DIVISION OF THE GEOSTRATEGIC SPACE AND OPERATING EQUIPMENT
STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS AND AREAS
Lecture No. 61/1998
Introduction.
1. The concept of a theater of war (military operations).
2. Division of geostrategic space.
3. Strategic directions, their characteristics and operational
equipment.
Conclusion.
LITERATURE
A) used in the preparation of the lecture text
1. Directives of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on clarifying the cut of the geostrategic
space in the interests of the security of Russia from 26.8.1992 and from
1.10.1992
2. Main continental strategic areas. A.P. Shenyak, VAA. Inv.
10249.
3. Methodology for studying and assessing military-geographical conditions
continental strategic areas. A.P. Shenyak, VAA. Inv. 10248.
Lecture number 61. Inv.
VISUAL AIDS
1. Map of the boundaries of continental and oceanic strategic regions. Inv.
….
2. Map of the boundaries of regions, districts and directions on the territory of the Russian Federation. Inv.
3. Slides to the lecture - pcs.
INTRODUCTION
Modern war is a complex social phenomenon that affects all
aspects of life and activity of people and states.
The study of war is not limited to consideration of issues related to
the conduct of the armed struggle by the parties. It is known that the ways of doing
armed struggle, its preparation, course and outcome largely depends on
political, economic, military and moral potential of the belligerents
states. Serious influence on the outcome of the armed struggle is exerted by
also physical and geographical (natural) conditions and preparedness
(operational equipment) territory in which the
war activities. Taken together, these factors are considered to be
military-geographical conditions (VSU).
Outstanding Russian scientist and traveler S.P. Krasheninnikov (1711-1755)
in the work "Description of the Kamchatka Land" * called on "to know their fatherland in
all its limits ** in order "to skillfully cover the borders
their.
Professor of the Russian Academy General Staff General P.A. Yazykov
substantiated the need for "strategic research of various countries",
which was confirmed by the practice of subsequent generations.
The experience of past wars convincingly confirms the importance of value and skill
taking into account the entire complex of military-geographical conditions in military affairs.
That is why it is natural to demand orders from the Minister of Defense
Russian Federation on the preparation of the Armed Forces with mandatory consideration
features of the conditions of strategic areas and directions.
The purpose of this lecture is to give you a general understanding of geostrategic slicing
space and familiarize with the main strategic directions for
the territory of Russia "by their characteristics and operational equipment.
Let me remind you that the modern geostrategic division of space has been introduced
into the practical activities of the headquarters by the directive of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of August 26
1992 No. 342 / II / 094. Updated by the Children's School of Economics from 8.12.98. No. 312/1/0520.
1. THE CONCEPT OF THE THEATER OF WAR (MILITARY ACTIONS).
In the classical definition, theater was understood as a territory or a water area,
on which hostilities developed directly. Theater boundaries
were determined by the reach of means of fire,
which, until the Second World War, rarely went beyond the depth
operational building of associations.
The development of means of destruction and delivery, significantly influenced the change
the concept of "theater of war". That is why the military leadership
USSR since the mid-50s, VDs were considered part of the territory
earthly gift, within which two
opposing groups of the armed forces capable of solving
strategic objectives. Long time there was a partition system
geospaces for 8, and since 1990 for 5 (NW, 3, S-3. S and V) theaters
military action.
The rapid development of events in the world associated with the end of the cold
war ", the collapse of the USSR into ...
Classical geopolitics is based on the principle of geographic determinism.This means that the location of the state, the geographical conditions of its existence, have a strong influence on its foreign policy strategy. Space is the main geopolitical category. Initially, this category included only the environment in which the state existed. But gradually this category began to cover other environments not directly related to the territory occupied by the state, in which the influence of certain states manifested itself. Throughout history, states have sought to change the space they occupy.
Colonial empires arose on other continents, friendly alliances and close economic and political alliances were formed, it became possible to deploy strategically important objects in other states (military bases, missile defense and air defense systems, radars). States sought to expand their "living space", gaining influence outside their territory. Classical geopolitics suggests that the dynamics of the political process in the international arena is due to the contradiction of interests of states that historically belonged to different groups: states of the "land" and states of the "sea". The space influenced the formation of mentality, value attitudes and, ultimately, the formation of national interests and the construction of foreign policy strategies. The space determines what resources the state can use for its development and improvement of the international situation. In XX the concept of space has undergone radical changes.
Then, as Karl Schmitt writes in his work "Land and Sea", the third element mastered by man, air, is added to land and sea. Space becomes three-dimensional, humanity is able to soar above the planet, observing a previously unseen perspective and gaining access to the space occupied by a rival. But in the work mentioned above, Schmitt does not undertake to resolve the issue of the meaning of the new element, since serious reflections on this topic are intertwined with hypotheses and poorly grounded assumptions. Logic suggests that geopolitics is based on the analysis of only the environment that relates to the Earth. And in this sense, space, especially outside the atmosphere, cannot be unconditionally considered terrestrial space.
But since space is tied to the Earth, and space activities are possible only if there are certain infrastructural objects on the planet. And as long as the frontiers of space, mastered by mankind, remain visible, there are grounds for classifying space as a geopolitical space. Since the introduction of the theory of the confrontation between sea and land powers, the sea has also changed dramatically. From the element it turns into space, and, as Karl Schmitt mentions in one of his works, “the former nomos of the earth disappears,” and together with
him and the basis of the domination of the sea powers. At the same time, it is known from the foundations of conflictology that a change in the conditions of existence of one of the parties to the conflict entails a transformation of the conflict itself. At the same time, it would be premature to talk about ending the conflict until the moment when an assessment of the shift of interests and influence of the land and sea states into a new spatial dimension is made. It is generally accepted that states consider the element of air to be akin to the sea and, on this basis, claim to be the leader in the new space. However, among the powers of the "Big Space Club" the first to conquer space was the land power, the USSR. And the third space power was China - the traditional state of Sushi until recently. For space, as for space, both sea and land powers compete in equal measure. However, geographic determinism manifests itself here as well.
Undeniable advantages have those countries that are located near the equator and at the same time have a large territory and access to the oceans. Given the availability of economic and technical resources, such countries are able to pursue an independent space policy, namely to launch rockets and satellites from their own spaceports. At the same time, they are not under pressure from the need to conclude international agreements with neighboring states, on whose territory the remnants of rocket fuel and rocket stages that do not burn in the atmosphere can fall. These states are free to choose partners for interaction in the new space.
The position occupied by the state in the field of space exploration and exploration is a factor influencing the international position. This is confirmed by the possibilities of spreading influence and maintaining control over strategically important objects on land and at sea, which gives the conquest of outer space and the deployment of satellites and stations in this space. Due to the exploration of outer space, states that do not have much influence in "earthly" geopolitics can acquire authority and become leaders in world politics. The capabilities of space are so highly valued that the term "aerocracy" has even appeared in the scientific community - power through the air. Outer space and space objects are considered “the heritage of mankind” from a legal point of view.
This measure, a mutually beneficial deterrence, is designed to prevent an increase in the clash of interests in the struggle for a new space, the appropriation by one state or group of rights to space activities. The concept of the struggle for living space in a space environment is as relevant as in two other environments already mastered by mankind.
Countries are striving to declare to the world their rights to a share in outer space. The shares of the largest states in the space sector and the budgets that are spent on space activities are actively calculated. Based on these calculations, conclusions are drawn about leadership in the military-political, economic and geopolitical terms. However, the number of applicants for participation in the profit sharing from space exploration is growing. And the states of the “Big Space Club” will not be able to remain among the leaders for long. The world's striving for multipolarity and a departure from the model of the American and Eurocentric world implies a direct projection of these trends onto new dimensions of space being mastered by mankind.
The time is not far off when the balance of the Land and Sea states will turn into the balance of the states of Europe and Asia, or developed and developing states. The states, leading in the field of astronautics, need to reconsider the very principles of cooperation and confrontation in outer space. It is in their interests to offer the world a new development model. Otherwise, these states will be forced to exponentially increase spending on space activities in an attempt to maintain their position and protect their interests in the confrontation with states that are only discovering the benefits of using a new spatial dimension and are able to start this activity from much higher levels. than the former leaders in astronautics began. The development of international relations on Earth largely depends on whether new blocs are formed in this area and what they will be.
Moving from an era of competition to an era of global cooperation is not such an insurmountable task. History shows that in reality the world has long been ready for the transition to a new era in the history of its development. It is well known that the Cold War was most clearly manifested in the rivalry between the two superpowers - the USSR and the United States - in space. Each of the powers tried on the basis of space achievements, the development of new, previously inaccessible frontiers, to prove the consistency and superiority of its system of social relations and its economic model. So, for example, in the program documents of the USSR, among the goals pursued in the field of space, "strengthening the position of the world socialist system" and "using the results of the space program in the interests of ideological struggle and increasing the prestige of the Soviet Union in world public opinion" were indicated. However, already in the 1960s, it became obvious that the USSR and the United States were striving to occupy free niches in space exploration, avoiding direct rivalry. So, the USA focused on the development of technology, in the USSR - on the study of human capabilities.
So, among the most important achievements of the United States in the period from 1957 to 1985, the first active communications satellite, an orbital solar observatory in low-earth orbit, the first photographs of the surface of Mars are indicated, among the achievements of the USSR - the first manned flight, a woman's flight into space, spacewalk and the most long expedition. This distribution of areas of responsibility has given the world much more than a direct clash of interests in any one area would have. The other participants in space activities followed the example of the superpowers. France, defining the directions of space activities for 1965-1970, sought to "take a leading position in those fields of astronautics that remained outside the sphere of attention of the USSR and the United States."
