By the end of 1942, the heroic struggle of the Soviet people behind enemy lines acquired a massive character and became truly nationwide. Hundreds of thousands of patriots fought against the invaders as part of partisan formations, underground organizations and groups, actively participated in disrupting the economic, political and military measures of the occupiers. Communications, especially railways, became the main object of the guerrilla's combat activity, which, in its scope, acquired strategic importance.
For the first time in the history of wars, partisans carried out, according to a single plan, a number of large operations to disable enemy railway communications over a large territory, which were closely related in time and facilities to the actions of the Red Army and reduced the throughput of railways by 35 - 40% Drobov M.A. ... Small war (guerrilla and sabotage). - M., publishing house "Education", 1996, p. 133.
In the winter of 1942-1943, when the Red Army smashed Hitler's troops on the Volga, the Caucasus, the Middle and Upper Don, they launched their attacks on the railways, along which the enemy was throwing reserves to the front. In February 1943, on the Bryansk - Karachev, Bryansk - Gomel sections, they blew up several railway bridges, including the bridge across the Desna, along which from 25 to 40 echelons passed daily to the front and the same number of trains back with broken military units. equipment and looted property.
Heavy blows against enemy communications were delivered during the summer-autumn campaign. This made it difficult for the enemy to regroup, to transport reserves and military equipment, which was a huge help to the Red Army.
The partisan operation, which went down in history under the name "Rail War", was grandiose in scale, in the number of forces involved and in the results achieved. It was planned by the Central Headquarters partisan movement, prepared for a long time and comprehensively and was called upon to assist the offensive of the Red Army on the Kursk Bulge. The main goal of the operation was to paralyze the transport of the Nazis by rail by simultaneously massively blowing up the rails. Partisans of the Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Oryol regions, Belarus and partly Ukraine were involved in this operation.
Operation "Rail War" began on the night of August 3, 1943. Two air transport divisions, 12 separate air regiments, and several long-range aviation regiments operated to transfer explosives and other means to the enemy's rear. Reconnaissance was actively conducted.
On the first night, 42 thousand rails were blown up. Massive explosions continued throughout August and the first half of September. As a result of the operation, about 215 thousand rails and many enemy military echelons were blown up (see Appendix 2, Photos 6 and 7), in some areas the movement of enemy trains was paralyzed for 3-15 days. Balashov A.I., Rudakov G.P. History of the Great Patriotic War. - St. Petersburg, publishing house "Peter", 2006, p. 407.
On September 19, a new operation began, which received the code name "Concert". This operation was closely related to the offensive soviet troops in Ukraine. Partisans from Karelia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Crimea joined the operation. More powerful blows followed. So, if 170 partisan brigades, detachments and groups of about 100 thousand people took part in Operation "Rail War", then 193 brigades and detachments of more than 120 thousand people took part in Operation Concert. Balashov A.I., Rudakov G.P. History of the Great Patriotic War. - St. Petersburg, publishing house "Peter", 2006, p. 408
The attacks on the railways were combined with attacks on individual garrisons and enemy units, with ambushes on highways and dirt roads, and also with disruption of the river transport of the Nazis. During 1943, about 11 thousand enemy trains were blown up, 6 thousand steam locomotives, about 40 thousand cars and platforms were disabled and damaged, over 22 thousand cars were destroyed, more than 900 railway bridges were destroyed. Drobov M.A. Small war (partisanship and sabotage). - M., publishing house "Education", 1996, p. 153
Powerful blows by partisans along the entire line of the Soviet-German front shocked the enemy. Soviet patriots not only inflicted great losses on the enemy, disorganized and paralyzed railway traffic, but also demoralized the occupation apparatus.
The main significance of the combat operations of the partisans on the communication routes was that the Nazis were forced to divert large forces to the protection of communications. In areas of active partisan operations, the Nazis were forced to provide each 100-kilometer section of the railway with up to two regiments. If we consider that in the spring of 1943 the enemy operated 3,000 km of railways in the occupied Soviet territory, it becomes quite obvious what colossal difficulties the partisans created for him.
During September - November 1943, the special operation "Desert" on the destruction of the water supply system on railway communications. As a result, 43 pumping stations were put out of action. But due to the lack of mine explosives, it was not possible to completely paralyze the work of the enemy's railway communications.
A striking example of interaction between the army and the partisans is the Belarusian operation in 1944 (see Appendix 2, Map 2). The aim of the operation was the defeat of Army Group Center and the liberation of Belarus. The operation was attended by 49 detachments with a total number of over 143 thousand people. Most of the reserves of the fascist Army Group "Center" were shackled by the fight against them.
On the night of June 20, the partisans carried out a massive attack on all the most important communications. As a result, traffic on some sections of the railroad completely stopped. Many of them were never recovered by the enemy. In the course of the offensive, the partisans continued to strike at the communications and only blew up 147 echelons on June 26-28.
The partisan movement has repeatedly proved its effectiveness during the wars. The Germans were afraid of the Soviet partisans. "People's avengers" destroyed communications, blew up bridges, took "tongues" and even made weapons themselves.
History of the concept
Partizan is a word that came to Russian from the Italian language, in which the word partigiano denotes a member of an irregular military detachment enjoying the support of the population and politicians. Guerrillas fight using specific means: war behind enemy lines, sabotage or sabotage. A distinctive feature of guerrilla tactics is covert movement in enemy territory and a good knowledge of the terrain. In Russia and the USSR, this tactic has been practiced for centuries. Suffice it to recall the war of 1812.
In the 1930s, in the USSR, the word "partisan" acquired a positive connotation - this was the name given only to partisans fighting for the Red Army. Since then, in Russia, this word is extremely positive and is almost never used in relation to enemy guerrilla groups - they are called terrorists or illegal military formations.
Soviet partisans
During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet partisans were controlled by the authorities and performed tasks similar to those of the army. But if the army fought at the front, then the partisans had to destroy enemy routes of communication and means of communication. 
During the war years, 6200 partisan detachments worked in the occupied lands of the USSR, in which about a million people took part. They were governed by the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, developing coordinated tactics and directing them towards common goals for the disparate partisan associations.
In 1942, Marshal of the USSR Kliment Voroshilov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement, and they were asked to create a partisan army in the rear of the enemy - German troops. Although the guerrillas are often thought of as indiscriminately organized units of the local population, the "people's avengers" behaved in accordance with the rules of strict military discipline and took the oath of allegiance as real soldiers - otherwise they would not survive in the brutal conditions of war.
Life of the partisan
The worst of all was for the Soviet partisans, who were forced to hide in the forests and mountains, in winter. Before that, not a single partisan movement in the world had faced the problem of cold - in addition to the difficulties of survival, the problem of camouflage was added. The partisans left footprints in the snow, and the vegetation no longer hid their shelters. Winter dwellings often impaired the mobility of the partisans: in the Crimea, they built mainly terrestrial dwellings like wigwams. In other areas, dugouts prevailed.
Many partisan headquarters had a radio station through which they communicated with Moscow and transmitted news to the local population in the occupied territories. With the help of the radio, the command gave orders to the partisans, who, in turn, coordinated airstrikes and provided intelligence information.
