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- "James Kennedy" - a Soviet song about the British allies
- A zoomorphic image of the enemy, especially the ruling elite of the Nazis. This feature is inherent in a large number of Soviet posters during the Great Patriotic War and is aimed at creating a feeling of disgust for Hitler and the Nazis in a citizen of the USSR and a soldier of the Red Army. These techniques were supposed to lead to a wide perception of the occupiers as beasts incapable of humanity. Thus, the attitude towards the invaders as to non-humans was justified, all sympathy for the enemy was suppressed.
- The scale of an object in the frame is an exaggeration and understatement of certain elements. This feature is typical for almost any visual propaganda. Propaganda artists showed one side or the other in the conflict as exaggeratedly strong or too weak. Personalities (the image of a hunched dwarf Hitler and a huge soldier next to him), objects (equipment, weapons) and geographic sizes (the size of the country could be adjusted to instill in the soldier a sense of imminent victory) were exaggerated and underestimated.
- Special emphasis on heavy enemy casualties. The enemy on propaganda posters was often depicted as either already defeated or close to defeat.
- Using color contrast. In addition to the scale, the color palette was also taken into account in the visual display of the elements of the enemy's image. So, in contrast to the bright (red, white) allied forces, enemy forces and personalities were most often darkened and executed in dark colors.
- The presence of historical allegories and an appeal to past historical experience. One of the key techniques used by allied propagandists to humiliate the image of the main enemy was equating him with already defeated enemies from the country's past. Drawing parallels between modern invaders and defeated historical rivals, propagandists sought to evoke a powerful upsurge of patriotic feelings in a person, to revive in his mind the myth of the historically determined impossibility of implementing enemy plans. [ ]
- The propaganda of the United States and Great Britain actively used the image of Christianity as a religion opposing fascism. In this case, the “good” represented by the Western allies stood on the defense of Christian humanism from the encroachments of the “forces of evil” (German Nazism). This poster theme is based on the assertion that the Nazis, who committed so many crimes against the peoples of the world and plotted even greater atrocities cannot be recognized by Christians in any way.It can be noted that the image of the battle of good and evil in Christianity is transferred to the battle of Western democracies and Nazism. Thus, a British war poster depicts a Christian cross opposed to the Nazi swastika. depicted in a smaller size) obscures, conveying to the viewer the idea that Christianity will definitely win this global confrontation with Nazism.The poster was supposed to have an impact on the soldiers believing in God, showing them that Nazism is equated with the Antichrist, brings only evil to the world, and therefore must be defeated in the name of the Christian faith.American poster of 1943, with created by Thomas Hart Benton, also appeals to the battle of Christianity with the "evil of the world." The poster "Again!" the author wanted to show that the values \u200b\u200bof the Christian religion are in danger due to the spread of the "Nazi plague". The German soldiers depicted on the poster, piercing the body of the crucified Christ with a spear and a German military plane shooting him from the air, personify the Nazis' trampling on all norms of morality and Christian ethics. With its actions to destroy entire nations, Nazi Germany is challenging Christ himself, the Christian religion, which, according to the poster's author, should be stopped. Like the British poster, the American one targets the believing soldiers, but uses a more vivid allegory than an opposition of symbols. This poster exploits an entire biblical story. The Soviet Union, for ideological reasons, could not use the image of Christianity as a humanistic religion, opposed to "Nazi barbarism." Soviet propagandists mainly resorted to the use of communist symbols and images, and also turned to the history of Russia, without touching on Orthodox themes.
During the war years, 150-180 propaganda films were released (out of a total of about 1300). In cinemas, before each screening, there was a viewing (mandatory, it was impossible to miss) the propaganda film magazine "Die Deutsche Wochenschau" - at the beginning of the war lasting 10-15 minutes, at the end - already half an hour.
In propaganda films (and Hitler's speeches) explaining the reasons for declaring war on America, parallels were drawn between it and the "Jewish" government of the Soviets, the Jewish character of its capital, the Jewish Bolshevik orientation of its policy (aimed at absorbing third countries), and President Roosevelt was declared a Jew. The United States was portrayed as a country of low morality, and the main source of well-being of its citizens was the game on the stock exchange.
Aimed at the enemy army
Loud-speaking horn installations were widely used on the front line, and propaganda bombs, shells and rocket mines were used to distribute leaflets. Leaflets of the Third Reich for the USSR were mostly distributed by Luftwaffe aircraft.
The facts of the capture or death of significant enemy figures (German leaflets with Yakov Dzhugashvili, the son of Stalin, the son of Khrushchev Leonid, major military leaders) were actively used, including with elements of falsification of materials (photographs, statements, etc.).
The spread of rumors in the unoccupied territory that "the Jews are not fighting", that they are not at the front, that they all settled in the rear, in supplies, etc.
Propaganda in the occupied territories
During World War II, only one side, Germany and its allies, made the long-term occupation of large and heterogeneous densely populated areas of enemy territory. It is the experience of Germany in this sense that is of greatest interest. Since the Germans had different interests in different territories that were under occupation, the methods of governing the subject countries and the propaganda techniques used were accordingly different. Thus, the inhabitants of the captured Scandinavia were considered "Aryans", full-fledged citizens of the Reich, who should take an active part in its affairs. The French were considered a civilized, but alien people, in which loyalty to the occupiers should be cultivated. For this purpose, for example, the German propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels posed in front of the cameras along with the stars of French culture [ ] .
see also
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✪ The Ducktators | World War 2 Era Propaganda Cartoon | 1942
✪ Myths about the great war. "Soviet heroes are a propaganda invention"
✪ Inconvenient questions of the Second World War (Cognitive TV, Artyom Voitenkov)
✪ World War I and how propaganda worked
✪ Lend Lease, World War II, refutation of Soviet propaganda myths
In the USSR, during the war, the historical heritage of pre-Bolshevik Russia, primarily the military, began to be used for propaganda purposes. In the army, the guard was recreated, the St. George awards and symbols, cadet corps returned in a modified form. Beginning in 1943, Soviet servicemen began to wear shoulder straps, new awards were introduced in honor of the historical Russian commanders and naval commanders - Alexander Nevsky, A. V. Suvorov, M. I. Kutuzov, F. F. Ushakov, P. S. Nakhimov. A large number of brochures began to be published about the heroic past of the Russian people.
Attempts were made to use the Church for propaganda purposes. In 1943, after a long break, the election of a new Moscow Patriarch was permitted. The patriotic position of the Church was widely reported in the press. In particular, the creation of a tank column "Dmitry Donskoy" at the expense of believers was widely known.
Enemies in propaganda materials
Enemies in propaganda materials appear to be miserable and helpless, then inhuman monsters. In some cases, the central link in the propaganda material is not the enemy himself, but the inhumanity and destructiveness of his actions. This is due to the need to simultaneously suppress fear in their soldiers in relation to the enemy, instill in them decisiveness and depersonalize the image of the enemy - to make sure that he is not perceived as a person and it is easier to shoot at him. As a rule, such materials have strong motives to defend their country, their home, as well as the motive of revenge.
The images of political leaders of an enemy state were often used in an unsightly form. In propaganda films, the fighting and personal qualities of enemy soldiers are often described as very low. Often, being safe, they look arrogant and stupid, but show cowardice in battle. The enemy in such a movie is very easy to kill. So, for example, in the final episode of the Soviet film "Two Soldiers" (1943), the main characters together freely shoot the advancing columns of the Germans.
Counterpropaganda
Serves to repel propaganda attacks and actions of the enemy, disavows rumors and speculations spread by the enemy for propaganda purposes, asserts the weakness, falsity and erroneousness of the enemy's position. During the Great Patriotic War, the image of Nazi German propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels was a frequent object of counterpropaganda (at the same time the ideological cliché "Goebbels propaganda" arose).
Since biblical prescription, the peoples of the world, not relying only on rude military force or the mind of their rulers, always supplemented them with an important factor of psychological pressure on the public opinion of opponents. Unfortunately, our country turned out to be completely unprepared to fight against Goebbels and his company, which already had a lot of experience in demagoguery, I confess, I was more than once surprised how skillfully in Berlin they washed a black dog white. In general, it is more difficult to fight a total state.
Propaganda in neutral states
Propaganda "in the camp of the enemy"
The propaganda work against the enemy was aimed at lowering his fighting spirit, forcing him to refuse to continue. armed struggle and persuade to surrender. To this end, the parties broadcast propaganda programs through the front line with the help of loud-speaking equipment, sometimes alternating them with music. Campaigning printed materials (leaflets, which also served as a "pass" to prisoners) were thrown into the location of enemy units. More often than not, such materials contained the idea of \u200b\u200bthe danger or senselessness of resistance. The propagandists informed the enemy soldiers that they were in a difficult situation, directly threatening death, that they had a family in the rear that was waiting for them to return safe and sound.
