During World War I (1914-1918), enemy Russian Empire there was a German-Turkish fleet on the Black Sea. And although the Young Turkish government doubted for a long time with whom to fight and with whom to be friends and adhered to neutrality. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and intelligence, closely watched the internal political events in Turkey: Minister of War Enver Pasha and Minister of Internal Affairs Talaat Pasha advocated an alliance with the German Empire, and the Minister of the Navy, head of the Istanbul garrison, Cemal Pasha, for cooperation with France. They informed the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, A. A. Eberhard, about the state of the Turkish fleet and army, their preparations, so that he could correctly respond to the actions of a potential enemy.
admiral A.A. Eberhard.
With the outbreak of war (August 1, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia), the government instructed Admiral A. A. Eberhard to avoid aggressive actions that could cause a war with the Ottoman Empire, strengthening the arguments of the Turkish "war party". The Black Sea Fleet had the right to start hostilities only by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (he was Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (junior) from July 20, 1914 to August 23, 1915), or according to the message of the Russian ambassador in Istanbul. Although the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) showed the fallacy of such a position, when the Japanese fleet suddenly attacked the Russian Port Arthur squadron and temporarily paralyzed its activities, which allowed the Japanese to carry out an unhindered landing of land armies. The imperial government, 10 years later, "stepped on the same rake", the commander of the fleet was bound by the directive of the government, the instructions of the high military command and was unable to carry out all measures to increase the combat readiness of the fleet, including the possibility of a preventive strike. As a result, the Black Sea Fleet, although it was significantly stronger than the Turkish naval forces, was forced to passively wait for the enemy's attack.
Power balance: Russian Black Sea Fleet and German-Turkish Fleet
Before the war, the Black Sea Fleet, in all respects, had complete superiority over the enemy: both in the number of pennants, in firepower, in combat training, in the training of officers and sailors. It consisted of: 6 battleships of the old type (the so-called battleships, or pre-dreadnoughts) - the flagship of the fleet "Eustathius", "John Chrysostom" (built in 1904-1911), "Panteleimon" (the former notorious "Prince Potemkin -Tavrichesky ", 1898-1905. Built)," Rostislav "(1894-1900. Built)," Three Saints "(built in 1891-1895)," Sinop "(1883-1889. Built); 2 Bogatyr-class cruisers, 17 destroyers, 12 destroyers, 4 submarines. The main base was Sevastopol, the fleet had its own shipyards in Sevastopol and Nikolaev. 4 more powerful battleships of a modern design (dreadnoughts) were built: "Empress Maria" (1911-July 1915), "Empress Catherine the Great" (1911-October 1915), "Emperor Alexander III"(1911-June 1917)," Emperor Nicholas I "(since 1914, unfinished due to a sharp deterioration in the political, financial and economic situation after the February Revolution of 1917). Also, during the war, the Black Sea Fleet received - 9 destroyers, 2 aircraft (prototypes of aircraft carriers), 10 submarines.
At the beginning of 1914, the exit of the Turkish fleet from the Bosphorus Strait to a battle with the Russian fleet seemed fantastic. The Ottoman Empire had been in decline for almost two centuries, and by the 20th century, the processes of decay only intensified. Turkey lost three wars to Russia in the 19th century (1806-1812, 1828-1829, 1877-1878), turned out to be the winner in the Crimean War (1853-1856), but only due to the alliance with England and France. ; already in the XX century it was defeated by Italy in the war for Tripolitania (1911-1912), and in the Balkan War (1912-1913). Russia was one of the five world leaders (Great Britain, Germany, USA, France, Russia). By the beginning of the century, Turkish naval forces were a pitiful sight - a bunch of outdated ships. One of the main reasons for this is the complete bankruptcy of Turkey, there was no money in the treasury. The Turks had only a few more or less efficient ships: 2 armored cruisers "Medzhidie" (built in the USA in 1903) and "Hamidie" (England in 1904), 2 squadron battleships "Torgut Reis" and "Hayreddin Barbarossa" (battleships type "Brandenburg", purchased in Germany in 1910), 4 destroyers built in France (1907 type "Durendal"), 4 destroyers of German construction (purchased from Germany in 1910, type "S 165"). Distinctive feature Turkish naval forces had an almost complete lack of combat training.
It cannot be said that the Turkish government did not try to change the situation in its favor: so in 1908, a grandiose fleet renewal program was adopted, it was decided to purchase 6 battleships of a new type, 12 destroyers, 12 destroyers, 6 submarines and a number of auxiliary ships. But the war with Italy, two Balkan wars devastated the treasury, orders were thwarted. Turkey ordered more ships in France and England (which is interesting - Russia's allies in the Entente, but they built ships for Turkey, a potential enemy of Russia on the Black Sea), so a battleship, 4 destroyers and 2 submarines were built in England. This replenishment could seriously change the balance of power in favor of Ottoman Empirebut as soon as the war began, England confiscated the ships in favor of its fleet. Only coming from Mediterranean Sea On August 10, 1914, two of the newest German cruisers: the heavy "Geben" (called "Sultan Selim") and the light "" Breslau "(" Midilli "), they entered the Turkish fleet together with the crews, allowed Turkey to conduct hostilities in the Black seas. The commander of the German Mediterranean Division, Rear Admiral V. Souchon, led the combined German-Turkish forces. "Goeben" was more powerful than any Russian battleship of the old type, but together the Russian battleships would have destroyed it, therefore, in a collision with the entire squadron, "Goeben" left, using its high speed.
Parties plans
The main goal of the Black Sea Fleet was complete domination of the Black Sea in order to reliably protect strategically important objects by the sea, cover the flank of the Caucasian army, and ensure the transfer of troops and supplies by sea. At the same time, disrupt the shipping of Turkey along its Black Sea coast. When the Turkish fleet appeared at Sevastopol, the Russian fleet had to destroy it. In addition, if necessary, the Black Sea Fleet was preparing to carry out the Bosphorus operation - to seize the Bosphorus, by the forces of the Black Sea Fleet and landing units. But after the appearance of German cruisers in Turkey, the plans of the Russian command were confused, Admiral Souchon was not going to engage in battle with the main forces of the Russian fleet, but using his speed he inflicted pinpoint strikes and left before the main forces of the Black Sea Fleet approached.
german cruiser "Goeben"
In 1915, when the newest battleships of the "Empress Maria" type entered the fleet, the fleet was tasked with disrupting the supply of coal and other supplies to the Bosphorus region and providing assistance to the troops of the Caucasian Front. For this purpose, 3 ship groups were created, each of which was more powerful than the German cruiser "Goeben". They were supposed, changing each other, to constantly be on the Turkish coast and thereby fulfill the main task of the fleet.
The strategic intent of the commander of the combined German-Turkish fleet, Rear Admiral Sushon, was to strike a surprise attack almost simultaneously at the main base of the Russian fleet in Sevastopol, the ports of Odessa, Feodosia and Novorossiysk. To sink or seriously damage the warships and merchant ships located there, as well as the most significant military and industrial facilities on the coast, and, thereby weakening the Russian Black Sea Fleet, achieve the possibility of complete superiority at sea. Thus, the German admiral planned to repeat the experience of the Japanese in 1904. But despite the success of the operation, the Russian fleet did not suffer serious losses, Souchon simply did not have enough firepower. If the Turkish fleet was more powerful, the Black Sea Fleet could receive a severe blow, which would dramatically worsen the position of the Russian Caucasian Army and disrupt the Black Sea communications.
The beginning of hostilities: "Sevastopol wake-up call"
Vice-Admiral A. A. Eberhard received news of the withdrawal of the German-Turkish squadron from the Bosphorus on October 27. He brought the Black Sea Fleet out to sea, waited the whole day on the approaches to Sevastopol, hoping to meet the enemy. But on the 28th the headquarters of the fleet received an order from the Supreme Command "not to seek a meeting with the Turkish fleet and to engage with it only in case of emergency." The Black Sea Fleet returned to the base and took no further action. Admiral A. A. Eberhard, although he acted on orders from above, but this does not remove his guilt for passivity, I think Admiral S. O. Makarov would not have reckoned with the ranks if it was about the honor of the Russian fleet.
Of course, the command of the fleet took action to prevent a surprise attack from the Turkish fleet. Reconnaissance was conducted, on the approaches to Sevastopol there were three destroyers on patrol, the main forces of the fleet were at the base in full readiness. But all this was not enough. The command did not make any orders to prepare the forces of the fleet, including the Sevastopol fortress, to repel an enemy attack. The head of the raid guard wanted to turn on the minefield, but A.A. Eberhard forbade it, as he was expecting the approach of the Prut mine layer. But the chief of the raid nevertheless warned the commander of the fortress artillery about the possible arrival of an enemy squadron. And the coastal artillery more or less fulfilled its task.
