One tank against a tank division. How one Soviet tank fought for two days against the tank division of the Wehrmacht Kv 1 against a German division

This episode is detailed in the memoirs of Colonel Erhard Routh, whose group tried to destroy a Soviet tank! The 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht fought for 48 hours with a single Soviet KV-1 tank ("Klim Voroshilov"). First, the fifty-ton KV-1 shot and crushed with its tracks a convoy of 12 supply trucks, which was going to the Germans from the captured town of Raiseniai. Then he destroyed the artillery battery with aimed shots!

The Germans, of course, fired back, but to no avail. The shells of the anti-tank guns did not even leave dents on his armor - the Germans struck by this later gave the KV-1 tanks the nickname "Ghost"! Even 150mm howitzers could not penetrate the KV-1 armor. True, Routh's soldiers managed to immobilize the tank by detonating a shell under its track. But "Klim Voroshilov" was not going to leave anywhere.

He took a strategic position on the only road leading to Raiseniai, and delayed the division's advance for two days (the Germans could not get around it, because the road passed through swamps where army trucks and light tanks were stuck).

Finally, by the end of the second day of the battle, Routh managed to shoot the tank with anti-aircraft guns. But when his soldiers cautiously approached the steel monster, the tank tower suddenly turned in their direction - apparently, the crew was still alive. Only a grenade thrown into the hatch of the tank put an end to this incredible battle ...

Erhard Raus fought on Eastern Front, having passed Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk, and ended the war as commander of the 3rd tank army and with the rank of colonel-general. Of the 427 pages of his memoir, directly describing fighting, 12 are devoted to a two-day battle with the only Russian tank at Raseiniai. Routh was clearly shaken by this tank.

Erhard Routh: “Although the tank did not move since the battle with the anti-tank battery, it turned out that its crew and commander had iron nerves. They calmly watched the approach of the anti-aircraft gun, without interfering with it, since while the gun was moving, it did not pose any threat to the tank. In addition, the closer the anti-aircraft gun is, the easier it will be to destroy it.

Came a critical moment in the duel of nerves, when the calculation began to prepare the anti-aircraft gun for a shot. Now is the time for the tank's crew to act. While the gunners, terribly nervous, were aiming and loading the gun, the tank turned the turret around and fired first! Each projectile hit the target. The heavily damaged anti-aircraft gun fell into a ditch, several people of the crew died, and the rest were forced to flee. Machine-gun fire from the tank prevented the removal of the gun and the pick up of the dead. The failure of this attempt, on which great hopes were pinned, was very unpleasant news for us. The optimism of the soldier died along with the 88-mm gun. Our soldiers spent not the best day chewing canned food, since it was impossible to bring hot food. "

The most amazing thing about this battle is the behavior of four tankers, whose names we do not know and will never know. They created more problems for the Germans than the entire 2nd Panzer Division, to which, apparently, the KV belonged. If the division delayed the German offensive by one day, then the only tank by two. And all this time the crew was waiting.

Moreover, if on the first day the crew of the KV could still hope for the arrival of their own, then on the second, when their own did not come and even the noise of the battle at Raseiniai had calmed down, it became clearer: the iron box in which they roast the second day would soon enough turn into their common coffin. They took it for granted and continued to fight!

Erhard Routh: “The witnesses of this deadly duel wanted to get closer to check the results of their shooting. To their great amazement, they found that only 2 shells penetrated the armor, while the other 5 88mm shells only made deep potholes in it. We also found 8 blue circles marking the impact of 50mm shells. The sappers' sortie resulted in serious damage to the track and a shallow chipping on the gun barrel. But we did not find any traces of hits from shells from 37-mm cannons and PzKW-35t tanks.

Driven by curiosity, our "David" scrambled onto the defeated "Goliath" in a vain attempt to open the turret hatch. Despite his best efforts, the lid did not budge. Suddenly the barrel of the gun began to move, and our soldiers rushed away in terror. Only one of the sappers kept his composure and quickly thrust a hand grenade into the hole made by a shell in the lower part of the tower. A dull explosion thundered, and the hatch cover flew to the side. Inside the tank lay the bodies of the brave crew, who had only been wounded before. Deeply shocked by this heroism, we buried them with all military honors. They fought to their last breath, but it was just one little drama of the great war! "

And here is another feat of the tanker:

Destroy 22 tanks in 30 minutes. The feat of tanker Kolobanov.

It was all like this:
In a harsh silence
There is a heavy tank
Disguised in the fishing line
Enemies go in droves
Iron idols
But takes the fight
Zinovy \u200b\u200bKolobanov.

These verses are just a small excerpt from a poem that was written in September 1941 by the poet Alexander Gitovich in honor of the commander of the 3rd tank company of the 1st tank battalion of the 1st tank division, senior lieutenant Zinovy \u200b\u200bKolobanov. A month before that, on August 20, 1941, the tank's crew, commanded by 30-year-old Kolobanov, destroyed 22 German tanks in one battle. In total, during this day, 5 tanks of Kolobanov's company knocked out 43 enemy tanks. In addition, an artillery battery, a passenger car and up to two companies of Hitler's infantry were destroyed.

This happened just in those days about which there was a strong opinion: the Soviet troops at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War only retreated, not offering the enemy serious resistance. The heroic deeds of Zinovy \u200b\u200bKolobanov and his subordinates are called upon to dispel this myth - the Red Army fought in the summer of 1941 with the Nazi-German invaders with all its might.

Division commander's order: "Stand to the death!"

At the end of August 1941, Kolobaev's 3rd tank company defended the approaches to Leningrad near the city of Krasnogvardeysk. Every day, every hour was "worth its weight in gold" - military enterprises and civilians were evacuated from the northern capital. On August 19, Z. Kolobaev received a personal order from the division commander: to block three roads that lead to the city from Luga, Volosovo and Kingisepp. Protecting three roads with five tanks - only he could cope with these. By that time, the tanker went through the Finnish war, burned three times in the tank, but each time he returned to service.

Tanks "Kliment Voroshilov" KV-1 against the German Pz.Kpfw.35 (t)

There is a diagram of that very fight.

The position of the heavy tank KV-1 Kolobanov was at a height with clay soil, at a distance of about 150 m from the fork in the road, near which two birches grew, called "Landmark No. 1", and about 300 m from the intersection, designated "Landmark No. 2 ". The length of the viewed section of the road is about 1000 m, 22 tanks can be easily placed on it with a marching distance between the tanks of 40 m.

The choice of a place for firing in two opposite directions (this position is called caponier) is explained as follows. The enemy could enter the road to Marienburg either along the road from Voiskovitsy, or along the road from Syaskelevo. In the first case, you would have to shoot in the forehead. Therefore, the caponier was dug right opposite the intersection in such a way that the heading angle was minimal. At the same time, I had to come to terms with the fact that the distance to the fork was reduced to a minimum.

It was on such a machine that Kolobanov fought.

At about 14:00 on August 20, after the unsuccessful aerial reconnaissance conducted by the Germans, German scouts-motorcyclists followed the seaside road to the Voyskovitsy state farm, which Kolobanov's crew freely let through, waiting for the main enemy forces to approach. For one and a half to two minutes, while the lead tank covered the distance to the intersection, Kolobanov made sure that there were no heavy tanks in the convoy, finally drew up a battle plan and decided to let the entire convoy pass to the fork (Reference No. 1). In this case, all the tanks managed to pass the turn at the beginning of the embankment road and be within the reach of his gun. Light tanks Pz.Kpfw. 35 (t) of the German 6th Panzer Division (in other sources, the 1st or 8th Panzer Divisions are also called) were moving in the column.

Having knocked out tanks in the head, middle and end of the column, Kolobanov not only blocked the road at both ends, but also deprived the Germans of the opportunity to move onto the road leading to Voyskovitsy.
A terrible panic arose in the enemy column. Some of the tanks, trying to hide from the destructive fire, climbed down the slope and got stuck up the towers in the swamp. Then they were burned too. Others, trying to turn around, bumped into each other, knocking down tracks and rollers. Frightened carriages, jumping out of burning cars, rushed in fear between them. Most of them came under machine gun fire.

In 30 minutes of the battle, Kolobanov's crew knocked out all 22 tanks in the convoy. Of the double ammunition, 98 armor-piercing rounds were expended. After the battle on the KV-1, Zinovy \u200b\u200bKolobanov counted more than a hundred hits.

Tank KV-1 with damage.

Submit for a reward!

Immediately after this tank battle, which ended in the complete victory of Soviet weapons, a note about the heroic deed of tanker Kolobanov appeared in the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda.

And in the archives of the Ministry of Defense, a unique document has been preserved - award list Zinovia Kolobanova.

Sheet 1 page.

It confirms the information about the number of destroyed tanks, but, perhaps, the most important thing - Zinovia Kolobanova and all members of his crew were nominated for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for their courage and heroism shown in a victorious battle. But the high command did not consider that the feat of the tankers deserved such a high assessment. Zinovy \u200b\u200bKolobanov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, Andrey Usov - the Order of Lenin, Nikolai Nikiforov - the Order of the Red Banner, and Nikolai Rodnikov and Pavel Kiselkov - the Orders of the Red Star.

After the feat

For three weeks after the battle at Voiskovitsy, the company of Senior Lieutenant Kolobanov held back the Germans on the approaches to Krasnogvardeysk in the Bolshaya Zagvozdka area. During this time, Kolobanov's 5 tanks destroyed three mortar batteries, four anti-tank guns and 250 German soldiers and officers.

On September 13, 1941 Krasnogvardeysk was abandoned by the Red Army. Kolobanov's company was again left at the most important line at that moment - it covered the retreat of the last military column to the city of Pushkin.

Tank KV-1

On September 15, 1941, senior lieutenant Kolobanov was seriously wounded. At night, at the cemetery of the city of Pushkin, where tanks were refueled with fuel and ammunition, a German shell exploded next to Zinovy \u200b\u200bKolobanov's KV. The tanker received shrapnel wounds to the head and spine, concussion of the brain and spinal cord.

The war for Zinovy \u200b\u200bKolobanov is over.

He was sent for treatment to the Traumatological Institute of Leningrad, to the very city that the tanker had so successfully defended. Before the blockade of the northern capital, the hero-tanker was evacuated and until March 15, 1945 he was treated in evacuation hospitals No. 3870 and 4007 in Sverdlovsk. But in the summer of 1945, after recovering from his injury, Zinovy \u200b\u200bKolobanov returned to duty. For another thirteen years he served in the army, having retired with the rank of lieutenant colonel, then for many years he lived and worked at a plant in Minsk.

With his wife and son.

