angles of attack greater than 10 ", but also provide a decrease in pressure pulsation on the upper wing surface, which causes shaking of the aircraft and limits it. maneuverability An important feature of the Su-27 is a wing with a deformed mid-surface, giving it a characteristic "serpentine" appearance. This wing is "tuned" to provide maximum aerodynamic quality in the middle of the maneuvering area in close combat. In these modes, the quality of the deformed wing is 1, 5 times higher than the quality of a flat wing, and the gain takes place in a rather wide range of angles of attack.As for the maximum aerodynamic quality of the aircraft as a whole, it is known that at M \u003d 0.9 the quality of the F-15A can reach a maximum of 10, and the Su- 27 -11.6, which is a record figure for fourth-generation fighters. The new configuration of the Su-27 provides not only an increase in lift, but also a decrease in drag, which has a positive effect on the aircraft's acceleration characteristics.

I would like to emphasize once again that the best maneuverable characteristics of the Su-27 in comparison with the F-15 were achieved due to a better aerodynamic layout, and not a decrease in the load on the bearing area. This is proved by simple calculations of the specific load on the bearing surface (in view of the fact that for both aircraft the fuselage and empennage play a significant role in creating the lift force, the flight weight will be attributed not to the wing area, but to the entire area of \u200b\u200btheir planned projections, which we will calculate from the given in book drawings). We get that at the beginning of the fight, the load on the planned projection of the Su-27UB was 220 kgf / m 2 , a F-15D - 205 kgf / m 2 , that is, almost the same (the difference in the order of the calculation error).

Another important characteristic, on which the maneuverability of a fighter depends, is the roll rate and rotation speed around the longitudinal axis. The higher these speeds, determined by the efficiency of the lateral controls and the mass-inertial characteristics of the machine, the faster the aircraft enters a bend and turns into a bend of opposite rotation. The ability to quickly change the direction of the turn is the most important tactical advantage, since it allows you to effectively escape from the enemy's blow and start the attack yourself.

D. North, referring to Viktor Pugachev, claims that the angular roll rate of the Su-27 is close to 270 degrees / s. This value is higher than that of the F-15, and roughly corresponds to F / A-18.

The positive aspects of the aerodynamic layout and the power plant of the Su-27 are fully manifested due to its static instability. Unlike the stable F-15, the Sukhoi seeks to change the direction of flight on its own, and only the constant operation of the fly-by-wire control system keeps it in an equilibrium position. The essence of control of a statically unstable fighter is that the pilot does not "force" him to perform this or that maneuver, but "allows" it to be performed. Therefore, the time required to withdraw from any steady state flight and start maneuvering is significantly less for the Su-27 than for the F-15, which was also one of the components of Sukhoi's success in the duel with the Eagle. Thus, the outstanding maneuverability of the Su-27, so convincingly demonstrated in the American sky, is a completely natural result of a set of design solutions that distinguish this fighter from the F-15.

In 1993, a return visit to Lipetsk by the Iglov group from the 1st TFW took place. When he was preparing, a very indicative incident arose, allowing to draw a conclusion about the airfield mileage of the overseas fighter. Arriving in Lipetsk, an advanced group of Americans, who had the task of settling all the issues on receiving the F-15, was horrified by the state of the local runway, which was considered quite safe by Russian standards. In any case, "Sukhi" flew from it regularly. The guests stated that it was simply impossible to fly on the F-15 from such a runway. In the end, the visit did take place, but the Americans taxied, took off and landed with extreme caution. They can be understood: the "Igla" wheels are inferior to the Su-27 wheels both in diameter and in width of pneumatics, and the air intakes, unlike the competitor, do not have protection against foreign objects. Nevertheless, it is believed that with a minimum load on the external hardpoints, the F-15 can be operated from unpaved runways with a strength of the order of 12-14 kgf / cm 2 ... True, the author is not aware of any cases of "Needles" flights from the ground.

Of interest is the assessment given to the F-15 by Russian pilots who got the opportunity to fly the Eagle in America and at home.



Su-27 became the first Soviet fighter capable of carrying 10 air-to-air missiles


Here is the opinion of A.N. Kharchevsky: “The F-15 is a well-controlled vehicle with excellent visibility and no spin restrictions. When you try to force it to spin from different positions, the plane only moves its nose from side to side, not wanting to start rotating. During maneuvering, the Eagle reaches angles of attack up to 25 °, while maintaining controllability. The control of the aircraft is soft, the car obeys the rudders perfectly, the effort on the handle is much less than that of the Su-27. However, the aerodynamics of the F-15 is less perfect than that of the Sukhoi: it accelerates more slowly during maneuvering and decelerates faster ... Stalling on the F-15 begins somewhat earlier than on the Su-27. Its approach can be judged, in particular, by the increasing noise in the cockpit. The takeoff of the F-15 is slower than that of the Sukhoi (during the group takeoff of the four, consisting of two Su-27UB and two F-15s, in order to maintain the formation, Russian aircraft were forced to turn off the afterburner, while the Americans took off at full afterburner ). The minimum speed of the F-15 is 210 km / h. This is significantly more than the Su-27 and MiG-29. However, the effectiveness of the all-turning stabilizer "Igla" remains at a speed of up to 100 km / h. The turning radius of the F-15 is greater than that of the Su-27. " In general, according to Kharchevsky, the Eagle is inferior to the Su-27 and MiG-29 in terms of maneuverability. According to another pilot of TsBPiPLS, the maneuverable capabilities of the Igla are most in line with those of the MiG-23MLD aircraft.

According to the pilots of the Lipetsk center, the F100-PW-200 engines installed on the F-15C / D have poorer throttle response than the AP-31F. This was indirectly manifested during the flights to Langley: Mr. Karabasov, who was sitting in the front cockpit of the F-15D, drew attention to the fact that the American pilot was working too hard with the throttle.