As a result, the Black Sea Fleet did not fulfill its main task - could not defend the Russian coast, missed the enemy fleet, which calmly went to the Bosphorus. On October 29-30, the German-Turkish fleet inflicted an artillery strike on Sevastopol, Odessa, Feodosia, Novorossiysk. This event was named - "Sevastopol wake-up call". In Odessa, the destroyers "Muhavenet-i-Millet" and "Gayret-i-Vatanie" drowned the gunboat "Donets", shelled the city and the port. The battle cruiser "Goeben" approached Sevastopol and for 15 minutes walked unhindered through our minefield, without opposition, shelling the city, port and ships stationed in the outer roadstead. The minefield's electrical circuit was turned off and no one turned it on without an order. The Konstantinovskaya battery was silent, waiting for the German cruiser to enter the targeted square, but opening fire, immediately hit the target three times. "Goeben" immediately gave full speed and retreated to sea. On the way back, he met a minelayer "Prut", which was awaited with a full load of mines in Sevastopol. Trying to save "Prut", three old destroyers who were on patrol ("Lieutenant Pushchin", "Hot" and "Tenacious") launched an attack on "Goeben". They did not have a single chance of success, but "Goeben" was not able to drown them, "went out in peace." The Goeben gunners easily repulsed this attack. The commander of the minelayer, Captain 2nd Rank GA Bykov, sank the ship, which is interesting, "Goeben" fired at it - 1 hour 5 minutes, at an almost unarmed ship. But it was a success, since the Prut was carrying most of the naval sea mines. The cruiser "Breslau" laid mines in the Kerch Strait, which blew up and sank the steamers "Yalta" and "Kazbek". This is a great fault of the commander and his staff, especially the Supreme Commander, who, with his instructions, tied the initiative of A.A. Eberhard. But in the end, the German-Turkish plan still did not work: the forces of the first strike were too scattered, and there was not enough firepower.
This is how Turkey entered the first world war and in the last war with Russia. On the same day, Russian ships began cruises to the shores of the enemy. The fire of the cruiser "Cahul" destroyed the huge coal storage facilities in Zonguldak, and the battleship "Panteleimon" and the destroyers sank three laden troop transports. The Turks were amazed at the activity of the Russian fleet, they miscalculated, thinking to themselves that they had gained time, the Black Sea Fleet was alive and functioning.
The hostilities on the Black Sea began unexpectedly for the Russian Empire. The Black Sea Fleet was taken by surprise, and only the lack of sufficient firepower, the dispersal of forces, prevented the German-Turkish fleet from becoming the master of the sea. The main reasons for this are the fear of the high command themselves to provoke a war with the Ottoman Empire and the lack of initiative of the command of the Black Sea Fleet.
But as history has shown, for Russia, the war very often starts unexpectedly, but the Russians very quickly "enter" the process and intercept the strategic initiative from the enemy. The Black Sea Fleet did not take a "respite", but immediately replied: on November 4-7, destroyers under the cover of battleships lay mines (in total during the war years, the Black Sea Fleet installed 13,000 mines) near the Bosphorus, the battleship Rostislav, the cruiser Cahul and 6 destroyers shelled Zunguldak, destroying coal storage, 2 Turkish transport. On the way back, the squadron sank 3 Turkish minesweepers, more than 200 people were taken prisoner. On November 15-18, the Russian squadron goes out in search of enemy ships, shells Trebizond and meets the German cruiser Goeben on the way back.
Battle at Cape Sarych (November 18, O.S. 5th)
The remoteness of the main base of the Black Sea Fleet - Sevastopol, from the Bosphorus did not allow the establishment of a permanent blockade of the Turkish fleet. The Russian squadron was forced to periodically return for repairs and rest. Since the Goeben was superior to any Russian battleship in firepower and speed, the Russian command had to keep the main forces together. At the headquarters of the fleet, it was believed that the German cruiser could move at a speed of 29 knots, but in reality, due to the impossibility of high-quality repairs in Turkey, the speed of the Goeben did not exceed 24 knots. For example: the flagship of the Russian squadron “Evstafiy” could sail at a maximum speed of 16 knots, the cruiser “Cahul” - 23 knots. But the Russian squadron had one interesting novelty - before the war, the firing of a compound of ships at one target was practiced.
On November 17, "Goeben" and "" Breslau "went to sea to intercept the Russian ships and, if the outcome was favorable, to attack. On the same day, Admiral A.A. Eberhard received a message from the Marine general staff about the exit of the Germans to the sea. But the lack of coal did not allow the start of the search and, increasing vigilance, the squadron moved to the Crimea. The collision occurred on the 18th, about 45 miles from Cape Chersonesos, near Cape Sarych. At 11.40, the enemy ship was spotted by the Almaz cruiser on reconnaissance, at the same time a radio intercept was made. Russian ships reduced the intervals between themselves, destroyers pulled up to the main forces. Then the reconnaissance "Almaz" and the cruiser "Cahul", "Memory of Mercury" were recalled.
cruiser "Almaz"
Because of the heavy fog and smoke that was walking in front of the flagship, the battle was reduced to a shootout between "Goeben" and "Eustathius" (Captain 1st Rank VI Galanin). Senior artilleryman V. M. Smirnov, who directed the fire of the battleship brigade (located on "John Chrysostom"), could not accurately determine the distance to the enemy ship, so the shells from the other battleships flew in flight. The battle lasted only 14 minutes, Russian ships (from 34-40 cables, 6-7 km), fired 30 shells of the main caliber. The Russian artillerymen "Eustathia" hit the target from the very first salvo, the 12-inch "hotel" pierced the German's 150-mm armor and caused a fire in the aft casemate of the left side. It was a success, usually even good gunners (like the Germans) were hit by the 3rd salvo. The Goeben changed course and returned fire. Soon the Germans realized that the Russians had taken into account the bloody lesson of Tsushima, in 14 minutes of the battle "Goeben" received 14 hits, including 3 and 305 mm shells. He took advantage of his superiority in speed, and while other Russian battleships did not take aim, he went into the fog. The duel with the outdated Russian hero did not cost the Germans cheap - total losses from 112 to 172 people (according to various sources). But Eustathius also suffered losses, of the 19 280 mm shells that the German cruiser fired, four (4) hit the Russian battleship. The flagship lost 58 people (33 killed, 25 wounded).
What conclusions could be drawn after this fleeting battle? First, a brigade of old battleships could well withstand a new type of battleship (dreadnought). One battleship will be defeated, but in combination they represent a formidable force if the crews are well trained, which was confirmed by the battle on May 10, 1915. Secondly, the battle showed good training of the Russian gunners, but the mediocre high command of the squadron - A. A. Eberhard was unable to organize a combined attack of his forces.
13 (26) December "Goeben" was blown up by 2 mines near the Bosphorus Strait, the area of \u200b\u200bthe hole on the left side was 64 square meters. meters, and the right - 50 sq. meters, "drank water" from 600 to 2000 tons. For the repair, it was necessary to call specialists from Germany, the restoration work was mainly completed by April 1915.
At the very end of 1914, 5 German submarines ("UB 7", "UB 8", "UB 13", "UB 14" and "UB 15") crossed into the Black Sea, from the Mediterranean, and this complicated the situation.
1915 year
Consistently, the Black Sea Fleet got rid of shortcomings. For reconnaissance of the Turkish routes, destroyers and hydro-aviation began to be used, and the effectiveness of agents' actions was increased. But still, the absence of a base in the southwestern part of the sea did not allow a complete blockade of the Turkish forces. From the beginning of January to the end of March 1915, the Russian squadron made 9 campaigns to the enemy shores, artillery strikes were inflicted on Zunguldak, Trebizond. Dozens of steamships and sailing ships with military cargo were sunk. Russian submarines began to patrol the Bosphorus area. The Batumi destroyer detachment was created - the 5th division ("Zavidny", "Zavetny", "Voiced" and "Sharp"). On March 28, the Black Sea squadron fired for the first time and bombed (the Nikolai I seaplane with 5 seaplanes) on the fortifications of the Bosphorus. Ports in the region of Kozlu, Eregli, Zunguldak were also shelled.
Odessa operation plan and its failure
Admiral V. Souchon decided to take advantage of the fact that the "Goeben" was restored to a greater extent and to strike back at Odessa. Why did you choose Odessa? It was in Odessa that Russian troops could be concentrated to capture the Bosphorus, therefore, destroying the transports, Souchon frustrated the plans of the Russian command and at the same time showed that the Turkish fleet was alive and combat-ready. The Ottoman Empire at that moment could be defeated due to an attack from 3 directions: from February 18, the Anglo-French fleet attacked the Dardanelles, the Dardanelles operation began; The Russian fleet shells the Bosphorus and prepares a landing army in Odessa, and the capture of Constantinople-Istanbul by the Russians is a nightmare of the Turks in recent decades. And at the end of 1914 and the beginning of 1915, Russian troops destroy the 3rd Turkish army near Sarikamish, the way to Anatolia is open. And here there is an opportunity to eliminate the threat from one direction. The plan of the operation was quite simple: "Goeben" and "Breslau" cover the forces of attack from the direction of Sevastopol, the cruisers "Medzhidie" and "Hamidie" with 4 destroyers at this time shell Odessa, destroying landing transports. The Turkish plan was doomed to success. However, the case was spoiled by Russian minefields. The Russian Empire at that time was the world leader in the field of mine weapons. The Turks and Germans clearly underestimated the mine danger. For which they paid.
