479th Infantry Regiment, 149th Infantry Division. Tragedy near Roslavl

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    ✪ Intelligence questioning: Igor Pykhalov about the detachments, part two

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I welcome you categorically! Igor Vasilievich, good afternoon. Good day. Let's continue. Yes. Let us continue today the topic of the barrage detachments, which, according to the beliefs of our accusers, always stood behind the backs of the Red Army and, accordingly, drove them into battle, because otherwise our people for some reason would not go into battle for Stalin. Or they shot in advance, like Mikhalkov's. We didn’t have time to reach them yet, but they had already been shot. Yes. These are the beliefs we have now. And, unfortunately, I must say that such ideas are very common. But, as we already found out last time that reality, it is, as always, very different from what the whistleblowers are telling us. That is, in reality, we really did have barrage detachments, and there were several types of them that were created at different times and had different subordination. As we remember, there were also barrage detachments at 3 departments, which later became Special departments (that is, NKVDs), there were barrage battalions and divisions created in September 1941, but which, too, at the same time, oddly enough for our alternative gifted public, instead of shooting their fighters in the back, they, together with these fighters, participated in battles, including here near Leningrad. And finally, there were also barrage detachments created by the territorial bodies of the NKVD. Now we, in fact, come to the very famous order No. 227, which was issued in the summer of 1942, when the Germans broke through to the Caucasus and Stalingrad. In principle, we have such a widespread idea that the barrage detachments appeared at that time. But in fact, as I said, it is not. There it was created another type of barrage detachments, that is, army. Actually, here I will also quote this order, No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin, which was surrendered on July 28, 1942. Just as regards the detachments: “The military councils of the armies and, above all, the commanders of the armies: b) form 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (200 people each) within the army, place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them in case panic and indiscriminate withdrawal of divisional units to shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot and thus help honest divisional fighters fulfill their duty to the Motherland. " "Alarmists and cowards". We have, yes, we always have people who, let's say, have problems understanding Russian, they conclude from this that ... It's easy to bring everyone down, yes. Yes. But in reality, there was precisely the idea to stop the running units, and shoot those who sow panic. Including in front of the formation, but not so that from a machine gun and everyone, but selectively. Accordingly, this order is issued on July 28. In pursuance of this order, on August 1, the commander of the Stalingrad Front, Lieutenant General V.N. Gordov gives his order No. 00162 / op, in which, again, regarding the detachments, it says the following: 1st and 4th tank armies - three barrage detachments of 200 people each. 5. To subordinate the defensive detachments to the military councils of the armies through their special departments. At the head of the barrage detachments to put the most experienced in a combat relation special officers. Defensive detachments will be manned with the best selected fighters and commanders from the Far Eastern divisions. Provide roadblocks with vehicles. 6. Within two days, restore each rifle division barrage battalions formed by the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 01919. To equip the defensive battalions of divisions with the best worthy fighters and commanders. Report about the execution by August 4, 1942 " As we can see, here these new army detachments are being formed, in accordance with Order 227, and the barrage battalions that have existed in all divisions since September 1941 are also being restored. But since, again, after all, such measures are, by and large, they are needed during a retreat or in defense. Since our army in the winter of 1942, on the contrary, tried to counterattack (and in a number of places successfully), there, accordingly, the need for such measures temporarily disappeared, but now again these barrage battalions are also ordered to be restored. Well, there were also barrage detachments under the Special Departments, which showed themselves in the same Stalingrad battle. And here I will immediately cite the message of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front dated August 14, 1942 "On the progress of the implementation of Order No. 227 ...": "In total, 24 people were shot during the specified period. For example, the commanders of the 414th Infantry Regiment and the 18th Infantry Division, Styrkov and Dobrynin, cowed during the battle, abandoned their squads and fled from the battlefield, both were detained by a detachment and by the order of the Special Division they were shot in front of the formation. " I dare say that the squads remained in place, it was the commanders who abandoned their subordinates and ran to the rear. It happens, yes. Further: “A Red Army soldier of the same regiment and division, Ogorodnikov, self-injured his left hand, was exposed for the crime, for which he was brought to trial by a military tribunal. On the basis of Order No. 227, three army detachments were formed, each with 200 men. These units are fully armed with rifles, machine guns and light machine guns. " Yes, by the way, I'll clarify here: this is a report on the 4th tank army , which was part of the Stalingrad Front, that is, these three detachments were formed in it. “The chiefs of the detachments have been assigned operational workers of special departments. On August 7, 1942, the indicated detachments and barrage battalions detained 363 people in units and formations in the army sectors, of which 93 people. left the encirclement, 146 - lagged behind their units, 52 - lost their units, 12 - came from captivity, 54 - fled from the battlefield, 2 - with dubious wounds. That is, a suspicion of a crossbow. As a result of a thorough check: 187 people were sent to their units, 43 - to the staffing department, 73 - to the special camps of the NKVD, 27 - to penal companies, 2 - to the medical commission, 6 people were arrested and, as mentioned above, 24 people. shot in front of the line. " What needs to be explained here: it turns out that here almost more than half were returned to their units without any reprisals, 43 - not to their own department, but to the staffing department, 73 - were sent to special camps of the NKVD, which were engaged in filtering prisoners of war, about which I already spoke during one of the programs. For checking. And again, for the overwhelming majority of them, this check will end well. Well, there, accordingly, 27 people were sent to penal companies, 6 were arrested, 2 were suspiciously wounded, they will apparently be checked for how it was received, and 24 were shot. That is, again, instead of a brutal machine-gun shooting here, in fact, people were dealt with and indeed some were subjected to, as they say now, repression, but to say that these were innocent people and suffered indiscriminately, this is somehow in general ... Well, the key - They were not caught by machine-gun fire in the back in combat positions during the battle, but were detained in the rear behind the front line. In general, according to this order number 227, as of October 15, 1942, that is, in about two months, 193 army detachments were formed, including 16 of them on the Stalingrad front and 25 on the Donskoy actually in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Battle of Stalingrad). At the same time, from August 1 to October 15, 1942, the detachments along the entire Soviet-German front detained 140,755 servicemen who had escaped from the front line (remember this figure - a little over 140 thousand). Of those arrested, 3,980 people were arrested (that is, about 4 thousand), 1189 people were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies, 185 people were sent to penal battalions, and 131 were returned to their units and to transit points. 094 people. That is, again, it turns out that the number of people who have been subjected to some kind of repression, let's say, is less than 10%. The overwhelming number of detainees, who fled from the battlefield, were simply returned to their units so that they could continue to fulfill their military duty. Again, let's come back, that is, through simple polls they find out who ran, who ran first, who yelled at the same time "Let's run." Well, with the identified citizens, with the organizers - with alarmists and deserters - you must naturally have a special conversation. Well, the fact that they were shot - yes, but what did you want, that's wartime. Now they will break through and then they will die ten times more, so you must be eliminated like mad dogs. Practically it is. Because, indeed, even since the times of the ancient world and the wars of that time, the army incurs the main losses during flight, and not during defense. Accordingly, since the Battle of Stalingrad was taking place at that time, we are interested in what was happening on the Don and Stalingrad fronts. On the Don Front during this period (from August 1 to October 15, 1942), 36.109 people were detained (that is, approximately 36 thousand), but of them: 736 people were arrested, 433 were shot, 1056 people were sent to penal companies, to penal battalions - 33 people and 32.933 people were returned to their units and to the transfer points. That is, the proportion is about the same, even in fact, there are even more of those people for whom everything turned out well. Well, in general, it is quite understandable that the battles are really fierce, so it really happens that the nerves do not stand and begin to retreat, but they were simply brought to life and returned back. In general, to put it mildly, it is strange: to destroy your own personnel against the background of battles and the advancing enemy. And on the Stalingrad front, 15.649 people were respectively detained, of which 244 were arrested, 278 were shot, 218 were in penal companies, 42 were in penal battalions, and 14.833 people were returned to their units and to transit points. That is, there is generally a percentage of repression, somewhere around 5%. Again, here I will just give a few examples of how the detachments on the Stalingrad front acted during this battle. For example: “On August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division of the 64th Army of the Stalingrad Front was surrounded by enemy tanks that had broken through, parts of the division, losing control, retreated in panic to the rear. A detachment under the command of Lieutenant of State Security Filatov, taking decisive measures, stopped the retreating servicemen in disorder and returned them to the previously occupied lines of defense. In another sector of this division, the enemy tried to break through into the depths of the defense. The detachment entered the battle and delayed the enemy's advance. On September 14, the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th Rifle Division of the 62nd Army. The soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd rifle regiments began to retreat in panic. The head of the detachment, junior lieutenant of state security Elman, ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating. As a result, the personnel of these regiments was stopped and in two hours the regiments occupied the former lines of defense. " That is, just here, it would seem, this brutal scene - that machine-gun fire was opened, but over the heads of the retreating and as a result, respectively, the fighters of these two regiments were not shot from their machine guns, but brought to their senses and returned back to their former lines of defense and the enemy was stopped. “On September 20 the Germans occupied the eastern outskirts of Melekhovskaya. The composite brigade, under the onslaught of the enemy, began an unauthorized retreat. The actions of a detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces put things in order in the brigade. The brigade occupied the previous lines and on the initiative of the political commander of the company of the same detachment Pestov, by joint actions with the brigade, the enemy was driven back from Melekhovskaya. That is, here, by the way, this is not the first time we observe a scene when a barrage detachment not only stops the fleeing or detains the retreating fighters and brings them to their senses, but then, together with them, enters into battle with the Germans and, accordingly, also often suffers ... Actually, this was the case in 1941, say, with us near Leningrad (I quoted documents), and so it was near Stalingrad. Again, here, for example: “On September 13, 1942, the 112th Rifle Division, under pressure from the enemy, withdrew from the occupied line. A detachment of the 62nd Army, under the leadership of the head of the detachment, Lieutenant of State Security Khlystov, took up defensive positions on the approaches to an important height. For four days, the soldiers and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of the enemy machine gunners, inflicting heavy losses on them. The blocking detachment held the line until the approach of military units. " Again, after two days, i.e. September 15-16: "The detachment of the 62nd Army for two days successfully fought with superior enemy forces in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Stalingrad railway station ..." At the same time, although this formation itself, it is small, as we remember, consisting of two hundred people , nevertheless, they were able not only to repulse the attacks of the Germans, but also to counterattack and inflict significant losses on the enemy in manpower, and held out until the approach of conventional army units. At the same time, moreover, as noted in the documents, such an extreme was observed that the detachments were used as ordinary linear units. Here, on this occasion, it is said: “A number of facts were noted when the barrage detachments were used incorrectly by individual