Among the partisans there were also women - if for the Germans, who thought of a woman only in the kitchen, this was unacceptable, then the Soviets in every possible way agitated the weaker sex to participate in the partisan war. Women scouts did not fall under suspicion of enemies, women doctors and radio operators helped with sabotage, and some brave women even took part in hostilities. It is also known about the officer's privileges - if there was a woman in the detachment, she often became the "field wife" of the commanders. Sometimes everything happened the other way around and wives instead of husbands gave orders and intervened in military issues - the higher authorities tried to suppress such a disorder.
Partisan tactics
The basis of the "long arm" tactics (as the Soviet leadership called the partisans) was the implementation of reconnaissance and sabotage - they destroyed the railways along which the Germans delivered trains with weapons and food, broke high-voltage lines, poisoned water pipes or wells in the enemy's rear. 
Thanks to these actions, it was possible to disorganize the enemy's rear and demoralize him. A great advantage of the partisans was that all of the above did not require large human resources: sometimes even a small detachment could implement subversive plans, and sometimes even one person.
When the Red Army advanced, the partisans attacked from the rear, breaking through the defenses, and unexpectedly disrupting enemy regrouping or retreat. Prior to that, the forces of partisan detachments were hiding in forests, mountains and swamps - in the steppe regions, the activities of partisans were ineffective.
Partisan warfare was especially successful in Belarus - forests and swamps hid the "second front" and contributed to their success. Therefore, the feats of the partisans are still remembered in Belarus: it is worth remembering at least the name of the Minsk football club of the same name.
With the help of propaganda in the occupied territories, the "people's avengers" could replenish the fighting ranks. However, partisan detachments were recruited unevenly - part of the population in the occupied territories kept their nose to the wind and waited, while other people familiar with the terror of the German invaders were more willing to join the partisans
Rail war
The "second front", as the German invaders called the partisans, played a huge role in the destruction of the enemy. In Belarus in 1943, there was a decree "On the destruction of enemy railway communications by the method of rail war" - the partisans had to wage the so-called rail war, blowing up trains, bridges and damaging enemy tracks in every possible way.
During the operations "Rail War" and "Concert" in Belarus, the movement of trains was stopped for 15-30 days, and the army and equipment of the enemy were also destroyed. Undermining enemy trains even in the absence of explosives, the partisans destroyed more than 70 bridges and killed 30 thousand German soldiers. On the first night of Operation Rail War alone, 42,000 rails were destroyed. It is believed that over the entire period of the war, the partisans destroyed about 18 thousand enemy formations, which is a truly colossal figure.
In many ways, these achievements became a reality thanks to the invention of the partisan craftsman T.E. Shavgulidze - in field conditions, he built a special wedge that derailed trains: the train ran into a wedge, which was attached to the tracks in a few minutes, then the wheel was rearranged from the inside to the outside of the rail, and the train was completely destroyed, which did not happen even after mine explosions ...
Guerrilla gunsmiths
Partisan brigades were mainly armed with light machine guns, machine guns and carbines. However, there were detachments with mortars or artillery. The partisans were armed with Soviets and often captured weapons, but this was not enough in the conditions of war behind enemy lines.
The partisans launched a large-scale production of handicraft weapons and even tanks. Local workers created special secret workshops - with primitive equipment and a small set of tools, however, engineers and amateur technicians managed to create excellent samples of parts for weapons from scrap metal and improvised parts.
In addition to repairs, the partisans were engaged in design work: “A large number of self-made mines, machine guns and guerrilla grenades have an original solution both for the entire structure as a whole and its individual units. Not limiting themselves to inventions of a “local” nature, the partisans sent to the mainland a large number of inventions and rationalization proposals. "
The most popular artisanal weapons were homemade submachine guns PPSh - the first of them was made in the Razgrom partisan brigade near Minsk in 1942. The partisans also made "surprises" with explosives and unexpected types of mines with a special detonator, the secret of which only their own knew. "People's Avengers" easily repaired even blown up German tanks and even organized artillery battalions from repaired mortars. Partisan engineers even made grenade launchers.
PREPARATION OF THE SURGERY
For two years the peoples of the Soviet Union have been waging the Great Patriotic War against the German invaders who treacherously invaded the territory of our country. In the rear of the German fascist hordes that temporarily seized Belarus, the partisan struggle of the Belarusian people flared up with unprecedented ferocity and stubbornness to crush the Nazi military machine and exterminate the criminal invaders' army by all means available to the people. Partisans and partisans inflict especially serious blows on the communications of the German army, crash military echelons with troops, equipment, ammunition, fuel and weapons, military equipment, blow up railway bridges, blow up or burn down station buildings, blow up and burn, shoot steam locomotives, carriages, tanks at stations and crossings, dismantle rails on railways. Guerrillas and partisans destroy the enemy's rear by their military actions, exhaust the enemy, inflicting enormous damage on him in manpower and equipment. Many hundreds of military echelons do not reach the front, they fly derailed at the hands of the avenging partisans.
The railways passing through Belarus, along their entire length, are under the continuous influence of partisan detachments and sabotage groups, which is of tremendous importance in disrupting the enemy's operational and strategic plans. At the same time, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus believes that the combat work of the Belarusian partisans to destroy the enemy transport routes can and should be strengthened, for this there are all the prerequisites and possibilities. The most important of these conditions are: the widespread rapid development of the partisan movement itself, which takes on the character of a nationwide movement against the occupiers, the presence of a wide communications network, airfields and landing sites for aircraft, the control of all partisan detachments and brigades in the occupied regions and regions of Belarus, the presence of regional and regional underground committees of the CP (b) of Belarus.
All these favorable conditions and the enormous strength of the movement itself make it possible at the moment to set before the partisan movement in Belarus the task of delivering massive attacks on enemy railway communications in order to radically disorganize the entire railway network passing through the territory of Belarus.
This task can be successfully solved by the Belarusian partisans not only by organizing the crash of military trains, blowing up bridges, railway stations, disabling steam locomotives and carriages, but also in other ways. The proposals made on this issue in the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Belarus, based on the study of two years of experience in guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines, show that the radical disorganization of the enemy's railway communications can be achieved by massive destruction of railroad tracks.
By the method of "rail war", the destruction of communications can be brought to a level catastrophic for the German fascist troops. With the massive use of this method of struggle, the enemy will be forced to carry out enormous labor-intensive work to replace blown up rails to restore tracks. It will be necessary to deliver a colossal amount of steel, rolled products, which for him will be an almost insoluble task.
Central Committee of the CP (b) of Belarus
decides:
1. To approve the plan for the deployment of a guerrilla "rail war" in the rear of the German invaders, submitted for consideration by the Central Committee, developed on the initiative of the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus, Comrade Ponomarenko, as the most effective way of mass destruction of enemy railway communications.
2. The Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus calls on all partisans and partisans, commanders and commissars of detachments and brigades, leaders of sabotage groups to intensify continuous hostilities to destroy the enemy's railway communications, to use the favorable opportunities of the summer period to inflict the strongest massive strikes on the Hitlerite military machine in the most vulnerable places for her. The radical disorganization of the enemy's railway communications will be a historical merit of the Belarusian partisans and partisans in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against the German fascist invaders.
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus P. Ponomarenko
Resolution of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus "On the destruction of enemy railway communications by the" rail war "method of June 24, 1943 // State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T. 4. Part 1. No. 1482
"RAIL WAR": SUCCESS OF THE SOVIET COMMAND?