In the early 1980s, it was decided to erect a monument at the site of the battle near Voyskovitsy. Zinovy \u200b\u200bKolobanov wrote a letter to the Minister of Defense of the USSR Dmitry Ustinov with a request to allocate a tank for installation on a pedestal, and the tank was allocated, however, not the KV-1, but the later IS-2.

However, the very fact that the minister granted Kolobanov's request suggests that he knew about the hero-tanker and did not question his feat.
Why not a hero? To the question: "Why was the hero-tanker Kolobanov not awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union either during the Great Patriotic War or after its end?" there are two answers. And both of them lie in the biography of the tanker Zinovy \u200b\u200bGrigorievich Kolobanov.

The first reason - after the war, the journalist of "Krasnaya Zvezda" A. Pinchuk published information that ZG Kolobanov allegedly for the breakthrough of the Mannerheim line. became a Hero of the Soviet Union (at the beginning of March 1940 he received the Gold Star and the Order of Lenin) and was awarded the extraordinary rank of captain. But for fraternization of his subordinates with Finnish military personnel after the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty of March 12, 1940, Kolobov Z.G. was deprived of both the title and the award, documentary information confirming the receipt of Kolobanov Z.G. the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for participation in Finnish war, not.

The second reason - on December 10, 1951, Kolobov was transferred to the Group soviet troops in Germany (GSVG), where he served until 1955. July 10, 1952 Z.G. Kolobanov was awarded military rank Lieutenant Colonel, and on April 30, 1954, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner (for 20 years of service in the army).

At this time, a Soviet soldier deserted from a tank battalion to the British occupation zone. Saving the battalion commander from a military tribunal, the commander announced to Kolobanov Z.G. on incomplete official compliance and transferred it to the Belarusian Military District. In Soviet times, the presence in the biography of even one of the listed reasons was quite enough to refuse to award the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Zinovy \u200b\u200bKolobanov passed away in 1994, but veteran organizations, social activists and historians are still trying to achieve the title of Hero of Russia.

In the Gatchina district of the Leningrad region, where Zinovy \u200b\u200bKolobanov fought in 1941, a collection of signatures was organized under an appeal with a request to honor the hero-tanker posthumously deserved by him at the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War. In the year of the 70th anniversary of the Victory, in the opinion of the public, this would be quite logical and appropriate.

By August 10, 1944, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, crossing the river. Vistula, broke through the enemy defenses south-west of the Polish city of Sandomierz and, having overturned parts of the enemy's 4th tank army, significantly expanded the bridgehead. In an effort to restore the lost positions on the western bank of the river. Vistula, the Germans urgently transferred to the Sandomierz area five divisions (including one tank) from Army Group Southern Ukraine, five infantry divisions from Germany, three infantry divisions from Hungary and six brigades of assault guns. Preparing for a German counteroffensive, the Soviet command carried out a regrouping of troops. Urgently erected defensive fortifications,
mine barriers were installed.

From August 11, deliberately moving away from the previously taken town of Szydluv and the village of Oglendów, units of the 6th Guards Tank Corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army also went on the defensive. The bridgehead by this time was uneven, abutting against the river. The Vistula was a semi-ring, in the center of which the 53rd Guards Tank Brigade was defended, to the left flank of which the 52nd Guards Tank Brigade was adjacent. It was not possible to open a full profile cover for vehicles in sandy soils - the walls of the trenches immediately crumbled. This area also caused a lot of trouble for the Germans. Our tankers have repeatedly observed how Panthers often skidded in the sands and how their driver-mechanics, when trying to get out, had to expose the weak side armor of their vehicles to the fire of our troops. In previous battles for Szydluv and Oglendów, these Panther maneuvers helped inflict serious losses on the enemy (only on August 11, 1944, tankers of the 53rd Guards Brigade destroyed 8 enemy tanks). Therefore, on August 12, the commander of the 53rd Guards brigade, Colonel V.S.Arkhipov, with his chief of staff S.I.Kirilkin, came to the conclusion that the enemy would no longer go through the open sandy fields, but would try to bypass the brigade's positions from the flanks, so they stood concentrate all your attention.

In front of the 2nd tank battalion of Major A. G. Korobov, the whole area was at a glance. On the right flank, where the T-34 tanks of the 3rd TB of Captain I.M. Mazurin occupied the defense, a deep and wide hollow stretched along which a field road ran from the village of Oglendów to the town of Staszów to the rear of our troops. Behind the ravine there was a swamp, where the 294th passed to the defense. rifle regiment 97th Infantry Division.

The road stretching in the lowlands, leading straight to the goal, could not be ignored by the Germans. To cover this path, the brigade command decided to ambush two T-34 tanks from the 3rd TB at the exit from the hollow on the slopes of an unnamed height, instructing the deputy battalion commander of the guard, Captain P.T.Ivushkin, to command them. The rest of the battalion's tanks were at the main defensive positions one kilometer from Oglendów.

The initial assumptions about the enemy's plans were confirmed already in the first reports of reconnaissance, which was conducted by patrols and three armored groups on tanks and motorcycles in the expected directions of the enemy's advance. In reconnaissance report No. 53 of the headquarters of the 6th GvTK, drawn up at 19.00 on August 13, it was reported:

"On the night from 12 to 13.08 in the area west of Shidluv, prisoners were captured by a sergeant-major belonging to the 1st company of the 501st separate battalion of heavy tanks of the RGK, and a private belonging to the 10th company of the 79th MP of the 16th TD, taken in the Ponik area ...

The sergeant major testified that at the station of Koneupol, after the unloading of the 501st separate battalion of heavy tanks of the RGK, a tank division of unknown numbering was unloaded. The 501st TB consists of three TR and a supply company.

The battalion arrived with 40 tanks, 20 of them of the Panther type and 20 of the T-IV. Up to 30 tanks have arrived in Khmelnik, the rest are out of order and require light repair. "

The arrival of the 501st Separate Heavy Tank Battalion under the command of Major von Legat said a lot in itself. In July - August 1944, the battalion was reorganized at the training center in Ohrdruf and received a new material part - the pride of German tank designers, ahead of time called "all-crushing" - Tiger-B tanks.

However, the low reliability of the "raw" vehicle (which began to be developed back in 1942, but was never brought to the "mind") led to the fact that the battalion was sent to the Eastern Front on August 5 in an incomplete composition, since 14 tanks with different problems were concentrated in the 1st company, which remained in the training center.

On August 9, the battalion arrived in Poland and unloaded at the Consupol station near the town of Kielce. As the prisoners showed, out of 40 tanks, only half were Panther heavy tanks, the rest at the last moment supplemented the Pz Kpfw IV. Later it turned out that the words of the prisoners about the arrival of the "Panthers" were untrue. Most likely, the prisoners tried to hide from the enemy the appearance of a secret novelty on the front, since these "Panthers" turned out to be the newest "Royal Tigers".

During a short march from the unloading station to the headquarters of the 16th TD, located in the Khmelnik area, 10 faulty tanks remained on the three kilometers of the way. Having spent a couple of days on repairs and preparation of the materiel, the battalion on August 11, having completed a 2-km march, reached the town of Szydluv. Since the march was again accompanied by breakdowns of new vehicles, by the end of the day in the battalion there were only 11 serviceable Tiger-B tanks - which had to be baptized by fire in the attack on Staszow.

It should be noted here that the forces of the 6th GvTK by no means ensured soviet tank crews significant numerical superiority: the Germans were opposed by nine combat-ready T-34-76 from the 53rd GvTBr, nine T-34-76 and ten T-34-85 52 GvTbr, and the 51st GvTBr, which occupied (in the north) defense, included eleven T-34-76 tanks and four T-34-85 tanks. Stashuv also had eleven IS-2 heavy tanks and one IS-85 tank belonging to the 71st OGvTTP.

From the middle of the night from 12 to 13 August, the growing rumble of tank engines in the depths of the German positions was heard more and more clearly. Before dawn, the commander of the 53rd Guards Brigade returned from headquarters to his tank, which served as an observation post and was in the battle formations of the 1st TB, whose vehicles were hidden by a ridge of low sand dunes. Ahead, on the right, stretched a hollow with a road leading to Staszów. On the left in the field were scattered heaps of straw, in which Ivushkin's tanks were disguised. Closer to the exit from the ravine was the "thirty-four" of junior lieutenant A. P. Oskin, whose crew included: driver-mechanic A. Stetsenko, gun commander A. Merkhaidarov, radio operator A. Grushin and loader A. Khalychev. Colonel Arkhipov with Ivushkin on their bellies crept up to the shock that hid the tank, and after talking with Oskin, they ordered not to open fire without a command.

The morning was hazy. From the observation post of the commander of the 53rd brigade, neither the outskirts of the village of Oglenduva, nor the hollow, nor even heaps of straw with camouflaged tanks were visible. The silence of the early morning was interrupted by the slowly growing rumble of tank engines, and soon the approaching clatter of tracks became audible. The roar of the Junkers, heading for Staszów, came from the air. German artillery then opened fire, but the shells swept high over the brigade's leading edge. Enemy reconnaissance was never able to detect the battle formations of the 53rd Tank Brigade, let alone an ambush.

At 7:00 on August 13, under cover of fog, the enemy launched an offensive to an unnamed height with eleven Tiger-B tanks, accompanied by several armored personnel carriers with infantry. Ivushkin reported to NP:

“The tanks have gone. I don't see, but I hear. They are going by the hollow. "

Here is how the further course of events was described by the commander of the 53rd Guards Brigade himself:

"A monstrous tank was getting out of the hollow. It was crawling uphill in jerks, skidding in the sand. Major Korobov radioed from the left flank:

I answer:
- Do not hurry! Hit from four hundred meters.
Meanwhile, a second hulk crept out of the hollow, then a third appeared. They appeared at significant intervals: while the third tank emerged from the hollow, the first had already passed Ivushkin's ambush. "Beat?" - he asked. - "Hit!" I see how the side of the shock, where Oskin's tank is standing, slightly moved. The sheaf rolled down, the cannon barrel became visible. He jerked, then again and again. It was Oskin who fired. I clearly saw through binoculars how black holes appeared in the starboard sides of enemy tanks. So the smoke appeared, and the flame flared up. The third tank turned its front towards Oskin, but, having rolled on a broken track, stopped and was finished off.

