70 years ago, the Great Wall of Fire Patriotic War swept through the lands of the Slavyansk region, causing enormous damage to every family and the entire region as a whole. Thousands of soldiers and commanders of the Red Army were killed in the battles for the liberation of the Slavyansk region. And today it is our duty to them to honor and remember the exploits of individual soldiers and entire divisions in those grandiose events.
Residents of the Slavyansky district are especially interested in learning about what happened on the territory of the district during the war years, which units liberated the villages of Slavyanskaya, Petrovskaya, Anastasievskaya, Achuevo, Zaboisky and other farms and villages. The renowned 77th Infantry Division, which played a significant role even on the scale of the entire Battle of the Caucasus, also contributed to the liberation of the Slavyansk region from the Nazi invaders. To better understand the picture of the unfolding bloody battles, the reader should arm himself with at least an ordinary modern map of the city of Slavyansk-on-Kuban and the Slavyansk region, and especially the curious will get on the Internet a map of the General Staff of 1942. In 1942 the 77th Infantry Division managed to fight in the Kuban only two months. But what a month! By the time the advanced german divisions approached the foothills of the North Caucasus and were already rushing to Novorossiysk, the 77th Infantry Division was located on the Taman Peninsula, and was urgently transferred to Novorossiysk in order to prevent the Germans from entering the city at any cost. Meanwhile, due to the fierce, desperate resistance of our rifle units, not envisaged by any German plans, the German troops first slowed down the offensive, and then by August 23, completely stopped the attacks, putting in order their battered units and pulling up reinforcements. In order to divert the forces of the Germans, the commander of the 47th Army, Major General G.P. Kotov, decided to strike with the forces of the more or less combat-ready 77th Infantry Division in the direction of the village of Neberdzhaevskaya - with an unexpected counterattack on the Neberdzhaevskaya and railway station Amanat division confused the enemy, who had to defend himself. Only on August 29, after regaining consciousness and regrouping, the Germans were able to continue the offensive and took possession of Novorossiysk, and even then with a deep coverage from the north-west through the village of Verkhne-Bakanskaya and the Volch'i Vorota pass, bypassing the positions of the 77th rifle division through which the Germans and could not get through. The city was taken by the enemy, but thanks to the gained time to Novorossiysk, units of the newly formed 318th rifle division had already been brought up from the front reserve and the Nazis stopped in the area of \u200b\u200bcement plants - the offensive along the sea failed.
Having failed at Novorossiysk, the Hitlerite command conceived a new plan - concentrating a strike fist in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Abinskaya, simultaneously with the offensive on Tuapse, with a swift blow to break through the defenses of the weak 216th rifle division in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Shapsugskaya and, crossing the mountains, reach the coast in the area of \u200b\u200bGelendzhik in to the rear of the Novorossiysk group of our troops. At first, the German offensive developed successfully, and the enemy managed to wedge into our location at 6-8 km, and the commander of the 47th Army decided instead of passive defense to inflict a risky counterattack on the flanks of the breakthrough group and concentrated two naval rifle brigades and the already small 77th rifle division. The reckoning was on surprise, and the failure of the operation threatened the loss of all available (and without that few) reserves. This counterattack was so unexpected for the Romanians and Germans that they fled, throwing all their weapons. Only one trophy machine guns were captured 145 units. In these battles, the Romanian 3rd Mountain Infantry Division was completely defeated and set aside for reorganization, but the 77th Infantry Division also suffered such losses that the command of the 47th Army decided to disband the remnants of the division, and send the personnel to replenish 216- 1st Infantry Division.
The headquarters of the 77th Infantry Division was assigned to reorganization, and the division again took part in the battles already near Nalchik. Then with battles, passing a long way, by mid-February 1943 the division was at the Protoka River on the border of the Slavyansk region. By this time, our units, pursuing the Germans, to the north of the village of Slavyanskaya, managed to force the Protoka on the shoulders of the fleeing enemy and firmly entrenched on the western bank in the area of \u200b\u200bthe farmsteads of Zaboisky and Krasnoarmeisky town. After battles on the right bank of the Protoka, by February 22, units of the 77th Infantry Division crossed the river and concentrated in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Zaboiskiy farm, conducting reconnaissance in a southern direction. The day before, on February 21, in the battle for the Vasilchenkov farm of the Krasnoarmeysk region, the division commander, Colonel Kashkin, was killed while repelling an attack of enemy tanks, and Colonel Kudinov took over. The division immediately, without rest, entered the battle, having received the task of advancing south along the Protoka River in the general direction to the village of Petrovskaya. The very next day, after a short artillery preparation, in the morning of February 23, the division launched an attack with part of its forces, conducting reconnaissance in force. Go on the attack full of strength the weather was very disturbing, because of the muddy roads, most of the division's artillery lagged behind and was at the crossing in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Grivenskaya, delaying the transition to the offensive of the 105th and 324th rifle regiments. Throughout the day, the 77th Infantry Division, with its left flank wedging along the Protoka, fought a heavy battle at the turn: the watering station - the Steinhardt collective farm (today the area of \u200b\u200bthe Galitsyn farm - E.L.), where it met hurricane machine-gun and mortar fire from the enemy. The units under fire moved slowly and by the end of the day their position was as follows: 276th rifle regiment in the central part of the Steinhardt collective farm; training battalion 0.5 km north of the watering station; The 105th Rifle Regiment and the 324th Rifle Regiment in the KOMS area (Kuban experimental reclamation station) were in readiness for an offensive.
On February 24, the offensive continued, the 77th Rifle Division went on the offensive with its right flank and was able to advance 800 meters, and the 105th Rifle Regiment entered into battle, advancing along the KOMS-Petrovskaya road, went to the watering station. On the left flank, the 276th Rifle Regiment fought in the central part of the Steinhardt collective farm. The 324th Rifle Regiment remained in reserve at the division commander in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Krasnoarmeisky town farm. On the right at the same time, the 417th Infantry Division was fighting in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Belikov farm. The forces of the division, which had not withdrawn from battles for many days, were running out and this was not at all facilitated by the spring thaw that had begun. On February 25, the division fought during the night and day in the same positions - at the turn of the Steinhardt collective farm - a watering station. The enemy repeatedly counterattacked, both from the front and from across the river, where the Germans were still stationed. At 16.30, near a platoon of enemy infantry, crossing the river. Channel from the western bank in order to sow panic in the rear of our troops, they tried to penetrate the location of the 276th infantry regiment, but were discovered in time and scattered by our dense artillery-mortar and machine-gun fire. In this sortie, the Germans lost up to 20 people in killed and wounded. By evening, units of the division were fighting on the line: the 105th rifle regiment and the training battalion - in the area of \u200b\u200bthe watering station; 276th Rifle Regiment - slightly moving forward, in the southern part of the Steinhardt collective farm; The 324th Rifle Regiment from the reserve moved to the right flank in the area 1 km northwest of the watering station.
The enemy did his best to prevent our units from breaking through to Slavyanskaya, in order to prevent them from reaching the rear of the German units located on the eastern bank of the Protoka, and also because there was an important strategic object in the village - a field airfield. The fact is that in late February - early March 1943, the 17th German army withdrew to the Taman Peninsula was isolated from the rest of its troops and was supplied only by air, so each airfield was critically important for them. The loss of the Slavyansky airfield instantly put all the troops of the left flank of the German group to the north of the Kuban River in a very difficult position - the nearest airfield was located only in the village of Varenikovskaya, on the other side of the Kuban. The spring thaw hit not only us, but also the Germans, the roads turned into a dirty mess, cars and carriages got stuck on the roads literally by the thousands. At that time, on the sections of the Petrovskaya - Anastasievskaya and Slavyanskaya - Anastasievskaya roads on the so-called "Rice Road" by the Germans, more than 6,000 cars and carts were hopelessly stuck in the mud. In these conditions, it was simply impossible to deliver ammunition and replenishment from Varenikovskaya and from near Temryuk.
Meanwhile, the 77th Rifle Division was slowly advancing. An unexpected attack on the night of February 26, managed to break through the German defenses in the area of \u200b\u200bthe watering station and our units, building on their success, by the end of the day on February 26 reached the northern outskirts of the Volodka farm - PTF (today, the area of \u200b\u200bfields between the village of Pogoreloe and the farm Galitsyn - E.L. ) and occupied the position: 324th Rifle Regiment - northern outskirts of Volodka; 105th Rifle Regiment - MTF; training battalion - PTF; The 276th Rifle Regiment was still fighting on the southern outskirts of the Steinhardt collective farm. Moving forward, the regiments took hold and put themselves in order. During the next day, February 27, no active offensive operations were carried out either, the regiments were resting and preparing for a night attack.
On the same day, February 27, while the 77th Rifle Division was putting itself in order, serious and dramatic events developed in another sector of the front. The 317th and 351st Infantry Divisions that went on the offensive on 26 February and the 417th Infantry Division covering the flank from the group of the Chief of Staff of the 58th Army, Major General M.S. Filippovsky, with a bold blow through the floodplains, which the Germans considered impassable, managed to break through the German defenses south of Chernoerkovskaya and by the evening of February 27, we reached the rear of the enemy's 49th Infantry Corps with deep coverage, cutting off the Anastasievskaya - Korzhevsky road. There was a splendid opportunity to cut the entire northern flank of the German defense into separate parts with strikes from the Korzhevsky area to Varenikovskaya, Anastasievskaya and Kurchanskaya. After that, the defense of the 17th Army on the Taman Peninsula was threatened with complete collapse. However, it was not possible to achieve the desired. Together with the 317th and 351st divisions, the 10th rifle corps of Major General A.M. Pykhtin was to go on the offensive. However, due to the lack of roads, the corps did not leave the concentration area - the village of Chernoerkovskaya at the appointed time and the divisions that went over to the offensive were forced to fight on their own. Meanwhile, the Germans, instantly realizing the gravity of the situation, urgently gathered all available reserves and launched a counterstrike. Left without support and using up ammunition, our units were pressed against the floodplains and, having abandoned all heavy weapons, in separate detachments began to break through the floodplains to the village of Chernoerkovskaya. By March 4, the exit of the surviving detachments of the 317th and 351st rifle divisions from the encirclement ended. The 317th, 351st and 417th rifle divisions suffered very heavy losses and temporarily lost the ability to conduct offensive operations - the plan to encircle the enemy's Slavic grouping failed.
However, the counterattack was not so easy for the Germans either. With the breakthrough of our units, after initial confusion, the enemy established that in his hands soviet troops there were settlements: Shedogub, Svistelnikov, Cut No. 7 (these farmsteads were located along the eastern bank of the Kurka River to the north of the modern route Slavyansk - Temryuk - EL), Korzhevsky. Our units cut the main communications of the 49th Infantry Corps, seized a field ammunition depot deep in the rear, 18 km west of the headquarters of the 49th Infantry Corps and continuously attacked the army ammunition depot in the area of \u200b\u200bCut No. 7, its capture and destruction could cause extremely serious damage the enemy. Covering themselves from the side of Svistelnikov - Gorlachev with the 1st Cossack and 4th security regiments, the Germans hastily assembled the main part of the shock group under the command of the commander of the 1st Mountain Infantry Division, Major General von Stettner, in the Anastasievskaya area, in order to strike at the flank of the bursting Soviet troops in the general direction of Shedogub (in the direction of the Voyskovy estuary on the modern map - E.L.). The group included, in addition to the 1st Cossack and 4th security regiments, the 42nd Grenadier Regiment of the 46th Infantry Division (which almost in full force had already been transferred to Crimea, and the 42nd Grenadier Regiment was supposed to fly by plane to a new location), the 2nd battalion of the 98th mountain infantry regiment of the 1st mountain infantry division and two self-propelled gun battalions. 28th of February battle group the enemy launched an offensive. Simultaneously with it, in order to cut the isthmus near the village of Chernoerkovskaya, along which the supply of our troops was going, the 13th Panzer Division of the Germans struck. As a result of competent leadership and skillful use of the available tank units, the Germans managed to defeat our two divisions and avoid a serious crisis in defense. However, this was only a temporary success, and soon, under pressure from our troops, the enemy was forced to withdraw to the line of the Kurka River.
This is how events developed among the neighbors. Meanwhile, the 77th Rifle Division, having put its units in order, on the night of February 28, again went on the offensive and during the night and day of February 28 fought stubborn battles for the capture of the Volodka and Kramari farms, but did not have significant progress, meeting stubborn resistance and constantly exposed to enemy air attacks.
The next day, March 1, only a small success was achieved - the left-flank 276th Infantry Regiment advanced 600 meters along the western bank of the Protoka River. On the same day at 18.00, the enemy, with the support of artillery from the Volodka area, counterattacked with forces up to the company of the position of the 105th Infantry Regiment, but his attack was repulsed.
On March 2, the 77th Rifle Division fought on the line: Volodka - "Kirp" - PTF and moved forward with the left flank - the 276th Rifle Regiment, after previous unsuccessful actions, began to be cited as an example for the rest of the units. By the end of the day, the 324th and 105th rifle regiments remained at their former lines, and the 276th rifle regiment, having defeated the enemy in the area of \u200b\u200bthe 2.5 mark, by the end of the day entered the garden area in the bend of the Protoka river two kilometers east of the Kramari farm ... On the right on the same day, the 417th Infantry Division captured the Belikov farm. On the left, on the eastern bank of the Protoka, the 7th Guards rifle brigade at the turn of the Babichiy estuary (opposite the Galitsyn farm on the other side of the Protoka - E.L.).
