Fathers atomic bomb American Robert Oppenheimer and Soviet scientist Igor Kurchatov are officially recognized. But in parallel, lethal weapons were developed in other countries (Italy, Denmark, Hungary), so the discovery rightfully belongs to everyone.
The first to tackle this issue were German physicists Fritz Strassmann and Otto Hahn, who in December 1938 for the first time managed to artificially split the atomic nucleus of uranium. And six months later, the first reactor was already being built at the Kummersdorf test site near Berlin and uranium ore was urgently purchased in the Congo.
The Uranium Project - Germans Start and Lost
In September 1939, the Uranium Project was classified. To participate in the program, 22 reputable scientific centers were attracted, the Minister of Armaments Albert Speer supervised the research. The construction of an installation for the separation of isotopes and the production of uranium for extracting an isotope from it that supports a chain reaction was entrusted to the IG Farbenindustry concern.
For two years, a group of the venerable scientist Heisenberg studied the possibilities of creating a reactor with and heavy water. A potential explosive (isotope uranium-235) could be isolated from uranium ore.
But it requires an inhibitor that slows down the reaction - graphite or heavy water. The choice of the latter option created an insurmountable problem.
The only plant for the production of heavy water, which was located in Norway, after the occupation was put out of action by fighters of the local resistance, and small stocks of valuable raw materials were exported to France.
The explosion of an experimental nuclear reactor in Leipzig also prevented the rapid implementation of the nuclear program.
Hitler supported the uranium project as long as he hoped to get a super-powerful weapon that could influence the outcome of the war he unleashed. After the government funding cut, the work programs continued for a while.
In 1944, Heisenberg managed to create cast uranium plates, and a special bunker was built for a reactor plant in Berlin.
It was planned to complete the experiment to achieve a chain reaction in January 1945, but a month later the equipment was urgently transported to the Swiss border, where it was deployed only a month later. The nuclear reactor contained 664 cubes of uranium weighing 1525 kg. It was surrounded by a graphite neutron reflector weighing 10 tons, and an additional 1.5 tons of heavy water was loaded into the core.
On March 23, the reactor finally started working, but the report to Berlin was premature: the reactor did not reach a critical point, and a chain reaction did not occur. Additional calculations showed that the mass of uranium should be increased by at least 750 kg, adding proportionally the amount of heavy water.
But stocks of strategic raw materials were at their limit, as was the fate of the Third Reich. On April 23, the Americans entered the Haigerloch village, where the tests were carried out. The military dismantled the reactor and shipped it to the United States.
The first atomic bombs in the USA
A little later, the Germans began to develop the atomic bomb in the United States and Great Britain. It all began with a letter from Albert Einstein and his co-authors, emigrant physicists, sent by them in September 1939 to US President Franklin Roosevelt.
The appeal stressed that Nazi Germany is close to creating an atomic bomb.
Stalin first learned about work on nuclear weapons (both allies and opponents) from scouts in 1943. They immediately decided to create a similar project in the USSR. The instructions were given not only to scientists, but also to intelligence, for which the extraction of any information about nuclear secrets became a super task.
Invaluable information about the developments of American scientists, which was obtained soviet intelligence officers, has significantly advanced the domestic nuclear project. She helped our scientists avoid ineffective search paths and significantly accelerate the time frame for achieving the final goal.
Serov Ivan Aleksandrovich - head of the operation to create a bomb
Of course, the Soviet government could not ignore the successes of the German nuclear physicists. After the war, a group of Soviet physicists was sent to Germany - future academicians in the uniform of colonels of the Soviet army.
Ivan Serov, the first deputy commissar of internal affairs, was appointed head of the operation, which allowed scientists to open any doors.
In addition to their German colleagues, they tracked down reserves of uranium metal. This, according to Kurchatov, reduced the development time of the Soviet bomb by at least a year. More than one ton of uranium and leading nuclear specialists was taken out of Germany by the American military.
Not only chemists and physicists were sent to the USSR, but also skilled labor - mechanics, electrical fitters, glass blowers. Some of the employees were found in prisoner of war camps. In total, about 1000 German specialists worked on the Soviet atomic project.
German scientists and laboratories on the territory of the USSR in the post-war years
A uranium centrifuge and other equipment were transported from Berlin, as well as documents and reagents from the von Ardenne laboratory and the Kaiser Institute of Physics. Within the framework of the program, laboratories "A", "B", "C", "D" were created, which were headed by German scientists.
The head of laboratory "A" was Baron Manfred von Ardenne, who developed a method for gaseous diffusion purification and separation of uranium isotopes in a centrifuge.
For the creation of such a centrifuge (only on an industrial scale) in 1947 he received the Stalin Prize. At that time, the laboratory was located in Moscow, on the site of the famous Kurchatov Institute. The team of each German scientist consisted of 5-6 Soviet specialists.
Later laboratory "A" was taken to Sukhumi, where on its basis the Physics and Technology Institute was created. In 1953, Baron von Ardenne became a Stalinist laureate for the second time.
Laboratory "B", which conducted experiments in the field of radiation chemistry in the Urals, was headed by Nikolaus Riehl, a key figure in the project. There, in Snezhinsk, a talented Russian geneticist Timofeev-Ressovsky, with whom they were friends back in Germany, worked with him. The successful test of the atomic bomb earned Ryhl the Star of Hero of Socialist Labor and the Stalin Prize.
The research of laboratory "B" in Obninsk was led by Professor Rudolf Pose - a pioneer in the field of nuclear testing. His team managed to create fast neutron reactors, the first nuclear power plant in the USSR, projects of reactors for submarines.
On the basis of the laboratory, the Physics and Power Engineering Institute named after A.I. Leipunsky. Until 1957, the professor worked in Sukhumi, then in Dubna, at the Joint Institute of Nuclear Technologies.
Laboratory "G", located in the Sukhumi sanatorium "Agudzera", was headed by Gustav Hertz. The nephew of the famous 19th century scientist gained fame after a series of experiments that confirmed the ideas of quantum mechanics and the theory of Niels Bohr.
The results of it productive work in Sukhumi, they were used to create an industrial installation in Novouralsk, where in 1949 they made the filling of the first Soviet bomb RDS-1.