Hero of the Soviet Union, commander of the partisan unit, Colonel Roman Naumovich Machulsky, in his memoirs indicates that "... Brigades" Assault "," People's Avengers "," Zheleznyak ", detachments of the Begoml-Borisov zone and the MV Frunze brigade of the Vileika region for the period from 15 August to November 1, 1943, over 2.5 thousand rails were killed on the Molodechno-Minsk section. During this time, the brigades "Death to Fascism", "Uncle Kolya", "For Soviet Belarus", them. N. A. Shchors, them. Pravda newspapers operating on the Minsk-Borisov-Orsha section destroyed over 8 thousand rails. Partisans of the brigade. VP Chkalov of the Baranovichi region in 15 days derailed 21 enemy echelons, destroyed more than 1,300 Hitlerites, broke 272 rails, blew up and burned 8 cars and 10 bridges.
On November 10-30, the troops of the Belorussian Front conducted the Gomel-Rechitsa operation. In the course of this operation, the partisans paralyzed traffic on the Minsk-Gomel, Brest-Luninets-Gomel, Orsha-Zhlobin railways and by strikes on the highways in these areas disrupted the regrouping and combat support of the enemy troops, prevented their transfer to the breakthrough sites and thereby contributed to the success advancing troops of the Red Army.
"RAIL WAR" IN BELARUS 1943
Evidence of the effectiveness of partisan strikes is that when the enemy attempted to halt the advance of the Red Army in the Mogilev direction and on December 12, 1943, from the Bykhov region sent the 292nd infantry division to the Parichi region, it arrived at its destination only on December 30, in connection with which , could not play her intended role in the attempted counterstrike.
The effectiveness of partisan actions in the southeastern regions of Belarus is also confirmed by General Kurt von Tippelskirch, at that time the commander of the 12th Army Corps of Army Group Center: “The 2nd German Army,” he wrote, “since September 27, has unsuccessfully tried to pull up enough the number of forces with the aim of a blow in a southern direction, to restore contact with the Army Group "South" between Pripyat and the Dnieper. The not dense and therefore overloaded railway network, the throughput of which, already insignificant in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Pripyat swamps, was further reduced as a result of the fierce activity of the partisans, could hardly provide the supply of everything necessary for this army. The transfer of the allocated forces was carried out at a snail's pace, which all the time strained the nerves of the command and forced him to postpone the dates of the planned offensive all the time, although the latter became more and more difficult every day. "
According to the data of the German Directorate of Railways "Minsk", as a result of the actions of the partisans, the movement on the railway tracks in September 1943 was interrupted for more than 265 days, and on double-track sections for 112 days, one track was carried out.
As a result of the first two stages of the "Rail War", the enemy's operational transportation during the period of intense fighting at the front through the territory of Belarus was reduced by 40%, which contributed to the success of the offensive operations of the Red Army and prevented the organization of a systematic withdrawal of German troops and the export of loot to Germany.
Operations "Railroad War" and "Concert" had a number of characteristic features. If until the summer of 1943, partisan combat operations on the railways were mainly limited to the activities of separate sabotage groups, now almost the entire personnel of detachments and formations and even members of reserve groups were involved in their conduct.
Both brilliantly carried out operations entered the chronicle of the Great Patriotic War as large, massive strikes by partisans on railway communications carried out within the time frame agreed with the Headquarters of the Supreme Command and had an important operational and strategic importance. In terms of their scale and importance, these operations were a new phenomenon in the history of war and the partisan movement. Never before has there been such close interaction between the partisan movement and the army. Never before has the struggle of the people's avengers behind enemy lines played such a role in achieving success on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War.
A.S. Rusak, A.V. Galinskaya, N. D. Shevchenko. "Rail War" in Belarus, 1943
"RAIL WAR": TACTICAL CALCULATION?
In order 0042 of July 14, 1943, the TSSHPD ordered: "interrupt the rails on the main highways, spare, access, auxiliary, depot tracks, destroy spare rails ..."
TsShPD mistakenly believed that the enemy lacks rails. Undermining the rails therefore seemed a very tempting, simple and affordable way of fighting. But the enemy had a surplus of rails, the Germans welded them at night and replaced them during the day, and then they came up with an 80-centimeter circuit bridge and began to let trains pass through it: after all, when a 200-gram saber exploded, only 25-40 cm of a rail was knocked out.
In 1943, two rail war operations took place. The first began on the night of July 22 by the Bryansk partisans, and the general multi-day one began on the night of August 3 and lasted until September 16. The second operation, called the "concert", began on September 16 and lasted until December 1. The planned "winter concert" did not take place due to the lack of explosives among the partisans.
All this did not give the desired results. Traffic on the railways was completely blocked only in the rear of Army Group Center, and even then only for three days, from 3 to 6 August. Moreover, the switching of the main efforts of the partisans to undermining the rails with a lack of explosives led to a reduction in train crashes, and ultimately contributed to an increase in the throughput of roads, but at the same time made it difficult for our military railway workers to restore the railways during the offensive.
Here are the numbers. The first operation involved about 100 thousand partisans. 214,705 rails were blown up, including at least 185 thousand on the roads of the enemy's Minsk railway directorate. The second operation: 120 thousand participated, 146 149 rails were blown up, including 89 thousand within the Minsk directorate. In total, 250 thousand rails were destroyed in the Minsk Directorate, or 60 percent of all rails blown up in 1943.
Of these 250 thousand, 25 thousand were blown up in unnecessary, unused areas. This slowed down the rate of restoration of highways during the advance of the Red Army.
The proportion of the sums of traffic interruptions caused by rails being blown up on the tracks between intermediate stations reached 24 percent of the sum of all traffic interruptions from all partisan actions. But in the sections between nodal stations, such breaks were only 10.1 percent, and in the directions - less than 3 percent, while crashes gave about 60 percent of the breaks. As of January 1, 1943, there were 11 million rails in the occupied territory, and the blowing up of 350 thousand rails was only 3 percent: it is quite tolerable, especially since the blows sometimes took place where the invaders themselves could not undermine the rails when retreating.
The number of Wehrmacht trains delivered not only did not decrease with the increase in the number of rails blown up, but on the contrary, even increased, since the more rails were torn, the less they produced train wrecks. The guerrillas spent about 50 tons of explosives to blow up the rails in August and the first half of September. That was enough to derail at least 1,500 trains. The smartest of the guerrilla commanders realized this, and from September they began to reduce the number of detonations of rails, while increasing the number of crashes.
What was required in return?
The fight against the enemy army for the partisans can only be carried out by organizing crashes, blowing up vehicles and armored vehicles with mines and, under favorable conditions, ambush attacks. The partisans' battles with the Wehrmacht units in its rear were associated with greater losses for the partisans than at the front. Two Ukrainian and six Leningrad partisan regiments, having entered into direct combat contact with the invaders, despite their heroism, were defeated.
As of January 1, 1943, the enemy's railway network in operation was 22 thousand km. The partisans committed sabotage almost without loss in areas where there were at least two thousand enemy soldiers per 100 km. Only the most important road sections were protected in this way. If the partisans committed sabotage all along, and the enemy brought the density of guards to a regiment for every 100 km, then the total number of guarding the railways in the occupied territories would have exceeded 400 thousand people - but it would not have saved the railroad from saboteurs.