Often, as a motive for refusing to resist, the thesis was proposed that the political regime in the country defended by the soldier was “wrong”. In case of surrender, the enemy promised decent, if not luxurious, conditions of detention until the end of the war. Many printed propaganda materials were designed as "prisoner passes" - it was assumed that a surrendering soldier should present such a leaflet to the first soldier of the enemy army. Often, campaign materials for the enemy were created in the name of collaborationist organizations such as the Russian Liberation Army or Free Germany.
Allied propaganda
Due to the circumstances, the Second World War left a special layer of propaganda materials - dedicated to the allies [ ]. During the war with the common enemy, the differences between the Western countries and the Soviet Union were forgotten. Allies, like their own warriors, are portrayed as strong, self-confident. Theses about brother nations, common struggle for peace and freedom often come to the fore. It is very noteworthy that propaganda clichés about the "communist threat" and "world imperialism", which were supplanted by "allied" propaganda, after the war immediately became in demand again, and the poster on which the Russian pilot shakes hands with the British in the sky over Germany began to be perceived [ by whom?] rather as strange.
Notable works
Allied propaganda
The Second World War is one of the most striking examples of the representation of the enemy image in propaganda campaigns. The fate of states and peoples depended on how politicians and their propagandists could portray their main military, political and ideological opponents, deliberately distort their image, emphasize the negative features of this image, motivate an ordinary person to protect not only the interests of their country, but also a certain ideology as well as the future of all mankind. The propaganda campaigns of the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, in which posters were actively used as the main tool for visualizing the enemy image, are no exception in this regard.
When analyzing the visual display of the enemy's image in the propaganda of allies, the following features stand out:
Notable works
War propaganda during the Great Patriotic War 1. A lie told a hundred times becomes true. I. Goebbels War is not just an armed confrontation between the fighting sides. The main goal of combat operations is to perform a set of tasks that cannot be limited simply by the physical destruction of the enemy army. Therefore, the desire to influence the enemy by means of propaganda, disinformation, intimidation, etc. since ancient times it has been the constant companion of all wars. 2. Psychological warfare specialist P.G. Warburton wrote the following: “In modern times, the main task in war is not the destruction of the enemy's armed forces, as it was before, but undermining the morale of the population of the enemy country as a whole and to such a level that it would force its government to go to peace. An armed clash of armies is only one of the means to achieve the same goal. Of particular importance in the confrontation between the warring parties is the psychological impact on the enemy, the desire to somehow shake his faith in the correctness of the ideas he is defending, faith in future victory. " War propaganda is the use of information channels in the interests of political support for ongoing hostilities and the common goals set for themselves by the belligerent parties. The skillful organization of work to influence the moral and psychological potential of the enemy during the Great Patriotic War had a fairly high efficiency. Having begun to form as a means of deterrence, information and psychological influence during the war has become an integral part of the art of war. 3. The purpose of the information-psychological impact is to have a demoralizing effect aimed at weakening the human psyche, sharpening his sense of self-preservation in order to reduce moral and combat qualities up to refusal to participate in hostilities, as well as to form positive attitudes in the enemy in relation to surrender captured as the only reasonable and safe way out of the current situation. The main forms of psychological influence during the Great Patriotic War were printed and radio propaganda. On a smaller scale, oral propaganda and visual agitation were presented. 4. The main bodies responsible for providing information and psychological influence on the troops and population of the enemy were in the USSR - the Bureau of Military-Political Propaganda, in Germany - the Ministry of Public Education and Propaganda. 5. The German propaganda ministry, headed by Joseph Paul Goebbels, gathered the best Nazi propaganda cadres. The main merit in the propaganda of the "horrors of Bolshevism" belongs to Goebbels' closest collaborator, Dr. Taubert. In parallel, a propaganda system was operating in the department of A. Rosenberg, the imperial minister of the eastern territories. Under the General Staff of the German Army, there was a special department to conduct propaganda among the enemy troops and the population of the occupied territories. In February 1941, in connection with the preparations for the invasion of the USSR, the Wehrmacht propaganda department began to develop a plan for the propaganda support of the military campaign. By the time of the invasion of Soviet territory, German troops destined for war on Eastern Front , 19 propaganda companies and 6 platoons of SS war correspondents were formed. They included: military journalists, translators, personnel for the maintenance of propaganda radio vehicles, employees of field printing houses, specialists in the publication and distribution of anti-Soviet literature, posters, leaflets. All German radio broadcasting was under the control of the Ministry of Propaganda. In 1943, foreign broadcasts were carried out in 53 languages. During the Second World War, much attention was paid to black propaganda from secret radio stations located in Germany. So three radio stations worked against the USSR. One of them was of a Trotskyist character, the second was separatist, and the third was posing as a national Russian. According to the provisions of a special directive on propaganda, the German troops were ordered to emphasize in every possible way that the enemy of Germany was not the peoples of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the German armed forces entered the country not as enemies, but, on the contrary, as liberators seeking to save people from Soviet tyranny. The fierce resistance of the Red Army two months after the start of the war required the Wehrmacht's propaganda department to make adjustments to its work. By this time, the Germans had already produced and distributed 200 million leaflets. These were mainly short calls to go over to the side of the Germans, to destroy commanders and commissars (in some leaflets they promised 100 rubles for the surrender of the commissar) or just small books with passes for a whole unit in the form of tear-off coupons. They are called "For you and your friends." There were also more complex materials, for example, multi-page photo collages, illustrating the delights of German captivity. In his Suggestions for compiling leaflets for enemy troops, Goebbels reminded his subordinates that for a propagandist in his work, all means are good if they contribute to the achievement of the goal: 7. “Propaganda of corruption is a dirty business that has nothing to do with faith or worldview. In this case, only the result itself is decisive. If we manage to win the enemy's trust ... and if we manage to penetrate the souls of the enemy's soldiers, plant slogans corrupting them into them, it makes no difference whether they are Marxist, Jewish or intellectual slogans, as long as they are effective! And ordinary people are usually much more primitive than we imagine. Therefore, propaganda, in essence, should always be simple and endlessly repetitive. Ultimately, the most significant results in influencing public opinion will be achieved only by those who are able to reduce problems to the simplest expressions and who have the courage to constantly repeat them in this simplified form, despite the objections of intellectuals. " Goebbels In contrast to the propaganda posters addressed to the population of the occupied territories, the trench leaflets intended for distribution in the war zone soviet troops , differed in a small format - the size of a postcard. It was more convenient to scatter such leaflets from aircraft over enemy positions, and saboteurs could carry them behind the front line for distribution in the rear of the Red Army. Finally, it was easier for any Red Army soldier to pick up such a leaflet from the ground and put it in his pocket unnoticed from the eyes of political commissars. Special efforts of German propaganda were focused on the figure of J. Stalin. In one of the leaflets, the usual abbreviation of the USSR was deciphered as Death of Stalin Will Save Russia. Immediately a caricature of a proletarian hammer strikes Stalin on the head, and a peasant sickle is pressed to his neck. In another leaflet, a caricatured Stalin with a predatory grin planes coffins, on the coffins - the numbers of the dead divisions and armies. The caption under the picture "Father Stalin takes care of his divisions ..." 8. The assortment of anti-Semitic leaflets was the most abundant in the arsenal of the Reich propagandists. Various methods and means of ideological decomposition of Soviet soldiers were used here - from primitive slogans to fiery appeals to start a new - anti-Bolshevik-anti-Jewish revolution "Kill the Jew-political instructor, his face asks for a brick!" “Soldiers, commanders and political workers! It is your sacred duty to start the second revolution for the happiness of the Motherland and your families. Know that the victory is yours, since the weapon is in your hands. Save the Fatherland from the Jewish boor! Down with the traitors of Russia - the Jewish accomplices! Death to Jewish Bolshevism! Forward, for freedom, for happiness and life! " The propagandists of the Third Reich kept saying that the German soldier was bringing land and freedom to Russia. The propaganda onslaught brought its results. In Soviet villages, the Germans were often greeted with bread and salt as liberators from collective farms, taxes and repression. However, the peasants of the occupied territories understood the essence of the new agrarian order rather quickly: the collective farms were never liquidated, the German authorities simply renamed them communal farms. The peasants did not receive individual land plots and were obliged to cultivate the communal lands under the strict supervision of a manager appointed by the occupation authorities. Dodgers from general works were expected to be severely punished by a military court. The entire harvest went to the disposal of the German authorities, and the peasants were paid for their work. The sizes and forms of payment were established at the discretion of local leaders. In general, the German new order did not give the peasants anything new in comparison with the Bolshevik government.9 All Nazi propaganda was based on false theses. The central thesis of Nazism is the racial superiority of the Germans. The second thesis was the presence of a threat to Europe from Jews and communists, and between the first and the second there was an identity sign. During the operational pause (April-May 1943), the activity of German troops at the front, with the exception of ordinary skirmishes in certain sectors, was limited to the Silver Stripe operation, the largest German propaganda campaign during the entire war. This operation was a reflection of the intention of the command of the German army to make the Russian people their ally in the struggle against the Soviet regime. 