It should be borne in mind that space has traditionally been a sphere and a symbol of global confrontation, the success in the development of which served as a clear illustration of the level of development of science, technology and economics, thereby demonstrating the effectiveness of a particular model of social and political structure and the value system that underlies this model. Unfortunately, as stated in the updated Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, such competition is intensifying in the modern world.
The identification of areas of cooperation and the desire to avoid a collision could be only the first preparatory steps for the adoption of a new, truly global space research program. Participation in this global program should be available to scientists from any country in the world. Otherwise, the privatization by the states-leaders of strategic spheres: planning, management, control, may become the beginning of a new round of competition for equal participation in scientific activity.
Literature
1. Khozin G.S. Great confrontation in space (USSR - USA). Eyewitness accounts. M .: Veche, 2001.416 p.
2. Schmitt K. The concept of the political. Ed. V.V. Afanasyeva. Moscow: Research Center "Engineer", 2011.290 p.
3. Belozerov V.K. Russian military doctrine: at the beginning of a long journey // Power. 2015. No. 2. S. 98-103.
Once again on the possibilities of solving the problem of unified leadership in repelling aerospace aggression against our country
The next article by Yuri Krinitskiy "To fend off a rapid global strike" continued a heated discussion about further ways of implementing the Concept of Aerospace Defense of the Russian Federation. the main problem lies in the fact that with the creation of the Aerospace Defense Forces, unified leadership and unified responsibility for organizing and conducting an armed struggle against all forces and means of the enemy's aerospace attack (SVKN) over the entire territory of Russia and its allies were not restored.
The discussion arose because of different ways of solving the problem. It turned out to be quite extensive. At the same time, behind the multitude of particulars and lengthy phrases used by the authors, it is not immediately possible to understand the essence and differences of the proposed solutions to the named problem. If we discard all the particulars, two fundamentally different paths emerge very clearly.
The essence of the first path (A.A. Travkin, A.V.Belomytsev, M.G. Valeev, Yu.V. Krinitsky, etc.) boils down to the centralization of control over the actions of the aerospace defense forces in the defense of the country's facilities and their isolation from the actions of all other troops (forces), including from the actions of air defense troops (forces) of the Ground Forces and the Navy. For this it is proposed:
The essence of the second path corresponds to the Aerospace Defense Concept “... the basis of aerospace defense is a complex of national and military measures, as well as combat operations of various (heterogeneous) groupings of troops (forces), conducted in a common system of armed struggle under a single leadership, according to a single concept and plan ... "And consists in centralizing control over the actions of all troops, forces and assets of aerospace defense and strike forces and assets of the services and combat arms of the Armed Forces, other troops in the fight against an aerospace enemy. For this it is proposed:
In this article by Yuri Krinitsky, another attempt is made to discredit the second way of solving the problem of unified leadership in organizing and conducting the fight against the forces and means of the enemy's aerospace attack. In this regard, there is a need to analyze in more detail the positive and negative consequences of each path and each proposed action.
The main consequences of the first way to solve the problem
The main positive consequence of the creation of the Armed Forces - the Aerospace Defense Forces, their transition to separate defensive forms of action and the abandonment of the territorial principle of building the aerospace defense system will be the simplification of planning in the Aerospace Defense Forces of strategic and operational forms of military action and command and control of troops in their course. However, these measures will sharply complicate the general coordination of actions at the level of the Armed Forces as a whole, since there will be a need for additional coordination of the actions of the Aerospace Defense Forces with the actions of groupings of troops (forces) of military districts and fleets. The proposed measures to isolate the use of the Aerospace Defense Forces from other actions of the Armed Forces will not allow concentrating the efforts of all the troops and forces of the Aerospace Defense Forces on the defense of objects and groupings of troops (forces) having the highest priority in each period of hostilities. Including it will be impossible to concentrate the efforts of the troops and forces of air defense and missile defense different types The Armed Forces on the Defense of Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) facilities from a disarming global strike by the enemy's SVKN.
In practice, the option of transforming the Aerospace Defense Forces from a branch of the armed forces into a service of the Armed Forces by removing the aerospace defense brigades (air defense divisions) from the Air Force and Air Defense Commands and forming four formations of them (three armies and a corps) of the Air Defense Forces is a return to the structure of the RF Armed Forces before the unification of the Air Defense and Air Forces into 1998, that is, the Aerospace Defense Forces will become the former Air Defense Forces only in a modern composition with the inclusion of two launch and control units spacecraft... Previously, the size of the Air Defense Forces made them self-sufficient for solving the tasks of defending the country's facilities, including for the defense of strategic nuclear forces. Currently, in the proposed VKO Troops "34 anti-aircraft missile regiments remain, of which a third is concentrated near Moscow" (Boris Cheltsov. "What will be the new look of the VKO"). Earlier in some separate armies Air defense anti-aircraft missile units were more than expected in the VKO Troops. It is quite obvious, even without modeling, that these forces cannot independently solve the tasks of defending the country's facilities, including the defense of strategic nuclear forces from a disarming global strike by the enemy's SVKN. At the same time, the number of air defense troops (forces) of military districts and fleets within the boundaries of some military districts is greater than in VKO brigades (air defense divisions). However, it will be impossible to attract some of them at least for the defense of strategic nuclear forces, since, according to the proposals, they must defend their groupings of troops of military districts and naval forces from air attacks.
When abandoning the territorial principle and separating the forms of using a new type of the Armed Forces - the Aerospace Defense Forces - from the actions of air defense troops (forces) of military districts and the fleet, the possibility of centralized control of air defense (air defense-missile defense) formations of different types of Armed Forces when they conduct combat operations in common areas is excluded. In such conditions, the overall effectiveness of actions falls, and the expenditures of combat and materiel increase. This is due general principles target allocation, embedded in the automation systems of anti-aircraft missile formations of different types of the Armed Forces. At the same time, in different formations, the same targets will be assigned for shelling, which will increase the total missile consumption by one and a half to two times. With a high impact density, some of the air attack weapons will remain unfired and will be able to break through to defended targets. In the absence of centralized control, as a result of inconsistency of actions and low efficiency of the identification system in a difficult air and jamming environment, some of their aircraft can be fired upon by their anti-aircraft weapons.
With the isolation of the actions of the formations of the Aerospace Defense Forces from the actions of strike aviation, missile forces and artillery, and the forces of the fleet, their coordination is extremely difficult for the timely disorganization of the control of forces and means of the enemy's aerospace attack and reducing their capabilities to deliver subsequent strikes.
When the VKO brigades (air defense divisions) and, accordingly, parts of the radio-technical troops are transferred to the VKO Troops, the air defense troops of the military districts and air force formations will actually be left without intelligence. This will complicate the organization of general reconnaissance of the air enemy within the boundaries of military districts, as well as the provision of radar information to formations, units and subunits of aviation, air defense troops (forces) of the Ground Forces and the Navy.
The main consequences of the second way of solving the problem
In the second way of solving the problem, the advantages of the first way become disadvantages and, conversely, disadvantages become advantages. The main negative consequence of the creation of a new type of the Armed Forces - the Aerospace Forces and the Strategic Aerospace Command, as well as the preservation of forms of combating the enemy's SVKN, combining defensive and strike actions, is the complication of planning in the Aerospace Forces strategic and operational forms of combating the enemy's SVKN and command and control in their course. In general, the management of the new type of the Armed Forces will become quite difficult, but this problem is being solved by the necessary composition of the main command of the Armed Forces. While maintaining the principle of separation at the strategic level of administrative and operational control in the RF Armed Forces, the main command of the Aerospace Forces will perform only administrative functions for controlling the type of the Armed Forces, and the SVKK will perform operational functions for planning the actions of all troops (forces) to combat the enemy's SVKN and to control troops ( forces) in the implementation of plans. This division of functions will simplify the overall command and control of troops (forces).
A decrease in the number of combat arms during the unification of the Aerospace Defense Forces with the Air Force, as well as the formed strategic aerospace command, which will assume the functions of coordinating the actions of troops (forces) in a strategic aerospace operation and partially in other strategic actions, will simplify the overall coordination of actions at the level The sun as a whole.
The implementation of the territorial principle of building the aerospace defense system in full with the creation of the infrastructure of the aerospace defense zones and regions will provide the possibility of concentrating the efforts of all troops and forces of aerospace defense available in the Armed Forces on the defense of objects and groupings of troops (forces) having the highest priority in each period of hostilities, including on the defense of strategic nuclear forces. Taking into account that the Ground Forces groupings are not targets of a priority strike, some of the military air defense units can be maintained to strengthen the defense of strategic nuclear forces against a sudden disarming global strike by the enemy's air defense forces. With other expected scenarios for the development of the military-political situation, the formation of military air defense systems, which have a sufficiently high maneuverability, can quickly move to defend groupings of troops. The feasibility of such measures is confirmed by the research conducted during the command-staff exercises and games. For example, the simulation carried out in the VA VKO showed that the attacking side (the United States and NATO) has the capabilities already in the first massive air-missile strike in any direction to disable more than 80-90 percent of the defending side's airfields and gain air superiority. Virtual maneuvers by anti-aircraft formations, units and subunits of the Ground Forces to cover the nearest airfields reduced their losses by more than 50-60 percent. Studies have also shown that the centralized control of air defense (air defense-missile defense) formations of different types of the Armed Forces when they conduct combat operations in common areas increases the overall effectiveness of actions by 1.4-1.6 times and increases the safety of aviation of all types.
The preservation of the methods and forms of combat against the aerospace enemy with the participation of the defense troops (forces) of the aerospace defense and the strike troops (forces) of aviation, missile and artillery forces and the naval forces ensures their coordination to disorganize the enemy's air and space forces and reduce their ability to deliver subsequent strikes.