In general, there were quite a few subjective moments in the perception of the American fighter jet by Russians. The “Igla” cockpit, which has a dark brown, almost black coloring of the dashboard and panels, with small, hard-to-read instrument indicators, even the delicate Kharchevsky called “terrible”, not to mention the more categorical Karabasov. The ejection seat seemed hard and uncomfortable. The lack of locks on the engine control knob also caused complaints. The absence of an automatic belt tensioning system on the F-15 ejection seat (as well as other US Air Force fighters, by the way) seemed completely unexpected and inexplicable to the Russian pilots. During piloting, Karabasov brought his "Eagle" to negative overload and watched as the American "surfaced" in the front cockpit (the poor fellow did not expect such a maneuver and did not tighten the waist belt fixing the pilot in the seat).

However, to attribute all this to the shortcomings of the F-15 is unlikely to be fair. Rather, these are features that Russian pilots are simply not used to. Americans take them absolutely naturally. So, small-format indicators were introduced on American fighters back in the 1950s. It can be assumed that the hard seat "Igla" also allows you to better feel the plane: it is known that the main organ of perception of the spatial position of the aircraft is the pilot's rear. At the same time, the view from the cockpit of the American fighter, according to the Russians, was simply excellent, both forward and backward.

In publications devoted to the visit of Russians to the United States, there are statements with which it is difficult to agree at all. So, it was noted that the pre-flight preparation of the F-15 is longer than the Su-27, and requires a larger number of operations. This statement contradicts everything that is written in this book about the operational maintainability of the aircraft in question. In any case, the time for replacing the engine on the F-15 is less, and the presence of the APU allows you to really save time when preparing for the flight. In addition, when servicing the Igla, the APU makes it possible to work with less provision of airfield facilities.

As you can see, a modern aircraft is not only about maneuverability and flight range. It is also important that the Su-27 has significantly surpassed its American competitor in armament. In particular, it can carry up to 10 missiles of the " air-air", While the F-15 - only 8." Sukhoi "is equipped with a more powerful cannon with a caliber of 30 mm against the 20-mm at the" Needle ". In terms of the total mass of the combat load - 6 tons - the Su-27 also surpasses the F-15A, however, only by 9%. The presence of an optical-location station and a helmet-mounted target designation system (there are none on the Igla) allows the Su-27 pilot to use the existing arsenal much more flexibly. The radar characteristics of both aircraft were generally comparable. As for other equipment, the Sukhoi is equipped with a number of systems that are not on the F-15. This can be said, in particular, about the automated control system for the actions of a group of fighters and the system of mutual-group electronic protection. All this is rather unambiguously reflected in the press, including the Western one.



The biography of the Su-27 is developing very peacefully, and the aircraft demonstrate their capabilities mainly during various air shows and exercises. In the photo: mirror aerobatics performed by a pair from the group "Russian Knights". MAKS-2007, Zhukovsky, August 2007


At the same time, when it comes to the equipment of the Su-27, it is necessary to note (especially in publications of the 1990s) an insufficient level of use of computer technology and a low level of integration of onboard systems. This puts the Sukhoi pilot in a worse position compared to Western colleagues, in particular, in an accurate understanding of what is happening in and around the plane at any given time. In a difficult tactical situation, this inevitably leads to the loss of precious time and can negate the many advantages of this fighter. This is indeed a serious drawback, however, typical only for the basic version of the Su-27, which remained in service only in the CIS countries, including in Ukraine.

When creating subsequent versions of the aircraft, sent for export, the main emphasis was placed on improving the onboard equipment. This is how the Su-27SK, Su-27KI and Su-30 family aircraft appeared. In a sense, the position of these machines in relation to the original Su-27 is similar to that of the F-15C / D in relation to the F-15A / B. Therefore, we will allow ourselves to continue comparing the characters in this book in terms of the characteristics of the Su-30 and F-15C / D. Events gave certain food for this recent years in India, and first of all - the joint American-Indian military exercises Sore lndia-2004, which took place from 15 to 27 February 2004 at the Indian airbase Gwalior.

In the Russian-language press, these exercises, in which the Sukhiye directly opposed the Iglam, received a very powerful response. The general tone of the publications was not just triumphant, but, one might say, hacky. Reason: "Sukhoi" won about 75% of all training battles with American fighters. The Indian pilots acted exceptionally competently: they often did not turn on the radar at all, but used the OLS-30I optical-locating station to detect the enemy, which allowed them to imperceptibly approach the Americans at “the distance of an aimed shot from an onboard gun”. And in close combat, as we know, the F-15C had few chances. According to the Indian command, in this way the Americans were "shot down" at least 20 times. During the "battles", another interesting discovery was made: Russian radars confidently detected the F-15C at a distance of up to 60 km even against the background of mountains, while the Iglov radar under such conditions could not distinguish the target due to multiple reflections from mountain ledges. It would seem that this is the answer to the question of comparing aircraft! But let us not succumb to mass hypnosis, no matter how pleasant it may be, but we will approach the assessment of these teachings in a more balanced way.

First, let's assess the composition of their participants. In Cope India 2004, the Indian side involved MiG-27 strike aircraft, Mirage-2000, MiG-21 (modernized) and Su-30K fighters. Several MiG-29s also solved a limited list of tasks. On the American side, six F-15Cs, equipped with modernized radar AN / APG-63 (V) 1, from the 19 TS of the 3rd TFW located at the Elmendorf base (Elmendorf, Alaska), one tanker and one transport C-5 Galaxy from 60th TW. This composition of "opponents" from the very beginning caused deep disappointment on both sides. After all, the Americans flew to distant lands specifically to "touch" in a combat situation not so much the Su-30, but the Su-30MKI just purchased by India, which are still the most advanced of the entire Su-27/30 family. The Indians, on the other hand, cherished similar intentions in relation to the F-16C, which are in service with neighboring Pakistan.

Secondly, Cope India 2004 was a complex combat exercise, and not some kind of demonstration duels in the air between aircraft of the American and Indian Air Forces. They provided for each side to simulate two types of operations: offensive and defensive. When the Indians attacked, F-15Cs rose to intercept the Su-30K, which covered the shock MiG-27. When the Americans attacked, it was the opposite. That is, in achieving overall success, not only the individual flight characteristics of each aircraft played a role, but also the training of pilots and command personnel, and, of course, the perfection of the on-board equipment of combat vehicles. Since the total count of the exercises turned out to be clearly in favor of the Sukikhs, there is no longer any reason to speak of their equipment as not perfect enough. At least starting with the Su-30 family.