On March 3, the situation remained almost unchanged. The 77th Rifle Division, having gone over to the attack with the right flank in the direction of Volodka, Kurichi, Pogoreloe, did not have much success, meeting stubborn resistance from enemy infantry and tanks. By the end of the day, the 324th Rifle Regiment reached the northern outskirts of Volodka, the 105th Rifle Regiment advanced 700 meters, the 276th Rifle Regiment fought in the garden area in the bend of the Protoka River.
On March 4, the division with two regiments advanced on Kramari and along the western bank of the Protoka River, hiding behind the third regiment in the Volodka sector. By the end of the day the regiments were in position: 324th Rifle Regiment - in the central part of Volodka; 105th Rifle Regiment - in the PTF area; The 276th Rifle Regiment, having seized the garden, moves to the rampart in the bend of the Protoka River.
On March 5, the fighting continued on the same lines and only on March 6 there was some success - the 324th Infantry Regiment, suppressing two heavy machine guns, was able to enter the southern part of the Volodka farm. The 105th Rifle Regiment, having captured the PTF area, began to move southward. The 276th Rifle Regiment fought for the capture of the rampart in the bend of the Protoka River. On March 7, fighting again on the same lines.
On March 8, the command ordered the division to seize the Pogoreloe farm. As a result of new battles, by the evening of March 8, the regiments reached the line: the 324th Rifle Regiment - reached the southern outskirts of Volodka; 105th Rifle Regiment - on the northern outskirts of the garden of the Kramari farm; the newly distinguished 276th Rifle Regiment took possession of a heavily fortified rampart in the bend of the Protoka River, having completed its immediate task. The next day, March 9, the 77th Infantry Division ceased active offensive operations and went over to the defensive, conducting reconnaissance with advanced units in the southern and southwestern directions.
Until March 15, the division was in its previous positions, receiving reinforcements and putting the units in order, and on March 16, after finding out that the Germans had begun to withdraw, began pursuit and, meeting insignificant resistance, took Kurichi, Volodka, Pogoreloe, and by the evening of March 16 went to boundary: southern outskirts of Pogoreloe - a canal southeast of Pogoreloe, which led from the village to the Protoka river. The next day, the division remained in the same positions to clarify the situation and conducted reconnaissance in the direction of Petrovskaya and the Kalinin collective farm (today the Vodny farm - EL). On March 18, the regiments began to move and by the end of the day they left: the 324th and 105th rifle regiments reached the eastern outskirts of the Petrovskaya village; The 276th Rifle Regiment reached the northwestern part of the Neshchadimovsky farm.
On March 19, the 77th Rifle Division, without meeting the enemy, with its main forces advanced to the southeastern outskirts of the Petrovskaya stanitsa, taking out an advanced guard to the watering station 2 km south of Petrovskaya and conducting reconnaissance in the southern and southwestern directions. The next day, March 20, the 105th and 276th rifle regiments remained on the southern outskirts of Petrovskaya, the artillery of the division was also concentrated there, and the 324th rifle regiment went to the Chernoerkovsky canal 4 km south of the village of Petrovskaya. The reconnaissance found out that the retreating enemy dug in along the southern bank of the Chernoerkovsky canal. On March 21 and 22, the division did not move from its place, conducting reconnaissance, and advanced detachments reached the area 800 meters north of the Chernoerkovsky canal, and was preparing for a new offensive. From March 19 to March 23, only the artillery of the division showed activity, the fire of which destroyed 2 mortar batteries, 7 machine guns and up to 40 fascists, suppressed an artillery battery and 5 heavy machine guns.
On the night of March 23, knocking down the enemy's rearguard detachments, the division crossed the canal and by 12.00 had reached the line: Khrapko farm - mark 2.0 (2-3 km north-west of the village of Risovy - E.L.). The 276th Rifle Regiment dug in on the southern bank of the canal. On March 24, the 77th rifle division, covering the left flank of the army at the mark 2.2 - watering station (2 km north of Risovoy - E.L.), conducted reconnaissance in the direction of the Svistelnikov farm and by the end of the day occupied the position: 324th rifle a regiment in the area of \u200b\u200bmark 2.2 with forward guard at the Khrapko farm; The 105th Rifle Regiment in the area of \u200b\u200bthe watering station with forward security at the 2.0 mark; The 276th Rifle Regiment is still on the southern bank of the Chernoerkovsky Canal. On March 25-28, the division remained at its former lines, digging in and conducting reconnaissance of the enemy's defenses.
On March 29, the 77th rifle division concentrated in the area of \u200b\u200bthe 2.0 mark - Khrapko and, acting from behind the left flank of the 417th rifle division, went on the offensive. The offensive at first developed successfully and by 15.00 it was possible to reach the line: STF - mark 3.2 south-west of Zagotskot (6 km north-west of the village of Anastasievskaya - E.L.) On March 30, the division in cooperation with the 417th rifle division and 11- m mountain rifle corps advanced in the same direction. On March 31, starting at 5.00, the division went on the offensive by 18.00, reached the southwestern outskirts of Svistelniki at the Erik Chumakov line, where it met strong organized enemy resistance from the northeastern outskirts of Svistelniki and immediately, after suffering serious losses, the division entrenched on the achieved lines: 276 1st Rifle Regiment - in the area of \u200b\u200bthe bridge over the Erik Chumakov; 105th Rifle Regiment - southeast of the bridge across the Erik Chumakov; 324th Rifle Regiment in the area of \u200b\u200bindividual houses northeast of Svistelniki. On the right, the 276th Rifle Division was advancing, which managed to temporarily capture Svistelnikov, on the left, the 41st Sukhumi NKVD Division was advancing in the direction of Kalabatka (today the fish farm area north of the Krasny Oktyabr farm - EL) - Krasny Oktyabr. On April 1-3, the division was consolidated on the achieved lines in readiness, with the 41st Sukhum Division entering the western outskirts of Svistelniki, to attack the central part of Svistelniki and further to the Kurka River line in the area of \u200b\u200bthe 1.5 mark - Kalabatka. The enemy continued to conduct intensive fire on the positions of the division: heavy machine-gun fire from the side of Svistelniki, artillery fire from the area of \u200b\u200bCut No. 7 and the methodical shelling of a six-barreled mortar from the area of \u200b\u200bthe southern outskirts of Svistelniki. The divisional commander, Colonel Kudinov, gave the order to suppress it and the entire 239th artillery regiment began to hunt for the mortar, however, without much success. But at least the mortar was fired less often and with caution.
On April 4, the 77th Rifle Division at 4.00 part of its forces went over to the offensive, acting from behind the left flank of the 41st Sukhum Division, reached the southwestern outskirts of Svistelniki. The enemy began to retreat. Artillery provided serious support these days. In the battles for Svistelnikov from March 29 to April 4, 16 machine guns, two 105-mm artillery batteries, four 81-mm mortar batteries were suppressed by fire from the 239th artillery regiment of the division, 7 dugouts were destroyed, three machine guns, two carts and up to two infantry platoons were destroyed ... The bulk of the division's forces remained in place for the time being, covering the junction with the 9th Army. All days from April 1 to April 4, enemy aircraft continuously attacked the division's combat formations, making an average of about 150 sorties per day. On April 5, the 77th Infantry Division, replacing parts of the 276th Infantry Division 3 km south-west of Svistelnikov, began reconnaissance at the Kurka River line in the strip: Svistelnikov on the right, Kalabatka on the left MTF. By the end of the day, the forward guard of the division reached the line 800-1000 meters east of the Kurka River. On April 6-12, the division was consolidated and conducted reconnaissance. From 5 to 12 April, while the infantry units did not show activity, the artillery duel of Soviet and German artillery batteries continued. These days, the 239th artillery regiment suppressed 5 machine guns, 4 mortars, one 105mm artillery battery, one 75mm artillery battery, one 81mm mortar battery, smashed 5 dugouts and destroyed up to two infantry platoons. The enemy's artillery from the Svetlyi Put, Krasny Oktyabr, MTF areas 1.5 km west of the Kalabatka and Kurchanskaya farmsteads, including several heavy long-range artillery batteries, were especially active. Our artillerymen noted with chagrin the unusually fast spotting of our artillery batteries by observers and sound meters of the enemy and effective zeroing at the positions of the regiment's artillery, which led to significant losses from enemy fire.
April 13 new attack. From 6.00 am, under the cover of artillery preparation, going over to the offensive, the division in extremely difficult conditions slowly moved to the Kurka River, but was stopped by heavy machine-gun and artillery-mortar fire from the eastern bank of the Kurka - this was firing directly from the "Blue Line" - the main defensive border of the Germans. The increased pressure of our troops put the Germans in a very difficult situation, all the available reserves had already been put into battle and there was simply nothing to plug new holes in the defense. And the German command went to desperate measures, deciding to blow up a dam on the Kurka River, the water in which, due to melting snow in the mountains and frequent rains, was almost level with the ramparts. Sappers planted explosives, a powerful explosion thundered and water poured through the gully at the positions of our units, flooding all approaches to Kurka, filling the already flooded trenches to the top, and our soldiers had to hide in tall grass and reeds. Let us remind you that this was not the height of summer, but early April. And in these conditions, our soldiers had to attack! Some of the units were advancing waist-deep in the icy April water under continuous enemy fire. The division, slightly moving forward, consolidated itself on the line: 276th Rifle Regiment - 400-500 meters from the dam in the area of \u200b\u200bthe bridge over the Kurka River; 105th Rifle Regiment - 400 meters east of the 1.5 mark; 324th Rifle Regiment - 150-200 meters from the dam in the bend of the Kurka River south of the 1.5 mark. Attacks followed one another. On this day, one of the assault groups in the amount of 15-20 people, showing miracles of heroism, managed to cross to the western bank of the Kurka, but was not supported by other units, suffered losses and retreated. The opportunity to seize a bridgehead on the western bank of the Kurka was missed. During the day, artillery destroyed 8 heavy machine guns and up to 60 infantrymen, suppressed a mortar battery, two 75-mm guns, 5 machine-gun points, destroyed 8 bunkers.
The attacks continued on April 14. During the day, our units managed to reach the eastern bank of the Kurka, throwing the Germans across the river, but failed to force it without good artillery support. Having reached the eastern bank of the Kurka, the 77th Rifle Division consolidated its position and brought its units in order during the day on April 15. The most difficult, bloody battles for the Svistelnikov farm were over. On April 16, the division surrendered its defense sector to units of the 276th Infantry Division and concentrated in the Vetpunkt area. Only the 239th artillery regiment temporarily remained subordinate to the 276th rifle division in the area of \u200b\u200bthe MTF (Svistelnikov). On April 19, the 77th Infantry Division was withdrawn from the fighting and marched to the Petrovskaya area - the Chernoerkovsky - Pogoreloe canal, and then departed for other sectors of the front.
The 77th Rifle Division made its contribution to the liberation of the Slavyansk region from the Nazi invaders, earning the honor and sincere respect of the Slavs. And while we remember the exploits of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers, until then we will maintain respect for ourselves and for our own history. The Russian people have always been patient, but woe to the enemy who forces us to act.
HER. Lyutov
List of sources and literature
1. Grechko A. A. Battle for the Caucasus. M .: Military publishing house, 1967. 424 s.
2. Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (TsAMO RF). F. 402. Op. 9575.D. 75.L. 26.
3. TsAMO RF. F. 1222. Op. 1.D. 9.L. 44.
4. Ibid. L. 44–45.
5. Tike V. March to the Caucasus. Battle for oil. 1942-1943. M .: Eksmo, 2005.448 p.
6. TsAMO RF. F. 1222. Op. 1.D. 9.L. 45.
7. Grechko A. A. Battle for the Caucasus. S. 310-312.
8. Tike V. March to the Caucasus. S. 370–375.
9. TsAMO RF. F. 1222. Op. 1.D. 9.L. 45–46.
10. TsAMO RF. F. 1222. Op. 1.D. 19.L. 2.
11. Ibid. L. 2v.
12. TsAMO RF. F. 1222. Op. 1.D. 9.L. 46–47.
13. Ibid. L. 46-47.
14. TsAMO RF. F. 1222. Op. 1.D. 16.L. 9.
15. TsAMO RF. F. 1222. Op. 1.D. 19.L. 4v. - 5 vol. - 6.
16. Ibid. L. 7–7 rev.
17. TsAMO RF. F. 1222. Op. 1.D. 9.L. 48.
Monument to the participants of the Kerch-Feodosia landing in Feodosia
The idea of \u200b\u200bthe owls. command provided at the same time. by landing troops in the region of Kerch and in the Feodosiya port to surround and destroy the Kerch grouping of the pr-ka. In the future, it was supposed to develop an offensive deep into the peninsula, to unblock the troops of the Sevastopol defense. district and completely liberate Crimea. Ch. the blow was delivered by the 44th A in the region of Feodosia, the auxiliary one - by the 51st A in the region of Kerch. The landing of troops was planned to be carried out in two echelons on the 250-km front at the same time. in several. points. Formations and units of the 44th A were concentrated in Novorossiysk, Anapa and Tuapse, the 51st A - in Temryuk, Taman and Kuchugury. Landing of assault forces 51st A to the north-east. the coast of the Kerch Peninsula began in the morning on December 26, 44th A in the Feodosia region - in the morning on December 29. The transportation of troops and equipment was carried out due to the lack of special. landing craft on warships and transp. ships, in stormy weather and under strong opposition from pr-ka. During the stubborn battles of the owls. troops captured bridgeheads in the north-east. the coast of the Kerch Peninsula and in the region of Feodosia. Having mastered December 29. Feodosia, the troops of the 44th A began to advance in the sowing. direction. Dec 30. troops of the 51st A liberated Kerch and launched an offensive in the west. direction. By the end of 2 Jan. 1942 troops Kavk. fr. cleared the enemy of the Kerch Peninsula. As a result, K.-F. before. owls. the troops defeated the Kerch group of the pr-ka, diverted part of the enemy forces from Sevastopol, prevented the possibility of an invasion by German-fasc. troops to the Caucasus through the Taman Peninsula, captured an important operative. a bridgehead in Crimea, to which the troops of the Crimean Front were later deployed
North Caucasian offensive operation, January 1 - February 4, 1943
Operation map
Come on. operation of troops South., Zakavk. and North Caucasus. (from Jan 24) fr. in cooperation with Chernomor. fleet, held on 1 January. - 4 Feb. with the aim of routing the North Caucasus. grouping of pr-ka and liberation of the North Caucasus, part of the Battle for the Caucasus 1942-43. By the beginning. 1943 troops Stalingr. (from January 1, 1943 - South) fr. (5th Shock, 2nd Guards. 51st and 28th A, 8th VA, Regiment General AI Eremenko, from February 2, Lieutenant General. R Ya Malinovsky) as a result of the Kotelnikov operation in 1942 on the line Loznoy, Priyutnoye, creating a threat to the rear of the enemy grouping in the North. The Caucasus. Troops Zakavk. Fr. (Army General I V Tyulenev), brought together in two groups, defended in a 1000 km strip from Achikulak to Novorossiysk.