As was known from the testimony of the Germans and from intelligence, the enemy's most critical situation was with steam locomotives. When the Red Army retreated, steam locomotives were evacuated or disabled. The Hitlerite command was forced to collect locomotives on the roads of all of Europe, not disdaining the most backward ones, and drive them to the East. The so-called ersatz steam locomotive M-50 appeared, which began to be produced by steam locomotive factories in Germany for the eastern railways. The locomotive fleet was drastically reduced from the attacks of partisans, aviation, the Resistance forces in the West, as well as from wear and tear.
The greatest interruption in the movement of trains was achieved not by an erroneous "rail war", but by the destruction of bridges and wrecks of trains. Since the bridges were heavily guarded, in winter it was possible to paralyze traffic by simultaneously shutting down the water supply in some area. The destruction of the communication line - so spectacular - made it difficult for transport, but did not suspend it for a long time.
Kholmov Dmitry VyacheslavovichMoscow State University A.A. Kuleshova
master historical sciences
Volchok Gennady Ignatievich, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Professor of the Department of History and Culture of Belarus Mogilevsky state university named after A.A.Kuleshov.
Annotation:
Based on the documents of the National Archives of the Republic of Belarus, the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, a number of publications, the process of interaction of the partisans of the Mogilev formation with the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front on the eve and during the operation "Bagration" is analyzed. Particular attention is paid to the combat actions of the partisans of the Mogilev formation in the third stage of the rail war (for example, the partisans of the Belynichsky region), the interaction of the partisans and units of the 2nd Belorussian Front during the first stage of Operation Bagration, the combat actions of units of the 49th and 50th armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front during the liberation of Mogilev and the Belynichi region.
In the work on the basis of documents of the National archive of the Republic of Belarus, the Central Archive of the Ministry of defense of the Russian Federation, number of publications, analyzes the process of interaction between the partisans of the Mogilev connection with the troops of the 2nd Belorussian front before and during the operation "Bagration". Special attention is paid to the fighting guerrillas Mogilev connections in the third stage, rail war (on the example of partisan Belynichi district), the interaction between the guerrillas and units of the 2nd Belorussian front during the first phase of "operation Bagration", the fighting parts of the 49th and 50th armies of the 2nd Belorussian front during the liberation of Mogilev and Belynichi district.
Keywords:
The Great Patriotic War; Operation Bagration; partisans; BShPD; TsSHPD; rail war; sabotage.
The great Patriotic war; operation Bagration; partisans; wireless broadband; Central; rail of war; sabotage,
UDC 94 (476) "1943/1944"
During the Great Patriotic War, one of the main tasks of the fight against the invaders in the occupied Soviet territory was the disruption of the operation of the enemy's transport, which was expressed in the destruction of artificial structures, tracks, stations, wharves, train wrecks, explosions of cars and ships. During the Great Patriotic War, railways acquired paramount importance as the most mobile mode of transport.
Huge masses of weapons, military equipment and other types of military supplies could be delivered to the troops as a whole only by rail. It is for these reasons that the railways became the main object of sabotage activities of partisans during the "Rail War".
Under this name, the history of the Great Patriotic War included the simultaneous, coordinated operations of Soviet partisans and underground fighters in the massive destruction of rails, sleepers, bridges, stations and trains on railway communications in the rear of the enemy, consisting of three stages, the last of which occurred during the operation " Bagration ".
On July 14, 1943, a secret order was issued by the head of the TSSHPD P. K. Ponomarenko "On the partisan rail war on the enemy's communications."
The main goal of Operation "Rail War" is to disrupt all the plans of the enemy, to put him in a catastrophic position, by the widespread destruction of rails.
By the summer of 1944, 372,000 partisans were operating in Belarus, united in 150 partisan brigades and 49 separate detachments. In addition, at that time more than 60 thousand underground fighters were fighting in the occupied territory of the republic. These huge forces of popular avengers were located from the front line to the state border and occupied a convenient position to attack all enemy communications.
By the end of 1943, the Mogilev partisan formation included 9 regional military operational groups, northeastern and southeastern groupings, uniting 10 regiments, 12 brigades and 50 separate detachments with a total number of more than 34 thousand partisans. In addition, on the territory of the region operated independently the partisan formation "Thirteen" consisting of the 1st, 3rd, 5th brigades and 11, 12, 13 separate detachments and the Rogachev military-operational group, which united the 255th regiment 252, 257, 258 , 259th and separate detachments of 5 thousand partisans.
In 1943, at the turn of the Basya and Pronya rivers, the front stopped for eight months. The Mogilev region, divided in two, turned out to be the leading edge of the deadly struggle against the invaders, and at the same time became a springboard for the imminent offensive of the Soviet troops.
During the third stage of Operation Bagration, the operational leadership of the combat actions of partisan brigades and detachments, the organization of their direct interaction with the Red Army troops, the provision of the necessary material and technical assistance, as in the first stage of liberation, was entrusted to the operational groups of the regional committees, seconded to the military councils of the fronts, as well as the representations (task force) of the BSHPD at the military councils of the armies.
At the end of May 1944, the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) B reviewed and approved the operational plan developed by the BSPD and determined the actions of the Belarusian partisans during the Bagration operation. To disrupt the transport of the enemy, disorganize the work of the military headquarters and suppress the attempts of the fascist command to freely maneuver with reserves, the plan provided for a powerful blow to all communications, and this blow was supposed to cover the entire territory of the occupied part of Belarus.
With the beginning of Operation Bagration, the chiefs of the BShPD operational groups promptly informed the partisans about the start of the operation and set specific tasks for interaction with regular troops.
In the operational and reconnaissance plan, partisan brigades and detachments operating in front of the 2nd Belorussian Front, it was indicated: “The main task of the combat activities of partisan brigades and detachments for June is to consider disruption of enemy transport along railways, highways and dirt roads ... disorganization of its rear, rout and the destruction of warehouses, headquarters and individual garrisons, as well as the protection of the local population. "
At the same time, specific tasks were set for conducting combat operations and reconnaissance. The Mogilev formation, for example, was asked to form at least 25 sabotage groups and send them to the Shklov-Chausy-Bykhov area in order to disrupt the work of the enemy's closest military rear.
The directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus of June 8, 1944, transmitted in cipher on the radio to underground party bodies and partisan detachments, was tasked with inflicting powerful blows on the enemy's railway communications and paralyzing his transportation along the lines Polotsk - Dvinsk, Polotsk - Molodechno, Orsha - Borisov, Minsk - Brest, Molodechno - Vilnius and Vilnius - Dvinsk.
On the eve of the offensive, the command of the 2nd Belorussian Front set the partisans the task: to save their people from destruction and deportation into slavery, to prevent the enemy from finally destroying and burning our cities and villages, to prevent the German troops from retreating with impunity.
The sabotage and reconnaissance work of the partisans began even earlier. So the partisans of the Shklov VOG in May 1944 reconnoitered and drew up schemes for the enemy's fortifications along the Dnieper River in the Orsha-Trebukhi sector, indicating all the firing points on them. Chief of the intelligence department of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Major General E.V. Aleshin responded about this document as follows: “The schemes of enemy fortifications on the right and left banks of the Dnieper in the Orsha-Trebukhi sector, made by the military-operational group under the Shklov RK CP (b) B, are of great value as of May 1, 1944. Due to the conscientious attitude to this work, the schemes are made with great accuracy and almost completely coincide with the data of aerial photographs.
