February 15, 1940 Soviet troops finally broke through the "Mannerheim line"- a powerful complex of Finnish defensive structures, considered impregnable. This marked a turning point in the Winter War of 1939-1940 and in military history as such. Today we will remind you what this legendary Finnish defensive line was and tell you about six most interesting facts associated with the "Mannerheim Line" - the history of its construction and operation.
Mannerheim Line or Enckel Line?
The name of Mannerheim, the Finnish commander-in-chief, and then the President of Finland, was given to the line of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus only at the end of 1939, when a group of foreign journalists visited its construction. The journalists returned home and wrote a series of reports about what they saw, in which they mentioned the term that later became official.
In Finland itself, this defense complex has long been called the "Enkel Line" in honor of the chief of the General Staff of the young republic, who in the early 1920s paid great attention to the construction of defensive structures on the southern borders of his homeland. Construction on the line began in 1920 and was suspended in 1924 when Enckel resigned from his post.
It resumed only in 1932, when the legendary military leader Karl Gustav Mannerheim, who had become the head of the State Defense Committee a year earlier, rode with an inspection along the Enkel Line and gave the order to complete it, strengthen and modernize it.
What is the Mannerheim Line?
With this, in fact, it was necessary to start. The Mannerheim Line is a giant defensive line built by the Finns in 1920-1939 near the border with Soviet Russia. It was created to stop the advance of the Red Army inland. And Helsinki had no doubts that this would one day begin.
The line was created taking into account the landscape of the Karelian Isthmus and in the west rested against the Gulf of Finland, and in the east - against Ladoga. The complex of structures consisted of six defense lines, of which the second, the main one, in fact, was the "Mannerheim line".
It consisted of 22 resistance nodes and separate strongholds. The features of the landscape made it possible to hold the defense on this line with small forces, while causing significant damage to the advancing enemy. And 136 kilometers of anti-tank obstacles, 330 kilometers of barbed wire, mines, bunkers, ditches, pillboxes and bunkers did not contribute to the rapid breakthrough of this line.
The bunkers and bunkers themselves were skillfully hidden from the eyes of the attackers, the relief made it possible to hide them, disguising them as hills with trees and other natural elements. During the Winter War, there was a rumor among Soviet soldiers that the Finnish bunkers were covered with rubber, because of which the shells hitting them bounced off - otherwise they could not explain the "survivability" of the enemy's firing points.
Was the line really impregnable?
During the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, Russian propaganda claimed that the Mannerheim Line was one of the greatest defense systems built by Mankind, more impregnable than the legendary French Maginot Line. Therefore, her breakthrough was presented as an unprecedented feat of Soviet soldiers. However, the Finnish field marshal himself, as well as most historians, were very skeptical about such statements.
The inaccessibility of the "Mannerheim Line" is a myth blown up by the Western press and Soviet propaganda... Our command had to justify the delays at the front (after all, a fast and victorious war was expected), the Finns raised the fighting spirit of the fighters with stories about the wonderful characteristics of the defense system, and the European media needed beautiful stories and hot facts.
In fact, the Mannerheim Line, despite its scale, had many significant flaws. Let's start with the fact that at the start of the war it was not completed, and there was still a lot of construction work left. In addition, most of the equipment of this defensive complex in 1939 was noticeably outdated, and there were not so many modern firing points. Yes, and there was no talk of a great depth of defense.
Why did Soviet troops storm the Mannerheim Line for more than two months?
The war with Finland was conceived by the Soviet leadership as a quick armed conflict on foreign territory, which in a short time would end with the victory of our army. The hostilities began on November 30, and on December 12 the Red Army reached the front edge of the main defense zone of the "Mannerheim Line". However, here they got stuck for two months.The reason for this is the lack of accurate data on the structure of the "Mannerheim Line", as well as the lack of personal strength and appropriate weapons. The Soviet army did not have enough large-caliber artillery to destroy the enemy's concrete firing points and military experience in breaking through such obstacles. And the command did not always behave competently.
For these and many other reasons, the battles for the Mannerheim Line lasted more than two months. And it was possible to break through it only in February 1940. The general offensive began on 11 February. The first breakthrough of the defensive wall occurred on the 13th, and on the 15th the fall of the "Mannerheim Line" became irreversible - the 7th Army went into the rear of the Finnish troops, which forced them to retreat to a new line of defense. So the fate of the Winter War was decided.
The fighting continued until March 12, after which the Moscow Peace Treaty was concluded, which recorded the annexation of a number of Finnish border territories by the Soviet Union. In particular, the cities of Vyborg and Sortvalla, as well as the Khanka Peninsula in the depths of Finland, where a Soviet naval base was built, became Russians.
What is a "Karelian sculptor"?
The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 gave the world several new terms. For example, "Molotov cocktail" and "Karelian sculptor". The latter was called the Soviet high-power howitzer of the B-4 caliber, the shell of which, after hitting the bunkers and bunkers, turned these structures into a shapeless mishmash of concrete and reinforcement. These bizarre forms of construction were visible from afar, due to which they received the nickname "Karelian monuments". The Finns also called the B-4 howitzer "Stalin's sledgehammer."
What is now on the site of the Mannerheim Line?
Immediately after the end of the Winter War, Soviet sappers made considerable efforts to destroy the remnants of the Mannerheim Line. Most of the firing points were blown up, only those engineering structures that could not be dismantled remained intact.
During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1941-1944, the Finns who occupied these territories again did not want to restore the "Mannerheim line", considering this matter unpromising.
Now, only scattered objects scattered throughout the Karelian Isthmus remain of the once large-scale line of the Finnish defense. They are the object of pilgrimage for lovers of military history and a few tourists. No attempt has been made by the Russian or Finnish authorities to tidy up this monument. However, powerful reinforced concrete fortifications can stand for centuries even in the open air in the harsh northern natural conditions.
Karelian UkrepRayon. Northern Shield of Leningrad.
Tour of the Sestroretsk, Beloostrovsky, Agalatovsky, Elizavetinsky and Lembalovsky battalion defense areas of the Karelian Ukrep District.Karelian UkrepRayon. Diagram of battalion defense areas. The border line is for 1939 - before the Winter War.
After Civil War the line of the western border of Soviet Russia has deteriorated. Large political and industrial centers of the Land of Soviets were located at a short distance from the border: Leningrad - 30-50 kilometers, Minsk - 50 kilometers, Odessa - 40 kilometers. The threat of capture was created major cities enemy in the early days of the war. No one had any illusions about the plans of the Western powers, and therefore in the late 1920s the USSR began building fortified areas. Leningrad could face the greatest danger from the north. The border with a completely unfriendly Finland passed at least 30 kilometers from the city.
Karelian UkrepDistrict began to be created in 1928 and defended Leningrad along the Karelian Isthmus. was one of the Strengthening Districts of the Stalin Line - a grand fortification that stretched along the border of the USSR from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea.
During the Great Patriotic War Karelian UkrepDistrict fully justified its purpose. The Finns' attempts to break through to Leningrad across the Karelian Isthmus were unsuccessful.
After the war, it did not lose its significance at all. By the early 50s KaUR facilities modernized, introduced new protection technologies. Pillboxes of KaUR they were intensively rearming with the most modern weapons. In the second half of the 20th century, long-term fortification lost its importance and was removed from combat duty. Until the 90s, objects were still part of the structure of the armed forces - as warehouses, guard rooms, but then they were banally abandoned. Market relations did not allow maintaining even legendary bunkers, stained with blood, but at the same time absolutely useless for capitalism pillboxes ...
Despite the deplorable state of the buildings, they are still of interest to lovers of fortification, military enthusiasts, local historians and everyone who is not indifferent to national history... Lost in the dense forests of Karelia, concrete masses remind us of the former greatness of a nonexistent state ...
Map of KaUR objects studied during our excursion. APK1 "Elephant"
On the outskirts Sestroretsk there is a perfectly preserved bunker KaUR. Miraculously escaped total destruction and the invasion of marauders two-gun artillery half-caponier by the efforts of enthusiasts turned into a museum. To the best of its strength and capabilities, the bunker is restored, the internal equipment is repaired, and a small exposition dedicated to KaUR is created.
The agro-industrial complex was built in 1938-139. His task was to cross the approaches to the Sestra River, the railway bridge and the space in front of the front of the Beloostrovsky Battalion Defense District. In the early 1950s, the building was modernized: 85-mm ZiF-26 guns and an NPS-3 machine-gun mount were installed. Probably for its impressive size, APK1 received the call sign "Elephant".
We can definitely say that this is a unique object. In Russia, there are practically no monuments of long-term fortification of the mid-20th century in such a state. The nearest Soviet - only on the Stalin Line in Belarus
KaUR. Artillery semi-caponier "Elephant" of the Sestroretsk BRO.
85-mm casemate gun ZIF-26 (1949 onwards)
85-mm casemate cannon ZIF-26 (1949 release)
APK1. Talking tubes duplicated the telephone connection.
APK1. Machine-gun embrasure with the layout of the "Maxim"
APK1. Machine-gun embrasure with the "Maxim" model. The aiming was carried out according to the commands of the bunker commander.
KaUR. Three-embrasure machine-gun pillbox of the Sestroretsk BRO.
KaUR.Machine gun pillbox. Interior.
KaUR. Machine gun pillbox. Interior. This is not a war, these are our contemporaries ...
KaUR. Memorial military cemetery on the outskirts of Sestroretsk
KaUR. Memorial military cemetery. Eternal fire.
Eternal fire ...
KaUR. Memorial on the old border, Rusty groove. Here on September 8, 1941, Finnish troops closed the blockade ring around Leningrad.
The memorial is included in the Leningrad Green Belt of Glory.
KaUR. Legendary bunker "Millionaire".
KaUR. Legendary bunker "Millionaire" of the Beloostrovsky BRO.
DOT Millionaire built in 1938. One of the largest structures of the KAUR.The bunker is two-story, two-gun. The thickness of the walls is 2 meters, more than 700 cubic meters of concrete were spent on the construction.
During the Great Patriotic War, during the Finnish offensive, the bunker was captured (September 11, 1941). Repeated attempts to repulse the bunker took place before the start of the offensive in 1944. June 10, 1944 DOT "Millionaire" was repulsed by units of the Red Army.
By the way, the capture of the pillbox by the Finns is a clear proof that the Finnish troops were not at all going to stop at the old border.
By the way, DOT Millionaire- only one of the two pillboxes captured by the Finns - the KAUR line was not broken!
By the way, do not confuse our "Millionaire" with the Finnish Sj5 "Millionth"... Finnish bunker "Millionniy" our troops stormed into the Winter War.
KaUR. Beloostrov. Machine gun bunker. All metal is carved by marauders.
After the war, the KaUR was rearmed ... for the construction of tank firing points, the towers of the latest (at that time) IS-4 tanks were used. Of course, there are no towers left, only concrete casemates. Electric distribution substation in the Lembalovsky BRO of the Karelian Stronghold.
The substation was intended to convert and distribute electricity to bunkers. The electrical distribution substation is located underground, in several tiers. Has 2 entrances.
The substation was modernized after the war. Has anti-nuclear and anti-chemical protection.
The substation was completely ransacked by looters and burned several times.
But even in this state, the structure is impressive!
It is worth noting that KaUr was the first electrified Stronghold. And in the Great Patriotic War and after it, KaUR's pillboxes could be proud of the electric control of guns, ventilation, and light. KaUr itself was equipped with a system of electrical barriers.
It is now that the facilities of the Strategic Missile Forces are cut off electricity for debts, and then they did not spare anything for defense ...
Lembolovskaya stronghold included in the Leningrad Green Belt of Glory. Here, in September 1941, units of the 23rd army stopped the Finnish offensive. On September 9, the Red Army, sailors and border guards fought to death and held the line until the offensive in 1944.
Memorial Lembolovskaya stronghold erected in 1967 by the workers of the Vasileostrovsky district of Leningrad near the village of Lembolovo, Vsevolozhsky district, on the 34th kilometer of the Priozersky highway.
In the area of the memorial pillboxes, communication passages, dugouts have been preserved. Previously, all this was restored, now it again floats on the ground ...
Part of the memorial is a monument to the pilots of the 44th bomber regiment, who committed a fire ram on July 11, 1942.
KaUR. Memorial Lembolovskaya tea. Pillbox.
We examined only a very small part of KaUR's facilities. A huge number of fortifications are hidden in the forests and bogs of the Karelian Isthmus, in private summer cottages, on the territory of rest homes. For those who are interested in the topic Karelian Strengthening District I highly recommend to visit the site www.kaur.ru
Created by a group of enthusiasts, it can rightfully be considered the only most complete museum (albeit on the Internet) Karelian Strengthening District.
On the site you can see absolutely unique photographs of objects. Many of them have not survived to this day and have been destroyed by looters. But thanks to the authors of the site, you will be able to assess the scope of defensive construction, get acquainted with the original equipment of bunkers ... Northern Shield of Leningrad in all its fortification glory, which, alas, could not resist its own country ...
Thank you for organizing the excursion Dmitry Cherenkov (www.kaur.ru) and Alexey Alekseev (Travel agency "Silver ring"). We remind you that in the objects on our Map You can find even more additional information.
The main events of the Soviet-Finnish war 11/30/1939 - 03/13/1940:
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USSR Finland |
Beginning of negotiations on concluding a mutual assistance agreement |
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Finland |
General mobilization announced |
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The formation of the 1st corps of the Finnish People's Army (originally the 106th Mountain Rifle Division) began, which was staffed by Finns and Karelians. By November 26, there were 13,405 people in the corps. The corps did not participate in hostilities |
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USSR Finland |
Negotiations were interrupted and the Finnish delegation left Moscow |
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The Soviet government appealed to the Finnish government with an official note, which reported that as a result of artillery shelling, allegedly carried out from the territory of Finland in the area of the border village of Mainila, four soldiers of the Red Army were killed and eight were wounded. |
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Denunciation of the Non-Aggression Pact with Finland announced |
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The severance of diplomatic relations with Finland |
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Soviet troops were ordered to cross the Soviet-Finnish border and begin fighting |
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Troops of the Leningrad Military District (commander of the 2nd rank army commander K.A.Meretskov, member of the Military Council A.A.Zhdanov): |
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7A advanced on the Karelian Isthmus (9 rifle divisions, 1 tank corps, 3 separate tank brigades, 13 artillery regiments; commander of the 2nd rank army commander V.F. Yakovlev, and from December 9 - 2nd rank army commander Meretskov) |
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8A (4 rifle divisions; commander of the divisional commander I.N. Khabarov, since January - commander of the 2nd rank G.M.Stern) - north of Lake Ladoga in the Petrozavodsk direction |
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9A (3rd rifle division; commander corps commander M.P. Dukhanov, from mid-December - corps commander V.I. Chuikov) - in central and northern Karelia |
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14A (2nd RD; Divisional Commander V.A.Frolov) advanced in the Arctic |
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The port of Petsamo was taken on the Murmansk direction |
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In the town of Terijoki, the Finnish communists formed the so-called People's Government, headed by Otto Kuusinen |
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The Soviet government signed an agreement of friendship and mutual assistance with the government of the "Finnish Democratic Republic" Kuusinen and refused any contacts with the legitimate government of Finland headed by Risto Ryti |
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Troops 7A overcame an operational obstacle zone 25-65 km deep and reached the front edge of the main defense zone of the "Mannerheim Line" |
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USSR expelled from the League of Nations |
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An offensive of the 44th rifle division from the Vazhenvara area along the road to Suomussalmi in order to provide assistance to the 163rd division surrounded by the Finns. Parts of the division, stretched out along the road, were repeatedly surrounded by the Finns during January 3-7. On January 7, the division's advance was stopped, and its main forces were surrounded. The division commander, brigade commander A.I. Vinogradov, regimental commissar I.T. Pakhomenko and chief of staff A.I. Volkov, instead of organizing the defense and withdrawing troops from the encirclement, fled themselves, leaving the troops. At the same time, Vinogradov gave the order to get out of the encirclement, abandoning equipment, which led to the abandonment of 37 tanks, 79 guns, 280 machine guns, 150 cars, all radio stations, and the entire convoy on the battlefield. Most of the soldiers died, 700 people left the encirclement, surrendered - 1200. For cowardice Vinogradov, Pakhomenko and Volkov were shot in front of the division's formation |
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The 7th Army is divided into 7A and 13A (commander corps commander V.D.Grendal, from March 2 - corps commander F.A.Parusinov), which were reinforced by troops |
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The government of the USSR recognizes the government in Helsinki as the legitimate government of Finland |
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Front stabilization on the Karelian Isthmus |
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Repulsed the Finnish attack on the 7th Army |
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On the Karelian Isthmus, the North-Western Front was formed (commander of the 1st rank commander S.K. Timoshenko, member of the Military Council Zhdanov) consisting of 24 rifle divisions, a tank corps, 5 separate tank brigades, 21 artillery regiments, 23 air regiments: |
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A new 15A was formed from parts of the 8th Army (commander, 2nd rank army commander M.P. Kovalev) |
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After the artillery barrage, the Red Army began to break through the main line of defense of the Finns on the Karelian Isthmus |
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Summ's Fortified Knot taken |
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Finland |
Commander of the troops of the Karelian Isthmus in the Finnish army, Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman is suspended. In his place was appointed Major General A.E. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd Army Corps |
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Units 7A went to the second line of defense |
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7A and 13A launched an offensive in the strip from Lake Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay |
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A foothold on the western shore of the Vyborg Bay was seized |
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Finland |
The Finns opened the sluices of the Saimaa Canal, flooding the area northeast of Viipuri (Vyborg) |
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50th corps cut the Vyborg-Antrea railway |
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USSR Finland |
Arrival of the Finnish delegation to Moscow |
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USSR Finland |
Conclusion of a peace treaty in Moscow. The USSR inherited the Karelian Isthmus, the cities of Vyborg, Sortavala, Kuolajarvi, islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Rybachy Peninsula in the Arctic. Lake Ladoga was completely within the borders of the USSR. The USSR leased part of the Hanko (Gangut) Peninsula for a period of 30 years to equip a naval base there. Finland returned to the Petsamo area, captured by the Red Army at the beginning of the war. (The border established by this treaty is close to the border under the Treaty of Nishtad with Sweden in 1721) |
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USSR Finland |
The assault on Vyborg by units of the Red Army. Cessation of hostilities |
Grouping Soviet troops consisted of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies. The 7th Army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th - north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th - in northern and central Karelia, the 14th - in Petsamo.
Soviet tank BT-5
Soviet tank T-28
The 7th Army's offensive on the Karelian Isthmus was opposed by the Isthmus Army (Kannaksen armeija) under the command of Hugo Esterman.
For the Soviet troops, these battles became the most difficult and bloody. The Soviet command had only "fragmentary intelligence information about concrete strips of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus." As a result, the allocated forces to break through the "Mannerheim Line" were completely insufficient. The troops were completely unprepared to overcome the line of bunkers and bunkers. In particular, there was little large-caliber artillery needed to destroy pillboxes. By December 12, units of the 7th Army were able to overcome only the support zone of the line and reach the front edge of the main defense zone, but the planned breakthrough of the zone on the move failed due to clearly insufficient forces and poor organization of the offensive. On December 12, the Finnish army carried out one of its most successful operations at Lake Tolvajärvi.
Breakthrough attempts continued until the end of December, but they were unsuccessful.
The 8th Army advanced 80 km. It was opposed by the IV Army Corps (IV armeija kunta), commanded by Juho Heiskanen.
Juho Heiskanen
Part of the Soviet troops was surrounded. After heavy fighting, they had to retreat.
The offensive of the 9th and 14th armies was opposed by Task Force Northern Finland (Pohjois-Suomen Ryhm?) Under the command of Major General Viljo Einar Tuompo. Its area of responsibility was a 400-mile stretch of territory from Petsamo to Kuhmo. The 9th Army was leading an offensive from the White Sea Karelia. She wedged into the enemy's defenses at 35-45 km, but was stopped. The 14th Army, advancing on the Petsamo area, achieved the greatest success. By interacting with the Northern Fleet, the troops of the 14th Army were able to capture the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, the city of Petsamo (now Pechenga). Thus, they closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea.
Front kitchen
Some researchers and memoirists try to explain Soviet failures, including the weather: severe frosts (up to -40 ° C) and deep snow up to 2 m.However, both the data of meteorological observations and other documents refute this: until December 20, 1939 on On the Karelian Isthmus, the temperature ranged from +2 to -7 ° C. Further, until the New Year, the temperature did not drop below 23 ° C. Frosts up to 40 ° C began in the second half of January, when there was a calm at the front. Moreover, these frosts prevented not only the attackers, but also the defenders, as Mannerheim wrote about. There was also no deep snow until January 1940. Thus, the operational reports of the Soviet divisions dated December 15, 1939 indicate a depth of snow cover of 10-15 cm. Moreover, successful offensive operations in February took place in more severe weather conditions.
Damaged Soviet tank T-26
T-26
An unpleasant surprise was the massive use of Molotov cocktails by the Finns against Soviet tanks. For 3 months of the war, the Finnish industry produced over half a million bottles.
Winter War Molotov cocktail
During the war, Soviet troops first used radar stations (RUS-1) in combat conditions to detect enemy aircraft.
Radar "RUS-1"
Mannerheim Line
The Mannerheim Line (Finn. Mannerheim-linja) is a complex of defensive structures on the Finnish part of the Karelian Isthmus, created in 1920 - 1930 to contain a possible offensive strike from the USSR. The line was about 135 km long and about 90 km deep. Named after Marshal Karl Mannerheim, on whose orders the plans for the defense of the Karelian Isthmus were developed back in 1918. On his own initiative, the largest structures of the complex were created.
Name
The name "Mannerheim Line" appeared after the complex was created, at the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish winter war in December 1939, when the Finnish troops began a stubborn defense. Shortly before that, in the fall, a group of foreign journalists arrived to get acquainted with the fortification works. At that time, much was written about the French Maginot Line and the German Siegfried Line. The son of the former adjutant of Mannerheim Jorm Galen-Kallela, who accompanied the foreigners, came up with the name "Mannerheim Line". After the outbreak of the Winter War, this name appeared in those newspapers whose representatives inspected the buildings.
History of creation
Preparations for the construction of the line began immediately after Finland gained independence in 1918; construction itself continued with interruptions until the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish war in 1939.
The first plan of the line was developed by Lieutenant Colonel A. Rappe in 1918.
The work on the defense plan was continued by the German Colonel Baron von Brandenstein. It was approved in August. In October 1918, the Finnish government allocated 300,000 marks for construction work. The work was carried out by German and Finnish sappers (one battalion) and Russian prisoners of war. With the departure of the German army, the work was significantly reduced and everything was reduced to the work of the Finnish training sapper battalion.