North. a group of troops (44th 58th 9th and 37th A, 4th Kuban and 5th Don Guards KK Lieutenant General and I. Maslennikov) - on the Achikulak line, south of Nalchik Chernomor. group of troops (46th, 18th 56th and 47th A, Lieutenant General IE Petrov) - on the Terskaya, Shaumyan, Novorossiysk line. Troops Zakavk. Fr. supported by the 4th and 5th VA. To the front in operative. Chernomor obeyed. fleet (vice-adm FS Oktyabrsky). In total, the composition of the South. and Zakavk. Fr. there were 55 rifle divisions and 41 brigades, 2 tank., 2 mechanic and 2 cavalry corps of more than 1 million people, 11341 guns and mortars, 1278 tanks, 900 aircraft). South. fr. opposed the operative. the "Hollidt" group and the 4th TA of the "Don" army group (field-general E. Manstein), Zakavk. fr. - 1st tank. and the 17th field A of Army Group "A" (regiment general from 1 February Field-General E Kleist) - a total of 32 infantry, 8 tank. and 3 motor vehicles. divisions (764 thousand people, 5290 guns and mortars, 700 tanks, 530 aircraft).
The idea of \u200b\u200bthe owls. command provided for coordinated strikes by the troops of the South. and Zakavk. fr. with S.-V., Yu. and J.-Z. dismember and destroy Ch. forces of Army Group "A", preventing its withdrawal from the North. Caucasus. South. fr. should have inflicted Ch. the strike by the armies is right. wing (5th Shock and 2nd Guards) to Rostov and cut off the escape routes to the north for the formations of Army Group "A", and the armies lion. wing (51st and 28th) to advance on Salsk, Tikhoretsk, towards the Zakavk troops. fr., in order to jointly encircle and destroy the group of pr-ka in the interfluve of the Kuban and Manych. Zakavk. fr. had the task of putting Ch. blow on your lion. wing dop. forces. Chernomor. groups of troops (18th, 56th and 47th A) to Krasnodar, Tikhoretsk, towards the troops of the South. fr., and the forces of the North. groups of troops to prevent the withdrawal of the pr-ka, to press the main. his strength to Ch. Caucasus Mountains and destroy them. Chernomor. fleet, providing assistance to Chernomor. group of forces, was supposed to part of the forces deploy active actions on the communications of the pr-ka and prepare the landing of troops in its rear.
1 jan. troops of the South. fr. went on the offensive in the Rostov and Salsk directions (see the Rostov operation of 1943). At the same time. German fasc. The command, trying to avoid the encirclement of the 1st TA, began to withdraw it from the Mozdok, Nalchik, Prokhladny areas in the general direction to Stavropol. 3 jan. North. a group of troops began pursuing the retreating troops of the pr-ka. At the direction of the General Staff, Kav. hull and tank. parts of the North. groups of troops 7 jan. were combined into a horse mechanic. group (general-leit. N Ya Kirichenko), edges had the task to go to the district of Nevinnomyssk or Armavir and cut off the escape routes of the pr-ka to the northwest. However, the pr-k managed to withdraw in an organized manner to the fortified defensive line along the river. Kuma and Zolka, where January 8-10. troops of the North. the group had to fight hard. 11-12 jan. from the region to the south of Neftegorsk, Shahumyan launched an offensive with the 46th and 18th A.
K ser. jan. troops of the South. fr. went into the big bend of the Don and the Manych canal and on the approaches to Rostov, and the troops of the North. the groups, pursuing the pr-ka, liberated the cities of Malgobek, Mozdok, Nalchik, Prokhladny, Georgievsk, Mineralnye Vody, Pyatigorsk, Essentuki, Kislovodsk and reached the border of Sergievka, Kursavka, Cherkessk. 21 jan. formations of the 44th A (Major General V.A.Khomenko), with the support of partisans and workers of local enterprises, seized Stavropol by storm. By Jan 24. troops of the South. fr. and North. the groups threw the pr-ka on the line Seversky Donets, Belaya Glina, Armavir, Labinskaya (on January 24, Armavir and Labinskaya were liberated). By the same time, 56th A (Major General A.A. Grechko), which went on the offensive on January 16, reached the near approaches to Krasnodar. In order not to let the pr-ku go to the Crimea through the Kerch Strait,
The Supreme Command headquarters ordered Chernomor. group ch. forces to seize Novorossiysk and liberate the Taman Peninsula, and to enter the Krasnodar region with right-flank formations. Jan 24. North. the group of troops was transformed into the North. Kavk. fr. (general-leit., from 30 January 1943 general-regiment. I. I. Maslennikov), to-ry received the task - troops of rights. wing (44th, 58th A horse-mechanized group of general-lieutenant N. Ya. Kirichenko) to develop an attack on Tikhoretsk, the village of Kushchevskaya, defeat the retreating units of the 1st TA pr-ka and in cooperation with the lion ... wing Yuzh. fr. to seize Bataysk, Azov and Rostov in the future to force the Taganrog Hall. and go to his sowing. the coast in the region of Krivaya Kosa, Budennovka with troops of the lion. wing (9th and 37th A) to advance on the village of Timashevskaya and Krasnodar and joint. from Chernomor. destroy the 17th A pr-ka with a group of troops. In the end. jan. - early. Feb troops of the North. Kavk. fr. liberated Kropotkin, Tikhoretsk, came to the approaches to Rostov from the south, to the Taganrog Hall. near Yeisk and pushed the prospect in the region north-east of Krasnodar. Meanwhile, the troops of the South. fr. moved to the east. approaches to Shakhty, Novocherkassk and Rostov. Troops Chernomor. groups Jan 29 released Maykop and by 4 Feb. went to the border of the river. Kuban and in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Ust-Labinskaya. On this S.-K. o ended. Partisans took an active part in it.
Despite the fact that it is German-fasc. troops in the North. The Caucasus managed to avoid defeat and retreat to the west. part of the Krasnodar Territory and in the region north of Rostov, the results of SK about had an important military. politician value. Hitler's plans to seize the Caucasus failed. Chech-Ingush was freed from the invaders. ASSR, North-Osset. ASSR and Kab.-Balk ASSR, Stavropol Territory, part of the Rostov region. and Krasnodar Territory.
Lit .: see at Art. Battle for the Caucasus 1942-1943.
Novorossiysk-Taman operation of 1943
September 9 – October 9, 1943
Come on. operation of the troops of the North. Kavk. fr. in cooperation with Chernomor. fleet and the Azov military. flotilla, conducted on 9 Sept. - 9 Oct. with the aim of liberating Novorossiysk and Taman Peninsula; part of the Battle for the Caucasus 1942–43. As a result of the Krasnodar operation of 1943 and subsequent battles to improve the operational. the position of the troops of the North Caucasus. fr. (9th, 56th and 18th A, 4th VA, 18 rifle divisions, 4 rifle brigades, 2 tank, regiment, over 317 thousand people, 4435 guns and mortars, 314 tanks and self-propelled guns, approx. 600 aircraft; Regiment General IE Petrov) reached the strongly fortified enemy line - the "Blue Line", which covered the approaches to the Taman Peninsula. They were opposed by the 17th A German-fasc. army group "A" (15 infantry and 1 cavalry division, in the operational reserve in the Crimea - 5 divisions, over 400 thousand people, 2860 guns and mortars, over 100 tanks and assault guns, 300 aircraft; E. Eneke, engineer troops). The idea of \u200b\u200bthe owls. command envisaged strikes of the 18th A and Chernomor forces. fleet to Novorossiysk and further to Verkhnebakansky and Anapa (main blow), 56th A to Gladkovskaya and Gostagaevskaya, 9th A to Kurchanskaya and Temryuk, cut the enemy grouping, cut off its escape routes to the Crimea and defeat it in parts.
The offensive began on the night of 10 Sept. powerful art. and aviats. preparation and landing of pestilence. landing in the Novorossiysk port (see Novorossiysk operation 1943). At the same time. Shock groups of the 18th A (General Leit. KN Leselidze) launched an offensive east and south of Novorossiysk. Troops of the 9th A (Major General A.A. Grechkin) began the offensive on September 11, and the 56th A (Lieutenant General A.A. Grechko) - on September 14. In the morning, 16 Sept. Novorossiysk was liberated. 18th A began to develop an offensive in the flank and rear of the pr-ka, and the 9th and 56th A pressed it to the west, towards the sea. ports of Taman. Chernomor. fleet (vice adm. L.A. Vladimirsky) and the Azov military. The flotilla (Rear Adm. SG Gorshkov) supported the advancing troops with ship fire and air strikes, and violated enemy seas. communications, as well as the landing of troops in the rear of the pr-ka, did not allow him to firmly gain a foothold at intermediate lines.
3 oct. troops of the 18th A liberated Taman, by the morning of October 9. 56th A cleared all sowing. part of the peninsula and the Chushka spit. Partisans provided great assistance to the troops during the operation.
H -T. about. completed the struggle for the Caucasus. As a result of her owls. troops inflicted a serious defeat on the German-fasc. 17th A, an important operative was eliminated. a bridgehead pr-ka, to-ry provided him with the defense of the Crimea and the possibility of attack. actions towards the Caucasus. The pr-k was forced to withdraw his warships and transports from the Azov metro station. facilities. The liberation of Novorossiysk and the Taman Peninsula significantly improved the basing of Chernomor. fleet and created favorable conditions for strikes against the Crimean grouping from the sea and across the Kerch Strait. For heroism and skillful actions, 19 formations and units received honorary names. "Novorossiysk", 15 - "Tamanskie", 5 - "Temryuk", 2 - "Kubanskie" and 1 - "Anapskaya".
Lit. see at Art. Battle for the Caucasus 1942-1943
The Kerch-Eltingen offensive operation, the 276th division did not participate in it, as it was greatly drained of blood and barely replenished after 18 days of rest. On October 28, 1943, the 276th Temryuk Division was loaded into wagons and sent to Ukraine. On the night of November 1, 1943, the Kerch-Eltingen offensive operation began. Since the divisions that defended the Crimea in 1942 were all sent to Ukraine, this operation only had heavy losses, but more than 7 km of the Kerch Strait with Adzhimushkai was not liberated.
The offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front duringZhytomyr-Berdichev operation (December 24, 1943 - January 14, 1944) began with a strike by the 1st Guards, 18th and 38th Combined Arms, 3rd Guards and 1st Tank Armies in the general direction of Vinnitsa. One army delivered an auxiliary strike to the north of the main grouping and two to the south. These armies went on the offensive on December 25-28. By the end of December 28, Soviet troops broke through the enemy's defenses on a front about 300 km wide and advanced to a depth of 100 km. On the whole, the armies of the front advanced in directions extending to the west, south-west and south. The 4th Panzer Army of the enemy could not hold back the onslaught of the Soviet troops and, having suffered heavy losses, retreated. To restore the situation in this sector of the front, the command of Army Group South (General-Field Marshal E. Manstein) had to take urgent measures.
In early January, it concentrated an additional 10 infantry and 6 tank divisions against the 1st Ukrainian Front. Pulling large forces into the region of Vinnitsa and Uman, the enemy launched two counterattacks on January 11-12. Fierce fighting continued for almost two weeks. The enemy managed to push our troops 35-50 km away. But he could not achieve more. Having advanced 100-170 km during the Zhytomyr-Berdichev operation, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front suspended the offensive on January 14. For 3 weeks of hostilities, they almost completely liberated Kiev and Zhytomyr regions and many areas of Vinnitsa and Rivne regions, including the cities of Zhytomyr (December 31), Novograd-Volynsky (January 3), Belaya Tserkov (January 4), Berdichev (January 5 ). January 10-11, the forward units of the 38th, 40th combined arms and the 1st tank armies came to the approaches to Vinnitsa, Zhmerinka, Uman and Zhashkov; defeated 6 enemy divisions and deeply covered the left flank of the German grouping, which was still holding the right bank of the Dnieper in the Kanev area. The prerequisites were created for striking the flank and rear of this group.
The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front carried outProskurov-Chernivtsi offensive operation (March 4 - April 17, 1944).