The uranium bomb that the Americans dropped on Hiroshima was of a cannon type. When creating the RDS-1, domestic atomic physicists were guided by the Fat Boy - the "Nagasaki bomb" made of plutonium according to the implosion principle.
In 1951, Hertz was awarded the Stalin Prize for his fruitful work.
German engineers and scientists lived in comfortable houses; from Germany they brought their families, furniture, paintings, they were provided with a decent salary and special food. Did they have prisoner status? According to academician A.P. Aleksandrov, an active participant in the project, all of them were prisoners in such conditions.
Having received permission to return to their homeland, German specialists signed a nondisclosure agreement about their participation in the Soviet atomic project for 25 years. In the GDR, they continued to work in their specialty. Baron von Ardenne was twice winner of the German National Prize.
The professor headed the Physics Institute in Dresden, which was created under the auspices of the Scientific Council for the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. The Scientific Council was chaired by Gustav Hertz, who received the GDR National Prize for his three-volume textbook on atomic physics. Here, in Dresden, in Technical University, Professor Rudolf Pose worked as well.
Participation in the Soviet atomic project of German specialists, as well as achievements soviet intelligence, do not diminish the merits of Soviet scientists who, with their heroic labor, created domestic atomic weapons. And yet, without the contribution of each participant in the project, the creation of the atomic industry and the nuclear bomb would have stretched indefinitely
In the USA and the USSR, work began simultaneously on the projects of the atomic bomb. In 1942, in August, in one of the buildings located in the courtyard of Kazan University, a secret Laboratory No. 2 began to operate. The head of this facility was Igor Kurchatov, the Russian "father" of the atomic bomb. At the same time in August, near Santa Fe, New Mexico, in the building of a former local school, the Metallurgical Laboratory, also secret, was opened. It was led by Robert Oppenheimer, the "father" of the atomic bomb from America.
It took a total of three years to complete the task. The first US was blown up at the test site in July 1945. Two more were dropped in August on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It took seven years for the birth of the atomic bomb in the USSR. The first explosion took place in 1949.
Igor Kurchatov: a short biography
The "father" of the atomic bomb in the USSR was born in 1903, on January 12. This event took place in the Ufa province, in the present-day city of Sim. Kurchatov is considered one of the founders of peaceful purposes.
He graduated with honors from the Simferopol men's gymnasium, as well as a vocational school. Kurchatov in 1920 entered the Tavrichesky University, the physics and mathematics department. Already 3 years later, he successfully graduated from this university ahead of schedule. The "father" of the atomic bomb in 1930 began working at the Physics and Technology Institute of Leningrad, where he headed the physics department.
The era before Kurchatov
Back in the 1930s, work began in the USSR related to atomic energy. Chemists and physicists from various scientific centers, as well as specialists from other countries, took part in all-union conferences organized by the USSR Academy of Sciences.
Radium samples were obtained in 1932. And in 1939 the chain reaction of fission of heavy atoms was calculated. 1940 became a landmark year in the nuclear field: the design of the atomic bomb was created, and methods for producing uranium-235 were proposed. Conventional explosives were first proposed to be used as a fuse to initiate a chain reaction. Also in 1940, Kurchatov presented his report on the fission of heavy nuclei.
Research during the Great Patriotic War
After the Germans attacked the USSR in 1941, nuclear research was suspended. The main Leningrad and Moscow institutes, which dealt with the problems of nuclear physics, were urgently evacuated.
The head of strategic intelligence, Beria, knew that Western physicists believed that atomic weapons were an achievable reality. According to historical data, Robert Oppenheimer, the head of the atomic bomb in America, came incognito to the USSR in September 1939. The Soviet leadership could learn about the possibility of obtaining this weapon from the information provided by this "father" of the atomic bomb.
In 1941, intelligence data from Great Britain and the United States began to arrive in the USSR. According to this information, intensive work has been launched in the West, the purpose of which is to create nuclear weapons.
In the spring of 1943, Laboratory No. 2 was created for the production of the first atomic bomb in the USSR. The question arose as to whom to entrust the leadership of it. The list of candidates initially included about 50 names. Beria, however, chose Kurchatov. He was summoned in October 1943 to a bride in Moscow. Today the scientific center that grew out of this laboratory bears his name - "Kurchatov Institute".
In 1946, on April 9, a decree was issued on the creation of a design bureau at Laboratory No. 2. Only at the beginning of 1947, the first production buildings were ready, which were located in the zone of the Mordovian nature reserve. Some of the laboratories were located in the monastery buildings.
RDS-1, the first Russian atomic bomb
They called the Soviet prototype RDS-1, which, according to one version, meant special. "After a while, this abbreviation began to be deciphered somewhat differently -" Stalin's jet engine. "In the documents to ensure secrecy, the Soviet bomb was called a" rocket engine. "
It was a device with a capacity of 22 kilotons. Its development of atomic weapons was carried out in the USSR, but the need to catch up with the United States, which had gone ahead during the war, forced domestic science use the data obtained by intelligence. The first Russian atomic bomb was based on the "Fat Man" developed by the Americans (pictured below).
It was he who was dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. Worked "Fat Man" on the decay of plutonium-239. The detonation scheme was implosive: the charges exploded along the perimeter of the fissile material and created a blast wave, which "squeezed" the substance in the center, and caused a chain reaction. This scheme was later recognized as ineffective.
The Soviet RDS-1 was made in the form of a large diameter and mass of a free-fall bomb. A charge of an atomic explosive device was made from plutonium. The electrical equipment, as well as the RDS-1 ballistic body, were of domestic design. The bomb consisted of a ballistic body, nuclear charge, explosive device, as well as equipment for automatic charge detonation systems.
Uranium deficiency
Soviet physics, taking the American plutonium bomb as a basis, faced a problem that had to be solved in an extremely short time: the production of plutonium had not yet begun in the USSR at the time of development. Therefore, trophy uranium was originally used. However, the reactor required at least 150 tons of this substance. In 1945, mines in East Germany and Czechoslovakia resumed their work. Uranium deposits in the Chita region, in the Kolyma, in Kazakhstan, in Central Asia, in the North Caucasus and Ukraine were found in 1946.
In the Urals, near the city of Kyshtym (not far from Chelyabinsk), they began to build "Mayak" - a radiochemical plant, and the first industrial reactor in the USSR. Kurchatov personally supervised the laying of uranium. Construction was launched in 1947 in three more locations: two in the Middle Urals and one in the Gorky region.