commanders of the formations. A significant number of barrage detachments were sent into battle on a par with line units, which suffered losses, as a result of which they were diverted for re-formation and the barrage service was not carried out. " Well, then there are several specific examples when in this way the barrage units were used as ordinary units. At the same time, about 65-70% of the personnel suffered losses. And naturally it was not always justified. In general, to roughly assess the situation in which these people acted in the same Stalingrad, you can look at a number of award lists that are now posted on the Internet, since we have been running the "People's Feat" project for several years. And there you can see how ours, as we put it "bloody gebnya", looked from this point of view. For example, senior lieutenant Vasily Filippovich Finogenov, who served as adjutant of the senior battalion, this was the name of the battalion chief of staff at that time (this is such an army term). Here he is a senior adjutant of the 1st Army Barrier Detachment, 1918 the year of birth , Russian, non-partisan: “Working as a senior adjutant at 1 A.Z.O. 62 army for the defense of Stalingrad, following the order of NKO No. 227, about 6,000 soldiers and commanders were detained, who were sent to their units to defend the city of Stalingrad ... "That is, these are the duties of the state, what the barrage detachment is supposed to do is to stop the fighters and return them to their parts. Further in this award we read the following: “It was ordered by the head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the 62nd Army to close the gap with a detachment, to prevent the enemy from reaching the Volga in the area of \u200b\u200bplant 221. On October 16, 1942, the detachment fought, he personally led the battle of the 2nd company by order of the chief of the detachment and with the fire of a light machine gun destroyed 27 fascists. The mortar crew of the 201 mortar battalion went out of action, he organized mortar fire and did not allow the enemy to accumulate for an attack. There was a case when the Germans attacked the detachment while bypassing the defense area, here he destroyed 6 Nazis with automatic fire. " He was a serious man. Yes. But, unfortunately, it was. Because he was awarded the medal "For Courage" for these exploits, and a few months later he was wounded and died in the hospital. By the way, here, again, in this barrage detachment there was a number of such people who distinguished themselves then. For example, Ivan Ilyich Andreev, a Red Army soldier, fighter of the 1st AZO of the 62nd Army, born in 1925, Russian, non-partisan. As we can see, this is 1942, respectively, he is a maximum of 17 years old, and most likely even 16: “... Serving in a barrage detachment when closing a gap in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Barricades plant, he organized mortar firing of the 201st mortar battalion, the crew which was destroyed and thereby did not allow the enemy to accumulate for an attack. " Apparently, the two of them were just here with Senior Lieutenant Finogenov and acted. The next example, again from the same barrage detachment, Stepan Stepanovich Limarenko, political commander of the 1st AZO (army barrage detachment), 62nd army, born in 1916, Russian, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks: “In the fight against German fascism to defend the city of Stalingrad, political commander Stepan Stepanovich Limarenko, fulfilling his duties as a fighter of a blocking detachment, under enemy fire, detained 78 unstable Red Army soldiers who left their defensive positions and tried to retreat. Comrade Limarenko detained them and forced them to occupy their former lines. Just the functions of the bloody gebni are to stop the Red Army soldiers and bring them back. Then we read: ... On October 16, 1942, Comrade Limarenko, together with the Red Army soldier V. P. detained two PTR rifles with calculations, which, having seen German tanks, left their positions and retreated to the rear of their defenses. Comrade Limarenko installed an PTR rifle, from which he destroyed three enemy tanks on Sculptural Street. Than the most German tanks failed to get to the Volga. " The military man Limarenko spoke seriously. And here is the award list for the Red Army soldier Chernodymov, who was with Limarenko. Born in 1921, Russian, member of the Komsomol: “Taking part in the fight against German fascism to defend the city of Stalingrad, the Red Army soldier, comrade Chernodymov V.P., being a fighter of the blocking detachment, staunchly fulfills the order of the NCO No. 227. At the same time, Comrade Chernodymov on October 16, 1942, together with the political commander, Comrade Limarenko, detained the calculation of two PTR rifles with guns, which were seen by German tanks trying to go to the rear along Sculptural Street to our units, this calculation left their positions and went to the rear. Comrade Chernodymov personally destroyed two enemy tanks with an PTR rifle, the rest returned back. " The only thing is not clear here. What did they get there, a total of five German tanks were knocked out, or they still counted each one. But even if, say, three for two, it's all the same ... A lot. Yes. Because they used anti-tank rifles in this case, that is, in general, this is really a feat. These are the situations. Moreover, many such cases are described here. For example, two fighters of the 4th detachment of the 62nd army (that was the 1st detachment, and this is the 4th), they just the next day, that is, on October 17, 1942, they saved the ammunition warehouse, which was on the shore The Volga, respectively, the Germans bombed it, a fire broke out there, and two soldiers, instead of scrambling, as in general many would do in such a situation, they tried to save this warehouse. I will even read out the award lists: “Kurbanov Tadjedin Agalievich. Red Army soldier, fighter of the 4th detachment of the OO NKVD of the 62nd Army. Born in 1919, Lezgin, candidate of the CPSU (b). While at the post near ferry No. 62 on October 17, 1942, the ferry was heavily bombed by enemy aircraft, as a result, shells and mines were set on fire in the ammunition depot near the ferry. Comrade Kurbanov, despite the bombing and the fact that the ammunition was burning and exploding, rushed to save them. Thanks to his courage and courage, the ammunition was saved. " Accordingly, together with him, he also took part in extinguishing this fire: “Nikolai Ivanovich. Red Army political commander, fighter of the 4th detachment of the OO NKVD of the 62nd Army. Born in 1915, Russian, member of the CPSU (b). While on October 17 this year at the post near ferry 62, the ferry and the post where he stood was subjected to heavy bombing by enemy aircraft, as a result of which a warehouse with ammunition from "Katyusha" and other shells and mines was set on fire. Comrade Obozny, despite the fact that the shells were exploding, rushed to take them apart. Thanks to his courage and courage, the fire was extinguished, the ammunition was saved. Comrade Obozny is worthy of the award with the Medal for Military Merit. " Stunned. That is, again, as you know, our creators, who are filming our current Russian films about the war, are very fond of portraying our special officers or NKVD fighters as well-fed cowardly creatures who can only hide behind other people's backs. As we can see, in reality the overwhelming majority of them acted in a completely different way. And indeed, in general, they not only were engaged in fulfilling their function of putting things in order, but also actually behaved, as it should be for real fighters. As I already said, in fact, during the Battle of Stalingrad, we observed three types of barrage detachments in action at once: barrage detachments under the Special Divisions, small, newly created army barrage detachments and division barrage battalions. At the same time, army detachments and detachments of the division, they acted closer to the front, i.e. they often went into battle and suppressed mass panic on the front line, while blocking detachments under special departments, they were already serving further in the rear, in communications, in order to again filter the contingent that was walking, well, and detain people who deserted, or shall we say improperly there are in the rear lane. Since during the Battle of Stalingrad the concepts of the front and rear were already rather conventional, because the Germans there pressed us practically to the Volga, such a division of labor was also often not observed. For example: “On October 15, 1942, during fierce battles in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the enemy managed to reach the Volga and cut off from the main forces of the 62nd Army the remnants of the 112th Rifle Division, as well as the 115th, 124th and 149th separate rifle brigades. At the same time, among the leading command staff, there were repeated attempts to abandon their units and cross over to the eastern bank of the Volga. In these conditions, to combat cowards and alarmists, a special department of the 62nd army created an operational group under the leadership of senior operative lieutenant of state security Ignatenko. Having united the remnants of the platoons of special departments with the personnel of the 3rd Army Barrier Detachment, she did an exceptionally great job of putting things in order, detaining deserters, cowards and alarmists who, under various pretexts, tried to cross to the left bank of the Volga. Within 15 days, the operational group detained and returned to the battlefield up to 800 private and command personnel, and 15 servicemen were shot in front of the formation by order of the special agencies. " We see the ratio, that is, 800 people were detained, 15 of them were shot in front of the formation, but the rest were simply returned to the ranks and again continued to fight. Accordingly, if this bloody gebni did not exist, what would have happened - first, the commanders, and then, accordingly, unstable fighters would try to cross to the other bank of the Volga, abandoning their positions, eventually could end ... From the point of view of today's civilians, it seems it would be understandable - no one wants to die, and therefore, we will retreat, there we will be alive and will be able to benefit the Motherland again. But the trouble is that it was necessary to bring benefit to the Motherland at the moment, standing firmly here, and not running anywhere. Having received an order, it must be obeyed. Sometimes, at the cost of your own life. In general, yes, absolutely. Because, indeed, from the point of view of common sense, you want to be away from the front line, but from the point of view of military duty, you need to carry out the order that was given to you. I will give a few more examples from the Don Front. This is a memorandum dated February 17, 1943 "On the work of special agencies to combat cowards and alarmists in parts of the Don Front for the period from October 1, 1942 to February 1, 1943": "October 2, 1942, during the offensive of our troops, individual units 138 rifle divisions, met by powerful artillery and mortar fire of the enemy, wavered and fled in panic through the battle formations of the 1st battalion of the 706th rifle regiment, 204th rifle division, which were in the second echelon. By the measures taken by the command and the divisional battalion, the situation was restored. 7 cowards and alarmists were shot in front of the formation, and the rest were returned to the front line. On October 16, 1942, during a counterattack by the enemy, a group of Red Army men of the 781st and 124th rifle divisions, in the amount of 30 people, showed cowardice and in panic began to flee from the battlefield, dragging other soldiers with them. The army detachment of the 21st Army, located in this sector, eliminated the panic by force of arms and restored the previous position. “Actually, here we see, again, the key words, that these 30 people, they not only fled, but at the same time, as it is rightly said, carried away other servicemen. Because, unfortunately, a man, he is by definition a herd creature, as you know, we came from the wild, from social animals, and therefore, everyone runs, then ... "Everyone ran, and I ran." Yes. And therefore, it is natural that it is necessary that there are people who would stop this panic and, accordingly, revive those who participate in such an escape. “On November 19, 1942, during the offensive of units of the 293rd Infantry Division, during the enemy's counterattack, two mortar platoons of the 1306th Infantry Regiment, together with platoon commanders, junior lieutenants Bogatyryov and Yegorov, left the occupied line without an order from the command and in panic, throwing weapons began to flee from the battlefield. A platoon of submachine gunners of an army blocking detachment located in this area stopped the fleeing and, having shot two alarmists in front of the formation, returned the rest to their former lines, after which they successfully advanced forward. " That is, again, as we see that two alarmists were identified and shot, but at the same time, the rest of the fighters, in general, as they say, came to their senses and then quite successfully fulfill their duty. But, unfortunately, these are the realities that, in general, are far from the ideals of humanism that are being preached to us today. Since today it is believed that human life is the highest value, therefore, it is natural that a coward and a selfish person should be, apparently, inviolable. Let me give you another example: “On November 20, 1942, during the enemy's counterattack, one of the companies of the 38th Infantry Division, which was at a height, did not offer resistance to the enemy, and without an order from the command, began to randomly withdraw from the occupied area. The 83rd blocking detachment of the 64th Army, carrying out a barrage service directly behind the battle formations of the units of the 38th Infantry Division, stopped the fleeing company in panic and returned it back to the previously occupied section of the hill, after which the personnel of the company showed exceptional endurance and perseverance in battles with the enemy. " That is, as we can see, it was not necessary to shoot anyone here, just roughly speaking, the people running in panic had to be stopped, brought to their senses, brought back to the same positions that they