By the decision of the commander, the main blow was delivered at the junction of the 1st and 4th German tank armies in the general direction of Ternopil, Chortkiv by the forces of the 60th and 1st Guards combined arms, 3rd Guards and 4th tank armies. Their air support was provided by the 2nd Air Force. An auxiliary blow in the direction of Khmelnik was delivered by the 18th Army.
In the offensive zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the enemy did not manage to create a defense sufficiently developed in engineering terms. The front's troops, with powerful support from artillery and aviation, quickly overcame its resistance. On the very first day of the offensive in the zone of the 60th Army, both tank armies were brought into battle. By the end of the second day, the breakthrough had expanded to 180 km along the front and 50 km in depth. The main difficulty for our troops these days was the thaw. In the impassable mud, not only cars were bogged down, but also tanks. The artillery lagged behind, the supply of ammunition and fuel was disrupted. Under these conditions, the most reliable means of traction was horse-drawn transport. When he stopped too, the most necessary things were carried on their shoulders by soldiers and mobilized local residents. However, it was not easier for the retreating enemy: he also left a large number of military equipment and vehicles on the muddy roads.
Despite all the difficulties, the troops of the strike group, having tank formations in front, did not slow down the pace of the offensive. On March 7-10, their forward units reached the Ternopil, Proskurov (Khmelnytsky) line and cut the Lvov-Odessa railway line, important for the enemy. A deep wedge was driven between the 4th and 1st German tank armies. Attacking in the auxiliary direction, the 18th Army (Lieutenant General E.P. Zhuravlev) had advanced to a depth of 30 km by the end of March 10 and started fighting for Khmelnik. The next day, the 38th Army (Colonel-General KS Moskalenko) launched an offensive. The 13th Army of General N.P. Pukhov, defending itself with the main forces north of Lutsk, with the left flank, interacting with the 60th Army (Colonel General I.D.Chernyakhovsky), successfully advanced to Brody. On March 8, the 3rd Guards (Colonel-General PS Rybalko) and 4th (Lieutenant-General V.M.Badanov) tank armies reached Ternopil. Having overcome 70-80 km with battles, they used up all the fuel and were forced to stop. The infantry was far behind. The formations of the 1st Guards Army (Colonel General A.A. Grechko) were able to advance only 24 km in five days.
The loss of the Lvov-Odessa railway line, which was the main communication of the two groups of the Wehrmacht armies in Ukraine, caused serious alarm at Hitler's headquarters, because now the troops would have to be supplied by a roundabout route through Romania. To prevent this, the command of Army Group "South" urgently prepared forces for a counterattack. Enemy resistance on the Ternopil, Proskurov, Khmilnyk line increased sharply. The enemy command hastily pulled forces to this line from other sectors of the front and from the reserve. By March 10-11, it concentrated 6 infantry and 9 tank divisions there, i.e. half of all tank formations operating in Ukraine, and launched a powerful counterattack on the troops of the shock group of the 1st Ukrainian Front, trying to push them back north of the Ternopil-Proskurov railway. A fierce battle ensued, in which up to 1,300 tanks, self-propelled guns and assault guns participated on both sides. According to Zhukov, there has not been such a fierce battle since Battle of Kursk... To repel enemy attacks, Soviet troops were forced on March 12 to temporarily go over to the defensive in the main direction. At the same time, the Front Military Council took emergency measures to bring up the lagging troops, primarily artillery and rifle formations, and the supply of fuel and ammunition. It was decided to continue the offensive in secondary directions.
TO THE HEAD OF THE I-ST UKRAINIAN FRONT.
TsAMO RF. - F. 18 A. - Op. 6367.- D. \u200b\u200b386.- L. 231. -Copy.
№ 81
TO THE HEAD OF STAFF OF THE 1st UKRAINIAN FRONT.
BATTLE REPORT No. 0252 / OP OF THE STAFF OF THE 18 ARMY 24.3.44 19.05.
Map 100.000-43
FIRST - Army troops during the first half of the day 24.3. 1944 continued the offensive.
Overcoming fire resistance, the enemy cover detachments moved forward.
52 SK - overcoming the fire resistance of the enemy covering detachments took possession of: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, western part GOLOSKOVA (on the left bank of the Bug river), village GLIBOCHANSKIE, RYABUKHA, REVUSHKIE, eastern part of SNITOVKA, MALAKOVSCHINA, CHERVONY KOSAR (RUSSIAN BUDA), x. OSYKOV, PASLENOV, KAZACHKI and by 17.00 he was fighting at the turn:
141 SD - fully reached the left bank of the BUG river, (lawsuit) LEZNEVO, western part of GOLOSKOV.
A separate motor-flamethrower brigade - no new data has been received.
316 SD - one rifle regiment captured the northern part of Kh. SNITOVETSKY, one regiment is fighting on the southwestern outskirts of MALAKOVSHCHINA, the left flank is the northeastern outskirts of KALNAYA DERAZHNYA.
276 SD - the right flank - the north-western outskirts of CHERVONY KOSAR (Rossiyska Buda), the center is the southern outskirts of the Osykov Paslenov village, the left flank is without. barrow (to the north of OLD ZAKRERSKY MAIDAN).
22 SK - repulsing the enemy covering detachments seized: svkh. RAIKOVO, SHVEDY, CITY, NOVAYA GUTA, MORDINSKY MAIDAN (MAKOGONOVKA), CHERVONY ZHOVTEN, PLYUSHKI, KH.GRISHKIVSKIE, KH.STROKI, ZHAROK (north and south), KH.VOLKOVSKYE, GANYISHKYUAS, KAYDANOVKA, 17.00 fight at the turn:
129 Guards SD - the right flank - the eastern edge of the grove (2 km north of ZGAROK, western), the left flank - the western outskirts of the Volkovinsky village.
161 SD - on the right flank - the northern part of VOLKOVINTSA, in the center of the eastern part of VOLKOVINTSA, on the left flank - a grove southeast of VOLKOVINTSA.
317 SD - the right flank is the southwestern outskirts of GRISHKA, the left flank is the southwestern outskirts of VASYUTINTSA.
SECOND - The enemy, hiding behind separate detachments, during the second half of the day, with the battle retreated in the southwest direction. On the right flank of the army from the right bank of the BUG river, it resists the advancing units with rifle and machine-gun fire.
Chief of Staff of the 18th Army
LIEUTENANT GENERAL - OZEROV / signature /
HEAD OF OPERATOR
COLONEL - GRECHKOSIY / signature /.
TsAMO RF. –F. 1 Guards arm. - Op. 6850. - D.432. - L. 160-161. -Copy.
TO THE HEAD OF HEADQUARTERS OF THE 1st UKRAINIAN FRONT.
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY No. 084 / OP OF THE STAFF OF THE 18 ARMY by 24.00 24.3.44.
Map 100.000-43
1. The troops of the 18th Army during 24.3.44, continued the offensive, during which they advanced 13-19 km. and captured 72 settlements, including DAVYDKOVTSY, MEDZHIBOZH, TREBUKHOVTSY, KAZACHKI, KALNAYA DRAZHNYA, KORICHENTSY RYMOVYE, VOLKOVINTSY, RADOVTSY, LUKI BARSKYE, VASYUTINTSYNYE and the railway station KOMAMYE.
2. The enemy during 24.3.44 in front of the front of the Army covering the retreat of the main forces of 20 MD, 25 TD, 371 and 208 TD in the southwestern direction with rear guards.
Enemy aviation actions in the 18th Army's zone were not recorded 24.03.44
3. Units of 52 SK, knocking down enemy cover groups, advanced up to 16 km. captured 41 settlements and by 22.00 were fighting on the turn:
141 SD - having mastered SHPICHINTSY, DAVYDKOVTSY, BAKHMATOVTSY, RED ZVEZDA, PIROGOVTSY, RUSANOVTSY, MEDZHIBOZH and fought: on the northern bank of the river. SOUTH BUG, \u200b\u200bsouth-west of Davydkovtsy, PIROGOVTSY, western outskirts of GOLOSKOV.
A separate flamethrower brigade, having mastered TREBUKHOVTSY, GOLOV-CHINTSY, x. GLYBOCHANSKIE, CHUBAROVO and fought on the northeastern approaches to GOLOSKOV and LISOGORKA.
316 SD - having mastered ZAVOLK, ZALETICHEVKA, RUDNIA, TERLOVKA, x. FALCONS, ZAKOT, REVUKHA, x. SNITOVETSKY, SNITOVKA, ROSSOKHA, CHERESHENKA and fought: the western and southern outskirts of ROSSOKH, CHERE-SHENKA, NIZHNE, KALNYANSKAYA SLOBODKA.
276 SD - having mastered h. SOKOLY, ANYUTINO (northern and southern), x. BA-BINO, western part of Klkh.im. DZERZHINSKY (VOYTOVTSY), x. REVUSHSKY, MALAKOVSHCHINA, KAZACHKI, CHERVONY KOSAR, klkh.im KALININA, OLD ZAKREVSKY MAIDAN, KALNAYA DRAZHNYA, BZOVA and fought: the southern outskirts of KALNAYA DERAZHNYA, southern outskirts of BZOV
TsAMO RF. - F. 18 A. - Op. 6367 .-- D. 389 .-- L. 83-84. - Copy. No. 76
TsAMO RF. - F. 18 A. - Op. 6367 .-- D. 389 .-- L. 83-84. - Copy.
No. 76 EXTRACT FROM THE JOURNAL OF COMBAT ACTIONSAfter 14:00 on March 24, 1944, for four hours, the enemy's combat formations were subjected to intensive bombardment and bombardment from the air. As a result of the impact of aviation from the air, many died along the Vinnitsa highway.
TsAMO RF. - F.18 A.-Op.6367.- D. \u200b\u200b386. - L. 232-233. -Copy.
№ 82
EXTRACT FROM THE MAGAZINE
COMBAT ACTION 47 STR.
03/25/1944
As a result of stubborn 4-day battles, the corps' formations by a bypass maneuver from the south-west by 11.00 completely captured the city of Proskurov, continuing to develop the offensive in a southern direction by the end of the day, occupied the settlements of Buivolovtsy, Andreikovtsy, Verkhniye and Nizhnye Volkovtsy railways. Art. Skibnevo. Trophies were captured in the city: tanks - 35, guns of various calibers - 30, cars - 250, tractors - 4, railway. Echelon-3 (with food and other military equipment), warehouses (with food and clothing).
As a result of the battles on 25.3.44, according to incomplete data, army units destroyed: up to 2000 soldiers and officers, 1060 cars, including those burned and damaged, 38 guns, 71 horse carts, 54 machine guns, 15 tanks.
Captured: 321 serviceable vehicles, 70 tractors and tractors, 10 armored personnel carriers, 50 serviceable tanks, 77 defective tanks, 86 different caliber guns, 20 machine guns, 1000 rifles and machine guns, 30 motorcycles, three echelons with food, two warehouses, tractors and other engineering equipment , steam locomotives - 5, empty wagons 105, wagons with coal 50, warehouses with fuel 4, warehouses with ammunition 11, warehouses with food 8, warehouses with communications property 3, wagons with engineering and other property 60, captured 100 prisoners.
Trophies captured by Satanov and Proskurov are counted.
^ DEPLOYMENT OF HEADQUARTERS FOR THE 1 GRP OF THE ARMY
GUARDS COLONEL / KISELEV / -signed
Weather on March 24, 1944: partly cloudy 10-6 points, height 200-600 meters, snowfall from time to time, visibility with snowfall 1 km., Outside snowfall 4-10 km., Air temperature from -3 at night to +4 degrees during the day.
Dirt roads are difficult to pass for all types of transport.
Combat operations of the 52nd corps of General Franz Iosifovich Perkhorovich 18th airborne army of the 1st Ukrainian Front
№ 70
COMBAT REPORT No. 0245 / OP OF THE STAFF OF THE 18 ARMY 22.3.44 12.30.
Map 100.000-43
FIRST- Army troops in the first half of the day on 22.3.44 continued the offensive.
Overcoming enemy fire resistance and repelling his counterattacks by infantry and tanks captured: LETICHEV, H. KOPYTYNETSKY, KLKH. WORKER, BUTSNY, GRABARKA, MAIDAN GOLENISCHEVSKY, VINNIKOVTSY and OAKOVA.
By 10.00 23.3.44, the advancing units of the Army were fighting on the line:
52 SK - STAVNITSA, GORBASOV, southern outskirts of VOYTOVTSA.
22 SK - the eastern outskirts of VOYTOVTSA, the eastern edge of the forest, which is west of BUTSNA, the north-western edge of the grove, which is south of MORDINO, the northeastern slopes of heights. 349.6, northeastern approaches to MAIDAN CHERNILIVETSKY, northeastern approaches to MAKAROVO, on the eastern approaches to OVSYANNIKI, southwestern outskirts of DUBOVA.
SECOND- The enemy is trying to delay the advance of our advancing units by fire and counterattacks in the morning of 23.3.44.
At 7.30 a force of up to 200 soldiers from the VOYTOVTSA region counterattacked the advance units of the 276th SD in the northern direction. The counterattack was repulsed.
(Sheet 226).
At 9.30 a force of up to 200 soldiers with six tanks from the ZALETICHEVKA area counterattacked the advance units of the 319th SD in the direction of LETICHEV. The counterattack was repulsed.
From 5.30 to 10.00 the enemy, by force from a company to two companies of infantry from the VOYTOVTSY area and the forest west of BUTSNA, twice counterattacked the advanced units of the 129th Guards SD. Counterattacks repulsed.
TsAMO RF. –F. 18 Army. - Op. 6367 .-- D. 336 .-- L. 226-227. - Copy.