Often, missions to obtain information about the enemy were carried out jointly by army and partisan intelligence officers. In early June 1944, in order to identify enemy forces in the area of \u200b\u200bthe settlements of Yamnitsa, Golyntsa, Titovka, Slonevshchina, Bykhov, army reconnaissance officers were thrown into the partisan detachments. To carry out the task, the command of the Mogilev military-operational group created two groups, which included army and partisan intelligence officers. The groups were led by Lieutenants Ushakov and Skuratovsky. The scouts successfully completed the mission. They reported that as of June 20, there were 91 tanks in the military town of Yamnitsa, 150 tanks on the eastern outskirts of Golynts, 32 tanks in the forest east of Dobrosnevich, and tanks and fuel tanks at the edge of the forest east of the Yamnitsa-Cheremnoye junction. The information obtained by the scouts was used by the command of the 2nd Belorussian Front in the development of combat operations.
At the same time, the command of the 2nd Belorussian Front required data on the operational reserves of the Nazis in the Mogilev area. The 540th detachment was instructed to receive them. The task was carried out by a group of partisans, which included S. Vospanov, K. Kosmachev, N. Moskalev and R. Nigmatullin. The scouts managed to capture the "language" - a fascist officer, chief of ammunition supply of the 60th motorized division of the 4th army. The data received from him was of great value. They were used in the preparation of the operation to defeat the Nazi troops in the Mogilev direction.
The Belarusian offensive operation "Bagration", in accordance with the plan of the Supreme Command, was preceded by a blow by the partisans of the republic on enemy communications, inflicted on the night of June 20, 1944.
On June 18, 1944, a representative of the headquarters of the 2nd Belorussian Front, Captain N.G. Borisov, flew to the headquarters of the Belynichskaya VOG by plane. He said that soon our troops would go over to the offensive in the Mogilev direction. In this regard, the Belynichskaya and Mogilevskaya military-operational groups were tasked on the night of June 20-21, 1944, to engage in a battle with an enemy tank division, parts of which were located in the villages of Yamnitsa, Golynets, Guslishche and Mezhisetki. The aviation of the 2nd Belorussian Front was supposed to support the partisans.
Fulfilling the assignments of the command of the 2nd Belorussian Front, the partisans of the Belynichskaya and Mogilevskaya VOG fought with the Nazis for four hours, which disrupted the sending of this division to the front.
The 122 partisan regiment "For the Motherland" of the Belynichskaya VOG was allocated a section of the Shklov - Lotva railroad.
On the way to their base in the village of Rafolovo, Belynichi district, the partisans destroyed the enemy garrison in the village of Avchinniki, Shklovsky district, broke a Nazi ambush near the village of Yermolovichi, Belynichi district. Having picked up the trophies, the partisans of the 122nd Regiment "For the Motherland" returned to their place of deployment in the village of Rafolovo, Nikolaevka, Malinovka and Pushcha.
Partisans of the 600 partisan regiment in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Shklov railway station destroyed a train with tanks and blew up several kilometers of the railway. The entire composition of the tank crews was destroyed, the tanks remained on the platforms until the arrival of the Red Army units.
The partisans completely disabled the railway on the Mogilev-Shklov section. The damage was so great that the Nazis could not restore it until the arrival of the Soviet troops.
In the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Belyavshchina, the 121st partisan regiment named after O.M. Kasayev (commander - Ilyinsky A.A.) defeated a punitive detachment of police and Germans, numbering about 600 people. The commander of the punitive detachment was killed, and his assistant, the head of the Gestapo investigation department, was wounded and taken prisoner. In accordance with the instructions of the BSHPD, he was kept under guard and treated in a partisan hospital, and after joining with units of the Red Army, he was transferred to the state security organs.
The partisans of the Kruglyanskaya brigade under the leadership of N.G. Ilyin and S.F. Novikov, on the Minsk-Orsha highways, 1,555 rails, 2 railway booths, a semaphore were blown up, more than 13 kilometers of telegraph and telephone communications were destroyed.
The main goal of the "rail war" for the partisans was to assist the spacecraft units in the defeat of the German fascist troops. However, it should be noted that during the third stage of the "rail war" there were also drawbacks.
So, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.Kh. After the war, Baghramyan wondered whether it was necessary to undermine the railway near our fronts that were preparing for the offensive.
And this moment deserves special attention, because in the area of \u200b\u200bhostilities of the same 1st Baltic Front, 83% of the rail tracks were undermined, which could not but slow down the pace of the advance of the Soviet troops. In addition, our troops were forced to allocate part of their forces to restore the railways destroyed by the partisans.
IG Starinov, a leading expert on partisan sabotage during the Great Patriotic War, adheres to the same positions. In his opinion, “the harmfulness of the installation of the head of the Central Broadcasting Control Center on the widespread undermining of rails was that there were 11 million rails in the occupied territory on January 1, 1943, and the undermining of 200 thousand rails a month was less than 2 percent, which was tolerant, especially if the rails were undermined to a large extent where the Germans themselves could not destroy when retreating ”[7, p. 598]. And this moment should not be forgotten.
However, the help of the partisans of Belarus to the advancing Soviet troops was still great, and received high recognition from the Soviet command.
The Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front gave the following assessment to the partisans of Belarus: “We are proud of you, dear brothers and sisters, of your courageous and selfless struggle behind enemy lines. The glory of the Belarusian partisans, formidable people's avengers who helped the Red Army to forge a victory over Hitler's murderers and murderers, thundered all over the world. "
Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov recalled after the war: "A few days before the start of the Red Army's actions to liberate Belarus, partisan detachments under the leadership of the party organs of the republic and regions carried out a number of major operations to destroy railways and highways and destroy bridges, which paralyzed the enemy rear at the most crucial moment."
The Wehrmacht generals were forced to recognize the merits of the partisans.
The former chief of the general staff of the Wehrmacht Heinz Guderian, referring to the actions of the partisans on the night of June 20, 1944, wrote: “This operation had a decisive influence on the outcome of the entire battle. As the war became protracted and the fighting at the front became more and more stubborn, guerrilla warfare became a real scourge, greatly affecting the morale of frontline soldiers. " ...
Former officer of the operational headquarters of Army Group Center, Gagenholz, in his book The Decisive Battles of the Second World War, defined the importance of partisan warfare on railroad communications: on June 20, 1944) blew up all the railways and paralyzed the transport system in 10 thousand places.
Eloquent confessions need no comment.
The actions of the people's avengers testified to the tactical literacy of the partisan command and the great experience of the personnel of the brigades and detachments.
On the whole, on the night of June 20, 1944, the partisans of Belarus achieved brilliant success in destroying enemy communications. That night they blew up 40775 rails, including 11240 rails on the main artery Brest - Baranovichi - Minsk - Orsha.
From 20 to 26 June 1944, the Bobruisk partisans successfully carried out the third the final stage "Rail war". Traffic on the Bobruisk-Osipovichi, Mogilev-Osipovichi, Osipovichi-Slutsk railways was paralyzed.
The partisan detachments of the Mogilev region, having seized the sections of the Orsha-Mogilev railway in a fight, blew up about 5 thousand rails and two railway bridges. A section of the road about 40 kilometers long was completely destroyed.