In October 1919, a new plan for the defensive line was developed. It was led by the Chief of the General Staff, Major General Oscar Enkel. Major design work was carried out by a member of the French military commission, Major J. Gros-Coissy.
According to this plan, 168 concrete and reinforced concrete structures were built in 1920-1924, of which 114 were machine-gun, 6 artillery and one mixed. Then there was a three-year break and the question of resuming work was raised only in 1927.
The new plan was developed by V. Karikoski. However, the work itself began only in 1930. They took the greatest scope in 1932, when, under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Fabricius, six two-embrasure bunkers were built.
Fortifications
The main defensive zone consisted of a system of defense nodes stretched out in a line, each of which included several wood-earthen field fortifications (DZOT) and long-term stone-concrete structures, as well as anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. The nodes of defense themselves were placed on the main defensive line extremely unevenly: the intervals between individual nodes of resistance sometimes reached 6-8 km. Each defense center had its own index, which usually began with the first letters of the nearby settlement. If the account is kept from the coast of the Gulf of Finland, then the designations of the nodes will follow in the following order:
Pillbox scheme:
"N" - Khumaljoki [now Ermilovo] "K" - Kolkkala [now Malyshevo] "N" - Nyayukki [not being.]
"Ko" - Kolmikeyala [not being.] "Well" - Hulkeyala [not being.] "Ka" - Karhula [now Dyatlovo]
"Sk" - Summakulya [not being.] "La" - Lyahde [not being,] "A" - Eyuryapyaa (Leipyasuo)
"Mi" - Muolaankyla [now Mushroom] "Ma" - Sikniemi [not being.] "Ma" - Mälkela [now Zverevo]
"La" - Lauttaniemi [non-existent.] "No" - Neisniemi [now Cape] "Ki" - Kiviniemi [now Losevo]
"Sa" - Sakkola [now Gromovo] "Ke" - Kelya [now Port] "Tai" - Taipale (now Solovyovo)
Dot SJ-5, covering the road to Vyborg. (2009)
Dot SK16
Thus, 18 defense nodes of varying degrees of power were built on the main defensive zone. The system of fortifications also included a rear defensive zone covering the approach to Vyborg. It included 10 defense nodes:
"R" - Rempetti [now Key] "Nr" - Nyarya [now does not exist] "Kai" - Kaipiala [not being.]
"Nu" - Nuoraa [now Sokolinskoe] "Kak" - Kakkola [now Sokolinskoe] "Le" - Leviyainen [not being.]
"A.-Sa" - Ala-Saine [now Cherkasovo] "Y.-Sa" - Julia-Saine [now V.-Cherkasovo]
"Not" - Heinjoki [now Veshchevo] "Ly" - Lyukyulya [now Ozernoye]
Dot Ink5
The center of resistance was defended by one or two rifle battalions, reinforced with artillery. Along the front, the knot occupied 3-4.5 kilometers and a depth of 1.5-2 kilometers. It consisted of 4-6 strong points, each strong point had 3-5 long-term firing points, mainly machine-gun artillery, which constituted the skeleton of the defense.
Each permanent structure was surrounded by trenches, which also filled the gaps between the resistance nodes. The trenches in most cases consisted of a communication course with machine-gun nests brought forward and rifle cells for one or three shooters.
The rifle cells were covered with armored shields with visors and embrasures for shooting. This protected the shooter's head from shrapnel fire. The flanks of the line rested against the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The coast of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and reinforced concrete forts with eight 120-mm and 152-mm coastal guns were created in the Taipale area on the shores of Lake Ladoga.
The fortifications were based on the terrain: the entire territory of the Karelian Isthmus is covered with large forests, dozens of small and medium-sized lakes and rivers. Lakes and rivers have swampy or rocky steep banks. In the forests, rocky ridges and numerous large boulders are found everywhere. Belgian general Badu wrote: "Nowhere in the world have natural conditions been so favorable for the construction of fortified lines as in Karelia."
Reinforced concrete structures of the "Mannerheim Line" are divided into buildings of the first generation (1920-1937) and the second generation (1938-1939).
A group of Red Army soldiers examines an armored canopy at a Finnish bunker
The pillboxes of the first generation were small, one-story, for one or three machine guns, did not have shelters for the garrison and internal equipment. The thickness of the reinforced concrete walls reached 2 m, the horizontal cover - 1.75-2 m. Subsequently, these pillboxes were strengthened: the walls were thickened, armor plates were installed on the embrasures.
The Finnish press dubbed the second generation pillboxes “million” or millionaire pillboxes, since the value of each of them exceeded one million Finnish marks. A total of 7 such pillboxes were built. The initiator of their construction was Baron Mannerheim, who returned to politics in 1937, who obtained additional appropriations from the country's parliament. Some of the most modern and heavily fortified pillboxes were Sj4 Poppius, which had flanking fire embrasures in the western casemate, and Sj5 Millionaire, with flanking fire embrasures in both casemates. Both pillboxes fired flanking fire across the entire hollow, covering each other's front with machine guns. The pillboxes of the flanking fire were called the Le Bourget casemate, after the French engineer who developed it, and became widespread during the First World War. Some pillboxes in the Hottinen area, for example Sk5, Sk6, were converted into casemates of flanking fire, while the frontal embrasure was walled up. The pillboxes of the flanking fire were well camouflaged by stones and snow, which made it difficult to detect them, in addition, it was almost impossible to penetrate the casemate from the front with artillery. "Million-dollar" pillboxes were large modern reinforced concrete structures with 4-6 embrasures, of which one or two were cannon, mainly of flanking action. The usual armament of the pillboxes were Russian 76-mm cannons of the 1900 model on casemate machines Durlyakher and 37-mm anti-tank guns "Bofors" model 1936 on casemates. Less common were the 76-mm mountain cannons of the 1904 model of the year on pedestal mounts.
The weak points of Finnish long-term structures are as follows: the inferior quality of concrete in buildings of the first term, oversaturation of concrete with flexible reinforcement, the absence of the first term of rigid reinforcement in buildings.
The strong qualities of the pillboxes consisted in a large number of firing embrasures that shot through the immediate and immediate approaches and flanking the approaches to neighboring reinforced concrete points, as well as in the tactically correct location of structures on the ground, in their careful camouflage, in the saturated filling of gaps.
Destroyed pillbox
Engineering barriers
The main types of antipersonnel obstacles were wire nets and mines. The Finns installed slingshots that were slightly different from the Soviet slingshots or Bruno's spirals. These antipersonnel obstacles were complemented by anti-tank obstacles. Nadolbs were usually placed in four rows, two meters from one another, in a checkerboard pattern. Rows of stones were sometimes reinforced with barbed wire, and in other cases with ditches and scarps. Thus, anti-tank obstacles were simultaneously turned into anti-personnel ones. The most powerful obstacles were at an altitude of 65.5 at bunker No. 006 and at Khotinen near pillboxes No. 45, 35 and 40, which were the main ones in the defense system of the Mezhdbolotny and Summsky resistance centers. At bunker No. 006, the wire net reached 45 rows, of which the first 42 rows were on metal stakes 60 centimeters high embedded in concrete. Nadolby in this place had 12 rows of stones and were located in the middle of the wire. To blow up the nadolba, it was necessary to pass 18 rows of wire under three to four layers of fire and 100-150 meters from the enemy's front line. In some cases, the area between bunkers and bunkers was occupied by residential buildings. They were usually located on the outskirts of the settlement and were built of granite, and the thickness of the walls reached 1 meter or more. The Finns turned such houses into defensive fortifications when needed. Finnish sappers managed to erect about 136 km of anti-tank obstacles and about 330 km of barbed wire along the main line of defense. In practice, when, in the first phase of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War, the Red Army came close to the fortifications of the main defensive zone and began to make attempts to break through it, it turned out that the above principles, developed before the war based on the results of survivability tests of anti-tank obstacles using the then in service Finnish army of several dozen outdated light tanks "Renault", proved to be untenable in front of the power of the Soviet tank mass. In addition to the fact that the nadolbs moved from their place under the pressure of T-28 medium tanks, detachments of Soviet sappers often blew up the nadolby with explosive charges, thereby arranging passageways for armored vehicles in them. But the most serious drawback was undoubtedly a good view of the anti-tank lines from the enemy's distant artillery positions, especially on open and flat terrain, such as in the area of the Sj (Summa-yarvi) defense junction, where 11.02 was. 1940 the main defensive zone was broken through. As a result of repeated artillery shelling, the nadolbs were destroyed and there were more and more passages in them.
Between the granite anti-tank nadolb there were rows of barbed wire (2010) Blockages of stones, barbed wire and in the distance the SJ-5 pillbox covering the road to Vyborg (winter 1940).
Terijoki government
On December 1, 1939, the newspaper Pravda published a message stating that the so-called People's Government had been formed in Finland, headed by Otto Kuusinen. In the historical literature, Kuusinen's government is usually referred to as "Terijoki", because after the outbreak of the war it was located in the city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk). This government was officially recognized by the USSR.
On December 2, negotiations were held in Moscow between the government of the Democratic Republic of Finland, headed by Otto Kuusinen, and the Soviet government, headed by VM Molotov, at which the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship was signed. Stalin, Voroshilov and Zhdanov also took part in the negotiations.
The main provisions of this agreement corresponded to the requirements that the USSR had previously presented to Finnish representatives (transfer of territories on the Karelian Isthmus, sale of a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, lease to Hanko). The exchange provided for the transfer of significant territories to Finland in Soviet Karelia and monetary compensation. The USSR also pledged to support the Finnish People's Army with weapons, assistance in the training of specialists, etc. The agreement was concluded for a period of 25 years, and, if a year before the expiration of the agreement, none of the parties announced its termination, it was automatically renewed. for 25 years. The treaty entered into force from the moment of its signing by the parties, and ratification was planned "as soon as possible in the capital of Finland - the city of Helsinki."
In the following days, Molotov met with officials from Sweden and the United States, at which the recognition of the People's Government of Finland was announced.
It was announced that the previous government of Finland had fled and, therefore, no longer ruled the country. The USSR declared in the League of Nations that from now on it would negotiate only with the new government.
RECEPTION Comrade MOLOTOV OF THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR OF WINTER
Accepted comrade. Molotov, on December 4, the Swedish envoy, Mr. Winter, announced the desire of the so-called "Finnish government" to begin new negotiations on an agreement with the Soviet Union. Comrade Molotov explained to Mr. Winter that the Soviet government did not recognize the so-called "Finnish government" which had already left the city of Helsinki and headed in an unknown direction, and therefore no question could now be raised about any negotiations with this "government". The Soviet government recognizes only the people's government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, has concluded an agreement with it on mutual assistance and friendship, and this is a reliable basis for the development of peaceful and favorable relations between the USSR and Finland.
V. Molotov signs an agreement between the USSR and the Terijoki government. Standing: A. Zhdanov, K. Voroshilov, I. Stalin, O. Kuusinen
The "people's government" was formed in the USSR from the Finnish communists. The leadership of the Soviet Union believed that the use in propaganda of the fact of the creation of a "people's government" and the conclusion of a mutual assistance treaty with it, testifying to friendship and alliance with the USSR while maintaining Finland's independence, would make it possible to influence the Finnish population, increasing corruption in the army and in the rear.
Finnish People's Army
On November 11, 1939, the formation of the first corps of the "Finnish People's Army" (originally the 106th Mountain Rifle Division), called "Ingermanlandia", began, which was staffed by Finns and Karelians who served in the troops of the Leningrad Military District.
By November 26, there were 13,405 people in the corps, and in February 1940 - 25 thousand servicemen who wore their national uniform (sewn from khaki cloth and looked like the Finnish uniform of the 1927 model; claims that it was a trophy uniform of the Polish army , erroneous - only part of the overcoats were used from it).
This "people's" army was supposed to replace the occupying units of the Red Army in Finland and become the military support of the "people's" government. "Finns" in confederates held a parade in Leningrad. Kuusinen announced that they will be given the honor of hoisting the red flag over the presidential palace in Helsinki. The Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b) prepared a draft instruction "How to start the political and organizational work of the communists (note: the word" communists "is crossed out by Zhdanov) in the areas liberated from white rule", which indicated practical measures to create popular front in the occupied Finnish territory. In December 1939, this instruction was applied in work with the population of Finnish Karelia, but the withdrawal of Soviet troops led to the curtailment of these measures.
Despite the fact that the Finnish People's Army was not supposed to participate in hostilities, from the end of December 1939, FNA units began to be widely used to solve combat missions. Throughout January 1940, the scouts of the 5th and 6th regiments of the 3rd SD FNA carried out special sabotage missions in the sector of the 8th Army: they destroyed ammunition depots in the rear of the Finnish troops, blew up railway bridges, and mined roads. FNA units took part in the battles for Lunkulansaari and during the capture of Vyborg.
When it became clear that the war was dragging on, and the Finnish people did not support the new government, the Kuusinen government receded into the shadows and was no longer mentioned in the official press. When the Soviet-Finnish consultations on the issue of concluding peace began in January, it was no longer mentioned. On January 25, the government of the USSR recognizes the government in Helsinki as the legitimate government of Finland.
Leaflet for volunteers - Karelians and Finns, citizens of the USSR
Foreign volunteers
Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, detachments and groups of volunteers from different countries of the world began to arrive in Finland. The largest numbers of volunteers came from Sweden, Denmark and Norway (Swedish Volunteer Corps), as well as Hungary. However, among the volunteers were citizens of many other states, including England and the United States, as well as a small number of Russian White volunteers from the Russian General Military Union (ROVS). The latter were used as officers of the "Russian People's Detachments" formed by the Finns from among the prisoners of the Red Army. But since the work on the formation of such detachments was started late, already at the end of the war, before the end of hostilities, only one of them (numbering 35-40 people) managed to take part in hostilities.
Preparing for the offensive
The course of hostilities revealed serious gaps in the organization of command and control and supply of troops, poor preparedness of the command staff, and the lack of specific skills among the troops necessary for waging war in winter in Finland. By the end of December, it became clear that fruitless attempts to continue the offensive would lead nowhere. There was a relative calm at the front. Throughout January and early February, there was a strengthening of troops, replenishment of material reserves, reorganization of units and formations. Subdivisions of skiers were created, methods of overcoming mined terrain, obstacles, methods of dealing with defensive structures were developed, personnel were trained. For the assault on the Mannerheim Line, the North-Western Front was created under the command of Army Commander 1st Rank Timoshenko and member of the Leningrad Military Council Zhdanov.
Timoshenko Semyon Konstaetinovich Zhdanov Andrey Alexandrovich
The front included the 7th and 13th armies. In the border areas, a tremendous amount of work was carried out to hastily build and re-equip communication lines for the uninterrupted supply of the army in the field. The total number of personnel was increased to 760.5 thousand people.
For the destruction of the fortifications on the "Mannerheim Line" divisions of the first echelon were assigned destruction artillery groups (AR) consisting of from one to six divisions in the main directions. In total, these groups included 14 divisions, in which there were 81 guns of 203, 234, 280 mm caliber.
203 mm howitzer "B-4" mod. 1931 year
Karelian Isthmus. Combat map. December 1939 "Black Line" - Mannerheim Line
During this period, the Finnish side also continued to replenish troops and supply them with weapons coming from the allies. In total, during the war, 350 aircraft, 500 guns, more than 6 thousand machine guns, about 100 thousand rifles, 650 thousand hand grenades, 2.5 million shells and 160 million cartridges were delivered to Finland [source not specified 198 days]. About 11.5 thousand foreign volunteers, mostly from Scandinavian countries, fought on the side of the Finns.
Finnish autonomous skier squads armed with machine guns
Finnish machine gun M-31 "Suomi":
TTD "Suomi" M-31 Lahti
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Applicable cartridge |
9x19 Parabellum |
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Sighting line length |
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Barrel length |
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Weight without cartridges |
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Weight of a box magazine for 20 cartridges empty / loaded |
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Weight of a box magazine for 36 cartridges empty / loaded |
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Weight of a box magazine for 50 rounds empty / loaded |
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Mass of a disk magazine for 40 rounds empty / loaded |
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Mass of a disk magazine for 71 cartridges empty / loaded |
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Rate of fire |
700-800 rpm |
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Bullet muzzle velocity |
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Sighting range |
500 meters |
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Magazine capacity |
20, 36, 50 rounds (box) 40, 71 (disc) |
At the same time, fighting continued in Karelia. The formations of the 8th and 9th armies, operating along the roads in continuous forests, suffered heavy losses. If in some places the achieved lines were held, in others the troops retreated, in some places even to the border line. The Finns widely used the tactics of partisan warfare: small autonomous detachments of skiers armed with machine guns attacked the troops moving along the roads, mainly in the dark, and after the attacks they went into the forest, where the bases were equipped. Snipers inflicted heavy losses. According to the firm opinion of the Red Army (however, refuted by many sources, including Finnish), the most dangerous were snipers - "cuckoos" who fired from trees. The formations of the Red Army that had broken forward were constantly surrounded and bursting back, often abandoning equipment and weapons.
The Battle of Suomussalmi was widely known, in particular, the history of the 44th Division of the 9th Army. From December 14, the division advanced from the Vazhenvar area along the road to Suomussalmi to the aid of the 163rd division surrounded by Finnish troops. The advance of the troops was completely unorganized. Parts of the division, stretched out along the road, were repeatedly surrounded by the Finns during January 3-7. As a result, on January 7, the division's advance was stopped, and its main forces were surrounded. The situation was not hopeless, since the division had a significant technical advantage over the Finns, but division commander A.I. Vinogradov, regimental commissar Pakhomenko and chief of staff Volkov, instead of organizing defense and withdrawing troops from the encirclement, fled themselves, leaving the troops. At the same time, Vinogradov gave the order to leave the encirclement, abandoning equipment, which led to the abandonment of 37 tanks, more than three hundred machine guns, several thousand rifles, up to 150 vehicles, all radio stations, the entire convoy and horse train on the battlefield. More than a thousand people from among those who escaped from the encirclement were wounded or frostbitten, some of the wounded were taken prisoner, since they were not taken out while fleeing. Vinogradov, Pakhomenko and Volkov were sentenced to death by a military tribunal and shot publicly in front of the division's formation.
On the Karelian Isthmus, the front stabilized by December 26. Soviet troops began thorough preparations for breaking through the main fortifications of the "Mannerheim Line", conducted reconnaissance of the defensive zone. At this time, the Finns unsuccessfully tried to disrupt the preparation of a new offensive by counterattacks. So, on December 28, the Finns attacked the central units of the 7th Army, but were repulsed with heavy losses. On January 3, 1940, at the northern tip of the island of Gotland (Sweden) with 50 crew members, a Soviet submarine S-2 under the command of Lieutenant Commander I.A. The S-2 was the only RKKF ship lost by the USSR.
The crew of the submarine "S-2"
On the basis of the directive of the Headquarters of the Main Military Council of the Red Army No. 01447 of January 30, 1940, the entire remaining Finnish population was subject to eviction from the territory occupied by Soviet troops. By the end of February, 2,080 people were evicted from the regions of Finland occupied by the Red Army in the battle zone of the 8th, 9th, 15th armies, of which: men - 402, women - 583, children under 16 - 1095. All resettled Finnish citizens were accommodated in three villages of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic: in the Interposelka of the Pryazhinsky district, in the village of Kovgora-Goymae, Kondopozhsky district, in the village of Kintezma, Kalevala district. They lived in barracks and were obliged to work in the forest in logging. They were allowed to return to Finland only in June 1940, after the end of the war.
February offensive of the Red Army
On February 1, 1940, the Red Army, pulling up reinforcements, resumed the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus along the entire width of the front of the 2nd Army Corps. The main blow was delivered in the direction of Sum. Artillery preparation also began. From that day, every day for several days, the troops of the North-Western Front under the command of S. Timoshenko rained down 12 thousand shells on the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line. The Finns answered rarely, but accurately. Therefore, the Soviet artillerymen had to abandon the most effective direct fire and conduct from closed positions and mainly in areas, since the reconnaissance of targets and adjustments were poorly adjusted. Five divisions of the 7th and 13th armies carried out a private offensive, but failed to succeed.
On February 6, an offensive began on the Summa strip. In the following days, the front of the offensive expanded to the west and east.
On February 9, the commander of the troops of the North-Western Front, Army Commander 1st Rank S. Timoshenko, sent directive No. 04606 to the troops. According to it, on February 11, after a powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the North-Western Front should go on the offensive.
On February 11, after ten days of artillery preparation, the general offensive of the Red Army began. The main forces were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. In this offensive, together with land units The ships of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga military flotilla, created in October 1939, operated on the North-Western Front.
Since the attacks of Soviet troops on the Summa area did not bring success, the main blow was shifted to the east, to the direction of Lyakhde. In this place, the defending side suffered huge losses from artillery barrage and the Soviet troops managed to break through the defense.
In the course of three-day intense battles, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of defense of the "Mannerheim Line", introduced tank formations into the breakthrough, which began to develop success. By February 17, units of the Finnish army were withdrawn to the second line of defense, since there was a threat of encirclement.
On February 18, the Finns closed the Saimaa Canal with the Kivikoski dam and the next day the water began to rise in Kärstilänäjärvi.
By February 21, 7th Army had reached the second line of defense, and 13th Army - towards the main line of defense north of Muolaa. By February 24, units of the 7th Army, interacting with the coastal detachments of the Baltic Fleet sailors, captured several coastal islands. On February 28, both armies of the North-Western Front launched an offensive in the strip from Lake Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay. Seeing the impossibility of stopping the offensive, the Finnish troops retreated.
On final stage Operations 13th Army advanced in the direction of Antrea (present-day Kamennogorsk), 7th - on Vyborg. The Finns put up fierce resistance, but were forced to retreat.
(To be continued)
Mannerheim Line or Enckel Line ...Currently, there is no single accepted name for the Finnish fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, built in 1920-1939.
Most call them the Mannerheim line, but many call them the Enckel line. The Finns, however, under the Mannerheim Line mean the line at which the Soviet troops were stopped in 1939 (and it differs from the line of fortified areas, see Fig. 1). Also in use are such varieties as the Mannerheim lines of the first and second periods of construction. It is noteworthy that J. Kr. Was directly in charge of the construction of both stages. Fabricius, so that the fortifications can rightfully be called the line of Fabricius.
The name itself, the Mannerheim line, appeared in 1939, when the son of the former aide-de-camp of Mannerheim, Jorm Galen-Kallel, accompanying the journalists on the front line, called them so that it was picked up by journalists.