TsAMO RF. –F. 18 Army. - Op. 6367 .-- D. 336 .-- L. 226-227. - Copy.
№ 71
^ TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE I UKRAINIAN FRONT.
BATTLE REPORT No. 083 / OP OF THE STAFF OF THE 18 ARMY. 23.3.44 20.25.
Map 100.000-43
1. The troops of the 18th Army during 23.3.44 continued the offensive, during which, having overcome the stubborn resistance of the enemy, they advanced 5-7 km. and captured 20 settlements, including LETICHEV, BUTSNY, GOLENISHCHEVO and DUBOVA.
2. The enemy in front of the Army front with strong fire of all kinds and counterattacks by infantry and tanks held back the advance of our troops; the most stubborn resistance was in the area south of LETICHEV and VOYTOVTSY.
In the area of \u200b\u200bx. GRISHKINSKY marked the accumulation of up to the enemy infantry regiment.
3. Units of the 52nd SC continued the offensive and, overcoming strong enemy fire resistance, advanced 5 km. During the battle, the corps units repelled two enemy counterattacks with a force of up to two companies of infantry with six tanks.
52 SK received from 1 Guards. A 141 SD and its combat area. The division, continuing the offensive, captured ARKADIEVTSY, REDVINTSY, TERESHEVTSY and YAROSLAVKA. By 18.00, the division is fighting for the capture of SHPICHINTSA and on the northern approaches to PARKHOMOVTSY.
(Sheet 75)
A separate flamethrower brigade is fighting at the same line.
316 SD - in an intense night battle, she broke the stubborn resistance of the enemy on the approaches to LETICHEV and by the morning after a street battle she completely cleared the city of the enemy.
The division repulsed a counterattack by two enemy infantry companies with six tanks from the ZALETICHEVKA area in the direction of LETICHEV; The enemy supported the counterattack with artillery fire and heavy mortar fire from ZAVOLOK, RUDN, ZALETICHEVKA and a grove east of ANYUTINO.
By 18.00 the division is fighting for the capture of ZAVOLOK and ZALETICHEVKA.
276 SD - overcoming stubborn resistance of the enemy, took possession of: x. CITY, KLH. WORKER, h. KOPYTYNETSKY. The forward divisions of the division at 9.30 repulsed a counterattack of the enemy with a force of up to two infantry companies from VOYTOVTSA in the direction of PTICH.DV.
By 18.00 the division is fighting on the line: KLH. WORKER, sowing. east outskirts of VOYTOVTSY.
4. Units of 22 SC with battles advanced up to 7 km. and captured: MALYNKI, BUTSNY, GOLENISHCHEVO (northern and southern), VINNIKOVTSY, DUBOVA, MORDINO, GRABARKA, MAIDAN GOLENISCHEVSKY, MAIDAN CHER-NELIVETSKY, MAIDAN and OVSYANNIKI.
129 Guards SD - having captured MALYNKI and BUTSNY, by 18.00 is fighting: with the right flank - on the southeastern outskirts of VOYTOVTSA, with the left flank
(Sheet 76)
on the outskirts of NOVAYA GUTA. During the day of the battle, units of the division repulsed five enemy counterattacks with a force of up to two infantry companies, each from VOYTOVTSY and mark 336.9 in the direction of MALYNKA.
161 SD - having captured GOLENISHCHEVO, MAIDAN GOLENISCHEVSKY, GRABARKA, MORDINO and MAIDAN CHERNELIVETSKY by 18.00 are fighting on the line: the western outskirts of MORDINO, the eastern slopes of vys. 358.8, western outskirts of MAIDAN CHERNELIVETSKY.
317 SD - having captured VINNIKOVTSY, DUBOVA, MAKAROVO and OVSYA-NNIKI by 18.00 are fighting on the line: the western outskirts of MAKAROVO, the eastern approaches to KLOPOTOVTSY. The forward detachments of the division - high. 338.3, PETRANI (western).
5. For 23.3.44, 47 prisoners were taken at the army fronts, 20 md 208, 371 infantry divisions and 101 guards.
276 SD from report 70 from 18 army on 22.3.44 12.30 Voytovtsy
TsAMO RF. - Form 10 Guards. shopping mall - Op. 24206. - D.10. - L. 43. - Copy.
№ 80
TO THE HEAD OF STAFF of the 1st UKRAINIAN FR.
BATTLE REPORT No. 0251 / OP OF THE STAFF OF THE 18 ARMY 24.3.44 12.25.
Map 100.000-43
FIRST - Troops of the 18 Army in the first half of the day on 03.24.44, continuing the offensive and overcoming enemy fire resistance, captured: SHPICHENTS, DAVYDKOVTSY, BAKHMATOVTSY, PARKHOMOVTSY, PIROGOVTSY, RUSANOVTSY, TRIBUKHOVTSY, RURBAROVO, SEVEREVALOK, ZAVOLOKOV, southern), klkh.im. DZERZHINSKY (VOYTOVTSY), VARENKA, NOVAYA GUTA, STARAYA GUTA, CHERNILIVTSY.
By 10.00, the advancing units of the Army were fighting on the line: DAVYDKOVTSY, BAKHMATOVTSY, PIROGOVTSY, RUDNIA, TERLOVKA, NOVA GUTA, CHERVONY ZHOVTEN, CHERNILOVTSY, KLOPOTOVTSY.
SECOND - The enemy in the first half of the day on 24.3.44 resisted the advancing units with fire of all kinds, continuing to retreat in the southwest direction.
An accumulation of up to an enemy infantry battalion was observed in the area south of the Plyushki village.
Chief of Staff of the 18th Army
LIEUTENANT GENERAL - ZEROV.
HEAD OF OPERATOR
An act worthy of a real officer!
" Top secret
copies only
Chief of the NKVD Troops for protection
rear of the active Red Army
To the Commissioner state security
Comrade Leontiev
On the condition of the 276th Infantry Regiment, I can report the following:
The 276th Infantry Regiment was my neighbor on the left from 23.7.42 and had the task of protecting the crossings across the Don on the Tsymlyanskaya - Nikolaevskaya line.
Approximately 26.7.42, the 276th Infantry Regiment received a new order from General Kiselev, to concentrate Martynovka, with the aim of destroying small enemy landing groups.
The reconnaissance, organized by the commander of the 276th rifle regiment, gave a clear picture of the concentration by this time in Tesmyanovka of a fairly solid enemy grouping, up to 50 tanks and many motorized infantry vehicles.
These data, by the commander of the 276th rifle regiment, were reported to the representative of the Field Headquarters 51 A (surname - not exactly) - Colonel Sokolov, who treated this with distrust, called Major Dovzhenko "alarmist" and did not draw any conclusions.
On 27.7.42, General Kiselev ordered the 276th rifle regiment, together with the attached battalion, the artillery of the Red Army (as agreed in the headquarters of 51A), to destroy the enemy accumulated in Nesmeyanovka.
The battalion and part of the artillery did not arrive at the disposal of the 276th rifle regiment by the appointed time, and he decided to act in cash.
As soon as the regiment deployed along the heights from Nesmeyanovka, two tank counterattacks followed one another from the enemy's side, more than 20 tanks each time.
Not the name of any anti-tank protection, the regiment suffered heavy losses. Despite this, the regiment commander received an order from Colonel Sokolov to take up the defense of the village of Martynovka, which he began to carry out. However, when reaching the line of defense, it again underwent a tank attack, which finally put the regiment out of action.
The regimental commander, Major Dovzhenko, was arrested by the Special Department of the Cavalry Corps for not following the order, that is, for not being able to eliminate the enemy, and for allegedly showing cowardice.
One detail should be indicated here, the cavalry corps on the same day, a few hours later, was itself scattered by this enemy group.
The special officers of the cavalry corps with Major Dovzhenko acted in a very original way. The moment of the arrest coincided with the attack on Martynovka, and when the situation required a change of place of stay, those who arrested Major Dovzhenko got into their cars and, taking his documents and weapons, drove away.
Major Dovzhenko was abandoned and unarmed in the face of the enemy and barely made it to the location of the headquarters of my regiment.
Having told about the incident, asked for advice on what to do? We went with him to headquarters 51 A, where he was released by the decision of the Military Council.
By 30.7.42, the remnants of the regiment numbered 200-250 people. Subsequently, I saw Dovzhenko in Pyatigorsk ( the exact date I don't remember), where he told me that he was forming a regiment from the remnants of his 276 regiments and the 279 regiments defeated in Voroshilovsk.
At this time, the headquarters of the rifle division was in Pyatigorsk.
Commander of the 26th Red Banner Regiment of the NKVD Troops
lieutenant colonel signature (Serebryakov)
September 7, 42 BC
Handwritten note in ink: "believe Lieutenant Colonel Serebryakov 26.9.42." A mastic stamp on the sheet "GUVV NKVD USSR Orgstroy Department No. 6652 dated 23.9.42" (f.38650 op.1 d.613 l.198).
Below is another interesting document on the topic:
TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL
KABARDINO-BALKAR REPUBLIC
TOV. M. M. Ulbashev
nalchik
CITIZEN GLASHEV KEMAL UZEIROVICH
July 31, 92 Nalchik
214488 st. Bezenchikskaya 74 "a"
By the Military Prosecutor's Office of the North Caucasian Military District at the request of citizens
Glashevs about the execution in November 1942 of their relatives in the ancestral village
Glashsvo initiated a criminal case and conducted a preliminary investigation.
It was established that in the period from August 1942 to February 1943 in a number of
districts of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, including in Cherek, actively
gangs of local residents acted, formed mainly
from among the hiding deserters of the Red Army and persons evading military
service.
In November 1942, the situation at the front of military units of the 37th Army of the Transcaucasian
the front defending the territory of Kabardino-Balkaria was extremely difficult.
After the capture of Nalchik by German troops, the 11th Infantry Division of the NVKD of the USSR
ended up in a semicircle, since it was cut off from Prokhladnenskaya and
Ordzhonikidze road, along which the withdrawal of troops and supplies was carried out
retreating military units. In this regard, the command of the 37th Army was
it was decided to withdraw the troops in Kabardino-Balkaria through
Upper Balkaria to Georgia. Retreat of Soviet troops through the Upper Balkaria
prevented the actions of bandit formations.
Chereksky's gangs were especially active in the above events.
district, headed by Tabakoev Battal Ismailovich, Zankishiev Ismail
Mussaevich (former chairman of the Verkhne-Balkarian village council), Asmanov N.
L., Tsakosv M. Sh., Kuchyukov K. 3., Matuev A. K. and others.
In November 1942, separate bandit groups were united into a large
A rebel organization led by an agent of the German special services
Zhanguzarov Yakub Dautovich, who worked as a propagandist before the war
Cherek District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, being at the front, went over to the side of the Germans.
He graduated from a special school, received the rank of an officer of the German army.
In the village of Upper Balkaria, Zhanguzarov created the headquarters of the
organization that coordinated the actions of bandit groups. By the leaders
organizations were appointed Tabaksoev and Zankishiev (both killed in 1944 at
liquidation of the gang). General management of the activities of the insurgent
organization was carried out from Nalchik through a representative of German
special services - Makharadze (former colonel of the Red Army, went over to the side
germans).
From November 20, the bandit groups of Upper Balkaria began to attack both separate
the Red Army, and small army units, join
gunfight with anti-bandit squads trying to block the road going
through the villages of Souty, Mukhol and Georgia.
November 21-23, 1942 Tabakoev's bandit group of up to 200 people
occupied the commanding heights around the village of Mukhol and Souty and launched attacks
to these settlements. 3rd squadron of the cavalry regiment and 1st battalion 276
infantry regiment of the 11th SD VV of the NKVD of the USSR fought these days defensive battles against
this bandit group. In the village Souty bandits captured a unit
anti-aircraft gunners 772 artillery regiment PZO and one gun. Captured gun bandits
fired at the buildings of the regional executive committee and the hospital. Subsequently, the building of the district executive committee
was burned.
In the same village, bandits carried out searches and robberies in the homes of local residents.
from among the activists and communists who went to the front in partisan detachments.
The military garrison of the village of Mukhol took refuge in the building of the district hospital, then retreated
at night from this village.
The losses of the 11th Rifle Division of the Internal Troops of the NKVD of the USSR in the indicated clashes with the gang for
the period from 21 to 25 November were 5 killed and 5 wounded.
The commander of the 37th Army, Major General Kozlov N.M., having learned about the Baid insurgent
performance in the Cherek region of Kabardino-Balkaria, set the task of acting
the commander of the 11th Rifle Division of the Internal Troops of the NKVD of the USSR, Lieutenant Colonel Shikip, take measures to eliminate
bandit groups of the Cherek region.
On November 26, 1942, Lieutenant Colonel Shikin ordered the commander of the 278th Infantry Company
regiment of the 11th division of the VV NKVD of the USSR to Captain Nakin F.D. to form a fighter
a detachment of 150-200 people from among the fighters of the 278th joint venture and local
activists, the forces of this detachment to liquidate the BAPD insurgency.
At the same time, the detachment was tasked with destroying the bandits and their accomplices on
location.
On the night of November 26, 1942, a detachment under the command of Captain Nakin approached
to the villages of Central Balkaria. From the village of Souty, Kumyum and Mukhol, the detachment was
fired at by small arms and an anti-aircraft gun previously captured by bandits.
Having an instruction from Lieutenant Colonel Shikin that if armed
resistance, act decisively, up to the use of all types of weapons,
captain Nakin gave the order to use weapons.