The preservation of aerospace defense brigades (air defense divisions) and, accordingly, units of radio technical troops as part of the air force and air defense commands, with the territorial principle of building the aerial defense system, will facilitate the organization of general reconnaissance of the air enemy within the boundaries of military districts, as well as providing radar information to formations, units and subunits of aviation, troops ) Air Defense of the Land Forces and the Navy.
Yuri Krinitsky, analyzing the ways to solve the problem, noted: “It is sad that today we are preparing to fend off a lightning knockout blow with a spread-out five of troops, most of which are subordinate to different command and control bodies, have different tasks and completely inadequate reaction time to a threat.” It is very sad, but it is Yuri Krinitskiy who does not want to unite them under a common leadership, as is achieved when creating the VKS and SVKK.
Everyone can independently choose a way to solve the problem of unified leadership in organizing and waging the fight against the enemy's SVKN on the basis of comparing their advantages and disadvantages.
The publication by Yuri Krinitskiy "To fend off a rapid global strike" continued the discussion on further ways of implementing the Concept of Aerospace Defense of Russia. The main problem is that with the creation of the Aerospace Defense Forces, unified leadership and single responsibility for organizing and conducting an armed struggle against all forces and means of an aerospace attack (ATS) of the enemy over the entire territory of the Russian Federation and its allies were not restored. In the last issue, in the first part of this article, we talked about ways to solve this problem. Today we will try to answer the question: do the Aerospace Defense Forces need their own aerospace theater of operations (TVD) in the presence of traditional continental, oceanic and sea theaters?
The answer to this question is given by the theory and practice of using this military-scientific category by military command and control bodies. Yuri Krinitskiy asserts: "The usual land-sea theaters with deployed groups of troops ... are becoming archaic." And in this regard, it proposes to introduce and use in planning actions the Troops of the East Kazakhstan Military District with their strategic aerospace and air directions, which should be cut regardless of the combined-arms strategic and operational directions. In his article, he argues that the space and time of the struggle in the air and space has fundamentally ceased to coincide with the space and time of the struggle on land and sea and that the past combination of air directions with strategic, as he calls, "land" directions has led to a mismatch in the space of the planned reflection with a space of predictable aggression.
To confirm or refute the presented provisions, let us turn to theory. According to the Military encyclopedic dictionary (WPP) 2007 (p. 903) Theater of Operations is a vast territory of a part of a continent with the seas washing it or an ocean (sea) area with islands and adjacent continental coasts, as well as the aerospace above them, within which strategic groupings of armed forces and military operations of a strategic scale can be conducted. The boundaries and composition of the theater of operations are determined by the military-political leadership of the states. For example, the military-political leadership of the United States and NATO divided the territory of Western Europe into three land theaters: the North-Western European, Central European and South European NATO theaters. In peacetime, NATO forces with a single command have been created at each of the theaters, their possible use has been planned, and control, basing and supply systems have been created.
Each theater has its own specific conditions for conducting military operations (military-political, military-economic, military, physical-geographical, ethnographic), as well as the operational equipment of the territory, which affects the preparation and conduct of operations of a strategic scale and war in general. Therefore, a comprehensive study of all these elements of the theater of operations, including the objects of command and control of the armed forces, the basing of the SVKN and air defense forces, the areas of deployment and deployment of the ground forces and the fleet, and their assessment are one of the tasks of the military command and control bodies to prepare the armed forces to repel aggression.
In the Russian Federation, the boundaries and composition of the theater of operations are officially determined during the period of threat. This is quite logical, because if there is no war, then there is no theater. Therefore, in order to ensure the study and analysis of the above elements of the situation in peacetime by the elements of dividing the geostrategic space, strategic directions have been determined by the elements of dividing the geostrategic space - part of the territory of the region with adjacent water areas and airspace, within the boundaries of which there are important economic, military and administrative centers with strategic importance, and during a war, operational-strategic groupings of the Armed Forces can deploy and conduct military operations (WES, p. 886). The strategic directions are subdivided into operational directions. In the threatened period, when the enemy and the expected area of \u200b\u200bmilitary operations have been clearly defined, the boundaries and composition of the theater of operations are officially established. Strategic directions become its elements.
In turn, the aerospace direction is a strip of aerospace, in which strike assets of aviation and missile forces are withdrawn by the shortest route from the basing (deployment) sites to the most important military facilities and industrial centers (WPP, p. 202). In reality, planes and cruise missiles do not necessarily have to take the shortest route. Aerospace directions are subdivided into air directions. According to Krinitsky, the totality of aerospace directions and the strategic space zone form an aerospace theater of operations. At the same time, he claims: “In the aerospace sphere, some of the objects were created in advance. These are airfields, missile positions, air force command posts, an orbital group. "
Now let's turn to practice. When preparing operations and combat actions, officials of command and control bodies of military formations (combined arms, ground, air force, air defense, navy), based on the potential or real enemy and the possible used, regardless of the official division of the geostrategic space, determine the general possible area (space) of the operation (fighting). Along with other elements of the situation assessment, the physical and geographical conditions of the area of \u200b\u200bthe operation (combat actions) are assessed. Elements of the operational equipment of the territory of the region (command and control centers, positional areas of missile forces, airfields, air defense and missile defense facilities, naval bases), areas of deployment, advancement and deployment of ground forces and navy and other troops are plotted on the maps. Proceeding from the real basing and real or projected deployment areas, as well as from the tasks, including the location of defended objects, and the capabilities of weapons, they determine the expected directions (space) of actions of SVKN groupings, land and sea groupings of the enemy. These directions may or may not coincide with each other. In the same way, the directions (space) of actions of own and interacting groupings of troops (forces) are determined. And only after that, to formulate ideas and decisions, write directives, combat orders and orders, as well as to organize interaction, they are tied to the areas officially defined for all directions, regardless of their "cutting". The main thing is that they are understood unambiguously by all governing bodies and officials.
Let's imagine that Yury Krinitsky's proposal is accepted. Commands of military districts, fleets, and air force formations planned actions in the generally accepted combined arms directions. In turn, the Aerospace Defense Forces cut their directions, naturally, not coinciding with the combined arms, and planned the use of their troops along them. It will be extremely difficult to reconcile these actions in reality, since the staff officers simply will not understand each other. It was for the possibility of coordinating the actions of groupings of air defense troops (forces) of all types and branches of troops, all types of aviation, ground forces, naval forces and other troops (forces) that air directions were combined with combined-arms strategic directions. In this case, it is enough only to name the direction in the directive, combat order or instructions for interaction, so that the subordinate or interacting control bodies correctly determine it.
Thus, proceeding from the actual planning of operations (combat actions), Krinitsky's assertion that “now the space of operations of the air attack forces and the troops (forces) of land and naval groupings does not fundamentally coincide” has no grounds for practice. In addition, the example he cited of the delivery of air strikes by multinational forces in 1991 against Iraq from directions that do not coincide with the direction of actions of the ground forces is not typical for Russia because of its global territory. For example, the enemy, when deploying the struggle for the islands of the Lesser Kuril ridge, will not deliver air strikes from Western Europe, the planes will not reach the Kuriles and Sakhalin. Only the north direction is a partial exception. However, here, too, one can expect actions not only by strategic aviation with cruise missiles, but also by airborne groups to seize or disable individual military or energy facilities.
Taking into account the results of the analysis of the theory and practice of using the theater of operations category, everyone can independently answer the question of whether the Aerospace Defense Forces need their own aerospace theater of military operations.
Counter-arguments on a number of private statements of Krinitsky
In addition to the main issues, the article under discussion raises particular ones and provides a number of theses, which, it should be noted, were written very talentedly, but with which one cannot agree.
First thesis. Yuri Krinitskiy asserts that "until there is a theater of operations, there can be no planning of joint operations in a theater of operations" and that "... no preparatory period will precede the enemy's aggressive actions from the airspace. There will be no time to plan an operation to repel an attack the day before or on a fait accompli. Therefore, the operation to repel the aggression must be planned in advance. " It is not clear to whom the author opposes. Official guidance documents prescribe planning for the use of the Armed Forces as a whole, as well as formations, formations and units, to be carried out in advance in peacetime and to clarify plans in a threatened period or with the start of sudden hostilities. In reality, in the RF Armed Forces, such planning is carried out and strictly controlled. Since strategic directions are determined in peacetime, air operations in the strategic direction (theater of operations) can and are planned well in advance in peacetime. Therefore, the name of this operation is twofold: for peacetime - an operation in a strategic direction, after "cutting" a theater of operations - an operation in a theater of operations.
The second thesis. Yuri Krinitsky writes that in the last decade and a half, during the exercises and in the preparation of real actions, the time of the beginning of the war “is completely unjustifiably chosen when the opposing operational-strategic groupings of troops have already been deployed, theaters of military operations are marked, the front line is drawn on the working maps of commanders, troops conditionally buried in trenches. Further, or simultaneously with this process, the stage of planning the operation begins. " The above thesis does not correspond to the existing realities, except for the situation created at a number of command-staff exercises when working out specific issues. First, as indicated in the counterarguments on the first thesis, plans for the use of the Armed Forces in general and all military formations should be developed in advance. If there are no plans, then the troops cannot deploy (it is not known where to deploy and for what tasks). Secondly, official documents define various options for the start of hostilities: operations can begin in conditions of a surprise attack by the enemy with an unfinished deployment of troops (forces) or with their full deployment and the creation of a planned grouping. In conditions of a surprise attack by the enemy, the repulsion of the enemy's air defense and missile defense forces should be carried out by the air defense and missile defense forces on duty. Their actions are being stepped up by the air defense forces of the Aerospace Defense Forces, the Air Force, the Ground Forces and the Navy (in the places of deployment or on the routes of advance) brought into combat readiness. The combat-ready forces of aviation, missile forces and artillery, and the navy must deliver a retaliatory strike against priority targets. In this case, the main groupings of troops and naval forces should be dispersed with subsequent exit and deployment in the destination areas. These postulates are known to all military men even from the schools.