The German captain of the cruiser "Medzhidie" - Büksel became the commander of the operation. On April 1, the Turkish detachment left the Bosphorus, on the night of the 3rd was in the Odessa region. The detachment lost some direction at night and came to the coast about 15 miles east of the intended point. Büksel changed course and moved west, towards Odessa. He planned to start shelling from the north, then moving south and southeast to continue shelling. Destroyers with trawls went ahead to search for mines. Behind them exactly in the wake of the cruiser. Suddenly at 6.40 the "Medzhidie" was blown up, an explosion occurred on the port side, the cruiser began to quickly sink with a roll to the left side. He did not completely drown, the depth was too shallow. The Turks threw away the gun bolts, destroyed the radio, the destroyers removed the crew. At 07.20 a.m. one of the destroyers torpedoed the cruiser in order to completely submerge it. The Turkish detachment withdrew. The Russian fleet left Sevastopol and attacked the German cruisers, they did not accept the battle and fled. Interestingly, the enemy was first detected using seaplanes.
On June 8, 1915, the Medzhidie was raised, initial repairs were carried out in Odessa, then a major overhaul in Nikolaev, was rearmed and a year later, in June 1916, became part of the Black Sea Fleet as Prut. As part of the fleet, he participated in several operations, in May 1918 he was captured by the Germans, transferred to the Turks, and there, thanks to Russian repairs, he was in the service of the Turkish fleet right up to 1947.
Plan of the Bosphorus operation
After the Crimean War (1853-1856), various options for waging a war with the Ottoman Empire were planned in the Russian Empire. After Russo-Turkish War 1877-1877 it became finally clear that only ground forces can be defeated only at the cost of great losses, resource consumption and loss of time. Too great distance from the Danube and the Caucasus to Istanbul, moreover, protected by strong fortresses.
Therefore, with the revival of the Black Sea Fleet, the idea arose of conducting the Bosphorus operation. With its help, it was possible to decapitate the old enemy with one blow and realize the age-old Russian dream - to return the ancient Constantinople-Constantinople to the bosom of the Orthodox world. To implement this plan, a powerful armored fleet was needed, an order of magnitude stronger than the Turkish naval forces. The fleet was built since 1883, battleships of the type "Empress Catherine the Great" were laid, a total of 4 ships were built ("Chesma", "Sinop", "George the Victorious"), and two of them participated in the First World War - "Sinop" and "George Victorious ". In addition, the destroyer fleet and the Volunteer Fleet (for the transport of troops) were intensively developed. In case of war, these battleships would be enough to eliminate the Turkish fleet. They were built to perform two tasks: 1) squadron battle; and 2) destruction of coastal fortifications, suppression of enemy batteries.
But defeat in the Russo-Japanese War pushed these plans aside. The task of reviving the fleet came to the fore. But right up to the appearance of "Geben" from "Breslau" from Turkey, theoretically the Black Sea Fleet could carry out this operation, there were enough forces.
After the Allies launched the Dardanelles operation, the Russian fleet systematically carried out demonstrative actions against the Bosphorus. If the British succeeded in the Dardanelles, the Black Sea Fleet would have to occupy the Bosphorus. Russian troops were pulling together to Odessa, a demonstrative loading on transports was carried out. The seething activity created the appearance of preparing a large-scale landing operation. Although, before the commissioning of new battleships, it would hardly have brought success. And the German offensive of 1915 did not allow the allocation of large forces for the operation.
A real opportunity appeared only in 1916: the Caucasian Front conducted a successful Erzurum operation, Southwestern front successfully routed the Austro-Hungarians, German troops tried to defeat the Anglo-French armies in the West. The Russian command now has reserves for the operation. Two newest battleships were put into operation, thereby neutralizing the "Goeben". The operation was planned to begin in 1917, but the February Revolution threw the empire into the abyss of anarchy and the Civil War. The dream of Russian Slavophiles never became a geopolitical reality - Constantinople did not become the third capital of the Russian Empire.
From March 28 to May 10, the Russian fleet fired 4 times on the Bosphorus. At the same time, 2 battleships fired at the coastal fortifications, 3 covered from the sea. On May 10, "Goeben" attacked the ships in cover ("Eustathius", "John Chrysostom" and "Rostislav"). Neither side achieved success when the 4th Russian battleship Panteleimon entered the battle and immediately made three hits with 305-mm shells, the Goeben was not badly damaged, but realizing that the enemy was superior, he left. The shootout itself lasted only 23 minutes.
On September 3, Bulgaria took the side of Germany. In September 1915, when 2 new battleships of the Dreadnought type entered the Black Sea Fleet, 3 brigades of ships were created, each superior in power to the Goeben. 1st in the composition: the dreadnought "Empress Maria" and the cruiser "Cahul". 2nd in the composition: the dreadnought "Empress Catherine the Great" and the cruiser "Memory of Mercury". 3rd consisting of: battleships "Eustathius", "John Chrysostom" and "Panteleimon". The battleships "Three Saints" and "Rostislav" made up a combat-ready reserve. Organizationally, the dreadnoughts "Empress Maria", "Empress Catherine the Great" and cruisers of the "Cahul" class were brought together to the 1st brigade of the fleet, and the battleships "Eustathius", "John Chrysostom" and "Panteleimon" - into the 2nd brigade of battleships of the Black Sea fleet.
In general, from that time on, the Russian fleet gained complete superiority, it constantly fired at the enemy coast. With the advent of new submarines in the fleet, including a minelayer of the "Crab" type, it became possible to cross enemy communications with the help of them. At the beginning, the submarines used the positional method - they took a position and were on duty, waiting for the enemy ship. Since the summer of 1915, the cruising method was used, when the boat patrolled in a certain area, alternately replacing each other. A novelty of the Russian fleet was the interaction of submarines and destroyers. This method paid off, increased the effectiveness of the blockade of the Bosphorus and coal regions in Turkey. Aerial reconnaissance also developed rapidly, Russian naval pilots were among the world leaders in this area.
1916 year
In 1915, the Black Sea Fleet strengthened its superiority and almost completely controlled the sea. Three brigades of battleships were formed, the destroyer forces were actively operating, the submarine forces and naval aviation were building up their combat experience. Conditions were created for the Bosphorus operation.
In 1916, evil fate threw several unpleasant "surprises": on August 14 (27), Romania entered the war on the side of the Entente, but since its armed forces were of very dubious combat effectiveness, they had to be strengthened by Russian troops, the Black Sea Fleet also contributed to sides of the Balkan coast and the Danube. The submarine threat to the fleet increased, the German submarine forces in the Black Sea grew to 10 submarines. The Black Sea Fleet did not have anti-submarine protection, so it had to be created on the approaches to Sevastopol.
In 1916, the fleet simultaneously performed several important tasks:
1) continued to block the Bosphorus;
2) regularly supported the right flank of the advancing Caucasian Front;
3) provided assistance to the troops of Romania and the Russian units stationed there;
4) continued to disrupt the enemy's sea communications;
5) protect their bases and communications from the enemy's submarine forces, his cruising raids.
The main link was considered to be the blockade of the strait, which was of great military and strategic importance. Using mine experience Baltic Fleet, it was decided to close the Bosphorus with mines. From July 30 to August 10, a mine barrier operation was carried out, 4 barriers were placed, a total of about 900 minutes. By the end of the year, 8 more mine installations were made, with the task of reinforcing the main barrier and blocking coastal waters - to hinder small ships and submarines. In total, during the war, 14 mine chains were delivered (about 2200 mines). To protect the minefields from minesweepers, a patrol from destroyers and submarines was established, since the end of the summer, mainly submarine forces were on duty. In minefields, the enemy lost several warships, submarines, and dozens of transport steam and sailing ships. The mine blockade violated Turkish shipping, the capital of the Ottomans began to experience difficulties in supplying food and fuel. But the complete blockade of the Bosphorus was still not possible.
Assistance to the actions of the Caucasian Front was of a large-scale nature, it was constant and played an important role in conducting offensive operations, for example Trapezudskaya. The fleet supported ground troops artillery, landed diversionary troops, sabotage detachments, covered from a possible strike from the sea, carried out the supply of supplies and reinforcements. The transportation of troops and supplies was carried out by a special transport flotilla (in 1916 - 90 ships).
So at the beginning of 1916, the Batumi destroyer detachment was reinforced, with 2 gunboats ((Donets, Kubanets)) 2 destroyers (Strict and Swift). To help in the Erzurum operation, the battleship “ Rostislav "and destroyers" Lieutenant Pushchin "," Zhivoi ".
Aviation of the Black Sea Fleet
The Russian Empire was one of the world leaders in the theory of the use of aircraft at sea and the construction of seaplanes. Back in 1910, the famous Russian test pilot L.M.Matsievich wrote about the importance of using aircraft in naval affairs and the construction of seaplanes. In 1911-1912. it was supported by the inventor D.P. Grigorovich. Work on seaplane in Russia kept pace with other leaders in the field of aircraft construction: the first French seaplane by A. Faber in 1910; American aircraft G. Curtis; and the Russian "Gakkel-V" in 1911.
After the plane of YM Gakkel, in 1912 the planes of II Sikorsky were created. However, the naval ministry did not support the good initiation of Russian inventors in 1911-1913. seaplanes of American and French brands were purchased.