occupied, after which they already quite successfully and staunchly performed your military duty. I would also note that if they were returned to their positions, then it is not indicated there that the Germans had already taken these positions and they kicked someone out of there, they just threw trenches and began to scatter, obeying some kind of, apparently, momentary impulse. We met the detachment, talked and came back, and sat down again in their places, Well, you don't have to give in to momentary impulses. This, in fact, is, in general, quite a common situation, moreover, not only during that war, but also in other conflicts, when people simply can simply move away from the fact that, roughly speaking, panicky rumors spread there that we bypassed or simply began to shoot very hard at the front line. Black sheep spoils the whole flock. This is yes. Accordingly, in this way the barrage detachments acted during the Battle of Stalingrad. Well, the next such large-scale battle, when, again, our troops had to defend themselves just so staunchly, this, as you know, was the Kursk Bulge. - in the summer of 1943. And accordingly, the detachments again participated in this and operated quite successfully. For example, let's say, on the very first day of this battle on the Kursk Bulge, i.e. July 5, 1943: “The 13th Army, the 2nd Battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment of the 15th Division, led by the battalion commander Captain Rakitsky, arbitrarily left its line and retreated in panic to the rear of the division, where it was detained by a detachment and returned to battle. " Note: not with machine-gun fire, but with the personnel of the barrage detachment. Accordingly, further: “From 5 to 10 July 1943, the barrage detachments of the Voronezh Front detained 1,870 people. Most of them were servicemen who had lost contact with their units. In the process of filtering them, 6 deserters, 19 self-mutilators and 49 cowards and alarmists who fled from the battlefield were identified and arrested. The rest of the detainees (that is, almost 1,800 people) were returned to duty. " Here I have such a document as a special message from the head of the Smersh counterintelligence department of the 69th Army of the Voronezh Front, Colonel Stroilov, about the work of the detachments from 12 to 17 July 1943. What does he report there: “In order to carry out the task of detaining the rank and file of the army formations and units that left the battlefield without permission, the Smersh Counterintelligence Department of the 69th Army on July 12, 1943, from the personnel of a separate company, organized 7 detachments , 7 people in each, headed by 2 operational workers. These detachments were exhibited in the villages of Alekseevka - Prokhodnoye, Novaya Slobodka - Samoilovka (there are also a number of names, I will not read them out). As a result of the work carried out by the detachments from 12 to 17 July with. Including 6,956 people of private and command and command personnel who left the battlefield or escaped from the encirclement of enemy troops were detained. " Further there is where all these people come from. What did they do with them: “It should be noted that the number of detained servicemen, starting from July 15, has sharply decreased in comparison with the first days of the work of the detachments. If on July 12, 2842 people were detained, and on July 13 - 1841 people, then on July 16, 394 people were detained, and already on July 17, only 167 people were detained, and then they escaped from the encirclement of the enemy troops. The mass withdrawal of private, command and command personnel from the battlefield by the detachments organized by us, which began at five o'clock on July 12, 1943, was basically stopped at 16 o'clock on the same day, and subsequently completely stopped. Accordingly: “Out of the detainees, 55 people were arrested, of which: suspicious for espionage - 20 people, for terror - 2, traitors to the Motherland - 1, cowards and alarmists - 28, deserters - 4. The rest of the detainees were sent to their units. ... In view of the fact that the withdrawal of servicemen from the battlefield has been stopped, I have removed the obstacle detachments, and their personnel have been sent to carry out their direct military duties. " By the way, here we see that these were barrage detachments, which were created just under a special department, i.e. what has been in effect since the beginning of the war. Yes, here I will additionally explain that this famous "Smersh" is mentioned here, it was just created the day before, or rather, not the day before, but a few months before that, on April 19, 1943, the Office of Special Departments of the NKVD, it was again transferred to army and accordingly reorganized into the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of Defense. Accordingly, people from there, i.e. from "Smersh", they acted like this - they stopped those who retreated in such a panic in front of the enemy. Accordingly, here is another document, a memo addressed to V.S. Abakumov on the results of the check of counterintelligence units of the 13th and 70th armies of the Central Front from 12 to 30 July 1943, signed by Colonel Shirmanov: “In order to prevent possible panic and to fight cowards deserting from the battlefield, I, together with the heads of departments "Smersh" of the 13th and 70th armies in all divisions, brigades and regiments, groups of obstacles and screens were organized under the leadership of the operational staff of armies, corps, divisions. As a result of these measures, about 1,300 servicemen were detained in the 13th and 70th armies in the area of \u200b\u200bthe 13th and 70th armies, among whom cowards and alarmists, deserters, mutilators and another anti-Soviet element were identified. Most of the servicemen returned in an organized manner to their positions and took part in the battles. " That is, again, we see that it is practically the same as in the previous documents. Well, I'll read one more note. Memorandum of the Head of the Smersh Counterintelligence Directorate of the Central Front, Major General A. Vadis, dated August 13, 1943, on the work in July 1943, respectively: “By strengthening the barrage service both behind the battle formations and in the rear of units in the reporting period, 4501 people, including: arrested - 145 people, transferred to the prosecutor's office - 70 people, transferred to the NKGB - 276 people, sent to special camps - 14 people, sent to the unit - 3303 people. " That is, again, it turns out, however, there are still about 2/3, a little more, who were simply sent to their units. Of the indicated number, the counterintelligence bodies "Smersh" of only one army, where the head of the Department, Colonel Pimenov, detained: headmen - 35 people, policemen - 59 people, who served in german army - 34 people, were in captivity - 87 people, to be drafted into the spacecraft - 777 people. Of these, 4 agents of the German gendarmerie were arrested and exposed. " That is, here, among other things, the process of checking our people who have been in the German occupation also begins and, accordingly, one of them could behave again, let's say so wrong. Well, a lot of people suffer over the fact that they checked those who ended up in the occupied territories. First, everyone left the occupied territories, evacuated to the east, this time. Secondly, once there, one could do very different things, for example, wash the floors in the commandant's office and inform the partisans about what was happening in the commandant's office, and it was possible to serve as a policeman in this commandant's office, walk with weapons, arrest, and shoot fellow citizens. Well, you probably have to answer for this. Somehow it doesn't fit at all, everyone is so white and fluffy, and, probably, in order to reveal this, it is necessary to carry out checks. Probably, in order to carry out checks, some of the citizens must be taken into custody and even, oh, horror! To arrest. The same thing that is typical is happening now. By the way, in one of our previous conversation, I just gave an example about one of the testing and filtration camps and how the same elders were checked there, and how it turned out that some of them were not even released, but even hired in the personnel of the NKVD. That is, apparently, they were either our agents, or those people who showed themselves so well in that capacity, as partisan assistants, underground workers, that they were generally appreciated accordingly. Well, those who exactly served the Germans did it in good faith, so to speak, treating them ... From the bottom of their hearts. Yes. They became “innocent victims of illegal Stalinist repressions,” as we put it. I was here recently, distracted a little to the side, bought a book called, in my opinion, "Thank God, the Germans have come." And there are memoirs of some scum named Osipov, they used to be on the Internet ... There was some kind of woman in the occupied city of Pushkin, here we had near Leningrad ... Yes, I remember this one. There is such a patented scum that I do not even know how in general ... well, these are not people ... there is some kind of, you know, a collective cross between Gozman and Novodvorskaya. Nothing changes. You bastards of such caliber that normal person , I don't know, it won't sit next to it in the field. Quiet horror ... And what have you got, you had to regret, or what? But the scum went along with the Germans, first to Riga, then to Berlin, and then, of course, as it should be scum, it ended up in the USA. Well yes. By the way, Egor and I would like to analyze this book separately. Well, returning, in fact, to our topic, since after the Kursk Bulge a radical turning point in the war took place, i.e. we went to advance and liberate first our territory, and then the occupied countries of Europe, then, accordingly, the need for such units and subdivisions that are engaged in barrage service, it gradually disappeared. And in the end, on October 29, 1944, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin No. 0349 "On the disbandment of individual barrage detachments", which sounded like this: "In connection with the change in the general situation at the fronts, the need for further maintenance of barrage detachments has disappeared. I order: 1. To disband separate barrage detachments by November 13, 1944. Use the personnel of the disbanded detachments to replenish rifle divisions. 2. To inform about the disbandment of the barrage detachments by November 20, 1944. " That is, on this, in fact, the combat path of the army detachments ended. Well, it is clear that the same platoons that were under the "Smersh" bodies, they continued to operate until the end of the war, because the functions of protecting the rear, respectively, the detention of a suspicious element and so on, as if no one removed them, and in any normal army they are still executed in one structure or another. In general, summing up, now, a cruel time, terrible circumstances, they require cruel and terrible measures. An order called "Not one step back!" was famous among the troops. There is a wonderful book by citizen Simonov "The Living and the Dead", which, in my opinion, shows very, very well how the servicemen felt about this order, what they thought about it and what they said. It was necessary - it was necessary, it ceased to be necessary - and was dismissed. By the way, on this occasion, I’m just about what people said, I will quote one veteran, respectively, his memoirs were published somewhere in the zero years. This is a certain M.G. Abdulin, he served in the 293rd Infantry Division during the Battle of Stalingrad. And there was an interview with him, we had such a magazine "Brother", in my opinion, and now it is still coming out: "- Mansur Gizatulovich, tell us how the famous order No. 227 was adopted in the trenches? “It was a harsh order. It appeared when the retreat reached the Volga. And he was a powerful sobering agent - "Not one step back!" The order stopped people. There is confidence in the neighbors on the right and left - they will not retreat. Although it was not easy to realize that there was a barrage detachment behind you. - And how did these units operate? - I do not know of a case when retreating people were shot. In the first weeks after the order, the guilty, and some not very guilty, fell under the "new broom". I remember being sent from the company to observe the execution of seventeen people "for cowardice and alarmism." I had to tell my friends about what I saw. Later I saw the barrage detachment under very dramatic circumstances. In the area of \u200b\u200bthe heights of Five Mounds, the Germans pressed us so that we skidded, throwing our greatcoats, in some gymnastics. And suddenly our tanks, and skiers behind them - a barrage detachment. Well, I think, here it is, death! A young Estonian captain approaches me. “Take,” he says, “the overcoat from the murdered man, you will catch a cold ...” Here is such an eyewitness testimony and there are quite a few such examples. But in general no one gives examples of how to shoot them with machine guns. Only Nikita Sergeich Mikhalkov in the cinema. More precisely, how to say, we still have our denouncers, they are, as they say, like a fool with a written sack, they are still running around with a fragment from the memories of tanker Loza, who was a participant in the events when the commander ordered to hit from tank machine guns in front of the fleeing in order to stop them ... But then again, there are those who tried to wave it around, respectively, either they read the text inattentively, or simply twist. Because the fire was not to kill, but precisely to stop. Well, they don't understand such trifles, it doesn't matter, “they killed everyone anyway”. It really happened there that several people were killed there, but this ... well, what to do if the unit is running and, accordingly, if these people are not stopped, the losses will be much greater. As Citizen Papanov said: "You will be handled, but you do not steal." That's it, you don't have to run, you must honestly fulfill your military duty. Thank you, Igor Vasilievich. What about next time? And the next time, then, continuing this theme of the bloody gebni, we can consider how our penal units acted and existed: that is, penal battalions and penal companies. Excellent. Looking forward to. Thanks. And that's all for today. Until next time.