The United States is actively using the F-15 in various regional conflicts in recent times. In the photo: F-15E from the 492nd Expeditionary Fighter Squadron before the next combat sortie. Afghanistan, Bagram airbase, June 9, 2007


Thirdly, in order to more objectively approach the results of the exercises, let's try to understand at least a little the conditions of their conduct. It turns out that by mutual agreement of the parties, certain "restrictions" were introduced into the tactics of their actions. In particular, at the suggestion of the Indians, the ceiling for air combat was limited to medium altitudes. The true essence of this seemingly innocent limitation is that it actually reduces the combat contact of the opposing forces to the conduct of close maneuvering combat. After all, if at high altitudes the launch range of an AMRAAM missile is more than 60 km (and at very high altitudes, more than 100 km), then at medium altitudes it drops to 30-35 km. This, naturally, leads to a decrease in the lead time of the enemy in the use of weapons. That is, the parties often simply do not have time to use ranged weapons and are forced to switch to the close one. And here's another important thing: the value of the maneuvering properties of the aircraft increases sharply when moving from high to medium altitudes, and in a battle at medium altitudes, an aircraft with a higher maneuverability gains advantages, and its shortcomings in long-range missile combat are relegated to the background - ideal conditions for "Dry"!

Another "limitation" was that the simulation of all air battles was conducted with the original ratio of the number of Indian and American aircraft 3: 1. Colonel G. Newback, who commanded the Americans, explained that "in each sortie, four F-15S fighters opposed 12 Indian Air Force fighters, usually Su-30K aircraft." That is, all the high-profile victories of the Indian Sukhoi were achieved in the most favorable conditions for them and in a three-on-one scenario! This is a reason to treat the results of Cope India 2004 a little more restrainedly. And let's evaluate the Su-30K as follows: a normal competitive fighter, which has both its strengths and weaknesses. Its success in a real battle will depend on how well the tactics of use are chosen.

The question is, why did the Americans put themselves in such unfavorable conditions? After all, they perfectly understood what they were doing, agreeing with the proposals of the Indians. The only logical explanation for this phenomenon seems to be the following: in those teachings, the Yankees did not need victory at all, they planned their defeat in advance. Later, they used this fact to form a stable opinion in the US government about the lag of American fighters in service with the latest models of Russian combat aircraft. Thanks to this, the US Air Force command soon managed to "knock out" the necessary budgetary funds from the senators for the construction of the fifth generation F / A-22 fighters.

Whatever it was, but Cope India-2004 opened a series of exercises in which the Indian Sukhoi won confident victories not only over the F-15, but also over other modern fighters. So, in 2005, a two-week exercise was held with the participation of the F-16S of the Singapore Air Force. Training air battles between them and the Su-30MKI began with single fights, after which one aircraft from each side was brought into battle. As a result, up to 10 aircraft (5 vs 5) participated in the battles. According to media reports, the Indians have won all 10 fights with the Singapore pilots.

In June 2005, 18 Indian Su-30Ks flew to France to the Charles Monier airbase to take part in the Garuda II exercise. Accompanied by Il-76 transport and Il-78M tankers, Indian fighters reached France with an intermediate landing in Egypt. From the French side, 6 Mirage-2000S / R fighters, 3 Mirage-2000-5, Mirage-200014 fighters, as well as a number of other aircraft, took part in the exercise. From 17 to 28 June, in accordance with the developed tactical scenario, the Su-30 and Mirazhi-2000 carried out mutual "cleansing" airspace... Two or three missions per day were carried out at medium altitudes in two training airspaces stretching from Marseille to Corsica. Air defense missions and refueling from tankers of both sides were also practiced. In close air battles, mixed formations took part, for example, two Mirazh-2000S and two Su-30s against four Mirazh-2000S and two Su-30s. The battles were fought in conditions of visual visibility with imitation of the launch of short-range air-to-air missiles R-73 developed in Russia and the French Mazhik-2. Some tasks included the defense of the AWACS aircraft and control of the E-ЗС. During eight flight days, the Mirages made 80 sorties, and the Sukhiye - 74. Despite the secrecy surrounding these exercises, it became known that the French pilots were impressed by the Su-30. One of the Mirage-2000 pilots said: “In close combat, the Mirage behaves more“ nervously ”than the Su-30. The decision to attack should be made in the very first minute, because otherwise the Su-30 with its power and maneuverability will definitely overwhelm you. "

From November 7 to November 18, 2005, a new joint Indian-US Air Force exercise Cope India-2005 took place. 12 F-16 fighters from the 13 TFS of the 35th TW, which flew from Japan, took part in them from the American side. India was represented by 30 Su-30K and Mirage-2000 aircraft, as well as MiG-29. This time, the actions of aviation were practiced in a full-scale military conflict, therefore, special training battles were not organized, and the fights took place as if by themselves while performing general exercises. In these operations, both Indian and American fighters were part of the groups of conditional opponents. In those cases when Indian pilots entered into duels with F-16 aircraft, the latter, as a rule, lost. The journalists of the American newspaper Christian Science Monitor received this information from the direct participants in the exercises.




In October 2006, the Indians conducted joint maneuvers with the British Air Force, during which British pilots were able to pilot the Su-30. It is interesting that the British, first of all, paid attention to the high capabilities of the aircraft onboard equipment, primarily the radar. There were even voices that the "board" of the Su-30 was in some sense superior to even the equipment of the newest Eurofighter Typhoon.

Of course, the exercises of 2005-2006. they are not directly related to the issue of comparing the Su-27/30 and the F-15, but it is still worth mentioning them here. This fireworks of victories, about which the Western press spoke so loudly, served as excellent publicity for the Su fighters. Although the Su-27/30 family is already one of the best-selling in the world. However, the F-15 also does not graze the rear in this sense. If you summarize the information contained in the chapters on airplanes, you get the following picture. Until May 2007, 1625 of all versions of Iglovs were produced, of which 534 aircraft were exported and manufactured outside the States under license. Singapore is in a state of contemplation, the order of which may amount to another two dozen cars. "Sukikh" before 1992 was produced in the amount of about 900 copies: 800 Su-27 and 100 Su-27UB. In subsequent years, it was exported and sold licenses for the production of another 605 fighters. That is, the total is 1505 pieces. Plus, today they are exploring the possibility of purchasing fighters of this family, including an additional one, Algeria, Venezuela, Vietnam, Libya and Malaysia. This is another 50 to 100 cars.