The construction of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus until 1940 took place in 2 stages. The first stage is 1920-1924, the second stage is 1937-1939.
The first stage of construction 1920-1924.
The need to build fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus became urgent immediately after the end of the civil war in 1918 in Finland. The main danger for the young state, according to the government, came from the Soviet Union. Therefore, the construction of defensive structures gave the following advantages:
- reliably covered the industrialized southern regions of Finland, and above all such major center like Vyborg;
- covered the shortest route to the capital;
- taking into account the fact that the army in Finland was small (due to the relative smallness of the population), the line gave
- concentrate more troops in other directions (for example, in Karelia), covering strategically important areas.
The presence of the fortification made it almost impossible for the lightning strike of the Red Army and gave Finland time to mobilize.
The search for the construction of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus began in 1918, but this all began to turn into reality after Major General Oskar Karlovich Enkel came to the post of Chief of the General Staff. The direct designers were Major, and later Lieutenant Colonel Zh.Zh. Gros-Kuassi (military expert from France, whose group at that time helped Finland) and Major J. Kr. Fabricius - former officer fortifier of the Russian Imperial Army. Construction began in 1920.
The Enkel Line passed through the following places: Rempetti -Humaljoki -Summa -oz.Muolaanjärvi -oz. Eyuryapyaanjärvi is a part of the Vuoksi-Taipale water system (now Klyuchevoe-Ermilovo-Soldatskoe-Lake Glubokoe-Lake Rakovye-Vuoksa-Solov'evo). In 1921, it was decided to build also a rear line covering Vyborg, on the borders of Nuoraa-Säinie-Luyukyla-Heinjoki (now Sokolinskoe Cherkasovo-Ozernoe-Veschevo).
The location was chosen in order to have time to mobilize reserves before the Red Army approached the fortifications.
The fortifications were a line of defense nodes stretched along the isthmus. Each node consisted of several concrete structures - long-term firing points (bunkers) and wood-earth firing points (bunkers), anti-personnel (barbed wire) and anti-tank (bunkers and anti-tank ditch) obstacles.
Also, trenches, dugouts, shelters, firing points, observation posts, etc. were built. The defense nodes were unevenly located, taking into account the most likely directions of a breakthrough.
A total of 168 concrete and reinforced concrete structures were built. Of these, 114 were machine-gun, 6 - gun, one combined machine-gun and gun pillboxes. The rest of the structures were shelters.
OK. Engel, as a student of the Russian school of fortification, tried to put into practice the principles developed by the Russian school of military engineers.
The scarcity of funds that were allocated did not have the best effect on the quality of the structures.
Initially, they abandoned machine-gun pillboxes with a flanking firing scheme, since much more structures were required than with frontal firing.
The quality of the concrete was not up to par, it was replete with aggregate (gravel, stones and sand). There were practically no metal fittings (with the exception of the artillery forts on Vuoksa). The quality and quantity of concrete made the structures of 1920-1924. period of construction are extremely vulnerable to artillery fire, especially in the area of embrasures.
All gun forts were built on the northern coast of Vuoksa Suvato (Sukhodolskoye), where it was believed that gun fire cover was more effective than machine gun cover. In fact, the cannons erected in the years 1922-1924 were installed only in 1939.
The remaining 114 firing points located in the wooded area were exclusively machine-gun. The overwhelming majority were one embrasure (for one machine gun). There were two embrasures, all two. All pillboxes were frontal fire, single-tier (one-tier). An exception is the Potoniem cannon fort and the shelter in the Kolmikesälä fortification.
Many machine-gun pillboxes had two rooms, the latter usually represented a shelter for 4-6 people, with two-tier bunks.
Ultimately, efforts to build a defensive line ruined Enckel's career. Under the pressure of criticism based on the shortcomings of the structures and on the "excessive" costs for them, on September 18, 1924, O.K. Engel resigned from the post of chief of the general. headquarters. The construction of the fortifications was suspended for many years.
The defensive line of the 1920-1924 model could be a significant obstacle for the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) in the 1920s, when it was not properly equipped with guns, tanks and bomber aircraft.
With a sharp increase in the equipment of the Red Army with new weapons in the 30s, the Enkel line was hopelessly outdated and required modernization. What the Finnish military leadership, led by Mannerheim, clearly understood.
The second stage of construction 1936-1939.
From 1924 to 1939, of any major work on the line, only the construction under the leadership of I. Kr. Fabricius with the forces of the sapper battalion of the Inkel fortified area.
A fundamentally new stage of construction began in 1936 with the appointment of Lieutenant Colonel I.Kr. Fabritius
head of the design and fortification department.
After inspecting and comprehending the state of the Enkel line at this time, the Finnish military leadership, headed by the head of the Council
Defense by Mannerheim, came to the conclusion that this does not pose a serious obstacle to the enemy.
The main directions in construction were as follows:
- Modernization of existing facilities. New casemates for flanking shooting, made of high-strength materials, were attached to the old pillboxes, the old walls were strengthened. Some old DOTs have been converted into hideouts.
- New designs of pillboxes with several embrasures for flanking fire and a barracks for the garrison have been developed.
- Several bunkers were built in the most dangerous areas, due to their size and cost, called "million".
- A new system of trenches, trenches, bunkers was built, positions for batteries were equipped.
- In connection with the change in the fire system, the engineering barriers were changed, the number of anti-tank bullets of the Irv was increased.
- The guns were finally delivered to the gun forts on the northern coast of Vuoksa.
To help local builders, on April 1, 1939, an assault force landed in the form of two Belgian fortifiers - Major General Badu and Captain of the Sapper Troops David. They brought with them drawings of the Belgian structures, which were taken into account in the construction.
The pillboxes of the "million type" consisted of two or three combat casemates leading flanking machine-gun fire (they are often called the "Le Bourget casemate").
The casemates are separated from each other by 30-40 meters and are connected by an underground passage. In the center there is a barracks-shelter for the garrison and service premises. For a certain period of time, the pillbox can lead an autonomous existence. On the roof there are 2-3 inspection steel domes with slits for observation. During shelling, to prevent bullets and shrapnel from entering, they were closed by a rotating drum curtain.
From the side of the enemy, the bunker was defended by a blank concrete wall, the thickness of which reached 2 meters. A cushion of earth and stones was poured onto the wall. In addition to the protective function, she well camouflaged the bunker, turning it, from the side of the enemy, into an ordinary hill.
From the side of the armored embrasures, 3-7 bolted armor plates, 60-70 mm thick, were attached to the concrete. Plates were purchased in the Czech Republic. The only exceptions were Sk11 (“Peltola”) and Sj5 (“Millionaire”), where the slabs were not structurally relied on.
At the beginning of the Winter War, the work was not fully completed, 48 new or modernized bunkers, 74 old one embrasure bunkers, 7 artillery forts and one combined machine-gun artillery were in combat condition on the main line of defense.
In total, there were 130 bunkers and bunkers on the line. The length of the line was 140 km from the Gulf of Finland to Ladoga
lakes. The distance from the border for the western flank is 16 km, for the eastern one 50 km.
The fortifications bore the name of the nearest settlement, several capital letters became a symbol for each structure.
The main line consisted of the following areas:
- "N" - Humaljoki [now Ermilovo]
- "Ink" - Inkela [no longer exists.]
- "K" - Kolkkala [now Malyshevo]
- "N" - Nyayukki [not existing now.]
- "Ko" - Kolmikeeyala [now not existing.]
- "Well" - Hulkeyala [no longer existing.]
- "Ka" - Karhula [now Dyatlovo]
- "Sj" - Summayarvi [not existing now.]
- "La" - Lyakhde [now not beings], awarded in Sk-Summakul [now not beings].
- "A" - Eyuryapää, named in Le-Leipäsuo [name preserved]
- "Mi" - Muola [now Mushroom]
- "Ma" - Sikniemi [no longer existing.]
- "Ma" - Myalkela [now Zverevo]
- "La" - Lauttaniemi [no longer existing.]
- "No" - Neisniemi [now Cape]
- "Ki" - Kiviniemi [now Losevo]
- "Sa" - Sakkola [now Gromovo]
- "Ke" - Kelya [now Port]
- "Tai" - Taipale [now Solovyovo]
The rear line covering Vyborg consisted of the following fortified areas:
- "R" - Rempetti [now Key]
- "Nr" - Nyarya [does not exist now]
- "Kai" - Kaipiala [no longer existing.]
- "Nu" - Nuoraa [now Sokolinskoe]
- "Kak" - Kakkola [now Sokolinskoe]
- "Le" - Leviyainen [not being.]
- "A.-Sa" - Ala-Saine [now Cherkasovo]
- "Y.-Sa" - Julia-Saine [now V.-Cherkasovo]
- "Not" - Heinjoki [now Veshchevo]
- "Ly" - Lyukyulya [now Ozernoye]
From the side of the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga, the fortifications were covered by coastal batteries.
In addition, areas that were subject to flooding were envisaged: concrete platinum in the fortified area Le on the Petrovka River (Peronjoki), timber-earth dams on the Gorokhovka and Aleksandrovka rivers (Rokkalanyoki and Tueppilyanjoki), a dam on the Volchya River (Saiyanjoki). In the event that the Soviet troops approached Vyborg, the locks of the Saimaa Canal were opened, with the flooding of a significant territory.
The most colorful description of the Mannerheim line was left by Major General Badu, some description wandered in Soviet sources, as one of the proofs of the inaccessibility of these fortifications:
“Nowhere in the world have natural conditions been so favorable for the construction of fortified lines as in Karelia. In this narrow place between two bodies of water - Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland - there are impenetrable forests and huge rocks. The famous "Mannerheim Line" was built from wood and granite, and where necessary - from concrete. The greatest fortress of the "Mannerheim Line" is given by anti-tank obstacles made in granite. Even twenty-five-ton tanks cannot overcome them. In granite, the Finns, using explosions, equipped machine-gun and gun nests,
who are not afraid of the most powerful bombs. Where there was a shortage of granite, the Finns did not regret concrete. "
In fact, the Finnish fortifications were far from perfect. The main reason is the scarcity of allocated funds from the Finnish budget, which was not rich at that time. This was partially offset by the competent location of the fortifications, their good camouflage, the small total length of the fortifications, the presence of natural barriers - forests, rivers, lakes and swamps (I personally did not observe the huge rocks mentioned by Badu in the fortification areas).
The main disadvantages were as follows:
- A small number of structures, and half of them are not concrete, but timber and earth. On the breakthrough line, these structures were exclusively machine-gun, and could not do anything with the tanks.
- Only their garrison was located in the pillboxes. Infantry filling units were located in the trenches, lived in tents. During the shelling, a few of the lucky ones could settle in concrete shelters. The rest were hiding in dugouts, made of wood and earth.
- They were strictly forbidden to hide in pillboxes.
- Although the garrison of the bunker, in general, is also not envious. Most of them were one-story. With a very big stretch, you can call two-story bunkers Sk-10, Sj-5 and the gun fort Patoniy - they had a small room on the second floor. "Millions" buildings had two or three levels (!), And not floors. Thus, the frontal wall and ceiling of the bunker, along which the fire of destruction was fired, was the corresponding wall and ceiling of the barracks. During the shelling, the eardrums burst at the garrison, blood was flowing from the ears and nose, some went crazy.
- The granite anti-tank fortifications "dragon teeth" praised by Badu in fact had little strength - they were easily destroyed by sappers, field artillery and even the guns of the T-28 tank, which could thus clear its way.
Thus, the Mannerheim Line was far from the perfect fortification of its time. But her competent disposition and stubbornness of the defenders did their job.
The territory located north of Leningrad and located between Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland has been called the Karelian Isthmus since ancient times.
In ancient times, there was a direct waterway from Lake Ladoga to the Gulf of Finland along the Vuoksi River through the northwestern part of the Karelian Isthmus. Along this route, the population of the Ladoga area and the northern part of the Karelian Isthmus communicated with the Gulf of Finland and further with the Baltic Sea. Near the confluence of the Vuoksi River into Lake Ladoga, a settlement arose, which received the name Korela, which later had the names Kexholm, Kyakisalmi, Priozersk.
The Karelians were the ancient population of the Karelian Isthmus. Since ancient times, the Karelians have entered into intercourse with their southern neighbors - the eastern Slavs of the Novgorod land. Soon after registration the old Russian state, Karelians became part of it and forever linked their fate with the great Russian people.
In the XII and XIII centuries, the small Karelian village of Korela turns into a city and establishes close political, economic and cultural ties with the northwestern Russian city of Novgorod.
Through Korela, mutually beneficial trade of the Karelian lands with Novgorod and further with other regions of Russia is carried out. The main commodities in this trade were the wealth of the northern forests.
The town of Korela became the administrative center of the Korela land, subject to Novgorod.
From the end of the 13th century, Swedish expansion began on the Karelian Isthmus. In 1293, Swedish knights landed on the shores of the Gulf of Finland at the western end of the Vuoksinsky waterway and founded the city of Vyborg. In 1295, the Swedes captured the town of Korela and built fortifications there. However, the Karelians, together with the Novgorodians, again liberated the city, destroyed the fortifications and captured the Swedish garrison.
In 1310, the Novgorodians built a new fortress in Korela, and although the struggle for the Karelian Isthmus continued for several decades, possessing the powerful Korela fortress and the support of the Karelian population, the Russians managed to defend the eastern half of the Karelian Isthmus from the Swedes.
At the end of the 15th century, all Russian lands united into a Russian centralized state headed by Moscow. Together with Novgorod and its vast possessions, the city of Korela with the surrounding Karelian land became part of the Russian state.
In 1580, the Swedish government began an operation to seize the Russian border regions. In November 1580, the Swedes besieged and captured the Korela fortress and captured the entire Karelian Isthmus.
At the beginning 17th century Taking advantage of the sharply aggravated class struggle in Russia and the brewing peasant war, the neighboring feudal states of Poland and Sweden organized an armed intervention in order to seize Russian lands.
Weakened by a long internal struggle and intervention, Russia was forced in 1617 to conclude a difficult Stolbovsky treaty with Sweden, according to which the captured Russian lands adjacent to the sea - the banks of the Neva and the Gulf of Finland, as well as the city of Korela with the Korelsky district passed into the hands of Sweden. Korela was renamed Kexholm by the Swedes.
Instead of Russian and Karelian residents, a new population began to appear in the city, which moved from Finland - Finnish traders, artisans and other classes. On the territory of Korelsky district, the Swedes established a difficult feudal regime, the oppression of the Swedish state and the Swedish landowners. Karelian peasants began to abandon their homes and leave for Russian possessions.
At the beginning of the 17th century, Peter I began a war with the Swedes for access to the Baltic Sea. The Russians reclaimed the mouth of the Neva River, where the city of St. Petersburg, the future capital of Russia, was founded in 1703.
From that time on, an acute question arose of ensuring the security of St. Petersburg from the attack of the Swedes. Soon, Narva and Dorpat were taken on the western approaches to it, and the Swedish troops were thrown back into the Baltic. Nevertheless, the northern approaches to the new capital and the Karelian Isthmus were still in the hands of the Swedes. Relying on fortresses located on the isthmus - Vyborg and Kexholm, the Swedes kept Petersburg under a constant threat of attack.
After a decisive victory at Poltava in 1709, Russian troops launched an offensive on the shores of the Baltic.
In the spring of 1710, Peter I began an operation to capture the Karelian Isthmus. After a three-month siege, the Vyborg fortress fell, and after a two-month siege, the Kexholm fortress was taken.
Under a peace treaty with Sweden in 1721, the return of the Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg and Kexholm to Russia was finally secured.
In 1910, to commemorate the 200th anniversary of this victory, a monument to Peter I was erected on a high cliff by the sea in the city of Vyborg.
As a result of the Russian-Swedish war of 1808-1809, Finland was annexed to Russia and became part of Russian Empire under the name "The Grand Duchy of Finland".
Knowing that the Finnish population for centuries was under the rule of Sweden and was exposed to Swedish propaganda, which instilled in the Finnish people a feeling of enmity towards Russia, the tsarist government decided to grant the annexed territory of Finland autonomy rights, thereby preserving local laws and customs so that the population of Finland did not resist new government and so that this territory does not become a hotbed of unrest and uprisings on the outskirts of the Russian capital.
In December 1811, Alexander I presented Finland with the Karelian Isthmus and the Vyborg province belonging to Russia with the cities of Vyborg and Kexholm. Almost the entire territory of the Karelian Isthmus up to the Sestra River and the present station Orekhovo went to Finland. The Finnish administration appeared on this territory, the composition of the population changed. The city of Vyborg was renamed Viipuri, and Kexholm - Kyakisalmi.
On December 18, 1917, the Soviet government granted independence to Finland at the request of the Finnish government. Its border with Soviet Russia was established in the southern part of the Karelian Isthmus from the Beloostrov station in the vicinity of the Rasuli station (Orekhovo) and to Lake Ladoga along the previously existing border of the Grand Duchy of Finland.
In the area where the border passed, there are a number of historical sites, such as Mednoe Lake, on which the dam of a copper smelter remains, which operated in the 18th century to melt bells into tools. The height at which Peter I made peace with the Swedes was called "Peace here". Over time, the name was transformed and turned into "Mertut".
After Finland gained independence by the decision of the government of the young Soviet republic in December 1917, Finnish reactionaries tied their fate with the enemies of the Soviet Union.
In 1918, the Finnish government appealed to the reactionary German government for armed assistance to suppress the revolutionary uprising of the workers and peasants of Finland.
In the spring and summer of 1918, the Finnish White Guards took part in the Entente campaign against Petrograd.
In 1924-1925. under the leadership of foreign specialists, mainly British, the Finnish army was reorganized, in addition, a new system of its equipment was developed.
Considering that Leningrad was at a distance of 32 kilometers from the border with Finland and, bearing in mind Finland's militaristic preparations, the question of strengthening the northern border of the Soviet state became very acute.
On the basis of the decision of the Soviet government, the People's Commissariat of Defense, by order No. 90/17 of March 19, 1928, created a management of military construction work for the construction of the Karelian fortified area under the command of brigade engineer Yakovlev within the boundaries: Lake Ladoga - Gulf of Finland, along the state border.
October 12, 1928 is considered the birthday of the Karelian fortified region. It was one of the first fortified areas created on the northwestern borders of our state.
The deployment and construction of military installations, the formation of units took place under the direct supervision of the hero of the Civil War M.N. Tukhachevsky, who was at that time the commander of the Leningrad Military District.
The secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the Bolshevik Party, Sergei Mironovich Kirov, and the party organizations of Leningrad provided great assistance in the construction.
Workers of Leningrad enterprises, united in detachments, mainly communists and Komsomol members, took part in the construction of military installations.
Since 1930, the cover of the state border on the Karelian Isthmus was assigned to the Karelian UR, reinforced by a separate artillery brigade.
FINLAND'S PREPARATIONS FOR WAR WITH THE USSR
Military construction work in Finland was carried out with funds from England, France, Sweden, Germany and the United States, under the guidance of the largest specialists of these countries.
Finland was visited by ministers of war and chiefs of general staff of large European states.
Such voyages especially intensified during the European crisis in 1938-1939, when World War II was already underway in most of Europe.
In 1938, the German military-technical commission and the commander of the Swedish engineering forces, General Alin, visited Finland, in 1939 - the commander-in-chief of the British army W. Kirk, the Swedish minister of war P.E.Scheld and the chief of the general staff of the German ground forces, General F. Halder.
General Kirk, according to the testimony of the British public figure D. Pritt, expressed satisfaction with the intensified preparation of Finland for the anti-Soviet war. He was especially satisfied with the Mannerheim line, consisting of three fortification strips and two intermediate strips with a total length of up to 90 kilometers and numbering 296 long-term reinforced concrete and 897 granite structures, some of which could withstand the hit of 152-mm and 203-mm shells.
All this indicated that the Finnish government was concerned not about establishing good-neighborly relations with the USSR, but about preparing for the participation of its country in the anti-Soviet war as part of any European coalition.
It is clear that in conditions of aggravated military-political relations in Europe, the Soviet Union could not remain indifferent to what was planned on its borders.
Finland's military preparations, in which the aggressive imperialist states were interested, were intended to create a springboard for the war with the USSR.
In 1938, the Finnish reactionary circles began secretly remilitarizing the Åland Islands, although according to the international convention of 1921 Finland was obliged not to arm them.
The Soviet government was worried about the situation on the Soviet-Finnish borders. In April 1938, the Soviet embassy in Helsinki informed the Finnish government of the urgent need to improve Soviet-Finnish relations and take measures that would strengthen the security of both the Soviet Union and Finland.
The Finnish government recognized this formulation of the question as natural and agreed to the appropriate negotiations. At this time, the governments of England, France, Sweden and Germany took all measures to disrupt the negotiations between the USSR and Finland and prevent the signing of the agreement.
The Export-Import Bank of the USA gave Finland a loan of $ 10 million at that time. Help from Finland was also promised by the Western European states.
During the negotiations in Moscow, a member of the Finnish government E. Erkko at a meeting of the Foreign Commission of the Seim said: “We will not make any concessions to the Soviet Union and will fight at all costs, England, America and Sweden promised to support us ".
On October 13 and 14, 1939, the mobilization of reserve troops was announced in Finland and general labor service was introduced.
The evacuation of the population began from the city of Helsinki, Vyborg, Tampere, the Karelian Isthmus zone and the coast of the Gulf of Finland.
By the end of November, Finland had deployed its troops on the border of the USSR. These troops consisted of 9 infantry divisions, 5 infantry brigades, 5 separate infantry regiments, 2 ranger battalions and one cavalry brigade.
In addition, Finland had trained reserves of 300-400 thousand people, including 100 thousand Shchutskorites (Finnish fascists).
The naval force had 29 different ships, while the air force had 270 aircraft.
The Finnish command hoped to pin down the main forces of the Red Army on the Mannerheim Line before receiving effective military assistance from the Western states, after which, together with the Allied troops, to launch a counteroffensive and transfer hostilities to Soviet soil.
Proceeding from this, the main forces of Finland under the command of General Esterman concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. The operational formation of Esterman's army consisted of 3 echelons. In the first echelon, 24 separate battalions and a cavalry brigade were deployed to cover the obstacle zone. In the 2nd echelon, on the main zone of fortifications - the Mannerheim Line, there were the 4th, 5th, 10th and 11th Infantry Divisions.
In the 3rd echelon, units of the 6th and 8th infantry divisions deployed in the second (rear) defensive zone. The towns of Viipuri (Vyborg), Kyakisalmi (Keksholm) and Sortavala were covered by jaeger battalions and detachments of the Shchutskorites.