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    ✪ Intelligence questioning: Igor Pykhalov about the detachments, part two

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I welcome you categorically! Igor Vasilievich, good afternoon. Good day. Let's continue. Yes. Let us continue today the topic of the barrage detachments, which, according to the beliefs of our accusers, always stood behind the backs of the Red Army and, accordingly, drove them into battle, because otherwise our people for some reason would not go into battle for Stalin. Or they shot in advance, like Mikhalkov's. We didn’t have time to reach them yet, but they had already been shot. Yes. These are the beliefs we have now. And, unfortunately, I must say that such ideas are very common. But, as we already found out last time that reality, it is, as always, very different from what the whistleblowers are telling us. That is, in reality, we really did have barrage detachments, and there were several types of them that were created at different times and had different subordination. As we remember, there were also barrage detachments at 3 departments, which later became Special departments (that is, NKVDs), there were barrage battalions and divisions created in September 1941, but which, too, at the same time, oddly enough for our alternative gifted public, instead of shooting their fighters in the back, they, together with these fighters, participated in battles, including here near Leningrad. And finally, there were also barrage detachments created by the territorial bodies of the NKVD. Now we, in fact, come to the very famous order No. 227, which was issued in the summer of 1942, when the Germans broke through to the Caucasus and Stalingrad. In principle, we have such a widespread idea that the barrage detachments appeared at that time. But in fact, as I said, it is not. There it was created another type of barrage detachments, that is, army. Actually, here I will also quote this order, No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin, which was surrendered on July 28, 1942. Just as regards the detachments: “The military councils of the armies and, above all, the commanders of the armies: b) form 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (200 people each) within the army, place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them in case panic and indiscriminate withdrawal of divisional units to shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot and thus help honest divisional fighters fulfill their duty to the Motherland. " "Alarmists and cowards". We have, yes, we always have people who, let's say, have problems understanding Russian, they conclude from this that ... It's easy to bring everyone down, yes. Yes. But in reality, there was precisely the idea to stop the running units, and shoot those who sow panic. Including in front of the formation, but not so that from a machine gun and everyone, but selectively. Accordingly, this order is issued on July 28. In pursuance of this order, on August 1, the commander of the Stalingrad Front, Lieutenant General V.N. Gordov gives his order No. 00162 / op, in which, again, regarding the detachments, it says the following: 1st and 4th tank armies - three barrage detachments of 200 people each. 5. To subordinate the defensive detachments to the military councils of the armies through their special departments. At the head of the barrage detachments to put the most experienced in a combat relation special officers. Defensive detachments will be manned with the best selected fighters and commanders from the Far Eastern divisions. Provide roadblocks with vehicles. 6. Within two days, restore in each rifle division the barrage battalions formed according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 01919. To equip the defensive battalions of divisions with the best worthy fighters and commanders. Report about the execution by August 4, 1942 " As we can see, these new army detachments are being formed here, in accordance with Order 227, and the barrage battalions that have existed in all divisions since September 1941 are also being restored. But since, again, after all, such measures are, by and large, they are needed during a retreat or in defense. Since our army in the winter of 1942, on the contrary, tried to counterattack (and in a number of places successfully), there, accordingly, the need for such measures temporarily disappeared, but now again these barrage battalions are also ordered to be restored. Well, there were also barrage detachments under the Special Departments, which showed themselves in the same Battle of Stalingrad. And here I will immediately cite the message of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front dated August 14, 1942 "On the progress of the implementation of order No. 227 ...": "In total, 24 people were shot during the specified period. For example, the commanders of the 414th Infantry Regiment and the 18th Infantry Division, Styrkov and Dobrynin, cowed during the battle, abandoned their squads and fled from the battlefield, both were detained by a detachment and by the order of the Special Division they were shot before the formation. I dare say that the squads remained in place, it was the commanders who abandoned their subordinates and ran to the rear. It happens, yes. Further: “A Red Army soldier of the same regiment and division, Ogorodnikov, self-injured his left hand, was exposed for the crime, for which he was brought to trial by a military tribunal. On the basis of Order No. 227, three army detachments were formed, each with 200 men. These units are fully armed with rifles, machine guns and light machine guns. " By the way, I will clarify here: this is a report on the 4th Panzer Army, which was part of the Stalingrad Front, that is, these three detachments were formed in it. “The chiefs of the detachments have been assigned operational workers of special departments. The indicated detachments and barrage battalions on August 7, 1942 in units and formations in the army sectors detained 363 people, of which: 93 people. left the encirclement, 146 - lagged behind their units, 52 - lost their units, 12 - came from captivity, 54 - fled from the battlefield, 2 - with dubious wounds. That is, a suspicion of a crossbow. As a result of a thorough check: 187 people were sent to their units, 43 - to the staffing department, 73 - to the special camps of the NKVD, 27 - to penal companies, 2 - to the medical commission, 6 people were arrested and, as mentioned above, 24 people. shot in front of the line. " What needs to be explained here: it turns out that here almost more than half were returned to their units without any reprisals, 43 - not to their own department, but to the staffing department, 73 - were sent to special camps of the NKVD, which were engaged in filtering prisoners of war, about which I already spoke during one of the programs. For checking. And again, for the overwhelming majority of them, this check will end well. Well, there, accordingly, 27 people were sent to penal companies, 6 were arrested, 2 were suspiciously wounded, they will apparently be checked for how it was received, and 24 were shot. That is, again, instead of a brutal machine-gun shooting here, in fact, people were dealt with and indeed some were subjected to, as they say now, repression, but to say that these were innocent people and suffered indiscriminately, this is somehow in general ... Well, the key - They were not caught by machine-gun fire in the back in combat positions during the battle, but were detained in the rear behind the front line. In general, according to this order number 227, as of October 15, 1942, that is, in about two months, 193 army detachments were formed, including 16 of them on the Stalingrad front and 25 on the Donskoy actually in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Battle of Stalingrad). At the same time, from August 1 to October 15, 1942, the detachments along the entire Soviet-German front detained 140,755 servicemen who had escaped from the front line (remember this figure - a little over 140 thousand). Of those arrested, 3,980 people were arrested (that is, about 4 thousand), 1189 people were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies, 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and to transit points. That is, again, it turns out that the number of people who have been subjected to some kind of repression, let's say, is less than 10%. The overwhelming number of detainees, who fled from the battlefield, were simply returned to their units so that they could continue to fulfill their military duty. Again, let's come back, that is, through simple polls they find out who ran, who ran first, who yelled at the same time "Let's run." Well, with the identified citizens, with the organizers - with alarmists and deserters - you must naturally have a special conversation. Well, the fact that they were shot - yes, but what did you want, that's wartime. Now they will break through and then they will die ten times more, so you must be eliminated like mad dogs. Practically it is. Because, indeed, even since the times of the ancient world and the wars of that time, the army incurs the main losses during flight, and not during defense. Accordingly, since the Battle of Stalingrad was taking place at that time, we are interested in what was happening on the Don and Stalingrad fronts. On the Don Front during this period (from August 1 to October 15, 1942), 36.109 people were detained (that is, approximately 36 thousand), but of them: 736 people were arrested, 433 were shot, 1056 people were sent to penal companies, to penal battalions - 33 people and 32.933 people were returned to their units and to the transfer points. That is, the proportion is about the same, even in fact, there are even more of those people for whom everything turned out well. Well, in general, it is quite understandable that the battles are really fierce, so it really happens that the nerves do not stand and begin to retreat, but they were simply brought to life and returned back. In general, to put it mildly, it is strange: to destroy your own personnel against the background of battles and the advancing enemy. And on the Stalingrad front, 15.649 people were respectively detained, of which 244 were arrested, 278 were shot, 218 were in penal companies, 42 were in penal battalions, and 14 were returned to their units and to transit points. 833 people. That is, there is generally a percentage of repression, somewhere around 5%. Again, here I will just give a few examples of how the detachments on the Stalingrad front acted during this battle. For example: “On August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division of the 64th Army of the Stalingrad Front was surrounded by enemy tanks that had broken through, parts of the division, losing control, retreated in panic to the rear. A detachment under the command of Lieutenant of State Security Filatov, taking decisive measures, stopped the retreating servicemen in disorder and returned them to the previously occupied lines of defense. In another sector of this division, the enemy tried to break through into the depths of the defense. The detachment entered the battle and delayed the enemy's advance. On September 14, the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th Rifle Division of the 62nd Army. The soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd rifle regiments began to retreat in panic. The head of the detachment, junior lieutenant of state security Elman, ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating. As a result, the personnel of these regiments was stopped and in two hours the regiments occupied the former lines of defense. " That is, just here, it would seem, this brutal scene - that machine-gun fire was opened, but over the heads of the retreating and as a result, respectively, the fighters of these two regiments were not shot from their machine guns, but brought to their senses and returned back to their former lines of defense and the enemy was stopped. “On September 20 the Germans occupied the eastern outskirts of Melekhovskaya. The composite brigade, under the onslaught of the enemy, began an unauthorized retreat. The actions of a detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces put things in order in the brigade. The brigade occupied the previous lines and on the initiative of the political commander of the company of the same detachment Pestov, by joint actions with the brigade, the enemy was driven back from Melekhovskaya. That is, here, by the way, this is not the first time we observe a scene when a barrage detachment not only stops the fleeing or detains the retreating fighters and brings them to their senses, but then, together with them, enters into battle with the Germans and, accordingly, also often suffers ... Actually, this was the case in 1941, say, with us near Leningrad (I quoted documents), and so it was near Stalingrad. Again, here, for example: “On September 13, 1942, the 112th Rifle Division, under pressure from the enemy, withdrew from the occupied line. A detachment of the 62nd Army, under the leadership of the head of the detachment, Lieutenant of State Security Khlystov, took up defensive positions on the approaches to an important height. For four days, the soldiers and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of the enemy machine gunners, inflicting heavy losses on them. The detachment held the line until the arrival of the military units. " Again, after two days, i.e. September 15-16: "A detachment of the 62nd Army for two days successfully fought against superior enemy forces in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Stalingrad railway station ..." At the same time, although this formation itself, it is small, as we remember, consisting of two hundred people , nevertheless, they were able not only to repulse the attacks of the Germans, but also to counterattack and inflict significant losses on the enemy in manpower, and held out until the approach of conventional army units. At the same time, moreover, as noted in the documents, such an extreme was observed that the detachments were used as ordinary linear units. Here, on this occasion, it is said: “A number of facts were noted when the barrage detachments were used incorrectly by individual commanders of the formations. A significant