In total, in Operation Bagration, partisans of the Mogilev region made 109 explosions of trains on the lines Minsk-Orsha, Minsk-Bobruisk, Minsk-Mogilev, Mogilev-Orsha, 87 steam locomotives, 420 wagons, 37 tanks with fuel were broken.
After the liberation of Mogilev, the troops of the 49th and 50th armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front, pursuing the enemy, entered the interfluve of the river. Dnieper and r. Druti and entered the territory of the Belynichsky district.
On the morning of June 27, 1944, units of the 42nd Smolensk Rifle Division (commanded by Major General Slits A.M.), having shot down the Nazis from the Bolmahomerovschina line, meeting enemy fire resistance, slowly moved forward, repelling the enemy's counterattack from the Vysokoye direction. By 17 o'clock on June 27, 1944, units of the 42nd Smolensk Rifle Division reached the line: 44 rifle regiment captured the villages of Vysokoe, Nikolaevka, Sinyavshchina, the 455th rifle regiment captured Golovchino in one of the battles, the 459th rifle regiment captured Brakovo.
By this time, partisan brigades and detachments of the Mogilev region already held under their control many sections of the highways Mogilev - Minsk, Mogilev - Bobruisk, a dense network of improved roads between the Dnieper and Druti, Drut and Berezina rivers.
On June 27, 1944, the remnants of the 14th German infantry division, as well as the scattered units of the 78th assault division that joined it, near the village of Zaozerye, Belynichsky district, encountered ambushes by partisans of the Shklov VOG. The partisans let the enemy column pass, made a roundabout maneuver and met it with fire at the edge of the forest. A particularly large number of enemy troops had accumulated here, and Soviet aviation dealt a tangible blow to them. The Nazis were forced to retreat to the open area, where they again came under attack from our pilots.
On June 28, 1944, the 42nd Smolensk Infantry Division with a force of 455th Infantry Regiment repulsed enemy attacks near Golovchin, 44th Infantry Regiment held the village of Vasilki, 459th Infantry Regiment repulsed the enemy's attack in the direction of Brakovo.
The commander of the 459th rifle regiment, Major Kozlov, with a rifle battalion and two self-propelled guns went to the Mogilev-Minsk highway and made an ambush. At this time, an enemy column of up to 2,000 vehicles, tanks, armored personnel carriers, trucks, and carts was walking along the highway. The battalion knocked out 2 head tanks of the Nazis and opened fire from mortars. Panic broke out in the column, the Nazis threw their cars and rushed into the forest.
The defeat of the enemy was completed by bomber aircraft, a pile of debris remained on the highway.
The 5th brigade of the "Thirteen" partisan formation received a task from the command of the 49th Army to prevent the destruction of the existing ones and to build new crossings on the Drut 'and Donkey rivers.
One of the detachments of this brigade was building a crossing on the Oslik River, 15 kilometers west of Belynich. Suddenly, a motorized enemy group appeared from the direction of Belynichy.
4 motorcycles rode ahead, followed by an armored car and a passenger car. The Ferdinand assault gun was at the back of this small column. The guerrillas quickly prepared for the meeting. From the third shot of the PTR, an armored car caught fire. The motorcyclists were soon killed. In addition to the driver, the disfigured bodies of a German major, lieutenant and general were removed from the smoking car. The captured soldier reported that the commander of the 4th Army Corps, Lieutenant General Felkers, was in the armored car.
"Ferdinand" with a set of shells was pushed to the highway near Belynichy, and the former tanker Pyotr Tyutyunnikov during June 27-28, 1944, ambushed enemy columns until the shells ran out.
During June 28, 1944 and until 20:00 on June 29, 1944, the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 122nd partisan regiment "For the Motherland" and the 1st battalion of the 600th partisan regiment under the command of the chief of staff of the Belynichskaya VOG Major Georgievsky fought with the retreating columns of the Germans through the Sipailovsky forest on the road connecting with the villages Gorodishche and Aksenkovichi. All roads were covered with forest and mined. During one and a half days of battles, 11 vehicles, 1 tankette, 2 motorcycles were destroyed, up to 100 soldiers and officers were destroyed, one was taken prisoner. The partisans held the road for 10 hours.
By the end of June 29, 1944, all the detachments and regiments of the Belynichskaya VOG, by order of the VOG under the Mogilev underground regional committee of the CP (b) B, were concentrated in the area of \u200b\u200bthe villages of Bely Log, Khatulshchina.
On June 29, 1944, the 42nd Smolensk Rifle Division, supported by units of the 32nd and 153rd Rifle Divisions, went on the offensive and by 10 a.m. occupied the regional center of Belynichi.
Combination with units of the Red Army of the detachments and regiments of the Belynichskaya VOG was preceded by battles with the retreating columns of the Germans. On the night of June 30, 1944, 35 and 760 partisan detachments and the 1st battalion of the 122nd partisan regiment "For the Motherland" under the command of the commander of the Belynichskaya VOG Major Fedotov destroyed the headquarters of the 487th Grenadier Regiment and its convoy.
By 17 o'clock on June 30, 1944, units of the division crossed the Oslik River, reached the border of the villages of Kulakovka, Sekerka and saddled the Mogilev-Minsk highway. The Nazis with artillery fire, machine guns, repeated counterattacks with the support of 6-8 tanks tried to detain Soviet units on the eastern bank of the Donkey River, however, suffering heavy losses in manpower and equipment, they retreated in the western direction, covering the retreat with groups of machine gunners and self-propelled artillery.
The Nazis put up stubborn resistance in the area of \u200b\u200bthe villages of Kulakovka, Korytnitsa, where a large enemy group tried to break out of the encirclement, trying to make their way to the Mogilev-Minsk highway by country roads, but after fierce battles it was destroyed.
By the end of the day on June 30, 1944, units of the 49th and 50th armies reached the border of the Belynichsky and neighboring Berezinsky, Klichevsky and Krupsky districts. The Belynichi district was completely liberated from the enemy.
32, 42, 64, 95, 199, 369 rifle divisions of the 49th army, 139, 238 rifle divisions of the 50th army, 157th rifle division of the 33rd army took part in the liberation of the Belynichsky district.
On June 30, 1944, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe villages of Bely Log and Khatulshchina at 14 o'clock, the regiments and detachments of the Belynichskaya VOG joined forces with the 139 and 238 rifle divisions.
On the same day, the acting commander of the partisan detachment "Thirteen" S.V. Pakhomov radioed to the front leadership: “I have united with the Red Army. I am located northwest of the village. Ushlovo. On the night of 1.7. I leave east of the village. Bobblehead. I look forward to further instructions. General Phifer is blown up in a tank, killed. I have his awards and insignia. His documents and his uniform were burnt. The general's identity was established by interviewing the named tank driver from the general's convoy.
Before joining the units of the Red Army, the Belynichskaya VOG consisted of 3,444 partisans.
For the fastest advance of the tank corps in the direction of Minsk, the partisans of the Shklov VOG restored roads and built five bridges across the Mozha River in the area of \u200b\u200bthe villages of Ukhvala, Pyshachye, Sloboda, Kuplenka, Berezka.