10. In April, the OKH prepared Basic Order No. 13 on the policy towards deserters from the enemy army. They were to be separated from the rest of the prisoners and placed in the best barracks. After crossing the front line, they were advised to provide a plentiful ration, and then sent to the rear in trucks, without being forced to walk. Officers were to appoint orderlies. Prisoners of war who voluntarily entered the German service were assigned to units of one officer and twenty-four soldiers; such units were to be incorporated into every German division. Their task was to conduct radio propaganda programs for enemy soldiers; in addition, they had to ensure the reception of new deserters from the Soviet troops. Operation Silver Stripe was carried out in May, June and July with the aim of bringing Main Order No. 13 to the Russian soldiers. In May and June, 49 million propaganda leaflets were distributed to Army Group North. The propaganda officers believed that this campaign could be more successful if it was carried out, as originally planned, was linked to Operation Citadel, that is, if it was not conducted during a lull at the front, when it is much more difficult to desertion ... *** 11. On June 25, a Soviet bureau of military-political propaganda was created, headed by L.Z. Mekhlis and deputy D.Z. Manuilsky. The functions of the bureau included conducting propaganda and counter-propaganda among the troops and population of the enemy. The German counterintelligence service recognized that the Soviet side possessed the entire arsenal of methods of ideological struggle. So, in November 1942, the headquarters of the 2nd German army noted the systematic, thoughtfulness and purposefulness of the work of Soviet propaganda on German soldiers and the population. The propagandists did not speculate in communist rhetoric, spared the church, did not touch the peasantry and the middle class of Germany. The main blow was directed against the Fuhrer and the NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers' Party) in order to tear them away from the people. “We must tirelessly see in front of us the appearance of a Hitlerite, this is the target that must be shot without a miss, this is the embodiment of the hated fascism. Our duty is to incite hatred of evil and to strengthen the thirst for the beautiful, the good, the just. " I. Ehrenburg The term fascist has become synonymous with an inhuman, a werewolf born of the dark forces of capitalism, an inhuman economic political system and the ideology of Nazi Germany. The Nazis were portrayed as soulless machine guns, methodical killers, exploiters, rapists, barbarians. The leaders of the Reich were presented as professional losers in a peaceful life, perverts, murderers and exploiters, modern slave owners. The appearance of Soviet soldiers: simple and humble people, very gentle in peacetime, real friends. It was about the exceptional art of a new man, our warrior-knight with new psychotechnical qualities. He was an epic hero freeing Mankind from the Universal evil. Wartime posters were a powerful means of information and psychological impact. They performed two important functions - to inform and create a clear negative image of the enemy among the population, and therefore contributed to the mood to destroy the enemy and help their state with all their might. Some of the most famous posters of the Great Patriotic War were "Windows TASS (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union. The propaganda included the image of the superiority of the Allied forces, the vastness of Russian territory and the unfair nature of the war on the part of Germany.) 13. After Operation Citadel, German psychological warfare specialists left Soviet propaganda seized the initiative forever. The Russians managed to take advantage of the fact that for two years the Germans behaved cruelly and unjustly in the occupied Soviet lands. The passionate belief of a part of the Soviet people that after the return of the Red Army to live was used for propaganda purposes. In addition, the People were promised that the war was about to be over. The radio was also used for propaganda purposes. The radio broadcast not only front-line news, but also actively created heroic images of their own army and the image of a hated enemy. From 1941 to 1945 a lot of ra zlichny leaflets were created to influence the behavior of both their own population, military, partisans, and enemy troops, the population of Germany and the liberated countries. The flyers were of various functions, informing and misleading, calling for action and causing a depressive mood, creating meaning and depriving them of meaning. The propaganda of both opposing sides served to achieve victory for each of the countries.
How Soviet propaganda worked during the Great Patriotic War Soviet propaganda during World War II was called the "third front". She suppressed enemies, inspired the soldiers of the Red Army and praised allies. She was flexible and often changed course, adjusting to military conditions and foreign policy. The need for propaganda in pre-war and wartime became immediately obvious - the Red Army had to mobilize more and more forces, involving the population, to resist the enemy's propaganda in the occupied territories, to stimulate patriotism among the partisans, and even to influence the enemy's army with propaganda methods. Famous Soviet posters and leaflets, radio broadcasts and broadcast recordings in enemy trenches became popular propaganda tools. The propaganda raised the fighting spirit of the Soviet people, made them fight more courageously. During Stalingrad battle The Red Army used revolutionary methods of psychological pressure on the enemy. From the loudspeakers installed at the front line, favorite hits of German music were heard, which were interrupted by messages about the victories of the Red Army in the sectors of the Stalingrad Front. But the most effective means was the monotonous beat of the metronome, which was interrupted after 7 beats with a comment in German: "Every 7 seconds, one German soldier dies at the front." At the end of a series of 10-20 "timer reports", tango was heard from the loudspeakers. The decision to organize propaganda was made in the early days of the Great Patriotic War. The formation of the images involved in propaganda was carried out by the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Department for Work with the Enemy Troops of the Red Army. Already on June 24, 1941, the Soviet Information Bureau became responsible for propaganda on the radio and in the press. In addition to military-political propaganda, there was also literary propaganda: the group, which was created specifically for propaganda and coverage of the military life of Soviet soldiers, included such famous writers as K.M. Simonov, N.A. Tikhonov, A.N. Tolstoy, A.A. Fadeev, K.A. Fedin, M.A. Sholokhov, I. G. Ehrenburg and many others. German anti-fascists - F. Wolf, V. Bredel also collaborated with them. Soviet authors were read abroad: for example, Ehrenburg's articles were distributed in 1,600 newspapers in the United States, and Leonov's letter to an Unknown American Friend was listened to by 10 million overseas radio listeners. “Literature becomes all defense-oriented,” said V. Vishnevsky. The responsibility of the writers was enormous - they had to not only show qualities soviet army and foster patriotism, but also through different approaches to influence different audiences. For example, Ehrenburg believed that "different reasons were required for the Red Army and for the neutral Swedes." In addition to the rise of the Red Army, the Soviet man and the allied troops, propaganda was also supposed to expose German troops, expose Germany's internal contradictions, and demonstrate the inhumanity of her attacks. The USSR possessed the entire arsenal of methods of ideological struggle. Acting in the camp of the enemy, our propagandists did not use excessive communist rhetoric, did not denounce the church in front of the German population, did not take up arms against the peasants. Propaganda was mainly directed against Hitler and the NSDAP, and used the opposition of the Fuhrer and the people. The German command followed the Soviet propaganda and saw that it was perfectly differentiated: “it speaks in folk, soldier and specific local expressions, appeals to the original human feelings, like fear of death, fear of battle and danger, longing for a wife and child, jealousy, homesickness. All this is opposed to the transition to the side of the Red Army ... ". Political propaganda knew no restrictions: Soviet propaganda aimed at the enemy not only denounced the injustice of the war, but also appealed to vast lands Russia, cold weather, superiority of the forces of the allied forces. Rumors were spread at the front for all strata of society - peasants, workers, women, young people, intellectuals. However, there were some common aspects in the propaganda - the image of the fascist enemy. The image of the enemy at all times and in all countries is formed about the same - it is necessary to divide the world of good, kind people who fight exclusively for the good, and the world of "non-humans" who are not a pity to kill in the name of future peace on earth. If the national socialist (and not fascist) bodies of Germany used the term "subhuman", then in the USSR the word "fascist" became such a common bogey. Ilya Ehrenburg thus defined the task of propaganda: “We must tirelessly see before us the appearance of a Hitlerite: this is the target that must be fired at without a miss, this is the personification of what is hated by us. Our duty is to incite hatred for evil and to strengthen the thirst for the beautiful, the good, the just. " The word "fascist" instantly became synonymous with an inhuman monster that kills everyone and everything in the name of evil. The fascists were portrayed as soulless rapists and cold killers, barbarians and rapists, perverts and slave owners. If the courage and strength of Soviet fighters were extolled, then the forces of Germany's allies contemptuously criticized: "In Donbass, Italians surrender - they do not need leaflets, they are driven crazy by the smell of our camp kitchens." Soviet people were portrayed as kind and peace-loving in non-war times - during the war they instantly managed to become heroes, destroying with their bare fists to the teeth armed professional murderers-fascists. And, importantly, the fascists and the Fritzes were not killed - they were only destroyed. The well-oiled machine of Soviet propaganda was quite flexible: for example, the very image of the enemy changed several times. If from 1933 until the beginning of the Second World War, a discourse of the separation of the images of the innocent German people and the insidious Nazi government was formed, then in May 1941 the anti-fascist connotations were eliminated. Of course, after June 22, they returned and the propaganda was launched with renewed vigor. Another cardinal turn marked by the German propaganda organs is the mobilization of spiritual reserves in 1942-1944. It was at that time that Stalin began to encourage the previously condemned communist values: tradition, nationality, churchliness. In 1943, Stalin authorized the election of a new Moscow patriarch, and the church became yet another patriotic instrument of propaganda. It was at that time that patriotism began to be combined with Pan-Slavic themes and motives for helping the Slavic brothers. "By changing the political and ideological line and the slogan" Expel the German occupiers from their native land and save the Fatherland! " Stalin achieved success, ”wrote the Germans. The military propaganda of the Soviet Union did not forget about the allied countries, relations with which were not always the most idyllic. First of all, the allies appeared in propaganda materials as friends of the Soviet people, cheerful and selfless fighters. Praised and material support, which turned out to be the allied troops of the USSR: American stew, egg powder and British pilots in Murmansk. Polevoy wrote this about the allied forces: “Russians, British, Americans, this is a mountain. Whoever tries to break a mountain with his head breaks his head ... ”. Propaganda was also carried out among the population of the Allied countries: Soviet delegations were given instructions on how to form a positive image of the USSR, how to convince the Allies of the need to open a Second Front, etc.