Construction work proceeded at a rapid pace, but uranium was still in short supply. The first industrial reactor could not be launched even by 1948. The uranium was loaded only on June 7 of this year.
Nuclear reactor start-up experiment
The "father" of the Soviet atomic bomb personally took over the duties of the chief operator at the control panel of the nuclear reactor. On June 7, between 11 and 12 o'clock in the morning, Kurchatov began an experiment to launch it. The reactor reached 100 kilowatts on June 8. After that, the "father" of the Soviet atomic bomb drowned out the chain reaction that had begun. The next stage of preparation of the nuclear reactor lasted for two days. After cooling water was supplied, it became clear that the available uranium was insufficient to carry out the experiment. The reactor reached a critical state only after loading the fifth portion of the substance. The chain reaction became possible again. It happened at 8 am on June 10th.
On the 17th of the same month, Kurchatov, the creator of the atomic bomb in the USSR, made an entry in the shift supervisor's journal, in which he warned that the water supply should in no case be stopped, otherwise an explosion would occur. On June 19, 1938 at 12:45, the industrial start-up of the nuclear reactor, the first in Eurasia, took place.
Successful bomb tests
In June 1949, the USSR accumulated 10 kg of plutonium - the amount that was planted in the bomb by the Americans. Kurchatov, the creator of the atomic bomb in the USSR, following Beria's decree, ordered a test of the RDS-1 for August 29.
A section of the Irtysh waterless steppe, located in Kazakhstan, not far from Semipalatinsk, was assigned as a test site. In the center of this experimental field, the diameter of which was about 20 km, a metal tower 37.5 meters high was constructed. RDS-1 was installed on it.
The charge used in the bomb was a multilayer design. In it, the transfer to the critical state of the active substance was carried out by compressing it using a spherical converging detonation wave, which was formed in the explosive.
Explosion consequences
The tower was completely destroyed after the explosion. A funnel appeared in its place. However, the main damage was caused by the shock wave. According to the description of eyewitnesses, when on August 30 a trip to the explosion site took place, the experimental field was a terrible picture. The highway and railway bridges were thrown back at a distance of 20-30 m and were twisted. Cars and wagons are scattered at a distance of 50-80 m from the place where they were, residential buildings were completely destroyed. The tanks used to test the force of the strike lay with knocked down towers on their sides, and the cannons became a heap of twisted metal. Also, 10 Pobeda cars, specially brought here for the experiment, burned down.
A total of 5 RDS-1 bombs were manufactured. They were not transferred to the Air Force, but were stored in Arzamas-16. Today in Sarov, which was previously Arzamas-16 (the laboratory is shown in the photo below), a model of the bomb is on display. It is in the local nuclear weapons museum.
"Fathers" of the atomic bomb
Only 12 Nobel laureates, future and present, participated in the creation of the American atomic bomb. In addition, they were assisted by a group of scientists from Great Britain, which was sent to Los Alamos in 1943.
In Soviet times, it was believed that the USSR completely independently solved the atomic problem. Everywhere it was said that Kurchatov, the creator of the atomic bomb in the USSR, was its "father". Although rumors of secrets stolen from the Americans occasionally leaked out. And only in the 1990s, 50 years later, Julius Khariton, one of the main participants in the events of that time, spoke about the great role of intelligence in creating the Soviet project. The technical and scientific results of the Americans were obtained by Klaus Fuchs, who arrived in an English group.
Therefore, Oppenheimer can be considered the "father" of the bombs that were created on both sides of the ocean. We can say that he was the creator of the first atomic bomb in the USSR. Both projects, American and Russian, were based on his ideas. It is wrong to consider Kurchatov and Oppenheimer to be only outstanding organizers. We have already talked about the Soviet scientist, as well as about the contribution made by the creator of the first atomic bomb in the USSR. Oppenheimer's major accomplishments were scientific. It was thanks to them that he turned out to be the head of the atomic project, as did the creator of the atomic bomb in the USSR.
Short biography of Robert Oppenheimer
This scientist was born in 1904, on April 22, in New York. in 1925 he graduated from Harvard University. The future creator of the first atomic bomb underwent an internship for a year at the Cavendish Laboratory at Rutherford. A year later, the scientist moved to the University of Göttingen. Here, under the leadership of M. Born, he defended doctoral dissertation... In 1928, the scientist returned to the United States. The "father" of the American atomic bomb from 1929 to 1947 taught at two universities in this country - California institute of Technology and the University of California.
On July 16, 1945, the first bomb was successfully tested in the United States, and shortly thereafter, Oppenheimer, along with other members of the Provisional Committee created under President Truman, was forced to select targets for the future atomic bombing. Many of his colleagues by that time actively opposed the use of dangerous nuclear weapons, which were not necessary, since Japan's surrender was a foregone conclusion. Oppenheimer did not join them.
Explaining his behavior later, he said that he relied on politicians and the military, who were better acquainted with the real situation. In October 1945, Oppenheimer ceased to be director of the Los Alamos Laboratory. He began work in Priston as head of the local research institute... His fame in the United States, as well as outside this country, reached its climax. New York newspapers wrote about him more and more often. President Truman presented Oppenheimer with the Medal of Merit, the highest order in America.
Apart from scientific works, he wrote several "Open Mind", "Science and Ordinary Knowledge" and others.
This scientist died in 1967, on February 18. Oppenheimer was a heavy smoker from his youth. He was diagnosed with laryngeal cancer in 1965. At the end of 1966, after an operation that did not bring results, he underwent chemotherapy and radiotherapy. However, the treatment had no effect, and on February 18, the scientist died.
So, Kurchatov is the "father" of the atomic bomb in the USSR, Oppenheimer in the USA. Now you know the names of those who pioneered the development of nuclear weapons. Having answered the question: "Who is called the father of the atomic bomb?", We talked only about initial stages stories of this dangerous weapon. It continues to this day. Moreover, today new developments are being actively pursued in this area. The "father" of the atomic bomb, American Robert Oppenheimer, and Russian scientist Igor Kurchatov were only pioneers in this matter.