On June 27, 1944, partisans of the Kirov military-operational group, together with units of the Red Army, fought to eliminate scattered enemy groups in the forests in the Gorodets area. On the same day, the 9th brigade and the 538th detachment were preparing a crossing of the Olsa River in the Klichev area. The partisans of the 537th regiment took part in the battle for the liberation of the village of Batsevichi, Klichevsky district, of the Kruglyanskaya military-operational group - the settlements of Tatarka, Trukhanovka, Old Polesie, Krucha. The Osipovichi partisans took control of all the main roads along which Hitler's troops could retreat. The Chekist partisan brigade on June 28, in the vicinity of the villages of Shepelevichi, Smogilovka, Gaenka, entered into battle with the retreating units of the 14th Infantry and 78th Assault Divisions. The battle lasted more than a day. The next day, with the help of the soldiers of the Red Army, the enemy was defeated.
The following fact testifies to the close interaction of the partisans and units of the Red Army. Together with parts of the 37th guards division The 1st Bobruisk partisan brigade under the command of V.I. Liventsev took part in the battles. On one of the front sections, she changed the 118th Guards Regiment, about which the following document was adopted: “We, the signatories below, the Chief of Staff of the 118th Infantry Regiment of the Guards Captain Glotov on the one hand and the Chief of Staff of the 1st Bobruisk Partisan Brigade Senior Lieutenant Kremnev on the other side made a real act in that the latter took over the defense sector of the 118th Guards regiment at the turn south of the Zalovye-Okolitsa road, Simena, a forest north of Zubrets ... ".
The 278th partisan detachment of the Klichevskaya VOG (commander - Ananich V.M.) attacked the retreating Hitlerite artillery regiment on the Neseta-Vyazovka road. During the battle, 59 people were killed, 8 guns, machine guns and rifles were captured. On June 28, 1944, near the village of Poplavy, partisan regiments of the 15th, 277th and partisan detachments of the 2nd, 115th and 278th united with units of the Red Army Kruglyansk partisans fought with the enemy in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Tatarka, Trukhanovka settlements, Old Polissya, Krucha, having destroyed 250 Nazis, 52 cars, 26 carts, a lot of enemy military property.
The command of the Osipovichi VOG, on the instructions of the Military Council of the 2nd Belorussian Front, in connection with the onset of the Red Army offensive, assigned in advance to each detachment the main roads in the area along which the Nazis could retreat under the blows of Soviet troops. In the fighting on the enemy's retreat routes, the Osipovichi partisans destroyed 1,322 and captured 2,412 Nazi soldiers and officers.
The population provided active assistance and support to the advancing troops. Residents dug roads, destroyed bridges, and set up forest heaps. When the Soviet troops approached, they helped to detect enemy ambushes, minefields, and force water barriers. Thus, the entire population of the village of Chechevichi, Bykhovsky district took part in the construction of a bridge across the river. Drut, blown up by the retreating Nazis.
For the fastest advance of the tank corps in the direction of Minsk, partisans of the Shklov VOG restored roads and built five bridges across the Mozha River in the area of \u200b\u200bthe villages of Ukhvacha, Pyshachye, Sloboda, Kuplenka, Berezka.
The partisan regiments of the 122nd For Motherland (commander - A.I. Lipsky, commissar - N.F. Kruchinin) and the 600th (commander - G.F. Mednikov) acted boldly and energetically on the enemy's retreat in the Belynichsky region. , Commissioner - V.T.Nekrasov). On June 27 and 28, they set up ambushes, mines and road blockages around the villages of Gorodishche and Aksenkovichi around the clock, hindering the advance of the retreating columns of the Nazis. As a result, 11 vehicles with manpower and military supplies, a tankette, a tractor and a motorcycle were blown up.
The commander of the 4th German Army, General von Tippelskirch, wrote that the army had managed to withdraw half of its forces across the Dnieper. Here, however, I found myself in a huge wooded-swampy area stretching almost to Minsk. It was controlled by partisan detachments and never once in all three years was it cleared of them, let alone occupied by German troops. The German general is silent about the numerous punitive operations of security divisions and regular units of Army Group Center, during which they failed to defeat the partisans who continued to strike at the enemy.
On June 28, 1944, the regional party committee appealed to all partisans with an appeal not to allow the German fascist invaders to leave the territory of the region with impunity, to help Soviet soldiers to quickly expel them from the Belarusian land. “Comrades, partisans and partisans, commanders and political workers! - emphasized in the appeal. "Alone and together with the Red Army units, strike the defeated enemy running in panic at every step, do not let him cross the Berezina River."
After the completion of the Mogilev operation, partisan regiments and detachments, by order of the headquarters of the partisan movement, arrived at the assembly point at the Buinichi state farm. As part of the Belynichskaya VOG, 3318 people arrived at the assembly point. From among those who left, they were sent: 2049 people to serve in the Red Army, 58 people to a fighter battalion. Transferred on the day of connection to the 139th SD 11 drivers. Sent for treatment in Mogilev -42 people. 558 adolescents, women and old people were declared unfit for military service and sent to permanent residence.
The weapons and ammunition available at the time of the connection were transferred to military units and to the NKVD warehouse. The regional executive committee, the "Buinichi" state farm and other bodies received 250 horses, 25 cows, 7 cars, 45 carts, 17 tons of flour and grain, 6.5 tons of potatoes. For
the submission to the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement, personal lists of personnel and other documents were prepared, each partisan received a certificate with a stamp and seal.
Last time in full combat strength Partisan formations of the Mogilev region lined up on July 9, 1944. The day was sunny. With red flags and bouquets of flowers, residents of Mogilev went to the Dynamo stadium.
A meeting of workers, soldiers of the Red Army and partisans, dedicated to the liberation of the city, took place here. The Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the BSSR N. Ya. Natalevich, regional leaders, guerrilla commanders... Columns of soldiers and officers of the Red Army marched to the sound of the orchestra. Soon they were replaced by people in civilian clothes. Partisan columns marched one after another in front of the tribune. The liberated city hosted a partisan parade.
The Mogilev offensive operation was part of the first stage of Operation Bagration, which took place from June 23 to July 4, 1944. The 2nd Belorussian Front fulfilled its tasks, the 49th and 50th armies vigorously pursued the Nazis from the front in the direction of Berezino, Smilovichi, Minsk, depriving them of the opportunity to break away and take up defenses in advance on new lines. As a result, the enemy's Minsk grouping was surrounded.
With the liberation of Minsk and Polotsk, the first stage of the grandiose battle for Belarus was completed.
The partisans of the Mogilev region, including the partisans of the Belynichsk military-operational group, rendered great assistance to the Soviet troops during the offensive operation "Bagration" and the liberation of the region's settlements from the enemy.
The partisans paralyzed traffic on the Orsha-Mogilev railway during the third stage of the rail war. Thanks to this, the German troops could not use rail transport both for the delivery of reserves and for the evacuation of their units.
With the beginning of the offensive of the units of the 2nd Belorussian Front, partisans of the Belynichskaya and Mogilevskaya VOGs, with the support of the Shklovskaya VOG and the Thirteen Regiment, intensified their activities on the Mogilev-Minsk highway, blocked dirt roads with the help of mining and forest blockages, and attacked enemy columns.
The partisans of the Belynichskaya VOG captured and held the crossings over water obstacles until the approach of the Soviet troops, built crossings for the advancing units of the Soviet troops across the rivers Drut ', Vabich, Donkey. The Kruglyansk partisans fought with the enemy in the area of \u200b\u200bthe settlements Tatarka, Trukhanovka, Staraye Polesie, Krucha, destroying 250 Nazis, 52 vehicles, 26 carts, a lot of the enemy's military property. In hostilities on the enemy's retreat routes, the Osipovichi partisans destroyed 1,322 and captured 2,412 Nazi soldiers and officers.