I was broadcasting "307 - 305". The signal is common. Direct fire hit a dozen or so barrels at once. Yes, and howitzer divisions covered the hollow with overhead fire, and it disappeared all the way to Oglendów in clouds of smoke and sand dust. "

The Junkers and Messerschmitts appeared, and almost simultaneously our fighters. The battle began to boil in the air. Korobov's 2nd tank battalion fought enemy tanks west of the height 247.9 during the day. By the end of the day, the 53rd Brigade took up defenses along its southern part - 300 m east of the village of Oglendów, ready for an offensive in the direction of Šedluv. Two tanks of the 3rd TB with a company of machine gunners attacked the village at 22.00, which by eight in the morning was completely cleared of the enemy. After that, the 3rd TB established itself on the outskirts. Among the trophies taken in the village were German tanks that had retreated after an unsuccessful attack. It was here that it became clear that the battle had to be fought with the latest German tanks (there was no time to deal with it on a foggy morning, and in the first reports, counting the burning tanks, they reported the destruction of three Panthers).

The 2nd TB, in cooperation with the 2nd tank company of the 71st OGvTTP and the 289th rifle regiment, began an offensive in the direction of Zarez at 9:00. Located to the west of Oglendów "Tigers-B" with their fire blocked the path of the advancing infantry. Then a platoon of tanks IS-2 of the guard of senior lieutenant Klimenkov moved forward and from pre-prepared positions opened fire on enemy tanks, as a result of a short battle Klimenkov burned one tank and knocked out one.

After that, the infantry, not encountering strong resistance, entered Oglendów, where the 3rd TB tanks were already finishing off the enemy. At this time, 7 Tiger-B tanks attacked our positions from the direction of height 272.1. Being in an ambush in the bushes east of Mokre on the IS-2 tank, Guards St.L-ta Udalov (Udalov fought on the IS-2 with tower number 98, which had a D-25 cannon) let enemy tanks at 700 - 800 m, opened fire on the head and after several well-aimed shots, one tank was burned, and the second was hit.

The enemy tanks were turned away and began to move away. Udalov drove his car along a forest road towards the enemy and again opened fire from the edge of the forest. Leaving one more burning tank, the enemy turned back. Soon the attack of the "Royal Tigers" was repeated, this time they were going in the direction of Ponik, where the IS-2 tank of Guards Lieutenant Belyakov stood in ambush, who opened fire from a distance of 1000 m and lit the tank with the third round. Seeing here, too, a direction destructive for the offensive, the remaining enemy tanks turned back.

In total, in three days of continuous battles in the period from 11 to 13 August 1944, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe townships of Staszow and Shidluv, the troops of the 6th GVTK captured and destroyed 24 enemy tanks, 13 of which were the newest heavy Tiger-B tanks.

"In the period from 9 to 19 August 1944, the 52nd Guards Brigade captured 7 and destroyed 225 soldiers and officers, destroyed one machine gun, captured 3 cannons, destroyed 6 tanks and 10 trucks, two special vehicles."

In addition, as follows from the reports of units and formations of the corps about prisoners and trophies captured from the enemy:

In total, from August 1 to August 29, 1944, the 53rd Tank Brigade destroyed 8 chief officers, 37 non-commissioned officers, 153 soldiers, captured 2 non-commissioned officers, 6 "Royal Tigers" and destroyed: 1 aircraft, 12 tanks, 29 howitzers , 150 rifles, 7 submachine guns, 20 machine guns, 4 mortars and 2 cannons. ”It should be noted that this success was all the more impressive since the units of the 6th GVTK did not lose a single tank of theirs in these battles.

The enemy's losses, a little later, were confirmed by intelligence report No. 39 of the headquarters of the 6th GvTK, drawn up on August 16 at 19.00:

"On August 16, in the Zaraz region, a prisoner belonging to the 501st heavy tank battalion was captured.

The prisoner showed that the 501st separate heavy tank battalion was being formed in Germany, received 40 new tanks: up to 20 "Royal Tigers" and up to 20 of the "T-4" type. The battalion arrived in the Khmelnik area two weeks ago. Currently, the battalion has up to 26 tanks, the rest were burned and damaged.

The prisoner, besides his own tanks, saw the Tiger tanks of another unit. The prisoner does not know the numbering of the part. "

According to the memoirs of the commander of the 53rd Guards Brigade: “... who knocked out and how many is a difficult question, since the tankmen of two battalions - I.M. Mazurin and A.G. Korobov, and two artillery (185th howitzer and 1645 light) two self-propelled artillery (1893 and 385) regiments. The assault aviation worked perfectly. Oskin's crew burned three tanks and knocked out one. Alexander Petrovich himself was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, Abubakir Merkhaidarov - the Order of Lenin. All crew members were awarded. "

After the battle, the commander of the 2nd TB brigade, Korobov, made a report in which he indicated that "about 20 large tanks were advancing at the junction of his battalion and the 51st Guards TBR." A legitimate question is, where did the rest of the "Royal Tigers" go? They were just as unlucky. They were ambushed by the command of the 52nd GvTBr, which was on the defensive on the left flank of the 6th GvTK. On August 12, the 2nd tank battalion of this brigade, under the command of Major A. N. Golomidov, was located at the edge of the forest near the village of Mokre, located a few kilometers west of Staszów. Towards evening, the battalion commander summoned the company commander, Senior Lieutenant V.I.Tokarev, and, having indicated a point on the map, ordered an ambush there. A kilometer from the battle formations of the battalion, in the area of \u200b\u200ba skyscraper with bushes, two tanks, led by the company commander, ambushed.

The tank crews spent the whole night of August 13 without sleep. "Thirty-fours" were partially dug into the ground among the mops of sheaves of bread. It was completely impossible to find both cars.

Here is how the further course of events was described by the commander of the 52nd Guards Tank Brigade, Hero of the Soviet Union, Guard Lieutenant Colonel L. I. Kurist:

"Early in the morning, a so-called 'frame' appeared in the sky - an enemy spotter plane. It flew over our area and disappeared. A little later, the enemy opened heavy artillery fire. Shells whistled over the heads of the tankers and exploded behind - at the edge of the forest and on the outskirts of the near villages. “Now Tigers and Panthers will come,” Tokarev said when the raid had stopped. “I'll be in the trench, you can see better from there. And you, Georgy (Komarichev, senior sergeant, gunner of the company commander's tank), be on the lookout.
Komarichev and Dzhoparidze (the loader) peered intently into the distance, from where the roar of engines could be heard. A few minutes later they saw how armored vehicles appeared from behind the hill, going from the hollow, bypassing the height, substituting the sides for our tanks. Apparently, the Germans did not even imagine that there could be an ambush here.
- Five, six, seven ... twelve ... - considered Komarichev.
- Tengiz! Twenty! You see, twenty !!! And behind them - the infantry!
- Nothing, Zhora. We are the guards!
- Come on armor-piercing!
Enemy tanks were also noticed by the crew of Junior Lieutenant Stepan Krailov. The tankers decided to let the enemy come close to hitting them for sure.
When the Germans were five hundred meters away, Komarichev and Krainev opened fire. From Komarichev's shot one "Tiger" caught fire, Krainev knocked out another. The Nazis made desperate attempts to break through to the edge of the forest. The tanks took a little to the left. However, this did not help either: burning and wrecked cars remained on the battlefield. Suffering heavy losses, the Germans wavered, the tanks turned around and began to gradually retreat. They gave up further attempts to attack the line occupied by the brigade. "

The intensity of that battle can be judged if only because the tank crews used up almost all the shells. On account of Komarichev and Japaridze were eight destroyed "Tigers" and "Panthers". Krainev knocked out six: "... Having entered into confrontation with the enemy, our tankers destroyed 14 tanks, more than 50 Hitlerites, and most importantly, they thwarted the enemy's counterattack in their sector."

Unfortunately, both tank brigade commanders in their memoirs did not separately indicate the exact number of destroyed and knocked out "Royal Tigers". According to the latest data published in the book "Tactics of the Tiger-I and Tiger-II tanks" by the English researcher Thomas Yenz, a week after the battle on August 21, 1944, there were 12 serviceable Tiger-II tanks, 27 tanks in the ranks of the 501st tank battalion required repair, and six Tiger-II tanks were irretrievably lost. However, citing these data, the author is somewhat disingenuous. Twelve Tiger-B tanks remained on the battlefield at Oglendów, Mokre and Shidluv. To date, from the archival data it is clear that during these battles it was possible to utterly defeat the 501st separate battalion "Tigers-B", capturing at the same time three completely serviceable vehicles of a new model, with tower numbers 102, 502 and 234.

Tank no. 502 was found standing in the yard of a house on the outskirts of the village of Oglendów. The reason why the crew abandoned a technically sound combat vehicle remains unclear. Most likely, since the village of Oglendów was taken by one swift throw of our tanks, the crew of the "King Tiger" simply fled in panic, leaving all the technical documentation inside the car. The tank had a full ammunition load and a sufficient supply of fuel. According to the technical documentation found in it, it turned out that the tank covered only 444 km. When trying to start the engine, he started up "with a half turn."

The captured tanks # 102 and # 502 were commanders, as they had additional means of communication.

The Germans appreciated the incident with dignity, removing von Legat from his post within a week.

Soon in the front-line newspaper of the 6th GVTK "Battle Call" there was an editorial with a subtitle - "The best tanks in the world - ours, Soviet!" It highlighted the recent events at the Sandomierz bridgehead: "... Seeing our superior tanks in everything, the Germans began to build their clumsy and clumsy monsters -" Tigers "," Panthers "and" Ferdinands. "But these machines are still inferior and inferior to the quality of Soviet vehicles. This is proved from the recent battles, where the retreat of the German armies is strewn with wreckage of "Tigers" and other German equipment. The last German tanks of the "T-VIB" type "Royal Tiger" did not frighten the Soviet soldiers. the artillerymen at the first meeting with them proved the absolute superiority of our combat vehicles against this so-called "secret" weapon of the Germans.Our valiant tankers Oskin, Udalov and Fun in the very first battle destroyed several "Royal Tigers" ... the Soviet-German front proved that the advantage of Soviet tanks over German ones is clear and undeniable. Our new tanks have the best gun, they have high maneuverability and maneuverability. "

So the first step was taken to create a legend, which obscured the real and much more impressionable success of our tankmen with its vulgar and awkward propaganda.

The reasons for the complete fiasco of the "Royal Tigers", which did not meet the expectations of the Germans near Sandomierz, were the skillful organization of defense and, no doubt, the skill of our tankers. On the other hand, the enemy was led by numerous mistakes in planning and tactics, an unsuccessful choice of direction for the use of heavy tanks, especially the 70-ton "Royal Tigers". The desire to quickly throw into battle the "miracle weapon" that was not brought to the "mind" eventually led to the fact that the next "pancake" prepared by the German "tank cooks" never got on the table in the proper form.