By 6.00 on 20.11.1942, s. Souty was taken with a fight. At the same time, during the battle, died
many women and children, as the bandits fired from residential buildings. Captain
Nakin, having captured the village of Souty, ordered to burn all the houses from where the bandits
put up armed resistance, as well as houses and buildings of the bandits. In
execution of this order in with. Souta, 40% of all houses were burned down.
By order of Captain Nakin, simultaneously with the group advancing on the village. Souts,
another group in the amount of 35 people took possession of located 3 km from the village. Souts,
in the mountains, by the village of Glashevo and advanced to the village of Verkh. Cheget, but under
strong fire from bandits was forced to retreat to the village without completing the operation
Souty, where in the evening of the same day she joined the main detachment.
When capturing the village of Glashevo local residents no armed
resistance. However, by order of Captain Nakin, the fighter
detachment Nastayev Ali, Kaygermazov Chokka, Osmanov and others
more than 63 people were shot in this village by unidentified persons.
On November 28, 1942, Captain Nakin reported to the headquarters of the 11th Rifle Division of the Internal Troops of the NKVD of the USSR
that during the operation to capture the village of Sauty, Glashevo and Upper
Cheget there were numerous casualties among the civilian population due to the
that the battles were fought directly in the indicated settlements.
The commander of the 37th Army, Major General Kozlov, having learned about the deaths of civilians,
ordered an official investigation into these facts. Investigation
it was found that, through the fault of Captain Nakin, under the pretext of destroying
unreasonable executions of the local population were allowed to accomplices of the bandits.
Thus, Captain Nakin, being the commander of the 11th rifle division
VV NKVD USSR, that is, the person of the commanding staff, gave the order to subordinates
shoot residents of the village of Glashevo who are not bandits and their accomplices,
than exceeded the authority and authority given to him, which entailed
especially grave consequences - illegal execution of more than 63 citizens, including
children, that is, he committed a crime under Art. 193-17 item "b" of the Criminal Code
RSFSR - 1926 (excess of power in the presence of especially aggravating
circumstances).
In 1942-43, the decision on this crime by F. Nakin was not made, since
he died on January 9, 1943.
Currently, the criminal case has been terminated on the basis of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR, that is
in view of the death of F.D. Nakin, who is guilty of the execution of residents
the village of Glashevo.
I ask you to notify all interested parties about the decision taken and explain to them
that they have the right to appeal this decision to the military prosecutor of the North Caucasus Military District.
Investigator for especially important cases of the VP SKVO
A. Mokritsky
The current archive of the Supreme Council of the KBR.
http://alanforum.com/index.php?showtopic\u003d172
from the combat report of Captain Nokin - “the enemy's strength in the village. V. Balkaria has ... up to 150 people, weapons - rifles, light machine guns and cannons ... In Mukhol there are 80 people of German submachine gunners and up to 200 armed bandits ... have guns ... the entire population revolted without exception "20:00 30.11.42. From the report of the commander of the detachment, Captain F. Nakin, Lieutenant Colonel Shikin: “I report that at 5.00 on 30.11.42 I captured the village of V. Balkaria and Kumyun .... I have losses - 14 wounded and 2 killed. These data differ, with the indicated investigator - 5 killed and 5 wounded.
What can I say, war is not an occupation for the slobber, and the commander and his subordinates are doomed to accurately and on time to fulfill the combat missions set by the command. Otherwise, according to the laws of wartime .... The investigator kept silent about whose order the battalion commander was carrying out, he did not confirm, and the data spread everywhere that 1,500 civilians were killed on his order, the investigator indicates: "that 63 people were shot by unidentified persons. , he does not give any other quantitative data!. And today in the Caucasus, bandits continue to hide behind civilians ...
I personally have reasonable doubts about the authenticity and objectivity of this procedural document. To begin with, any of his conclusions, the investigator, as a rule, makes references to documents or testimonies of witnesses, expert opinions, etc. None of this is in the document posted on dubious sites and unreasonably unreasoned by other authors. And on the dead, you can blame anything you want, but those who live today should not allow this to be done in order to preserve the memory of the heroes who laid down their heads in battles with the hated German fascist invaders, to prevent attempts to falsify history and justify traitors to the Motherland, no matter what nationality they are. had.
OWL. SECRET
STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE
DECISION No. GKO-207ss
from July 19, 1941 Moscow, Kremlin
ON THE FORMATION OF NEW DIVISIONS
1. To approve the following deadlines for the completion of the formation of rifle divisions:
276 RD - OrVO - dislocation Oboyan - by 30.07.41. (center of Oboyansk district, Kursk region).
2. To allow the NKO to accelerate the formation of the first 30 divisions with a period of readiness until August 1 to use a variable composition of 6 reserve brigades and 37 march battalions in order to replenish these reserve brigades called up for mobilization and withdrawn from the front line.
3. Approve the following weapons for each SD:
Rifles - 11,000 pieces
Light machine guns - 162
Heavy machine guns - 108
PPSh - 162
Mortars 50 mm - 54
Mortars 82 mm - 18
Mortars 120 mm - 6
45-mm anti-tank guns - 18
76 mm regimental cannons - 12
76 mm divisional guns - 16
85 mm anti-aircraft guns - 4
122 mm howitzers - 8
37 mm anti-aircraft guns - 6
Truck vehicles - 120
Tractors STZ-5 - 12
7. To oblige the Commanders of the troops of the Districts to find weapons for the formed divisions from the presence in the troops, in the district warehouses and repair bases in accordance with Appendix 1.
8. To oblige Comrade Kulik by July 23 to submit additional proposals for providing the 26th rifle division, formed by August 20, with 333 45-mm anti-tank guns. and 76 mm divisional guns in the amount of 206 pcs.
CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE
DEFENSE COMMITTEE I. STALIN
________________________________________
Extracts sent to: com. Zhukov, Malenkov - everything; Kulik - p. 8
The combat composition of the division:
871, 873 and 876 Infantry Regiment,
852 artillery regiment,
353 separate anti-tank battalion,
372 reconnaissance company,
568 sapper battalion,
748 separate battalion communications (255 separate communications company),
316 health battalion,
381 separate company of chemical protection,
325 (743) motor transport company,
499 (427) field bakery,
323 (668) divisional veterinary infirmary,
2145 (963) field post station,
590 (847) field cash desk of the State Bank.
Combat period
20.8.41-5.12.41
4.3.42-20.5.42
To defend the northern approaches to the Crimea, 276 and 271 rifle divisions, 40 and 42 cavalry divisions were transferred to Northern Tavria. August 14, 1941 by directive General Staff the management of the 51st army was formed, which included 156, 106, 271 and 276 rifle, 40, 42 and 48 cavalry divisions. 51 army was created on the rights of the front with the operational subordination of the Black Sea Fleet to it.
Colonel General F.I.Kuznetsov was appointed commander of the army, corps commissar A.S. Nikolaev was a member of the Military Council, and Major General M.M. Ivanov was chief of staff.
The leadership of the 51st Army found itself in a very difficult position. Two weeks after his arrival, skirmishes began with the reconnaissance detachments of Manstein's 11th Army approaching from the Dnieper. It was necessary to create new divisions, train and arm them, in the Crimea there were no stocks of weapons, not even rifles. The formations that arrived in August from the mainland - 2 rifle and 3 cavalry divisions - were small in number, the rank and file had not yet been trained, the material part was scanty. From the beginning to the end of the battle for Crimea in the fall of 1941, the commander of the 51st Army did not have at his disposal an artillery "fist" in the form of army artillery brigades with which he could influence the course of the battles. The only opportunity is to take artillery from the divisions scattered throughout the peninsula and therefore doomed to inaction, but the commander did not dare to take such a risk.
By order of the army commander issued after the German troops reached the western bank of the Dnieper in the Kakhovka area, 3 divisions of the 9th corps were moved north - the 276th division (Major General I.S.Savinov) to the Chongarsky peninsula and the Arabat arrow, 106 -I-stretched for 70 kilometers along the southern bank of the Sivash to the Perekop positions. 3 cavalry divisions - the 48th under the command of Major General DI Averkin, the 42nd (commanded by Colonel V.V. Glagolev) and the 40th (commanded by Colonel F.F.Kudyurov) - had antiamphibious missions; 271st Division of Colonel MA Titov - on antiamphibious defense in the area of \u200b\u200bSimferopol; 4 divisions formed in Crimea - 172th motorized colonel I.G. Toroptsev, 184th colonel V.N. Abramov, 320th colonel M.V. Vinogradov, 321st colonel I.M. Aliyev - were put on the defensive the coast. This order of battle was basically maintained throughout all the autumn battles.
By the second half of September, the German command concentrated in Northern Tavria the 11th army, consisting of 11 divisions and a large number of aviation, setting this grouping the task of capturing the Crimean peninsula. Manstein's 11th Army had the following forces: General Zalmuth's 30th Army Corps (22nd, 72nd, 170th Infantry Divisions); General Hansen's 54th Army Corps (46th, 50th, 73rd Infantry Divisions); General Kobler's 49th Army Corps (1st and 4th Mountain Divisions); motorized SS divisions "Adolf Hitler" and "Viking". In addition, Manstein had at his disposal up to 40 regiments of artillery. It was supported by the 4th Aviation Corps consisting of the 77th Fighter Squadron (Me-109 - 150 aircraft) and two bombing squadrons (Ju-87 - over 100 aircraft, Heinkel-111 - up to 100 aircraft).
On September 15, 1941, the enemy launched an offensive. Its units captured the Salkovo station and reached the Arabat spit. 17 - 18 September 1941 in the area of \u200b\u200bSalkovo and the Arabat spit, the 276th Infantry Division held the defensive position. The division was withdrawn to the defense area with extreme delay, and did not manage to master it. We have lost Salkovo.
The main enemy forces were developing an offensive against Perekop and Armyansk. September 24-26, 1941, for three days, the 156th division's single combat with the enemy in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Perekop shaft; the Germans were forced to literally gnaw through its defenses. On September 26, the Germans, operating along the Perekop Bay, broke through with part of their forces on the Perekop shaft and captured Armyansk. At that moment, our operational group of troops launched a counterstrike. 3 days of very fierce fighting. The Germans were driven out of Armyansk, part of their forces were thrown back behind the Perekop shaft, part of them was pressed against it near the coast of the bay. One side, then the other counterattacked. The northwestern part of Armyansk is now in our hands, now in the hands of the Germans. By the evening of September 28, by order of the army commander, our troops withdrew to the Pyatiozero in battles. From September 29 to October 4, 1941, the Germans tried to break through to Ishun, they were again stopped here by the 156th division. The reason for the breakthrough of our defense was primarily due to the fact that, despite the presence of sufficiently large forces on the territory of Crimea in general, only the 156th Infantry Division of the Red Army was initially located in the place of the breakthrough of the German troops. When other units of the reserve group (271 RD, 172 MD and 42 CD) and, above all, the 172nd Motorized Division with the 5th Panzer Regiment moved to the aid of this formation, it was too late.
Taking into account the created situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on September 30 made a decision to evacuate all the troops of the Primorsky Army from Odessa and submit them to the commander of the 51st Army. The troops received the task of holding the Arabat Spit, the Chongarsky Isthmus and Ishun positions and preventing the enemy from further advancing deep into the Crimea. On September 30, 1941, in Simferopol, a directive was received from Moscow, setting the 51st Army with the task of "holding the Crimean isthmuses with all its might."
Having mastered the Perekop positions, the command of the 11th German army did not dare to start the battle for the Five Lakes with all their forces. With the advance detachments, the enemy probed the defile, trying to capture key positions. In early October 1941, the enemy decided to storm the Ishun positions. After fierce battles, the attacks of the German troops were repelled and the German command did not undertake any active actions until October 16. Everyone was preparing for new decisive battles.
On October 16, 1941, German troops pushed back the armies of the Southern Front in the direction of Taganrog. In Crimea, this message was accepted as the first signal of imminent danger. Indeed, 48 hours later, the 11th Army of the Wehrmacht began attacks on the Ishun positions. After the enemy broke through to Krasnoperekopsk, a bloody nine-day battle unfolded on the Ishun plateau - a relatively small area bounded from the north by lakes Staroye, Krasnoye, Kiyatskoye, from the south by the Chatyrlyk river, which flows into the Karkinitsky bay, and from the east by the line of the village of Urzhinka (Smushki. The defense was held by the formations of the 9th corps, these are the 106th division of Colonel A.N. Pervushin, 271st Colonel M.A.Titov, 157th Colonel D.I. Tomilov, 48th Cavalry Division of General D.P. Averkin and 42nd - Cavalry Division of Colonel V.V. Glagolev, who was the right neighbor of the 172nd Division of Colonel I.L. Laskin. Since from the side of Urzhin the enemy only covered himself with Romanian cavalry units, A. N. Pervushin's division did not take direct part in the battles of October 18–20, but with its fire provided invaluable assistance to the units of the operational group in the Proletarka area. On the evening of October 19, the 170th German Infantry Division with which more than 30 StuG III assault installations operated, escaped to the mouth of the Chatyrlyk. With a counterattack of the 5th tank regiment and rifle units, I.A.Laskin threw back the enemy. From that moment on, the battle did not subside on Chatyrlyk. Here the Germans have directed large forces.
In general, the German command turned out to be more operational. By the beginning of the battles, it is essentially. covered in the area of \u200b\u200bGenichesk Romanian units, and all the main forces were thrown on Krasnoperekopsk and Ishun. The 276th division calmly remained on Chongar until its withdrawal to Kerch. While the commander F.I.Kuznetsov, on a difficult day on October 20, categorically ordered "Batov's operational group to stubbornly hold the Ishun positions", generals I.F.Dashichev, I.S.Savinov received an order from him to "stubbornly defend Chongar, Sivash ... "where there were virtually no German attacks.