Since 1913, it has developed into a wider construction of domestic seaplanes. The main role in that case belonged to Russian designers, not the state. They were able to quickly create projects of naval aircraft, surpassing foreign ones and soon ousted them from the Russian naval aviation. These devotees are Grigorovich, Willish, Engels, Sedelnikov, Fride, Shishmarev, as well as the design bureau of the Russian-Baltic Carriage Works and the Aviation Test Station. Up to 15% of aircraft manufactured in Russia were for water use, this was not the case anywhere in the world.
At the beginning of the war, there were 8 seaplanes on the Black Sea, based on the Curtis type. The head of the Fleet Communications Service was Senior Lieutenant Stakhovsky. The aircraft were based at the 1st grade station in Sevastopol (Kilen Bay), 1st grade stations were built in Ovidiopol, Ak-mosque; stations of the 2nd category - Zolokarakh and Klerovka. Before the war, 3 and then 24 observation posts were created, from the Danube to Batum. This made it possible to quickly transfer aircraft along the entire Russian coast of the Black Sea. At the end of 1914, hangars from Ovidiopol and Ak-mosque began to be transferred to the Round Bay in Sevastopol, and in May 1915 an aviation station was opened.
From August to the end of October 1914 (before the start of the war with the Ottoman Empire), they managed to complete the deployment of air units, train personnel, and develop some tactical techniques. It became clear that the aircraft can be used to detect sea mines and enemy submarines.
With the outbreak of the war in the Black Sea Fleet, two ships were rebuilt into aircraft "mothers": "Emperor Nicholas I" and "Alexander I"; then they were joined by the water cruiser "Romania". They could carry 6-8 aircraft. In addition, one seaplane was placed on the cruiser Almaz.
The first experience of using naval aviation took place on March 24, 1915: a Russian squadron made a trip to Rumelia (a region of Turkey in Europe), the squadron included "Nicholas I" with 4 aircraft. It was planned to use them for aerial reconnaissance, but then they were used to bombard coastal targets. This was the first experience of the Russian naval aviation on enemy shores. On March 27, 1915, a squadron with the participation of already 2 air transports (cruiser Almaz, Nikolay), the aircraft conducted reconnaissance of the strait and found that there were no large ships, dropped 3 bombs on coastal fortifications and a destroyer.
By April 1915, the squadron had grown to 18 aircraft, 5 FBA seaplanes arrived in April, and from May the old Curtis aircraft began to be replaced by M-5 seaplanes from designer D.P. Grigorovich.
On May 3, Russian seaplanes made the 1st raid on the capital of the Ottomans - Istanbul. These actions showed that aviation is beginning to play an important role not only for reconnaissance, but also for attacking actions. Until the end of the year, combat training, the interaction of aircraft and ship crews, was being improved. In October 1915, a Russian squadron made a campaign to the shores of Bulgaria, Varna, Evksinograd were shelled, on the 25th an air raid was made.
On January 1, 1916, the Black Sea Squadron consisted of: 30 officers, 371 other personnel, 30 aircraft, 2 air transport and the cruiser Almaz. At the end of the year, another air transport "Romania" entered service. The Black Sea detachment consisted of the 1st and 2nd naval detachments (on the Nikolay and Alexandra - 13 pilots), the hydroaviation detachment of the Caucasian Front (8 pilots), a training unit in the Round Bay (5 pilots), the formation of a detachment of airships began ...
On January 8-15, exercises were held, aerial photography, reconnaissance, and bombing techniques were practiced. On January 24, the Russian squadron approached Zunguldak. The Zunguldak coal district was the second most important area of \u200b\u200binfluence of the Russian fleet (after the Bosphorus). Due to the underdevelopment of the railway network, coal was transported mainly by sea. Usually, only ships dealt a blow to it, the pilots were tasked with bombing the steamer, the secondary targets were the port, power station, railway... Although the pilots were hampered by strong clouds and anti-aircraft fire, they were able to drop 18 large and 20 small bombs, set fire to and drown a 7000-ton steamer and several ships, destroyed the railway junction building, set several mines on fire.
A similar operation was carried out on August 25 against the Austro-German forces in Varna, but this time the enemy put up strong resistance, when the squadron left, it was attacked by enemy aircraft, which dropped several dozen bombs.
Another task for the seaplane was to assist in the conduct of large amphibious operations. In April 1916, both air transport took part in escorting a transport flotilla of 27 ships from Novorossiysk and Mariupol to the Rize district. Aircraft covered the landing troops from the air and carried out anti-submarine protection. A month later, "Alexander" took part in the landing at Trebizond. At the beginning of December 1916, the squadron included 45 M-5 seaplanes (reconnaissance officer, artillery fire spotter), 45 M-9 (heavy seaplane for bombing coastal targets and ships), 10 M-11 (the first in world (!) seaplane-fighter) all Russian-made, designer D.P. Grigorovich.
The order for the fleet defined the tasks of naval aviation:
1) attack of enemy ships, its bases and coastal fortifications;
2) fight against enemy air forces;
3) anti-submarine warfare;
4) surveillance and aerial reconnaissance;
5) protection of the fleet at sea from enemy aircraft and its submarines;
6) adjusting the artillery fire of ships.
By the beginning of 1917, naval aviation had grown to 110 aircraft, and 8 ground fighters (Nieuport) arrived in the summer. Was formed air division Black Sea - the 1st brigade consisted of 4 ship detachments (then 6), the 2nd brigade of 13 land-based detachments. In March 1917, a grandiose operation to capture the Bosphorus was supposed to begin, over 150 seaplanes were supposed to support it from the air, but the death of the empire ruined the plans of this operation. After the February Revolution, "Alexander" was renamed to "Republican", and "Nikolay" to "Aviator". May 24-27 "Aviator" made its last trip to aerial photography and bombardment of Sinop. The further activities of the Black Sea Fleet naval aviation ended in connection with the outbreak of the Civil War, the pilots were scattered by fate on different sides of the front.
The mystery of the death of the battleship "Empress Maria"
The Russo-Japanese War revealed a number of significant shortcomings of the Russian fleet, the battleships were outdated. England is building a new battleship "Dreadnought", but Russian inventors are not inferior to the world's advanced developments. Russian shipbuilders built ships of the line ("dreadnoughts") according to the plan of I.G. Bubnov and A.N. Krylov, which surpassed the English prototype in many respects. In 1909 the ships “Sevastopol”, “Gangut”, “Poltava” and “Petropavlovsk” were laid down at the Baltic shipyards.
battleship Empress Maria
Linear placement of 12 305-mm guns, in three-gun turrets, made it possible to fire from both sides simultaneously with all guns. The weight of a salvo of one of the first British battleships of a new type, the Vengard, was 3003 kg, on the Sevastopol it reached 5650 kg. In one minute, the Russian battleship shot up to 11.5 tons of metal and explosives. The main armor belt was 225 mm thick. For the Black Sea Fleet in the Nikolaev shipyard in 1915-1917, according to the project "Emperor", the battleships "Empress Maria", "Emperor Alexander III" and "Catherine II" were built. The 4th dreadnought "Emperor Nicholas I" was laid down in 1915, but due to revolutionary events it was not completed.
On June 25, 1915, the battleship "Empress Maria" left the Nikolaev port and headed for Sevastopol under the protection of the squadron. This day became a holiday for shipbuilders and for the entire Black Sea Fleet. On October 13-15, 1915, the battleship covered the actions of the 2nd battleship brigade in the Zunguldak region. 2-4, 6-8 November 1915 covered the 2nd brigade from the sea during the shelling of Varna and Evksinograd. From February 5 to April 18, he assisted the Trebizond operation. In the course of hostilities, it became clear that the battleships of the "Empress Maria" class lived up to their hopes. During the first year of service, the ship made 24 military campaigns, sank many Turkish ships.
In the summer of 1916, by the decision of the Supreme Commander (Emperor Nicholas) of the Russian Army, the Black Sea Fleet was headed by Vice Admiral Alexander Kolchak. The admiral made the "Empress Maria" the flagship of the fleet and systematically went to sea on it. Having laid a glorious initiative, in the fall of 1916, the battleship was delivered to the Sevastopol raid for preventive maintenance. And this autumn became fatal for "Empress Mary". The morning of October 7 (20), 1916 did not bode well, the usual day began. A wake-up call was given to the crews of the ships over the Northern Bay. On the battleship, everything went according to a certain usual schedule. Suddenly, at 6.20 am, a powerful explosion shook the surroundings, then 15 explosions lasted another hour. Frightened Sevastopol residents ran out onto the embankment and witnessed a terrible picture. The battleship Empress Maria was dying in the roadstead in her native bay. The ship banked to starboard, capsized and sank. The wounded were located right on the shore and here they were given first aid. There was black smoke over the city. By the evening, the size of the disaster became known: 225 sailors were killed, 85 were seriously wounded, the most powerful ship of the Black Sea Fleet was killed.
The tragedy shook the entire Russian Empire. The Naval Ministry commission headed by a combat officer (participant in the defense of Port Arthur), a member of the Admiralty Council, Admiral N.M. Yakovlev, began to find out the reasons for the death of the ship. A well-known shipbuilder, one of the authors of the Black Sea battleship project, an associate of Admiral S.O. Makarov, Academician A.N.Krylov became a member of the commission, who drew up a conclusion, which was approved by all members of the commission.