As you can see, in terms of the total number of copies produced, both heroes of this book roughly correspond to each other with an F-15 advantage of 9%, which is explained by the large volume of US domestic orders. However, if we consider the number of vehicles supplied for export, the advantage goes to Sukhoi and is about the same 9%. At the same time, the Su-27/30 family has prospects for obtaining new export contracts, while Eagle has practically exhausted its export potential. Thus, another - economic - round of the competition between American and Russian fighters ends in favor of the latter. I would like to emphasize that for modern Russia this is especially important as it generates significant income. Their size can be judged by repeated statements Director General AHK "Sukhoi" M.A. Poghosyan, who claims that for the period from 1996 to 2006, the total income from the export of these fighters and the sale of licenses for their production exceeded 15 billion USD.

Concluding the comparison of two outstanding aircraft of the late 20th century, let us turn our attention to another important aspect. It is generally known that an engineering product is better, the more development potential it has. In other words, the more competitive products you can create on its basis. In this sense, the Su-27 not only left the brainchild of McDonnell Douglas far behind. On its basis, the following classes of aircraft have been developed and mass-produced: air supremacy fighters, multifunctional tactical fighters, carrier-based fighters and attack aircraft, tactical and Euro-strategic ground-based strike vehicles, combat training aircraft - everything, not counting prototypes and experimental samples, more than 15 options! This characterizes the Russian aircraft as an outstanding engineering product. The Igl has a similar list about half as long, and in terms of the depth of changes made to the design, it is very far from the truly universal Su-27 family.





Further development of the Su-27 was the Su-34 front-line bomber, as well as the Su-33 carrier-based fighter and the Su-27KUB carrier-based combat training aircraft.


Finally, interesting information about "Needle" appeared literally at the moment this book went to print. On November 2, 2007, one of the Missouri National Guard F-15Cs fell apart in the air during another training flight. As it turned out, at the moment of increasing overload, the longitudinal power elements of the fuselage in the area immediately behind the cockpit collapsed. Already on the 3rd, the Americans stopped the flights of all their "Needles" and began to inspect their technical condition. The latter revealed many cracks in the destruction of the fuselage structure on a large number of aircraft. Following the USA, Japan also landed its "Eagles". And while Boeing specialists continue to develop a set of measures that would prevent further development revealed "disease", "Needles" remain chained to the ground. Only a few F-15Es fly, performing combat work in Afghanistan and Iraq.

So, we have completed, and a fairly comprehensive examination of both fighters. It's time to move on to conclusions. It seems that after all that has been read, it is most logical to conclude that these aircraft belong to the same generation and have very close capabilities. In the event of their combat use, especially against each other, a lot will depend on the qualifications of the pilots, tactics of action and the effectiveness of all the necessary types of support. At the same time, the Sukhikhs have clearly expressed strengths - close combat, flight range, weapons and certain elements of onboard equipment. And, of course, there is a huge potential for modernization, which has not yet been exhausted - 30 years after the first take-off. The last representatives of the family will remain competitive for a long time - at least 20 years, as evidenced by the messages about new contracts for their sale and licensed production. And Eagle has already disappeared - no matter what the reasons. Either the Americans completely exhausted the possibilities inherent in the design, or they deliberately put an end to it so as not to block the way to the Raptor. In any case, in the historical confrontation between the two superfighters of the fourth generation, the last word remained with the Sukhoi.



A pair of Su-27s from the 4th Center for Combat Training and Retraining of Flight Personnel of the Russian Air Force. Lipetsk, June 2006



Su-27 from the 831st Galati IAP of the Ukrainian Air Force during a flight to the British airbase Fairford to participate in an international air show. August 1997



Landing of a Su-27UB from the 62nd IAP of the Ukrainian Air Force. Belbek airfield (Crimea), spring 2000. Later, this aircraft was based at the Ozernoye airfield near Zhitomir and on July 27, 2002 crashed at the Sknilov airfield in Lviv









1 Free of fuel, ammunition and external suspension pylons.

2 In the shock version.

3 With conformal fuel tanks.

4 After upgrading under the MSIP program: + 9.0 / -3.

As Vasily Klyuchevsky wrote about the Romanov dynasty, "something fatal was weighing on the new dynasty: the princes, repeating their ancestor, turned out to be sickly and frail." Indeed, by the age of thirty, the first of the dynasty - Michael, as they said then, "grieved with his feet" so much that he was "carried to and from the cart in armchairs."

Yes, and the heirs came to the throne, not really ripe for power.

And here we come to the most interesting. The "quietest" had three sons: Fyodor, Ivan and Peter. Dying, he bequeathed the throne to the elder Fyodor, but did not order the fate of the other two sons. Fedor, becoming king at the age of 14, but already a seriously ill person. He ruled Russia for six years - from 1676 to 1682 he was married twice.

In July 1680, the tsar married Agafya Semyonovna Grushetskaya. On July 11, 1681, Fyodor Alekseevich's heir Ilya was born, but Agafya Semyonovna died three days later, and on July 20, the heir Ilya also died.

On February 14, 1682, the tsar married Martha Matveyevna Apraksina. Fedor Alekseevich died on April 27, 1682 at the age of 21, but left no male descendants.

Apparently, therefore, he is usually remembered only briefly. And in vain. Tsar Fyodor Alekseevich was not lucky with health. As a child, Fyodor Alekseevich, who was already painful, was run over by a sleigh, and he also suffered from scurvy. But God rewarded him with a clear mind, a bright soul and a kind heart. Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, apparently guessing that Fedor's age would be short-lived, nevertheless gave him, like other children, an excellent education, for which Simeon Polotsky, a monk from White Russia, was responsible. There was also a desire to do for the Muscovite state everything that was in time for the few years that fate gave him on the throne.

Autocrat Tsar Fyodor Alekseevich

And, given the illness, this required not only desire, but also
and strong will. Not to mention the sense of duty to the country and citizens. In the end, being a religious person, the dying Fyodor Alekseevich could spend all the time remaining for him in prayers, thinking only about his own soul.