number of barrage detachments were sent into battle on a par with line units, which suffered losses, as a result of which they were diverted for re-formation and the barrage service was not carried out. " Well, further there are several specific examples, when in this way the barrage units were used as ordinary units. At the same time, they suffered losses of about 65-70% of the personnel. And naturally it was not always justified. In general, to roughly assess the situation in which these people acted in the same Stalingrad, you can look at a number of award lists that are now posted on the Internet, since we have been running the "People's Feat" project for several years. And there you can see how ours, as we put it "bloody gebnya", looked from this point of view. For example, senior lieutenant Vasily Filippovich Finogenov, who served as adjutant of the senior battalion, this was the name of the battalion chief of staff at that time (this is such an army term). Here he is a senior adjutant of the 1st Army Barrier Detachment, born in 1918, Russian, non-partisan: “Working as a senior adjutant at 1 A.Z.O. 62 army for the defense of Stalingrad, following the order of NKO No. 227, about 6,000 fighters and commanders were detained, who were sent to their units for the defense of Stalingrad ... " return them to their parts. Further in this award we read the following: “It was ordered by the head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the 62nd army to close the gap with a detachment, to prevent the enemy from reaching the Volga in the area of \u200b\u200bplant 221. On October 16, 1942, the detachment fought, he personally, on the orders of the chief of the detachment, led the battle of the 2nd company and destroyed 27 fascists with light machine gun fire. The mortar crew of the 201 mortar battalion went out of action, he organized mortar fire and did not allow the enemy to accumulate for an attack. There was a case when the Germans attacked the detachment while bypassing the defense area, here he destroyed 6 Nazis with automatic fire. " He was a serious man. Yes. But, unfortunately, it was. Because he was awarded the medal "For Courage" for these exploits, and a few months later he was wounded and died in the hospital. By the way, here, again, in this barrage detachment there was a number of such people who distinguished themselves then. For example, Ivan Ilyich Andreev, a Red Army soldier, fighter of the 1st AZO of the 62nd Army, born in 1925, Russian, non-partisan. As we can see, this is 1942, respectively, he is a maximum of 17 years old, and most likely even 16: “... Serving in a barrage detachment when closing a gap in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Barricades plant, he organized mortar firing of the 201st mortar battalion, the crew which was destroyed and thereby did not allow the enemy to accumulate for an attack. " Apparently, the two of them were just here with Senior Lieutenant Finogenov and acted. The next example, again from the same barrage detachment, Stepan Stepanovich Limarenko, political commander of the 1st AZO (army barrage detachment), 62nd army, born in 1916, Russian, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks: “In the fight against German fascism to defend the city of Stalingrad, political commander Stepan Stepanovich Limarenko, fulfilling his duties as a fighter of a blocking detachment, under enemy fire, detained 78 unstable Red Army soldiers who left their defensive positions and tried to retreat. Comrade Limarenko detained them and forced them to occupy their former lines. Just the functions of the bloody gebni are to stop the Red Army soldiers and bring them back. Then we read: ... On October 16, 1942, Comrade Limarenko, together with the Red Army soldier V.P. Chernodymov. detained two PTR rifles with the crews, which, seeing the German tanks, left their positions and retreated to the rear of their defenses. Comrade Limarenko installed an PTR rifle, from which he destroyed three enemy tanks on Sculptural Street. Than the most German tanks failed to get to the Volga. " The military man Limarenko spoke seriously. And here is the award list for the Red Army soldier Chernodymov, who was with Limarenko. Born in 1921, Russian, member of the Komsomol: “Taking part in the fight against German fascism to defend the city of Stalingrad, the Red Army soldier, comrade Chernodymov V.P., being a fighter of the blocking detachment, staunchly fulfills the order of the NKO # 227. At the same time, Comrade Chernodymov on October 16, 1942, together with the political commander, Comrade Limarenko, detained the calculation of two PTR rifles with guns, which were seen by German tanks trying to pass our units to the rear along Sculptural Street, this calculation left their positions and went to the rear. Comrade Chernodymov personally destroyed two enemy tanks with an PTR rifle, the rest returned back. " The only thing is not clear here. What did they get there, a total of five German tanks were knocked out, or they still counted each one. But even if, say, three for two, it's all the same ... A lot. Yes. Because they used anti-tank rifles in this case, that is, in general, this is really a feat. These are the situations. Moreover, many such cases are described here. For example, two fighters of the 4th detachment of the 62nd army (that was the 1st detachment, and this is the 4th), they just the next day, that is, on October 17, 1942, they saved the ammunition warehouse, which was on the shore The Volga, respectively, the Germans bombed it, a fire broke out there, and two soldiers, instead of scrambling, as in general many would do in such a situation, they tried to save this warehouse. I will even read out the award lists: “Kurbanov Tadjedin Agalievich. Red Army soldier, fighter of the 4th detachment of the OO NKVD of the 62nd Army. Born in 1919, Lezgin, candidate of the CPSU (b). While at the post near ferry No. 62 on October 17, 1942, the ferry was heavily bombed by enemy aircraft, as a result, shells and mines were set on fire in the ammunition depot near the ferry. Comrade Kurbanov, despite the bombing and the fact that the ammunition was burning and exploding, rushed to save them. Thanks to his courage and courage, the ammunition was saved. " Accordingly, together with him, he also took part in extinguishing this fire: “Nikolai Ivanovich. Red Army political commander, fighter of the 4th blocking detachment of the NKVD OO of the 62nd Army. Born in 1915, Russian, member of the CPSU (b). While on October 17 this year at the post near ferry 62, the ferry and the post where he stood was subjected to heavy bombing by enemy aircraft, as a result of which a warehouse with ammunition from "Katyusha" and other shells and mines was set on fire. Comrade Obozny, despite the fact that the shells were exploding, rushed to take them apart. Thanks to his courage and courage, the fire was extinguished, the ammunition was saved. Comrade Obozny is worthy of the award with the Medal for Military Merit. "Stunned. That is, again, as you know, our creators, who are filming our current Russian films about the war, are very fond of portraying our special officers or NKVD fighters as well-fed cowardly creatures who can only hide behind other people's backs. As we can see, in reality the overwhelming majority of them acted in a completely different way. And indeed, in general, they not only were engaged in fulfilling their function of putting things in order, but also actually behaved, as it should be for real fighters. As I already said, in fact, during the Battle of Stalingrad, we observed three types of barrage detachments in action at once: barrage detachments under the Special Divisions, small, newly created army barrage detachments and division barrage battalions. At the same time, army detachments and detachments of the division, they acted closer to the front, i.e. they often went into battle and suppressed mass panic on the front line, while blocking detachments under special departments, they were already serving further in the rear, in communications, in order to again filter the contingent that was walking, well, and detain people who deserted, or shall we say improperly there are in the rear lane. Since during the Battle of Stalingrad the concepts of the front and rear were already rather conventional, because the Germans there pressed us practically to the Volga, such a division of labor was also often not observed. For example: “On October 15, 1942, during fierce battles in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the enemy managed to reach the Volga and cut off from the main forces of the 62nd Army the remnants of the 112th Rifle Division, as well as the 115th, 124th and 149th separate rifle brigades. At the same time, among the leading command staff, there were repeated attempts to abandon their units and cross over to the eastern bank of the Volga. In these conditions, to combat cowards and alarmists, a special department of the 62nd army created an operational group under the leadership of senior operative lieutenant of state security Ignatenko. Having united the remnants of the platoons of special departments with the personnel of the 3rd Army Barrier Detachment, she did an exceptionally great job of putting things in order, detaining deserters, cowards and alarmists who, under various pretexts, tried to cross to the left bank of the Volga. Within 15 days, the operational group detained and returned to the battlefield up to 800 private and command personnel, and 15 servicemen were shot in front of the formation by order of the special agencies. “We see the ratio, that is, 800 people were detained, 15 of them were shot in front of the formation, but the rest were simply returned to the ranks and again continued to fight. Accordingly, if this bloody gebni did not exist, what would have happened - first, the commanders, and then, accordingly, unstable fighters would try to cross to the other bank of the Volga, abandoning their positions, eventually could end ... From the point of view of today's civilians, it seems it would be understandable - no one wants to die, and therefore, we will retreat, there we will be alive and will be able to benefit the Motherland again. But the trouble is that it was necessary to bring benefit to the Motherland at the moment, standing firmly here, and not running anywhere. Having received an order, it must be obeyed. Sometimes, at the cost of your own life. In general, yes, absolutely. Because, indeed, from the point of view of common sense, you want to be away from the front line, but from the point of view of military duty, you need to carry out the order that was given to you. I will give a few more examples from the Don Front. This is a memorandum dated February 17, 1943 "On the work of special agencies to combat cowards and alarmists in parts of the Don Front for the period from October 1, 1942 to February 1, 1943": "October 2, 1942, during the offensive of our troops, individual units 138 rifle divisions, met by powerful artillery and mortar fire of the enemy, wavered and fled in panic through the battle formations of the 1st battalion of the 706th rifle regiment, 204th rifle division, which were in the second echelon. By the measures taken by the command and the divisional battalion, the situation was restored. 7 cowards and alarmists were shot in front of the formation, and the rest were returned to the front line. On October 16, 1942, during a counterattack by the enemy, a group of Red Army men of the 781st and 124th rifle divisions, in the amount of 30 people, showed cowardice and in panic began to flee from the battlefield, dragging other soldiers with them. The army detachment of the 21st Army, located in this sector, liquidated the panic by force of arms and restored the previous situation. " Actually, here we see, again, the key words, that these 30 people, they not only fled, but at the same time, as it is rightly said, carried away other servicemen with them. Because, unfortunately, a man, he is by definition a herd creature, as you know, we came from the wild, from social animals, and therefore, everyone runs, then ... "Everyone ran, and I ran." Yes. And therefore, it is natural that it is necessary that there are people who would stop this panic and, accordingly, revive those who participate in such an escape. “On November 19, 1942, during the offensive of units of the 293rd Infantry Division, during the enemy's counterattack, two mortar platoons of the 1306th Infantry Regiment, together with platoon commanders, junior lieutenants Bogatyryov and Yegorov, left the occupied line without an order from the command and in panic, throwing weapons began to flee from the battlefield. A platoon of submachine gunners of an army blocking detachment located in this area stopped the fleeing and, having shot two alarmists in front of the formation, returned the rest to their former lines, after which they successfully advanced forward. " That is, again, as we see that two alarmists were identified and shot, but at the same time, the rest of the fighters, in general, as they say, came to their senses and then quite successfully fulfill their duty. But, unfortunately, these are the realities that, in general, are far from the ideals of humanism that are being preached to us today. Since today it is believed that human life is the highest value, therefore, it is natural that a coward and a selfish person should be, apparently, inviolable. Let me give you another example: “On November 20, 1942, during the enemy's counterattack, one of the companies of the 38th Infantry Division, which was at a height, did not offer resistance to the enemy, and without an order from the command, began to randomly withdraw from the occupied area. The 83rd blocking detachment of the 64th Army, carrying out a barrage service directly behind the battle formations of the units of the 38th Infantry Division, stopped the fleeing company in panic and returned it back to the previously occupied section of the hill, after which the personnel of the company showed exceptional endurance and perseverance in battles with the enemy. " That is, as we can see, it was not necessary to shoot anyone here, just roughly speaking, the people running in panic had to be stopped, brought to their senses, brought back to the same positions that they occupied, after which they already quite successfully and staunchly