Third thesis Yuri Krinitskiy is revealed in several places in the article: “The troops and forces of the VKO (air defense, missile defense) from a structure that performed the most important independent task of the decisive initial period of the war, turned into a secondary structure that ensures the subsequent, very unhurried actions of combined-arms groupings of troops not deployed within the borders of nonexistent continental theater of operations ... There is a reality in the form of a lightning (disarming) global strike. His scenario is designed for six hours ... The strategic nuclear forces need to be protected by the VKO forces not for a month or a day, but for these most important hours. " It is not clear on the basis of what initial data Krinitsky made such conclusions.
Firstly, the very creation of the Aerospace Defense Forces shows that the leadership of the state and the Armed Forces has realized the importance of the role of the Aerospace Defense Forces in the armed struggle. To repel a possible sudden aerospace or air attack, combat alert for air defense is organized, the missile defense units are continuously on alert and carry out the assigned tasks, the remaining air defense units and units of all types of the Armed Forces and the Aerospace Defense Forces are kept on alert in peacetime with a minimum period of putting into combat readiness.
Secondly, the troops and forces of the aerospace defense (air defense, missile defense) independent tasks, despite their importance, have never been assigned, because it is impossible to defend all the necessary objects only by defeating the enemy's air defense systems in flight due to the insufficient effectiveness of air defense and missile defense systems. Even in the 80s of the last century, with the largest number of air defense forces and means, the effectiveness of air defense in different regions, according to estimates, did not exceed 8-20 percent.
Thirdly, it is undoubtedly necessary to protect the strategic nuclear forces from a sudden disarming strike. To solve this problem, Yuriy Krinitsky, referring to Vladimir Slipchenko, proposes "to destroy up to 70 percent of the enemy's high-precision air and missile targets with air defense means, and up to 90 percent of the enemy's high-precision air and missile targets." By what forces? Any specialist knows that it is impossible to achieve such an efficiency of the aerospace defense system not only practically, but also theoretically (money, industrial capacity and people are not enough to produce and maintain the required amount of aerial defense weapons). It is fundamentally impossible to solve the problem of protecting strategic nuclear forces with the forces remaining after all the reductions that may be in the Aerospace Defense Forces. Therefore, it is proposed to concentrate efforts in the fight against the aerospace enemy not only of the Aerospace Defense Forces, but also of the Air Defense Forces of the Land Forces and the Air Defense Forces of the Fleet and all combat-ready strike forces of the aviation, missile forces and artillery and the fleet.
Fourth, the assertion of Yuri Krinitsky that the actions of combined-arms groupings of troops in comparison with the actions of air defense forces and means are unhurried, far-fetched. Combined-arms actions are called combined-arms actions because they include actions of all or most of the types and branches of the Armed Forces, that is, these are actions of aviation, ground forces, navy, other troops, as well as air defense forces and assets. The forces and means of the formations included in the combined-arms grouping are brought into readiness for different times and operate at different speeds, and not only according to Krinitsky, who believes that Iskander or Granit missiles, when striking, aircraft fly more slowly than anti-aircraft guided missiles and fighter aircraft.
Fourth thesis Yuri Krinitsky that the only military threat to Russia is a lightning-fast global disarming strike by the United States and NATO, so the Aerospace Defense Forces become the main military force state, runs through his entire article. The matter came to the point of approval with reference to Vladimir Slipchenko: "It is quite obvious that in a war there will be no future ground groupings for the attacking side, prepared for such a war,". Here the author has clearly gone overboard. Firstly, the Air Defense Forces have never been, and the Aerospace Defense Forces will never become the main military force of the state, if only because even a small war cannot be won by destroying the enemy's SVKN (in reality, a small part of them). Second, the United States and NATO, with their well-developed SVKN, are not the only potential adversaries of Russia. A sudden, lightning-fast global disarming strike is not the only option for a military threat. Of course, we must prepare and, in accordance with the provisions of official documents, we are preparing to reveal its preparation and weaken the aerospace defense forces to ensure the delivery of a counter and even retaliatory strike, unacceptable for the aggressor, by all combat-ready forces, including the strategic nuclear forces. However, in order to repel any other aggression, as well as in internal conflicts, we need not only the Aerospace Defense Forces and Strategic Nuclear Forces, but also the Ground and Airborne Forces, and the Navy, and all other troops and forces. These troops and forces will also be needed to prevent the seizure of our resources even in a hypothetical situation of the destruction of our strategic nuclear forces by non-nuclear weapons.
Fifth statement Yuri Krinitsky is that we must sit and wait until the enemy's SVKN launched cross the state border of Russia, otherwise we, as in the war with Georgia, will be declared an aggressor. According to Krinitsky, all other states have the right to preventive action, and Russia should not have such a right. In fact, we are not that poor. Official documents prescribe: in order to eliminate military threats to Russia and the allies, we have the right and must bring the armed forces into readiness and, if necessary, deliver pre-emptive strikes, primarily strikes against critical enemy targets. To eliminate the escalation of crisis situations and the outbreak of armed conflicts, a multivariate use of strategic nuclear forces is envisaged, from demonstrative launches of missiles and aircraft flights to massive oncoming and retaliatory strikes. Proceeding from this, Yuri Krinitsky's appeal “In a probable war of the future, Russia needs its own concept of a lightning-fast crushing response. Strategic nuclear forces should be used not when there is nothing left of them and the country's economy, but when they are still able to inflict unacceptable damage to the aggressor, that is, in the first hours of the war, ”he was clearly late.
Sixth statement Yuri Krinitskiy: “The simple addition of the tasks of the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces did not lead to the emergence of a new integrated strategic goal. It was an enlarged set of two important but different and incompatible tasks of halves of artificially created organizational structures. With minor modifications, the situation persists to this day ... In fact, there was not even a merger, but the absorption of the Air Defense Forces by the Air Force. All commanders and commanders of the new type of armed forces were selected exclusively from the airborne strikers. Accordingly, the consequences were fatal for those who stood guard over the air borders of the Motherland. " We should have stopped nostalgic about the event of the last century. The unification of the Air Defense Forces and the Air Force was caused, firstly, by the fact that there were not enough troops and forces for the two types of the Armed Forces. Secondly, in the armed forces of the overwhelming majority of states, the aviation and air defense forces are in the same type of armed forces and no one doubts the advisability of such a structure. Thirdly, the use of Air Defense and Aviation Troops in common air and air defense formations greatly facilitates the planning of air operations, including defensive and strike actions, the organization of interaction between air defense and aviation formations, and also increases the safety of its aviation. Israel demonstrates a striking example of a new quality from the joint use of aviation and air defense forces, the Iron Dome missile defense system of which reflects the strikes of Palestinian missiles, and the aviation immediately strikes at the identified launchers. Fourth, at the most crucial moment of the unification of the Air Defense Forces and the Air Force, the first commander-in-chief of the new type of the Armed Forces - the Air Force for four whole years (1998-2002) was not an aviator-striker, but a representative of the Air Defense Forces, a graduate of the Air Defense Academy, General of the Army Anatoly Kornukov. In addition, representatives of the Air Defense Forces Viktor Sinitsyn (1998-2000) and Boris Cheltsov (2000-2007) were also the first and second chiefs of the main headquarters of the Air Force. They did everything possible to ensure that the anti-aircraft component does not suffer more than the aviation component in the new type of aircraft. Fifthly, the accusation of the airborne strikers of fatal consequences for the representatives of the Air Defense Forces has no basis. There is also no basis for accusing the combined arms, as Yuri Krinitsky put it, of the "infantry" command and control bodies of incompetence with regard to air defense. Accusing general military commanders of incompetence in comparison with narrow specialists is tantamount to accusing the conductor of a musician, because the conductor does not know how to beat the drum as dashingly as he does. The combined-arms commander unites with a common concept all the variety of actions of various troops and forces to solve common tasks, and narrow specialists serve for consultations, development of proposals for the use of their troops (forces), their detailed planning and organization of actions. In the same way, Air Force officials, including aviators, who come from shock workers, work in relation to their troops (forces). At the same time, the quality of management activities to the greatest extent depends on the level of training officials (as they are taught, so they work).
Seventh thesis Yuri Krinitsky is to accuse science of focusing on forms of military action that are not needed at all: “The main thing here is the method of military action ... Unfortunately, in recent decades, Russian military science has focused on forms, and the development of a new, effective technology, that is, almost no one is involved in conducting hostilities, including in the East Kazakhstan region. This is the path to the degradation of the art of war. " Firstly, this statement discredits VA VKO, in which, by the way, Yuri Krinitsky works. In fact, the main scientific activity of the academy is devoted to the development of methods of dealing with the enemy's SVKN. It was on the basis of the development of methods to combat hypersonic aircraft that the academy scientists put forward and then proved the hypothesis of the need to integrate air defense and missile defense systems into the general aerospace defense system. For some reason, Yuri Krinitsky did not notice that the article, which he analyzes in such detail, is ultimately devoted to the technology of developing strategic, operational and tactical methods of dealing with the enemy's SVKN. Secondly, of course, the method has a leading role, since it expresses the content of actions. But in order to describe any method of action, several pages of text are required, at a strategic level, several dozen pages. Therefore, without external expression of the content, one cannot even name any document defining preparation for military operations. For example, a plan for what? (It is necessary to describe the method: “Concentrate efforts on such and such a direction ... and so on.”) The name of the form allows to briefly express the essential features of the way of achieving the goal (solving problems) of the forthcoming military operations. In particular, already in the title "Plan of Operation" or "Plan of Striking," each military person presents in general terms a method, that is, the content of actions. Thus, the forms of military action are the "bird" language of the military and must be preserved.