By the way, some Western sources for some reason claim that the allegedly captured Tiger with the number 502 actually had the number 002, and that the Russians themselves allegedly changed the number. This stupidity is hard to believe. Firstly, there is no difference what number the tank has and, therefore, there is no point in changing the numbers. And secondly, according to German reports, it is easy to check the tanks with which numbers were part of the 501st battalion. And then it turns out that the Royal Tiger with the number 002 never existed. But the tank with the number 502 was.

To complete the picture, I would like to note that the 501st Heavy Tank Battalion (s.Pz.Abt.501) was formed on May 10, 1942 from two tank companies. He was part of the 7th Tank Regiment. On March 6, 1943, the third company was included in the battalion. He took part in battles in North Africa, where in May 1943 he was almost completely destroyed. Re-created on September 9th, 1943. In the summer of 1944, having received a new materiel (Royal Tigers), the battalion was included in the Northern Ukraine Army Group and sent to the Eastern Front. After the events described near Stashuv, the battalion fought defensive battles near the Pilica river, again suffered heavy losses and by the fall was withdrawn to the rear for reorganization. In the fall, on November 27, 1944, the battalion was renamed the 424th Heavy Tank Battalion and attached to the XXIVth Tank Corps, and the former 101st SS Heavy Tank Battalion was then renamed the 501st.

It's hard to believe, but the 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht fought for 48 hours with one and only Soviet tank KV-1 ("Klim Voroshilov").

This episode is detailed in the memoirs of Colonel Erhard Routh, whose group tried to destroy a Soviet tank. The fifty-ton KV-1 shot and crushed with its tracks a convoy of 12 supply trucks, which was going to the Germans from the captured town of Raiseniai. Then he destroyed the artillery battery with aimed shots. The Germans, of course, fired back, but to no avail. The shells of anti-tank guns did not even leave dents on his armor - the Germans struck by this later gave the KV-1 tanks the nickname "Ghost". Why, the cannons - the KV-1 armor - could not penetrate even 150 mm howitzers. True, Routh's soldiers managed to immobilize the tank by detonating a shell under its track.

But "Klim Voroshilov" was not going to leave anywhere. He took a strategic position on the only road leading to Raiseniai and delayed the division's advance for two days (the Germans could not bypass it, because the road passed through swamps where army trucks and light tanks were stuck).

Here is what Erhard Routh himself writes about this:
“Nothing important happened in our sector. The troops improved their positions, carried out reconnaissance in the direction of Siluva and on the east bank of Dubissa in both directions, but mainly tried to find out what was happening on the south bank. We only met small units and individual soldiers. During this time, we made contact with the patrols of Battle Group von Seckendorf and the 1st Panzer Division at Lidavenai. While clearing the wooded area west of the bridgehead, our infantry encountered a larger Russian force, which was still held in two places on the western bank of the river Dubissa.

In violation of the accepted rules, several prisoners captured in recent battles, including one lieutenant of the Red Army, were sent to the rear in a truck, guarded by only one non-commissioned officer. Halfway back to Raseinay, the driver suddenly saw an enemy tank on the road and stopped. At this moment, Russian prisoners (and there were about 20 people) suddenly attacked the driver and the guard. A non-commissioned officer was sitting next to the driver, facing the prisoners, when they tried to snatch weapons from both of them. The Russian lieutenant had already grabbed the non-commissioned officer's machine gun, but he managed to free one hand and hit the Russian with all his might, throwing him back. The lieutenant collapsed and took several more people with him. Before the prisoners had time to rush at the non-commissioned officer again, he freed his left hand, although he was being held by three. Now he was completely free. With lightning speed, he tore the machine gun from his shoulder and fired a burst at the rioted crowd. The effect was terrible. Only a few prisoners, apart from the wounded officer, managed to jump out of the car to hide in the forest. The car, in which there were no surviving prisoners, quickly turned around and rushed back to the bridgehead, although the tank fired at it.

This little drama was the first sign that the only road leading to our beachhead was blocked by the super-heavy KV-1 tank. The Russian tank also managed to destroy the telephone wires connecting us with the division headquarters. Although the intentions of the enemy remained unclear, we began to fear an attack from the rear. I immediately ordered Lieutenant Vengenroth's 3rd Battery of the 41st Tank Destroyer Battalion to take up a position in the rear near the flattop of a hill near the 6th Motorized Brigade's command post, which also served as the command post for the entire battle group. To strengthen our anti-tank defenses, I had to turn a nearby battery of 150mm howitzers 180 degrees. The 3rd company of Lieutenant Gebhardt from the 57th engineer tank battalion was ordered to mine the road and its surroundings. The tanks assigned to us (half of Major Schenk's 65th tank battalion) were located in the forest. They were ordered to be ready for a counterattack whenever required.

Time passed, but the enemy tank, which blocked the road, did not move, although from time to time it fired towards Raseinaya. At noon on June 24, the scouts returned, whom I sent to clarify the situation. They reported that apart from this tank they did not find any troops or equipment that could attack us. The officer in command of this unit made the logical conclusion that this was a single tank from the detachment that attacked battle group "Von Seckendorf".

Although the danger of an attack was dispelled, measures should be taken to quickly destroy this dangerous obstacle, or at least drive the Russian tank away. With his fire, he had already set fire to 12 supply trucks that were coming to us from Raseinaya. We were unable to evacuate the wounded in the battles for the bridgehead, and as a result, several people died without receiving medical attention, including a young lieutenant who was shot at point-blank range. If we could get them out, they would be saved. All attempts to bypass this tank were unsuccessful. The cars either got stuck in the mud or collided with scattered Russian units still wandering through the forest.
So I ordered Lieutenant Vengenroth's battery. recently received 50mm anti-tank guns, get through the forest, approach the tank at an effective range and destroy it. The battery commander and his brave soldiers gladly accepted this dangerous assignment and set to work with full confidence that it would not drag on for too long. From the command post at the top of the hill, we watched them as they carefully made their way through the trees from one hollow to another. We were not alone. Dozens of soldiers climbed onto the rooftops and climbed the trees with intense attention, waiting for the end of the venture. We saw how the first gun approached 1000 meters to the tank, which was sticking out right in the middle of the road. The Russians did not seem to notice the threat. The second gun disappeared from view for a while, and then emerged from the ravine right in front of the tank and took a well-camouflaged position. Another 30 minutes passed, and the last two guns also returned to their original positions.

We watched from the top of the hill. Suddenly, someone suggested that the tank was damaged and abandoned by the crew, as it stood completely motionless on the road, representing an ideal target. (One can imagine the disappointment of our comrades, who, drenched in sweat, dragged the guns to the firing positions for several hours, if that were the case.) Suddenly, a shot from the first of our anti-tank guns rang out, a flash blinked, and the silvery track ran straight into the tank. The distance did not exceed 600 meters. Flashed a ball of fire, there was a sharp crack. Direct hit! This was followed by the second and third hits.

Officers and soldiers shouted joyfully, like spectators at a merry performance. “We got you! Bravo! The tank is finished! " The tank did not react in any way until our cannons got 8 hits. Then his turret turned around, carefully groped for the target and began to methodically destroy our guns with single shots from an 80-mm gun. Two of our 50 mm guns were blown to pieces, the other two were seriously damaged. The personnel lost several people killed and wounded. Lieutenant Wengenroth took the survivors back to avoid unnecessary losses. Only after nightfall did he manage to pull out the guns. The Russian tank was still tightly blocking the road, so we were literally paralyzed. Deeply shaken, Lieutenant Vengenroth returned to the beachhead with his soldiers. The newly obtained weapon, which he trusted unconditionally, was completely helpless against the monstrous tank. A sense of deep frustration swept across our entire battle group.

It was required to find some new way master the situation.
It was clear that of all our weapons, only 88mm anti-aircraft guns, with their heavy armor-piercing shells, could cope with the destruction of the steel giant. In the second half of the day, one such gun was withdrawn from the battle at Raseinai and began to creep cautiously towards the tank from the south. The KV-1 was still deployed north, as it was from this direction that the previous attack had been launched. The long-barreled anti-aircraft gun approached a distance of 2000 yards, from which satisfactory results could already be achieved. Unfortunately, the trucks that had previously been destroyed by the monstrous tank were still burning down the sides of the road, and their smoke prevented the gunners from taking aim. But, on the other hand, the same smoke turned into a curtain, under the cover of which the gun could be dragged even closer to the target. Having tied many branches to the gun for better camouflage, the gunners slowly rolled it forward, trying not to disturb the tank.

Finally, the crew made it to the edge of the forest, from where visibility was excellent. The distance to the tank now did not exceed 500 meters. We thought that the first shot would give a direct hit and would certainly destroy the tank that was in our way. The crew began to prepare the gun for firing.
Although the tank had not moved since the battle with the anti-tank battery, it turned out that its crew and commander had iron nerves. They calmly watched the approach of the anti-aircraft gun, without interfering with it, since while the gun was moving, it did not pose any threat to the tank. In addition, the closer the anti-aircraft gun is, the easier it will be to destroy it. Came a critical moment in the duel of nerves, when the calculation began to prepare the anti-aircraft gun for a shot. Now is the time for the tank's crew to act. While the gunners, terribly nervous, were aiming and loading the gun, the tank turned the turret and fired first! Each projectile hit the target. The heavily damaged anti-aircraft gun fell into a ditch, several people of the crew died, and the rest were forced to flee. Machine-gun fire from the tank prevented the removal of the gun and the pick up of the dead.

The failure of this attempt, on which great hopes were pinned, was very unpleasant news for us. The optimism of the soldier died along with the 88-mm gun. Our soldiers did not have the best day chewing canned food, since it was impossible to bring hot food.
However, the biggest fears disappeared, at least temporarily. The Russian attack on Raseinai was repulsed by the von Seckendorff battle group, which managed to hold Hill 106. Now there was no need to fear that the Soviet 2nd Panzer Division would break through to our rear and cut us off. All that remained was a painful splinter in the form of a tank blocking our only supply route. We decided that if we could not cope with it during the day, then at night we will do it. The brigade headquarters discussed various options for destroying the tank for several hours, and preparations began for several of them at once.

Our sappers proposed to simply blow up the tank on the night of June 24/25. It should be said that the sappers, not without malevolent satisfaction, followed the unsuccessful attempts of the artillerymen to destroy the enemy. Now it was their turn to try their luck. When Lieutenant Gebhardt called 12 volunteers, all 12 people raised their hands in unison. In order not to offend others, every tenth was chosen. These 12 lucky ones were looking forward to the approaching night. Lieutenant Gebhardt, who intended to personally command the operation, briefed all the sappers in detail with the general plan of the operation and the personal task of each of them separately. After dark, the lieutenant, at the head of a small column, set off. The road passed the eastern height of 123, through a small sandy area to a strip of trees, among which a tank was discovered, and then through a sparse forest to the old concentration area.