performed your military duty. I would also note that if they were returned to their positions, then it is not indicated there that the Germans had already taken these positions and they kicked someone out of there, they just threw trenches and began to scatter, obeying some kind of, apparently, momentary impulse. We met the detachment, talked and came back, and sat down again in their places, Well, you don't have to give in to momentary impulses. This, in fact, is, in general, quite a common situation, moreover, not only during that war, but also in other conflicts, when people simply can simply move away from the fact that, roughly speaking, panicky rumors spread there that we bypassed or simply began to shoot very hard at the front line. Black sheep spoils the whole flock. This is yes. Accordingly, in this way the barrage detachments acted during the Battle of Stalingrad. Well, the next such large-scale battle, when, again, our troops had to defend themselves just so staunchly, this, as you know, was the Kursk Bulge. - in the summer of 1943. And accordingly, the detachments again participated in this and operated quite successfully. For example, let's say, on the very first day of this battle on the Kursk Bulge, i.e. July 5, 1943: “The 13th Army, the 2nd Battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment of the 15th Division, led by the battalion commander Captain Rakitsky, arbitrarily left its line and retreated in panic to the rear of the division, where it was detained by a detachment and returned to battle. " Note: not with machine-gun fire, but with the personnel of the barrage detachment. Accordingly, further: “From 5 to 10 July 1943, the barrage detachments of the Voronezh Front detained 1,870 people. Most of them were servicemen who had lost contact with their units. In the process of filtering them, 6 deserters, 19 self-mutilators and 49 cowards and alarmists who fled from the battlefield were identified and arrested. The rest of the detainees (that is, almost 1,800 people) were returned to duty. " Here I have such a document as a special message from the head of the Smersh counterintelligence department of the 69th Army of the Voronezh Front, Colonel Stroilov, about the work of the detachments from 12 to 17 July 1943. What does he report there: “In order to carry out the task of detaining the rank and file of the army formations and units that left the battlefield without permission, the Smersh Counterintelligence Department of the 69th Army on July 12, 1943, from the personnel of a separate company, organized 7 detachments , 7 people in each, headed by 2 operational workers. These detachments were exhibited in the villages of Alekseevka - Prokhodnoye, Novaya Slobodka - Samoilovka (there are also a number of names, I will not read them out). As a result of the work carried out by the detachments from 12 to 17 July with. Including 6,956 people of private and command and command personnel who left the battlefield or escaped from the encirclement of enemy troops were detained. " Further there is where all these people come from. What was done with them: “It should be noted that the number of detained servicemen, starting from July 15, has sharply decreased compared to the first days of the work of the detachments. If on July 12, 2842 people were detained, and on July 13 - 1841 people, then on July 16, 394 people were detained, and already on July 17, only 167 people were detained, and then they escaped from the encirclement of the enemy troops. The mass withdrawal of private, command and command personnel from the battlefield by the detachments organized by us, which began at five o'clock on July 12, 1943, was basically stopped at 16 o'clock on the same day, and subsequently completely stopped. Accordingly: “Out of the detainees, 55 people were arrested, of which: suspicious for espionage - 20 people, for terror - 2, traitors to the Motherland - 1, cowards and alarmists - 28, deserters - 4. The rest of the detainees were sent to their units. ... In view of the fact that the withdrawal of servicemen from the battlefield has been stopped, I have removed the obstacle detachments, and their personnel have been sent to carry out their direct military duties. " By the way, here we see that these were barrage detachments, which were created just under a special department, i.e. what has been in effect since the beginning of the war. Yes, here I will additionally explain that this famous "Smersh" is mentioned here, it was just created the day before, or rather, not the day before, but a few months before that, on April 19, 1943, the Office of Special Departments of the NKVD, it was again transferred to army and accordingly reorganized into the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of Defense. Accordingly, people from there, i.e. from "Smersh", they acted like this - they stopped those who retreated in such a panic in front of the enemy. Accordingly, here is another document, a memo addressed to V.S. Abakumov on the results of the check of counterintelligence units of the 13th and 70th armies of the Central Front from 12 to 30 July 1943, signed by Colonel Shirmanov: “In order to prevent possible panic and to fight cowards deserting from the battlefield, I, together with the heads of departments "Smersh" of the 13th and 70th armies in all divisions, brigades and regiments, groups of obstacles and screens were organized under the leadership of the operational staff of armies, corps, divisions. As a result of these measures, about 1,300 servicemen were detained in the 13th and 70th armies in the area of \u200b\u200bthe 13th and 70th armies, among whom cowards and alarmists, deserters, mutilators and another anti-Soviet element were identified. Most of the servicemen returned in an organized manner to their positions and took part in the battles. " That is, again, we see that it is practically the same as in the previous documents. Well, I'll read one more note. Memorandum of the head of the Smersh counterintelligence department of the Central Front, Major General A. Vadis of August 13, 1943 on, respectively, work for July 1943: “By strengthening the barrage service both behind the battle formations and in the rear of the units, 4501 people were detained in the reporting period, of which: 145 were arrested, transferred to the prosecutor's office - 70 people, transferred to the NKGB - 276 people, sent to special camps - 14 people, sent to the unit - 3303 people. " That is, again, it turns out, however, there are still about 2/3, a little more, who were simply sent to their units. Of the indicated number, the Smersh counterintelligence bodies of only one army, where the head of the Department, Colonel Pimenov, detained: headmen - 35 people, police officers - 59 people, who served in the German army - 34 people, who were taken prisoner - 87 people, subject to conscription to the spacecraft - 777 people. Of these, 4 agents of the German gendarmerie were arrested and exposed. " That is, here, among other things, the process of checking our people who have been in the German occupation also begins and, accordingly, one of them could behave again, let's say so wrong. Well, a lot of people suffer over the fact that they checked those who ended up in the occupied territories. First, everyone left the occupied territories, evacuated to the east, this time. Secondly, once there, one could do very different things, for example, wash the floors in the commandant's office and inform the partisans about what was happening in the commandant's office, and it was possible to serve as a policeman in this commandant's office, walk with weapons, arrest, and shoot fellow citizens. Well, you probably have to answer for this. Somehow it doesn't fit at all, everyone is so white and fluffy, and, probably, in order to reveal this, it is necessary to carry out checks. Probably, in order to carry out checks, some of the citizens must be taken into custody and even, oh, horror! To arrest. The same thing that is typical is happening now. By the way, in one of our previous conversation, I just gave an example about one of the testing and filtration camps and how the same elders were checked there, and how it turned out that some of them were not even released, but even hired in the personnel of the NKVD. That is, apparently, they were either our agents, or those people who showed themselves so well in that capacity, as partisan assistants, underground workers, that they were generally appreciated accordingly. Well, those who exactly served the Germans did it in good faith, so to speak, treating them ... From the bottom of their hearts. Yes. They became “innocent victims of illegal Stalinist repressions,” as we put it. I recently, distracted a little to the side, bought a book called, in my opinion, "Thank God, the Germans have come." And there are memoirs of some scum named Osipov, they used to be on the Internet ... There was some kind of woman in the occupied city of Pushkin, here we had near Leningrad ... Yes, I remember this one. There is such a patented scum that I don’t even know how in general ... well, these are not people ... there is some kind of, you know, a collective cross between Gozman and Novodvorskaya. Nothing changes. You are scum of such caliber that a normal person, I don’t know, will not sit next to him in the field. Quiet horror ... And what have you got, you had to regret, or what? But the scum went along with the Germans, first to Riga, then to Berlin, and then, of course, as it should be scum, it ended up in the USA. Well yes. By the way, Egor and I would like to analyze this book separately. Well, returning, in fact, to our topic, since after the Kursk Bulge a radical turning point in the war took place, i.e. we went to advance and liberate first our territory, and then the occupied countries of Europe, then, accordingly, the need for such units and subdivisions that are engaged in barrage service, it gradually disappeared. And in the end, on October 29, 1944, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin No. 0349 "On the disbandment of individual barrage detachments", which sounded like this: "In connection with the change in the general situation at the fronts, the need for further maintenance of barrage detachments has disappeared. I order: 1. To disband separate barrage detachments by November 13, 1944. Use the personnel of the disbanded detachments to replenish rifle divisions. 2. To inform about the disbandment of the barrage detachments by November 20, 1944. " That is, on this, in fact, the combat path of the army detachments ended. Well, it is clear that the same platoons that were under the "Smersh" bodies, they continued to operate until the end of the war, because the functions of protecting the rear, respectively, the detention of a suspicious element and so on, as if no one removed them, and in any normal army they are still executed in one structure or another. In general, summing up, now, a cruel time, terrible circumstances, they require cruel and terrible measures. An order called "Not one step back!" was famous among the troops. There is a wonderful book by citizen Simonov "The Living and the Dead", which, in my opinion, shows very, very well how the servicemen felt about this order, what they thought about it and what they said. It was necessary - it was necessary, it ceased to be necessary - and was dismissed. By the way, on this occasion, I’m just about what people said, I will quote one veteran, respectively, his memoirs were published somewhere in the zero years. This is a certain M.G. Abdulin, he served in the 293rd Infantry Division during the Battle of Stalingrad. And there was an interview with him, we had such a magazine "Brother", in my opinion, and now it is still coming out: "- Mansur Gizatulovich, tell us how the famous order No. 227 was adopted in the trenches? “It was a harsh order. It appeared when the retreat reached the Volga. And he was a powerful sobering agent - "Not one step back!" The order stopped people. There is confidence in the neighbors on the right and left - they will not retreat. Although it was not easy to realize that there was a barrage detachment behind you. - And how did these units operate? - I do not know of a case when retreating people were shot. In the first weeks after the order, the guilty, and some not very guilty, fell under the "new broom". I remember being sent from the company to watch the execution of seventeen people "for cowardice and alarmism." I had to tell my friends about what I saw. Later I saw the barrage detachment under very dramatic circumstances. In the area of \u200b\u200bthe heights of Five Mounds, the Germans pressed us so that we skidded, throwing our greatcoats, in some gymnasts. And suddenly our tanks, and skiers behind them - a barrage detachment. Well, I think, here it is, death! A young Estonian captain approaches me. “Take,” he says, “the overcoat from the murdered man, you will catch a cold ...” Here is such an eyewitness testimony and there are quite a few such examples. But in general no one gives examples of how to shoot them with machine guns. Only Nikita Sergeich Mikhalkov in the cinema. More precisely, how to say, we still have our denouncers, they are, as they say, like a fool with a written sack, they are still running around with a fragment from the memories of tanker Loza, who was a participant in the events when the commander ordered to hit from tank machine guns in front of the fleeing in order to stop them ... But again, there are those who tried to wave it around, respectively, either they inattentively read the text, or just twist. Because the fire was not to kill, but precisely to stop. Well, they don't understand such trifles, it doesn't matter, “they killed everyone anyway”. It really happened there that several people were killed there, but this ... well, what to do if the unit is running and, accordingly, if these people are not stopped, the losses will be much greater. As Citizen Papanov said: "You will be handled, but you do not steal." That's it, you don't have to run, you must honestly fulfill your military duty. Thank you, Igor Vasilievich. What about next time? And the next time, then, continuing this theme of the bloody gebni, we can consider how our penal units acted and existed: that is, penal battalions and penal companies. Excellent. Looking forward to. Thanks. And that's all for today. Until next time.