Eighth thesis Yuriy Krinitskiy: “The practical experience of planning joint anti-aircraft operations in theater of operations, obtained at various exercises, is also fiction. Military science differs in that its postulates cannot be objectively verified in practice in peacetime, since practice is war. While she's gone, certainty scientific provisions tested in exercises. But often they resemble a game of chess with oneself. " Why does the planning fiction only concern anti-aircraft operations in theaters? Then this is a general fiction of planning all forms of military action. It also applies to planning the actions of the Aerospace Defense Forces.
Questions about the use of fighter aircraft and the performance indicators of aerospace defense are very complex and require not unambiguous arguments, but extensive evidence. Therefore, they do not fit into the framework of this article. The author hopes that he will be given the opportunity to return to these issues in future publications.
Analysis of modern geopolitical processes and trends in world development allows us to conclude that it is necessary for the Russian Federation to develop and consistently implement a geostrategy aimed at protecting the country's national interests. Despite the desire of our geopolitical rivals to weaken the role of Russia in world politics, the active foreign policy of the Russian leadership, relying on the country's military potential, which must be strengthened, should allow the Russian Federation to occupy a leading position in the international arena.
The geostrategic priorities of the state serve as the key to solving many military-political, socio-economic and other tasks facing the country's leadership. Geostrategy creates the basis for developing technologies for implementing priorities national security, prevention of military-political, socio-economic and other disasters that arise at the borders saturated with energy resources.
In his Address to the Federal Assembly, the President of the Russian Federation emphasized that “Russia's military and foreign policy doctrines should provide an answer to the most pressing questions, namely, how, under current conditions and together with partners, it is effective to fight not only terror, but also the proliferation of nuclear and chemical , bacteriological weapons, how to extinguish modern local conflicts, how to overcome other new challenges ”.
The geostrategy of the Russian Federation must necessarily rely on the possibilities of its own space and geopolitical position. This can allow solving the following critical tasks:
- the formation of an integral military-political, socio-economic, cultural, informational and other functional space within the state borders of the Russian Federation;
- creation of the necessary geopolitical, economic and other conditions for the effective use of the resource, demographic, communication and other properties of the space of the Russian Federation;
- the formation of friendly geopolitical envelopes in the space of "near" and "far" abroad, common with the neighboring countries of economic, information, cultural and other spaces;
- coordination of efforts of all interested states in the creation of a world order that meets the interests of the development of all peoples of the planet and excludes the hegemony of any country.
As part of the solution of these tasks, the geostrategy of the Russian Federation will determine a number of measures aimed at strengthening the political, economic and military might of Russia, strengthening its international influence, at creating political, economic and other alliances with other countries.
Be able to foresee
Building a promising strategy for Russia in the field of ensuring national security is possible only on the basis of scientific foresight of the course and development of world processes. At the same time, the general situation in the world, regions, country is assessed, trends, directions of development of the situation and the factors that determine them are studied, attempts are made to assess the new possibilities of these factors.
For the success of forecasting, therefore, it is necessary: \u200b\u200bfirst, knowledge of the current world situation and determination of the main trends in the development of the situation; secondly, knowledge of the situation in the leading world powers, national interests and aspirations of the main geopolitical players; third, the real formation of their own national interests, the determination of the country's place on the geopolitical map of the world at the present time and in the future, and on this basis, the construction of a state strategy of national security aimed at ensuring national interests.
One of the important stages of forecasting is the collection of forecast background data - a set of conditions external to the forecasting object that are essential for solving the forecasting problem. Several blocks will stand out in the forecast background, the main of which are the development of the political situation in outside world and development trends in the field of defense and security.
The world is changing
When analyzing the situation in the outside world, it is necessary to consider options for the development of the situation in the leading countries, as well as in international organizations (NATO, EU, UN, etc.). The prospects of evolution in the CIS states - the zone of Russia's strategic interests are also assessed. It is advisable to subject the evolution of the situation in the United States and China to a special analysis, as well as to consider the prospects for a united Europe.
A number of experts note that the geopolitical model of the world today is in a difficult, transitional state. The US leadership has not yet been challenged by anyone, but the only superpower is unable to control the rapid growth of new regional leaders and the “landslide” geopolitical processes on the world periphery. The scope of interethnic and interfaith conflicts is growing from year to year, the lack of international security guarantees inevitably pushes the world towards a new arms race. Countries that do not want to succumb to the dictates of the United States and its Western allies are striving at any cost to become the owners of nuclear missiles. The worst option, which experts predict, is joining Iran's "nuclear club" in the near future. The scale of activity of radical Islamists who preach violent methods, primarily terror, to achieve political goals is growing.
An important question is whether NATO will expand its area of \u200b\u200bresponsibility and conduct military operations there. In this context, it is necessary to predict what policy the United States and its allies will pursue in the post-Soviet space (Black Sea basin, Transcaucasia, Central Asia), to what extent Russia's interests will be taken into account and to what extent possible actions will be carried out jointly with it.
Another essential element of the forecast consists in analyzing the degree of legal, institutional, military-administrative and military-technical consolidation of the interaction between Russia and NATO, their dependence on each other, and the ability of the Russian Federation to influence the policy of the Alliance. The question of the role of the UN largely boils down to how it will reflect the new balance of power in the world and how this will affect the ability of the UN Security Council to work out effective, implementable solutions.
An important question is also the direction in which the process of globalization will develop and what consequences it will lead to.
Military strength - role remains
The forecast of the dynamics of military expenditures for the aforementioned countries and blocs will largely determine the military-strategic situation in the world, the role of military power in international relations. The ratio of defense expenditures of the above-mentioned subjects and Russia in 10-15 years will indicate the place of the Russian Federation in the world as a military power, its own defense capability and the possibility of using force abroad in the implementation of foreign policy guidelines.
It also requires a general assessment of the evolution of views on the nature, methods of waging wars of the future and their possible format. A special role is played by the forecast of the future role and place of nuclear weapons in the balance of forces between the leading powers, in ensuring their defense and security.
The geostrategic position of the Russian Federation and its relations with other nuclear powers (the absence of nuclear allies), the large area and weak defense of the territory, the limited budgetary resources put it in a specific position in the context of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. From this, conclusions can follow in terms of activation russian politics in this area. Until now, it must be admitted, it is characterized by passiveness and comes down to responding to the initiatives of the United States and the EU countries.
The most important subject of the forecast is also a new and extremely dangerous tendency - the threat of the emergence of non-state players in this area, and international terrorist organizations gaining access to nuclear weapons.
Of particular importance for Russia are the conflicts arising on its territory (Chechnya), as well as in the immediate vicinity of the Russian borders (the Transnistrian, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgian-Abkhazian, Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts).
Proceeding from the above factors and tendencies, the spheres are singled out to which special attention should be paid in the process of developing the main directions of Russia's geostrategy.
Concepts for building Russia's geostrategy
There are several concepts for building Russia's geostrategy. One of the concepts is called the concept of revenge. Its supporters advocate the return of the positions that the Soviet Union once possessed, including in relation to countries that were under the patronage of the former USSR... A number of supporters of this school consider it necessary to build up the military power of the Russian Federation, to support states that take anti-Western positions, including, for example, rapprochement with China on an anti-Western basis.
Most likely, the orientation towards such a policy will lead to a series of further major geopolitical failures of the Russian Federation.
There are adherents of the establishment of an authoritarian regime of government, including in the field of foreign policy. This approach presupposes an unambiguous division of world states into adversaries or allies and a tough confrontational course against rivals. Some representatives propose to sharply increase pressure on the CIS republics in order to force them to rapprochement with Russia.
In our opinion, such a straightforward foreign policy is unlikely to bring success in today's difficult geopolitical conditions.
Another school is called the “voluntary submission” school. In fact, the concept of voluntary submission was preached by the former Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev in the early 90s, when the Russian Federation practically unquestioningly followed the guidelines of the West. Representatives of this school adhered to a liberal paradigm and believed that in its security policy, Russia should be unambiguously guided by NATO and other transatlantic structures. Now the concept of "voluntary submission" or "Atlanticism" has few supporters among the Russian political establishment.
A number of analysts are proposing a “balancing” concept of building Russia's geostrategy, which implies a selective choice of partners and “fellow travelers” in a particular issue. Certain elements of this concept can be adopted. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that accompanying interests cannot be constant and with respect to different world problems, the “fellow-travelers” may have different points of view.
Officially, Russia adheres to a strategy aimed at creating a multipolar system of international relations. Meanwhile, detailed scientific developments the concept of multipolarity and Russia's role in participating in a multipolar world does not exist. Moreover, there are seemingly dangerous points of view that the Russian Federation, implementing the ideas of multipolarity, should strive to turn Western Europe and China into independent poles of world politics. But this can be very dangerous, provided that Russia itself stands still.
Of interest is the concept of Russia's geostrategy, aimed at breaking down the unipolar model of the world by opposing American influence, primarily in the post-Soviet space, as well as in the Middle East, Asia and other regions of the world.
In general, to determine the main directions of the country's geostrategy, it is necessary to take into account many factors. It is an integrated approach to the formation of geostrategy that will determine the promising directions of the country's development, the implementation of which will allow Russia to take an appropriate place among the leading world powers.
From a geopolitical perspective
Geopolitical analysis is essential for the development of geostrategy. First, the study of political phenomena from the point of view of geopolitics provides new opportunities for the study of macropolitical processes and strategic forecasting in the interests of security.
Second, the use of geopolitical constructions makes it possible to overcome a certain one-sidedness in the interpretation of foreign policy (especially global and regional) security problems.
Thirdly, geopolitical analysis focuses on the study of tension potentials in the region and in the world as a whole, focuses on the contradictions between different types of development of the earth's surface.
The study of potential and actual conflicts in the system of international relations is of particular importance for the analysis of the military-strategic aspect of security.