At the negotiations in Moscow, the Soviet government proposed to Finland to move the state border on the Karelian Isthmus 120 km to the north, and instead of the territory extending to the Soviet Union, Finland received the territory of Karelia twice as large.
However, the Finnish delegation did not show compliance, and on November 28, 1939, the USSR denounced the non-aggression pact concluded with it and recalled its diplomatic representatives. The Soviet government at that time gave the order to the main command of the Red Army and the Navy to be ready for any surprises and immediately stop possible forays by the Finnish military.
SITUATION AT THE BORDER OF THE KAREL Isthmus
BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF MILITARY ACTIONS IN 1939
In 1929, military installations were built along the front edge of the defense, and in the same year, the commandant's office of the Karelian fortified region was formed, the 15th and 17th separate machine-gun battalions (each six-crew - five machine-gun companies, the sixth company - economic) and 151- and I separate company communication.
The commandant's office of the Karelian fortified area was located in Leningrad in the Peter and Paul Fortress. A.A. Inno (Finn, former commander of the Petrograd International Military School) was appointed commandant of KaUR, A.V. Blagodatov was appointed chief of staff.
The 15th separate pulbat occupied the area from Lake Ladoga to Lembalovo, the headquarters was located in Agalatovo (in 1935 the headquarters of the 15th pulbat moved to Kuyvozi).
The 17th separate pulbat occupied the Lembalovo - Elizavetinka - Sestroretskiy Kurort area, the battalion headquarters in Levashovo.
In 1932, the construction of the Mertut substation began to provide light and ventilation for military installations and electrify barriers.
In 1936, the civilian population was evicted from the area occupied by the fortified area.
In connection with the intensified military training on the Karelian Isthmus on the part of Finland, the Soviet state was also forced to take measures to further strengthen the northern border.
In 1935-1936, the construction of military towns began - Garbolovo, Oselki, Chernaya Rechka, Sertolovo I and II. The 90th rifle division from Ukraine and the 70th rifle division from the Volga Military District were transferred to this area. The 19th rifle corps was also organized, which included, in addition to the 90th and 70th rifle divisions, the 24th rifle division. In the fall of 1936, the defense of the Karelian Isthmus was assigned to the 19th rifle corps. The 90th Infantry Division covered a strip of the region from Lake Ladoga to Lake Lembalovskoye. The headquarters was located in Oselki. The 70th Infantry Division covered the strip from Elizavetinka to the Gulf of Finland. The headquarters was located in the village of Chernaya Rechka. The reserve 24th Infantry Division was stationed in Leningrad. The 19th Rifle Corps was reinforced with two corps artillery regiments.
In 1936, the commandant's office for the fortified area was abolished. The construction of new structures and fortifications continued. The 15th and 17th separate pulbats were assigned to rifle divisions in accordance with the areas they occupied.
In July 1938 and October 1939, on the basis of the 90th and 70th rifle divisions, the 7th and 106th fortress separate pulbats were formed.
The military-political situation was heating up. The Soviet government was forced to take urgent measures to ensure the security of the northwestern borders.
In September-October 1939, when Nazi Germany attacked Poland, Soviet government invited the Baltic states to conclude treaties of mutual assistance, and such treaties were signed.
Soviet troops entered these countries and began to create air and naval bases for the defense of our neighbors. At this time, the British and German instructors in Finland were intensively preparing the Finnish troops for the war with the USSR.
WAR WITH FINLAND NOVEMBER 30, 1939 TO MARCH 13, 1940
The provocative forays of the Finnish military on the border intensified. In November 1939, provocative shots of the Finns thundered in the area of the village of Mainila, where our units were located - four soldiers were killed, nine were wounded.
On November 30, 1939, the troops of the Leningrad Military District launched an offensive on the Karelian Isthmus. As part of the rifle divisions, there were also serf machine-gun battalions. They were withdrawn from the line, and one or two companies were left to guard the structures and property under the command of the deputy commander of the 70th rifle division, Colonel Lazarenko.
This is how one of the participants in the Finnish campaign, junior political instructor Comrade Katasonov, recalls the beginning of the events.
“On the afternoon of November 29, a combat order was received. Intensive preparation for the campaign began. Late in the evening the headquarters reported: "It was ordered to cross the border tomorrow, November 30th." At night, there were party and Komsomol meetings, and then a rally. I had never seen such a meeting before. The speeches are short, clear, precise, words coming from the heart. And by itself, not a resolution was born, but a solemn oath, born by a single impulse - to win. One by one, the fighters rise. In their speeches ardent love for the people, the party, an oath of allegiance to the Motherland.
This is how the night passes. It's still dark. The forest is noisy. Soldiers move silently to the border, silently occupy firing positions, choose cover, lie down at the machine guns. A light streak appeared on the horizon. The fighters are eagerly awaiting the signal to start the offensive. 7 hours 40 minutes. 7 hours 50 minutes. Carefully, so as not to make noise, people check the bolts of rifles, machine-gun belts. Commands are whispered. 8 ocloc'k. Rockets crash into the sky, illuminating the black tree trunks. At the same time, gun thunder rolls. Artillery preparation began. Shell explosions are visible on the Finnish side of the Sestra River. Lying in the snow, we watch the destruction wrought by our artillery.
8 hours 30 minutes. The artillery fire dies down. Suddenly, the silence is broken by the powerful hum of the engines of tanks and tractors. Infantry is following the tanks, artillery is moving. Under the onslaught of tanks, the Finns flee. They hastily mine roads along the route of our troops. The border post of the USSR - Finland is left behind. "
On the Karelian Isthmus, in the main direction, the 7th Army under the command of the 2nd rank commander LF Yakovlev delivered a blow to the Finnish army.
In the course of the outbreak of hostilities, the military council of the district, guided by the instructions of the High Command of the Red Army, concentrated its main efforts on the Karelian Isthmus. The troops north of Lake Ladoga were tasked with pinning the forces of Finland in this area, preventing the landing of the amphibious assault of the Western powers in the north of Finland.
The forces of the 7th Army were tasked with advancing along the highways and railways leading to Vyborg. The breakthrough in the 17 km sector was to be carried out by two rifle corps, reinforced by three tank brigades, one tank battalion and twenty artillery regiments. An auxiliary blow was delivered in the Kexholm direction.
On November 30, 1939, after a 30-minute artillery barrage, Soviet troops in the north launched an offensive and blocked the northern coast of Lake Ladoga for 10 days.
On the Karelian Isthmus, Soviet troops in the first days met stubborn resistance and by the end of the day advanced only five to six kilometers. Two days later, the 142nd Infantry Division and the 10th Tank Brigade approached the main zone of the Finnish defense - the Mannerheim Line. Other formations of the 7th Army reached her only on December 12.
The actions of the army were actively supported by the Baltic Fleet under the command of the 2nd rank flagship VF Tributs, as well as the Northern Fleet.
Marines occupied a number of islands located to the west of Kronstadt - Seiskari (Seskar), Lavansari (Powerful), Sursari (Gogland), Narvi (Nerva), Someri (Sommers), and in addition, the Finnish part of the Kalastayasaarento peninsula (Rybachiy and Middle ) in the Barents Sea. The fleet blocked Finland from the sea.
The battles in the foreground zone demanded tremendous physical and moral efforts from the personnel of the troops.
The Military Council of the Leningrad District decided to force the water line in the zone of the 142nd Infantry Division. For this, the 49th and 150th rifle divisions reinforced by artillery, united in a special group under the command of corps commander V. D. Grendal. She was supposed to cross the Taipalen-yoki (Burnaya) River and go to the rear of the Finnish fortifications, and the 142nd Infantry Division was supposed to cross the isthmus in the area of Lake Suvanto-jarvi (Sukhodolskoe) and the Vuoksi River at the Kiviniemi station (Losevo).
On December 6, 1939, Taipalen-yoki was forced with great difficulty, and six battalions of infantry were transferred there. However, it was not possible to build on the success further.
The offensive in the conditions of a wooded lake and the widespread use of various obstacles by the enemy in combination with natural boundaries demanded a great deal of effort, perseverance and heroism from the Soviet troops. Deep snow, up to two meters, excluded the advance of troops and especially equipment off the roads, and the paths suitable for movement were covered by Finnish troops and permanent structures.
The Finnish army already had machine guns at this time. The first period of the Soviet offensive revealed shortcomings in their training and management. Some units were not sufficiently trained to fight in these conditions. Despite the heroism and courage during the battles, overcoming obstacles by individual soldiers and commanders, it soon became clear that the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line could take a protracted nature and lead to unnecessary losses.
The offensive launched on December 7 in the Kiviniemi (Losevo) area was also unsuccessful. It was suspended, and the preparation of the troops for the general offensive began.
In December 1939, the formation of the 13th Army began.
To strengthen the leadership of the troops on the Karelian Isthmus, the commander of the 7th army was appointed commander of the 2nd rank KA Meretskov, members of the Military Council - AA Zhdanov and divisional commissar NN Vashugin. Chief of Staff - brigade commander G.S. Isserson. Corps commander V.D.Grendal was appointed commander of the 13th Army, and Corps Commissar A.I. Zaporozhets was appointed a member of the Military Council.
To combine the actions of both armies, the North-Western Front was formed, headed by the commander of the 1st rank S.K. Timoshenko. The Military Council included A. A. Zhdanov, Chief of Staff, 2nd Rank Army Commander I. V. Smorodinov, Air Force Commander E. S. Ptukhin, and Corps Commissar A. N. Melnikov.
The headquarters of the Leningrad district, by decision of the Headquarters, was reorganized into the headquarters and management of the North-Western Front.
To prepare troops for action in winter on skis in lacustrine-wooded areas in severe frosts and to gain experience in storming long-term lines and reinforced concrete structures, the Main Military Council decided to start a comprehensive training of troops.
The front received the task of preparing offensive operations in order to break through the Mannerheim line, defeat the main forces of the White Finns on the Karelian Isthmus, with the subsequent exit of Soviet troops to the line Kexholm (Priozersk) - Antrea station (Kamennogorsk) - Vyborg.
The main blow was delivered in the Vyborg direction, the auxiliary ones - in the Kexholm direction and across the Vyborg Bay.
To carry out the operation were involved:
13th Army consisting of:
nine divisions, six reserve regiments of the High Command, three corps artillery regiments, two armored vehicle divisions, one tank brigade, two separate tank battalions, five air regiments and one cavalry regiment;
7th Army:
twelve divisions, seven artillery regiments of the High Command's reserve, four corps artillery regiments, two divisions of armored vehicles, five tank and one rifle-machine gun brigades, ten air regiments, two separate tank battalions;
Reserve group Rates consisting of:
three rifle divisions, a tank brigade and a cavalry corps.
For almost a month, Soviet troops carefully prepared to break through the Mannerheim Line. Leningrad factories provided the front troops with new means of struggle and protection - mine detectors, armored shields, armored vehicles, and sanitary drags.
Work was done to prepare the starting line for the offensive.
The carrying capacity of the railways of the Leningrad junction increased, new roads and bridges were built, and the network of unpaved roads was improved. Trenches were laid in the direction of enemy pillboxes, trenches were dug, command and observation posts were built, firing positions for artillery, starting positions for tanks and infantry were prepared.
During the training period, combat operations at the front did not stop. On the basis of intelligence, artillery and aviation were destroying the fortifications of the Finns' main line of defense. Much of the Mannerheim Line's structures were destroyed by artillery fire before the start of the decisive offensive.
In addition to destructive actions, massive methodical fire exhausted the enemy.
The artillery of the 7th Army alone consumed about twelve thousand shells and mines daily.
In addition, in the final training period from 1 to 10 February, private operations were carried out by the 100th, 113th and 42nd rifle divisions of the 7th army, as well as the 150th and 49th rifle divisions of the 13th army. with the aim of thorough reconnaissance of the enemy defense and disorientation regarding the timing of the main attack, checking the readiness of the troops for the upcoming offensive.
By the end of January 1940, preparations for the offensive were largely completed. On February 3, 1940, the Front Military Council approved the final version of the operation plan. The 13th Army was tasked with breaking through the fortified zone from the mouth of the Taipalen-yoki (Burnaya) River to Lake Muolan-Yarvi (Glubokoe), followed by an offensive on the line Kexholm (Priozersk) - Antrea station (Kamennogorsk), delivering the main blow with the left flank between lakes Vuoksi-järvi and Muolan-järvi by forces of five rifle divisions and a tank brigade with the support of six artillery regiments.
An auxiliary strike was planned to be delivered on the left flank by two rifle divisions. In the center of the army, in order to pin down the enemy, it was supposed to advance with the forces of one division. The immediate task of the army was to reach the line Lokhi-yoki (Solovyevo, on the shore of Lake Ladoga) - Purpua (area north of the central part of Lake Sukhodolskoye) - Lake Suvanto-Yarvi (Sukhodolskoye) - Ritasari (the area of the mouth of the Bulatnaya river) on the fourth or fifth day of the operation - Ilves (area north of Lake Glubokoe) (to a depth of twelve kilometers).
The 7th Army received the task of breaking through the enemy's fortified zone on the Muolan-Yarvi (Glubokoe) - Karhula (Dyatlovo) Lake sector, followed by an offensive on the Antrea station (Kamennogorsk) - Vyborg. The army delivered the main blow on its right flank on the Muolan-Yarvi-Karhula front with nine divisions, five tank and one rifle machine-gun brigade, supported by ten artillery regiments. An auxiliary blow was delivered on the left flank by two rifle divisions. The immediate task was to reach the Ilves line (area north of Lake Glubokoe) - Kamyarya (Gavrilovo) - Humola (Mokhovoe) station (ten to twelve kilometers deep) on the fourth or fifth day.
On February 11, 1940, after a powerful artillery barrage, the infantry and tanks of both armies, under the cover of a barrage of fire, launched an attack. The decisive stage of the battles has come. By February 14, units of the 7th Army (123rd Rifle Division) broke through the main line of the Finnish defense on the front six kilometers and to a depth of six to seven kilometers. By the end of February 16, the breakthrough in the zone of the 7th Army had reached a width of eleven to twelve kilometers and a depth of eleven kilometers.
In the zone of the 13th Army, units of the 23rd Rifle Corps approached the front edge of the fortified region of Muola - Ilves.
On February 16, the reserve divisions of the front were brought into battle on the main axis. In the afternoon, the Finns, unable to withstand the blow, retreated, leaving their positions from Muolan-jarvi to Karhul and west from Karhul to the Gulf of Finland.
On the morning of February 17, the troops of the 7th Army began to pursue the enemy. The pace of the offensive increased to six to ten kilometers a day. By February 21, Soviet units cleared the enemy from the western part of the Karelian Isthmus, the islands of Koivisto (Bjerke, Bolshoy Berezovy), Revonsari (Lisiy), Tiurin-sari (West Berezovy) and Piy-sari (North Berezovy).
The mobile groups of the 7th Army, advancing in front of the infantry, were stopped in front of the second line of the Finnish defense. On February 21, the front command ordered the main divisions to be withdrawn from the battle for rest and replenishment, to regroup the advancing troops, and to bring up reserves. On February 28, after the artillery barrage, our units went on the offensive again. Unable to withstand the onslaught, the Finnish troops began to retreat along the breakthrough front from Vuoksi to Vyborg Bay.
The troops of the 7th Army during February 28-29 broke through the second line of defense, and from March 1 to 3 they reached the approaches to Vyborg.
Inspired by the successes of the 7th Army, the 13th Army, forcing part of its forces in two places on the Vuoksi River, developed an attack on Kexholm (Priozersk), threatening to encircle two Finnish divisions. Other troops of this army went to Lake Noskuanselka (Bolshoye Graduevskoe), to the Noskuanselka-Repola region, cutting the Vyborg-Antrea (Kamennogorsk) railway. The 7th Army reached the Saimaa Canal, seizing the enemy's Vyborg grouping from the northeast.
Having crossed the Vyborg Bay, Soviet troops captured a bridgehead on its western coast along a front forty kilometers and a depth of thirteen kilometers, cutting off the Vyborg-Helsinki highway.
In early March, a crucial moment came for the Soviet troops - the battles for the city of Vyborg. The Finnish command attached great importance to the reliability of the defense of Vyborg. It hoped that measures to strengthen it would drag out the war and allow it to wait for active assistance from Western states. For this, Lieutenant General K.L.Esh, Chief of the General Staff, was put at the head of the troops defending Vyborg. In addition, at the end of February, the Finns blew up the sluices of the Saimaa Canal, flooded the outskirts of the city and areas in front of it for tens of square kilometers.
To encircle the enemy grouping and defeat it, the 10th and 28th Rifle Corps had to take a position west of the Saimaa Canal. The successful actions of the troops of the 7th Army created the conditions for the complete encirclement of Vyborg. On March 11, Soviet troops approached the Vyborg suburb of Karjala (named after Kirov). Despite the stubborn resistance of the enemy, on March 13, units of the 7th Infantry Division reached the prison and railway station. The division captured the eastern and southeastern regions of Vyborg. The fate of Vyborg was decided. Vyborg was taken.
Every day of continued hostilities brought Finland closer to a military disaster.
Having suffered a military defeat, the Finnish government turned to the Soviet government with a request for peace. On March 12, 1940, as a result of negotiations in Moscow, a peace treaty was signed. On March 13 at 12 o'clock, in accordance with the terms of the peace treaty, hostilities along the entire front were stopped. The peace treaty obliged Finland not to participate in coalitions hostile to the USSR.
The Finnish parts of the Kalastayasaarento Peninsula (Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas) were transferred to the Soviet Union. The USSR received a lease on the Hanko Peninsula for thirty years. The border on the Karelian Isthmus was moved 150 kilometers away from Leningrad.
The Karelian Isthmus, as an old Russian land, again returned to the composition of the Russian land.
V Soviet-Finnish war In 1939, units of the Red Army gained rich experience of combat operations in winter conditions of breaking through a powerful fortified area. This combat experience was also gained by units of the Karelian fortified region, which took the most active part from the beginning of preparation for hostilities until victory.
Much has been written about the valor, courage and heroism in these battles of the soldiers of the Red Army, but at least some examples of combat actions of the fortified area units should be noted. At the time of crossing the border, the calculation of the field power plant of the 30th separate electrical engineering company under the command of a junior military technician Lisunov Kuzma Evdokimovich distinguished themselves. On the instructions of the command, the group prepared for the destruction of equipment and communication lines of the enemy. At the bridge over the Sestra River, on the very border, at night, preparations were made for the operation. A field power plant was brought up and installed on the outskirts of the village of Aleksandrovka. In the morning, just before the start of hostilities, the electric current to the communication line in the Vyborg direction, all the enemy's telephone and telegraph equipment in the Rajajoki (Solnechnoye) and Terijoki (Zelenogorsk) areas were disabled. During this operation, the junior military technician Lisunov was awarded the order Krasnaya Zvezda, and the rest of the group - the medal "For Military Merit".
On December 15, 1939, two machine-gun platoons - Kutikhin and Sturova, together with rifle units, received an order to attack enemy firing points located on the northern shore of Lake Suvanto-Yarvi (Sukhodolskoye).
The units by their actions were supposed to divert the attention of the enemy and thereby provide an opportunity for the neighbor on the right to deliver the main blow to the enemy from the flank.
The path of the attackers passed along a snow-covered lake. Attack signal. Under a hail of bullets, the fighters rushed forward, but the attack drowned. Enemy fire pressed the soldiers to the ground. A few minutes later, junior lieutenant Shutikhin rose to his full height, dragging the fighters along with him. Bursting into the enemy's position, Shutikhin received a through wound in the thigh. The command of the platoon was taken over by his assistant Khrabrov. He also confidently and boldly led the platoon's actions and completed the combat mission to the end. The platoon of Junior Lieutenant Sturov also acted boldly and skillfully. Both officers were awarded the Order of the Red Star, and the squad leader Khrabrov was awarded the Medal For Courage.
Most Finns are hunters and excellent skiers. The command of the Finnish troops skillfully used these qualities of soldiers and officers to organize sabotage detachments and groups in order to penetrate our rear to organize sabotage, attacks on the columns of units, headquarters, and rear.
Subdivisions of machine-gun battalions of the fortified area were often used to cover the flanks and joints of units, to protect headquarters, rear services and important communications. They had to fight to destroy enemy sabotage groups.
One of the machine-gun companies under the command of Senior Lieutenant Zinghaus was surrounded. The path to the rear was cut off by the enemy sabotage group. It was necessary to reconnoiter the enemy's forces. A squad headed by junior lieutenant Bondarev expressed a desire to go to intelligence. The soldiers left early in the morning in white camouflage coats and, having walked about three kilometers, began to carefully enter the destroyed village. Suddenly, machine guns and machine guns crackled from behind the pipes and skeletons of houses. The squad turned into battle formation and entered the battle. The forces were unequal. The White Finns, seeing that there were not many fighters, surrounded them, but the fighters did not flinch, fought bravely to the end.
The platoon that came to the rescue was late. All seven people died a heroic death. Their names are: Junior Lieutenant L. V. Bondarev, squad leader V. V. Mankov, Red Army soldiers I. P. Kukushkin, V. Ya. Zhigalov, I. V. Luchin, Z. Sh. Khodyrov, I. I. Bogdanov. The memory of them remained forever in the hearts of the Soviet people.
There was such a case: under cover of a dark night, a group of White Finns surrounded the Red Army soldier Zanka. Enemies crept silently, but Zanku found them and, since they were already close, first set in motion hand grenades, and then, deploying a machine gun, opened fire. The enemy fled in panic into the forest. The Red Army soldier Zanku was wounded in this battle, but did not leave the machine gun and his combat post. For bravery and courage, he was awarded the medal "For Military Merit".
On January 13, 1940, a machine-gun platoon under the command of Lieutenant P.A. A group of White Finns by force up to the company, having hidden from the flank, attacked the platoon, with the aim of destroying the guards, breaking through to the headquarters, crushing it, taking prisoners and documents.
Having cut the connection and surrounded the platoon on three sides, the Finns, with a shout and noise, went on the attack. Platoon commander Ananich gave the command to take up a perimeter defense. The enemy was thrown back with grenades and machine-gun fire. Three times the enemies rose to attack, but each time they were met by heavy machine gun fire and grenade explosions. With heavy losses, the White Finns disappeared into the forest. Lieutenant Ananich was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for skillful actions, valor and bravery in defending the headquarters.
There were many other examples when the soldiers of the Karelian fortified area showed skill, ingenuity, courage, courage and devotion to the Motherland.
In the difficult conditions of a combat situation, the fighters of the UR divisions associated their best thoughts with the Communist Party. The communists were in the front ranks and in the most dangerous areas, by personal example they drew people to military exploits. The death of the heroes killed the junior political instructor Pavlotsky, the commissar of the 40th separate machine-gun battalion, the senior political instructor Panin, and the junior political instructor Antonov.