On October 22, 1941, Vice-Admiral G.I. Levchenko arrived at the command post of the operational group from Sevastopol. By the decision of the Headquarters to combine the actions of land and naval forces Crimea created a single command. The vice-admiral was appointed commander, and General P.I.Batov - his deputy. GI Levchenko soberly assessed the situation, the difficulties of defense and understood that it was now almost impossible to correct mistakes and quickly gather into a fist the units and formations scattered along the coast and inside the Crimea. The only thing you can count on besides your own forces is on the divisions of the Primorsky armies of I.E. Petrov. "They will arrive at the scene of the fighting on October 24th." It was felt that the naval command lived with one desire and task: to save Sevastopol from an attack from land. Leaving, the vice admiral said that at this time the task force of several divisions still remained, but, obviously, in the near future it would be more expedient to transfer all the troops to the commander of the Primorsky Army.
Meanwhile, battles raged on Chatyrlyk. Colonel I. A. Laskin, like an armored fist, fought off the advancing German troops with the tank regiment of Major S. P. Baranov. On October 20 and 21, 3 German divisions (72, 73, 170) tried to break through the defenses. Enemy tanks could not pass the swampy river bed, but the infantry, with the support of artillery and aviation, broke into our trenches in places. The 514th regiment of I.F.Ustinov and the 383rd regiment of V.V. Shashlo counterattacked the enemy several times a day and threw him back behind Chatyrlyk.
On October 24, Soviet troops from the operational group of PI Batov launched a last desperate counterattack. At the same time, the troops of General I.E. Petrova. Immediately after unloading from the ships, the commander of the Primorsky Army ordered the 25th, 95th rifle divisions and the 2nd cavalry divisions, which were poorly manned, and especially artillery, to immediately go to the front line. The offensive with the aim of delivering a counterattack against the enemy that had broken through in the Ishun direction began and took place in the absence of the necessary artillery support.
The counterattack of the Maritime Army was met with massive enemy artillery fire and a large group of German bombers under the cover of fighters. The planned participation of the Black Sea Fleet warships as fire support from the Karkinitsky and Perekopsky bays could not take place due to the impossibility of approaching the coast due to the lack of depths for cruisers. By this time shallow vessels were out of order. Thus, this part of the forces of the Primorsky army did not have the opportunity to influence the course and outcome of the battles for the Ishun positions. With their small forces, the formations of the operational group and the Primorsky army fought off renewed enemy attacks. It was on this day, October 26, that Manstein sent a new 132nd Infantry Division from the 42nd Army Corps to Vorontsovka, followed by the 22nd Infantry Division.
On October 26-27, the Soviet defense was broken through in a number of sectors. Our troops began to retreat south.
German troops began to develop an offensive in two directions: 4 infantry and motorized divisions - to Sevastopol; 5 infantry, motorized divisions and 2 cavalry brigades - to the Kerch Peninsula.
On October 31, 1941, the Germans captured Yevpatoria and cut the highway and railroad to Simferopol. There was a threat of interception of communications and the defeat of the Primorsk and 51st armies in the steppe part of the Crimea.
The Soviet command decided to withdraw the 51st Army in the direction of Feodosia, Kerch, and Primorskaya - to Simferopol, Sevastopol for the defense of the main base of the Black Sea Fleet.
On the night of November 1, 1941, the enemy occupied Simferopol. In addition, the Germans managed to forestall our retreating units and capture the mountain defiles, through which the shortest routes passed. As a result, the Maritime Army was forced to retreat through the mountains along the route Alushta, Yalta, Sevastopol. The 51st Army fought back to Feodosia and Kerch.
Withdrawal of the troops of the 9th rifle corps on the Kerch Peninsula was carried out in the most difficult conditions. The 156th, 271st and 157th rifle divisions retreated to Kerch; they fought heroically in the Ishun positions and there they expended almost all their strength. But 2 full-blooded divisions also retreated to Kerch: the 106th A.N. Pervushin and the 276th I.S.Savinov. However, they acted on their own, not under the control of the corps commander.
On the way to the Kerch Peninsula, our retreating formations used every line that could be caught in order to hold back the German divisions. Colonel Titov arrived at the NP to Pervushin (the commander of the 106th division): "The Germans are entering the Armyansk - Dzhankoy railway." Here, in the Chokrak (Istochnoye) - Chirik (Chapaevo) area, the 106th gave the enemy a battle. The division commander moved the 534th rifle regiment of Lieutenant Colonel A.G. Sergeev and the howitzer regiment of G. B. Avin here. And at Istochny, the 534th regiment stood perfectly at the turn, detained the enemy for three days and thus prevented him from cutting off our units at Sivash on Chongar. Further, the division withdrew to Dzhankoy. Shooting was already going on in the streets. Horse scouts rushed by: German tanks appeared and crushed one of our batteries. One of the commanders had a battery of 76mm cannons at the headquarters and deployed it along the street. The enemy attack immediately died out.
For two last days October 106th division, together with units from the 271st and 276th divisions, fought a defensive battle on the line of the Salgir River, southeast of Dzhankoy.
On the Akmonai positions, blocking the enemy's path to the Kerch Peninsula proper, our formations entered the night of November 4, having suffered heavy losses in personnel, having several shells per gun and ten to one and a half cartridges per rifle. And yet they fought off enemy attacks for two days. From a report on the operational situation for November 6: "Dashichev's group, having a weakened combat strength, under the onslaught of 5 infantry divisions, 2 cavalry brigades (Romanians) was forced to leave the Akmonai positions and retreat to the line: Astaban (Kamyshenka), Karach (Kuibyshevo), Kerleut (Moshkarovo), Kopyl (60 kilometers west of Kerch) ". Everything is correct here, except for one thing: there was no "Dashichev group". Due to a lack of forces, Soviet troops could only conduct a mobile defense. After three days of fighting, the German command pulled up a fresh 170th Infantry Division of the 30th Army Corps from the reserve. It became clear that the Red Army would not be able to keep the city and the fortress of Kerch. Therefore, by order of the Headquarters, the withdrawal of troops to the Taman Peninsula began. The artillery, which had no shells, crossed to the Taman Peninsula first, together with hospitals and medical battalions. Large-caliber guns, which safely crossed the Kerch Strait on barges, took up firing positions on the Chushka Spit on November 16. There they received an ammunition load of shells from the artillery bases of the Transcaucasian Front. This made it possible to strengthen the fire cover of the rearguards retreating through Yenikale following the main forces of our divisions.
On November 16, 1941, after stubborn battles, the 51st Army, by order of the Supreme High Command, left the city of Kerch.
In November she was evacuated to the Kuban and included in the Transcaucasian (from December 30 - Caucasian) front.
In December 1941, the 276th Rifle Division was part of the North Caucasian Military District.44
On February 15, 1942, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered the immediate transfer of the 271th, 276th, and 320th rifle divisions from the North Caucasian Military District to reinforce the Crimean Front.
In order to unite the efforts of the Crimean and North Caucasian Fronts, as well as the Black Sea Fleet, on April 21, 1942, the High Command of the North Caucasian Direction was formed, headed by Marshal Soviet Union S.M.Budyonny, to whom the Crimean Front, the Sevastopol defensive region, the North Caucasian Military District (later the front) were subordinated, Black Sea Fleet (together with the Azov military flotilla).
SM Budyonny began by strengthening the combat capability of troops in Sevastopol and on the Kerch Peninsula. On April 28, he arrived in the village of Leninskoye at the command post of the Crimean Front and made recommendations on strengthening the defense, echeloning it, creating reserves, changing command posts, since, having stopped the offensive, the front troops continued to maintain their previous combat formations.
The German command, planning a strike on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front towards the Transcaucasus in the new campaign of the summer of 1942, decided beforehand, before the offensive of the main forces, to improve the operational position of its troops, primarily by capturing the entire Crimea. It planned first to block the Crimean peninsula and cut it off from Novorossiysk and other ports of the Caucasus, defeat the most powerful group of Soviet troops in the Crimea - the Crimean Front and capture the Kerch Peninsula, and then take Sevastopol by decisive assault. The capture of the Crimea created favorable conditions for the enemy for an offensive into the Caucasus from Rostov both by land and through the Kerch Strait.
By May 8, 1942, the Crimean Front included 16 rifle and one cavalry divisions, 3 rifle and 4 tank brigades, 3 tank battalions, 9 artillery regiments of the High Command reserve, 3 regiments of guards mortars and other, smaller units. The enemy was inferior: in manpower - 2 times, in tanks - 1.2 times, in artillery - 1.8 times. The Germans, however, had a larger air force - 1.7 times.
Preparing for the offensive, at the end of April and early May, the enemy carried out intensified aerial reconnaissance of the Kerch Peninsula, systematically carried out strikes with bomber aircraft along the lines of communication of our troops, made an enhanced supply of ammunition, concentrated aviation at airfields in the Crimea and on the Black Sea coast, and replenished tank units.
The troops of the Crimean Front, after unsuccessful attempts to seize Koi-Asan and other points through private operations, having significant losses, put themselves in order (restored materiel, replenished with personnel), going on the defensive. The theater of military operations at that time was the Kerch Peninsula (from north to south from 18 to 24 km, from east to west - 80 km - from Kerch to Koi-Asan, not counting the narrowest part to the east of Kerch).
As part of the front troops, 44 A was defended, which had 276, 396, 157 rifle divisions and 63 rifle divisions. The army was reinforced by three artillery regiments, one regiment and a separate rocket artillery battalion. In connection with the preparations for the offensive of the front forces, the army and divisions had narrow stripes and a small depth of defense. In the 9 km wide defense zone of the army, the average density of artillery was about 54 guns (of which 13 were anti-tank ones), mortars and combat vehicles of the RA per 1 km of the front. The 276 Rifle Division and 63 Rifle Division, which defended themselves in the first echelon, were reinforced by 422 and 961 APs from the second echelon formations, respectively. In the divisions of the first echelon, artillery support groups for infantry (consisting of one or two divisions) and a long-range group (consisting of two or three divisions) were created. The army artillery group consisted of 457 and 53 popes. Rocket artillery units made up an army group of guards mortar units. Thus, the artillery grouping also continued to remain offensive, although the army command knew that the enemy was preparing for an offensive. The artillery prepared concentrated and defensive fire in front of the leading edge and on the flanks. Mainly artillery fire was planned in divisions. Preparation of massive artillery fire on an army scale was not envisaged, especially for counterpreparations. Therefore, on the eve of the enemy's artillery preparation, only three out of 19 divisions in the army carried out a fire raid on it. We can also note shortcomings in the preparation of fire inside the defensive zone, and in the organization of interaction between artillery and infantry. The anti-tank defense was built by the division's standard means. In the 276th rifle division, four were created, and in the 63rd rifle division, two anti-tank strong points. 766 paws created an anti-tank area on the right flank of the army. The main disadvantages of the anti-tank defense were its shallow depth (2-3 km) and the absence of anti-tank reserves in the divisions and the army. Intelligence data indicated that the enemy was concentrating its main efforts to strike against the left flank of the army. However, the army command did not take decisive measures to suppress it with massive artillery fire.
At 5.30 on May 8, 1942, after an hour-long artillery preparation with the support of aviation, the enemy launched an offensive. The blow was delivered by the forces of three infantry and one tank divisions in the 63rd Guards Division. In total, up to 150 tanks operated in this direction.
The artillery of the army suffered significant losses from artillery fire and strikes by enemy aircraft. Due to the violation of control and the absence of a pre-planned maneuver of fire on the advancing enemy, fire was mainly fired by artillery located on the left flank of the army. The density of its fire was clearly insufficient to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy. Unable to withstand a powerful blow, parts of the 63rd Guards Division began to withdraw. The artillerymen entered into single combat with enemy tanks and infantry. The 477, 766, 852 and 53 units and 25 guards were active. mp. The enemy concentrated the main efforts of his artillery and aviation against them. Our artillery units again suffered losses, the overwhelming majority of the means of propulsion were destroyed by bomb strikes. At the cost of heavy losses, the enemy broke through the army's defenses on the first day and continued to advance in the 63rd Guards Rifle Division. The army's artillery withdrew with the infantry and deployed on new defensive lines, continuously supporting the troops with their fire. The actions of the artillery units were mostly scattered; they were not controlled by the commander of the army artillery due to a communication failure. On the night of May 9, 1942, a regrouping of artillery was carried out, which made it possible to restore control and strengthen its fire effect on the enemy.
On May 12, the Germans landed a parachute landing at the Marfovka airfield, in the rear of the 44th Army. The landing made it possible to begin the struggle for the Tatarsky shaft before the 156th Infantry Division, which was moving out of the front reserve, reached its line. On May 13, the defense in the center of the Turkish Wall was broken. On the night of May 14, the High Command admits defeat on the Kerch Peninsula. S.M. Budyonny with sanction VGK rates at 3.40 he orders: "To begin the withdrawal of the Crimean Front troops to the Taman Peninsula." The peculiarity of the battles on the Kerch Peninsula was that they took place in a kind of corridor, bounded from the north by the Azov Sea and from the south by the Black Sea. The advancing German divisions tried to overtake the units of the 44th, 47th and 51st armies retreating in disorder and cut off their escape routes to the east by strikes in the direction of the sea.