480 RUB | UAH 150 | $ 7.5 ", MOUSEOFF, FGCOLOR," #FFFFCC ", BGCOLOR," # 393939 ");" onMouseOut \u003d "return nd ();"\u003e Dissertation - 480 rubles, delivery 10 minutes , around the clock, seven days a week
Gorlov Andrey Sergeevich. Soviet propaganda during the Great Patriotic War: institutional and organizational aspects: dissertation ... candidate of historical sciences: 07.00.02 / Gorlov Andrey Sergeevich; [Place of protection: Ros. state University of Tourism and Service] .- Moscow, 2009.- 270 p .: ill. RSL OD, 61 10-7 / 41
Introduction
Chapter 1. Material and personnel base of Soviet propaganda 26
1. Propaganda: nature and main categories 28
2. The institutional dimension of advocacy 37
3. Resources and personnel of Soviet propaganda 67
Chapter 2. Propaganda forms and images 87
1. Mechanisms, forms and methods of advocacy 89
2. Basic propaganda images and symbols 129
3. Patriotic propaganda is the central direction of ideological work 151
Chapter 3. War propaganda: successes and failures 170
1. The effectiveness of Soviet propaganda during the war years 173
2. Miscalculations of propaganda 193
Conclusion 228
List of sources and literature 232
Applications 263
Introduction to work
Relevance of the research topic. The history of wars and military conflicts clearly demonstrates that the outcome of armed clashes ultimately depends on two factors - material and moral. In turn, the experience of the Second World War convincingly showed that the successful fulfillment of combat missions largely depended on the effectiveness of educational and propaganda work in the troops. Modern research shows that the combat effectiveness of military units by two-thirds depends on the psychophysical state of the soldiers, and only a third falls on equipment and other factors. An equally important factor in victory is the psychological and moral state of the rear. It is obvious that these indicators can be influenced by active propaganda and counter-propaganda activities.
The war against fascism became a battle of ideologies and national characters. During the period of the most difficult military, economic, political and informational confrontation, Soviet propaganda accumulated experience in managing social processes in the extreme conditions of wartime. For this reason, it seems socially significant to analyze the specific historical content of such an ideological and communication phenomenon as propaganda and, above all, its influence on the course of hostilities and the achievement of victory in the war.
The degree of knowledge of the problem. Literature on the problem under consideration can be conditionally divided into several groups. The first make up general studies about the Great Patriotic War, from which one can glean information about the course of military operations that affected the organization of military propaganda. The second the group highlights the role of the CPSU during the period under study. These are both general works on the history of the party and works devoted to the study of the features of the party's propaganda work during the war years. Third the group includes works that provide an overview of Soviet propaganda during the period of hostilities. Within this group, one can single out works in which the emphasis is on the effectiveness of the perception of promotional activities; studies devoted to the analysis of certain forms of propaganda in 1941-1945: in print, on the radio, in poster graphics, through culture and the religious sphere, as well as studies of the organization of propaganda among certain categories of the population of the rear and occupied territories, enemy troops, work with prisoners of war and the foreign public.
IN fourth the group includes works that highlight theoretical issues related to the concept of "propaganda", its structure, goals and objectives. First of all, these are the works of foreign authors who analyze Soviet propaganda from the outside. In particular, the leading aspects of Soviet propaganda were studied in the monograph by D. Berber and M. Harrison, who emphasized that the main emphasis in propaganda was placed on the Russian Motherland, which was natural, but at the same time looked like a serious deviation from the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The result of the "new propaganda course" was a conscious appeal to the past of Russia in order to ensure a "patriotic impulse". In turn, “heroes of epic victories” over foreign conquerors became role models. American historians emphasized the immutability in Soviet propaganda of the image of Stalin, whose name during the war was turned into a “symbol of the patriotic cause,” a source of patriotic inspiration and moral support. After the Battle of Stalingrad, references to "Stalin's strategy" and "Stalin's school of military art" became frequent, and at the end of the war, Stalin's identification with victory reached its climax with his acceptance of the title of generalissimo. The fifth The group is represented by literature of a source study, considering various groups of propagandistic sources: soundtracks and front and rear folklore, stamps and medals, handwritten almanacs and letters.
In general, one can distinguish four stages studying the problems considered in the dissertation.
Most publications the first period (1940s - first half of 1950s) is characterized by purposeful politicization, propaganda in style and essay in form. Social and political literature from June 1941 to the mid-1950s was devoted to the disclosure of essentially one topic - the heroism of the Soviet people in the war through the prism of successes in the ideological work of party bodies. Nevertheless, already within the framework of this stage, not only propaganda myths were formed, but also the foundations for promising research were laid.
On second Stage, covering the second half of the 1950s - the first half of the 1980s, priority in scientific work was also given to the leading role of the party in agitation and propaganda work at the front and in the rear. The study of the institution of Soviet propaganda during the war years was intended, first of all, to demonstrate the superiority of the Soviet system. However, in spite of strict censorship and total control of the party organs over historical science, there has also been a significant expansion of the research field. In particular, in the 1970s, essays on the history of party organizations in various regions became widespread, in which, among other subjects, issues of propaganda work during the war years were considered. In addition, during these years, a significant number of works have accumulated, in which consideration of the ideological work of the party during the war years formed a holistic view of the manifestation of the high moral qualities of Soviet people during the war years, as a result of not only direct ideological influence from the party and political bodies, but also as a result of the activities of cultural institutions. In the early 1970s. the first works related to the activities of propaganda bodies in the occupied territories of the USSR appeared.
On third stage in the second half of the 1980s. the study of propaganda work in the territories occupied by the German troops continued. Attempts were also made to systematize the leading directions of propaganda work during the war years. The expansion of interest in the activities of institutions and art workers during the war years, in particular, in the work of front-line brigades and the practice of "patronage" over hospitals, is also obvious.
However, a breakthrough in the study of propaganda campaigns occurred only in the 1990s, when within the framework of fourth (modern) historiographic period, a number of authors turned to the topic of the relationship between ideology and spiritual life during the war. A surge of interest in russian historiography to social history, microhistory and historical anthropology stimulated the study of the "human dimension of war." The theme of public sentiment in the Red Army was also reflected. In particular, I.V. drew attention to the prospects of studying the political and moral state of the defenders of the capital. Maximov, and V.A. Selyunin, in the first chapter of his dissertation, among other things, investigated the problems of the spiritual mobilization of workers to repulse the aggressors.