Change in US military doctrine from 1945 to 1996 and basic concepts
//On the territory of the United States, in Los Alamos, in the desert expanses of New Mexico, an American nuclear center was established in 1942. On its basis, work was launched to create a nuclear bomb. The general management of the project was entrusted to the talented nuclear physicist R. Oppenheimer. Under his leadership, the best minds of that time were collected, not only from the United States and England, but almost all Western Europe... A huge team worked on the creation of nuclear weapons, including 12 laureates Nobel Prize... There was no shortage of funds either.
By the summer of 1945, the Americans had managed to assemble two atomic bombs, named "Kid" and "Fat Man". The first bomb weighed 2,722 kg and was loaded with enriched Uranium-235. "Fat Man" with a charge from Plutonium-239 with a capacity of more than 20 kt had a mass of 3175 kg. On June 16, the first field test of a nuclear device took place, timed to coincide with the meeting of the leaders of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France.
By this time, the relationship between the former associates had changed. It should be noted that the United States, as soon as it had an atomic bomb, sought a monopoly right to possess it in order to deprive other countries of the opportunity to use atomic energy at their discretion.
US President H. Truman became the first political leader who decided to use nuclear bombs. From a military point of view, there was no need for such bombing of densely populated Japanese cities. But political motives during this period prevailed over the military. The leadership of the United States strove for supremacy in the entire post-war world, and the nuclear bombings, in their opinion, were to become a significant reinforcement of these aspirations. To this end, they began to seek the adoption of the American "Baruch Plan", which would secure for the United States monopoly ownership of atomic weapons, in other words, "absolute military superiority."
The fatal hour has come. On 6 and 9 August, the crews of the B-29 Enola Gay and Bocks car dropped their deadly cargo on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The total human losses and the scale of destruction from these bombings are characterized by the following figures: instantly died from thermal radiation (temperature about 5000 degrees C) and a shock wave - 300 thousand people, another 200 thousand were injured, burned, irradiated. On an area of \u200b\u200b12 sq. km, all buildings were completely destroyed. In Hiroshima alone, out of 90,000 buildings, 62,000 were destroyed. These bombings shocked the whole world. It is believed that this event marked the beginning of the nuclear arms race and the confrontation between the two political systems of that time at a new qualitative level.
The development of American strategic offensive weapons after World War II was carried out depending on the provisions of military doctrine. Its political side determined the main goal of the US leadership - the achievement of world domination. The main obstacle in the way of these aspirations was considered the Soviet Union, which, in their opinion, should have been eliminated. Depending on the balance of power in the world, the achievements of science and technology, its basic provisions changed, which was reflected in the adoption of certain strategic strategies (concepts). Each subsequent strategy did not completely replace the one that preceded it, but only modernized it, mainly in matters of determining the ways of building the Armed Forces and methods of waging war.
From mid-1945 to 1953, the American military-political leadership in the development of strategic nuclear forces (SNF) proceeded from the assumption that the United States had a monopoly in nuclear weapons and could achieve world domination by eliminating the USSR in a nuclear war. Preparations for such a war began almost immediately after the defeat of Nazi Germany. This is evidenced by the directive of the Joint Defense Planning Committee No. 432 / d of December 14, 1945, where the task was set to prepare the atomic bombing of 20 Soviet cities - the main political and industrial centers of the Soviet Union. At the same time, it was planned to use the entire stock of atomic bombs available at that time (196 pieces), which were carried by modernized B-29 bombers. The method of their application was also determined - a sudden atomic "first strike", which should confront the Soviet leadership with the fact that further resistance was futile.
The political rationale for such actions is the thesis about the "Soviet threat", one of the main authors of which can be considered the US Charge d'Affaires in the USSR, J. Kennan. It was he who, on February 22, 1946, sent a "long telegram" to Washington, where in eight thousand words outlined the "life threat" that seemed to be hanging over the United States, and proposed a strategy of confrontation with the Soviet Union.
President H. Truman gave instructions to develop a doctrine (later called the "Truman Doctrine") for a policy of strength in relation to the USSR. In order to centralize planning and increase the effectiveness of the use of strategic aviation, the Strategic Aviation Command (SAC) was created in the spring of 1947. At the same time, the task of improving strategic aviation technology is being implemented at an accelerated pace.
By mid-1948, the Chiefs of Staff Committee had drawn up a plan for a nuclear war with the USSR, code-named Chariotir. He stipulated that the war should begin "with concentrated raids using atomic bombs against government, political and administrative centers, industrial cities and selected oil refineries from bases in the Western Hemisphere and England." In the first 30 days alone, it was planned to drop 133 nuclear bombs on 70 Soviet cities.
However, as calculated by American military analysts, this was not enough to achieve a quick victory. They believed that during this time Soviet army will be able to master key regions of Europe and Asia. In early 1949, a special committee of the highest ranks of the army, aviation and navy was created under the leadership of Lieutenant General H. Harmon, who was tasked with trying to assess the political and military consequences of the planned nuclear offensive against the Soviet Union from the air. The committee's findings and calculations clearly indicated that the United States nuclear war not ready yet.
The committee's conclusions indicated that it was necessary to increase the numerical strength of the SAC, increase its combat capabilities, and replenish nuclear arsenals. To ensure the delivery of a massive nuclear strike by air means, the United States needs to create a network of bases along the borders of the USSR, from which bombers carrying nuclear weapons could carry out combat missions along the shortest routes to planned targets on Soviet territory. It is necessary to launch serial production of the B-36 heavy strategic intercontinental bombers capable of operating from bases on American territory.
The announcement that the Soviet Union had acquired the secret of nuclear weapons made the US ruling circles want to unleash a preventive war as soon as possible. The Troian plan was developed, which called for fighting January 1, 1950. At that time, SAC had 840 strategic bombers in combat units, 1350 in reserve and over 300 atomic bombs.
To assess its viability, the Committee of Chiefs of Staff ordered Lieutenant General D. Hull's group to test the chances of disabling nine of the most important strategic areas in the Soviet Union at headquarters games. Having lost the air offensive against the USSR, Hull's analysts summed up: the probability of achieving these goals is 70%, which will entail the loss of 55% of the existing bombers. It turned out that the US strategic aviation in this case will very quickly lose combat capability. Therefore, the question of preventive war in 1950 was removed. Soon the American leadership was able to make sure in practice that such assessments were correct. During the Korean War, which began in 1950, B-29 bombers suffered heavy losses from attacks by jet fighter aircraft.