Three main versions of the death of the battleship were put forward:
1. spontaneous combustion of gunpowder;
2. negligence in handling fire or gunpowder;
3. malicious intent.
The commission was inclined towards the second version (negligence), since the gunpowder was, in the opinion of all the battleship gunners, of high quality. As for malicious intent, even after establishing violations in the rules of access to artillery cellars and a lack of control over the workers on board. For example: the chief of the ship's armament, Prince Russov, pointed out that the hatch in the powder magazine was not locked at all and was not guarded. The Commission considered this version unlikely. As a result, none of the hypotheses put forward by the commission found sufficient facts to confirm.
Also, the Sevastopol Gendarme Directorate and the counterintelligence service of the General Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, created on the initiative of the sailors at the end of 1915, were investigating the causes of the explosions. But they could not find out the true cause of the flagship's death. The revolutionary events finally stopped the investigation.
German trace: already in the Soviet period, it became clear that Germany was closely watching all the changes in the Russian fleet, including the new dreadnoughts. And in Germany they understood how dangerous the operation "Constantinople" (the Bosphorus operation), where battleships had to play a very important role. In 1933, during the investigation of sabotage at the Nikolaev shipyard, the Stalinist chekists exposed the network of German intelligence, headed by V.E. Verman. The purpose of the organization was to disrupt the shipbuilding program of the military and merchant fleet of the USSR. During the investigation, many interesting factsrooted in the pre-revolutionary period. Verman himself was an experienced reconnaissance officer (he was a senior electrical engineer) and began his activity back in 1908, when a large-scale program for the restoration of the Russian fleet began. The network covered everything big cities Black Sea region, special attention was paid to Odessa, Nikolaev, Sevastopol, Novorossiysk. During interrogation, Werman said that German intelligence was planning a sabotage on the battleship, and the group was led by saboteur Helmut von Stithoff. He was considered the best specialist in the field of mining and undermining ships. In the summer of 1916, Helmut Von Shtithoff began working at the Nikolaev shipyard as an electrician. It was planned to blow up the battleship right at the shipyard. However, something fell through, Shtithoff urgently curtailed the operation and left for Germany. But Verman's group continued to work independently and did not curtail its activities, she had the opportunity to access the battleship. After unsuccessful attempt Undermining the warship "Empress Maria" Helmut von Stithoff command transferred to the next mission. During this period, British intelligence (a certain Heaviland) tried to recruit him.
Helmut von Stithoff
In 1942, the merited saboteur of Germany, Helmut von Stittoff, was shot by the secret police (Gestapo). The trail leading to the clue of the death of the battleship "Empress Maria" was erased.
1945 - Konigsberg, a German archive was found in a destroyed house by Soviet soldiers. An album was found there, in which there was a whole series of pictures of the battleship Empress Maria, one of the pictures shows the moment of the explosion. It seems as if someone knew in advance the time and place of the sabotage and carefully filmed everything.
English trail: on the night before the death of the giant, Gunnery Voronov was on duty at the main tower. His duties were: inspection and measurement of the temperature of the artillery cellar. This morning the captain of the 2nd rank Gorodissky was also on alert on the ship. At dawn, Gorodissky ordered his Voronov to measure the temperature in the cellar of the main tower. Voronov went down to the cellar and no one saw him again. And after a while the first explosion thundered. Voronov's body was never found among the bodies of the victims. The commission had suspicions about his account, but there was no evidence and he was recorded as missing.
But recently new information has emerged: the English writer Robert Merid, who has long been involved in the mysterious death of the battleship, has undertaken his own investigation. And from it we learn very interesting (and shameful for the "ally" of the Russian Empire) information. Lieutenant of British naval intelligence served in Russia from 1914 to 1916, a week after the explosion, he left Russia and arrived in England as a lieutenant colonel. After the end of the war, he retired and left the country. After a while, he appeared in Canada, bought an estate, began to equip it, lived the usual life of a rich gentleman. And in 1929 he died under strange circumstances: a fire "happened" in the hotel where he spent the night, everyone was saved (including a woman with a small child and a paralyzed old man in a wheelchair), and a military officer could not escape from the 2nd floor.
This begs the question - who did the colonel in the deep periphery interfere with world processes, being in retirement? Research of photo archives led to unexpected results - lieutenant colonel british intelligence John Heaviland and the gunner of the battleship Empress Maria Voronov are one and the same person. The very same Voronov who disappeared on October 7, 1916 at the time of the explosion of the battleship "Empress Maria". It is also interesting that shortly before his death, some Russian immigrants attempted to assassinate him, among them the former electrician of the battleship "Empress Maria" Ivan Nazarin. Maybe they also got on the trail and tried to at least somehow avenge their ship !?
To summarize, in any crime motive and opportunity are important. German intelligence had both motive and opportunity. Destroying the battleship, they helped their ally (the Ottoman Empire), disrupted the timing of the Bosphorus operation, inflicted a heavy psychological blow on their main enemy. Yes, and there was an opportunity: unfortunately, the Security Service was not developed in the Russian Empire, any agent of the German intelligence network (and more than one) could penetrate the battleship under construction, and since he could work there, he could carry a "hellish machine". Anyone familiar with the realities of Soviet-Russian factories will confirm this: you can take out something, or bring it in.
The British Empire was an ally of Russia in that war, but it is known from the course of history that a powerful reconnaissance and sabotage service appeared in it in one of the first, and Britain was an old enemy of the Russian Empire. The motive for the destruction of the battleship? With horror, the English elite thought about the day when "Oleg's shield" would again be nailed to the gates of Constantinople. It would be the day of the collapse of the age-old machinations and intrigues of England against Russia. The straits were not to be taken over by the Russians at any cost. The capabilities of British intelligence in Russia were no worse than those of Germany, and besides, England often did her business with the wrong hands. Perhaps the battleship was destroyed by the forces of the German intelligence network, but under the leadership of the British. And the cover is good, who is to blame (?) - the Germans!
On the resignation of Admiral A. A. Eberhard (July 1916)
In the summer of 1916, Admiral A. And Eberhard was replaced by Admiral A. Kolchak. The reasons for this event are not Eberhard's failures and mistakes, but rather a tribute to court circles and public opinion.
Alexander Vasilievich Kolchak
A.A. Eberhard did not listen to the opinion of the greats of this world, acting on the basis of the interests of the Black Sea Fleet, aroused their anger and Emperor Nicholas decided to compromise. Eberhard went into honorary exile in the Council of State, and was replaced by a young admiral, who continued to do what the fleet had done before him.
This story began from the very beginning of the war, when the German cruisers entered the straits (August 10, 1914), the Ottoman Empire was then a neutral country and did not have the right to pass warships through the straits. A.A. Eberhard decided to go with the entire fleet to Istanbul and demand their exit to the Mediterranean Sea, where the British squadron was waiting for them. In case of refusal, he wanted to attack them directly in the raid, where their speed advantage disappeared. This plan was Russian in spirit, in the best traditions of FF Ushakov and P.S.Nakhimov. But the government categorically forbade doing this, they still hoped that Turkey would not enter the war.
Even when the German-Turkish fleet went to sea, clearly not for a walk, Eberhard was restrained by orders not to "provoke" the enemy. As a result, we received the "Sevastopol wake-up call". But here, too, the admiral did not fulfill the directive of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich), about the main task - "the defense of his shores" and immediately responded with a march to the enemy shores. The admiral understood that it was possible to defend its shores only by eliminating enemy ships from the Black Sea. The best defense is attack. Not everyone at Headquarters understood this, and it even came to direct insults by the "grand" prince of the admiral. But the admiral apparently understood that the Motherland was one, and there were many fools and continued to do his work. On November 18, 1914, the German Admiral Souchon attempted to intercept Eberhard, who was returning from the shelling of Trebizond. "Intercepted", but got "in the nose". Since then, Souchon no longer looked for a fight with the entire Russian squadron, but limited himself to tactics according to the pirate principle - "Hit and leave." Soon "Goeben" was blown up by a Russian mine near the Bosphorus and was out of order for several months.
At the beginning of 1915, new high-speed Novik-class destroyers began to enter the fleet. This made it possible to launch constant strikes along the coast of Turkey, destroying enemy transports, destroying its shipping
"Goeben", after renovation, resumed raids on the Russian coast. These sorties brought minimal damage, but very annoying St. Petersburg society. In addition, 1915 was a very difficult year for Russia, the initial patriotic frenzy subsided, difficulties piled up. Creeping talk began about "betrayal of the German admiral," although his family was of Swedish origin. The command demanded to defend their shores, while Eberhard continued to destroy the enemy's naval forces.
The second battle of Russian battleships with "Goeben" near the Bosphorus (May 1915) was also in favor of A. A. Eberhard. The German-Turkish fleet was unable to prevent several landings in 1916. The Black Sea Fleet confidently controlled the sea, which, as in old times (under the first Rurikovichs), again became Russian. But Petrograd had heard little about the small victories of the Black Sea Fleet, which, with small bricks, prepared the general Victory. Dirty talk continued about the admiral's passivity and mediocrity; the fact that the Germans are in charge of the sea, apparently some forces sponsored some of the newspapers.