It is possible to point out several main trends affecting both the system of ensuring the national security of the country as a whole and the process of forming Russia's geostrategy. The negative trends include:
- the intentions of the leading geopolitical actors to weaken Russia's influence on world geopolitical processes by reducing the role of international structures (primarily the UN), in which the Russian Federation is one of the most active participants;
- the presence of territorial claims against Russia, the promotion of theories about the possibility of revising the existing borders;
- activation of disintegration processes in the post-Soviet space, transformation of the territory of the former USSR into a zone of strategic interests of the West;
- the presence of zones of existing and potential conflicts along the perimeter of the Russian borders.
In addition to these purely negative trends for the Russian Federation, there are general global trends, which also have an important impact on Russia.
After the collapse of the USSR, the building of a unipolar world led by the United States became the defining trend in world development. At the same time, at the present stage on the world stage, a number of strong states are in favor of multipolarity. The active actions of the main geopolitical actors intending to establish the most beneficial models of the world's geopolitical structure pose difficult tasks for Russia in terms of defining its own geostrategy.
Globalization is one of the central places in the system of geopolitical processes, according to which some countries receive significant advantages in development, while others find themselves on the economic and political periphery. In this regard, it is necessary for Russia to actively participate in world integration processes - both political (using UN mechanisms, the G8) and economic (cooperation with the EU, participation in the WTO) and military (finding ways for mutually beneficial relations with NATO) ...
The rise of international terrorism. This problem has become global. For many states, including Russia, terrorism has become the main threat to the country's national security, affecting the interests of the individual, society and the state. Despite the ongoing geopolitical confrontation, the world's leading powers face the need for international cooperation in the fight against terrorism.
Development of regional and sub-regional integration in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region and other world centers. Integration processes are taking place in Europe, there is an active debate on the adoption of a single European constitution. Strengthening cooperation in Europe (OSCE, intensification of relations with the EU), the Asia-Pacific region (APEC, SCO), and the Muslim world (Organization of the Islamic Conference) is important for Russia. Cooperation between the CIS countries (CSTO, EurAsEC, etc.) is of great importance.
A high degree of geopolitical mobility of the world. AT last years Various events taking place on the world arena significantly alter the global geopolitical situation (collapse of the USSR, collapse of the socialist camp, widespread Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, Washington's global imposition of "American-style democracies", etc.).
These trends have a significant impact on the formation of Russia's geostrategy.
Voice of the people
Analyzing polls public opinionIt should be emphasized that the majority of the Russian population still sees Russia as a great power or a potential global player. Thus, 34 percent believe that the country needs to return the superpower status that the USSR had. Another 35 percent say that in the 21st century Russia should strive to become one of the 10-15 economically developed and politically influential countries of the world.
Only a small number of respondents are ready to confine themselves to the position of a regional leader. 16 percent would like, as the elite aspires to do so, to create the core of integration in the post-Soviet space, and then join the United States and the European Union. And 7 percent of Russians do not want Russia to set global goals for itself.
When asked by sociologists what problems are the most acute in Russia today, Russians put terrorism in the first place among the problems related to the country's geostrategy. This is followed by the lack of spirituality of society, the raw-material nature of the economy, the absence of a national idea and the demographic crisis.
Opinion polls play a significant role in shaping the country's geostrategy. Geostrategy, like national interests, must take into account the mood and needs of society. The majority of the Russian population believes that Russia should take a leading position in the world arena.
How to strengthen the state?
At present, the Russian Federation cannot yet claim the role of a superpower played by the Soviet Union, but it remains one of the world powers on which the future of the global system largely depends. In this sense, there is almost universal approval of the now asserting line, which is called pragmatic-realistic. Most likely, it will be she who will determine foreign policy Russia in the foreseeable future.
Despite the collapse of the USSR, Russia remains one of the leading powers in terms of its political significance and influence on the course of affairs in the world, including as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and in terms of the related responsibility. In addition to its geopolitical position and the presence of nuclear weapons, the main features that make it possible to consider Russia a world power in modern conditions include its potential capabilities and prospects in the field of resource support, a sufficiently high level of scientific and technological development, the presence of significant territorial and human resources, and a number of others.
Of course, all these positions are not automatically provided. They may be lost in the coming years if the country does not emerge from the economic, scientific, technological and spiritual crisis. On the contrary, Russia's ability to ensure a high quality of life for its citizens and to influence the course of events in the world will expand subject to the successful completion of political and socio-economic reforms. All the prerequisites for this are in place.
Today Russia has all the means to ensure its national security and development, because it is one thing when geopolitical interests were directed towards the struggle for world domination, which was waged between the USSR and the United States and demanded incredible expenses, and another thing is when interests are directed towards greater degree to ensure its own national security, which requires much lower costs and efforts from Russia.
Thus, to the question of whether the Russian Federation is worth claiming great power, the answer should be: yes, it is. But not for the role of a superpower competing on an equal footing with the United States, but rather for a place in the five leading powers in the world. This is an objective process that meets the national interests of Russia.
Therefore, a clear multi-vector strategy for upholding national interests is needed, one that presupposes a combination of flexibility and consistent firmness based on Russia's overall geopolitical potential. The main conditions for the revival of Russia and the transformation of the country into a leading world power are further stabilization of the country's internal political situation, economic growth and military build-up.
In the next decade, the energy factor will play a significant role in world politics. At present, Russia has a chance to establish itself in the international arena as the most important link in the context of global energy interests. However, it would be wrong to rely only on energy capabilities. Leading Western countries set themselves the task of diversifying energy flows, searching for new energy sources, and it is possible that by 2020 the role of Russia as an “energy power” may decrease. Therefore, in economic terms, emphasis must be placed on innovative technologies, with the help of which it is possible to establish mutually beneficial economic ties with the leading world powers.
As for military security, militarization continues in the world. Weapons continue to be the most important foreign policy tool. The military arsenals of the leading countries far exceed the level required for the country's defense. Moreover, offensive types of weapons are constantly being improved and produced.
The modern military-political situation is characterized by the strengthening of the US claims to world leadership. Washington, with the help of its Atlantic allies, is pursuing a foreign policy relying on a powerful military potential, which in most cases does not coincide with Russia's national interests.
Whatever the West may say, NATO's eastward expansion is primarily directed against Russia. And the initiator of this movement is the United States. The deployment of missile defense elements in the Czech Republic and Poland is yet another proof of Washington's hegemonic aspirations against Russia. In these conditions, you need to be prepared for any surprises. This means that Russia must have a reliable military-strategic deterrent potential - a potential that would extinguish any attempts of potential aggressors to resolve emerging problems with Russia by force of arms. In the current state of the Russian Armed Forces, this potential must certainly rely on strategic nuclear forces. The preservation by the Russian Federation of its nuclear deterrent potential will make it possible to minimize the military superiority of other world powers and their coalitions over Russia.
Caution: "information viruses"
The modern geopolitical situation requires a fundamentally different approach to the problem of ensuring Russia's national security, analysis of the content and evolution of the entire spectrum of geopolitical factors, the most important of which is informational. Today it is legitimate to assert that, all other things being equal, the achievement of strategic advantages by a state depends on its informational capabilities. This is evidenced by the results of the Cold War, which was fought primarily by information means. Having reached parity with the United States in the military sphere, the USSR was defeated in information confrontation. In this context, the assessment by the American military-political leadership of the role of information becomes understandable and the reasons for the constant increase in allocations for development and improvement are explainable. information technologies.
The complexity of Russia's current situation lies in the fact that, on the one hand, it should not be on the periphery of the world information technology market and therefore it needs to cooperate with advanced countries in the exchange of information and technologies. On the other hand, the Russian leadership needs to take into account that in the face of escalating geopolitical confrontation, the leading countries will use the information component to weaken Russia's position on the world stage. In the struggle for geopolitical influence and economic resources, Russia's rivals are throwing new challenges to it, launching "information viruses" and using modern information technologies and means of communication to introduce them into the mass consciousness.
The cultural, civilizational and spiritual aspects play an important role in the geopolitical and geostrategic foundations of the state. Political history shows that it has never been possible to hold on to the space of world empires by force alone.
The change in geopolitical and historical reality as a result of the collapse of the USSR led to the search for a new connecting and unifying idea, a new historical choice, a new system of values. The ideas of the market, democracy, human rights and freedoms were not enough for Russia. They lose their attractiveness and mobilizing power. The formation of a genuine domestic system of values \u200b\u200bon the basis of our way of life, traditions, history is the most important task, without which the process of reforming the country and creating a new statehood in Russia will drag on for decades.
The power of Russia will depend on the ability to revive and preserve the energy-informational strategic resource of Russian culture and language.
A well-formed ideology is needed for the country's progressive development. The role of ideology in the formation of a strategy for ensuring the national security of Russia is to consolidate public consciousness, all citizens around well-founded ideological ideas about the status of our country in the system of international relations, about its place in the system of world economic relations, about the general idea of \u200b\u200bdevelopment, about the basis on which to develop specific directions of the political course of Russia.
The stable and dynamically developing Russian Federation, compatible in various parameters with the developed countries of the West and the East, precisely in the new geopolitical situation is capable of playing a critical role in the formation of at least a more or less balanced structure of the modern world.
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So, let's summarize.
The overall world situation will be characterized by slow progress towards a multipolar world. The United States will continue to play the leading role. In the Asia-Pacific region, the role of China as an independent pole of world politics will gradually increase, and the positions of Japan and India will also strengthen. Despite the difficulties that have arisen, most likely, the unification of the European countries will take place on the basis of a single constitution and Europe (or the European Union) will turn into an independent pole of world politics.