The pale light of the stars twinkling in the sky was enough to outline the outlines of the nearby trees, the road, and the tank. Trying not to make any noise, so as not to betray themselves, the soldiers who took off their shoes climbed to the side of the road and began to examine the tank from a close distance in order to outline the most convenient path. The Russian giant stood in the same place, his tower came to a standstill. Peace and quiet reigned everywhere, only occasionally a flash flickered in the air, followed by a dull rumble. Occasionally, an enemy shell hissed through and exploded at the crossroads north of Raseinaya. These were the last echoes of the heavy fighting in the south all day long. By midnight, artillery fire from both sides finally ceased.

Suddenly, in the woods on the other side of the road, there were crackling and footsteps. The ghostly figures rushed to the tank, shouting something as they ran. Is it the crew? Then there were blows on the tower, with a clang the hatch was thrown back and someone got out. Judging by the muffled clinking, it was food. The scouts immediately reported this to Lieutenant Gebhardt, who began to annoy him with questions: “Maybe rush at them and take them prisoner? They seem to be civilians. " The temptation was great, as it seemed very easy to do it. However, the tank crew remained in the turret and were awake. Such an attack would alarm the tankers and could jeopardize the success of the entire operation. Lieutenant Gebhardt reluctantly rejected the offer. As a result, the sappers had to wait another hour for the civilians (or were they partisans?) To leave.

During this time, a thorough reconnaissance of the area was carried out. At 01.00 the sappers began to act, as the tank crew fell asleep in the tower, unaware of the danger. After the explosive charges were installed on the track and thick side armor, the sappers set fire to the fuse-cord and fled. A few seconds later, a booming explosion tore through the silence of the night. The task was completed, and the sappers decided that they had achieved a decisive success. However, before the echo of the explosion died out among the trees, the tank's machine gun came to life, and bullets whistled around. The tank itself did not move. Probably, its caterpillar was killed, but it was not possible to find out, as the machine gun fired at everything around madly. Lieutenant Gebhardt and his patrol returned to the beachhead visibly discouraged. Now they were no longer sure of success, moreover, it turned out that one person was missing. Attempts to find him in the dark have led nowhere.

Shortly before dawn, we heard a second, weaker, explosion somewhere near the tank, for which we could not find a reason. The tank machine gun came to life again and for several minutes poured lead on everything around. Then there was silence again.
It began to dawn soon after. The rays of the morning sun colored the forests and fields with gold. Thousands of dewdrops sparkled like diamonds on the grass and flowers, the early birds sang. The soldiers began to stretch and blink sleepily as they rose to their feet. A new day was beginning.
The sun had not yet had time to rise high when a barefoot soldier, with his bound boots slung over his shoulder, marched past the brigade's command post. Unfortunately, it was I, the brigade commander, who first noticed him, and rudely called him over to me. When the frightened traveler stretched out in front of me, I demanded in an intelligible language an explanation of his morning walk in such a strange way. Is he a follower of Daddy Kneipp? If so, then this is not the place to showcase your passions. (Daddy Kneipp in the 19th century created a society under the motto "Back to nature" and preached physical health, cold baths, sleeping outdoors, and the like.)

Greatly frightened, the lonely wanderer began to get confused and indistinctly bleat. Every word from this silent intruder had to be pulled out literally with ticks. However, with each of his answers, my face brightened. Finally I patted him on the shoulder with a smile and shook his hand gratefully. To an outside observer who did not hear what was being said, such a development of events might seem extremely strange. What could a barefoot guy tell that the attitude towards him changed so rapidly? I could not satisfy this curiosity until the order was given for the brigade for the day with the report of the young sapper.

“I listened to the sentries and lay in the ditch next to the Russian tank. When everything was ready, I, together with the company commander, hung an explosive charge, which was twice as heavy as required for guidance, to the tank's track, and set fire to the fuse. Since the ditch was deep enough to provide shelter from the debris, I expected the results of the explosion. However, after the explosion, the tank continued to shower the forest edge and ditch with bullets. More than an hour passed before the enemy calmed down. Then I got close to the tank and examined the track in the place where the charge was installed. Not more than half of its width was destroyed. I did not notice any other damage.
When I returned to the gathering point of the sabotage group, she had already left. While searching for my boots, which I left there, I discovered another forgotten demolition charge. I took it and returned to the tank, climbed onto the hull and hung the charge from the muzzle of the cannon in the hope of damaging it. The charge was too small to cause serious damage to the machine itself. I crawled under the tank and blew it up.
After the explosion, the tank immediately fired at the edge of the forest and the ditch from a machine gun. The shooting did not stop until dawn, only then did I manage to crawl out from under the tank. Sadly, I discovered that my charge was still too small. When I got to the rally point, I tried to put on my boots, but found out that they are too small and in general they are not my pair. One of my comrades put on mine by mistake. As a result, I had to go back barefoot and I was late. "

It was a true story brave man... However, despite his efforts, the tank continued to block the road, firing at any moving object it noticed. The fourth decision, which was born on the morning of June 25, was to call the Ju-87 dive bombers to destroy the tank. However, we were refused, since the planes were required literally everywhere. But even if they were found, the dive bombers would hardly have been able to destroy the tank with a direct hit. We were confident that the fragments of the nearby ruptures would not frighten the crew of the steel giant.
But now this damned tank had to be destroyed at any cost. The combat power of the garrison of our bridgehead will be seriously undermined if the road cannot be unblocked. The division will not be able to fulfill the task assigned to it. Therefore, I decided to use the last means we had left, although this plan could lead to large losses in men, tanks and equipment, but at the same time it did not promise guaranteed success. However, my intentions were to mislead the enemy and help keep our losses to a minimum. We intended to divert the attention of the KV-1 with a mock attack from Major Schenk's tanks and bring 88mm cannons closer to destroy the terrible monster. The area around the Russian tank contributed to this. There it was possible to secretly sneak up on the tank and set up observation posts in the wooded area of \u200b\u200bthe eastern road. Since the forest was quite sparse, our agile PzKw-35t could move freely in all directions.

Soon the 65th Tank Battalion arrived and began shelling the Russian tank from three sides. The KV-1 crew began to get noticeably nervous. The turret spun from side to side, trying to catch the sassy German tanks. The Russians fired at targets flashing among the trees, but they were always late. The German tank appeared, but literally at the same instant disappeared. The crew of the KV-1 tank was confident in the durability of their armor, which resembled an elephant's skin and reflected all the shells, but the Russians wanted to destroy their annoying opponents, while at the same time continuing to block the road.

Fortunately for us, the Russians were seized by excitement, and they stopped watching their rear, from where misfortune was approaching them. The anti-aircraft gun took up a position near the place where the same one had already been destroyed the day before. Its formidable barrel aimed at the tank, and the first shot thundered. The wounded KV-1 tried to turn the turret back, but the anti-aircraft gunners managed to fire 2 more shots during this time. The turret stopped rotating, but the tank did not catch fire, although we expected it. Although the enemy no longer responded to our fire, after two days of failure, we could not believe in success. Four more rounds were fired with armor-piercing shells from an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun, which ripped open the monster's skin. His gun lifted up helplessly, but the tank continued to stand on the road that was no longer blocked.

The witnesses to this deadly duel wanted to get closer to check the results of their shooting. To their great surprise, they found that only 2 shells penetrated the armor, while the other 5 88mm shells only made deep potholes in it. We also found 8 blue circles marking the impact of 50mm shells. The sappers' sortie resulted in serious damage to the track and a shallow chipping on the gun barrel. But we did not find any traces of hits from shells from 37-mm cannons and PzKW-35t tanks. Driven by curiosity, our "David" scrambled onto the defeated "Goliath" in a vain attempt to open the turret hatch. Despite his best efforts, the lid did not budge.

Suddenly the barrel of the gun began to move, and our soldiers rushed away in terror. Only one of the sappers kept his composure and quickly thrust a hand grenade into the hole made by a shell in the lower part of the tower. A dull explosion thundered, and the hatch cover flew to the side. Inside the tank lay the bodies of the brave crew, who had only been wounded before. Deeply shocked by this heroism, we buried them with all military honors. They fought to their last breath, but this was only one small drama of the great war.
After a single heavy tank blocked the road for 2 days, she began to act. Our trucks delivered the supplies needed for the next offensive to the beachhead. "

PzKw-35-t

The 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht was part of the 41st Panzer Corps. Together with the 56th Panzer Corps, he made up the 4th Panzer Group - the main striking force of Army Group North, whose task was to capture the Baltic States, capture Leningrad and join the Finns. The 6th Division was commanded by Major General Franz Landgraf. It was armed mainly with tanks of the Czechoslovakian production PzKw-35t - light, with thin armor, but with high maneuverability and maneuverability. There were a number of more powerful PzKw-III and PzKw-IV. Before the start of the offensive, the division was divided into two tactical groups. The more powerful was commanded by Colonel Erhard Raus, the weaker - by Lieutenant Colonel Erich von Seckendorff.

In the first two days of the war, the division's offensive was successful. By the evening of June 23, the division captured the Lithuanian city of Raseiniai and crossed the Dubissa River. The tasks assigned to the division were completed, but the Germans, who already had experience in campaigns in the west, were unpleasantly struck by the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops. One of the units of Routh's group came under fire from snipers occupying positions on fruit trees growing in a meadow. Snipers killed several German officers, delayed the advance of German units for almost an hour, preventing them from quickly encircling the Soviet units. The snipers were deliberately doomed as they ended up inside the location of the German troops. But they carried out the task to the end. In the west, the Germans did not see anything like it.

How the only KV-1 ended up in the rear of Routh's group on the morning of June 24 is not clear. It is possible that he just got lost. However, in the end, the tank blocked the only road leading from the rear to the group's positions.

This episode is described not by regular communist propagandists, but by Erhard Routh himself. Routh then fought the entire war on the Eastern Front, passing Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk, and finished it as commander of the 3rd Panzer Army and with the rank of colonel general. Of the 427 pages of his memoirs, directly describing the hostilities, 12 are devoted to a two-day battle with the only Russian tank at Raseiniai. Routh was clearly shaken by this tank. Therefore, there is no reason for mistrust. Soviet historiography ignored this episode. Moreover, since for the first time in domestic press he was mentioned by Suvorov-Rezun, some "patriots" began to "expose" the feat. In the sense - not a feat, but so-so.