But the world situation was changing rapidly, which was reflected in the American strategy of "massive retaliation", adopted in 1953. It was based on the superiority of the United States over the USSR in the number of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Provided for a general nuclear war against the countries of the socialist camp. The main means of achieving victory was considered to be strategic aviation, for the development of which up to 50% of the financial resources allocated to the Ministry of Defense for the purchase of weapons were allocated.
In 1955, the SAC had 1565 bombers, 70% of which were jet B-47s, and 4750 nuclear bombs for them with a yield of 50 kt to 20 Mt. In the same year, the B-52 heavy strategic bomber was adopted, which is gradually becoming the main intercontinental carrier of nuclear weapons.
At the same time, the military-political leadership of the United States is beginning to realize that in the conditions of the rapid increase in the capabilities of Soviet air defense systems, heavy bombers cannot single-handedly solve the problem of achieving victory in a nuclear war. In 1958, the Thor and Jupiter medium-range ballistic missiles, which are being deployed in Europe, entered service. A year later, the first Atlas-D intercontinental missiles were put on alert, and the introduction of the nuclear submarine J. Washington "with" Polaris-A1 "missiles.
With the introduction of ballistic missiles in the strategic nuclear forces, the US's capabilities to deliver a nuclear strike increase significantly. However, in the USSR, by the end of the 1950s, intercontinental carriers of nuclear weapons were being created capable of striking back against the territory of the United States. The Pentagon was particularly concerned about Soviet ICBMs. Under these conditions, the leaders of the United States considered that the strategy of "massive retaliation" did not fully correspond to modern realities and should be adjusted.
By the early 1960s, nuclear planning in the United States was becoming centralized. Prior to that, each branch of the Armed Forces planned to use nuclear weapons independently. But the increase in the number of strategic delivery vehicles required the creation of a single body for planning nuclear operations. It became the Joint Strategic Objectives Planning Headquarters, subordinate to the commander of the SAC and the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces. In December 1960, the first unified plan for conducting a nuclear war was drawn up, which was named the "Unified Comprehensive Operational Plan" - SIOP. It provided, in accordance with the requirements of the strategy of "massive retaliation", against the USSR and China only a general nuclear war with unlimited use of nuclear weapons (3.5 thousand nuclear warheads).
In 1961, a “flexible response” strategy was adopted, reflecting changes in official views on the possible nature of a war with the USSR. In addition to a general nuclear war, American strategists began to admit the possibility of the limited use of nuclear weapons and the conduct of wars with conventional means of destruction for a short time (no more than two weeks). The choice of methods and means of warfare had to be carried out taking into account the current geostrategic situation, the balance of forces and the availability of resources.
The new installations had a very significant impact on the development of American strategic weapons. A rapid quantitative growth of ICBMs and SLBMs begins. Special attention is paid to the improvement of the latter, since they could be used as means of "forward deployment" in Europe. At the same time, the American government no longer needed to look for possible deployment areas for them and persuade the Europeans to give their consent to the use of their territory, as it was during the deployment of medium-range missiles.
The military-political leadership of the United States believed that it was necessary to have such a quantitative composition of the strategic nuclear forces, the use of which would ensure the "guaranteed destruction" of the Soviet Union as a viable state.
In the early years of this decade, a significant grouping of ICBMs was deployed. So, if at the beginning of 1960 in combat strength SAC had 20 missiles of only one type - "Atlas-D", by the end of 1962 - already 294. By this time, the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missiles of the "E" and "F" modifications, "Titan-1" and "Minuteman-1A". The latest ICBMs in terms of the degree of perfection were several orders of magnitude higher than their predecessors. In the same year, the tenth American SSBN went on combat patrols. The total number of Polaris-A1 and Polaris-A2 SLBMs has reached 160 units. The last of the ordered B-52H heavy bombers and B-58 medium bombers entered service. The total number of bombers in the Strategic Air Command was 1,819. Thus, the American nuclear triad of strategic offensive forces (units and formations of ICBMs, nuclear missile submarines and strategic bombers) was formed, each component of which harmoniously complemented each other. It was equipped with over 6,000 nuclear warheads.
In mid-1961, the SIOP-2 plan was approved, reflecting the "flexible response" strategy. It envisaged the conduct of five interconnected operations to destroy the Soviet nuclear arsenal, suppress the air defense system, destroy bodies and points of military and state control, large groupings of troops, as well as deliver strikes on cities. The total number of targets in the plan was 6,000. In place of those, the developers of the plan also took into account the possibility of the Soviet Union delivering a retaliatory nuclear strike on US territory.
At the beginning of 1961, a commission was formed, whose duties were charged with working out promising ways of developing American strategic nuclear forces. Subsequently, such commissions were created regularly.
In the fall of 1962, the world again found itself on the brink of nuclear war. The outbreak of the Cuban missile crisis made politicians around the world look at nuclear weapons from a new angle. For the first time, it clearly played the role of a deterrent. The sudden appearance of Soviet medium-range missiles in Cuba for the United States and their lack of overwhelming superiority in the number of ICBMs and SLBMs over the Soviet Union made a military solution to the conflict impossible.
The American military leadership immediately declared the need for additional armament, in fact, taking a course towards unleashing a strategic offensive arms race (START). The desires of the military found due support in the US Senate. A huge amount of money was allocated for the development of strategic offensive arms, which made it possible to qualitatively and quantitatively improve the strategic nuclear forces. In 1965, the Thor and Jupiter missiles, Atlas of all modifications and Titan-1 were completely decommissioned. They were replaced by the Minuteman-1V and Minuteman-2 intercontinental missiles, as well as the Titan-2 heavy ICBM.
The marine component of the SNA has grown significantly, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Considering such factors as the almost undivided domination of the US Navy and the combined NATO fleet in the vastness of the oceans in the early 60s, the high survivability, stealth and mobility of SSBNs, the American leadership decided to significantly increase the number of deployed submarine missile carriers that could successfully replace medium-range missiles. range. Their main targets were to be the large industrial and administrative centers of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.