Due to insufficient economic and declining military power, Russia will not be able to claim the role of an independent pole of the future world order. At the same time, in terms of its political significance, including as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, due to its advantageous geopolitical position, the presence of nuclear weapons, the ability to take a leading position in the field of resource provision, our country will remain one of the world powers, from which a significant to the extent that the future of the world system depends.
Realizing Russia's opportunities on the world stage is only possible if a geostrategy is properly formed to protect national interests. It is advisable to form a geostrategy based on the three-level nature of the national interests of the Russian Federation.
The national interests of the Russian Federation at the global level consist in its active and full participation in the construction of such a system of international relations in which it would be given a place that best suits its political, economic and intellectual potential, military-political and foreign economic opportunities and needs.
The national interests of the Russian Federation at the regional level boil down to ensuring a stable and secure international environment, as well as promoting and consolidating its military-political and economic positions in the world arena through the use of mechanisms of regional cooperation.
The national interests of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet space consist in the development of comprehensive mutually beneficial relations with the CIS countries and their maximum involvement in the sphere of Russian interests.
Geostrategy must take into account threats to the national security of the Russian Federation and provide for measures to neutralize these threats.
The way to increase Russia's influence on the world arena lies through the rise of the national economy. It is necessary to make efforts to increase production capacity, improve the quality of manufactured products, introduce modern technologies, develop knowledge-intensive industries, expand the consumer market. At the same time, it is advisable for Russia to gain a foothold in the role of one of the main suppliers of energy resources to the world market and thereby ensure itself the opportunity to influence the price situation on the world hydrocarbon market. This can only happen if Russian companies enjoy high trust of partners, if their proposals have a high degree of guarantees.
Circumstances dictate the need to strengthen the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which must be ready to repel military aggression against Russia. The weakness of the Russian army will not allow us to defend Russian interests on the world stage. Russia's proposals and objections on important international issues must be backed up by the might of the Russian army. It is not so much about the quantitative growth of the Armed Forces as about improving their quality. The Russian army is in dire need of modern weapons, an increase in the level of training of servicemen, an improvement in their living conditions, as well as an increase in morale and fighting spirit.
In connection with the intensification of geopolitical rivalry and the information war unleashed against Russia by our geopolitical adversaries, the United States and its Atlantic allies, the organization of information confrontation is becoming an important task of the state in ensuring information security. The success of Russian information operations in the international arena will largely depend on the correctness of identifying the weak points of our geopolitical opponents, the active nature of information activities and the skillful use of the results of these events.
It seems extremely important to raise Russian culture, to turn to the historical traditions of the Russian people. We must try to revive and fully support the information strategic resource of the Russian language, Russian ethnos and culture both within the country and in the near abroad.
The unique position of the Russian Federation on the globe, its geographical and historical features indicate the need to develop its own geostrategic model based on military potential. After all, the United States and its Atlantic allies continue to strive to weaken our country, assigning it the role of a raw material appendage in the world arena. This status in no way meets the interests of either the individual or the Russian society. The Russian Federation can be a prosperous state only if it is a strong state, including militarily.
In the global airspace, large military space and strategic air operations are possible with the participation of the military space and missile aviation forces of the world's leading states
Both in nature and in society there are facts, events, processes and phenomena that mature, arise, exist and stop regardless of what we think about them. A person can create the prerequisites and even be the cause of the occurrence of a phenomenon. He can influence him by creating other conditions and prerequisites. But it cannot be canceled by its attitude to reality. By ignoring or denying, it is impossible to prevent what happened objectively.
Approximately such an atmosphere of rejection is formed in relation to the scientific category "aerospace theater of military operations" (VK theater of operations). What will change if we abandon this term and do not begin to include it in official encyclopedias, and even more so in guidelines for the preparation and conduct of military operations? Will the aerospace theater of operations disappear from this as an objective phenomenon of modern war? Or, perhaps, the circumstances of the armed struggle that determine its existence will dissolve by themselves?
Let's try to understand the problem consistently and logically.
The origins of the concept of theater
Whoever created man, the earthly firmament turned out to be the natural habitat of his creation on our planet. For some time a person could immerse himself in water, and to maintain life he was obliged to drink it. He breathed air, but he did not live in the air and did not fly like a bird.
Living in conflicting contradictions with nature and among themselves, people have mastered their familiar habitat not only for peaceful purposes, but also in the struggle for existence. The growing number of wars and the expansion of their scale, the improvement of the means and methods of armed violence have turned the earth's surface into a space for military operations.
American launch vehicle "Antares" at sunrise. Photo: NASA
Voivods and generals of the past won victories and suffered defeats. By analyzing their successes and failures, they sought to understand their reasons. Some of these reasons were related to the assessment of the battlefield conditions. The commander, who better took into account the military-geographical factors of the situation, took more advantageous positions and had a better chance of winning. This task was not easy. As in the well-known poem: "We retreated in silence for a long time ... But then we found a large field - there is to roam where free!". However, the assessment of the combat area was intuitive. At best, it was built on its own and others' experience, but was not scientific.
It was the experience of the Napoleonic battles of the early 19th century that stirred up military-theoretical thought, including along the line of military geography. The first scientific categories in this area were "theater of war" (TV) and "theater of war" (TVD). They were proposed almost simultaneously by Antoine Henri Jomini in Essays on the Art of War and Karl Clausewitz in the two-volume On War. According to their theory, "TV covers all countries in which two belligerent powers can attack each other, acting either from their own territory, or from the territory of their allies and secondary states involved in the whirlwind of war." And under the theater of operations was meant a part of the territory of the TV, within which the general battle of the main forces of the belligerents took place, usually deciding the course and outcome of the war as a whole. It was believed that in the theater of operations "one or several armies operate separately from other troops." In turn, the theater of operations was divided into operational zones, within which part of the army (for example, the corps) solved one particular task. The operations area included several lines of operations assigned to divisions.
Thus, the concept of theater of military operations not only had a geographical meaning, but had a military-strategic expediency. When forming the method of combat operations, when answers are needed to the questions: "By what forces?", "When?" and "Where?", at least with the third (spatial), the commanders and subordinates had no problems of mutual understanding.
When studying theater of operations, initially, attention was paid only to the characteristics of natural conditions and their influence on the course and outcome of military operations. Russian military theorist Dmitry Alekseevich Milyutin, professor of the Department of Military Geography of the Academy of the General Staff (later Field Marshal, Minister of War of Russia), has developed a more complete methodology. In 1847, in his work "The First Experiments of Military Statistics", he formulated the position that "when assessing theaters of military operations, apart from purely geographical ones, it is necessary to take into account political, economic, moral and other factors."
The study and preparation of the theater of operations was initially carried out mainly in the interests of the ground forces, since they played a decisive role in the war. But man more and more actively mastered the second habitat on planet Earth - the World Ocean. And, of course, for military purposes. With the advent of fleets, the sea water area was included in the theater of operations. Thus, during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the theater of operations already covered not only the territories of Korea and Manchuria, but also the waters of the Japanese and Yellow Seas.
Subsequently, when the armed struggle at sea reached the level of solving independent strategic tasks, and it was also understood that the means and methods of its conduct were significantly different from those used on land, theaters of military operations began to be divided into continental (CTVD) and oceanic (ATVD ). Although a certain “ geographic intersection»These concepts have been retained. The CTVD included coastal waters, from where the ships could operate against ground targets (participate in operations in the continental theater of operations). The ATVD included a land strip where the objects of the naval infrastructure were located and from where the ground group of forces could participate in the operation at the ATVD by their actions.
Fundamentally important in this conventional division of the war space was the statement of the dogmas given below.
1. Troops (forces, means) operating on land, and troops (forces, means) operating at sea, are fundamentally different in physical principles and methods of warfare.
2. On land and in the ocean (within the CTVD and ATVD), the solution of independent tasks of a strategic scale is required.
3. At the CTVD and ATVD, it is necessary to create independent inter-service groupings of the Armed Forces of a strategic scale. Their basis at the CTVD will be ground forces, and at the OTVD - the Navy units.
4. A fundamentally different military infrastructure is being created within the boundaries of the CTVD and ATVD, which meets the needs of the created (created) strategic groupings of the Armed Forces.
It is noteworthy that the division of theaters of military operations into continental and oceanic was stopped at the beginning of the 21st century. They were simply replaced by a theater of operations. But this happened not because objective circumstances changed (the above dogmas lost their relevance), but because Russia was weakened militarily. The lack of funds (primarily ships) for waging modern war prompted the reformers to come up with the idea of \u200b\u200bintegrating groupings of troops by depersonalizing the theater of operations. As far as this is a competent decision, the issue is controversial and lies outside the scope of the objectives of this publication. Let's leave it for another time.
Aerospace
Peter the Great also owns the words: "Not we, but our great-grandchildren will fly through the air like birds." And the great Suvorov assessed the prospect of airspace development with his inherent general practicality: "If I could be a bird, I would own more than one capital."
At the beginning of the twentieth century, mankind created flying devices moving in the third physical environment - air, and immediately spread armed struggle into it. The external resemblance of airspace to the open spaces of the sea led to the appearance of such terms as "air ocean", "air fleet", "air squadron", "aeronautics".
In fact, armed combat in the air turned out to be fundamentally different from combat at sea. But it was not given to everyone to see these differences, and not immediately.
Orion spacecraft: final preparations for launch. Photo: Georgy Danilov
"Victory smiles at the one who anticipates changes in the forms of war, not the one who adapts to the changes." These words belong to the great predictor of the nature of future wars, the Italian general Giulio Douai. Even when the planes "did not fly, but only bounced," he spoke of the need to create air fleets and their use in future air operations. Douay developed the concept of air warfare and the theory of air supremacy. But most importantly, he insisted on assigning independent tasks to the air forces: “To create an air force capable of carrying out combat missions with its own means, in which neither the land army nor navy will not be able to assist them in any way. "
And although the general does not use the term "air theater of operations" in his writings, he categorically opposes the battlefield in the air to the battlefield on the ground: "Everything that from the birth of mankind prescribed its conditions to war and determined its basic properties, no longer has any influence on actions in the air".