Many regular officers of the fortified area, platoon and company commanders who distinguished themselves in battles, were promoted during the Great Patriotic War to the posts of commanders of units of the fortified areas of the Leningrad Front. Among them are Podkopaev, Ostroumov, Kosarev, Khasanov, Levchenko, Shirokov, Gerasimov, Shalygin, Bataev, Shutikhin, Soloviev and others.
In connection with the movement of the state border, the 19th Rifle Corps changed its deployment. Its 142nd and 115th rifle divisions entered the section of the new border from Sortavala (exclusively) to Enso (Svetogorsk) (exclusively), to the left of their border in the section Enso - Gulf of Finland was covered by the 123rd and 43rd divisions of the 50th rifle corps.
At the turn of the Karelian fortified area in August 1940, the 22nd fortified area was formed, which included the 1st, 13th, 7th, 106th and 4th separate machine gun battalions, a communications battalion, and the 125th separate Sapper battalion, 30th and 33rd separate electrotechnical companies. Directorate of the 22nd SD is located in the village of Chernaya Rechka. Colonel Yermolin (died in early 1941) was appointed commandant, and brigade commissar Dranichnikov was the commissar.
In January 1941, by order of the Leningrad Military District, the 4th OPAB (battalion commander - Captain Sintsov) in full force with weapons (1119 people, 107 easel and 60 light machine guns) was withdrawn from the 22nd SD and transferred to the area north of Vyborg , where the construction of a new fortified line was completed at the Enso - Gulf of Finland line. The battalion became part of the 50th Rifle Corps, whose headquarters were located in the city of Vyborg. The 13th and 7th pulbats were transferred to the Rybachy Peninsula, and new ones were organized in their place. The Karelian Isthmus lived a peaceful life within the Soviet Union for only about 15 months.
PATRIOTIC WAR ON THE KARELIAN Isthmus
Already in 1940, when Germany began to prepare an attack on the USSR, alarming intelligence reports began to appear at the headquarters of the Leningrad district that the German troops occupying Norway were studying Russian, not Norwegian. Other scouts reported that the attack on Leningrad would take place in the spring of 1941.
On the territory of Finland, active preparations were made for military operations. Roads to the borders of the USSR were intensively built. In the border areas, prohibited zones were created, and free passage to the port cities located on the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia was prohibited.
From June 1, 1941, covert mobilization and transfer of troops to the Soviet border was carried out in Finland. German troops appeared in Finland.
Taking into account the situation, the Military Council of the district took measures aimed at increasing the readiness of our troops. On June 19, 1941, all the troops of the Leningrad District were alerted No. 2. The situation was becoming more and more alarming. At half past midnight on June 22, the Military Council received from Moscow a telegram from the People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union SK Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff GK Zhukov warning of the possibility of a German attack on the Soviet Union. At dawn on June 22, German troops, treacherously violating the 1939 treaty, began military action against the USSR.
In the north, Hitler's troops, together with Finnish troops, developed the Blue Arctic Fox plan, according to which the army of Nazi Germany, Norway, received the task of capturing Murmansk and Kandalaksha, and the Finnish troops, advancing between the Ladoga and Onega lakes and on the Karelian Isthmus, were to unite with the German troops on the Svir River and in the Leningrad region.
At 4:30 am on June 22, 1941, an order was received from the People's Commissar of Defense not to allow anything that could aggravate relations with Finland. By eight o'clock in the morning on June 22, 1941, at the headquarters of the Leningrad district, a directive was received from the People's Commissar of Defense regarding further actions:
"1. Troops by all means and means attack the enemy forces and destroy them in the areas where they violated the Soviet border. Until further notice, the ground troops will not cross the border.
2. Reconnaissance and combat aviation to establish the places of concentration of enemy aviation and the grouping of his ground forces ... Do not make raids on the territory of Finland and Romania until special instructions. "
The troops began to move to the defensive lines.
On June 24, the Northern Front was formed on the basis of the command and control and troops of the Leningrad Military District. The front commander was appointed Lieutenant General M.M. Popov, Chief of Staff - Major General D.N. Nikishev, members of the Military Council - Corps Commissar N.N.Klementyev, Divisional Commissar A.A. Kuznetsov and Brigade Commissar T.F. Bayonets.
On June 24, the Headquarters of the Main Command of the USSR Armed Forces informed the Military Councils of the Northern Front, Northern and Red Banner Baltic Fleets that German aviation was being concentrated in Finland to strike at Leningrad, Murmansk and Kandalaksha.
On June 25, in order to prevent an attack by enemy aviation on Leningrad, a preemptive air strike was delivered against 19 enemy airfields. There were 487 sorties, 130 enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground and 11 were shot down in the air. Air strikes against enemy airfields and troop concentrations continued in the following days.
At the beginning of 1941, Lieutenant General M.A.Popov was appointed commandant of the 22nd fortified area, and Colonel Ladygin was appointed chief of staff. By the beginning of World War II, units of the 22nd SD were deployed: 1st OPB - Nikulyasy - Peremyaki (headquarters in Kuyvozi), 63rd OPB - Lembalovo - Elizavetinka (headquarters in Agalatovo), 4th OPB - Copper Plant - Mertut (headquarters in the Mertuti area), the 106th OPB - Beloostrov - Sestroretsk (headquarters - Dibuny), the 125th separate sapper battalion - the Beloostrov area, the 22nd SD headquarters - the Black Rechka area.
By 1941, the construction of machine-gun structures (pillboxes), as well as artillery caponiers in the main directions, was completely completed, a command post of the UR was built, the construction of engineering and artillery depots and rear services was completed.
By June 1941, at the turn of the fortified area, the density of military structures was insignificant, there were large gaps between the nodes - from three to seven kilometers. The depth of the defense did not exceed one and a half to two kilometers. The anti-tank defense was very weak. The defense of the line was designed for a strong field filling.
As mentioned earlier, the 4th separate machine-gun battalion under the command of Captain Sintsov occupied the newly built structures from Enso to the Gulf of Finland. By the beginning of the war, the fortified area was fully developed and prepared for hostilities. At that time, violations at the border became more frequent. On June 18, in the area of Louko (Pogranichnoe) station (border station on the Vyborg-Helsinki railway), during a continuous combing of the area by military units, three saboteurs were found, two were killed during the arrest, the third was removed from a tree, where he put our military installations on the diagram and photographed them ...
During interrogation, the saboteur behaved arrogantly and boastfully declared: "Soon little Finland will do great things with his old friend."
On June 26, in the same area at 6 o'clock in the morning, a Finnish reinforced infantry battalion suddenly, without firing shots, attacked a border post in the area of a company stronghold of senior lieutenant Batayev. The calculation was to quietly destroy the border guards and seize military installations before their occupation by garrisons. At night, the personnel of the garrisons rested in the village, 200-300 meters from the structures, the bunkers were guarded by sentries.
The border guards found the enemy and opened fire. Upon alarm, the garrisons occupied the structures and repulsed the first attack with heavy machine-gun fire. Then the enemy opened fire on structures from 155-mm heavy guns, trying to destroy the structures. Under the cover of artillery fire, the Finns tried to drive a wedge on the flanks and infiltrate into the rear, but all their attempts were repelled by the fire of border guards and machine-gun units of the UR, deployed from other strongholds to these areas.
The company commander, senior sergeant Bataev, an Ossetian, energetic commander, skillfully guided the company’s actions in battle, unraveling the enemy’s plans in a timely manner. Lieutenant Smolensky especially distinguished himself in these battles. Despite heavy enemy fire, he always appeared in the most needed areas and by transferring part of the machine guns from structures to open areas eliminated the danger of bypassing, encircling and blocking structures from the rear.
The battle lasted 7 hours. By the approaching rifle units, the enemy was thrown back beyond the state border.
The next day, the Finnish units attacked a strong point on the northern outskirts of the city of Enso, but met with heavy fire from the military installations of the company of senior lieutenant Shalygin, they were forced to retreat abroad. However, some of the Finnish "cuckoos" infiltrated, bypassing the stronghold, into the city of Enso and occupied the territory of a warehouse of a paper mill. But this unit of the enemy was thrown back abroad. These were the first battles on the Karelian Isthmus, and units of the fortified area took an active part in them on the border of 1940.
In Hitler's plan "Barbarossa" the capture of Leningrad was assigned one of the first places. The political and military leaders of fascist Germany believed that the seizure of Leningrad, Kronstadt and the Murmansk railway would automatically entail the loss of the Baltic by the Soviet Union, lead to the death of the Baltic Fleet, sharply weaken the defensive potential of the Soviet armed forces and deprive the USSR of communications going inland from the ports of Barents and the White Seas. They believed that Leningrad would be taken by German troops by the end of July 1941.
After the successful attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR and two unsuccessful attempts to attack the Finnish army, the main command of the Finnish troops on July 1, 1941 began their third attempt in the north of Lake Ladoga. The Finnish troops were tasked with pinning down the Red Army units in the Sortavala and Vyborg directions. However, the enemy's attacks north of Lake Ladoga in the direction of Lakhdenpohja at the junction of the 23rd and 7th armies were also unsuccessful. And only on July 31, the 2nd Army Corps of the Finnish Army began an offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, fighting with units of the 23rd Army, 7th Army and border troops.
The second Finnish army corps sought to encircle the Soviet troops operating here, and then build on the success, striking in the direction of the Vuoksi River, crossing it and reaching the rear of the Vyborg grouping of the Northern Front. The 4th corps of the Finnish army was preparing to launch an offensive in the Vyborg direction.
The 142nd and 115th rifle divisions of the 23rd army, together with the border guards, showed stubborn resistance to the enemy. But to defend on a wide front (142nd Rifle Division covered the border on a section of 59 km, and 115th Rifle Division - on a 47-kilometer stretch), without reserves, it was almost impossible.
North of the 142nd Rifle Division, on its right flank, the 168th Rifle Division of the 7th Army operated under the command of Colonel Andrei Leontyevich Bondarev. For almost a month she defended the USSR border together with border guards. Even after the 142nd RD was cut off from the 168th RD, the Bondarevites, as they were then called at the front, did not flinch. Nestled against the shores of Lake Ladoga, they, led by their division commander, resolutely repulsed the numerous attacks of the enemy troops. Often the enemy broke through and surrounded individual units, but none of them was defeated or captured. SN Borshchev, the head of the operations department of the 168th Rifle Division, wrote about this time: "For 25 days we stood to death, holding our state border, and for 20 days we held the defense lines of Sortavala - Niva station."
It is no coincidence that in the diary of the Finnish general V.E. Tuompo, published in Finland in 1969, in the entry on August 19, 1941, the division commander of the 168th Rifle Division Bondarev was given a very expressive and flattering description: "A good and staunch commander." Such an assessment was given to Bondarev by Mannerheim's closest assistant at his rate. The professionalism and courage of A. L. Bondarev have earned high marks even from enemies.
The famous Finnish military historian Helge Seppälä in his last book also gave an assessment to the commander of the 168th Rifle Division A.L. Bondarev. He writes: "Bondarev was a skillful commander."
In the 142nd Rifle Division of the 23rd Army, the commander of the 461st Infantry Regiment, Colonel V.A.Trubachev and machine gunner A.I. Zakhodsky, acted skillfully and professionally. They became Heroes of the Soviet Union. Many other defenders of the northern border of Leningrad showed courage, heroism and skill. Among them was Colonel of the 102nd Combined Border Detachment S.N.Donskoy. This detachment fought on the border of the USSR together with the 168th rifle division of A.L. Bondarev and 142nd rifle division of S.P. Mikulsky.
“On the Keksholm direction,” the reports for July 1 said, “the enemy went on the offensive in several places and tried to penetrate our territory. By a decisive counterattack of our troops, the enemy's attacks were repulsed with heavy losses for him. "
In this direction, the combined detachment of the border guards of Lieutenant Colonel S.N.Donskoy did not allow the enemy to break through to Kexholm from the northwest on the move. Despite its small number, the detachment fought stubborn battles for more than 10 days, inflicting significant losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment. Subsequently, the detachment was the base for the creation of a military group in the Kexholm direction.
In the Finnish three-volume history of the war about the troops on the Karelian Isthmus it is said: “The enemy was staunch, his main part was the forces of border guards who fought stubbornly, made counterattacks, tried to move forward. Using hand grenades and inflicting bayonets, they fought bloody close combat in forests and hilly terrain continuously throughout the day. "
These examples speak of the courage and resilience of all the troops that fought in 1941 on the Karelian Isthmus. Unfortunately, in our fiction and military literature, the course of the battles of the July and August days of 1941 is not sufficiently disclosed, the struggle of soldiers in certain sectors is not covered.
This can only be explained by the fact that the fighting on the southern approaches to Leningrad on the Luga line, and then on the near approaches to the city, attracted maximum attention. Naturally, they occupied the central place in the historical and memoir literature. For the same reason, the combat operations of the Karelian fortified region, which detained the enemy, and held the front 25 kilometers from Leningrad for almost 3 years, were not covered either.
Only in the Finnish multivolume history of the war can one find a proper assessment of the courage of border guards, soldiers of rifle and UR divisions on the Karelian Isthmus in the period 1941-1944.
Only as a result of long and fierce battles did the 2nd corps of the enemy manage to break through the defenses of the 23rd army in the border zone, develop an offensive in the direction of Khitola, Kexholm, and on August 7 and 8 cut the railway in the Sortavala-Khitola and Khitola-Vyborg sectors.
Part of the troops of the 23rd Army, located in the region of Sortavala and Khitol, were pinned to the shores of Lake Ladoga. The middle part of the front was held by our troops, but gradually retreated to the Vuoksa water barrier.
In early August, in connection with the threat of the encirclement of our troops, an order was given to the Leningrad Front to prepare the fortified area structures on the 1940 border for an explosion.
On August 7, weapons and instruments were removed. The structures were blown up. The UR battalion under the command of Captain Sintsov was transferred to the Slutsko-Kolpinsky fortified area, to the southern direction of the defense of Leningrad.
The entire part of the 168th Rifle Division of the 7th Army, encircled in the Sortavala region, was transported in full force by the Ladoga flotilla to the island of Valaam, and from there to the Petrokrepost area.
The 142nd Rifle Division, encircled north of Kexholm, was transferred by ships of the Ladoga Flotilla to the southern coast of the Vuoksinsky system, where it subsequently took up defensive positions.
From the beginning of World War II to August 1941, the 22nd fortified area expanded across the wartime state.
In addition to the existing artillery and machine gun battalions, new ones were organized, and the SD already consisted of the 246th, 1st, 4th, 126th, 154th, 293rd, 106th and 63rd (8th) OPAB, 125th separate sapper battalion, 147th separate communications battalion, 228th transport company and 2nd electrorot. The number of personnel of the UR is 5634 people.
To reinforce the field forces with the task of extending the delay of the enemy on road areas, four barrage detachments were allocated from the 22nd SD, which were to create strong points to help the field forces. Each detachment consisted of a machine-gun company, reinforced with artillery:
3rd company of the 1st OPAB under the command of Lieutenant Nikolenko - Kiviniemi region (Losevo);
3rd company of the 63rd OPAB under the command of Lieutenant Maleev - the mouth of the Salmenkayta (Bulatnaya) river;
1st company of the 293rd OPAB - between lakes Muolan-yarvi (Glubokoe) and Yayuryapyan-yarvi (Bolshoye Rakovoe);
2nd company of the 106th OPAB under the command of Senior Lieutenant Yuferitsin - Srednevyborgskoe highway in the Kelola region (Boboshino, Kamenka).
These were the first units of the 22nd SD, which began hostilities. The 3rd company of the 1st OPAB, under the command of Lieutenant Nikolenko, reinforced by an artillery platoon, left for the Kiviniemi area on August 12, 1941.
In the evening of August 12, the company arrived in the Kiviniemi area and took up defensive positions on the left (northwestern) bank of the channel of the same name.
The Kiviniemi (Losevskaya) channel flows out of Vuoksi and flows into Lake Suvanto-jarvi (Sukhodolskoye). At the confluence of the channel into the lake, there was a railway bridge of the Kexholm-Leningrad railway, at that time it was blown up. All Finnish houses in the area were burned or destroyed, including the Kiviniemi station. A wooden bridge for road and horse-drawn transport was thrown across the Kiviniemi canal. The Kiviniemi canal is very fast, rapids, many stones sticking out of the water. The speed of water movement in the channel is due to the fact that the water level in Vuoksi is almost two meters higher than the level of Suvanto-jarvi.
The task of the company was to hold the bank of the Kiviniemi channel as long as possible. The task was communicated to every commander and soldier, everyone knew what to do and how to act when the enemy approached.
The first night and day were spent preparing the defensive line - main and reserve firing positions were equipped, cannons and heavy machine guns were installed. By morning the company was ready to meet the enemy. However, the entire day of August 13, the enemy did not appear, separate groups of retreating Soviet troops and lone soldiers passed by.
By nightfall, the traffic on the road stopped, and heavy enemy fire began. The shooting was indiscriminate, and it was not clear where it came from.
The shots were all around and even behind our positions. Not seeing the enemy, the company did not open fire, waited. After a while, the shooting stopped.
On the Karelian Isthmus in August, the darkness of the day is short, and soon the soldiers found several "cuckoos" (Finnish soldiers who ambushed trees) that had infiltrated the area. The Finns let the retreating groups of our soldiers pass and shot them with explosive bullets, the wounds inflicted were terrible. It turns out that these are the "cuckoos" and arranged such a shooting from machine guns. Therefore, they could not immediately establish where the shooting was from, since the shots and bursts of bullets created the illusion of a much larger amount of firepower than there actually was.
Already in the morning the soldiers of the company managed to destroy several "cuckoos" by shooting with rifles. The Finns' reckoning that a company would open its own on their fire, and thereby give out firing points to reconnaissance, was not justified.
By the middle of the day, Finnish units approached the area and began shelling the company's positions from mortars. For almost two hours, the shelling was conducted, but it did not cause damage. The company did not respond to fire, did not unmask its firing positions. After the mortar shelling, the Finns began to probe the defenses in small groups, and in the evening they went on an assault in the direction of the platoon of Lieutenant Seredin, who was in the outposts of the main direction on the road to the bridge. Intense fire from the machine guns of Lieutenant Nikolenko's company pushed the advancing enemy to the ground, and later forced them to retreat into the forest. At night, the Finns tried to break through on the right flank to the railway bridge, but they did not succeed.
During the period from 13 to 20 August, the Finns all the time tried to break through, but with small forces, and the company, together with rifle units, managed to repel the attacks. Every day it became harder and harder to hold the enemy, increasing the pressure.
The rifle units left on August 18, and the company could only rely on its own forces. And they became less and less. Everyone was tired, slept in fits and starts between attacks, ran out of food and ammunition.
On August 19, in the middle of the day, an order was received to move to the right (southeastern) bank of the channel and continue to hold the area.
When the company almost all crossed over to the right bank, and only a cover platoon of Lieutenant Seredin remained at the bridge on the left bank, the Finns began firing mortars at the soldiers and moving towards the platoon's line. Seredin sent a platoon to the company on the right bank, and he, together with the Red Army soldier Demchenko, continued firing from a machine gun.
When the Finns approached the lieutenant very close, and the machine gun ran out of cartridges, Seredin and Demchenko fired grenades, but both were killed. After that, Lieutenant Nikolenko ordered to blow up the bridge that had been mined earlier and to occupy the lines along the right bank of the Vuoksi River. Here, basements and foundations of destroyed houses were used as firing points and shelters.
Organizing the defense, the fighters tried to contact the neighbors on the right and left, but found no one. Behind, in the forest, were the positions of the artillery regiment, with which the company had contact from the first day, and which more than once helped with fire in difficult times at the company's request.
On the morning of August 20, the artillery regiment announced that it was leaving for a new location. The company was left alone. The ammunition is running out. The emergency supply was eaten, food ran out, but in the middle of the day an order was received to return to the OPAB.
Moving from the Kiviniemi area along the road that passed by the railway station Rautu (Sosnovo) and, having passed under the bridge, we found a small group of Finns. The company turned into battle formation and took up the battle. The Finns retreated into the forest. The company could not pursue them, since there was almost no ammunition. Continuing the movement, the company soon arrived at the 1st OPAB. The company fulfilled its task - it held the defense of the Kiviniemi region for almost ten days.
On August 17, the 3rd company of the 63rd OPAB under the command of Lieutenant Maleyev, also reinforced by an artillery platoon, was sent to the mouth of the Salmenkayta (Bulatnaya) river and, together with units of the 123rd rifle division, repulsed enemy attacks for seven days. In one of the battles, Lieutenant Maleev was wounded, but continued to lead the battle until he received an order to return to the OPAB.
On August 25, a detachment of the 106th OPAB under the command of Senior Lieutenant V.N.
In the first battle, Junior Sergeant Yegorov distinguished himself. He let the drunken Finnish soldiers approaching close to the attack and destroyed a large group of enemy with machine-gun fire.
On August 26, the artillery platoon of the fortified area under the command of junior lieutenant Ivanov was sent to the Kiriyasala area to reinforce the rifle units covering the road to Lembalovo. The platoon had three 45-mm cannons and three light machine guns. The soldiers set up firing positions near the village of Lipola and carefully camouflaged their guns. In the evening, the first groups of Finns appeared on the road leading to the village. They entered the village cautiously. Then loaded carts appeared. The tipsy soldiers began to sing songs. On the northern outskirts, the Finns flooded a bathhouse. Junior lieutenant Ivanov, having prepared the data, gave the command "fire". The first shells hit the target. The bathhouse and nearby buildings were set on fire, and panic broke out among the Finnish soldiers. Finnish submachine gunners tried several times to break into the platoon's location, but not a single attack was successful. For three days the platoon held its positions and only by order moved to the Steklyannoye area, where he continued to act together with the border guards.
In early August, the third company of the 125th engineer battalion, under the command of senior lieutenant Tivosenko, was in the detachment of obstacles and ensured the withdrawal of our units from the Kexholm area by setting up mine-explosive barriers.
Placing mines in the Karlahti (Kuznechnoye) area, the company found itself without cover for the rifle units. The enemy occupied the village of Karlahti with large forces and began to move his units along the highway. The company took up the battle formation and entered the battle. Courage and bravery were shown in this battle by junior lieutenant Sizov, sergeant Kirponos, Shustov, Shtukaturov and Startsev. More than a hundred Finnish soldiers were killed in the battle. The company held this line until the arrival of the rifle units. Junior lieutenant Sizov, covering the retreat of his platoon with light machine gun fire, died, but ensured the exit for the platoon without loss.