Meanwhile, even what was done in the short period of his reign is impressive.
Fyodor Alekseevich earned a good memory, even if he broke only one extremely harmful Russian tradition - parochialism. In today's language, the social lift did not work under parochialism. Of course, this state of affairs greatly hindered the effective management of the state.

Even over trifles at court, localism caused incessant squabbles. Many people understood the absurdity and inferiority of such a tradition in the changed conditions. However, old traditions, even the most ridiculous ones, are sometimes as difficult to break as pack ice. Fyodor Alekseevich, nevertheless, broke this ice.


According to the historian Sergei Soloviev, by order of the sovereign, right in the tsar's hallway, they laid down all the category books, where they recorded who, where, when and by whom they served, and set them on fire. Let everyone remember their genealogy, the tsar remarked, but the state will no longer need discharge books. The decision was fixed in the year of the king's death at the Zemsky Sobor.

When today they talk about the brilliant galaxy of "nestlings of Petrov's nest" or about the "Catherine's eagles", among whom there were people from various strata of society, rarely anyone, unfortunately, recalls what contribution to this historical breakthrough was made by Tsar Fedor Alekseevich, of our leaders who staked not on gentility, but on talent.

Of course, even today the children of famous, wealthy and influential people have a handicap in front of the rest, regardless of their real abilities, but this is already perceived by society as something unhealthy and unfair. And before the reform of Fyodor Alekseevich, this state of affairs was considered the norm.


Many decisions of Tsar Fyodor bore fruit after his death. It was under him that a project was developed to divide the then managers into civil and military ranks, each of which, in turn, was divided into degrees. This is a very important project, and it is not for nothing that all prominent historians pay attention to it. As Sergei Platonov notes: "This project for the first time clearly expressed the idea, unusual in the Moscow state, of the complete separation of civil and military powers."

Due to the death of the sovereign, the project did not have time to be implemented, however, the necessary reform had already been worked out then: so, the future Peter's table of ranks did not arise out of emptiness. This does not mean, of course, that Peter I copied the project of Tsar Fyodor, just the idea itself, born during that reign, did not disappear anywhere, but at the right moment impregnated Peter's thought. And there are many such examples.

Certainly, some of Fyodor Alekseevich's decisions do not lend themselves to an unambiguous assessment. So, for example, after the population census he conducted, a household taxation was introduced. On the one hand, this helped to replenish the treasury, on the other hand, it increased serfdom. But most of the sovereign's undertakings deserve only a positive assessment. It was he who introduced the provincial and local command management, which later greatly facilitated Peter's implementation of the provincial reform.

One more thing. There is a misconception that only Peter was thinking about the reform of the Russian army according to the European model. The merits of Peter the Great in this area are undeniable, but still the regiments foreign system appeared under his predecessors.

Tsar Fyodor was also actively involved in military construction. So, the Russians began to learn to fight in a European way long before the appearance of Peter's "funny". This was the work of more than one tsar and more than one generation of Russian people.


Clerk Zotov teaches Tsarevich Peter Alekseevich to read and write.

I would also credit Fyodor Alekseevich, a sovereign and just a person, with the fact that he treated his half-brother Pyotr Alekseevich, the future reformer Peter I, with kindness. And while he was alive, he took care of his education.

By the way, we have few who understand that in the most important thing - in the adoption of innovations - these two sons of Alexei Mikhailovich, although from different mothers, stood side by side, both continued their father's work. There are certainly differences. Fyodor was an evolutionary, Peter's reform was a revolution.


The death of Tsar Fyodor Alekseevich.
Not to mention the scale of the transformation. And due to historical conditions, and due to his ill health, and due to the short duration of his reign, Fedor's undertakings were limited, as Sergei Platonov writes, to "the upper strata of Moscow society." That is, the evolutionary aspirations of Tsar Fyodor (with the exception of the abolition of parochialism) did not go beyond Moscow and the court world,
in contrast to the Peter's reform, which changed the whole country.

One can only regret that Tsar Fyodor Alekseevich ruled the Moscow state for such a short time. But he did everything he could. Perhaps even more, considering his illness.

He died in April 1682, appointing his brother Ivan and his sister Sophia as heirs. Without stipulating the fate of Peter, he thereby deprived him of his rights to the Russian throne.
But after the death of Tsar Fyodor, his will was neglected. The body of the tsar had not yet had time to cool down, and all the highest dignitaries of the state gathered in the Kremlin under the leadership of Patriarch Joachim. This meeting recognized Ivan Alekseevich as "a mournful head" and decided to crown ten-year-old Peter. This choice did not suit the legitimate heirs to the throne, Ivan and Sophia. And they can be understood: Peter, according to Fedor's will, had no right to the throne at all.
Let's sum up the reign of Fedor Alekseevich Romanov:


What was done:


In the history of Russia, it is difficult to find an autocrat about whom not only the wide reader, but also the specialists in history, would know as little as about the son of Alexei Mikhailovich and the elder brother of Peter I - Tsar Fedor (1676-1682).

It's not that there are missing documents. The state archives of the Russian state have been remarkably well preserved over the years. The reign of Fedor was not "offended" by his contemporaries - chroniclers, authors of memoirs and court writers, foreign travelers and diplomats, the ubiquitous (even then!) Newspapermen.

And the officials who documented state activities Fyodor Alekseevich, and the witnesses of his reign had something to write about. When, as a result of a fierce court struggle, the boyars were elevated to the throne of the legitimate heir of Alexei, 15-year-old Fedor, they were convinced that they would not succeed in ruling from behind the puppet king. An educated, energetic and God-fearing tsar for several years succeeded so much in reformatory activities and so frightened the opposition that he condemned himself to a palace coup and an evil silence after his death.


It is clear that the relatives and minions of the new tsar tried to "cleanse" from the pages of Russian history the memory of the years of Fedor's reign, to hide the failed conspiracies and (especially!) The main one, who succeeded, which brought Peter I. to power. The most bitter in the history of Fedor's reign Alekseevich was that it was the elder brother who began the reforms that allowed the youngest of the sons of Aleksei Tishayshy to call himself the First, Great, Father of the Fatherland and, finally, the All-Russian Emperor. Fedor began and successfully carried out transformations, without flooding the country with blood, like Peter I, without reducing its population by almost a quarter, without bowing to the West, without assigning the powerful state the role of a raw material appendage of Europe - and at the same time without frightening the European man in the street with a terrible and unpredictable "Russian bear" ...