History

Formation began at the end of 1941 in Ryazan (Oktyabrsky town) from conscripts from Ryazan, Ryazan, Tula and Moscow regions. 02/15/1942, an order was received to send the division to the army. 02/18/1942 the last echelons of the division left Ryazan. She entered the battle almost from the wheels on 02/28/1942 in the region of the Kaluga villages of Vesniny and Lyubovka. At this line, the division fought, alternating offensive and defensive battles until 03/27/1942, from where it went on the offensive. In general, until the spring of 1943, she conducted private operations in the area south of Belyov.

At the beginning of 1943 she took part in battles in the Oryol direction, fought for the city of Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky.

The last hostilities were conducted on the outskirts of Prague.

Division has 27 Heroes Soviet Union, 10 full cavaliers Order of Glory.

Full title

149th Infantry Novograd-Volynskaya Red Banner Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov Division

Subordination

  • Moscow Military District - 01/01/1942
  • Western Front, 61st Army - on 03/01/1942.
  • Bryansk Front, 61st Army - on 05/01/1942.
  • Western Front, 61st Army - as of 01.07.1942.
  • Central Front, 65th Army - on 03/01/1943.
  • Central Front, 65th Army, 18th Rifle Corps - as of 07/01/1943.
  • Central Front, 65th Army, 27th Rifle Corps - on 10/01/1943.
  • Belorussian Front, 65th Army, 18th Rifle Corps - as of 11/01/1943.
  • Belorussian Front, 65th Army - as of 12/01/1943.
  • 1st Ukrainian Front, 13th Army, 24th Rifle Corps - as of 01/01/1944.
  • 1st Ukrainian Front, 13th Army, 102nd Rifle Corps - on 04/01/1944.
  • 1st Ukrainian Front, 3rd Guards Army, 76th Rifle Corps - on 05/01/1944.
  • 1st Ukrainian Front, 3rd Guards Army, 120th Rifle Corps - as of 01.10.1944.
  • 1st Ukrainian Front, 3rd Guards Army, 76th Rifle Corps - on 04/01/1945.

Composition

  • 479th Rifle Order of Alexander Nevsky Regiment
  • 568th Rifle Order of Alexander Nevsky Regiment
  • 744th Rifle Order of Alexander Nevsky Regiment
  • 271st separate anti-tank destroyer division
  • 130th separate reconnaissance company
  • 233rd separate sapper battalion
  • 149th separate battalion communications (28th separate company communication)
  • 226th Medical and Sanitary Battalion
  • 510th Separate Chemical Defense Company
  • 106th motor transport company
  • 526th Field Bakery
  • 891st Divisional Veterinary Infirmary
  • 1720th Field Post Station
  • 1082nd (1083rd) field cash desk of the State Bank

Commanders

  • Fedyunkin, Ivan Fedorovich (01/02/1942 - 10/05/1942), colonel
  • Volkov, Andrey Nikolaevich (10/06/1942 - 10/25/1942), colonel
  • Fedyunkin Ivan Fedorovich (10/26/1942 - 11/04/1942), colonel
  • Orlov, Andrey Arkhipovich (11/05/1942 - 12/01/1942), lieutenant colonel
  • Volkov Nikolay Lvovich (02.12.1942 - 04.06.1943), Colonel
  • Orlov, Andrey Arkhipovich (06/05/1943 - 05/11/1945), colonel, from 02/11/44 Major General

Distinguished soldiers of the division

Formed in September 1939 in Ostrogozhsk, Voronezh region, deployed on the basis of the regiment of the 19th rifle division.

The personnel consisted of conscripts from the Voronezh region, Oryol region, northern Kazakhstan, western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

The division took part in the Great Patriotic War.

In total, the 149th Infantry Division was formed 2 times. The second time - at the end of 1941 in Ryazan in the Oktyabrsky town (later - the territory of RVVAIU). Consisted of conscripts from Ryazan, Ryazan, Tula and Moscow regions.

02/18/1942 the last echelons of the division left Ryazan. She entered the battle almost from the wheels on 02/28/1942 in the region of the Kaluga villages of Vesniny and Lyubovka. At this line, the division fought, alternating offensive and defensive battles until 03/27/1942, from where it went on the offensive. In general, until the spring of 1943, she conducted private operations in the area south of Belev.

At the beginning of 1943 she participated in battles in the Oryol direction, fought for the city of Dmitrovsk-Orlovsk.

By participating in Battle of Kursk reflected an enemy strike from the Sevsk region. In the fall of 1943 she took part in the Chernigov-Pripyat operation, in the fall of 1943 she crossed the Dnieper in the Loev area.

In 1944 she participated in the Zhytomyr-Berdichevskaya offensive operation and the Lvov-Sandomierz offensive, liberated Poland.

In 1945 she took part in the Berlin Strategic Operation and the Prague Operation.

Forced the rivers Desna, Sozh, Dnieper, Western Bug, Vistula, Oder and Neisse.

The last hostilities were conducted on the outskirts of Prague.

01/03/1944 division was given the honorary name "Novograd-Volynskaya".

149 RD was awarded 3 military orders: Red Banner, Suvorov 2nd degree and Kutuzov 2nd degree. In the division there are 27 Heroes of the Soviet Union, 6 full holders of the Order of Glory.

Vladimir Rastorguev.

Formed in September 1939 in Ostrogozhsk, Voronezh region, deployed on the basis of the regiment of the 19th rifle division.

On 06/22/1941, she was stationed in Stary Oskol, and was in summer camps in the Korotoyak forest. 06/26/1941 began loading into the train at the Valuyki station. Initially, according to the Headquarters Directive of the Civil Code of 06/25/1941, Bakhmach was determined as the place of unloading of the division, but already on 06/27/1941 it was transferred to Sukhinichi.

The division departed on the route Ostrogozhsk - Voronezh - Yelets - Efremov - Volovo - Gorbachevo - Sukhinichi. Started unloading on June 28, 1941 at the Zanoznaya station near Spas-Demensk. By 07/10/1941, she occupied a 30-kilometer defense zone along the left bank of the Desna in the Mikhailovka area, riding the Spas-Demensk - Roslavl road. By July 12, the division concentrated in the Novoselovsky area (30 km south of Yelnya).

07/19/1941 received an order to make a 200-kilometer march along the route Roslavl - Yakhroma and prevent the enemy from advancing in the direction of Yelnya. When approaching the village, Zakharovka entered into battle with enemy units.

Here the division became part of the shock group of General Kachalov (145, 149sd 104td, 320 papes RGK, 643 and 364 caps, reserve moto rifle regiment 106th Panzer Division). The group on the evening of July 22, she received an order to go on the offensive against Smolensk. The immediate task of the new offensive is to reach the Strigino, Pochinok, Trutnevo line by the end of the day. By July 25, the Task Force was supposed to reach Smolensk.

At first, the Soviet troops were opposed by units of the SS Reich division and the Great Germany life regiment of the 46th motorized corps; in Strigino, the headquarters of the 46th motorized corps is located. But soon units of the 18td also approached, and from 26 July units 263 and 269pd IXAK also approached.

On the morning of July 24, the offensive in the direction of Pochinok continued. The 149th Infantry Division continued fighting at the turn of the river. Stop east of Gavryukovka. Soviet troops advanced extremely slowly, and the enemy had the opportunity to transfer reinforcements to the front of the Soviet offensive, in particular, parts of the 18th Panzer Division from near Krasnoye. As a result, the Task Force again failed to achieve its goal. Katchalov's order said: "Fighting 24.7, only in the 145th SD sector (in one direction) ensured success and the units moved forward. The commander of the 149th RD, Major General Zakharov, did not organize the battle. The artillery operated at extreme distances without interaction with the infantry and inside the artillery of the ARGK, corps and military. As a result, the units, having met organized resistance from insignificant enemy forces, not only did not move forward, but also retreated, having lost the points captured the day before. "

On July 25, the 28th Army's operational group continued its offensive against Pochinok. The 149th rifle division reached the Nikulino, Osinovka line, the 145th division - st. Maslovka. Dmitrievka. However, by this time, the formations of the German IX Army Corps had already come to help the 2nd Panzer Group. The 292nd Infantry Division, having made a march 40-50 km, by 26 July occupied a 20 km wide front on the southern flank of the Elninsky grouping in the area south of Strigino. The 263rd Infantry Division reached Azarovka on the Smolensk-Roslavl highway.

On July 26, OG Katchalov tried to break through to the river. Khmara. The 145th and 149th rifle divisions slowly moved forward, but the German units being transferred to the area of \u200b\u200bthe Soviet offensive pinned down soviet troops... As stated in the operational report of the Western Front headquarters, "The 145th Infantry Division is suffering heavy losses. The offensive is developing slowly due to the influence of enemy aircraft and the threat to the left flank from the west ..."

The losses of the task force of the 28th Army are listed in the report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction: In 149 RD - 10 command personnel, 48 junior command personnel, 910 rank-and-file personnel.

Until 07/29/1941, she fought heavy offensive battles, moving forward with difficulty, ultimately on 07/29/1941, retreating somewhat, took up defensive positions at the edge of the forest southwest of Chernyavka, Rudnya, Zakharovka. However, the enemy did not sit still. Having completed the destruction of the encircled units of the Red Army in the Mogilev area and to the east, the German command could now concentrate its efforts against the Kachalov OG. VIIAK (7, 23, 197 pd) was concentrated on the left flank of the attacking group of Pochinok, from the north IXAK (263, 292 pd), from the southeast he was finishing the last preparations before the attack on Roslavl, in the rear of the Kachalov OG XXIVMK 2TGr Guderian. The German command withdrawn to the reserve the previously acting against the task force 18td, and parts of the SS "Reich" and "Great Germany" were occupied in the Yelninsky ledge. In fact, only long battles in the Mogilev area gave a chance for a small task force with essentially open flanks to influence the flank of the GrA Center, which had broken through to Smolensk. Now it was the enemy's turn.

On August 1, German troops launched a concentric offensive against Roslavl. Parts of the 145th regiment were still attacking in the area of \u200b\u200bKrasnosvyatye and Galeevka, but the enemy VIIAK, having shot down the weak 13A units on the Sozh River, was rapidly advancing from Khislavichi and Mstislavl to Roslavl. XXIVMK crossed from Krichev in the offensive against Roslavl and its forward 4td covered 2/3 of the way to it. Before the units of the Kachalov OG, the threat of the enemy going into the rear of our units rapidly arose.

Meanwhile, the right flank of the task force began to be threatened by the new 137th regiment, which had previously operated in Smolensk, and now transferred to the IXAK flank. On August 2, 292 and 137 infantry divisions of the enemy attacked units of the 149th infantry division and, in fact, crushing them, began to move south to Roslavl. By August 03, the division was surrounded, along with the 145th rifle division and the 104th tank division... Having undertaken 08/04/1941 unsuccessful attempt breakthrough through Starinka, 08/05/1941, the division began an exit on a different route across the Oster River near the Moscow-Warsaw highway. Coming out of the encirclement, by 08/10/1941, the division withdrew in a relatively organized manner beyond the Desna (not in full strength), where units of the 145th rifle division were poured into its composition. Some scattered units, including the division commander with the group, left only by 08/28/1941.