In 1967, the strategic nuclear forces had 41 SSBNs with 656 missiles, of which more than 80% were Polaris-A3 SLBMs, 1,054 ICBMs, and over 800 heavy bombers. After the obsolete B-47 aircraft were removed from service, the nuclear bombs intended for them were eliminated. In connection with the change in strategic aviation tactics, the AGM-28 Hound Dog cruise missiles with a nuclear warhead were supplied to the B-52.
The rapid growth in the second half of the 60s in the number of Soviet ICBMs of the "OS" type with improved characteristics, the creation of a missile defense system, made the likelihood of America achieving a quick victory in a possible nuclear war scanty.
The strategic nuclear arms race posed more and more new challenges to the US military-industrial complex. It was necessary to find a new way of rapidly building up nuclear power. The high scientific and production level of the leading American rocket-building firms made it possible to solve this problem as well. The designers have found a way to significantly increase the number of lifted nuclear charges without increasing the number of their carriers. Multiple warheads (MIRVs) were developed and introduced, first with scattering combat elements, and then with individual guidance.
The US leadership decided that the time had come to slightly adjust the military-technical side of its military doctrine. Using the tried and tested thesis about the "Soviet missile threat" and "the US lagging behind," it easily secured the allocation of funds for new strategic weapons. Since 1970, the deployment of Minuteman-3 ICBMs and Poseidon-S3 SLBMs with MIRV-type MIRVs began. At the same time, the outdated "Minuteman-1B" and "Polaris" were removed from combat duty.
In 1971, the "realistic intimidation" strategy was officially adopted. It was based on the idea of \u200b\u200bnuclear superiority over the USSR. The authors of the strategy took into account the coming equality in the number of strategic delivery vehicles between the USA and the USSR. By that time, without taking into account the nuclear forces of Britain and France, the following balance of strategic weapons had been formed. In terms of land-based ICBMs, the United States had 1,054 versus 1,300 in the Soviet Union, in terms of the number of SLBMs, 656 versus 300, and for strategic bombers, 550 versus 145, respectively. The new strategy for the development of strategic offensive arms provided for a sharp increase in the number of nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles while improving their tactical and technical characteristics, which was supposed to ensure a qualitative superiority over the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces.
The improvement of the strategic offensive forces was reflected in the next plan - SIOP-4, adopted in 1971. It was developed taking into account the interaction of all components of the nuclear triad and provided for the defeat of 16 thousand targets.
But under pressure from the world community, the US leadership was forced to negotiate on nuclear disarmament. The methods of conducting such negotiations were regulated by the concept of "negotiating from a position of strength" - component strategies of "realistic intimidation". In 1972, the Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Limitation of ABM Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures in the Field of Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-1) were signed. However, the building up of the strategic nuclear potential of the opposing political systems continued.
By the mid-70s, the deployment of the Minuteman-3 and Poseidon missile systems was completed. All Lafayette-class SSBNs equipped with new missiles have been upgraded. Heavy bombers have been armed with SRAM nuclear missile launchers. All this led to a sharp increase in the nuclear arsenal assigned to strategic delivery vehicles. So for five years from 1970 to 1975, the number of warheads increased from 5102 to 8500 pieces. Improvement of the strategic arms combat control system was in full swing, which made it possible to implement the principle of rapid re-aiming of warheads to new targets. To completely recalculate and replace the flight task for one missile now required only a few tens of minutes, and the entire grouping of ICBM SNS could be re-aimed in 10 hours. By the end of 1979, this system had been implemented at all ICBM launchers and launch control posts. At the same time, the security of the Minuteman ICBM silo launchers was increased.
The qualitative improvement of US strategic offensive arms made it possible to move from the concept of "guaranteed destruction" to the concept of "target selection", which provided for multivariate actions - from a limited nuclear strike by several missiles to a massive strike against the entire complex of targeted targets. The SIOP-5 plan was drawn up and approved in 1975, which provided for strikes against military, administrative and economic facilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries in total up to 25 thousand.
The main form of use of American strategic offensive arms was considered a sudden massive nuclear strike by all combat-ready ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as a number of heavy bombers. By this time, SLBMs had become the leading ones in the US nuclear triad. If until 1970 most of the nuclear charges belonged to strategic aviation, then in 1975 4536 warheads were installed on 656 sea-based missiles (on 1054 ICBMs - 2154 charges, and on heavy bombers - 1800). The views on their application have also changed. In addition to striking cities, given the short flight time (12 - 18 minutes), submarine missiles could be used to defeat starting Soviet ICBMs in the active section of the trajectory or directly in launchers, preventing their launch before the American ICBMs approach. The latter were entrusted with the task of hitting highly protected targets and, first of all, silos and command posts of missile units of the Strategic Missile Forces. Thus, a Soviet retaliatory nuclear strike on US territory could be thwarted or significantly weakened. Heavy bombers were planned to be used to destroy surviving or newly identified targets.
From the second half of the 70s, the transformation of the views of the American political leadership on the prospects for nuclear war began. Taking into account the opinion of the majority of scientists that even a retaliatory Soviet nuclear strike would be fatal for the United States, it decided to accept the theory of limited nuclear war for one theater of operations, namely, the European one. New nuclear weapons were needed for its implementation.
The administration of President J. Carter has allocated funds for the development and production of the highly efficient strategic sea-based system "Trident". The implementation of this project was supposed to be carried out in two stages. On the first, it was planned to re-equip 12 SSBNs of the type "J. Madison "with Trident-S4 missiles, as well as build and commission 8 new generation Ohio-class SSBNs with 24 of the same missiles. At the second stage, it was planned to build 14 more SSBNs and arm all the boats of this project with the new Trident-D5 SLBM with higher tactical and technical characteristics.
In 1979, President J. Carter made a decision on the full-scale production of the Piskiper (MX) intercontinental ballistic missile, which, in terms of its characteristics, was supposed to surpass all existing Soviet ICBMs. Its development has been carried out since the mid-70s, along with the Pershing-2 MRBM and a new type of strategic weapons - long-range ground and air-based cruise missiles.
With the coming to power of the administration of President R. Reagan, the "doctrine of neoglobalism" emerged, reflecting the new views of the military-political leadership of the United States on the path to achieving world domination. It provided for a wide range of measures (political, economic, ideological, military) to "roll back communism", direct use military force against those countries where the United States sees a threat to its "vital interests." Naturally, the military-technical side of the doctrine was also adjusted. In the 1980s, it was based on the strategy of "direct confrontation" with the USSR on a global and regional scale, aimed at achieving "complete and indisputable US military superiority."