The study of the work of various propaganda institutions during the period under study received a new impetus. For example, the main goal of I.I. Shirokorad became a study of the activities of the central periodical press during the Great Patriotic War, which is estimated by the authors as component political organization and a tool for managing Soviet society. In the monograph by N.A. Sannikov's attention is focused on the study of newspapers and magazines, as well as combat leaflets of flotillas, fleets and individual warships. Separate paragraphs of the monograph are devoted to the disclosure of the implementation of such tasks of Soviet newspapers as, for example: the education of friendship of peoples and loyalty to the ideas of socialism, the creation of the image of the enemy and the unity of the front and rear. N.L. Volkovsky subjected to a detailed analysis of the changes that took place in the media system during the war years, investigated the propaganda aimed at the enemy troops and partly at the population of the occupied territories.
The gender aspect of Soviet military propaganda was investigated in G.N. Kameneva, who reconstructed the main directions, forms and methods of work of party bodies with women, including questions of ideological work in general and the activities of the anti-fascist committee soviet women, in particular. In the works of E.S. Senyavskaya analyzes the content and transformation of the image of the enemy in the minds of opponents during the First and Second World Wars. Considering xenophobia as the most important prerequisite for the emergence of this phenomenon, the author simultaneously draws attention to the influence of the personal experience of soldiers and citizens in the formation and comprehension of the image of the enemy. The use of song and poetic front-line folklore as one of the main types of sources allowed E.S. Senyavskaya show not only the perception of war by representatives different types and types of troops, but also the formation of heroic symbols of the era. In the publications of N.D. Kozlova, G.A. Kumaneva, M.S. Zinich, O. V. Friendship and V.F. Winter, among other things, contains a systematic study of ideological stereotypes in 1941-1945. A separate section of A.V. Fateeva is devoted to the analysis of the experience of Soviet propagandists in creating the image of the enemy-fascist during the Patriotic War. The author emphasized the systematic, comprehensive nature of Soviet military propaganda, taking into account the level of culture of the objects of influence. In the monograph by A.V. Golubev, on a broad source base, highlights plots related not only to the expectations of war, but also to the images of the enemy and allies in the Soviet caricature of the war years.
The works of Russian historians contain information about changes in the system of ideological influence at the initial stage of the war, show the expansion of the scale of ideological and educational influence on public consciousness, carried out by employees of cultural and educational institutions. For example, the attempt by A.M. Mazuritsky on identifying the characteristic features of the professional activity of librarians during the war years and determining its content at various stages.
Despite the numerous studies, the role of propaganda during the Great Patriotic War remains insufficiently studied. Besides, in last years separate historiographic stereotypes are being laid. For example, attempts to present treason to the Motherland as disagreement with the existing Soviet system or the conclusion that the attitude of the people to the Great Patriotic War was based on “grandfather's” rules, and there was nothing specifically “Soviet” in it. " It can be stated that in domestic and foreign historiography there is no generalizing and comprehensive study of the functioning of the Soviet propaganda machine in the extreme conditions of the Great Patriotic War.
The purpose of the study is a comprehensive historical and political analysis of the institution of Soviet-party propaganda during the Great Patriotic War.
Research objectives. Based on the formulated goal, the following tasks were identified:
identify the main structures and resource potential of propaganda;
to identify the forms and determine the main stages of propaganda work in the army and in the rear during the war;
to isolate the main propaganda images;
to determine the degree of effectiveness of Soviet military propaganda, as well as the reasons for miscalculations and the forms of their manifestation.
Research object the institution of party political propaganda acts as a combination of material, financial, personnel and other resources. This unified complex includes central and regional periodicals, news agencies and censorship bodies, party and state bodies, public organizations and creative unions. At the same time, the dissertation research is limited to questions reflecting the propaganda carried out in the rear and at the front and directed at Soviet citizens. The issues of counter-propaganda and propaganda campaigns abroad remained outside the scope of work.
Research subject forms and methods of propaganda work during the Great Patriotic War, including the main propaganda images.
Chronological framework the studies cover June 1941 - May 1945, that is, the entire period of the Great Patriotic War, when large-scale hostilities were accompanied by active propaganda in various directions and at different levels. However, in order to reconstruct the propaganda potential (including the experience of agitation and propaganda work), in a number of cases, the chronological boundaries of work are expanded for the pre-war years.
Territorial framework theses cover the entire territory of the USSR.
Theoretical and methodological basis of the research. Research approaches are determined by the following principles: the reconstructive capabilities of the available source base; highlighting two goals in propaganda: short-term, providing a mechanism for mobilizing the masses to achieve victory in a war, and long-term, aimed at political socialization of various segments of the population; taking into account the ratio of methods of direct and indirect propaganda and the differentiation of propaganda by social and professional groups.
An important role in the research is played by the fundamental principles of social history, in particular, the study of social processes not “from above”, through “official discourse”, which embodies the language of power and ideology, but, as it were, “from below”, “from within”. At the same time, it is necessary to see historical events in many ways, examining them from various points of view, both “from below” and “from above,” in the totality of political, ideological and spiritual processes.
Source base of the thesis... The dissertation is based mainly on archival sources deposited in the funds of the State Archives of the Russian Federation (GA RF), the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History (RGASPI), as well as on documents published in print.
The source base of the research, in accordance with the structure of the work, includes several groups. So, first A group of published sources is made up of party and government decrees that determine the structure, composition and general directions of the work of propaganda institutions. Second the group of sources is the propaganda materials of the wartime, which can be used to restore the main directions, forms and methods of propaganda influence. IN third the group includes official materials (summaries, reviews and information on political sentiments) and documents of personal origin (letters, memoirs and memoirs), as well as oral stories that allow reconstructing the mechanism of "feedback" in the system of propaganda work. However, when working with these documents, it is necessary to take into account the social conditioning of the thinking of their creators and their subjectivity. But along with this, firstly, for many points in history they serve as the only evidence, and secondly, sources of personal origin play a primary role in recreating the image of a person and the atmosphere of that era. In addition, materials of a subjective nature are often the expression of views and moods typical of that era.
Archival materials have a similar division, the characteristics of which are given below. Among the basic funds of these archives are materials of the bodies responsible for propaganda work (the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the Glavpura of the Red Army, TASS, the Radio Committee, etc.), censorship documents of the Glavlit and the personal fund of R.S. Compatriots, as well as front and rear letters of Soviet citizens, deposited in the funds of the leaders of the party and state. In particular, the materials of censorship, in addition to the obviousness of establishing the external "framework" of propaganda material, reflect to a certain extent the limits of self-censorship of various levels of the propaganda apparatus.
The dissertation candidate, first of all, attracted the funds of the State Archives of the Russian Federation, which directly presented propaganda materials of that period: leaflets (F. 9550), photo albums (F. 10050), postcards (F. 10048), transcripts of radio broadcasts "Listen, Front" and "Krasnoarmeiskiy hour" (F. R-6903), helping to recreate the general picture of the printed and radio propaganda of the period studied in the work. A separate and very specific source is represented by leaflets and posters, compactly deposited in several funds of the State Archives of the Russian Federation and in a number of files of the former archive of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
The materials of the TASS fund contain messengers of various TASS editions, which allow not only determining the degree of differentiation of information emanating from the bowels of the department (special messengers for Moscow and regional newspapers, for the Political Administration of the Red Army and for newspapers of the liberated regions, for front-line and youth newspapers, etc.), but also to trace the transformation of basic propaganda clichés and images. The propaganda materials of the Radio Committee play a similar role, with the exception that the funds contain a set of letters from the front and to the front. Indirect forms of propaganda are reflected in the documents of the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Cultural Workers and the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Art Workers. A specific layer of propaganda documents are the materials of the Sovinformburo and Osoaviakhim. In particular, the reports of the Sovinformburo, which were printed in newspapers and sold in millions of leaflets, were largely propagandistic in nature. Various lecturer forms of propaganda and the content of lecture work can be traced from the materials of the All-Union Lecture Bureau. And the fund of the All-Union Committee for high school contains documents covering the content and specifics of propaganda work in the country's universities.
The funds of RGASPI contain significant information on the topic of the thesis. Thus, the materials of the fund of the Central Committee of the CPSU (F. 17. Op. 125) contain documents defining the general directions of the work of Soviet propaganda in the war years. Their study allows, in particular, to see the evolution of forms of propaganda aimed at the population of temporarily occupied territories (D. 145), and to trace the main stages of planning propaganda operations (D. 155). The materials of the organizational and instructor department of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) (Op. 122) reflect the deployment of propaganda in the rear (D. 17). A.S. Shcherbakov (F. 88) provided the study with the necessary examples of propaganda texts from the Soviet Information Bureau (for example, D. 989-991), as well as information on the strategy of ideological work during the war years.