The Muse of History, Clio, is shy and conservative. It is a shame because science, which has long been of interest to power in its content, has many sins on its conscience, the main of which is deceiving the reader. Conservative, because, according to the professional historian Anatole France, “historians rewrite each other. Thus, they avoid unnecessary work and accusations of arrogance. "

The reign of the elder brother Peter I provided an excellent example of these qualities in Russian and world historiography.

The six-year reign of Tsar Fyodor Alekseevich is extremely saturated with events and decisions that are most important for the fate of Russia. Nevertheless, the personality of the reformer sovereign for centuries remained "in the shadow" of his younger brother, who was planted by the conspirators on his still warm throne and who actually reached the helm of power only in 1695.

Fyodor Alekseevich resolutely led Russia out of a heavy and bloody war with the Ottoman Empire, and then radically reformed the army, making it a regular 3/4 of its strength. He carried out a general population census, introduced a uniform taxation and reduced taxes three times, each time achieving a more equitable distribution of them. In the end, the tsar summoned elected representatives from the taxpayers to the Zemsky Sobor, so that the people themselves decided how to pay taxes and carry out state duties correctly and not a burden.

The entire state apparatus, from the Boyar Duma to local government, was reformed to a greater rejoicing of subjects, who were able to smash the countless nests of officials - bribes and robbers with their own hands. The sovereign deprived the local governors of access to finance, deprived them of "feeding" and put them on a salary. He introduced a unified system of ranks in the army (in general terms preserved until now) and among diplomats, abolished parochialism.

Fyodor Alekseevich for the first time in Russia officially appointed a government (the Disciplinary Chamber), taking a major step towards separating the executive from the legislature. The tsar fought with judicial red tape from the first days of his reign, being able to temporarily establish “justice in the courts”. He eradicated the custom of endless preliminary detention, put things in order in prisons, and abolished articular executions (reintroduced by Peter I).

The country's first nursing homes for veterans, the sick and the disabled were built at the personal expense of Fyodor Alekseevich. Interest-free loans to the townspeople and the provision of resources to them by the Order of Stone Affairs renewed Moscow - under Fedor, 10 thousand stone buildings were erected in the capital. The Tsar introduced European dress and linear notes at the court, Russian music, painting, architecture and poetry flourished with him. These arts, along with the humanities and horse breeding, Fyodor Alekseevich successfully dealt with personally.

Book lovers are especially interested in the unique phenomenon of his reign - a large and highly efficient independent publishing house with state funding, built with the latest technology. The latter developed so effectively that already during the war with the Turks, the Russian army received not only the first hand grenades in Europe and unified field artillery, but also “squeaky” ones, which were already called simply “rifles”.

Historians should have noticed that Russia during the time of Fedor was a powerful and prosperous power, recognized on the world stage as an empire. Its army became at this time one of the most powerful in Eurasia. In a few years, the fortified border in the European part moved far to the south, the Russians received thousands of square kilometers of fertile and well-defended land.

Claiming in the territory from the Baltic to The Pacific the concept of Russia as a great Orthodox power, the guarantor of peace and justice for all peoples, the tsar vigorously defended its interests in international relations, putting our state on a par with the world's leading empires.

Guided by the idea that the power and glory of the state are based on the wealth, security and enlightenment of every citizen, Fyodor Alekseevich enriched the country with reasonable measures, significantly replenishing the treasury by reducing the tax burden and optimizing government spending.

The tsar managed to approve the basic principles of organizing a financially autonomous Moscow University, independent of the authorities, whose students could not only be taken into the army, but also arrested without the permission of the academic council. Among the reforms that Fyodor Alekseevich was preparing was the organization of vocational schools for orphans and children of the poor, and the multiple multiplication of the dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church, and the introduction of a unified system of government officials, and the publication of the first scientific history of Russia.

The far from complete list of major events and transformations that took place during the reign of Fyodor Alekseevich is enough to pay close attention to the personality of the autocrat, who for the first time in the history of the ruling clan in Russia received a higher humanitarian education.

The archives and publications of documents are overflowing with very energetic “personal” decrees of Tsar Fyodor on the most important issues of politics and economy in Russia. At the request of the autocrat, state institutions, politicians and the military drew up detailed information, analytical reviews, maps and plans, on the basis of which the tsar made bold strategic decisions and developed projects of transformations, many of which he managed to implement.

Nevertheless, historians continue to repeat the tale about the "weak and sickly" sovereign, who allegedly did not accept any independent decisions... But if the country was not ruled by Tsar Fedor, then who was behind his back? - The authors of historical works did not have an answer to this, and it is no coincidence.

Under the sovereign, there was not only an obvious favorite or "first minister" (as it always was under his father Alexei Tishaish, and then under his sister Sophia, stepmother Natalia and brother Petra). Changes in the composition of Fyodor's entourage and the distribution of leading posts indicate that neither a specific personality of the "gray cardinal", nor a specific grouping stood behind the tsar's back.

Certain plans of the king had supporters among the aristocrats, statesmen and generals. For example, the future chancellor boyar Prince Vasily Vasilyevich Golitsyn, whose idea Fyodor Alekseevich supported by giving a secret decree to the commander of the Russian army to destroy Chigirin - the bone of contention between Russia and Turkey (1678), in order to lead the country out of a devastating war. Or the famous General Grigory Ivanovich Kosagov, whose plan for the decisive advancement of the fortified border of Russia to the south was approved by the tsar contrary to the opinion of a number of influential courtiers.

Documents preserved in the archives testify that these and other strategic decisions were made by the king after a very serious study of all relevant materials.

There is a certain irony in the fact that historians, who actively use in their work analytical materials and collections of documents on specific problems, prepared at one time for Tsar Fyodor, continue to pretend that all this arose by itself. After all, the clerks of the 17th century. pointed out exactly for whom, when and why help was required! Moreover, in his clear and precise decrees, especially those concerning the "public benefit", the sovereign often considered it necessary to reveal the essence of the problem, explain what he wants to achieve and how exactly his decision will affect the interests of broad strata of his subjects.