The strongholds from the companies and subunits of the fortified area completed their tasks, the enemy's movement was suspended for almost a month. This respite gave the 23rd Army the opportunity to withdraw its troops from the attack with fewer losses. The area of Vyborg, Koivisto and the northeastern part of the Gulf of Finland, together with the islands included in this area, were defended by the troops of the 23rd Army, border troops and the Baltic Fleet until the end of October 1941 and only on November 1 they left the area and were evacuated with the help of ships of the fleet. through Kronstadt to Leningrad.
On August 18, 1941, the 125th engineer battalion (without one company) was sent to the Volosovo-Krasnogvardeysk (Gatchina) area, where for a month, in contact with the enemy under continuous bombardment and shelling, it set up mine-explosive barriers on the way of the advancing enemy.
Our small rifle units, border guards and destroyer battalions fought heroically, holding back the advance of Finnish troops to Leningrad, defending every line.
And the Karelian fortified area was improving, preparing to repel the enemy. Replenishment approached, new parts were formed. It was necessary in a short time to familiarize people with military service, the equipment of military installations, and teach them how to use weapons. All this was done on the move, at the same time the structures were put on alert, and new long-term points and positions were built.
Thousands of Leningraders worked together with the soldiers on the fortifications of the border: workers, workers, students. In the difficult time of July 1941, from the Karelian fortified area for the defense of Leningrad to the newly created Krasnogvardeisky (Krasnogvardeysk - Gatchina) and Slutsko-Kolpinsky (Slutsk - Pavlovsk) fortified areas in full force, with weapons, the 126th, 4th, 283rd OPAB.
Starting from the first days of September, our retreating troops began to move through the subdivisions of the fortified area. It was necessary to take measures so that the enemy did not break through on the shoulders of the retreating fighters. This retreat of our troops did not very much resemble a systematic, organized retreat. Apparently, the commander of the 23rd Army, Lieutenant General P. S. Pshennikov, with his headquarters, lost control of the troops and failed to organize their withdrawal to the borders of the fortified area. This can be judged by the nature of the retreat and by the fact that Marshal K.E. Voroshilov, as commander of the Northern Front, gave the order to organize the withdrawal of units to the line of the Karelian fortified area only at the end of August, appointing Lieutenant General A.I. Cherepanova. Cherepanov had to form control and organize the interaction of the KaUR, the Ladoga military flotilla, the artillery of the Baltic Fleet, units coming from the front reserve, and also collect the retreating units.
To the approach of the Finnish army to the fortified area, in August, the 113th OPAB was additionally formed, and instead of those who had departed to Krasnogvardeysk and Slutsk, new ones were organized - the 4th OPAB and 126th OPAB. The personnel continued to improve, to study military equipment and battle tactics, many subdivisions of the fortified area had already begun to engage in battles with the enemy.
When the Finnish army approached the fortified area, the front edge of the defense was formed where our troops managed to stop the Finnish ones, so it did not everywhere coincide with the front edge of the fortified area. Only in the regions of Lembalovo, Elizavetinka, Mertuti, Beloostrov and Sestroretsk were the firing structures of the fortified area located in the areas of the first and second trenches of field troops. But the order of battle of the UR units constituted the main backbone of the region's defense. Rifle units carried outposts.
The commanders of the combat areas were the commanders of the field units, they were operatively subordinate to the subdivisions of the fortified area located within the boundaries of the combat areas. This provision gave the right, if necessary, to cause fire or to involve one or another unit in the battle. The interaction of parts of the fortified area with field troops was organized at the following link: rifle regiment- OPAB, rifle battalion- machine gun and artillery company. It consisted in mutual knowledge of battle formations, establishing communications, common signals, landmarks, call signs, and drawing up a joint battle plan.
Separate structures entered the battle already in the first days of the approach of the Finnish troops to the line of the fortified area.
The pillbox "07", being a test one, was built outside the strip of the fortified area with an extension to the line of the front edge at a distance of 700 meters from other structures. It was not connected to other structures.
It was also different in design. Pillbox "07" is a two-embrasure rubble concrete structure, while other structures are reinforced concrete. The garrison of the "seven" consisted of 7 people: the commandant lieutenant Petrov, an old party member called up from the reserve; deputy political instructor young, energetic commander Yaroslavtsev; chiefs of machine guns Kolosov and Smirnov, gunners Vedenev and Semichev; light machine gunner Ivanov. Thanks to the great work of the lieutenant and political officer, the personnel in a short time mastered the technique and tactics of combat. On the morning of September 3, 1941, the enemy opened massive artillery fire on our battle formations. More than 880 shells and mines were fired in the G7 area alone, 25 of them hit the structure. After the artillery barrage, the Finnish infantry went on the offensive. Letting the attackers close at close range, the garrison repulsed the attack with machine-gun fire. Then the enemy in small groups decided to bypass the structure from the rear. Under the cover of artillery and mortar fire, the groups managed to approach the G7 from the front and the rear about a hundred meters, but their attack was repulsed by dagger fire from machine guns from the structure and from the light machine gun of Private Semichev, who left the structure to open positions near the entrance.
The next day, new attacks were repulsed. Communication with the company was broken, and for two days the garrison fought in complete encirclement. A group of signalmen from the company could not break through to the structure, repelling one attack after another. The besieged killed more than 70 enemy soldiers and officers. All attacks were repulsed.
On September 6 at 15 o'clock three groups of Finns, using the rough terrain, in dashes tried to get close to the "seven" from three sides. Two of these groups lay down under fire from rifle units, the third continued to creep up to the structure. Lieutenant Petrov forbade opening fire on the enemy without a command.
When the group overcame the barbed wire, covering the approach to the structure, and approached 30 meters, at the command of the commandant, a barrage of machine-gun fire fell on it. The commander of the Finnish group gave the order to withdraw, but was immediately killed. All attempts by the Finns to carry away the killed were unsuccessful. At night, the soldiers of the garrison picked up the dead enemies. Among them was found the corpse of a Finnish officer with the rank of captain.
For four days the garrison staunchly repelled the attacks of the White Finns. The wounded soldiers did not go out of order. After bandaging their wounds, they again took up their posts and continued to fight. Lieutenant Petrov showed himself to be a brave officer. Distinguished in battle machine gunner deputy political instructor Yaroslavtsev, who destroyed up to 50 Finns and 2 machine guns, Sergeant Kolosov, who destroyed up to 20 soldiers and a light machine gun. Signalers Kozlov and Gizatdinov restored more than 80 gusts under heavy fire. The medical instructor Garifulin acted excellently, assisting three wounded soldiers of the garrison and carrying out twelve wounded soldiers of rifle units from the battlefield.
During one of the shelling by direct hits of large-caliber concrete-piercing shells, the frontal wall was pierced through the structure and the embrasures were broken. For several nights, by the heroic labor of sappers and soldiers of other structures, slabs of ship armor and concrete mortar were dragged to the G7. In a short time, all the damage was covered with concrete, and the frontal wall was covered with armor plates 200 mm thick. All this was carried out at a distance of 150 meters from the first trench of the Finns.
As soon as communication with the building "07" was restored, the secretary of the Central Committee of the party, a member of the Military Council of the Front, AA Zhdanov, phoned from Smolny. He was interested in the military successes of the garrison, thanked for the heroism. Lieutenant Petrov assured: "The seven will not let the enemy pass."
Having met the stubborn resistance of the garrison "07", the Finns went over to the defensive in this sector. After unsuccessful attempts to break through the line of the fortified area, the command of the Finnish troops abandoned major offensive operations. Finnish troops switched to reconnaissance battles of local importance and sabotage actions to block and destroy individual military installations.
On March 31, 1942, at dawn, Finnish artillery made a strong raid along the front edge and into the depths of the battle formations. Under cover of fire, demonstrating a false attack on the right flank of "07", a company of Finnish skiers in white coats destroyed the outposts to the left of the structure. The commandant of the building, Lieutenant Petrov, was at the company's command post at that time. At the command of Sergeant Kolosov, the crews took their combat positions and opened fire on the assault group. Outside the structure in the trench were Junior Sergeant Smirnov and the light machine gunner Ivanov. They also opened fire. Smirnov was killed, and a bullet hit the disk of Ivanov's light machine gun, and he was forced to hide in the structure. Under the cover of the first attacking group, the second group of Finns with drags loaded with boxes of explosives approached the structure from the rear.
"07" continued to fire at the enemy. At this time, a violent explosion occurred. The entrance and the back wall of the structure were destroyed. A group of fighters under the command of Lieutenant Petrov broke through the curtain of fire, discovered the destruction of the structure and the corpses of its defenders in it. There were six of them: sergeants Kolosov, Vedenev and Smirnov, privates Kovylin, Semichev, Ivanov.
For all three years of defense in the Karelian fortified area, the Finnish army managed to block and blow up the only bunker "07".
However, over the course of several nights, under the cover of machine-gun fire, the sappers rebuilt the "seven" and it became an even more powerful structure. The new garrison "07" continued the traditions of heroically perished comrades, haunted by the enemy.
The actions of the garrison of Building 02 are no less valiant. This machine-gun structure had two embrasures. There was a dead space in front of the floor wall ahead. The location of this bunker is 350 meters from the enemy. Commandant - Junior Lieutenant Norkin. To the right and to the left, hollows, densely overgrown with bushes, approached him. The outposts occupied positions of 300 meters, on the right at the height "Nameless". The neighboring structure supported the "two" with fire, being in the depth behind the ravine at a distance of 500-600 meters.
On June 7, at 13:00, Finnish batteries opened heavy artillery and mortar fire at the Bezymyannaya hill, then the fire was transferred to the "two" area. Communication with the company was broken. The officer who came running from the outposts from the height "Nameless" said that the outposts had been knocked out and the Finns were moving towards the "two". The commandant, junior lieutenant Norkin, who knew perfectly the strengths and weaknesses of the structure, decided to repulse the attacks with the main forces of the garrison outside the structure from the trenches. Having ordered the three fighters to stay at the machine guns, and cover the left and right flanks with fire, Norkin and the rest of the fighters took up a perimeter defense near the structure. The commandant sent Lance corporal Blinov to the building of the neighbors to report the situation and from there to ask the commander of the company to fire on the area of the building.
The Finns appeared 50-60 meters from the structure. The attack was repulsed with dagger fire from the machine gun of Corporal Shpagin and Private Denisov, who took up positions in the trench in front of the floor wall of the structure. The second group of Finns, numbering 15-20 people, tried to attack from the left, but under the machine-gun and automatic fire of the garrison soldiers lay down in the hollow. The Finns sought to get into a trench near the structure and use it to block the structure.
At this time, the artillery fire of our field batteries fell on the heights. The personnel of the garrison took refuge in the structure, only Corporal Shpagin and Private Denisov were found at the bottom of the trench, covered with earth, alive, but deaf from the explosions of shells.
The garrison of the "two" not only did not allow blocking the structure, but with its fire helped the approaching reserve of rifle subunits to knock out the enemy from the height "Nameless" and restore the previous position.
From June 10, 1942 to June 10, 1944, the Vanguard garrison under the command of Lieutenant Chetvertakov (293rd OPAB) also fought continuous battles with the enemy. This bunker was located south-west of the height of Mertut behind the anti-tank escarpment, protruding, as it were, at the apex of a triangle beyond our line of defense. The enemy trenches were 120-150 meters away. This bunker was the most forward point of the battalion. He was constantly under enemy fire. The bunker had two 76-mm guns and two tank turrets with machine guns. The fact that this structure bothered the enemy and was not in vain called the "Vanguard" is evidenced by the fact that the 76-mm cannon facing the enemy was smashed by enemy fire and was replaced with a new one seven times. This continued until a new 45-mm gun DOT-4 with a telescopic sight was installed, and instead of a periscope with a fourfold magnification, a stereo tube was not installed. The situation in this sector of the defense changed radically, and the Vanguard bunker deserved the name "master of the front line", since the target was destroyed by one or two shells.
Local battles were fought along the entire front on the Karelian Isthmus from Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland. At times, attempts to break through our defenses went on for weeks of continuous attacks. The Finns tried by any means to break through the defenses somewhere, to seize the structures and positions of our units, but these attempts were unsuccessful and only brought tangible losses to the enemy. Many say that the Karelian fortified area almost never fought, but this statement is not true. Despite the continuous search, the Finns could not find a weak spot in the defense of the fortified area, and in December 1941 they themselves went on the defensive, waiting for a situation more convenient for the offensive. However, this situation did not work out.
On September 8, 1941, the blockade of Leningrad began. The Finns saw that the group of German fascist troops "North", which had achieved blockade of the city from the south, had lost 70% of manpower and equipment by the end of September. The balance of forces and means of the parties by this time became equal. The offensive forces of the enemy have dried up.
From November 20, 1941, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front established the grain rate: the first line of troops for 300 grams of bread and 100 grams of breadcrumbs per day per person, the rest of the troops - 150 grams of bread and 75 grams of breadcrumbs.
The impending famine of the blockade was no less an enemy than the one that buried itself near the line of the fortified area. Welding deteriorated sharply. The supply of fuel for motor vehicles has ceased. There were not enough warm clothes. Even with such a bread rate, there were frequent interruptions. In the difficult conditions of the blockade, the organization of food for the personnel was one of the most important tasks. Every opportunity was sought to improve it. In late autumn, in all parts of the country, the harvesting of vegetables and potatoes unharvested in the fields was carried out. Due to the lack of fodder for the horse train, part of it was slaughtered for planned rations. Fishing in the lakes was organized. On the initiative of the motor transport, some of the cars were converted to gas-generating fuel, and for this mass production of birch chocks was organized.
To strengthen the country's defense capability, fighters and officers contributed their personal savings to the defense fund. For example, over the two years of the war, the personnel of the 63rd OPAB contributed 521,624 rubles to the fund, and sent 13,987 rubles in cash to children in the liberated regions. The other OPAB of the fortified area did not lag behind.
Doctors did a lot of work on the health of the personnel. They organized the production of coniferous infusion, identified the fighters weakened from malnutrition and lack of sleep, and organized short-term rest for them in the rear of the units.
The Soviet people and the Communist Party did not leave besieged Leningrad and his defenders. The flow of cargoes with food and ammunition from all over the country flowed to Ladoga - the "Road of Life".
The "Road of Life", laid in November 1941 along Lake Ladoga, opened a green street for these goods from Big land... Although she could not meet the needs of the city and the front, she still played a large role in supporting the fighting efficiency of the blockade army.
In January 1942, a sled train of 20 carts was organized from the UR units under the command of Senior Lieutenant V.T. Belonogov. In difficult winter conditions, without roads, this convoy delivered food, fodder and ammunition across the ice of Lake Ladoga from Borisova Griva, where the front bases were located, to Voloyarvi, and from there - to a part of the fortified area.
And the fortified area continued to improve and conduct an active defense of the line. During this period of the defense of Leningrad, sapper subunits carried out tremendous work, mining the neutral zone and the front edge of the defense. Sappers installed anti-tank mines, subtle obstacles, wire obstacles and hedgehogs, in tank-hazardous areas - nadolby, ensuring the impassability of the defense line and protecting the fortified structures from the enemy.
The fire control and its system were improved. Particular attention was paid to firing in poor visibility conditions and at night. For all structures, fire tablets were developed, which made it possible at night and with poor visibility to set sights on machine guns and cannons, to conduct aimed fire at closed targets (one by one meter square) with all fire weapons in whose sector this square fell. This greatly facilitated the conduct of combat and created more effective fire control, especially at night. The development of documentation was carried out under the leadership of the commander of the 283rd OPAB Captain A.I. Shirokov (the OPAB had returned from Kolpino by this time). The effectiveness of the use of combat tablets was personally checked by the commander of the Leningrad Front. After that, Captain AI Shirokov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, and all the other 29 participants in the development of tablets were also awarded orders and medals.
In January 1942, 103 more machine-gun bunkers, 15 artillery bunkers, 11 machine-gun and artillery bots were built.
By August 1941, the KaUR consisted of 8 OPAB with a personnel strength of 5634 people and had 541 heavy machine guns, 260 light machine guns, 25 guns, mainly 76 mm, 3200 rifles.
In May 1942, the 283rd OPAB returned from Kolpino. In August-November 1942 and a little later, the formation of additional 112th, 133rd and 522nd OPAB was completed.
By October 25, 1942, the 22nd fortified area included 13 OPAB (112th, 246th, 113th, 4th, 1st, 63rd, 126th, 154th, 293- 1st, 106th, 522nd, 283rd, 133rd OPAB), as well as the 147th separate communications battalion, the 125th separate sapper battalion, an autotube and an electric subdivision. The total number of personnel in the fortified area was 11 364 people: officer - 1344 people, sergeant - 2279 people, private - 7741 people. The fortified area was armed with 2 152-mm guns, 156 76-mm guns, 84 45-mm guns, 120 mortars, 704 heavy machine guns, 350 light machine guns, 141 anti-tank rifles.
The OPAB was located in the following order: the shores of Lake Ladoga from Kraskovo to Nikulyas - 112th OPAB, Nikulyas district - 246th OPAB, Soelo - Katuma - 113th OPAB, Peremyaki - 1st OPAB, Nenyumaki - 4th OPAB, Lembalovo - 63rd OPAB, Okhta - Elizavetinka - 126th OPAB, Copper Plant - 154th OPAB, Mertut - 293rd OPAB, Kamenka - 522th OPAB, Sestroretsk - 106th OPAB, Sestroretsk - 283rd OPAB, the coast of the Gulf of Finland from Sestroretsk to Fox Nose - the 133rd OPAB.
All this made it possible to have only 3 rifle divisions of the 23rd army - 142nd, 92nd and 123rd - on the border of the Karelian Isthmus with a length of more than 100 kilometers. The defense zone of the divisions ranged from 25 to 40 kilometers.
In addition to the main line of defense in front of Leningrad, three more lines were created in the depth of the defense of the Karelian Isthmus, which had 213 firing installations. These lines of defense passed from the Kraskovo region through Matoxa, Lekhtusi, Nizhnie Oselki, Agalatovo to Fox Nose and from Nizhniye Oselki through Toksovo, Rakhya to the Neva River region, south of Shlisselburg. The last, third line of defense ran along the outskirts of Leningrad and Leningrad.
On October 23, 1942, by order of the commander of the Leningrad Front, for the convenience of management, 2 directorates were created - the 22nd and 17th fortified areas.
By 1943, the Karelian fortified area included:
22nd fortified area
Within the boundaries: the Gulf of Finland - Lake Lembalovskoe.
Commandant - Colonel Valery Aleksandrovich Kotik.
Since April 1943, Colonel Vasily Meshcheryakov, former chief of staff of the 14th fortified area (Kolpino region), was appointed commandant of the 22nd UR.
The head of the political department is Colonel Lobanov Vasily Vasilyevich.
Chief of Staff - Colonel Ivanovsky.
The headquarters of the 22nd fortified area was located in the village of Chernaya Rechka.
The 22nd fortified area included the following OPAB:
133rd OPAB (Sestroretsk - Lisiy Nos)
The battalion commander is Major Nikolai Mikhailovich Frolov.
Chief of Staff - Captain Alexander Anisimov.
Deputy for Political Affairs - Captain Mikhail Pavlovich Tikhomirov.
283rd OPAB (Sestroretsk)
The battalion commander - Major Alexey Nikolaevich Shirokov.
Chief of Staff - Major Aleksey Alekseevich Chaikin.
Zampolit - Captain Alexander Grigorievich Paschenko.
106th OPAB (Sestroretsk)
Combat - Major Ivan Ivanovich Podkopaev.
Chief of Staff - Major Vasily Chizhov.
Zampolit - Major Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Demidov.
522th OPAB (Kamenka)
The battalion commander - Major Nikonenok Gavriil Georgievich.
Chief of Staff - Captain Lebedev.
Zampolit - Nikolai Panfilovich Bogdanov.
293rd OPAB (Mertut)
The battalion commander - Major Grebenshchikov Nikolai Mikhailovich.
Chief of Staff - Major Mikhail Nikolayevich Likholet.
Zampolit - Major Vasily Alekseevich Zadvornov.
154th OPAB (Copper Plant)
The battalion commander - Major Kosarev Pavel Andreevich.
Chief of Staff - Captain Nikolai Mikhailovich Klinov.
Zampolit - Major A.V. Toropov
126th OPAB (Okhta - Elizavetinka)
Combat - Captain Nozdratenko Ivan Mikhailovich.
Chief of Staff - Senior Lieutenant Petrochenko Ivan Zakharovich.
Zampolit - Major Georgy Dmitrievich Bokov.
63rd OPAB (Lembalovo)
The battalion commander - Major Yuferitsin Vasily Nikolaevich.
Chief of Staff - Captain Nikolai Konstantinovich Navrotsky.
Zampolit - Captain Victor Rosenoer.
125th separate sapper battalion
The battalion commander - Lieutenant Colonel Kozlov Georgy Fedorovich.
Chief of Staff - Captain Baltash.
Zampolit - Captain Alexey Soloviev.
Separate communications battalion
Two electrotechnical companies
17th fortified area
Within the boundaries: Lembalovskoe Lake - Ladoga Lake.
Commandant - Colonel Shalev Alexander Vasilievich.
Since April 1943, in order to use the combat experience of the UR in the offensive, the former commandant of the 79th fortified area, Colonel Georgy Nikolaevich Maslovsky, was appointed commandant of the 17th UR.
The head of the political department is Colonel Gavrilenko.
Chief of Staff - Colonel Dekabrsky.
The headquarters of the 17th fortified area was located in the village of Matoksa.
The 17th fortified area included the following OPAB:
4th OPAB (Nenyumaki)
The battalion commander - Major Khasanov Sharif Farkhutdinovich.
Chief of Staff - Captain V. V. Semyonov
Zampolit - Major N. M. Belyutin
1st OPAB (Peremyaky)
The battalion commander - Major Gerasimov Alexey Foteevich.
Chief of Staff - Major Sadovsky.
Zampolit - Major Dementyev.
113th OPAB (Soelo - Katuma)
The battalion commander - Major Mitenichev Alexander Nikolaevich.
Chief of Staff - Captain Deripas Andrey Fedorovich.
Zampolit - Major Nikolai Nikitich Popkov.
246th OPAB (Nikulyasy)
Combat Major Semyon Markovich Sakhartov.
Chief of Staff - Captain Kirgizov Nikolai Pavlovich.
Zampolit - Captain Mikhail Ivanovich Kuznetsov.
112th OPAB (Kraskovo - Nikulyasy)
The battalion commander - Major Smirnov Pavel Ivanovich.