It should be noted that there is a wide variety of sources that make it possible to assess certain aspects of Soviet propaganda and its effectiveness during the war. If the propaganda materials of party and state bodies deposited in the archives allow showing various forms, methods and techniques of propaganda influence, then letters, reviews and reports on public sentiments help to identify feedback mechanisms between the authorities and society in the propaganda and agitation system.
Scientific novelty of research lies in the fact that prior to the presented dissertation, a systematic analysis of Soviet propaganda during the Great Patriotic War was not carried out. In work for the first time in domestic science a comprehensive consideration of the problem posed was undertaken, including such little developed aspects as figurative presentations and the effectiveness of advocacy. The rejection of ideological stereotypes, the use of interdisciplinary approaches and the introduction of a new set of sources into scientific circulation made it possible to bring the problem of Soviet propaganda during the war to new level scientific understanding.
Scientific novelty was embodied in the following the main provisions of the research submitted to the defense:
propaganda is an integral part of the ideology, politics and culture of any society, for which the state creates a special organizational and ideological apparatus;
in certain historical periods (especially during the war), propaganda activities become one of the priority areas public policy and one of the key factors in achieving victory over the enemy;
the main functions of Soviet propaganda during the war years were: mobilization public opinion to support the goals and values \u200b\u200baspiring to national status and the political socialization of the population;
documents testify to the effectiveness of the propaganda influence on different age, regional, social and professional "strata". The mechanism of "feedback", manifested in various verbal forms (for example, in letters and folk art) and, most importantly, in the mass movement at the front and in the rear to mobilize forces and resources to defeat the enemy, is a clear evidence that propaganda found your audience.
These provisions correspond to the following points of the Passport of Specialties of the Higher Attestation Commission of the Russian Federation: clause 4 "History of relations between the authorities and society, state bodies and public institutions of Russia and its regions", clause 23 "History of the Great Patriotic War" and clause 25 "History of state and social ideology , public mood and public opinion ”.
Theoretical and practical significance of the research... The results of this study can be used in writing general works on the history of Russia, as well as special studies on the history of the Great Patriotic War, problems of propaganda support for military operations, etc. The dissertation materials can also be used in the preparation of lecture and special courses on Russian history.
Identification and systematization of agitation and propaganda methods of influencing mass consciousness and behavior can be of practical importance. After all, agitation and propaganda to this day are the most important methods of ideological influence. The latest political technologies (political advertising and PR), despite the abundance scientific developments (as a rule, Western ones), adapted to the Russian electorate, acquire familiar features.
Approbation of research results. The thesis was discussed and recommended for defense at a meeting of the Department of History and Political Science of the Russian State University of Tourism and Service. The dissertation materials were published in three scientific articles, with a total volume of 1.9 pp.
Dissertation structure is based on a problematic principle, which is due to the very concept of work: a characteristic of the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda during the war years, taking into account real and potential resources, forms and methods of work and the relevance of propaganda material. In view of the above, the dissertation research consists of three chapters, an introduction, a conclusion, a list of sources and literature and applications, which is illustrative.
The institutional dimension of advocacy
It is no secret that the historical experience of our country was closely related to the large-scale ideological indoctrination of the population and the intensive use of a wide range of propaganda tools over the past century. This required an extensive and integral system of propaganda institutions, including material, organizational and human resources.
In general, the system of party leadership of propaganda, the apex of which during the Great Patriotic War was the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, requires a separate analysis. It should be borne in mind that the general vector of propaganda work was set at the highest state level. From the log of records of persons taken by I. Stalin on June 22, 1941, it is clear that among the first visitors (at 5:45 am), together with G.K. Zhukov, L.P. Beria, V.M. Molotov and S.K. Tymoshenko was the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army L.Z. Mekhlis. 124 Head of the USSR Council of People's Commissars Ya.E. Chadayev recalled that at a meeting with Stalin of members of the Politburo and a number of deputy chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on July 18, 1941, the secretary of the Central Committee of the party A. Shcherbakov declared the need "to increase attention to political propaganda, especially at the front," including the expansion of the army press and the delivery of political literature to the German rear. At the same time, the main political work in the occupied territory was entrusted to underground party organizations. Chaadaev testified that Stalin reacted positively to Shcherbakov's proposals and in his short speech dwelt on the content of political propaganda: “Everything can be expected from the cannibal Hitler and his henchmen, even more than what he had in mind at this time. But his plans on the water are written with pitchforks ... And the proposal to highlight these plans in print should be accepted. " On September 1, 1942, at a meeting with the leaders of the partisan movement, Stalin set the task of conducting constant political work among the population and at the same time exposing "false German propaganda."
But, of course, the party leadership of Soviet propaganda during the war years was not limited to the establishment of a common framework and leading directions of ideological work. We are often dealing with a detailed regulation of not only content, but also forms, methods and techniques of propaganda.
By 1941, the government had many effective institutions at its disposal to communicate its policy objectives to the people. The most important of these was the Communist Party's agitation and propaganda apparatus, which had cadres at all levels of its activities: activists with special responsibilities at the level of grassroots party cells, special departments and secretariats, professional agitators and propagandists at higher levels... The Soviet people were exposed to a continuous stream of party propaganda through party cells in every enterprise and in every institution, the Red Corners, which supplied people with literature and visual materials, and mobile propaganda teams.
In accordance with the main tasks of propaganda in wartime (mobilization and socialization of the population), the propaganda apparatus was a clear pyramid, the top of which was occupied by the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee. Without the approval of the latter, the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) did not take a single serious decision. Department of agitation and propaganda of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)
The structure of the Directorate, which was directly responsible for the organization and effectiveness of propaganda work, in 1941-1945 included the following subdivisions: the agitation department, which included: a group of rapporteurs on current politics and international situation; print and oral advocacy trainers and consultants; assistant head of the department for publishing campaign literature; the magazine "Sputnik Agitator"; Department of Cinematography (since February 1943); Department of Cultural and Educational Institutions (consultants for cinema, radio broadcasting and theater; sector of political education institutions); Department of Marxist-Leninist training and retraining of party personnel (sector of party and Leninist courses; sector of retraining and training of propaganda and newspaper workers); Department of Science (since May 1942); Department of Party Propaganda (lecturer group; sector of printed and oral propaganda of Marxism-Leninism; sector of propaganda of Marxism-Leninism in universities12); printing department (sectors of magazines, publishing houses, regional, regional and republican newspapers, printing and paper, regional printing, fiction, central newspapers); department of advocacy groups; department of broadcasting and radioification (since November 1944);
The effectiveness of institutions is largely determined not only by their organizational structure, but also by available resources, including personnel. So, according to G.F. Aleksandrov, made in March 1944, during the war years there was a discrepancy between the high requirements for ideological and political work and the material, technical and resource base of political, cultural and agitation and propaganda work. For example, the circulation of newspapers (including Pravda) has decreased by more than three times.
During the Great Patriotic War, the leading place among the propaganda resources was occupied by printed propaganda. The latter circumstance determined the essential place of paper resources in the organization of the propaganda space. Already on June 26, 1941 G.F. Alexandrov in a note addressed to A.S. Shcherbakova proposed "in connection with the need to ensure the uninterrupted production of central political newspapers (Pravda, Izvestia, Krasnaya Zvezda)" to temporarily reduce the frequency or circulation of a number of departmental and other newspapers, including Pionerskaya Pravda and Atheist. 194 In order to resolve the paper crisis in the bowels of the Propaganda Department in August 1941, a note was born "On the organization of newsprint production in the eastern regions of the country." Completion of the construction of the Krasnoyarsk and the beginning of the construction of the Kirovo-Chepetsky pulp and paper mills were considered the "most correct solution" to the issue of increasing the production of newsprint. Another “paper source” was the reorientation of the Kama Paper Mill in the Molotovsk Region and the Kuibyshev Factory in the Vologda Region to newsprint production.195 However, the departmental resistance of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, to which the Krasnoyarsk Mill had been transferred shortly before, led to the adoption of a rather compromise resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), which placed the main emphasis on the construction of a pulp and paper mill in the city of Chepts, Kirov region and the expansion of the capacity of the Kama plant It is significant that the construction of the plant in Chepets, equated in terms of material and technical supplies to defense construction projects, was entrusted to the GULAG of the NKVDSSSR.196
However, the paper crisis was not overcome in 1942 either. So, at the end of February, the head of the Political Department of the People's Commissariat for Railways M. Belousov turned to A.S. Shcherbakov with a request to increase the circulation of the newspaper "Gudok" to 150 thousand copies, but received a negative answer. In June 1942, the Propaganda Department opposed the resumption of the publication of the Rybnaya Promyshlennost newspaper due to the fact that the situation with the paper had not improved. As an informational “compensation”, the editors of the newspapers Pravda and Izvestia were given instructions on systematic coverage of socialist competition in the fishing industry.199 There is another illustrative example. The head of the Kuibyshev oblast, M. Semykina, in a note to the Propaganda Department at the beginning of March 1942, noted that the regional party committee at a number of evacuated enterprises allowed the publication of "Battle sheets", which in their content are actually large-circulation newspapers, and even more frequently than any large circulation ... "Boevye leafki" were also published by the field editions of the newspapers Komsomolskaya Pravda and Volzhskaya Kommuna. In addition, several cases of an increase in the frequency of publication of a number of newspapers were noted, which violated the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on this issue. As we can see, in conditions of a paper shortage, local authorities and departments were looking for various ways to circumvent the bans on the publication of their printed publications, and the controlling bodies (including censorship bodies) in every possible way suppressed such attempts.