The KV, which has a crew of 4, "traded" itself for 12 trucks, 4 anti-tank guns, 1 anti-aircraft gun, possibly for several tanks, as well as for several dozen Germans killed and died from wounds. This in itself is an outstanding result, given the fact that before 1945, in the overwhelming majority of even victorious battles, our losses were higher than the German ones. But these are only direct losses of the Germans. Indirect - losses of the Seckendorf group, which, reflecting the Soviet blow, could not receive help from the Routh group.

Accordingly, for the same reason, the losses of our 2nd Panzer Division were less than if Routh had supported Seckendorff.

However, perhaps more important than the direct and indirect losses of people and equipment was the loss of time by the Germans. On June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht had only 17 tank divisions on the entire Eastern Front, including 4 tank divisions in the 4th tank group. One of them was kept by KV alone. Moreover, on June 25, the 6th division could not advance solely because of the presence of a single tank in its rear. One day of delay for one division is a lot in conditions when German tank groups were advancing at a high pace, tearing apart the Red Army's defenses and creating many "cauldrons" for it. After all, the Wehrmacht actually fulfilled the task set by "Barbarossa", almost completely destroying the Red Army that opposed it in the summer of 1941. But because of such "incidents" as an unexpected tank on the road, he did it much more slowly and with much greater losses than planned. And in the end he ran into the impenetrable mud of the Russian autumn, the deadly frosts of the Russian winter and the Siberian divisions near Moscow. After that, the war passed into a protracted stage, hopeless for the Germans.

And yet the most amazing thing about this battle is the behavior of four tankers, whose names we do not know and will never know. They created more problems for the Germans than the entire 2nd Panzer Division, to which, apparently, the KV belonged. If the division delayed the German offensive by one day, then the only tank by two. No wonder Routh had to take the anti-aircraft guns from Seckendorf, although it would seem that it should have been the other way around.

It is almost impossible to assume that the tankers had a special mission to block the only supply route of the Routh group. At that moment, our intelligence service was simply absent. This means that the tank was on the road by accident. The tank commander himself realized what the most important position he took. And he deliberately began to hold her back. It is unlikely that the standing of the tank in one place can be interpreted as a lack of initiative, the crew acted too skillfully. On the contrary, standing was an initiative.

Sitting in a cramped iron box for two days without getting out, and in the June heat, is torture in itself. If this box is, moreover, surrounded by an enemy whose goal is to destroy the tank together with the crew (in addition, the tank is not one of the enemy's targets, as in a "normal" battle, but the only goal), for the crew this is already absolutely incredible physical and psychological stress. Moreover, the tankers spent almost all this time not in battle, but in anticipation of a battle, which is morally much more difficult.

All five combat episodes - the defeat of a convoy of trucks, the destruction of an anti-tank battery, the destruction of anti-aircraft guns, firing at sappers, the last battle with tanks - in total hardly took even an hour. The rest of the time, the KV crew wondered from which side and in what form they would be destroyed next time. The fight with the anti-aircraft gun is especially indicative. The tankers deliberately hesitated until the Germans installed a cannon and began to prepare for firing - in order to fire for sure themselves and finish the job with one shell. Try to at least roughly imagine this expectation.

The fact remains that one tank was holding back the advance of Battle Group Raus. And if someone thinks that the only feat is the containment of the tank group, no less, then really the opposition to the "Rouse" group is not such ??

Before answering this question, I will give you the composition of the Raus battle group:
II tank regiment
I / 4th motorized regiment
II / 76th Artillery Regiment
company of the 57th tank sapper battalion
company of the 41st tank destroyer battalion
battery II / 411th anti-aircraft regiment
6th Motorcycle Battalion.

against 4 people.

When, in the morning hours of June 22, 1941, the German army launched the Barbarossa plan - an attack on Soviet Union, Soviet troops were taken by surprise. And although the Red Army was armed with a large number of types armored vehicles, which were completely unknown to the Germans, however, this technical superiority could not compensate for the disastrous tactical mistakes of the army command. An unexpected fact for the Wehrmacht was not only the large number of Soviet tanks that the German troops had to face, but also their high combat qualities, especially tanks of the latest designs.

Although produced in limited quantities, literally in the last months before the German attack, the new types of Soviet tanks, the T-34 and KV, were a very serious opponent. Even just before the start of Operation Barbarossa, their number and combat characteristics, and in some cases even their very existence, were not discovered by the German military intelligence services.

Tank KV-2 captured by the Germans

That new soviet tanks, including the KV-2, turned out to be a surprise for the German command, as evidenced, for example, by an entry in the diary of Colonel-General Franz Halder, who wrote on June 24, 1941:

"On the front of Army Group North, new Russian heavy tanks have appeared, which are most likely armed with an 80 mm cannon, or even a 150 mm cannon, which is, however, unlikely."

But the very next day, when new updated reports arrived, Halder was forced to agree with the reality. He wrote:

"Scattered information about new Russian tanks is coming in: weight 52 tons, booking a forehead 37 cm (?), Sides 8 cm, armament a 152 mm cannon and three machine guns, crew of 5, speed 30 km / h, power reserve 100 km. for the fight: 50mm cannons pierce the armor under the turret, 88mm cannons probably also pierce the side armor (not exactly known). "

An excellent example of such complete ignorance is the conversation that took place in early August 1941 between Adolf Hitler and the commander of Panzergruppe 2, General Guderian:

Hitler: "If I knew that the data on the number of Russian tanks given in your book ( Guderian "Achtung Panzer", 1937) were correct, then I think that I (perhaps) would never start this war. "

Guderian, in his book, estimated the number of Soviet tanks at 10,000, which caused a sharp reaction from the German censors. However, it turned out that Guderian's estimates were even too low. 6th August 1941 command german army, officially announced that the total number of destroyed Soviet tanks is 13145 pieces. This figure seems to be true, given that between 1933 and 1941, more than 30,000 armored vehicles of all types (including armored vehicles) were built in the USSR. Approximately 20,000 of this number were light, while the number of heavy tanks was only 1,800, including the most recent types. This number seems to be relatively small compared to the volume of tank production in the USSR (for example, light T-26 tanks), but compared to the tank fleet of other European armies, it is quite significant.

Sufficiently fresh Russian sources cite the following data on the composition of the Red Army as of June 1, 1941:

personnel - 5,224,066;
field artillery - 48 647;
mortars - 53,117;
anti-aircraft guns - 8 680;
tanks and other armored vehicles - 25,932;
trucks - 193,218;
tractors and tractors - 42,931;
horses - 498,493.

The German high command quickly realized the danger of the situation. The fight against the new T-34 and KB tanks demanded tremendous efforts and led to heavy losses. Therefore, just a month after the outbreak of hostilities, an army newsletter "D 343 Merkblatt fur die Bekampfung der russischen Panzerkampfwagen" was issued to instruct German soldiers on methods of fighting Soviet tanks. We can say that it was a symbol of shock from the collision with the T-34 and KV. By the way, it is interesting that when faced with the KV-2 tanks, the Germans initially believed that the KV-2 tank of the 1939 model is a later version of the vehicle, and accordingly assigned it the KW-IIB index, i.e. an improved version compared to the 1940 model, which received the KW-IIA index.

Despite the fact that most of the KV-2 tanks were lost not in battle, but due to mechanical breakdowns, as a result of which they had to be abandoned due to the impossibility of repair and restoration, the German offensive was significantly slowed down. Sometimes only one single KV-2, which took a key position on the front line and was supported by infantry, was able to stop the enemy offensive. The powerful armor of this tank and the weakness of the German anti-tank weapons of that time made it possible to detain even large units for hours or even days. Some KV-2s could withstand up to 20 direct hits before being destroyed by 88mm anti-aircraft guns acting as anti-tank guns or by calling in Ju-87 "Stuka" dive bombers to attack.

Another way to fight the Russischer Koloss was infantry attack and close combat, which usually involved heavy casualties. Heavy field artillery could also play a role in solving the KV-2 Problem. However, only the 10 cm Kanone 18, lFH 10.5cm and sFH 15cm had a limited number of direct-fire anti-tank rounds in their ammunition load. Other field guns had to rely mainly on luck in trying to achieve a direct hit when firing on the KV-2 along ballistic trajectories.

The main German tanks of that period, which were at the forefront of the offensive, were rarely used to combat the KV-2. They were too poorly armed to effectively fight a Soviet heavy tank:

The PzKpfW III had a 3.7 cm KWK gun;
PzKpfW III - 5 cm KWK L / 42;
PzKpfW IV -7.5 cm KWK L / 24;
PzKpfW 38 (t) - 3.7 cm;
PzKpfW 35 (t) - 3.7 cm.

Despite the fact that the number of KV-2 tanks in the first months of hostilities remained relatively small and many of them were lost without efforts on the part of the enemy, in the technical aspect, its influence can hardly be overestimated. The consequence of the "T-34, KW Shock" for the Wehrmacht was the adoption of much better armed and armored tanks PzKpfW VI "Tiger" in 1942 and PzKpfW V "Panther" in 1943.

KV-2 training models for training Wehrmacht soldiers

After the Wehrmacht faced medium and heavy Soviet tanks in the early days of the Barbarossa plan, the German command took urgent measures to effectively prepare its troops to fight this new unexpected enemy. In the German infantry and panzergrenadier units, it was quickly adopted new program training adequate to the current situation. Using a large number of different models for training soldiers since the early 1930s, German units, in this case, also built their own wooden models of Soviet tanks on a 1: 1 scale.

They were often extremely detailed and precise. High level and good quality mock-up work, made it possible to create models of a combat vehicle corresponding to a real tank, not only in size, but also to reproduce on it various angles of inclination of armor protection sheets, for training in the use of magnetic anti-tank mines, handrails and steps for climbing onto a tank, the location of hatches and viewing devices , angles of fire, not only the main armament, but also machine guns. Training mock-ups of tanks were often installed on four-wheeled chassis so that they could simulate their movement at the real speed of tanks. Although most of these training models were built to mimic the average Soviet tank T-34, some other much less common types of armored vehicles were also reproduced. Currently, only one wooden KB-2 can be documented.

The capabilities of German anti-tank guns in the fight against the KV-2

The armament and tactics of the German Wehrmacht in 1939 fully corresponded to the tactics adopted by the German command of the extremely mobile actions of troops during the "Blitzkrieg". Particular attention was paid to rapid breakthroughs over considerable distances, bypassing enemy nodes of resistance. Despite the available information that the enemy, in particular the French armed forces, had heavy tanks of the Char B1 type, the German command believed that their use in battle would be offset by the tactical advantages gained through close cooperation ground forces with units of the Luftwaffe.