At the end of May 1916, Russian battleships fire at Varna, and the Empress Maria covers them from the sea. The English Admiral Phillimore, who was present at the Panteleimon, called, after this campaign, the Russian fleet of the line: "the best combat formation in the world." This campaign coincided with the intensification of the activity of the German submarine forces, and on July 4, 1916, the Goeben fired at Tuapse.
This was the last straw, A. A. Eberhard was replaced by A. Kolchak. But, interestingly, he did the same as A. A. Eberhard: he continued mining the exit from the Bosphorus (again the Goeben, 6 German submarines blew up) in order to block the Turkish forces; Russian destroyers and submarines tormented the Turkish coast with their cruising operations. One of the reasons for the appointment of Kolchak was that it was believed that he was a specialist in landing operations and mine work.
And from the end of 1916 there was a systematic preparation for the "operation Constantinople": there were trainings for the landing and disembarkation of troops, constant reconnaissance exits to the Bosphorus, the coast was carefully studied, aerial photographic reconnaissance was carried out. Kolchak had every chance to go down in the history of the empire as the hero who hoisted the Russian banner over the ancient capital of the Christian world.
Literature
- Kozlov D. Yu. « Strange war"In the Black Sea (August-October 1914)... - M .: Quadriga, 2009 .-- 223 p. - ISBN 978-5-904162-07-8
- Zolotarev V.L., Kozlov I.A. Russian navy in the Black Sea and in the Eastern Mediterranean.... - M .: Nauka, 1988 .-- 208 p.
Dear Sirs!
I present to you the 4th, published in Russia, Book of Memory of the First World War - "The Black Sea Fleet in the Great War of 1914-1918" - over 8600 personalities, mainly the lower ranks and officers of the fleet, collected over 2 years of unselfish labor by Alexander Igorevich Grigorov and his assistants.
The book of memory "The Black Sea Fleet in the Great War of 1914-1918" was published at the end of 2014 with private donations, with a circulation of 100 copies.
The book of memory "The Black Sea Fleet in the Great War of 1914-1918" contains information about losses and awards of lower ranks and officers, service records of officers and other mentions of naval ranks and civilians, as well as information about the fate of some personalities after the end of the Great war.
You can get an idea of \u200b\u200bthe Book from the Introduction and Preface by the compiler - A.I. Grigorov (structure, sources, documents, working group, thanks ...). See the full content of the book below - read the table of contents.
For the PDF and the Internet version of the Book, the author of the site compiled the Alphabetical Index (search by last name), where after the full name the page of the book is indicated - accordingly, you need to remember the page number, then download the book (RAR archive), unzip and find the page you are interested in, and on the page itself, find the person you are interested in.
The book is presented in one PDF file (Book and alphabetical index). The PDF file contains bookmarks for navigating within each section of the book - please open the left side with bookmarks after opening the PDF file.
To read the Book, you need to download the archive with the PDF file (see below).
Simple search algorithm
(open the links in html here or download the entire book with an alphabetical index)
If you find the person you are interested in in the index, write down the page number, download the book (PDF file in the RAR archive), unzip the downloaded archive, open the PDF file of the book, find the page, and the page - the person you are interested in;
If you do not immediately find the personnel you are looking for, please,
read again: "How to Work with Pointers and Search in the Book."
Memory book
"The Black Sea Fleet in the Great War of 1914-1918"
Foreword
Word of His Eminence, His Eminence Lazarus, Metropolitan of Simferopol and Crimea
Section 1. Fighting Black Sea Fleet in the Great War of 1914-1918. Historical reference
Section 2. Losses of officers and military officials of the Black Sea Fleet in 1914-1918
Section 3. Awards and promotions to the following ranks of officers, clergy and class officials of the Black Sea Fleet according to reports in the provincial press
Section 4. Service records of the Commanders of the Black Sea Fleet 1914-1918
Section 5. List of personnel of ships of the fleet, combatant and administrative institutions of the Maritime Department. Edition October 1914 Black Sea Fleet
Section 6. Officers and military officials in the naval militia in the Tauride province in 1914-1917
Section 7. The clergy of the Black Sea Fleet in the Great War of 1914-1918
Section 8. Awarding officers of the Black Sea Fleet with the Order of St. George and St. George's Weapons in 1914-1918
Section 9. Losses of the lower ranks of the Black Sea Fleet (according to the funds of the RGAVMF)
Foreword. Passage of service by lower ranks and non-commissioned officers (information on ranks and titles of positions)
Losses in 1914
Losses in 1915
Losses in 1916
Losses in 1917
Sources
Section 10. Lower ranks of the Black Sea Fleet - St. George Cavaliers
Awarded repeatedly
Commander of the Black Sea Fleet awards
1914 awards
1915 awards
1916 awards
1917 awards
Without order numbers, in the lists
Awarding by the head of the Black Sea Fleet Special Purpose Expedition
Submariners of the Black Sea Fleet - St. George Cavaliers
Section 11. Wrecked ships of the Black Sea Fleet in 1914-1918
Section 12. Marine pilots and observer pilots of the Black Sea Fleet
Losses
Some track records
Awards for officers
Awarding of lower ranks
Section 13. Officers and military officials of the Black Sea Fleet who died during the revolutionary riots in November 1917 - February 1918.
Application. The first commanders of the White, Ukrainian and Red Black Sea fleets
Application. Returned from the Great War. Various mentions.
Application. To the history of the Maritime Ministry of the Crimean regional government
Addition. Lists of losses of the lower ranks of the battleship "Empress Maria", 1916
Alphabetical index (A – Z) of names (see the website)
Team of authors
List of some abbreviations
During the First World War (1914-1918), the enemy of the Russian Empire on the Black Sea was the German-Turkish fleet. And although the Young Turkish government doubted for a long time with whom to fight and with whom to be friends and adhered to neutrality. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and intelligence, closely watched the internal political events in Turkey: Minister of War Enver Pasha and Minister of Internal Affairs Talaat Pasha advocated an alliance with the German Empire, and the Minister of the Navy, the head of the Istanbul garrison, Cemal Pasha, for cooperation with France. They informed the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, A.A. Eberhard, about the state of the Turkish fleet and army, their preparations, so that he could correctly react to the actions of a potential enemy.
With the outbreak of war (August 1, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia), the government instructed Admiral A. A. Eberhard to avoid aggressive actions that could cause a war with the Ottoman Empire, strengthening the arguments of the Turkish "war party". The Black Sea Fleet had the right to start hostilities only by order of the Supreme Commander (he was Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (junior) from July 20, 1914 to August 23, 1915), or according to the message of the Russian ambassador in Istanbul. Although the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) showed the fallacy of such a position, when the Japanese fleet suddenly attacked the Russian Port Arthur squadron and temporarily paralyzed its activities, which allowed the Japanese to carry out an unhindered landing of land armies. The imperial government, 10 years later, "stepped on the same rake", the commander of the fleet was bound by the directive of the government, the instructions of the high military command and was unable to carry out all measures to increase the combat readiness of the fleet, including the possibility of a preventive strike. As a result, the Black Sea Fleet, although it was significantly stronger than the Turkish naval forces, was forced to passively wait for the enemy's attack.
Power balance: Russian Black Sea Fleet and German-Turkish Fleet
Before the war, the Black Sea Fleet, in all respects, had complete superiority over the enemy: both in the number of pennants, in firepower, in combat training, in the training of officers and sailors. It consisted of: 6 battleships of the old type (the so-called battleships, or pre-dreadnoughts) - the flagship of the fleet "Eustathius", "John Chrysostom" (built in 1904-1911), "Panteleimon" (the former notorious "Prince Potemkin -Tavrichesky ", 1898-1905. Built)," Rostislav "(1894-1900. Built)," Three Saints "(built in 1891-1895)," Sinop "(1883-1889. Built); 2 Bogatyr-class cruisers, 17 destroyers, 12 destroyers, 4 submarines. The main base was Sevastopol, the fleet had its own shipyards in Sevastopol and Nikolaev. 4 more powerful battleships of the modern design (dreadnoughts) were under construction: "Empress Maria" (1911-July 1915), "Empress Catherine the Great" (1911-October 1915), "Emperor Alexander III" (1911-June 1917) .), "Emperor Nicholas I" (since 1914, unfinished due to a sharp deterioration in the political, financial and economic situation after the February Revolution of 1917). Also, during the war, the Black Sea Fleet received - 9 destroyers, 2 aircraft (prototypes of aircraft carriers), 10 submarines.
At the beginning of 1914, the exit of the Turkish fleet from the Bosphorus Strait to battle with the Russian fleet seemed fantastic. The Ottoman Empire had been in decline for almost two centuries, and by the 20th century, the processes of decay only intensified. Turkey lost three wars to Russia in the 19th century (1806-1812, 1828-1829, 1877-1878), turned out to be the winner in the Crimean War (1853-1856), but only at the expense of an alliance with England and France ; already in the XX century it was defeated by Italy in the war for Tripolitania (1911-1912), and in the Balkan War (1912-1913). Russia was one of the five world leaders (Great Britain, Germany, USA, France, Russia). By the beginning of the century, the Turkish naval forces were a pitiful sight - a bunch of morally and technically obsolete ships. One of the main reasons for this is the complete bankruptcy of Turkey, there was no money in the treasury. The Turks had only a few more or less combat-ready ships: 2 armored cruisers "Medzhidie" (built in the USA in 1903) and "Hamidie" (England, 1904), 2 squadron battleships "Torgut Reis" and "Hayreddin Barbarossa" (battleships type "Brandenburg", purchased in Germany in 1910), 4 destroyers built in France (1907 type "Durendal"), 4 destroyers of German construction (purchased from Germany in 1910, type "S 165"). A distinctive feature of the Turkish naval forces was the almost complete lack of combat training.