It should be clarified that the volume of production of newsprint and printed paper at the enterprises of the Narkombumprom and before the war did not allow to fully meet the ever-increasing demands for newspapers, magazines, as well as mass political and fiction... It was just that during the war the situation with the paper became even more difficult. If in the I quarter. 1941 the average monthly production of newsprint was 19 thousand tons, and printed - 9.8 thousand tons, then in the first quarter. In 1944, the average monthly production fell to 3.5 thousand tons (18.4% of the pre-war output), and printed output - to 1150 tons (or 12.7%). It is clear that such a sharp decrease in paper production did not allow a sufficiently widespread print propaganda. At the same time, the drop in paper production was explained not only by the loss of a number of enterprises as a result of hostilities, 202 but also by the "completely unsatisfactory work of the existing factories."
For example, the Balakhna plant, designed for 11 thousand tons of newsprint, operated only at 30% of its capacity due to the fact that Narkomles did not provide the plant with wood, and the Gorky CHP plant systematically limited the supply of electricity. The Kamsky combine, capable of producing more than 8 thousand tons per month, actually produced no more than 350-700 tons. The Sokolsky combine in the Vologda region did not fulfill production plans due to the emergency condition of the equipment and the lack of provision of timber and chemicals by the Narkombumprom.
Main propaganda images and symbols
Modern researchers proceed from the assumption that the symbols created during the war years were a bizarre combination of real facts and fiction, genuine events and propaganda cliches. Of course, the content of Soviet propaganda was very extensive. For example, during the war years, only the Military Department prepared materials and propaganda information for the leadership of the Soviet Information Bureau on a wide range of issues: fabrications of the enemy press and radio about the use of explosive dum-dum bullets by Soviet pilots; about the heroism of Soviet pilots; the myth of the invincibility of the German army; indicative figures of German losses; about the mood of German prisoners; about the defectors of the German, Romanian and Finnish armies; on the relationship between the soldiers of the German and Hungarian armies; the losses of the German army on the Soviet-German front; Soviet planes "destroyed" by the German information bureau; the introduction of the institution of military commissars and their role in building and organizing the victories of the Red Army; about the partisan movement in the areas occupied by German troops; on the imaginary and true results of air raids on Moscow; elements of the moral decay of the German army; the collapse of the German plan for a blitzkrieg. 3 The Bird of God Does Not Know - 6 Drawings Transport - 5 Drawings The best enemy divisions and the best aviation units are broken - 3 drawings Waste, not a fairy tale about German helmets - 3 drawings Dog's joy - 3 drawings Feuilleton window - 3 drawings Exemplary house - panel Action of our artillery - panel Window-feuilleton - Fascism consists of only fakes - 5 drawings Down with trash from the attics! - 2 drawings An iron horse, a live horse - 1 panel But behind this broad problematic there was a certain set of images that can be conditionally reduced to two groups - positive (patriotic and heroic) and negative (enemy image) symbols, most often presented in opposition to each other ... For example, an analysis of the content of TASS frontline information for the end of 1941 - beginning of 1942 demonstrates the predominance of the following topics: examples of heroic deeds of soldiers, commanders and political workers of the Red Army; facts testifying to the "developing process of the moral decline of the German fascist armies", violence and robberies perpetrated by the German fascist invaders over the civilian population, and the "brutal treatment of Soviet prisoners of war"; materials showing active assistance to the population of the Red Army, including correspondence about actions partisan detachments and help them from the residents.321 But this does not mean at all that publishing during the war years was reduced to the release of ideological and propaganda literature. For example, in early January 1942, the Glavlit representative at the central publishing houses of the OGIZ Tsirulnikov sent the head of the Kuibyshev oblast M. Semykina the manuscripts of the central publishing houses to be put into production. Among them were not only works about Lenin, the works of Stalin and historical and propaganda publications, but also works of the classics of Russian and foreign literature. When Semykina, in a letter to the Propaganda Department on March 4, 1942, voiced the untimely publication of a number of works (for example, Pushkin's Captain's Daughter, Griboyedov's Woe from Wit, Ilf and Petrov's Twelve Chairs, and Mamin-Sibiryak's Mountain Nest) then a harsh reaction followed her letter. The department instructed the chief of Glavlit, Skochilov, to explain to the overly zealous employee “the erroneousness of her views and the expediency of publishing” these works.32 Heroic Symbols During the war years heroism was the main behavioral-forming principle, both at the front and in the rear. Quiet heroism, the ability of people to preserve human dignity in the most extreme conditions, was no less significant. Because of this, heroic symbols could not help but become objects of military propaganda. In addition, in the context of the “personality cult,” the cult of individual heroes became natural, serving the former. Hero-symbols also served as the support of the Stalinist system, since the main quality that propaganda endowed them with was precisely their loyalty to the system. The famous slogan “For the Motherland, for Stalin!”, Of course, did not arise “on the initiative from below,” but was purposefully implanted by ideological structures. But these and other symbols of the all-Union scale supplemented in the minds of people their own experience (the exploits of fellow soldiers or personal tragedies)
Miscalculations of propaganda work
As already noted, the attitude to military reality and to propaganda influence was determined by many factors, including the mood on the eve of the fascist attack on our country. Let us imagine a fairly typical cut of the mass sentiment, reconstructed from the list of questions sent to the Sputnik Agitator magazine at the end of 1940, which was asked to the agitator in the transport-horse artel of Voroshilovgrad region. Having made a short journey through the corridors of power, on January 2, 1941, from the Agitation Department of the Propaganda and Agitation Directorate of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), a letter from a local agitator, along with a list of questions, was sent to the NKVD of the USSR. In the letter, the "communist of Lenin's call" asked the editorial board of the magazine to answer "insidious and malicious" questions that put the experienced agitator at a standstill. From the extensive list presented, we will select issues that are somehow related to the defense-patriotic and foreign policy topics.469 In many ways, the hard-hitting questions were generated by the monopoly of the official communist press: “... in our USSR newspapers are like crackers - you open up and read nothing”. By virtue of what, the workers of the artel were very interested in whether Germany would attack the USSR from the west, and Japan from the east in the spring of 1941? At the same time, Soviet-German relations, undoubtedly, were in the first place: "Answer, why did Comrades Molotov and Stalin agree to an agreement with Hitler?" “Will Hitler cheat the USSR, and how is it now in Germany and when will Soviet power be formed?”; “Why and why hasn't our press been scolding the fascists since the autumn of 1939?”; "Do the people of Germany want to fight or not?"; "Why is Hitler pulling Germans from everywhere, will he not take the Germans from our republic. Germans to the Volga region?"; "Does Hitler really love the USSR, or is he double-dealing?" The Italian theme sounded most often in the context of the German one: “In what conditions do the Communist Parties of Germany and Italy work? And why are there no societies of friendship with the Soviet Union in Germany and Italy? "; "Will there be Soviet power in Germany and Italy, and when and what will happen then to Hitler and Mussolini?"
Relations with other countries were not ignored either: Turkey (“Why does the USSR not take its cities and lands from Turkey?”); Finland ("Why did the USSR not seize Helsinki on March 13, 1940, after all, the proletarians of Finland are with us? Or did Hitler ban it?"), The Baltic states ("Answer, are the workers of the soviet government really happy in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, after all they are now tails, but queues for everything? ") and the Entente countries (" Tell me, why did the USSR not declare war on England and France?).