At the same time, special hopes were pinned on the Ju-87 "Stuka" dive bombers, which were supposed to provide direct support to the advancing troops. In accordance with these provisions, the anti-tank units of the Wehrmacht were armed mainly with two types of anti-tank guns: a 3,7cm RAK 35/36 cannon of 37mm caliber and a 5cm RAK 38 cannon of 50mm caliber.

The 50 mm anti-tank gun RAK 38 L / 60 entered service with the Wehrmacht at the end of 1940 to replace the 37 mm anti-tank gun

On June 22, 1941, with the start of Operation Barbarossa, the situation on the front line changed significantly for the German soldiers. Firstly, the number of Soviet tanks that took part in the hostilities turned out to be significantly more than expected, and secondly, the new T-34 and KB tanks were well armored. In order to effectively fight against these unexpected enemies, the crews of the 37 mm and 50 mm anti-tank guns, due to their weak armor penetration, had to admit Soviet tanks at close distances - up to 30 meters. This tactic was possible, but extremely dangerous and led to heavy losses.

Schemes for effective fire on the KV-2 from an 88 mm L / 56 tank gun. A 1942 instruction sheet for German Tigers tank crews dating back to 1942.

An even more difficult opponent was the KV-2, with its armor reaching 75 mm in the front of the hull and 110 mm in the front of the turret. 37 mm and 50 mm German armor-piercing shells bounced off it with no visible effect even when fired from very close distances. Their use was completely ineffective, except for those cases when the artillerymen managed to damage the tracks, or jam the KV-2 turret. The Soviet concept of a "mobile fire bunker" proved to be quite effective, albeit in a slightly different aspect than originally planned. The only German gun capable of fighting the KB-2 at long distances was the 88 mm anti-aircraft gun, which in this case was used for firing at ground targets. The excellent characteristics of this weapon often saved the situation when it was used as an emergency measure in critical combat situations arising on the front line.

The development of the 88 mm anti-aircraft gun dates back to 1928. By the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, a more advanced modification of this weapon, the Model 36, was in service, which replaced the older Model 18.

Considering the negative combat experience of using 37 mm and 50 mm anti-tank guns in the first weeks of Operation Barbarossa, the Wehrmacht immediately made efforts to develop new, more powerful weapons, which ultimately culminated in the creation of the 7.5 cm RAK 40 (75 mm anti-tank gun). 8.8 cm RAC 43/41 (88 mm anti-tank gun) and 12.8 cm RAK K.44 (128 mm anti-tank gun). Although these guns were adopted too late to fight the KV-2, they later fought quite successfully against a number of other Soviet tanks, the successors of the KV.

Sourse of information:

"Military vehicles" No. 63, KV-2.

< Назад		Forward\u003e

The 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht was part of the 41st Panzer Corps. Together with the 56th Panzer Corps, he made up the 4th Panzer Group - the main striking force of Army Group North, whose task was to capture the Baltic, capture Leningrad and join the Finns. The 6th Division was commanded by Major General Franz Landgraf. It was armed mainly with Czechoslovakian-made PzKw-35t tanks - light, with thin armor, but with high maneuverability and maneuverability. There were a number of more powerful PzKw-III and PzKw-IV. Before the start of the offensive, the division was divided into two tactical groups. The more powerful was commanded by Colonel Erhard Raus, the weaker one was by Lieutenant Colonel Erich von Seckendorff.

This episode was described not by regular communist propagandists, but by Erhard Routh himself. Routh then fought the entire war on the Eastern Front, passing Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk, and finished it as commander of the 3rd Panzer Army and with the rank of colonel general. Of the 427 pages of his memoirs, directly describing the hostilities, 12 are devoted to a two-day battle with the only Russian tank at Raseiniai. Routh was clearly shaken by this tank. Therefore, there is no reason for mistrust. Soviet historiography ignored this episode. Moreover, since for the first time in the domestic press he was mentioned by Suvorov-Rezun, some "patriots" began to "expose" the feat. In the sense - not a feat, but so-so.

The crew of the KV-1 tank (4 people) destroyed themselves at the cost of their lives for 12 trucks, 4 anti-tank guns, 1 anti-aircraft gun, possibly several tanks, and several dozen Germans killed and died from wounds.

This in itself is an outstanding result, given the fact that before 1945, in the overwhelming majority of even victorious battles, our losses were higher than the German ones. But these are only direct losses of the Germans. Indirect - losses of the Seckendorff group, which, reflecting the Soviet blow, could not receive help from the Routh group. Accordingly, for the same reason, the losses of our 2nd Panzer Division were less than if Routh had supported Seckendorf.

However, perhaps more important than the direct and indirect losses of people and equipment was the loss of time by the Germans. On June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht had only 17 tank divisions along the entire Eastern Front, including 4 tank divisions in the 4th tank group. One of them was kept alone by KV. Moreover, on June 25, the 6th division could not advance solely due to the presence of a single tank in its rear. One day of delay for one division is a lot in conditions when German tank groups were advancing at a high pace, tearing apart the Red Army's defenses and creating many "cauldrons" for it. After all, the Wehrmacht actually fulfilled the task set by "Barbarossa", almost completely destroying the Red Army that opposed him in the summer of 1941. But because of such "incidents" as an unexpected tank on the road, he did it much more slowly and with much greater losses than planned. And in the end he ran into the impenetrable mud of the Russian autumn, the deadly frosts of the Russian winter and the Siberian divisions near Moscow. After that the war passed into a protracted stage, hopeless for the Germans.

Staying in a cramped iron box for two days, and in the June heat, is torture in itself. If this box is, moreover, surrounded by an enemy whose goal is to destroy the tank together with the crew (in addition, the tank is not one of the enemy's targets, as in a "normal" battle, but the only goal), for the crew this is already absolutely incredible physical and psychological stress. Moreover, the tankers spent almost all this time not in battle, but in anticipation of the battle, which is morally much more difficult.

All five combat episodes - the defeat of a convoy of trucks, the destruction of an anti-tank battery, the destruction of anti-aircraft guns, firing at sappers, the last battle with tanks - in total hardly took even an hour. The rest of the time the crew of the KV wondered from which side and in what form they would be destroyed next time. The fight with the anti-aircraft gun is especially indicative. The tankers deliberately hesitated until the Germans installed a cannon and began to prepare for firing - in order to fire for sure themselves and finish the job with one shell. Try to at least roughly imagine this expectation.

Moreover, if on the first day the crew of the KV could still hope for the arrival of their own, then on the second, when their own did not come and even the noise of the battle at Raseiniai had quieted down, it became clearer: the iron box in which they roast the second day would soon enough turn into their common coffin. They took it for granted and continued to fight.

Here is what Erhard Routh himself writes about this:

“Nothing important happened in our sector. The troops improved their positions, conducted reconnaissance in the direction of Siluva and on the east bank of Dubissa in both directions, but mainly tried to find out what was happening on the south bank. We only encountered small units and individual soldiers. During this time, we made contact with the patrols of Battle Group von Seckendorf and the 1st Panzer Division at Lidavenai. While clearing the wooded area west of the bridgehead, our infantry encountered larger Russian forces, which were still held in two places on the western bank of the river. Dubissa.

In violation of the accepted rules, several prisoners captured in recent battles, including one lieutenant of the Red Army, were sent to the rear in a truck under the protection of only one non-commissioned officer. Halfway back to Raseinay, the driver suddenly saw an enemy tank on the road and stopped. At this moment, Russian prisoners (and there were about 20 of them) unexpectedly attacked the driver and the guard. The non-commissioned officer was sitting next to the driver, facing the prisoners, when they tried to snatch the weapons from both of them. The Russian lieutenant had already grabbed the non-commissioned officer's assault rifle, but he managed to free one hand and hit the Russian with all his might, throwing him back. The lieutenant collapsed and took several more people with him. Before the prisoners had time to rush at the non-commissioned officer again, he freed his left hand, although he was being held by three. Now he was completely free. With lightning speed, he tore the machine gun from his shoulder and fired a burst at the rioted crowd. The effect was terrible. Only a few prisoners, apart from the wounded officer, managed to jump out of the car to hide in the forest. The car, in which there were no surviving prisoners, quickly turned around and rushed back to the bridgehead, although the tank fired at it.

This little drama was the first sign that the only road leading to our beachhead was blocked by the super-heavy KV-1 tank. The Russian tank also managed to destroy the telephone wires connecting us with the division headquarters. Although the intentions of the enemy remained unclear, we began to fear an attack from the rear. I immediately ordered Lieutenant Vengenroth's 3rd Battery of the 41st Tank Destroyer Battalion to take up a position in the rear near the flat top of the hill near the 6th Motorized Brigade's command post, which also served as the command post for the entire battle group. To strengthen our anti-tank defenses, I had to turn a nearby battery of 150mm howitzers 180 degrees. The 3rd company of Lieutenant Gebhardt from the 57th engineer tank battalion was ordered to mine the road and its surroundings. The tanks assigned to us (half of Major Schenk's 65th tank battalion) were located in the forest. They were ordered to be ready for a counterattack whenever required.

Time passed, but the enemy tank, which blocked the road, did not move, although from time to time it fired towards Raseinaya. At noon on June 24, the scouts returned, whom I sent to clarify the situation. They reported that apart from this tank they did not find any troops or equipment that could attack us. The officer in charge of this unit made the logical conclusion that this was a single tank from the squad that attacked the von Seckendorf battle group.

Although the danger of an attack was dispelled, it was necessary to take measures to quickly destroy this dangerous obstacle, or at least drive the Russian tank away. With his fire, he had already set fire to 12 supply trucks that were coming to us from Raseinaya. We could not evacuate the wounded in the battles for the bridgehead, and as a result, several people died without receiving medical attention, including a young lieutenant who was shot at point-blank range. If we could get them out, they would be saved. All attempts to bypass this tank were unsuccessful. The cars either got stuck in the mud or collided with scattered Russian units still wandering through the forest.

So I ordered Lieutenant Vengenroth's battery. recently received 50mm anti-tank guns, get through the forest, approach the tank at an effective range and destroy it. The battery commander and his brave soldiers gladly accepted this dangerous mission and set to work with full confidence that it would not drag on for too long. From the command post at the top of the hill, we watched them as they carefully made their way through the trees from one hollow to another. We were not alone. Dozens of soldiers climbed onto the rooftops and climbed the trees with intense attention, waiting for the end of the venture. We saw how the first gun approached 1000 meters to the tank, which was sticking out right in the middle of the road. The Russians did not seem to notice the threat. The second gun disappeared from sight for a while, and then emerged from the ravine right in front of the tank and took up a well-camouflaged position. Another 30 minutes passed, and the last two guns also returned to their original positions.