But all this will come true in many decades. In the meantime, in the First World War, aviation was used to solve tasks not higher than a tactical scale. Her actions on the battlefield contributed to the success of the ground forces, but had no independent significance.
In World War II, Germany and its allies out of 13,000 combat aircraft concentrated almost half on the Eastern Front. This made it possible to create operational associations of the Luftwaffe - the air fleets. The level of tasks solved by aviation has risen to operational. But the degree of its independence was not yet high. Most of the forces were used to support ground forces in an offensive or defensive. And in terms of spatial characteristics, the bombers of the Air Force of Nazi Germany were not yet capable of operating in the strategic depth of the territory of the USSR.
But after the end of World War II, the leading states made a technological breakthrough in the military field. The United States of America has created samples of strategic bombers and strategic reconnaissance aircraft. Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine ballistic missiles appeared. All this in nuclear weapons was brought together into a single grouping of strategic offensive forces (SNA). To defeat the most modern enemy, such a group could do without ground forces and without naval forces general purpose.
Humanity stepped into space and, without changing its principles, immediately adapted this fourth physical environment to the field of armed struggle. Near-earth space was filled with orbital groupings of space forces and systems.
The first rehearsal for the wars of the future was the US Air Force's Eldorado Canyon air operation against Libya in April 1986. No ground forces were involved in the fighting. Then there were "Desert Storm" (1991), "Desert Fox" (1998), "Resolute Force" (1999), "Unbreakable Freedom" (2001), "Freedom for Iraq" (2003). All operations were effectively supported from space.
In recent years, the successful development of hypersonic aircraft (HZVA) and aerospace aircraft has led to the filling of that layer of near-earth space (40–100 km), in which aerodynamic vehicles can no longer fly, and artificial satellites cannot yet have a stable orbit. So the third physical environment (air) and the fourth physical environment (space) merged into a single air-space.
And the unified aerospace attack force (SVKN) reached the level independent decision not some auxiliary, but strategic tasks of the war in a single aerospace sphere.
Theater or not theater?
How much space can generally be called a theater of operations? Jomini gave the answer to this question in his time. He names three signs of theater of operations:
- coverage of their own and enemy territory;
- the presence of strategically important lines or objects that should be captured, destroyed, held or protected;
- the physical and geographical conditions and military infrastructure that support the deployment and use of strategic forces.
From this "classical" position, let us analyze modern airspace.
By the first sign
The airspace is currently conditionally divided into air directions. Each of them extends according to the principle "from the enemy" and in its projection onto the earth's surface covers the territory of foreign countries, the waters of the seas where air attack weapons are based and from where they can fly; the territory of the regions of Russia that fall within the combat radius of these airborne weapons. As for the space zone, it is all the more common and is used for peaceful and military purposes by all states that have the appropriate technologies.
On the second basis
The aerospace attack forces have as their main goal the destruction of ground targets in Russia. Within reach, they "shoot" the entire territory of our country (just as, in fact, Russian strategic nuclear forces are capable of reaching any point on the planet). This means that there is no such strategic facility that would not be within the hypothetical military commander's military unit. But even in outer space itself there are devices that ensure the military security of our Motherland. They are also strategically important sites. The enemy will strive to destroy them, and we will protect them.
On the third basis
A few decades ago, space was an environment with unacceptable physical and geographical conditions for humans. But the development of technology has led to the fact that today space crews are in it for months, performing the assigned tasks. And in most cases, this is not required, since spacecraft are controlled remotely. The air environment was inhabited even earlier and does not present any problems for the use of strategic groupings of air attack forces.
Finally, with regard to infrastructure. Part of it was created on the surface of the Earth. These are airfields, cosmodromes, command posts, radar stations, etc. But the main elements of the infrastructure of the theater of military operations will appear immediately before the start of hostilities, since the operational and combat formation of the aerospace attack forces takes place in the air and space according to the plans developed in advance of the strategic air space operation (SVKNO), air offensive operation (VNO) and massive missile and air strike (MRAU).
This achieves the surprise of an aerospace attack, which is impossible in a conventional theater of operations. The elements of the air infrastructure being created are air command, communications and navigation points, refueling points, jamming zones, etc. An orbital group has already been deployed and is functioning in space, which solves reconnaissance, navigation, and control tasks in peacetime. It is also a product of operational equipment in outer space in the interests of war, although such a concept also does not exist in official terminology.
It takes hours, if not tens of minutes, to create and build all this. For the defending side, in such a tight time frame, it is too late to create a grouping of the Aerospace Defense Forces capable of repelling aerospace aggression only upon detection of an enemy-built SVKN group. The aerospace defense grouping must be created, deployed and ready for hostilities in advance, that is, yesterday, today and tomorrow. Accordingly, the operational equipment of the TVD VK must be dealt with in advance.
Thus, according to all the indicated features, modern air and space can be considered an independent air and space theater of military operations.
Accept or Deny?
I will quote the statement of Yuri Anoshko and Vladimir Barvinenko, who supported him (“Criticism of the theory of the theory does not bear fruit”): “As for the transition of air and space to the category of a theater of war or military operations ... this statement is only your invention ( Anatoly Korabelnikov. – Auth.) and Yuri Krinitsky. It is not accepted not only officially, but also by the scientific world. "
I don’t presume to find the discoverer of the idea, but I know many scientists who developed this topic. In 2006, in the VA VKO named after Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, the "Handbook of an Aerospace Defense Officer" was published under the general editorship of Professor SK Burmistrov. This handbook of VKO specialists contains chapter III, which is called "The environment of the aerospace space as a theater of military operations." It is noteworthy that the author's team of the reference book includes Yuri Anoshko and Vladimir Barvinenko. As for the "scholarly world that did not accept the theater of military operations", among the developers of the "Officer's Handbook of the East Kazakhstan region" are respected scientists, designers and teachers: Igor Ashurbeyli, Alexander Gorkov, Anatoly Nogovitsyn, Boris Cheltsov and two dozen professionals from the East Kazakhstan region.
In addition, A. I. Hyupenen and S. I. Pokladov regularly publish materials on the topic of the theater of war. There are monographs and articles by Yu. D. Podgornykh, ES Sirotinin, V. Ya. Dolgov about the space theater (and this is a narrower category than the VK theater). The Lenin and State Prize laureate, the chief designer of complex space systems, the developer of the PKO systems Konstantin Aleksandrovich Vlasko-Vlasov calls space a front. Professor I. V. Erokhin did not use the term VK theater. But in his book "Aerospace Sphere and Armed Struggle in It" the meaning of the concept of the VC sphere exactly coincides with the proposed concept of the VC theater. Having worked with a famous scientist in the same office for more than 10 years, I can not assume about this, but assert.
Who are they all if not the learned world?
Finally, about the fact that "the TVD VK has not been officially adopted." Let us open the Military-Political Dictionary of the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Deputy Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission under the Government of the Russian Federation Dmitry Rogozin "War and Peace in Terms and Definitions." Here is what it says about the somehow controversial subject: “theaters of operations can be continental, oceanic, sea and aerospace.
Aerospace theater of operations is a global airspace within which large military-space and strategic air operations are possible with the participation of military-space and missile-aviation forces of the world's leading states.
This theater is distinguished by the special conditions of armed struggle, characteristic only of it, the widespread use of automated combat and support military space systems and complexes, manned and unmanned aviation forces, the global scope and exceptional transience of military operations, during which dominance in space is won and conditions are created for solving military space tasks, including repelling an air and space attack of the enemy and striking targets and armed forces from space.
The aerospace theater of operations is divided into spheres of action into near-space airspace, near, middle and deep space. Taking into account the possible use of forces within its borders, certain aerospace directions are distinguished. "
So, strictly speaking, what is the subject of controversy? There is a term, there is a definition, characteristics are given and even the content is revealed. “Criticism of the theory's statements does not bear fruit” - here I fully agree. So let's move forward.
Why is all this necessary and why is it denied
The problem is not to accept another term in the lexicon of scientists and military personnel. It is necessary to change the attitude towards modern war, which will begin suddenly from the air and outer space and will end there (or basically will end in it).
Any theater of operations is a strategic category. On it, by definition, the strategic groupings of the armed forces of the warring countries or coalitions collide. And they solve strategic problems by implementing strategic forms and methods of action. The organization of preparation for military operations in a theater of operations is a very complex set of works. According to Dmitry Rogozin's military-political dictionary, “the category of theater of military operations is used both in peacetime and in wartime as a basis for planning operations, developing measures to prepare infrastructure, as well as for solving specific military-political and military-strategic tasks during war ".
If an aerospace theater of operations is included in the guidance documents for the control of the Armed Forces, it means that it is necessary to prepare the appropriate strategic operations to address priority tasks in aerospace. Accordingly, to take a course towards priority development of two functional components of the RF Armed Forces: those that will repel a sudden strategic attack from the airspace, and those that will defeat the military-economic potential of the enemy with their counter or retaliatory actions.
The first of these are the Troops and Forces of the East Kazakhstan region.
This is where the inconvenience for the reformers lies. Many recent reorganizations of our aircraft have been unsuccessful. The reason for this is the priority of departmental interests over state ones. It has become commonplace to ensure the survivability of one's own species, branch of troops by pulling away another. Who is stronger, who is closer to power, is right. And most of all, those troops that are intended to fight in the most responsible aerospace theater of military operations - the Air Defense Forces and Missile Defense Forces, are being pulled apart. They do not become more effective from constant renaming, reassignments. With each change of the signboard, the winners receive certain prizes, and our children, whose skies are not so safe, may become the losers in this struggle.