During August, it strengthens the defensive positions on the Desna. By August 28, with 320pap after replenishment, it concentrated in the area of \u200b\u200bGavrilovka, Solozha. The command of the Reserve Front prepared a sowing offensive. and south of the Varshavskoe highway. The strongest strike group was concentrated sowing. highway. The group included part of the forces of 222sd, 211sd, 149sd, 109td.

211, 149sd, 109, 104td on August 30 went over to the offensive from the Desna river line. The purpose of the operation was to encircle and defeat the enemy defending in the Varshavskoe highway area, then to develop the offensive on Roslavl. Going on the offensive from the Lipovka District, Kholmets. K14: 00 Aug 31 the division fought in the Izotovsky, hut area. Gorodchanskie. The enemy practically did not offer resistance while retreating to the south. On the evening of August 31, the right-flank new 211sd division was attacked by the enemy's 10th division. Unable to withstand the counterattack, 211sd began to retreat in an unorganized manner to the r. Gum. After a counterattack by the enemy and because of the withdrawal of its neighbors, 149sd also began to retreat to the Desna.

Having put themselves in order, 222, 211, 149sd, 145, 146, 148tbr again went over to the offensive on September 6, forcing Stryana in the direction of Shumaevo. The offensive was not successful. Our troops suffered heavy losses while crossing the river and were forced by September 12 to stop trying to go over to the offensive.

In September, the division was withdrawn to the second echelon to the defensive lines on the Shuitsa River.

On October 2, German troops launched a general offensive against Moscow. The defense of the divisions of the first echelon 43A was broken. The division, which was in the second echelon of 43A, along with 148tbr was ordered to attack the enemy that had broken through, but even before the attack began, it came under a massive air raid and could not start the offensive. "Enemy aviation in the amount of 45 aircraft from 14.00 to 17.00 stormed the 149th Infantry Division and did not allow it to rise and begin to perform the task." By the end of the day, she was fighting in the Skorobovka and Zabolovka areas. By the end of October 3, the division withdrew beyond the Snoot river, blocking the Warsaw highway. The tank units of the 4TGr continued to advance into the depth of the defense of our troops, bypassing the positions of our troops from the south. In the second half of October 4, German tank formations burst from the south into Sutoki on the Warsaw highway. and at 16:00 captured Spas-Demensky, thereby cutting off the escape routes of units 43A who fought on the river Snopot. Headquarters 43A was deprived of contact with its formations. The remnants of formations 43A began to retreat northward, trying to get out of the encirclement. When the division was withdrawn, the division was dispersed and by October 5, only the sapper battalion withdrew with the division headquarters. Continuing an independent exit from the encirclement, without communication with the army headquarters, the remnants of the division entered the Maloyaroslavets area and were withdrawn to the east. Art. Balabanovo. On October 11, the division consisted of 621 men, 2 guns and a small part of the convoy.

All these years, the father was listed as missing. Uncertainty had a depressing effect on me and my family. Mom Anisya Afanasyevna, who lost her husband at the age of 29, believed until her death that her Stesha was alive and would definitely show up. She never got married, she remained faithful to her beloved forever. Raising three children alone, in the difficult hungry post-war years and in difficult life moments, my mother turned to him as if he were alive, asked for advice and tearfully called him home. It became my filial duty to find at least some grain of information about last days father and the battles in which he participated.

From the exercises to the front

In May-June 1941, large training sessions of military units were held in the Korotoyak forest near Ostrogozhsk. Men-reservists and storekeepers from Voronezh, Tambov, Orel, Kursk and other regions were called to them. Several thousand men were called up from the villages and villages of Alekseevsky, Ostrogozhsky, Ukolovsky, Valuisky and other regions. From collective farms, state farms and industrial enterprises, horses, carts and mechanized transport were supplied to the gathering place. All units were stationed in Ostrogozhsk.

On Sunday, June 22, 1941, the camp participants had a rest after lunch. The sun was shining, a meeting of the football teams of the 479th and 568th rifle regiments was held at the makeshift stadium. And suddenly the alarm sounded sharply and piercingly over the forest - the war began. The 149th Infantry Division was formed from the reservists. Fyodor Zakharov was appointed commander, who later became Lieutenant General, Hero of the Soviet Union.

The division was quite powerful military force, numbering 15 thousand fighters. On June 26, 1941, the command of the division organized an urgent loading of personnel and military equipment into echelons, served simultaneously at the railway stations of Ostrogozhsk, Alekseevka and Valuek. Having learned about the imminent departure to the front, many relatives arrived here. Most of them traveled on foot from villages in the surrounding areas.

In July, the rapidly advancing enemy had already reached the distant approaches to the capital. According to the plan of the command, in the region of Smolensk, Roslavl and Yelnya, a major battle was to take place, during which the troops of the Bryansk, Western and Reserve fronts would inflict a crushing blow on the enemy, and the German offensive on Moscow would be thwarted. Unfortunately, it did not happen.

Short wins, first losses

The division was sent to Sukhinichi ( Western front), where the situation was dramatic. She occupied a 30-kilometer defense line in the Mikhailovka area on the left bank of the Desna. In the summer and autumn of 1941, in the Roslavl region, fierce battles broke out between the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts against the advancing Army Group Center. They came part of Smolensk defensive battle and Vyazemskaya operation. On July 16, German troops captured the southern part of Smolensk.

On July 19, the regiments of the 149th Infantry Division were ordered to make a 200-kilometer march along the Roslavl-Yakhroma route and prevent the enemy from advancing in the direction of Yelnya. From July 21 to August 7, a group of troops under the command of Lieutenant General Vladimir Kachalov concentrated in the Popov Bor-Kozlovka-Kirill-Novo-Kurgan region in order to launch a counteroffensive against Smolensk.

Initially, the offensive of our regiments was successful. They advanced 60 kilometers forward, capturing about six hundred enemy soldiers and officers. This was perhaps the very first major capture of German troops since the beginning of the war. By July 27, the advance units of the 149th Infantry Division entered the Pochinka area. The enemy units suffered heavy losses. However, having received reinforcements, the enemy struck at the flanks of our units, throwing nine divisions from the direction of Monastyrshchina and Yelnya. Enemy air raids intensified, and tanks appeared. For several days, our fellow countrymen continued to fight heavy battles, slowly moving forward. On the evening of July 28, the enemy broke through the defense line and launched an offensive against Roslavl along the Warsaw highway. In the afternoon, July 29, with a slight retreat, the division occupied the edge of the forest southwest of Chernyavka, Rudnya, Zakharovka and went over to the defensive.

Tragedy near Roslavl

On August 1, the Germans, having a significant superiority in manpower and equipment, after a long artillery preparation, with the support of aviation, continued their offensive against Roslavl. Our fighters slowly retreated to Roslavl. By the end of August 3, the enemy began to tighten the encirclement. To save the operational documents of the army headquarters, the commander of the 149th rifle division, General Zakharov, received an order with the forces of one regiment to break through the enemy encirclement in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Lykovka, thereby making it possible to leave the encirclement of the headquarters and the remnants of units of the 28th army.

“The 568th Valuisky Rifle Regiment was allocated to solve this problem. He entered the battle and began to push the enemy. But the forces were not equal. The breakthrough failed. Then the commander of the 28th Army, General Kachalov, himself got into the command tank and rushed into battle. On the outskirts of the village of Starinka near Roslavl, a tank exploded from a direct hit from an enemy shell. So at the 51st year of his life, Lieutenant General Kachalov died, ”the Belgorod regional historian described this dramatic moment Mikhail Karagodin. Units of the 28th Army have repeatedly tried to break out of the encirclement. But few succeeded.

On August 5, the commander of the 149th Infantry Division, General Zakharov, made another attempt to withdraw his division from the encirclement, but along a different route, across the Oster River near the Moscow-Warsaw highway. Five days later, losing their soldiers, part of the division withdrew from the encirclement beyond the Desna. But some of its scattered parts, including the division commander, General Zakharov, were able to escape from the enemy ring only by October 28. In total, about eight thousand soldiers came to their own, more than two thousand of them were wounded.

Until the last breath

For several days the division tried to gain a foothold on the Desna. By August 30, she received an order from the command of the 43rd Army to go on the offensive against Yelnya. The soldiers of the Ostrogozhsky, Alekseevsky and Valuysky regiments were again thrown into the thick of it.

Until mid-September, our fellow countrymen, being surrounded, fought heavy defensive battles and yet were able to partially get out of it and gain a foothold on the defensive line on the Shuitsa River. With the start of Operation Typhoon, on October 2, the 149th Division received an order to launch a counterattack on the flank of the enemy group that had broken through. But she did not manage to go on the offensive, as the enemy's air raid began.

On October 6-7, the remnants of the 149th Infantry Division occupied the lines on the Ugra River, south of the city Yukhnov, and then retreated to Naro-Fominsk, where they were poured into the combined Moscow rifle division. The regiments of the 149th Infantry Division fought as best they could and died, like most other parts of the Western and Reserve Fronts. On December 27, the 149th Infantry Division was disbanded. At present, the main places of death and capture of its soldiers are known: Yelnya, Deminsk, the Desna River, Novospasskoye, Roslavl, Smolensk, Spassk-Demensk, Stodolische, Yukhnov, Ekimovichi.

Forever in memory

Fraternal and single burials of Soviet soldiers remained in the places of fierce battles of the 149th Infantry Division. Most of the fighters died in conditions of continuous bombardment and a hasty withdrawal of units. They were never buried, they remained missing forever. Where they managed to bury their comrades, wooden posts with surnames, first names were installed on the graves. military ranks dead. Such burials are located in the villages of Bogdanovo, Zabolotye, Izotovka, Gusarki, the village of Buda, in the forest, 500 meters from the village of Usoki, Smolensk region.

After a long search, I managed to find out where my father died. He was seriously wounded near the Shuitsa River and was taken prisoner at the Stalag-352 camp, which was located in Belarus near Minsk. He died on the second day of captivity - November 12, 1941. I found out about this in a declassified German archive. Today the fate of the 149th Rifle Division is little known in our country. We must correct this injustice and preserve the memory of our heroic fellow countrymen.

From the editor

Already at the beginning of 1942, in Ryazan, the 149th rifle division was re-formed - from Ryazan, Muscovites, and Tula. At the end of February, the unit was already fighting in the vicinity of Kaluga. At the beginning of 1943, the division fought in the Oryol direction, and participated in the battle on the Kursk Bulge, repelling the enemy's counterattack in the Sevsk area. And then there was the crossing of the Dnieper, the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, the liberation of Poland ... The soldiers and officers of the division took Berlin and Prague, and she ended the war with the rank of Novograd-Volynskaya, Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov. Now we know that this is our Belgorod division too.

Nikolay Lesunov