We watched from the top of the hill. Suddenly, someone suggested that the tank was damaged and abandoned by the crew, since it stood on the road completely motionless, representing an ideal target (You can imagine the disappointment of our comrades, who, sweating, dragged the guns to the firing positions for several hours, if so it was).

Suddenly a shot from the first of our anti-tank guns rang out, a flash blinked, and the silvery track ran straight into the tank. The distance did not exceed 600 meters. Flashed a ball of fire, there was a sharp crack. Direct hit! Then came the second and third hits.

Officers and soldiers shouted joyfully, like spectators at a merry performance. "Hit! Bravo! The tank is finished!" The tank did not react in any way until our cannons got 8 hits. Then his turret turned around, carefully groped for the target and began to methodically destroy our guns with single shots from an 80-mm gun. Two of our 50 mm guns were blown to pieces, the other two were seriously damaged. The personnel lost several people killed and wounded. Lieutenant Vengenroth led the survivors back to avoid unnecessary losses. Only after nightfall did he manage to pull out the guns. The Russian tank was still tightly blocking the road, so we were literally paralyzed. Deeply shaken, Lieutenant Vengenroth returned to the beachhead with his soldiers. The newly acquired weapon, which he trusted unconditionally, proved completely helpless against the monstrous tank. A sense of deep frustration swept across our entire battle group.

It was necessary to find some new way to master the situation.

It was clear that of all our weapons, only 88 mm anti-aircraft guns with their heavy armor-piercing shells could cope with the destruction of the steel giant. In the second half of the day, one such gun was withdrawn from the battle at Raseinay and began to creep cautiously towards the tank from the south. The KV-1 was still deployed north as it was from this direction that the previous attack had been launched. The long-barreled anti-aircraft gun approached a distance of 2000 yards, from which satisfactory results could already be achieved. Unfortunately, the trucks that had previously been destroyed by the monstrous tank were still burning down the sides of the road, and their smoke prevented the gunners from taking aim. But, on the other hand, the same smoke turned into a curtain, under the cover of which the gun could be dragged even closer to the target. Having tied many branches to the gun for better concealment, the gunners slowly rolled it forward, trying not to disturb the tank.

Finally, the crew got to the edge of the forest, from where visibility was excellent. The distance to the tank now did not exceed 500 meters. We thought that the first shot would give a direct hit and would certainly destroy the tank that was in our way. The crew began to prepare the gun for firing.

Although the tank had not moved since the battle with the anti-tank battery, it turned out that its crew and commander had iron nerves. They calmly watched the approach of the anti-aircraft gun, without interfering with it, since while the gun was moving, it did not pose any threat to the tank. In addition, the closer the anti-aircraft gun is, the easier it will be to destroy it. Came a critical moment in the duel of nerves, when the calculation began to prepare the anti-aircraft gun for a shot. Now is the time for the tank's crew to act. While the gunners, terribly nervous, were aiming and loading the gun, the tank turned the turret and fired first! Each projectile hit the target. The heavily damaged anti-aircraft gun fell into a ditch, several crewmen were killed, and the rest were forced to flee. Machine-gun fire from the tank prevented the removal of the gun and the pick up of the dead.

However, the biggest fears disappeared, at least temporarily. The Russian attack on Raseinai was repulsed by the von Seckendorff battle group, which managed to hold Hill 106. Now there was no need to fear that the Soviet 2nd Panzer Division would break through to our rear and cut us off. All that remained was a painful splinter in the form of a tank blocking our only supply route. We decided that if we could not cope with it during the day, then at night we will do it. The brigade headquarters discussed various options for destroying the tank for several hours, and preparations began for several of them at once.

Our sappers proposed to simply blow up the tank on the night of June 24/25. It should be said that the sappers, not without malevolent satisfaction, followed the unsuccessful attempts of the artillerymen to destroy the enemy. Now it was their turn to try their luck. When Lieutenant Gebhardt called 12 volunteers, all 12 people raised their hands in unison. In order not to offend others, every tenth was chosen. These 12 lucky ones were looking forward to the approaching night. Lieutenant Gebhardt, who intended to personally command the operation, briefed all the sappers in detail with the general plan of the operation and the personal task of each of them separately. After dark, the lieutenant, at the head of a small column, set off. The road passed the eastern height 123, through a small sandy area to a strip of trees, among which a tank was found, and then through a sparse forest to the old concentration area.

Maybe rush at them and take them prisoner? They seem to be civilians. "The temptation was great, as it seemed very easy to do. However, the tank crew remained in the tower and stayed awake. Such an attack would alarm the tankers and could jeopardize the success of the entire operation. Lieutenant Gebhardt reluctantly rejected the offer. As a result The sappers had to wait another hour for the civilians (or were they partisans?) to leave.

During this time, a thorough reconnaissance of the area was carried out. At 01.00 the sappers began to act, as the tank crew fell asleep in the tower, unaware of the danger. After explosive charges were installed on the track and thick side armor, the sappers set fire to the fuse-cord and fled. Seconds later, a booming explosion tore through the silence of the night. The task was completed, and the engineers decided that they had achieved decisive success. However, before the echo of the explosion died out among the trees, the tank's machine gun came to life, and bullets whistled around. The tank itself did not move. Probably, its caterpillar was killed, but it was not possible to find out, as the machine gun fired at everything around madly. Lieutenant Gebhardt and his patrol returned to the bridgehead visibly depressed. Now they were no longer sure of success, moreover, it turned out that one person was missing. Attempts to find him in the dark have led nowhere.

Shortly before dawn, we heard a second, weaker, explosion somewhere near the tank, the reasons for which we could not find. The tank machine gun came to life again and for several minutes poured lead on everything around. Then there was silence again.

It began to dawn soon after. The rays of the morning sun colored the forests and fields with gold. Thousands of dewdrops sparkled like diamonds on the grass and flowers, the early birds sang. The soldiers began to stretch and blink sleepily as they rose to their feet. A new day was beginning.

The sun had not yet risen high when the barefoot soldier, with his tied boots slung over his shoulder, marched past the brigade's command post. Unfortunately, it was I, the brigade commander, who first noticed him, and rudely called him over to me. When the frightened traveler stretched out in front of me, I demanded in an intelligible language an explanation of his morning walk in such a strange way. Is he a follower of Daddy Kneipp? If so, then this is not the place to showcase your passions. (Daddy Kneipp in the 19th century created a society under the motto "Back to Nature" and preached physical health, cold baths, outdoor sleep, and the like.)

Strongly frightened, the lonely wanderer began to get confused and indistinctly bleat. Every word from this silent intruder had to be pulled out literally with ticks. However, with each of his answers, my face brightened. Finally I patted him on the shoulder with a smile and shook his hand gratefully. To an outside observer who did not hear what was being said, such a development of events might seem extremely strange. What could a barefoot guy tell that the attitude towards him changed so rapidly? I could not satisfy this curiosity until the order was given for the brigade for the day with the report of the young sapper.

When I returned to the gathering point of the sabotage group, she had already left. While searching for my boots, which I left there, I discovered another forgotten demolition charge. I took it and returned to the tank, climbed onto the hull and hung the charge from the muzzle of the cannon in the hope of damaging it. The charge was too small to cause serious damage to the machine itself. I crawled under the tank and blew it up.

After the explosion, the tank immediately fired at the edge of the forest and the ditch from a machine gun. The shooting did not stop until dawn, only then I managed to crawl out from under the tank. Sadly, I discovered that my charge was still too small. When I got to the rally point, I tried to put on my boots, but found out that they are too small and in general they are not my pair. One of my comrades put on mine by mistake. As a result, I had to go back barefoot and I was late. "

It was the true story of a brave man. However, despite his efforts, the tank continued to block the road, firing at any moving object it noticed. The fourth decision, which was born on the morning of June 25, was to call the Ju-87 dive bombers to destroy the tank. However, we were refused, since the planes were required literally everywhere. But even if they were found, the dive bombers would hardly have been able to destroy the tank with a direct hit. We were confident that the fragments of the nearby ruptures would not frighten the crew of the steel giant.

But now this damned tank had to be destroyed at any cost. The combat power of the garrison of our bridgehead will be seriously undermined if the road cannot be unblocked. The division will not be able to fulfill the task assigned to it. Therefore, I decided to use the last means that remained with us, although this plan could lead to large losses in people, tanks and equipment, but at the same time it did not promise guaranteed success. However, my intentions were to mislead the enemy and help keep our losses to a minimum. We intended to divert the attention of the KV-1 with a mock attack by Major Schenk's tanks and bring 88mm cannons closer to destroy the terrible monster. The area around the Russian tank contributed to this. There it was possible to secretly sneak up on the tank and set up observation posts in the wooded area of \u200b\u200bthe eastern road. Since the forest was quite sparse, our agile PzKw-35t could move freely in all directions.

(memories of participants Battle of Kursk) - Historical truth

The last battle of the prisoners of the 20th block - Military Review

***

Fortunately for us, the Russians were seized by excitement, and they stopped watching their rear, from where misfortune was approaching them. The anti-aircraft gun took up a position near the place where the same one had already been destroyed the day before. Its formidable barrel aimed at the tank, and the first shot thundered. The wounded KV-1 tried to turn the turret back, but the anti-aircraft gunners managed to fire 2 more shots during this time. The turret stopped rotating, but the tank did not catch fire, although we expected it. Although the enemy no longer responded to our fire, after two days of failure, we could not believe in success. Four more shots were fired with armor-piercing shells from an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun, which ripped open the monster's skin. His gun was helplessly lifted up, but the tank continued to stand on the road that was no longer blocked.

The witnesses to this deadly duel wanted to get closer to check the results of their shooting. To their great amazement, they found that only 2 rounds penetrated the armor, while the other 5 88mm rounds only made deep potholes in it. We also found 8 blue circles marking the impact of 50mm shells. The sappers' sortie resulted in serious damage to the track and a shallow chipping on the gun barrel. But we did not find any traces of hits from shells from 37-mm cannons and PzKW-35t tanks. Driven by curiosity, our "David" scrambled onto the defeated "Goliath" in a vain attempt to open the turret hatch. Despite his best efforts, the lid did not budge.

After a single heavy tank blocked the road for 2 days, she began to act. Our trucks delivered the supplies needed for the next offensive to the beachhead. "

***

So 4 tankers in a heavy KV-1 tank against a German battle group "Raus" with the following composition:

II tank regiment

I / 4th motorized regiment

II / 76th Artillery Regiment

company of the 57th tank sapper battalion

company of the 41st tank destroyer battalion

battery II / 411th anti-aircraft regiment

6th Motorcycle Battalion.