The evacuation from the Kerch Peninsula lasted from 15 to 20 May 1942. By order of Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, barges, seiners, minesweepers, boats, launches and tugs, torpedo and patrol boats were assembled from the nearest bases and ports from the nearest bases and ports. In total, about 140 thousand people were evacuated.
On the night of May 20, 1942, the last units, covering the evacuation of the remnants of the Crimean Front troops to the Taman Peninsula, plunged into the ships under the fire of mortars and machine guns (after exhaustion of opportunities for resistance in the city, the defenders of Kerch went to the Adzhimushkai quarries). Directive Headquarters eliminated the Crimean Front and the North Caucasian direction. The remnants of the troops were sent to the formation of a new North Caucasian Front.
Since May 8, 1942, the Crimean Front has lost 162,282 people, 4,646 guns and mortars, 196 tanks, 417 aircraft, 10,400 vehicles, 860 tractors and other property. About 140 thousand people, 157 aircraft, 22 guns and 29 PC installations were evacuated to the Taman Peninsula. The Germans, as a result of Operation Bustard Hunt, announced 170 thousand prisoners, the capture and destruction of 258 tanks and 1,100 guns.
It was formed by decree No. GKO-207ss dated 07.19.41. On the formation of new divisions. ...
276 RD - OrVO - dislocation Oboyan - by 30.07.41
Arriving in the Crimea, units of the division took up defenses in the north of Crimea on the Chongar Peninsula and the Arabat Spit. An anti-tank ditch was built on the Chongarsky Peninsula and the Arbat Spit, along with 6-8 rows of barbed wire, and mining of the area was carried out.
On August 30, units of the 11th German army captured a bridgehead on the Dnieper in the Kakhovka area, which was gradually expanding and new 11A units were transferred to it. By September 11, the defense of 9A against the enemy bridgehead finally collapsed and units of 9 and 18A began to retreat to defensive positions near Melitopol. The motorized division SS "Adolf Hitler" by September 15 broke through to the positions of the division on the Chongar Peninsula and captured the Salkovo station. The enemy units also reached the Arabat arrow. Unfired units of the 276thsd division could not offer staunch resistance. One battalion was cut off at the Novo-Alekseevka station (somewhat to the north) and was fighting surrounded. The units were attacked before completing the construction of the defensive lines. In Novo-Alekseevka, the soldiers were still digging trenches. The battalion accepted the battle in unfavorable conditions, for several days it heroically fought back from machine gunners and enemy tanks, they could not break through to Chongar in their division and with the remnants of their forces retreated to units of the 9th Army. On the evening of September 18, a counterattack was launched to rescue the battalion. However, the dusk attack by inexperienced units was unsuccessful and was canceled. Salkovo could not be returned. From the documents of the SS Division "Leibstandarte A.G.": "... 1087 prisoners were captured, mainly from the 276th division, of which 873rd joint venture 254 people and 3 lieutenants, 876 joint venture 3 lieutenants, 51st division 348th SP 201 people lieutenant and junior lieutenant. "
This ended fighting in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Chongar Peninsula. The enemy made no further attempts here. The main enemy forces were developing an offensive against Perekop and Armyansk.
On October 26, the defense of our troops in the northern Crimea was finally broken through. Units 51A began to slip in the direction of the Dzhankoy-Kerch Peninsula, and the Primorsky Army toward Simferopol. On the night of November 1, the enemy occupied Simferopol. The 51st Army fought back to Feodosia and Kerch.
The withdrawal of the troops of the 9th Rifle Corps to the Kerch Peninsula was carried out in the most difficult conditions. The 156th, 157th and 271st rifle divisions retreated to Kerch. They fought heroically in the Ishun positions and there they expended almost all their forces. But 2 full-blooded divisions also retreated to Kerch: the 106th A.N. Pervushin and the 276th I.S.Savinov. However, they acted on their own, not under the control of the corps commander. On the way to the Kerch Peninsula, our retreating formations used every line that could be caught in order to hold back the German divisions.
Further, the division withdrew to Dzhankoy. Shooting was already going on in the streets. Horse scouts rushed by: German tanks appeared and crushed one of our batteries. One of the commanders had a battery of 76mm cannons at the headquarters and deployed it along the street. The enemy attack immediately died out. During the last two days of October, the 106th division, together with units from the 271st and 276th divisions, fought a defensive battle on the line of the Salgir River, southeast of Dzhankoy.
On the Akmonai positions, blocking the enemy's path to the Kerch Peninsula proper, our formations entered the night of November 4, having suffered heavy losses in personnel, having several shells per gun and ten to one and a half cartridges per rifle. And yet they fought off enemy attacks for two days. From the situation report for November 6: "Dashichev's group, having a weakened combat strength, under the onslaught of 5 infantry divisions, 2 cavalry brigades (Romanians) had to leave the Akmonai positions and retreat to the line: Astaban (Kamyshenka), Karach (Kuibyshevo), Kerleut (Moshkarovo), Kopyl (60 kilometers to the west Kerch) "... After three days of fighting, the German command pulled up a fresh 170th Infantry Division of the 30th Army Corps from the reserve. It became clear that the Red Army would not be able to keep Kerch. Therefore, by order of the Headquarters, the withdrawal of troops to the Taman Peninsula began. The artillery, which had no shells, crossed to the Taman Peninsula first, together with hospitals and medical battalions. Large-caliber guns, which safely crossed the Kerch Strait on barges, took up firing positions on the Chushka Spit on November 16. There they received an ammunition load of shells from the artillery bases of the Transcaucasian Front. This made it possible to strengthen the fire cover of the rearguards retreating through Yenikale following the main forces of our divisions.
On November 16, 1941, after stubborn battles, the 51st Army, by order of the Supreme High Command, left the city of Kerch.
In December 1941, the 276th Rifle Division was part of the North Caucasian Military District in the Labinskaya, Belorechenskaya area. Judging by the documents, 276 SD was actually disbanded in December 1941. Parts of it went to complete the 156 and 157sd. From the arrived marching reinforcements, the division was re-formed.
On February 15, 1942, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered the immediate transfer of the 271th, 276th, and 320th rifle divisions from the North Caucasian Military District to reinforce the Crimean Front.
In order to combine the efforts of the Crimean and North Caucasian Fronts, as well as the Black Sea Fleet, on April 21, 1942, the High Command of the North Caucasian direction was formed, headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M.Budyonny, to whom the Crimean Front, the Sevastopol defensive region, North -Caucasian Military District (later front), Black Sea Fleet (together with the Azov military flotilla).
SM Budyonny began by strengthening the combat capability of troops in Sevastopol and on the Kerch Peninsula. On April 28, he arrived in the village of Leninskoye at the command post of the Crimean Front and made recommendations on strengthening the defense, echeloning it, creating reserves, changing command posts, since, having stopped the offensive, the front troops continued to maintain their previous combat formations.
The German command, planning a strike on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front towards the Transcaucasus in the new campaign of the summer of 1942, decided beforehand, before the offensive of the main forces, to improve the operational position of its troops, primarily by capturing the entire Crimea. It planned first to block the Crimean peninsula and cut it off from Novorossiysk and other ports of the Caucasus, defeat the most powerful group of Soviet troops in the Crimea - the Crimean Front and capture the Kerch Peninsula, and then take Sevastopol by decisive assault. The capture of the Crimea created favorable conditions for the enemy for an offensive into the Caucasus from Rostov both by land and through the Kerch Strait.
By May 8, 1942, the Crimean Front included 16 rifle and one cavalry divisions, 3 rifle and 4 tank brigades, 3 tank battalions, 9 artillery regiments of the High Command reserve, 3 regiments of guards mortars and other, smaller units. The enemy was inferior: in manpower - 2 times, in tanks - 1.2 times, in artillery - 1.8 times. The Germans, however, had a larger air force - 1.7 times.
Preparing for the offensive, at the end of April and early May, the enemy carried out intensified aerial reconnaissance of the Kerch Peninsula, systematically carried out strikes with bomber aircraft along the lines of communication of our troops, made an enhanced supply of ammunition, concentrated aviation at airfields in the Crimea and on the Black Sea coast, and replenished tank units.
The troops of the Crimean Front, after unsuccessful attempts to seize Koi-Asan and other points through private operations, having significant losses, put themselves in order (restored materiel, replenished with personnel), going on the defensive. The theater of military operations at that time was the Kerch Peninsula (it stretches from north to south from 18 to 24 km, from east to west - 80 km - from Kerch to Koi-Asan, not counting the narrowest part to the east of Kerch).
As part of the front troops, 44 A was defended, which had 276, 396, 157 rifle divisions and 63 rifle divisions. The army was reinforced by three artillery regiments, one regiment and a separate rocket artillery battalion. In connection with the preparations for the offensive of the front forces, the army and divisions had narrow stripes and a small depth of defense. In the 9 km wide defense zone of the army, the average density of artillery was about 54 guns (of which 13 were anti-tank ones), mortars and combat vehicles of the RA per 1 km of the front. The 276 Rifle Division and 63 Rifle Division, which defended themselves in the first echelon, were reinforced by 422 and 961 APs from the second echelon formations, respectively. In the divisions of the first echelon, artillery support groups for infantry (consisting of one or two divisions) and a long-range group (consisting of two or three divisions) were created. The army artillery group consisted of 457 and 53 popes. Rocket artillery units made up an army group of guards mortar units. Thus, the artillery grouping also continued to remain offensive, although the army command knew that the enemy was preparing for an offensive. The artillery prepared concentrated and defensive fire in front of the leading edge and on the flanks. Mainly artillery fire was planned in divisions. Preparation of massive artillery fire on an army scale was not envisaged, especially for counterpreparations. Therefore, on the eve of the enemy's artillery preparation, only three out of 19 divisions in the army carried out a fire raid on it. We can also note shortcomings in the preparation of fire inside the defensive zone, and in the organization of interaction between artillery and infantry. The anti-tank defense was built by the division's standard means. In the 276th rifle division, four were created, and in the 63rd rifle division, two anti-tank strong points. 766 paws created an anti-tank area on the right flank of the army. The main disadvantages of the anti-tank defense were its shallow depth (2-3 km) and the absence of anti-tank reserves in the divisions and the army. Intelligence data indicated that the enemy was concentrating its main efforts to strike against the left flank of the army. However, the army command did not take decisive measures to suppress it with massive artillery fire.
At 5.30 on May 8, 1942, after an hour-long artillery preparation with the support of aviation, the enemy launched an offensive. The blow was delivered by the forces of three infantry and one tank divisions in the 63rd Guards Division. In total, up to 150 tanks operated in this direction.
The artillery of the army suffered significant losses from artillery fire and strikes by enemy aircraft. Due to the violation of control and the absence of a pre-planned maneuver of fire on the advancing enemy, fire was mainly fired by artillery located on the left flank of the army. The density of its fire was clearly insufficient to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy. Unable to withstand a powerful blow, parts of the 63rd Guards Division began to withdraw. The artillerymen entered into single combat with enemy tanks and infantry. The 477, 766, 852 and 53 units and 25 guards were active. mp. The enemy concentrated the main efforts of his artillery and aviation against them. Our artillery units again suffered losses, the overwhelming majority of the means of propulsion were destroyed by bomb strikes. At the cost of heavy losses, the enemy broke through the army's defenses on the first day and continued to advance in the 63rd Guards Rifle Division. 276rd by the end of the day, leaving the Ak-Monai positions, withdrew to the Armageli region. The army's artillery withdrew with the infantry and deployed on new defensive lines, continuously supporting the troops with their fire. The actions of the artillery units were mostly scattered; they were not controlled by the commander of the army artillery due to a communication failure. On the night of May 9, 1942, a regrouping of artillery was carried out, which made it possible to restore control and strengthen its fire effect on the enemy.
On May 12, the Germans landed a parachute landing at the Marfovka airfield, in the rear of the 44th Army. The landing made it possible to begin the struggle for the Tatarsky shaft before the 156th Infantry Division, which was moving out of the front reserve, reached its line. On May 13, the defense in the center of the Turkish Wall was broken. On the night of May 14, the High Command admits defeat on the Kerch Peninsula. SM Budyonny, with the approval of the Supreme Command Headquarters at 3.40, orders: "To begin the withdrawal of the Crimean Front troops to the Taman Peninsula." The peculiarity of the battles on the Kerch Peninsula was that they took place in a kind of corridor, bounded from the north by the Azov Sea and from the south by the Black Sea. The advancing German divisions tried to overtake the units of the 44th, 47th and 51st armies retreating in disorder and cut off their escape routes to the east by strikes in the direction of the sea.
The evacuation from the Kerch Peninsula lasted from 15 to 20 May 1942. By order of Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, barges, seiners, minesweepers, boats, launches and tugs, torpedo and patrol boats were assembled from the nearest bases and ports from the nearest bases and ports. In total, about 140 thousand people were evacuated.
On the night of May 20, 1942, the last units, covering the evacuation of the remnants of the Crimean Front troops to the Taman Peninsula, plunged into the ships under the fire of mortars and machine guns (after exhaustion of opportunities for resistance in the city, the defenders of Kerch went to the Adzhimushkai quarries). Directive Headquarters eliminated the Crimean Front and the North Caucasian direction. The remnants of the troops were sent to the formation of a new North Caucasian Front.
Since May 8, 1942, the Crimean Front has lost 162,282 people, 4,646 guns and mortars, 196 tanks, 417 aircraft, 10,400 vehicles, 860 tractors and other property. About 140 thousand people, 157 aircraft, 22 guns and 29 PC installations were evacuated to the Taman Peninsula. The Germans, as a result of Operation Bustard Hunt, announced 170 thousand prisoners, the capture and destruction of 258 tanks and 1,100 guns.