Chief of Staff - Captain Slobodsky.
Zampolit - Captain Ivanov M.M.
Separate communications battalion and separate sapper company
Field filling
22nd fortified area: 123rd Infantry Division (Gulf of Finland - Mednozavodskoe Lake), 92nd Infantry Division (Mednozavodskoe Lake - Lembalovskoe Lake).
17th fortified area: 142nd rifle division (Lembalovskoye Lake - Ladoga Lake).
The important role played by the line of the fortified area on the Karelian Isthmus during the Patriotic War is evidenced by the following facts:
1.On September 10, 1941, at the most critical time for Leningrad, the commander of the Leningrad Front, a member of the Supreme High Command General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, withdrew most of the field troops, as well as the 4th, 126th and 283rd OPAB from Karelian an isthmus for the defense of more vulnerable lines south of Leningrad. Attempts by the Finnish army to break through the defenses were unsuccessful.
2. Statements of the enemies themselves. In the winter of 1942, during military operations to capture the height of 73.3 in the Lembalovo area by our units, the captain of the Finnish army was captured in the enemy trench. A topographic map with the combat structures of our fortified area marked on it was seized from the prisoner. During interrogation, he said: "We had been preparing for war with you for a long time and with the help of intelligence long before the war we had complete information about your fortified area, but, despite this, we refused to break through, realizing that this would require very large sacrifices."
3. In his memoirs, Major General BV Bychevsky writes: “We should also not forget that in early September 1941 the Finnish troops were finally stopped precisely on the line of the old fortified area; they had to bury themselves in the ground already under fire from guns and machine guns installed in the reinforced concrete structures of the fortified area. "
4. In the book "Defense of Leningrad 1941-1944." the former commander of the Leningrad front, MM Popov, assesses the role of the Karelian fortified area: “By the measures taken before the war and at its beginning, we sharply increased the combat readiness of this UR. It was in front of its leading edge that the avalanche of Finnish troops, rolling towards Leningrad, subsequently stopped. After some attempts to break through the defense of the UR, the Finns abandoned them and began to hastily dig into the ground. Here they sat inactive until June 10, 1944. "
The iron ring of the blockade, hunger and deprivation did not break the will of the fighters. Anger towards the invaders spontaneously spawned a mass extermination movement. At first, it arose in those units where the battle formations coincided with the general defense line of the forward edge of the Karelian Isthmus.
In October 1941, in the morning, near the bunker "07", a group of Finns was working on installing slingshots on their front edge. Machine-gun fire from the bunker was impossible, since this area was not shot through. The commandant of the bunker had no connection - he could not call fire on the working Finns. With the permission of the commandant of the building, Sergeants Kolosov and Smirnov moved into the trench with a light machine gun. Two Finns were killed, the rest fled. The enemy opened fire on the positions of the light machine gun, but the sergeants took refuge in the structure.
On January 13, 1942, corporal Kharkov, who soon became a notable sniper of the Leningrad Front, opened his account for revenge. Junior Sergeant Fominsky, one of the best fighters of the unit, killed 15 White Finns by the anniversary of the Red Army in 1942. Fominsky is an Altai hunter, since childhood he became friends with weapons. Once, while reaching the firing line in the winter of 1942, he was wounded, but did not leave the battlefield and destroyed two more enemy soldiers. The government praised the feats of the fighters. Sergeant Larionov, who killed 122 White Finns, was awarded the Medal For Courage, Sergeant Major Borodunov was awarded the Order of the Red Star, Lieutenant Navrotsky was awarded the Medal For Courage, and Senior Lieutenant Strikozov was awarded the Order of the Red Star.
From January 1942, for four months, the fighters of the 113th OPAB under the leadership of the fighter sapper Lieutenant Artemyev went to the forefront in the Korosari region. After Artemiev was killed, the fighters were commanded by senior lieutenant A. F. Deripas. During these four months, 42 Finnish soldiers and 2 horses were destroyed.
Girls took an active part in the fighter movement. The first to open the account was the Komsomol member Tamara Chernakova from the garrison of the pillbox "Sovet". Her example was followed by the fighters of the female garrison of the pillbox "Volia" Vasiliev, Mazova, Orlova, Kins and others. In single combat with the enemy, Sergeant Shostka, Lieutenant Sazontov, Red Army soldier Smirnov, and medical instructor Tamara Chernakova were killed. In honor of the feat of the fighters of the Red Army Smirnov and medical instructor Tamara Chernakova, the military installations in which they served are named after them. One of the streets of the village of Chernaya Rechka is named after Tamara Chernakova.
In the center from left to right - the chief of staff of the 154th OPAB Bialiatsky, battalion commander Kosarev and
political commander Toropov together with female fighters on March 8, 1942.
Since the beginning of the blockade, about 2,000 women from the suburbs of Leningrad have arrived in the fortified area to replenish existing and newly formed units. Mostly women occupied rear positions. They were doctors, paramedics, medical instructors, storekeepers, cooks, clerks in headquarters and commissaries, signalmen, radio operators, telegraph operators. But women were also in military installations. More than 10% of machine-gun pillboxes were occupied by female garrisons, and they were not inferior in all sections of service to men.
Here, for example, what the deputy commandant of the Volya bunker located in the responsible Vyborg direction, senior sergeant Orlova, wrote in a handwritten album created by the Komsomol: “Our garrison Volya was formed on September 17, 1942 from volunteer girls from Leningrad. It consisted of: Kins Z.P., Loban V.D., Sokolova L.I., Kozlova L.A., Bugrova N.D., Yakovleva N.S., Konstantinova V., Glebova V.V. , Slobodskaya R. M. and Eroshchina L. M. Under the leadership of the company commander Navrodsky, and later Onosov, the commandant of the Nazarov building, the girls began to study the regulations. We mastered the technique in a short time. We, eager to take revenge on the enemy, go to the front line of the defense, not sparing our lives, hunt down the occupiers and destroy them. All the girls of the garrison opened an account of revenge, and the garrison became a destroyer, our area is impassable for the enemy. "
The platoon of Lieutenant Yekimov was very active in the fighter movement. He organized 130 ambushes and killed several dozen enemy soldiers in three months.
In October 1943, on the 15th anniversary of the creation of the fortified area, the Leningrad City Council of Working People's Deputies awarded the fortified area with the Red Banner of the Executive Committee of the City Council for the staunch defense of Leningrad. The banner was handed over directly to the battle formations of the fortified area by a commission of the City Executive Committee chaired by the secretary of the City Committee, Comrade Kapustin. The influx into the party has increased. Leaving on a mission, the soldiers applied for membership in the party.
Sensing the imminent retribution, the Finns feverishly built their defenses. On January 27, 1944, a magnificent salute of 324 guns announced the liberation of Leningrad from 900 days of the blockade. Fireballs of artillery volleys and multi-colored rockets soared upward, far around illuminating the horizon. But on the Karelian Isthmus, having built powerful fortifications and deeply buried in the ground, there was still an enemy - the White Finnish army, and the threat to the city in this area still remained. Each commander and soldier felt that it was his turn to settle accounts with the invaders. It was necessary to break the habit of the habits developed during the long defense. The soldiers learned to attack, crawl on their bellies, cut the wire, storm pillboxes and bunkers, quickly burrow into the ground, throw grenades at tanks. The gunners learned to roll the guns on their hands in off-road conditions, keeping up with the machine gunners, to pave the way for them with fire. The headquarters of the fortified area units were also persistently and intensely preparing for the operation.
During the blockade, the enemy strenuously rebuilt its bunkers on the Mannerheim Line, and also built powerful new defensive structures and strongholds. He created a line of anti-tank granite overheads 106 kilometers long across the entire Karelian Isthmus, especially intense in the Vyborg direction. Using favorable natural conditions, the enemy cut the isthmus with three fortified strips, in the Vyborg direction, almost 100 kilometers deep.
The first defensive line ran along the front line of the defense. Strong strongholds and points covered important areas, such as the Leningrad-Vyborg railway, Primorskoe highway, and the Old Beloostrov area.
The second main defensive zone ran 20-30 km from the first. It began in the area of Vammelsuu (Serovo), Metsäkylä (Molodezhnoe) off the coast of the Gulf of Finland and went east through Sakhakylä (Mukhino), Kuterselka (Lebyazhye), Kivennapa (Pervomayskoe), south of Rautu (Sosnovo) to the Vuoksa water system, ending in the area Taipale (Solovyevo). Its construction was completed by the summer of 1944. This powerful line of defense consisted of 926 bunkers and shelters, covered with a network of granite bumps and anti-personnel obstacles. It was designed for long lasting resistance.
The third strip ran 30-40 km south and southeast of Vyborg through the Kuparsaari (Zhdinovsky) area, and then along the Vuoksinsky water system to the village of Taipale on Lake Ladoga. The defense skillfully used natural conditions and the water system.
In 1939-1940, it took Soviet troops three and a half months to break through the defense of Mannerheim and capture Vyborg. By 1944, the Finnish command had created on the Karelian Isthmus a much more powerful deeply echeloned system of fortifications than in 1939.
A blow to the Finnish army could withdraw it from the war and deprive Nazi Germany of an ally. The government circles of Finland watched with alarm how, under the blows of Soviet troops, the German fascist troops were continuously rolling back to the west. Major defeats of Army Group North near Leningrad led to increased internal political tension in Finland.
In mid-February 1944, the representative of the Finnish government, Yu. K. Paasikivi, informed through the Soviet embassy in Sweden about Finland's desire to find out from the government of the USSR the conditions on which it could withdraw from the war.
The Soviet government outlined its preconditions for an armistice on February 19, 1944: Finland must break off relations with Germany, intern or expel Nazi troops on its territory, restore the Soviet-Finnish treaty of 1940, immediately return Soviet prisoners of war, as well as civilians in in the camps.
However, on April 16, 1944, the leadership of the Finnish state rejected them. At the head of the state were R. Ryti, E. Lincomies and V. Tanner - after the war, they were all convicted as war criminals. They decided to keep the occupied territory and did not agree to the elimination of Finland's vassal dependence on Nazi Germany.
The task of the Soviet troops to defeat the Finnish army was not easy - it was necessary to break through the "Karelian shaft" in the shortest possible time with the least losses. The Leningrad Front began to fulfill this task.
By this time, the combat power of the Karelian fortified area had increased significantly. By 1944, another 462 bunkers and 383 bots were built, 2 km of roadblocks were installed, and 47.1 km of minefields were built. The anti-tank defense was significantly strengthened due to new means of fighting tanks. Also, 52 km of anti-tank ditches, 106 km of trenches and communication passages were dug, 121.8 km of barbed wire and 60 km of electric obstacles were installed. The fire density of structures has increased. At the beginning of the war, its density was 1.65 bullets per minute per linear meter, and by 1944 it became 4.4 bullets, and in important directions - up to 8 bullets, and this is without taking into account the field filling.
The OPAB were ready to move to the headquarters of the field separate machine-gun and artillery battalions - lists of personnel and weapons were prepared for the transition in units. In the artillery depots of the fortified areas, instead of machine guns in the embrasures of bunkers, stocks of heavy machine guns and mortars were created.
The battalion of the 113th OPAB Major Mitenichev conducts classes with the command staff
for combat and political training. 1943 year.
Before World War II and at its beginning, the structure of the headquarters of the pulbats of the fortified area depended on the number of bunkers in the defense center and, accordingly, the number of embrasures. Therefore, the number of personnel and weapons at battalion headquarters differed. The large gaps between the battalion defense units were calculated to be occupied by field filling.
The combat experience of the Krasnogvardeisky and Slutsko-Kolpinsky UR showed the inexpediency of such an organization of the headquarters of the pulbats. This was confirmed by the September 1941 battles in the Karelian fortified area, especially in the areas where intense battles were going on - Lembalov, Elizabethan and Beloostrovsky.
45-mm anti-tank guns were introduced to the headquarters of the OPAB. By forming new OPAB, the front of each OPAB was reduced to 4.5-6.5 kilometers, depending on the importance of the direction. The defense of the fortified area became continuous - the OPAB were adjacent to each other. The battalion units of the pillboxes were divided between the OPAB, the headquarters were brought to a single denominator. As a result of the creation of a continuous front of the OPAB at the turn of the fortified area, there was no need to have field filling between the OPAB. Field troops were able to create more powerful reserves to conduct counterattacks in the event of an enemy attack in one direction or another.
The positive experience of using the OPAB 16th SD in the offensive battles of January 1943 during the breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad, the transfer to the field headquarters of the 14th and 79th fortified areas, showed the expediency of organizing a field-type OPAB. For this, 82-mm mortars and anti-tank guns were introduced into each OPAB. The OPAB had an average of 640 personnel, 16 76-mm cannons, 8 45-mm cannons, 12 82-mm mortars, 28 anti-tank rifles, 36 heavy machine guns, 16 light machine guns. Armament was mastered by the personnel of the garrisons on the basis of interchangeability.
All this made it possible to significantly strengthen the defense line of the Karelian fortified area, and, in addition, to prepare artillery bulbs for participation in the Vyborg operation.
VYBORG OPERATION AND PARTICIPATION IN IT OF THE UKREPRIONE
Before the start of the Vyborg operation, Soviet troops on the Karelian Isthmus were opposed by the 3rd and 4th Finnish corps, united on July 15, 1941 into the Karelian Isthmus group, as well as formations and units directly subordinate to its high command. The headquarters of the high command, headed by Marshal K.G. Mannerheim, was located in the city of Mikkeli, 140 kilometers northwest of Vyborg.
By the beginning of military operations, the ratio of forces between the Leningrad Front and the Finnish army was characterized by the superiority of the Soviet side: in infantry - 2 times, artillery - six times, tanks - seven times, aviation - five times.
In total, 260 thousand Soviet troops were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus, about 7.5 thousand guns and about 630 tanks, and 60-80% of our troops were preparing for action in the Vyborg direction. The offensive was to be carried out in close cooperation with the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Flotilla. the main task to break through the enemy's defenses was assigned to the 21st Army, which arrived at the Leningrad Front in May 1944 from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters. Re-formed in July 1943, it fought in the summer and autumn of the same year and distinguished itself in the capture of Yelnya and Smolensk. (For the first time, the formed 21st Army fought to encircle German troops at Stalingrad). Replenished with the reserves of the Leningrad Front, it represented an impressive force, it included three rifle corps (30th, 97th and 109th), and in addition, units of the 22nd fortified region, the breakthrough artillery corps and other connections. The army was reinforced with a command-political structure. Lieutenant General D.N. Gusev, who had previously headed the headquarters of the Leningrad Front, was appointed commander of the 21st Army. Members of the Military Council were Major General V.P. Mzhavanadze, Colonel E. E. Maltsev, Chief of Staff - Major General V.I.Petukhov, (from June 18, 1944, Chief of Staff - Major General G.K. Bukhovets) , head of the political department - Colonel A. A. Bystrov, commander of artillery - Lieutenant-General M.S. Mikhalkin, commander of armored and mechanized troops - Colonel I. B. Shpiller, chief engineering troops- Colonel A. T. Gromtsev.
On the right flank of the 21st Army, the 23rd Army was to fight. The commander of the 23rd Army was Lieutenant General A.I. Cherepanov (from July 3, 1944 - Major General V.I.Shvetsov), members of the Military Council were Major General F.A. Shamanin, Major General V.M Khanzhin, Chief of Staff - Major General D.M. Bolshakov, Chief of the Political Department - Colonel F.P.Stepchenko, Artillery Commander - Major General I.M. Pyadusov, Commander of Armored and Mechanized Forces - Colonel Z.G. Paikin, Chief of Engineering Troops - Colonel F. M. Kiyashko.
The 23rd Army, which was on the defensive on the Karelian Isthmus from Lake Ladoga to the Gulf of Finland, did not receive an independent section for a breakthrough. The task was set before her, using the successes of the 21st Army, to expand the breakthrough in the direction of the northeastern part of the isthmus, to reach the Vuoksinsky water system and move towards Kexholm. All this made it possible to avoid unnecessary losses. The army had two rifle corps in its composition: the 115th for action in the first echelon and the 98th for the second echelon. The fighting on the Karelian Isthmus was supposed to be supported by the 13th Air Army of Lieutenant General S. D. Rybalchenko. To strengthen the front air force for the period of the offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command transferred from its reserve the 334th bomber division of Colonel General I.P. Skok and the 113th bomber air division of Major General M.V.Shcherbakov. Strengthened at the expense of the Headquarters, the 13th Air Army could use 770 aircraft, including 260 bombers, 200 attack aircraft and 270 fighters. The actions of the air forces during the operation were led by a representative of the Headquarters chief marshal Aviation A. A. Novikov.
For more than a month, the 21st and 23rd armies were trained in the area of Strelna, Gostilitsy, Ropsha and Krasnoe Selo, as well as north of Leningrad in the 23rd Army, where units of the 21st Army were also stationed.
The 109th Rifle Corps, despite the beginning of the white nights, was secretly transported from the Oranienbaum area to the vicinity of Lisiy Nos on the ships of the Krasnoznamenny Baltic Fleet... The 97th Rifle Corps was redeployed by rail, as well as by the movement of small units from May 6 to June 7 in different directions through Leningrad during the busiest hours on the streets. At the same time, within 15 days, a hundred echelons with personnel, guns and mortars marched to the Karelian Isthmus from the Stavka reserve from the Pskov and Narva directions to Levashovo and Toksovo. After that, the replacement of the 23rd Army by the 21st Army began in the main direction and the advancement of artillery pieces for direct fire.
Finnish General K.L. Ash later wrote that Finland did not expect such a surprise from the Leningrad Front in terms of secrecy and concentration of troops. The front-line newspapers of the Leningrad Front at that time wrote that the troops were preparing to strike in Estonia. This camouflage and extensive agitation and political work made it possible to secretly prepare an offensive on the Karelian Isthmus. Parts of the fortified area were also involved in the Vyborg operation. In order to camouflage preparatory operations, part of the fortified area was assigned the task of engineering preparation of the bridgehead in the places of the planned breakthrough. The plan provided for the equipment of initial trenches, communication routes, firing positions, shelters, as well as camouflage and road work. In order to disorient the enemy, at the same time in other places work was carried out on the construction of false structures and trenches.
To accomplish this task, up to 1200 soldiers and officers were allocated from the UR units every day. The Finns all the time interfered with the work with their fire, so in dangerous areas the work was carried out in the dark under the cover of fire weapons.
In the period from June 1 to June 9, 1944, a continuous trench with a length of 53 kilometers was dug and fully equipped, 5 kilometers of roads were built and 12,600 anti-tank mines were removed. In addition, positions for direct-fire guns, mortar platforms were equipped, and ammunition was delivered. All these preparations were carefully disguised. A group of sappers, advancing to the front line of the defense, paved the way for our tanks. On the night of June 10, the commander of the Leningrad Front, General of the Army L.A. Govorov, and a member of the Military Council, Lieutenant General A.A. Zhdanov, arrived at the observation post of the Izmail construction to direct the operation.
On the morning of June 9, 1944, the echeloned strikes of our aviation against the 10th and 2nd Finnish infantry divisions announced the beginning of a period of preliminary destruction of the enemy's defenses. For ten hours, the 113th, 276th and 334th bomber air divisions, as well as the 277th and 281st assault air divisions, bombed Finnish positions, headquarters and fortified areas in the areas of Lake Bright, Old Beloostrov and Rajajoki. 250 large-caliber guns fired at bunkers, bunkers and fortified enemy defenses. This cannonade was attended by 219 guns and 102 mortars from units of the 22nd and 17th fortified areas.
For June 9, pilots of the 13th air army made 1150 sorties. In the noise of the cannonade stood out 280-mm and 305-mm heavy siege artillery guns, transferred by the Headquarters, the guns of the Kronstadt fortress, the battleship "October Revolution", the cruisers "Kirov" and "Maxim Gorky".
Commandant of the 22nd SD Colonel V.A.Kotik (center) with the political administration of the fortified area.
1944 year.
It "was such a fiery hell, which has never been in the history of Finland," recalls the former commander of the 1st Infantry Regiment of the 10th Infantry Division T. Viljanen (later Lieutenant General, Chief of the General Staff of the Finnish Army).
In the evening, reconnaissance in force began. The forward battalions of the first echelon divisions, under cover of powerful artillery fire and tank support, rose to the attack and wedged themselves into the enemy's defenses. In the course of reconnaissance, the enemy's firepower was more accurately determined, additional information appeared about the opposing units. The Finnish command took the reconnaissance for the beginning of the offensive of our troops and considered that the offensive had been repelled. The Finns, in turn, decided to conduct reconnaissance in force and began to pull troops to the front line. And the 21st Army was already ready for the offensive. In the early morning of June 10, 1944, the troops went on the attack. For two hours, a hurricane of artillery and aviation fire was conducted on a small segment of the main attack, dust and sand were in the air. The horizon turned black, clouds of yellow smoke and burns rose to a height of 20-30 meters. It was hot and stuffy. The batteries fired at enemy fortifications, both from closed positions and direct fire. So the reinforced concrete pillbox "Millionaire", located at a distance of two hundred meters from the forward positions of the Soviet troops, was destroyed. It was destroyed by the 4th battery of the 18th guards howitzer artillery. Of the 140 shells, 96 hit the target. The strength and accuracy of the artillery fire was evidenced by the fact that 335 engineering structures were destroyed on the Karelian Isthmus. And when the guards units rose to the attack, 80 guns and 115 heavy machine guns of the fortified area units ensured their advance, suppressing enemy firing points with accurate fire.
During the day, the enemy's first line of defense was crushed and the 21st Army by the end of the day reached the enemy's 2nd line of defense. The 109th corps of Lieutenant General I.P. Alferov burst into the city of Terijoki (Zelenogorsk) and liberated it by the end of the day. The 30th Guards Corps, continuing to move along the Srednevyborgskoye Highway, approached one of the most powerful units of the enemy's defense Kivennapa (Pervomayskoye).
On the second day of the offensive of our troops, the 23rd Army entered the battle. The 98th Corps was introduced into the gap made by the 97th Rifle Corps. From that day on, the 97th Corps was reassigned to the 23rd Army.
By the end of June 11, 80 settlements were liberated. Moscow saluted the front's successes. The 23rd Army advanced only two to six kilometers. With the support of the Ladoga Flotilla under the command of Admiral V.S.Cherokov, units of the 142nd Infantry Division went along the shores of Lake Ladoga to the Vuoksinsky water system, to the Taipalen-yoki (Burnaya) river. The 112th OPAB of the 17th SD was entrenched on its southern coast.