It cannot be said that the Turkish government did not try to change the situation in its favor: so in 1908, a grandiose fleet renewal program was adopted, it was decided to purchase 6 battleships of the latest model, 12 destroyers, 12 destroyers, 6 submarines and a number of auxiliary ships. But the war with Italy, two Balkan wars devastated the treasury, orders were thwarted. Turkey ordered more ships in France and England (which is interesting - Russia's allies in the Entente, but they built ships for Turkey, a potential enemy of Russia on the Black Sea), so a battleship, 4 destroyers and 2 submarines were built in England. This replenishment could have seriously altered the balance of power in favor of the Ottoman Empire, but as soon as the war began, England confiscated the ships in favor of its fleet. Only the arrival from the Mediterranean Sea on August 10, 1914 of the two newest German cruisers: the heavy Geben (named Sultan Selim) and the light Breslau (Midilli), they entered the Turkish fleet together with their crews, allowed Turkey to lead fighting in the Black Sea basin. The commander of the German Mediterranean Division, Rear Admiral V. Souchon, led the combined German-Turkish forces. "Goeben" was more powerful than any Russian battleship of the old type, but together the Russian battleships would have destroyed it, therefore, in a collision with the entire squadron, "Goeben" left using its high speed.
Reference: Souchon Wilhelm (1864-1946), headed the German-Turkish fleet in 1914-1917. At the age of 17 he became an officer, served on various ships, commanded the gunboat "Adler", took part in the German annexation of the Samoa Islands, commander of the battleship "Wettin", chief of staff of the German Baltic Fleet, since 1911 Rear Admiral, since October 1913, the commander of the Mediterranean Division ... With the beginning of the war, he was able to make a breakthrough into the Dardanelles, with the complete superiority of the English fleet, before that he shelled the French ports in North Africa, delaying the arrival of the expeditionary force for three days, which was important when the German armies attacked Paris. By his actions ("Sevastopol wake-up call") he dragged the Ottoman Empire into the war. He acted quite successfully against superior forces The Entente, bound the Russian Black Sea Fleet with his actions, in September 1917 he was transferred to the Baltic, led the 4th squadron of the fleet. He took part in the capture of the Gulf of Riga and the Moonsund archipelago. In March 1919, he resigned, did not return to the service, calmly lived out his days, seeing the revival and repeated death of the German fleet.
Parties plans
The main goal of the Black Sea Fleet was complete domination of the Black Sea in order to reliably protect strategically important objects by the sea, cover the flank of the Caucasian army, and ensure the transfer of troops and supplies by sea. At the same time, disrupt the shipping of Turkey along its Black Sea coast. When the Turkish fleet appeared at Sevastopol, the Russian fleet had to destroy it. In addition, if necessary, the Black Sea Fleet was preparing to carry out the Bosphorus operation - to seize the Bosphorus, by the forces of the Black Sea Fleet and landing units. But the appearance of German cruisers in Turkey, the plans of the Russian command were confused, Admiral Souchon was not going to engage in battle with the main forces of the Russian fleet, but using his speed he inflicted pinpoint strikes and left before the main forces of the Black Sea Fleet approached.
In 1915, when the newest battleships of the "Empress Maria" type entered the fleet, the fleet was tasked with disrupting the supply of coal and other supplies to the Bosphorus region and providing assistance to the troops of the Caucasian Front. For this purpose, 3 ship groups were created, each of which was more powerful than the German cruiser "Goeben". They were supposed, changing each other, to constantly be on the Turkish coast and thereby fulfill the main task of the fleet.
The strategic intent of the commander of the combined German-Turkish fleet, Rear Admiral Sushon, was to strike a surprise attack almost simultaneously at the main base of the Russian fleet in Sevastopol, the ports of Odessa, Feodosia and Novorossiysk. To sink or seriously damage the warships and merchant ships located there, as well as the most significant military and industrial facilities on the coast, and, thereby weakening the Russian Black Sea Fleet, achieve the possibility of complete superiority at sea. Thus, the German admiral planned to repeat the experience of the Japanese in 1904. But despite the success of the operation, the Russian fleet did not suffer serious losses, Souchon simply did not have enough firepower. If the Turkish fleet was more powerful, the Black Sea Fleet could receive a severe blow, which sharply worsened the position of the Russian Caucasian Army and disrupted the Black Sea communications.
The beginning of hostilities: "Sevastopol wake-up call"
Vice-Admiral A. A. Eberhard received the news of the withdrawal of the German-Turkish squadron from the Bosphorus on October 27, he brought the Black Sea Fleet to sea, waited a whole day on the approaches to Sevastopol in the hope of meeting the enemy. But on the 28th the headquarters of the fleet received an order from the Supreme Command "not to seek a meeting with the Turkish fleet and to engage with it only in case of emergency." The Black Sea Fleet returned to the base and no longer took active action. Admiral A. A. Eberhard, although he acted on orders from above, but this does not remove his guilt for passivity, I think Admiral S. O. Makarov would not have reckoned with the ranks if it was about the honor of the Russian fleet.
Of course, the command of the fleet took action to prevent a surprise attack from the Turkish fleet. Reconnaissance was conducted, on the approaches to Sevastopol there were three destroyers on patrol (which missed the German cruiser), the main forces of the fleet were at the base in full readiness. But all this was not enough. The command did not make any orders to prepare the forces of the fleet, including the Sevastopol fortress, to repel an enemy attack. The head of the raid security wanted to turn on the minefield, but A.A. Eberhard forbade it to do so, as he was expecting the approach of the Prut minelay. But the chief of the raid nevertheless warned the commander of the fortress artillery about the possible arrival of an enemy squadron. And the coastal artillery more or less fulfilled its task.
As a result, the Black Sea Fleet did not fulfill its main task - it could not defend the Russian coast, let the enemy fleet go, which calmly went to the Bosphorus. On October 29-30, the German-Turkish fleet inflicted an artillery strike on Sevastopol, Odessa, Feodosia, Novorossiysk. This event was named - "Sevastopol wake-up call". In Odessa, the destroyers "Muhavenet-i-Millet" and "Gayret-i-Vatanie" drowned the gunboat "Donets", fired at the city and port. The battle cruiser "Goeben" approached Sevastopol and for 15 minutes walked unhindered through our minefield, without opposition, shelling the city, port and ships stationed in the outer roadstead. The minefield's electrical circuit was turned off and no one turned it on without an order. The Konstantinovskaya battery was silent, waiting for the German cruiser to enter the targeted square, but opening fire, immediately hit the target three times. "Goeben" immediately gave full speed and retreated to sea. On the way back, he met a minelayer "Prut", which was awaited with a full load of mines in Sevastopol. Trying to save "Prut", three old destroyers who were on patrol ("Lieutenant Pushchin", "Hot" and "Tenacious") launched an attack on "Goeben". They did not have a single chance of success, but "Goeben" was not able to drown them, "went out in peace." The Goeben gunners easily repulsed this attack. The commander of the minelayer, Captain 2nd Rank GA Bykov, sank the ship, which is interesting, "Goeben" fired at it - 1 hour 5 minutes, at an almost unarmed ship. But it was a success, since the Prut was carrying most of the naval sea mines. The cruiser "Breslau" laid mines in the Kerch Strait, which blew up and sank the steamers "Yalta" and "Kazbek". This is the great fault of the commander and his staff, especially the Supreme Commander, who, with his instructions, tied the initiative of A.A. Eberhard. But in the end, the German-Turkish plan still did not work: the forces of the first strike were too scattered, and there was not enough firepower.
This is how Turkey entered the first world war and the last war with Russia. On the same day, Russian ships began cruises to the shores of the enemy. The fire of the cruiser "Cahul" destroyed the huge coal storage facilities in Zonguldak, and the battleship "Panteleimon" and the destroyers sank three loaded troop transports. The Turks were amazed at such an activity of the Russian fleet, they miscalculated, thinking to themselves that they had gained time, the Black Sea Fleet was alive and functioning.
Composition of the Black Sea Fleet in the First World War
By the beginning of the First World War, the Black Sea Fleet consisted of five battleships, but all of them were already outdated not so much physically as morally. The fact is that these were squadron battleships, which, according to the new classification of 1907, began to be called battleships, but the new name did not add either speed or firepower to them. Nevertheless, it was these ships that bore the brunt of the battles with the German-Turkish battle cruiser Ge-bin. We will tell you about this fierce struggle for domination in the Black Sea today.