A number of those who asked questions were interested in broader problems of the world order: "Is the second imperialist war beneficial for our revolution?"; "Answer, if the war ends, will America and England exist then?" There were also frankly provocative questions: “If, one way or another, the USSR gets involved in world war - tell me, will Soviet power in the USSR then hold out and where will the communists be sent then? “Answer, what if all countries eventually grab the Bolsheviks by the throats during the war, who will then be in power in the USSR, and will he be then?”; "Answer, what would have happened if the proletariat had rebelled all over the world against the bourgeois and the Bolsheviks, and that there were neither one nor the other, would it be good for the working people then, and then there would be wars?" All this caused bewilderment: "Tell me, because everything shows that the USSR is preparing for war, with whom to fight and when?" or “When will there be a social revolution in the world?” 470 There is, as we can see, the disorientation of the population caused by sharp turns in the foreign policy and, accordingly, in the propaganda line.
To a large extent, the propaganda bodies themselves, especially in the field, contributed to the formation of an inadequate image of the enemy. About "very strange" methods of political propaganda among the population of Rostov-on-Don reported to the editor of the newspaper "Bezbozhnik" its correspondent I.S. Zubkovsky in May 1941. According to the correspondent, in the center of the city, on Budyonny Prospekt, a huge map of Europe hung in a shop window, richly decorated with National Socialist flags, which daily marked the advance of German troops. The reaction of the residents crowding at the map to the events at the front is indicative: “he is a German, cunning”, “no one can go against him,” “he will go where
Archival documents also testify to a general underestimation of the defense-patriotic theme, in particular in such a spectacular form as cinematography. From a note by G.F. Aleksandrova "On the plan for the production of feature films for 1941", sent to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) at the end of March 1941, it followed that the Committee for Cinematography "did not learn the necessary lessons from past mistakes and was unsatisfactorily prepared for 1941". The plan provided for the release in 1941 of 45 films, of which only 3 were devoted to defense topics. Films of historical and historical-revolutionary (12) and everyday topics (11) prevailed. As for the scripts of 3 films on defense themes, they, according to the head of Agitprop, did not reflect "the heroic deeds of the Red Army in recent years, its daily life and combat training." In particular, the plan did not include films about soviet aviation, and the script for the painting "Loop" incorrectly depicted "the first steps of Russian aviation." Aleksandrov believed that the film, built on "Utochkin's frivolous charm and trickery, would not have a positive educational value." Similarly, the script of the film "Two Commanders" was criticized, according to which it was possible to conclude that "the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army perform heroic deeds not due to high political consciousness, not as a result of hard work and excellent combat training, but by chance, due to simple luck ". The author of the memo was outraged by the presence in the script of the film "Harvest" "politically ambiguous witticisms." For example, at the moment the Red Army crossed the Polish border, the collective farmers had a fashionable hairstyle "if tomorrow is a warrior."
Soloviev Maxim Valentinovich
One of the features of World War II was the active information war between the Soviet and Nazi regimes. Moscow and Berlin actively used technical innovations of the 20th century: radio, cinema, mass printing. Great powers actively studied and used methods to influence the psyche of people, their consciousness and subconsciousness.
The methods were the same for the "democratic" United States and for the totalitarian Germany and the Soviet Union. Constant influence on people, from a very early age, their inclusion in various mass children's, youth, women's, trade union and other organizations. Constant hammering into the mind of slogans, theses. Tight control of the media. Creation of the image of the enemy - internal and external. In the West, these were communists, Jewish Bolsheviks and Jews (in the Third Reich), "commissars"; in the USSR, they were bourgeois plutocrats.
The regimes of Mussolini and Hitler were distinguished by their great belligerence, the militarization of their propaganda. The cult of strength became the basis of their ideology - constant military parades, militant speeches, and paramilitary mass movements were held. European inhabitants were intimidated, they tried to break their will to resist even before the start of the big war. For example, the German film Baptism by Fire of 1939, about the actions of the Luftwaffe in the Polish campaign, was designed for this very effect.
The peculiarity of the United States' propaganda was their appropriation of the position of a "fighter for peace", "democracy", they have kept this distinction to this day. This is confirmed by the names of several American organizations of that time: the American Committee for the Struggle Against War, the World Congress against War, the American League against War and Fascism, etc. The Soviet Union sinned the same, although Soviet foreign policy was really aimed at preserving peace in the USSR, in unlike Italy, Germany, the USA, which deliberately kindled the world fire of war.
They helped in the most powerful informational impact on people, the widespread elimination of illiteracy, the growth of the role of radio and cinema. Already at that time, psychologists knew that people were divided into two categories - an easily suggested majority (90-95%) and a small category of hard-to-hear people. The work is carried out with both groups of the population: for the first, rather ordinary, simple agitation, the idea is stubbornly hammered into the heads day after day, until it takes over the masses. The second group is carried away with more sophisticated teachings and ideas.
For the illiterate and semi-literate, there were posters that were supposed to explain the essence of the phenomenon, event in the simplest way.
Cinematography began to play a huge role and is still playing. Films carry a big message of persuasion. They can be used, both for the benefit of the people, and for its corruption, deception. For example, in the USSR, socialist realism played the most important role when people's lives were idealized. He set a high social and cultural bar towards which Soviet people should strive. Films were made about workers, historical and patriotic films, for example: "Steel Way (Turksib)" in 1929, "Alexander Nevsky" in 1938.
In the 1930s, the USSR began to correct mistakes and abuses that were made after the October Revolution of 1917. Thus, they reduced the pressure on Christianity, began to restore the images of the heroes of the period of "accursed tsarism". Although back in the 1920s it was believed that the "tsarist legacy" should be done away with completely, including with Kutuzov, Suvorov, Ushakov, Nakhimov, Rumyantsev, etc. Gradually it came to the understanding that the Soviet patriot should be educated by examples pre-revolutionary times. Great figures of Russian culture - Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Pushkin, Lermontov - were also rehabilitated. Chekhov, etc.
Posters were still of great importance, the wartime painters Sokolov-Skalya, Denisovsky, Lebedev were the most famous masters of their creation; the Kukryniksy collective is the pseudonym of three famous Soviet artists, which was derived from the initial letters of their surnames. They have worked together for 20 years - Mikhail Kupriyanov, Porfiry Krylov and Nikolai Sokolov. Many of these works reminded of the exploits of long-standing Russian national heroes, as one of the posters depicted Alexander Nevsky the hero-prince, the victor of the Swedes and German knights, the invincible commander Alexander Suvorov, who beat the Turks and the French, Vasily Chapaev, the Soviet hero of the Civil War. In parallel with the great counter-offensive of the Red Army near Moscow in 1941-1942, a poster with Mikhail Kutuzov, who had defeated Napoleon's “Great Army” 130 years earlier, was massively issued.
Some of the works of Soviet artists were of a satirical nature; they drew cartoons of Hitler's leaders, in particular Goebbels. Others described the atrocities of the Nazis - robbery, murder, violence. They were quickly distributed throughout the Union, at every factory, collective farm, in universities and schools, hospitals, units of the Red Army, on ships, so that they affected almost every Soviet citizen. It happened that such campaign materials were accompanied by caustic verses, the authors of which were poets such as Samuil Marshak. The popularity of military posters and cartoons was achieved thanks to the talent of Soviet artists, who painted them in the simplest and most accessible form for people.
To maintain a fighting spirit and at the same time for a certain relaxation of the psyche of people, propaganda trains, agitation brigades were created. Moving teams of lecturers, artists, poets, singers, and actors were recruited. They traveled throughout the Union, including to the front, held talks, lectures, showed films, organized concerts, and provided people with information about the course of the war.
Cinema also played a huge role, it was during the war that famous films such as "Kutuzov" (1943), "Zoya" (1944), about short life Moscow schoolgirl Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, who at the beginning of the war became a partisan saboteur and was executed by the Germans.
During the Great Patriotic War, a series of excellent documentaries was shot: "The defeat of the German army near Moscow" (1942), "The Siege of Leningrad" (1942), "Battle for Ukraine" (1943), "Battle for the Eagle" (1943 years), "Berlin" (1945), "Vienna" (1945).
Soviet propaganda during the Second World War, both within the country and abroad, was surprisingly successful. Abroad, Moscow was able to play on the sympathies of the peoples of the world for the Soviet system and the people who suffered so much from the atrocities of the Nazis. For most people, the Soviet people were the liberators of Europe, the winners of the "brown plague". And the USSR was the model of the state of the future.
Domestically, strict discipline and appeal to deeply rooted feelings of love for their homeland and fatherland allowed Stalin to conduct such a successful military campaign that they were very surprised in Berlin, London and Washington. They believed that the USSR was a colossus with feet of clay that would not withstand the blow of the armed forces of the Third Reich.