Of course, for a correct understanding of the inner world of the tsar-reformer, the logic of his decisions, which follows from the content of the documents reviewed by the tsar and the motivational part of the decrees, is not enough. Man is not a logical machine, he is influenced by many circumstances that the historian has to reconstruct from the entire huge mass of authentic documents and evidence of that time. And most importantly, each of us (and we will not deny this to Tsar Fyodor) has our own very complex inner world, our own tastes, convictions and preferences that have developed since childhood.

The personal life of the king, who was unreasonably presented as weak, sick and incapable of anything, turned out to be surprisingly rich and even romantic.

The wedding of Fedor Alekseevich with the first wife of Grushetskaya Agafya Semyonovna


Agafya Semyonovna Grushetskaya (1663 - 14 July (24 July) 1681) - Russian queen, from the noble family of the Grushetsky, daughter of the governor of the gentry Semyon Fedorovich Grushetsky. From July 18 (July 28), 1680, the wife of Tsar Fyodor Alekseevich (05/30/1661 - 04/27/1682). She gave birth to the only child who died in infancy, Tsarevich Ilya Fedorovich (July 11 (July 21) - July 21 (July 31) 1681). She died on the third day after giving birth on July 14 (July 24) 1681 from fever. She was buried in the Ascension Monastery. Reburied in the underground chamber of the southern extension of the Archangel Cathedral in 1929.

Agafya was the daughter of a Smolensk nobleman of Polish origin, a nobleman of Moscow, the Chernavsky governor Semyon Fedorovich Grushetsky. Agafya Semyonovna could read and write, spoke Polish fluently, understood Latin books, had a fairly clear idea of \u200b\u200blife in the West, and even understood if French was spoken in her presence; played the harpsichord. Her nanny was a Polish woman. She was one of the most beautiful girls of her time. “With her face - a heavenly angel, and with her mind she is light” - this is how they wrote about the blue-eyed beauty Agafya. The young 18-year-old Tsar Fyodor Alekseevich noticed her in the crowd during the procession of the cross, on Easter, in the spring of 1680. When he passed by her, she fainted, as an old witch showed her face during a mystical divination ritual. The king, violating decency, left the procession and rushed to the young beauty to help. The face of the insensitive girl amazed the prince with its beauty and her features cut into his memory and heart. He instructed Yazykov, Ivan Maksimovich, to make inquiries about her. It turned out that this was Agafya Semyonovna Grushetskaya and that she lived with her mother in the house of her uncle, the Duma nobleman Semyon Ivanovich Zaborovsky (her mother’s brother), who until 1677 ruled the Monastery order. The young Tsar Fyodor ordered to hand it over to his uncle, Zaborovsky, "so that he would keep that niece of his and not marry him off without a decree."

Not wishing to break the old customs, the tsar ordered to call all the beautiful girls from the upper circle to see brides and chose Grushetskaya from them. In the expenditure records of the palace preserved the names of those girls who in July 1680 were brought to choose from among their brides. There are about 20 of them. A list of some of the rejected girls who returned home after the show: the daughters of Fyodor Kurakin, Martha and Anna Fyodorovna; daughter of Ivan Khitrovo, - Vasilisa; daughter of the roundabout, Prince Danila the Great - Galina; daughter of the steward, Prince Nikita of Rostov; two daughters of princes Semyon and Alexei Zvenigorodsky; daughters of princes Semyon Lvov, Volodymyr Volkonsky. All the girls who attended those brides were given the sovereign's salary: four zarbavs (a kind of brocade) - the price is 101 rubles; 40 arsh. Otlasov; 70 arsh. Abundant (thick silk fabric); 180 arsh. Kamok.

Having learned about the choice of the tsar, one of his closest relatives, Ivan Ilyich Miloslavsky, began to spread the most ridiculous inventions about the tsar's bride in order to prevent an ordinary noblewoman from appearing in the first roles in the tsar's palace. However, he achieved only that the anger of the king fell upon him, and only the intercession of Agafya Semyonovna saved him from disgrace. The Tsar again allowed Miloslavsky to appear at the court, but his influence did not return. The marriage of the tsar was arranged by his favorites - I. M. Yazykov and A. T. Likhachev. “People are new and ignorant, they owed only their dexterity and ingenuity to their closeness to Fedor, who was very attached to them. In the struggle for dominance with the Miloslavskys, behind which were the tsar's sisters and aunts, the new favorites needed strong support, and only the young queen could provide them, as before Naryshkina Matveyev. The Miloslavskys directly attributed Fedor's marriage to their intrigue. " Indeed, after the marriage, the influence of Likhachev and Yazykov increased sharply, and the Miloslavskys receded into the shadows. Tsar's bed-room IM Yazykov on May 8, 1681 was granted a boyar.

The very logic of the study forced the author to build a narrative about the affairs of government and the problems of the state around the inner world, family and other personal relationships of the tsar-reformer. The upbringing, hobbies, inclinations and passions of the tsarevich, and then tsar Fyodor Alekseevich, both in life and in the book, are closely intertwined with the fundamental, often dramatic decisions he made about the fate of the Russian state.

How to reliably reveal this inner world of a person who lived an unusual life for us in the distant 17th century? This is not an easy question for a historian. First of all, one should identify and study all the circumstances of Fedor's life, the details of his environment, the books he read, find everything that can be known about his faith and beliefs, his loved ones, friends and toys, hobbies and sympathies. However, the only criterion that the picture of the hero's inner world, reconstructed in such a complex way (and inevitably having gaps), is correct, is its fullness and harmony, i.e. ultimately - convincing to the reader.

I didn't make a reservation. The assessment by the wide reader of the picture of the inner world of Tsar Fyodor Alekseevich and Russia of his era, recreated in the book, objectively has no less weight than the opinion of professional historians. At the high level of generalization, which in this case had to be resorted to, the ingenious methods of processing sources used in the early stages of work no longer matter. To evaluate the author's logic, no special knowledge is required: this is a property of generalizing works on history, which often forces scientists in fear to refuse to write them and even assure that such works are not scientific enough.