The Pentagon soon drew up "Directives for the Construction of the US Armed Forces" for the coming years. In them, in particular, it was determined that in a nuclear war "the United States must prevail and be able to force the USSR to cease hostilities in a short time on US terms." The military plans provided for the conduct of both general and limited nuclear war within the framework of one theater of operations. In addition, the task was to be ready to conduct an effective war from space.
On the basis of these provisions, concepts for the development of the SNA were developed. The concept of "strategic sufficiency" required to have such a combat composition of strategic delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads for them in order to ensure the "deterrence" of the Soviet Union. " The concept of "active counteraction" envisaged ways of ensuring flexibility in the use of strategic offensive forces in any situation - from a single use of nuclear weapons to the use of the entire nuclear arsenal.
In March 1980, the President approved the SIOP-5D plan. The plan provided for the delivery of three variants of nuclear strikes: preventive, retaliatory-counter and retaliatory. The number of targets was 40 thousand, which included 900 cities with a population of over 250 thousand each, 15 thousand industrial and economic facilities, 3500 military targets on the territory of the USSR, Warsaw Pact countries, China, Vietnam and Cuba.
In early October 1981, President Reagan announced his "strategic program" for the 1980s, which contained guidelines for further building up the strategic nuclear potential. The latest hearings on this program were held at six meetings of the US Congress War Committee. They were attended by representatives of the President, the Ministry of Defense, leading scientists in the field of weapons. As a result of comprehensive discussions of all structural elements, the strategic arms buildup program was approved. In accordance with it, starting from 1983, 108 Pershing-2 MRBM launchers and 464 BGM-109G land-based cruise missiles were deployed in Europe as forward-based nuclear weapons.
In the second half of the 1980s, another concept was developed - “substantial equivalence”. It determined how, in the context of the reduction and elimination of some types of strategic offensive arms, by improving the combat characteristics of others, to ensure a qualitative superiority over the USSR's strategic nuclear forces.
Since 1985, the deployment of 50 silo-based MX ICBMs began (another 50 missiles of this type in the mobile version were planned to be put on alert at the beginning of the 90s) and 100 heavy bombers B-1V. The production of BGM-86 air-launched cruise missiles to equip 180 B-52 bombers was in full swing. A new MIRV with more powerful warheads was installed on 350 Minuteman-3 ICBMs, while the control system was modernized.
An interesting situation has developed after the deployment of Pershing-2 missiles in West Germany. Formally, this group was not part of the US SNA and was a nuclear weapon of the Supreme Commander of the NATO Allied Armed Forces in Europe (this position was always held by representatives of the United States). The official version for the world community, its deployment in Europe was a reaction to the appearance of the Soviet Union RSD-10 (SS-20) missiles and the need to re-arm NATO in the face of a missile threat from the East. In fact, of course, the reason was different, which was confirmed by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces of NATO in Europe, General B. Rogers. He said in one of his speeches in 1983: “Most people believe that we are modernizing our weapons because of the SS-20 missiles. We would have carried out modernization even if there were no SS-20 missiles. "
The main purpose of the Pershing (included in the SIOP plan) was to inflict a decapitation strike on the command posts of the strategic formations of the USSR Armed Forces and the Strategic Missile Forces in Eastern Europe, which was supposed to disrupt the implementation of the Soviet retaliatory strike. To do this, they possessed all the necessary tactical and technical characteristics: short approach time (8-10 minutes), high firing accuracy and a nuclear charge capable of hitting highly protected targets. Thus, it became clear that they were intended for solving strategic offensive tasks.
Land-based cruise missiles, also considered a NATO nuclear weapon, became a dangerous weapon. But their use was envisaged in accordance with the "SIOP" plan. Their main advantage was high firing accuracy (up to 30 m) and stealth flight, which took place at an altitude of several tens of meters, which, combined with a small effective dispersion area, made the interception of such missiles by an air defense system extremely difficult. Any high-security point targets such as command posts, silos, etc. could be the targets for the CD.
However, by the end of the 1980s, the United States and the USSR had accumulated such a huge nuclear potential that it had long outgrown reasonable limits. A situation arose when it was necessary to decide what to do next. The situation was aggravated by the fact that half of the ICBMs (Minuteman-2 and part of Minuteman-3) had been in operation for 20 years or more. Keeping them in combat readiness cost more and more every year. Under these conditions, the country's leadership decided on the possibility of a 50% reduction in strategic offensive arms, subject to a reciprocal step by the Soviet Union. Such an agreement was concluded at the end of July 1991. Its provisions largely determined the path of the development of strategic weapons in the 90s. An instruction was given for the development of such strategic offensive arms, so that the USSR would have to spend large financial and material resources to counter the threat from them.
The situation changed dramatically after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result, the United States achieved world domination and remained the only "superpower" in the world. Finally, the political part of American military doctrine was fulfilled. But with the ending " cold war"According to the Clinton administration, threats to US interests remain. In 1995, the National Military Strategy report appeared, presented by the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, and sent to Congress. It was the last of the official documents that set out the provisions of the new military doctrine. It is based on a “flexible and selective engagement strategy”. Certain adjustments in the new strategy have been made to the content of the main strategic concepts.
The military-political leadership still relies on force, and the Armed Forces are preparing to wage war and achieve "victory in any wars, wherever and whenever they arise." Naturally, the military structure is being improved, including the strategic nuclear forces. They are entrusted with the task of deterring and intimidating a potential enemy, both in a peacetime period and during a general or limited war using conventional weapons.
A significant place in theoretical developments is given to the place and methods of operation of the SNS in a nuclear war. Taking into account the current balance of forces between the United States and Russia in the field of strategic weapons, the American military-political leadership believes that goals in a nuclear war can be achieved as a result of multiple and spaced nuclear strikes against objects of military and economic potential, administrative and political control. In terms of time, it can be both proactive and reciprocal actions.
The following types of nuclear strikes are envisaged: selective - to destroy various command and control organs, limited or regional (for example, against enemy forces in the course of a conventional war with an unsuccessful development of the situation) and massive. In this regard, a certain reorganization of the US strategic offensive arms was carried out. A further change in American views on the possible development and use of strategic nuclear weapons can be expected at the beginning of the next millennium.