Together with our soldiers, the partisans of the region participated in the liberation of cities and urban settlements, such as Klichev, Osipovichi. In the conditions of a panic retreat of the invaders under the blows of the Red Army, they liberated many settlements with their own forces and held them until the approach of Soviet troops.
Thus, as a result of the Mogilev operation, as an integral part of the Belarusian offensive operation, with the assistance of partisans, favorable conditions were created for the offensive of Soviet troops directly to Minsk in order to encircle and defeat the enemy's Minsk grouping.
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Reviews:
11/29/2015, 12:44 PM Dzhumagalieva Kulyash Valitkhanovna
Review: The author, using sources and archival materials, was able to reveal the main provisions of the problem. There are a number of topics on the history of the Great Patriotic War that require not only a more thorough study, but, which is especially important, a revision from new positions. One of them is the partisan movement in the occupied territory. It is gratifying that the author was able to concisely isolate the role and significance of the partisan movement in Belarus. The article meets all the requirements and can be published.
5.12.2015, 10:45 Nadkin Timofey Dmitrievich
Review: I agree with the review of the previous reviewer. I believe that it can be recommended for publication. This is really a work based on the involvement of several types of sources, and not reflections on a "free" topic.
02/03/2016, 7:53 Gres Sergey Mikhailovich
Review: Post
Dictionary of Historical Concepts
Autocephaly (from greek auto - itself, mullet - head) - self-government, independence of the church. Autocephalous in Orthodoxy is an administratively independent local church, headed by a patriarch or metropolitan. Autocephaly does not mean the absolute independence of the local church. All autocephalous churches are parts of the one Universal Church of Christ.
Autonomy is the independent exercise of state power or broad internal self-government given to the people compactly living within the borders of the state.
Annexation is the forcible annexation of the territory of another state by one state.
Home Army - Polish military formations that fought on the territory of Western Belarus for the liberation of Poland and its restoration within the borders until September 1939.
Belarusianization - the policy of national-state and national-cultural development in the BSSR in the 1920s.
Bolshevization of the Soviets - the growth of the influence of the Bolsheviks on the masses, accompanied by an increase in their representation in the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.
A buffer state is a state between two neighboring countries that reduces or eliminates contradictions between them.
Genocide is the extermination of certain groups of the population on racial, ethnic or religious grounds.
Ghettos are special quarters in cities (city concentration camps) created by the Nazis in the occupied territory to exterminate the Jewish population.
Civil war is an armed struggle for state power within one country between different social and political groups.
Industrialization is the process of creating large-scale machine production in industry and other sectors of the national economy.
Intervention is the violent intervention of one or more states in the internal affairs of another state.
The canonical church is the common name for most of the Orthodox autocephalous churches. A canonical church is a church that corresponds to Orthodox canons (laws), that is, a real church.
Collaboration is a policy of cooperation with the occupiers.
Collectivization is the unification of individual farms of peasants into large collective farms (collective farms).
Contribution - money or material values \u200b\u200breceived by the victorious state from the country that was defeated in the war.
Cooperation is a voluntary association of people for joint work. For example, a partnership for joint cultivation of land, a trade cooperative, etc. The income of the members of the cooperative depends on the property invested in the common business.
Indigenousization is one of the main directions of the Belarusianization policy, which provides for an increase in the role of indigenous people in the social and political life of the republic, the promotion of cadres from the indigenous population for party, Soviet, economic and social work.
"Eastern Kresy" - the official name of the West Belarusian lands as part of Pol shi.
Mobilization - transfer of the armed forces of the state from a peaceful state to combat readiness; mass conscription during the war into the armed forces of citizens liable for military service in the reserve; the next call for military service of young men of the corresponding age.
People's militia - voluntary military and paramilitary units (workers' detachments, self-defense groups, detachments of the party and Soviet activists, etc.) from citizens who are not subject to a priority call for mobilization.
National democracy is a direction of social and political thought that combines general democratic ideas and goals with the tasks of social and national liberation of oppressed peoples.
Nationalization is the transfer of land, enterprises, and other means of production from private ownership to state ownership.
Occupation is the occupation by the troops of one state of the territory or part of the territory of another state, accompanied by the establishment of its own administration and laws.
Operation Bagration was an offensive operation of the Red Army from June 23 to August 29, 1944, during which the territory of the BSSR was liberated from the Nazi invaders.
Siegemen - former officers Polish army, which for services in the Polish-Soviet war of 1919 - 1920. the Polish authorities were distributing plots of Western Belarusian lands.
Ostarbeiters - "Eastern workers"; population from the occupied territory of the USSR, exported for forced labor in Germany.
Partisan zone is an area controlled by partisans.
The partisan movement is an armed struggle of broad strata of the population, united in organized formations in the occupied territories, against an aggressor for state independence.
Plan "Ost" - the plan of Nazi Germany, which provided for the colonization and Germanization of the territory of Eastern Europe, including the BSSR
Underground struggle is the illegal activity of bodies and organizations, individual representatives of the population on the territory occupied by the enemy, aimed at disrupting the occupation policy and restoring national-state independence.
The policy of "sanitation" (health improvement) is a complex of socio-economic and political events held in Poland, including in Western Belarus, by the head of the Polish state, Y. Pilsudski.
"Prishchepovshchina" - a trend in agrarian policy (by the name of the People's Commissar of Agriculture of the BSSR D. Prishchepov), in which the stake was placed on the development of the farm system.
Tax in kind is an element of the new economic policy, which replaced the surplus appropriation. The tax in kind was calculated on the basis of the area under crops and was announced to the peasants even before the start of agricultural work.
Food appropriation is an element of the policy of "war communism", a system of procurement of agricultural products, in accordance with which the peasants were obliged to surrender all surplus products to the state.
Requisition - compulsory alienation of property into ownership or temporary use by the state; forced levies levied on the population by the occupation authorities.
"Rail War" - coordinated operations of the Soviet partisans and underground fighters for the massive destruction of railway communications (rails, bridges, stations, trains) behind enemy lines.
Sectarianism (religious) - the general name of religious groups, associations, separating shixya from the dominant church (in Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, Christianity).
Surazh (Vitebsk) "gates" - a 40-kilometer breakthrough in the line of the Soviet-German front between Velizh and Usvyaty, through which the partisan detachments communicated with the "Big Land".
Federation - form state structure, in which the states (states, lands, republics, etc.), forming a union, are subordinate to a single center and remain independent in resolving individual issues of domestic policy.
Evacuation - targeted removal of the population, industrial equipment eat industrial and agricultural enterprises, food, property, material and cultural values \u200b\u200bfrom places threatened by occupation.
- Section I. OCTOBER REVOLUTION. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BELARUSIAN STATEHOOD
- § 2. Events of the October Revolution in Belarus and on the Western Front
- § 4-5. Proclamation and formation of the Belarusian statehood
- § 7. Belarusian statehood in the conditions of the Civil War. Second proclamation of the SSRB
- Generalization lesson for Section I “The October Revolution. Creation of the Belarusian statehood "
- Section ІІ. BELARUS IN THE CONDITIONS OF THE FORMATION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST SOCIETY. WESTERN BELARUS UNDER POLAND