I am sure that books, the content of which is absolutely clear to the reader, are a natural result and goal of all special historical research, in general, giving them meaning. If the result of the research cannot be stated in terms that are clear for every literate person, if the logic of its construction is incomprehensible, and the resulting picture is unconvincing, then the work is not completed or the historian has performed it poorly.

It gave me great pleasure to write this book about the mysterious and romantic period in the history of Russia, in which the first and completely true, although not officially announced, emperor lived and worked hard.

I hope that you, my dear reader, will fully enjoy this joy of learning new things.

The name of Tsar Fyodor Alekseevich Romanov is not as widely known today as the names of his father Aleksei Mikhailovich and his younger brother Pyotr Alekseevich. And in vain.

Having received from his father a country strengthened, revived after the turmoil and civil wars, Fyodor Alekseevich became the forerunner of many reforms and transformations that we today associate with the name of Peter. Everyone knows that history does not tolerate the subjunctive mood. And, nevertheless, it can be assumed that if Fyodor Alekseevich had not died so early, today we would be talking about the great reformer and reformer of Russia, Tsar Fyodor III.

Short life and short reign

Fyodor was the second son of Alexei Mikhailovich and his first wife Maria Ilyinichna Miloslavskaya. In a marriage with Miloslavskaya, Alexei Mikhailovich had 13 children, four of them are sons. Almost all of Maria Ilyinichna's daughters were strong and healthy, but her sons were born weak. The eldest son Alexei died at the age of 15, Simeon lived to be only three years old. Two sons of Mary reigned: Ivan Alekseevich, who was co-ruler of Peter I, and did not differ in health or intelligence, and Fyodor, who, although he was as weak in health as the brothers, but had all the makings of a statesman.

He was born on May 30, 1661. His tutor was the monk Simeon of Polotsk - one of the most educated people of his time, spiritual writer, theologian, poet and translator. He instilled in Fedor an interest in Western culture in its Polish version. Under the guidance of Simeon of Polotsk, the prince learned Polish, latin languages, was able to get acquainted with the works of European scientists and philosophers.

The reign of Fyodor began in 1676, after Alexei Mikhailovich died. The first months of his reign, Fedor was seriously ill, he suffered from "scrobut" - scurvy. The state was actually ruled by a friend of the late Alexei Mikhailovich Artamon Matveyev - godfather of the second wife of the late Emperor Natalia Naryshkina, a relative of his first wife Ivan Miloslavsky and Patriarch Joachim. However, having risen to his feet, Fyodor harshly took power into his own hands and began by sending into exile Matveyev, who was too sympathetic to little Pyotr Alekseevich.

The short reign of Fedor lasted only 6 years, in 1682 he died. But during this time the young sovereign managed to do quite a lot.

Basic transformations of Fedor Alekseevich

Among the main merits of the young tsar should be attributed the abolition of parochialism - the order of occupying positions based not on the personal qualities of the applicant, but on what post his ancestors held. Localism was a real burden for the Russian state, preventing the appointment of truly capable people, and drowning any undertaking in disputes about who should obey whom. Fyodor ordered to burn all the discharge books, which indicated the positions held by representatives of noble families. Instead, he introduced genealogical books, where only genealogy was recorded.

The next important step was to care for the education of Russia. A printing house was opened at the Printing House, where they began to publish books: liturgical literature, scientific works, works of secular content, translations from Latin. Fyodor Alekseevich developed a project for an educational institution, which was opened after his death, and was named the Slavic-Greek-Latin Academy.

Under Fedor Alekseevich, units of the army received a new development, which were staffed and armed according to the European model and were called "regiments of a foreign system."

The young tsar was also engaged in reforming the state apparatus: he abolished a number of orders, combining orders that were similar in function.

In 1678, a general population census was carried out, a year later household taxes were introduced. This increased the tax burden, but it caused an inflow of funds into the state treasury.

Fedor achieved considerable success in foreign policy: another war against the Ottoman ports and the Crimean Khanate ended in victory. Turkey and Poland were forced to recognize the Left-Bank Ukraine and Kiev for Russia. Fedor Alekseevich tried to return and access to the Baltic Sea, but to no avail. This task was realized by his younger brother Peter.

Fedor did a lot for the improvement of Moscow. Here, streets began to be paved, the first sewerage system was installed, and shopping malls were removed from Red Square. In addition, the sovereign created a system of loans for Muscovites who lost their homes as a result of fires, which were very frequent in the wooden capital.

Finally, it was under Fedor Alekseevich that Russian aristocrats began to wear European clothes. Young boyars began to shave their beards, cut their hair in the Polish manner, and dress in the Polish fashion. It was forbidden to appear at court in single-row and ohabnya. Under Fyodor Alekseevich, the first periodical edition appeared in Russia - "Courants". It was a handwritten "digest" of news from European newspapers, which was read to the Tsar and the Boyar Duma by the clerks of the Ambassador Prikaz. At this time, foreign fashions penetrated into painting, artists began to paint portraits in the European style, they were called "parsuns".

Fyodor Alekseevich abolished crippling executions, such as cutting off hands, ears, cutting off the tongue, and, in general, thought about the humanization of punishments. This, however, did not prevent him from giving the order to burn the main ideologue of the Old Believers, Archpriest Avvakum Petrov. They say that the reason for this decision was the fact that Habakkuk insulted his father in letters to his supporters.

Fedor took care of the upbringing of his younger brothers - Ivan and Peter, subscribed to books, globes, ship models and other manuals for them.

A lot was done, but even more projects remained projects, since in 1682 Fyodor Alekseevich died.

The question of succession

Fyodor Alekseevich was married twice. His first wife, a Polish noblewoman from Smolensk, Agafya Grushetskaya, gave birth to him in 1681, a son who was named Ilya. The boy died on the 10th day of his life, and Queen Agafya soon died. The second marriage with Martha Apraksina lasted just over two months. The sovereign died at the age of 20.

He did not manage to give any orders regarding the heir, therefore a dynastic crisis arose, which caused an aggravation of the struggle between the supporters of Tsarevich Ivan and Tsarevich Peter. The unrest ended in a compromise decision: to make the brothers co-rulers, appointing Princess Sophia as regent.