- the original name of an aviation nuclear bomb, the action of which is based on an explosive chain nuclear fission reaction. With the advent of the so-called hydrogen bomb, based on a thermonuclear fusion reaction, a common term for them was established - a nuclear bomb.
Development of the first Soviet atomic bomb RDS-1 ("product 501", atomic charge "1-200") began at KB-11 of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building (now the All-Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics, Russian Federal Nuclear Center (RFNC-VNIIEF), Sarov, Nizhny Novgorod region) July 1, 1946 under the leadership of Academician Yuliy Khariton. The USSR Academy of Sciences, many research institutes, design bureaus, and defense plants took part in the development.
To implement the Soviet atomic project, it was decided to follow the path of approaching American prototypes, the performance of which has already been proven in practice. In addition, scientific and technical information about American atomic bombs was obtained through reconnaissance.
At the same time, it was clear from the very beginning that many technical solutions American prototypes are not the best. Even at the initial stages, Soviet specialists could offer the best solutions for both the charge as a whole and its individual units. But the demand of the country's leadership was to get a working bomb with the least risk before its first test.
Presumably, the design of the RDS-1 was largely based on the American "Fat Man". Although some systems, such as the ballistic body and electronic filling, were of Soviet design. Intelligence materials on the US plutonium bomb made it possible to avoid a number of mistakes in the creation of a bomb by Soviet scientists and designers, significantly reduce the time for its development, and reduce costs.
The first domestic atomic bomb had the official designation RDS-1. It was deciphered in different ways: "Russia makes itself", "Motherland gives to Stalin", etc. But to ensure secrecy in the official decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of June 21, 1946, it was referred to as "Special jet engine" ("C" ).
Initially, the atomic bomb was developed in two versions: using "heavy fuel" (plutonium, RDS-1) and using "light fuel" (uranium-235, RDS-2). In 1948, work on the RDS-2 was curtailed due to its relatively low efficiency.
Structurally, the RDS-1 consisted of the following principal components: a nuclear charge; explosive device and automatic charge detonation system with safety systems; ballistic body of the bomb, which housed a nuclear charge and automatic detonation.
Inside the hull was located a nuclear charge (made of high-purity plutonium) with a capacity of 20 kilotons and blocks of the automation system. The charge of the RDS-1 bomb was a multilayer structure, in which the transfer of the active substance (plutonium to the supercritical state) was carried out due to its compression by means of a converging spherical detonation wave in an explosive. Plutonium was located in the center of a nuclear charge and structurally consisted of two spherical semi-parts. A neutron initiator (detonator) was installed in the cavity of the plutonium core. On top of the plutonium were two layers of explosive (an alloy of TNT with hexagen). The inner layer was formed from two hemispherical bases, the outer one was assembled from separate elements. The outer layer (focusing system) was designed to create a spherical detonation wave. The bomb automation system ensured the implementation of a nuclear explosion at the desired point of the bomb fall trajectory. To increase the reliability of the operation of the product, the main elements of the automatic detonation were made according to a redundant scheme. In case of failure of a high-altitude fuse, an impact type fuse is installed to carry out a nuclear explosion when a bomb hits the ground.
During the tests, the operability of the systems and mechanisms of the bomb was first checked when dropped from an aircraft without a plutonium charge. The bomb ballistics testing was completed by 1949.
For testing a nuclear charge in 1949, a test site was built near the city of Semipalatinsk, Kazakh SSR, in the waterless steppe. On the experimental field there were numerous structures with measuring equipment, military, civil and industrial facilities to study the impact of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion. In the center of the experimental field there was a 37.5-meter-high metal tower for the RDS-1 installation.
On August 29, 1949, at the Semipalatinsk test site, an atomic charge with automatic equipment was placed on the tower, without a bomb body. The power of the explosion was 20 kilotons of TNT.
The technology for creating domestic nuclear weapons was created, and the country had to develop its serial production.
Even before the test of the atomic charge in March 1949, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution on the construction of the USSR's first plant for the industrial production of atomic bombs in the closed area of \u200b\u200bfacility No. 550, as part of KB-11, with a production capacity of 20 RDS units per year.
She attracted specialists from many countries. Scientists and engineers from the USA, USSR, England, Germany and Japan worked on these developments. Special active work were led in this area by the Americans who had the best technological base and raw materials, as well as who were able to attract the strongest intellectual resources to research at that time.
The United States government has set before physicists the task of creating a new type of weapon in an extremely short time, which could be delivered to the most remote point of the planet.
Los Alamos, located in the uninhabited desert of New Mexico, became the center for American nuclear research. Many scientists, designers, engineers and the military worked on the top-secret military project, while the experienced theoretical physicist Robert Oppenheimer, who is most often called the "father" of atomic weapons, headed the entire work. Under his leadership the best specialists all over the world developed a controlled technology, without interrupting the search process for a minute.
By the fall of 1944, measures to create the first in the history of the nuclear power plant in general came to an end. By this time, a special aviation regiment had already been formed in the United States, which was to carry out the tasks of delivering lethal weapons to the places of their use. The regiment's pilots underwent special training, performing training flights at different altitudes and in conditions close to combat.
The first atomic bombings
In mid-1945, US designers managed to assemble two nuclear devices ready for use. The first targets for the strike were also selected. Japan was the strategic enemy of the United States at that time.
The American leadership decided to launch the first atomic strikes on two Japanese cities in order to intimidate not only Japan with this action, but also other countries, including the USSR.
On August 6th and 9th, 1945, American bombers dropped the first ever atomic bombs on the unsuspecting inhabitants of Japanese cities such as Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As a result, more than one hundred thousand people died from heat radiation and a shock wave. Such were the consequences of the use of unprecedented weapons. The world has entered a new phase of its development.
However, the US monopoly on the military use of the atom was not very long. The Soviet Union also strenuously sought ways of practical implementation of the principles underlying nuclear weapons. Igor Kurchatov headed the work of the collective of Soviet scientists and inventors. In August 1949, the tests of the Soviet atomic bomb, which received the working name RDS-1, were successfully carried out. The fragile military balance in the world was restored.