In the main direction, the 30th corps drove the enemy out of the village of Kivennapa, and the 109th corps liberated the Raivola station (Roshchino) and the village of Tyurisevya (Ushkovo).
On June 12, 1944, by a directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, it was proposed to liberate Vyborg on June 18-20.
The commander of the Leningrad Front, General of the Army L.A. Govorov, being at the command post of the main direction, decided to transfer the vector of the main attack from the Srednevyborgskoye highway to the strip of the Primorskoye highway because the enemy concentrated large forces against the 30th corps and had powerful fortifications in the Kivennap area. and such a maneuver could have avoided unnecessary losses in manpower and equipment and achieved great success.
The 108th rifle corps of Lieutenant General N.P. Tikhonov and the 110th corps of Major General A.S. Gryaznov were transferred to the seaside sector. On the night of June 13, 1944, there was a hidden regrouping of Soviet troops. By the end of the day on June 13, a powerful artillery group was created in the seaside direction. To ensure this maneuver, especially the artillery corps, units of the 22nd fortified area were used. The front headquarters ordered the commandant of the 22nd fortified area, Colonel Kotik, to transfer the 522nd and 293rd OPAB to the Kivennapa (Pervomayskoye) area, and the 133rd OPAB to the Vehmainen (Krivko) area. The battalions were reorganized into field headquarters in advance. The OPAB was tasked with conducting active hostilities in order to cover the regrouping of troops, as well as simulate preparations for breaking through the Finnish defense in this sector, diverting all the attention of the enemy. The battalions were subordinated to the corps commanders operating in this direction.
On June 13, during the regrouping of the forces of the 21st and 23rd armies, our aviation inflicted bomb ulars on the enemy in the areas of Metsäkylä (Molodezhnoe), Kuterselka (Lebyazhye), Liikola (Tsvelodubovo area) at nodes, strong points and communications, preventing the enemy from pulling up to front their reserves. On this day, units of the 13th Air Army made more than 600 sorties. In the process of rapid regrouping, the formations and units of the 21st and 23rd armies continued to actively fire at the enemy, and decisively attack positions in some areas. It was at this time that the Komsomol organizer of the 2nd company of the 98th rifle regiment D.K.Ushkov performed his feat in the area of Mustolovskiye Heights, closing the embrasure of the bunker. Thanks to this feat, the key line of the enemy's defense was taken. Hero of the Soviet Union D.K.Ushkov was buried with honors in Pargolovo.
The Finnish troops, despite the powerful air and artillery training, met units of the 109th and 108th rifle corps with organized fire and strong counterattacks.
The most intense battles flared up for the fortified Kuterselka (Lebyazhye) knot, located at the dominant height. For six hours in a row, the 277th and 281st assault air divisions of Colonels F. S. Khatminsky and S. E. Greskov stormed the height of Kuterselka. Six hours did not get out of the aircraft cabins. The pilots gave the enemy no pauses, no respite. One wave of IL-2 replaced another. Before the planes had time to land, they were quickly refueled and armed with bombs and eres. And by the evening the 133rd and 187th rifle regiments Major General II Yastrebov's 72nd Rifle Division occupied Kuterselka. Thus, in six days, our troops overcame two enemy lines of defense. Many fighters and commanders of the fortified area showed courage and courage, participating in operations, supported rifle units with their fire.
The commander of the 45-mm gun, senior sergeant Mochalov, received the task to advance with his crew to the combat formations of the rifle unit. Under enemy fire, he equipped a firing position, and on a general signal, the gun opened fire on the embrasures of the Finnish bunker, preventing the enemy from firing at our infantry. During the battle, the senior sergeant was wounded by a shrapnel in the head, but continued to command the gun.
And even earlier, at the very beginning of the Vyborg operation, during the crossing of our infantry across the Sestra River, there was such an episode. The gun suppressed enemy firing points. At this time, from the Pesochnaya hill, the Finns opened heavy machine-gun fire, forcing the guard chains to lie down. Mochalov, assessing the situation, shifted fire at the height occupied by the enemy. The enemy machine gun fell silent. The way was open for the guards. For resourcefulness and courage, senior sergeant Mochalov was awarded the Order of Glory.
No forces could hold back the powerful impulse of our troops, inspired by the idea of liberating their Motherland.
In the battles in the Kivennap area, the UR family mortar crew of Sergeant Major M.D.Kocheshkova distinguished himself. Having received the task, the crew quickly prepared the main and reserve positions, as well as a shelter. By order of the platoon commander, the crew opened fire on enemy firing points.
Mother and sons worked harmoniously. The mortar barrel was hot from the shooting, the paint was burnt. Several enemy firing points were suppressed by well-aimed fire. The enemy spotted the position of the mortars and unleashed a flurry of fire on it, but the crew managed to retreat to a reserve position and continue firing. The combat mission was completed. In addition to the mother of Maria Dmitrievna, the family mortar crew included the eldest son Dmitry, the loader, and the youngest son Vladimir, the gunner. For this battle, Maria Dmitrievna was awarded the Order of the Red Star, and her sons were awarded medals "For Courage".
On June 14, storming the main defensive line of the enemy, the 108th corps approached the village of Metsäkyulya (Molodezhnoe), located at the intersection of roads to Vyborg, Koivisto (Primorsk) and Raivola (Roshchino). The enemy defense area in Metsäkylä, located on the high bank of the Vammel-yoki River (Chernaya Rechka, Roshchinka), consisted of four strongholds with circular fire. The 46th and 90th rifle divisions forced the Wamel-yoki and stormed the enemy's fortifications. The Finnish troops, fearing encirclement in the area southwest of Vanhasakh (Sosnovaya Polyana), hastily retreated.
On June 15, the 113th OPAB of the 17th fortified area was transferred to the 109th Rifle Corps, which, having broken through the defenses of the second, the main enemy line, fought along the Leningrad-Vyborg railway line. The battalion was used to close the joints of rifle units. To manage the combat activities and material support of the battalions of the fortified area, an operational group was assigned from the headquarters of the 22nd fortified area, headed by the chief of staff of the 22nd fortified area V.E. Later, the troops of the 21st army increased the pace of the offensive, and the need to use parts of the 22nd fortified area disappeared. Only the 113th and 4th OPAB remained in the 109th Rifle Corps. On the night of June 16, the chief of staff of the front, Lieutenant General M.M. Popov ordered the commander of the 17th fortified area, Colonel G.N. advanced rifle units, subjugate them and be placed at the disposal of the commander of the 23rd Army, Lieutenant General AI Cherepanov. The commander of the 23rd Army set a task for the 17th fortified area: as the 115th rifle corps of Major General S. B. Kozachek cleared the southern coast of the Vuoksinsky water system from the enemy, secure the section from the Taipalen-yoki (Burnaya) river to Yayuryapya (Baryshevo). As the southern coast was liberated, the 283rd and 126th OPAB from the 22nd fortified area arrived in the group of the OPAB of the 17th fortified area.
The rapid advance of the front in the Vyborg direction is by no means explained by the weak resistance of the enemy, but by the force of the onslaught of units of the 21st Army. During June 17 and 18, the 108th, 109th and 110th rifle corps occupied a large number of settlements, including Perk-jarvi (Kirillovskoe), Uusikirkko (Polyany), Loistola (Vladimirovo), Pihkala (Mamontovka), Humalyoki (Ermilovo), Markki (south of Leipyasuo), Ilyakyla (Dyatlovo). The Finnish troops desperately resisted, trying by any means to contain the offensive of the 21st Army, and there were many opportunities for this among the forests, swamps, granite rocks, rivers and lakes of the isthmus. However, the Soviet soldiers persistently and fearlessly marched forward. Using strong support from artillery and aircraft, hiding behind boulders and trees, they blocked and destroyed enemy strongholds.
On June 17, the commander of the Karelian Isthmus group, General Esh, ordered the withdrawal of troops to the Vyborg-Kuparsaari-Taipale line, fearing the encirclement and destruction of his troops. The English newspaper "Daily Mail" wrote these days: "Now on the Karelian Isthmus the Russians have broken through a steel, concrete line, which, as they claimed, was one of the strongest in the world."
At the same time, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was announced on awarding the commander of the Leningrad Front L.A. Govorov the military rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union, and a member of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front A.A. Zhdanov and the commander of the 21st Army D.N. colonel.
On June 19, 1944, the Len Front commander issued an order to the forces of the 21st Army to capture Vyborg over the next day. On the same day, Marshal KG Mannerheim, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Army, made a radio call for Finnish soldiers to stop the Russian troops. The assault on Vyborg began. Major General N.G. Lyashchenko's 90th Infantry Division stormed into Vyborg and fought for almost six hours, trying to dismember and destroy the 20th Finnish Infantry Brigade of Colonel A.A.Kemppi piece by piece. A battalion commanded by Major D.A.Filichkin from the 90th Rifle Division took the Vyborg Fortress on June 20, 1944. In the evening of the same day, Vyborg was completely liberated from the enemy.
On June 21 and 23, 1944, especially fierce battles were fought in the areas of Tammisuo, Mannikkala (Smirnovo), Tali (Paltsevo), Repola. The 97th and 109th rifle corps took part in them, and the command sent the 113th and 4th OPAB of the 17th SD to the same place.
The 113th OPAB was sent to cover the junctions of the 21st Army units in the Repola-Tali region, in the area between the lakes Leitmo-jarvi (Maloe Krasnokholmskoe), Repolan-jarvi (Smirnovskoe) and Lyukyulyan-jarvi (Smirnovskoe), east of the Saimaa canal. At this system of lakes, Soviet troops met with strong enemy resistance. Having come to his senses from the blow near Vyborg, using his fortifications and fresh forces, the enemy made a serious rebuff in the areas of the Tali station (Paltsevo), the villages of Lehtola, Nurma and Repola. The Finns repeatedly stormed the leading edge of our troops, trying to throw them back from the area they occupied.
In this area, the 133rd Infantry Regiment of the 109th Infantry Corps under the command of Major P. Ya. The crossroads at the Tali station (Paltsevo) were defended by the 1st company of the 113th OPAB Captain A.A.Komarov. Because of the fierce fighting, the soldiers and the army press called this crossroads "the crossroads of death." Captain A. A. Komarov was wounded in the battles, but he did not leave the battlefield and continued to command the company. The commander of the machine-gun platoon, Lieutenant I.I.Buglo, was seriously wounded. Our losses grew, but the line was held.
The battles for the Tali station showed clear interaction, cohesion and mutual assistance of soldiers of various types of troops. The Soviet offensive on the Karelian Isthmus in order to force Finland to withdraw from the war continued for three more weeks. Soon, the 113th OPAB was sent to a new place to replace the units of the 381st division of Major General A.V. Yakushev to strengthen the defense of the Heinjoki (Veshchevo) - Ristiseppyala (Zhitkovo) - Paakkola (Baryshevskoe) area along the water line Lake Koltavesi (Makarovskoe ) - the Vuoksi river and the islands on Vuoksi Kaupin-saari (Winding) and Musta-saari (Dark).
In the Tali area, the 113th OPAB was replaced by the 4th OPAB, with which Komarov's company remained. Instead, Captain Brushnevsky's company was transferred to the 113th OPAB from the 4th OPAB.
Later, in the sectors to the north and west of Vyborg, the advance of the troops of the Leningrad Front was suspended. By the end of July 6, 1944, the operation to liberate the islands of the Gulf of Finland was basically completed. “For three or four days,” recalled Admiral V. F. Tributs, “we cleared the islands of small enemy groups. Booby traps prevented them from doing this faster. On July 10, the islands of the Vyborg Bay became completely ours. The task set by the front command was completed. " The islands of the Vyborg Bay occupied the OPAB of the 9th fortified area (commandant - Colonel Kazunenko), which during the blockade was located on the western shore of Lake Ladoga south of the 17th SD.
And to the east of Vyborg on June 22, 1944, they occupied a line along the southern coast of the Vuoksinsky water system and began to strengthen the 112th, 522th, 293rd, 133rd, 283rd and 126th battalions of the 17th fortified area. For this purpose, the 17th fortified area was assigned an electrotechnical battalion of the 2nd engineering brigade. At the new frontier, the 17th fortified area was given the task of improving the defense on an 80-km section from Lake Ladoga to the village of Yayuryapya (Baryshevo), preventing active enemy actions, destroying it with all means of fire.
The battle formation of the field OPAB at the new line was built by platoon and company strongpoints. The length of the front of the company strongpoints was 1.5-2.5 kilometers, battalion - 8-15 kilometers. All fire weapons were located in open areas, near which shelters for personnel and weapons were erected. Most of the artillery pieces were put on direct fire to shoot through the water mirror in front of the front. Capital observation posts were set up for company and battalion commanders. Dugouts were built for all personnel. The main engineering equipment was trenches. Within a month and a half, a continuous trench was dug along the front edge of the defense with the equipment of sites and shelters. A total of 110 kilometers of full profile trenches were dug. In addition, 82 kilometers of barbed wire and 26 kilometers of electrical obstacles were installed. In front of the front line, along the coast, as well as at the junctions of battalions, 10 thousand mines were delivered, made by sappers from water pipes.
Retreating beyond the Vuoksi River, the Finnish command decided to maintain a bridgehead on its right bank northwest of Yayuryapya (Baryshevo), choosing for this a site of terrain adjacent to the bank and consisting of a high granite massif overgrown with forest. In the crevices of the rocks, behind the huge boulders and under them, firing points were equipped, where machine gunners and submachine gunners took their positions. Such positions were hardly vulnerable to mounted artillery fire, and it was very difficult to bring up direct-fire guns and tanks over such rough terrain. The high bank allowed the Finns to sail the river with impunity and bring ammunition and soldiers to the bridgehead. 115th rifle corps Major General S. B. Kozachek, advancing in this direction, was tasked with eliminating the Finnish bridgehead, creating conditions for crossing the Vuoksi River and capturing a bridgehead on the left bank. To secure the sector liberated from the enemy, the 293rd OPAB of the fortified area was allocated. Units of the OPAB, moving behind the attacking units of rifle units, and, if necessary, helping them, on the night of July 9, 1944, advanced to the Vuoksi coast and took up defensive positions. In the following days, the units of the 293rd OPAB with fire from all types of weapons provided great assistance to the rifle units when crossing the river and seizing a bridgehead on the Finnish coast.
After the seizure of the bridgehead, the 293rd OPAB was transferred there. Under heavy enemy fire, the soldiers dug trenches, shelters, equipped machine-gun platforms and positions for guns and mortars, while repelling all enemy attempts to dislodge our units from the captured bridgehead.
On July 11, at the direction of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the troops on the Karelian Isthmus stopped their offensive and went on the defensive. Many rifle divisions and technical units were transferred to the south. The 293rd OPAB returned to the right bank of the Vuoksi River in the general line of defense. The fortified area was tasked with improving the defense in engineering terms, preventing active enemy actions, destroying it with all means of fire.
Moving beyond the Vuoksinsky water system, the Finns left in the forests in the Rautu (Sosnovo) area a group of seasoned scouts-saboteurs, assigning them the task of monitoring the movement military units, equipment and cargo on the Leningrad-Rautu railway. In carefully disguised caches for the saboteurs, supplies of food, ammunition, explosives and spare radio stations for communications were created. The saboteurs knew the area very well. Within a month of subdivisions border troops The NKVD tried unsuccessfully to catch them. Experienced scouts evaded pursuit. Driven into a dead end by relentless pursuit, the saboteurs received permission to go to their shore. For the passage, they chose a place on the shore in the battle formations of the fortified area.
Warm August night. Treacherously sleepy. Quiet. The water surface of Vuoksi sways a little. In the trench near the machine guns - the gunner, an elderly soldier Polikarpov and his assistant Ibragimov. The silence at the front is deceiving. A splash is heard on the side to the right on the water. What is it? Fish or man? The fighters listen carefully and peer into the darkness. About two hundred meters away something is moving, the flickering of oars is barely visible - a boat with people. A long queue abruptly breaks the silence of the night. Immediately echoed by the neighboring machine gun. A sheaf of rockets illuminates the water surface. At the rubber boat - the screams of drowning people. The high vigilance of the fighters Polikarpov and Ibragimov eliminated a group of dangerous enemies.
End of August 1944. For two nights, in the darkest time, unit observers heard the noise of an aircraft flying over our battle formations. Whose he could not be identified. Reported on command.
Two days later, near the shores of Lake Ladoga, signalmen Simkin and Fedorov, serving a nearby artillery platoon, were building a dugout for themselves. Leaving their carbines in the dug pit, they dragged along the logs cut down nearby. Throwing another log from their shoulders, we sat down to smoke. At this time, a man dressed in the uniform of a tankman of the Soviet troops approached them. He began to question the soldiers about the road to Rautu (Sosnovo). The signalmen, knowing that there were no our tank units in this sector, realized that this was a stranger. Simkin imperceptibly nudged Fedorov. He, as if remembering something, walked to the dugout for weapons. The saboteur, realizing that he had been exposed, snatched a pistol from his pocket and, firing several shots, wounded both fighters, while he himself ran into the forest. The soldiers of the artillery platoon, attracted by the shooting, rushed to pursue the saboteur. The gunners drove him into an empty farm and cut off his escape routes. The saboteur ran into the bathhouse and slammed the door behind him, trying to close. Gunner Ilyukhin, a tall, strong Siberian, pulled the door open with force and flung it open. Ilyukhin was killed by a point-blank shot. The saboteur committed suicide with the second bullet.
Three days later, the orderly Konyashin detained a Finnish soldier, exhausted from hunger and barely standing on his feet, in the battle formations of one of the artillery bullets, who turned out to be the second saboteur from the thrown group. During interrogation, he testified: “Three of us, two soldiers and a non-commissioned officer, trained at the sabotage school in Lappeenranta, were dropped by parachute in the swamp area east of Rautu. A load of explosives was also dropped. Our group was given the task of undermining bridges and tracks, disabling the Leningrad-Rautu railway. The parachute descent was unsuccessful. We scattered in different directions and could not find each other, and the explosives, apparently, drowned in the swamp. I walked near the river for five days, trying to get ashore and get over to my own people, but all the time I ran into your soldiers. "
The third saboteur, a non-commissioned officer, who landed unsuccessfully in the swamp, drowned. So the vigilance of the fighters created the conditions for the elimination of the landing of enemy saboteurs.
The victories of the Soviet troops on all fronts disheartened the enemy. It was felt all over. Fire activity was greatly reduced, reconnaissance activities ceased.
In Finland, at that time, in an atmosphere of political tension under pressure from the public, President R. Ryti resigned. The new Finnish leadership had to ask the Soviet government for peace negotiations.
An armistice was concluded. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the troops of the Leningrad and Karelian fronts to cease hostilities from September 5, 1944. The final armistice agreement was signed in Moscow on September 19, 1944, and the peace treaty - in Paris on February 10, 1947.
In September 1944, the 21st Army was transferred to the Vistula-Oder direction, and the terms of an armistice began to be implemented on the Karelian Isthmus. For the Finnish army, directions and roads were determined for the withdrawal of troops and the evacuation of property, the timing and procedure for the withdrawal. Starting from September 20, 1944, in two weeks the Finnish troops had to leave the border of 1940, passing 15 kilometers daily. At the end of each day, the Finns had to set up a barrier on the road showing the distance traveled. The next day, Soviet troops left their place of deployment, reached the barrier, and so - to the very border. A 15-kilometer distance was always to be maintained between the Finnish and Soviet troops. Houses and other buildings were to remain intact. When leaving, the Finns even left unharvested crops in many places.
Parts of the Karelian fortified region went to the border together with border guards and troops of the 23rd Army. The 293rd OPAB was commanded by Major Dragan, 283rd by Major Shirokov, 522th by Major Nikonenok, 133rd by Major Frolov, 126th by Major Shkurenko, 112th by Major Sakhartov. The first week after reaching the state border, the battalions, together with rifle units, helped to restore the engineering support of the border - they equipped the border strip, erected barbed wire, and tore trenches. Then they began to build military camps to accommodate personnel, and after reconnaissance, they began work on equipping battalion units and company defense strongpoints.
A peaceful period began for the Karelian fortified area. During the exit of Soviet troops to the border in 1940, two armies were stationed on the Karelian Isthmus - the 23rd and the 59th. The commander of the 23rd Army was Lieutenant General V.I.Shvetsov, the headquarters was in Kirva (Svobodnoe). The commander of the 59th Army was Lieutenant General Korovnikov. The army headquarters was located in Vyborg. However, soon the 59th army was transferred to the southern direction, and the headquarters of the 23rd army was located in the Vyborg fortress. The 23rd Army occupied the entire territory from Lake Ladoga to the Gulf of Finland.
The 17th fortified area occupied the line from Khitol through Oya-jarvi and Inkilya (Zaitsevo) to Yaska (Lesogorsky) on the Vuoksi river. The headquarters is located in the village of Sairala (Borodinskoe).
During the transition of the 59th army to the southern front, the 16th fortified area was withdrawn from near Narva. He was directed to the Karelian Isthmus, where he took up defenses from Yaska (Lesogorsky) to the Gulf of Finland. The headquarters of the fortified area was located in the Vyborg fortress together with the headquarters of the 23rd Army.
1945 year. Command of the 16th SD with the commanders of the OPAB.
In the center is the commandant of the fortified area, Colonel K. K. Zhelnin.
In the first row, on the far right, Colonel S.P. Ostroumov, Chief of Staff of the UR.
In the top row, second from the right, is the battalion commander of the 113th OPAB Lieutenant Colonel Shabalov,
fifth from right - battalion commander of the 4th OPAB Major Sh. F. Khasanov.
The 113th and 4th OPAB, which were part of the 21st Army, became part of the 16th fortified area. The 113th OPAB from Enso (Svetogorsk) moved to the line in the area of the Saimaa Canal and settled in the villages of Karkorpi (Iskrovka) and Kilpen-yoki (Komsomolskoye). The location of the 4th OPAB was the village of Terva-yoki (Kondratyevo) on the river of the same name.
In May 1946, the 16th, 17th, 6th and 9th fortified areas were disbanded. Part of the officer corps went to replenish the 22nd fortified area (on the border of 1939) and the 79th fortified area in Estonia.
The 1st, 246th, 106th, 154th, 63rd OPAB from June 1944 remained on the old borders of the 22nd fortified area (on the border of 1939) and from that time did not participate in hostilities.
The 22nd fortified area was reorganized several times, most recently as the 22nd machine-gun and artillery division, and then it was completely disbanded. The last division commander was Major General Vasily Efimovich Meshcheryakov.
Such is the long and bloody historical path of the land of the Karelian Isthmus - the borderland of the Russian and the Karelian fortified region - the northern outpost of the cradle of the revolution in the city of Leningrad.