As the slipway work was completed on the Potemkin and two cruisers, the question arose about the further workload of the shipyards in Nikolaev and Sevastopol. The military leadership decided to continue building battleships. At first, the Borodino project was considered as a prototype, but the management wanted to rework it for the conditions of the Black Sea. Then they decided that it would be better to build an improved copy of Potemkin. It was planned to strengthen its armament, improve its booking, but in the end the initial project went into construction without any changes. It was decided to build two ships in the Nikolaev Admiralty, work began on the construction of "Eustathius" (sometimes in the literature it is called "St. Eustathius"), the Lazarevsky Admiralty of the Sevastopol port was instructed to build "John Chrysostom". It was planned that the ships would go out for testing in the spring of 1906.
Preparations for the construction of ships began in the summer of 1903, in November work began on the "John Chrysostom", in March 1904 on the "Eustathia". Their official laying took place on October 31 and November 10, 1904, respectively. Initially, work proceeded at a rapid pace, but in 1905-1906. they were actually suspended for a number of reasons. During the mass strikes and strikes in 1905-1906. work stalled. Taking into account experience russo-Japanese War the military leadership ordered to rework the project, maximize armament and booking: 4x203-mm and 12x152-mm were placed on the ships (there was even a variant of the project with 6x203-mm and 20x75-mm) and all 47-mm guns were removed, the booking system became more thought-out ( the total weight of the armor increased by 173.7 tons compared to the original version). To compensate for the overload from the battleships, the masts with battle tops, bulky cranes for lifting boats, and even network barriers were removed. The question of the number of masts (one or two) has been repeatedly resolved at the highest level in the Maritime Ministry. In turn, the designers tried to save the battleships from anachronisms - useless mine boats, bow torpedo tubes and a full stock of barrage mines (45 ball mines). In the process of making changes to the project, the ships began to gradually grow in size, but their hulls were already formed on the stocks and the designers had to look for a compromise.
The main weapons of the newest battleships were four 40-caliber 305-mm guns in the towers, made according to the design of the Metal Plant. Now they received new ammunition - the shells "grew" to 965.2 mm in length and became heavier by increasing the amount of explosives. Because of this, the cellars and turret compartments had to be redone. The rate of fire of a 305-mm gun was one shot per minute, the cellars held 240 (later 308) 12-inch shells and charges. The firing range of the main caliber was 110 cables due to the elevation angle of the guns in the new turrets increased to 35 degrees.
The debate about medium-caliber guns for new ships continued for a long time. Only in October 1906, the final decision was made to install four 50-capyber 203-mm cannons. Their rate of fire is 4 rds / min, 440 rounds of ammunition, 86 cable firing range. The armament of the ships was supplemented by 12x152-mm guns (rate of fire 6 rounds / min, ammunition of 2160 rounds, firing range of 61 cables) and 14x75-mm (rate of fire 12 rounds / min, ammunition of 4200 rounds, firing range of 43 cables). These metamorphoses with weapons affected the timing of construction, the battleships became another Russian long-term construction. On April 30, 1906 “John Chrysostom” was launched, on October 21 - “Eustathius”. Completion began, which dragged on for several years. Traditionally, the delivery times for mechanisms, equipment and weapons were constantly disrupted, their installation on ships was out of schedule, and sometimes work had to be suspended. In May 1910, Evstafiy was transferred to Sevastopol to complete the work. In July, both ships went for sea trials for the first time. The first tests were unsuccessful, but then they went "in all respects satisfactory." On January 26, 1911, the act of “acceptance into the treasury” of the mechanisms of “John Chrysostom” was signed, and on July 20, “Eustathia”. The cost of building battleships was 13,784,760 and 14,118,210 rubles, respectively.
The newest battleships (as, according to the new classification, in October 1907, battleships began to be called squadron ships) significantly strengthened the Black Sea Fleet. They entered the operational fleet in 1911 - March 19 "John Chrysostom" and May 15 "Eustathius". On July 29, a brigade of battleships of the Black Sea Fleet was formed. It included two new battleships, Panteleimon and Rostislav, ie. three battleships of almost the same type and a relatively weak (due to 254-mm guns) battleship. It was this unit that became the foremost in the domestic fleet in terms of combat training and fully realized the invaluable experience of the Russo-Japanese war, which was paid for with great blood.
Experiments began on the Black Sea in the fall of 1906. A separate practical detachment was created under the flag of Rear Admiral G.F. Tsyvinsky. It includes "Panteleimon", "Rostislav", "Three Saints" and "Sinop". At the Tendra training ground, a special place was equipped for conducting artillery fire. The squadron's ships began to practice new methods of centralized control of the squadron's fire at long distances. In June 1907, the first results of these experiments were demonstrated to the commissions from St. Petersburg. They were shown five types of zeroing at long distances. In October "Panteleimon" was the first in the Russian fleet to fire the main caliber at 80 cables. In 1908, research continued - now the shooting was carried out at a distance of 110 cables. In addition to firing, the ships of the detachment jointly maneuvered at different speeds, practiced sailing in any weather and constantly carried out various experiments with communications, etc. In 1909, one of the campaigns ended in tragedy - on the night of May 30, Rostislav, when the detachment was returning to Sevastopol, sank the Kambala submarine with a ram. The ships continued to engage in experimental firing at a distance of up to 100 cables. At the same time, they "tested" new 305-mm armor-piercing shells weighing 380 kg (the previous ones weighed 332 kg). Their combat capabilities were excellent and they performed well during the war.
After the commissioning of two battleships, the question of further destiny ships-veterans. It was planned to re-equip the newest 305-mm guns "Chesma", but these plans remained on paper. And the new towers for the rearmament of the Chesma were handed over to be installed on the Ioann Chrysostom. Three old battleships were written off, two more were converted into auxiliary vessels. Now the military leadership was deciding the fate of the Three Saints and Rostislav. These ships were quite new, but they needed modernization and rearmament. It was planned to change masts, bridges, and alter superstructures on them. This made the ships lighter and reduced the overload, which worsened the fighting qualities. They refused from capital works at "Rostislav", tk. the necessary rearmament for 305-mm guns was extremely costly and it was not "pulled" by the country's military budget, where every ruble counted.
The only battleship that underwent an almost complete modernization was the Three Saints, the first classic "capital ship" of the Black Sea Fleet. Several projects were developed, and there were fierce disputes around them. Two projects became "finalists", the version of the Sevastopol port won. Its development was completed in August 1909, it was planned to allocate more than 600 thousand rubles for the work. But then there were no funds in the budget, and work began only in November 1911. They continued until the summer of 1912. The masts and bridges were changed on the Three Saints, new deckhouses were installed, the superstructure was changed and the spardeck was dismantled, the casemate was remade and 10x152 mm guns. The composition of the armament was changed: the surface torpedo tubes were removed, the number of 152-mm guns was increased from 8 to 14 (ammunition for 190 rounds per gun), all 120-mm, 47-mm and 37-mm guns were removed. The main battery turrets were repaired, their design flaws were corrected. Thanks to this, the firing range has increased to 80 cables. Unfortunately, no funds were allocated (105 thousand rubles were required) for the modernization of the towers and an increase in the elevation angle of 305-mm guns from 15 to 25 degrees. This would increase the firing range up to 100 cables. On July 19, 1912, the updated battleship went out for sea trials, by August 23, artillery trials were completed. Soon after the complete completion of the test program (September 21, 1912), the upgraded battleship Three Saints was replaced as part of the battleship Rostislav brigade.
The new ships were actively engaged in combat training and made cruises in the Black Sea. One of them ended in a scandalous episode that led to the change of the fleet commander. When leaving the Romanian port of Constanta on September 19, 1912, Vice Admiral I.F. Bostrem decided to “boo” and performed a risky maneuver. As a result, two battleships ran aground in the outer roadstead of the port. "Eustathius" soon managed to get off on its own, and work on removing the "Panteleimon" from the aground took 8 hours. Both ships were damaged in the hull and after returning to Sevastopol were forced to dock. In August 1913, "John Chrysostom" took part in the most secret experiment in the entire history of the Russian Imperial Navy - experimental firing at the "Excluded ship N ° 4" (former battleship "Chesma"). Its results were immediately classified. The brigade's combat training continued and every year it became more and more tense due to the aggravation of the situation in the Balkans. The firing of the brigade at the Tendra training ground continued, the ships continued their voyages across the Black Sea. For the first time in the winter of 1913-14. battleships were not withdrawn to the armed reserve.
Combat training became even more intense and intense in 1914. In April, Rostislav and Sinop were assigned to a reserve brigade of battleships, and in September it became the 2nd battleship brigade. It also included "Three Saints" (the result of savings on the modernization of the towers). The last battleship firing took place on October 7 in the area of \u200b\u200bCape Feolent. On this day, battleships, cruisers and the 2nd destroyer division carried out combat artillery and torpedo firing. Their target was "Excluded ship No. 3" (former battleship "Catherine II"), Shooting battleships from a distance of 90 cables showed high level training of gunners and became a "dress rehearsal" for the coming battles. And they finished off the target with a torpedo from the Strogy destroyer. The veteran ship's hull sank at a depth of 183 m.
By this time, the Black Sea battleships had a formidable enemy. Thanks to the "insufficiently energetic" opposition from the British fleet, two German ships were able to pass the Mediterranean Sea and enter the Dardanelles on July 28, 1914. We are talking about the battle cruiser "Goeben" and the light cruiser "Breslau". On August 3, Turkish flags were raised on them, they were renamed “Yavuz Sultan Selim” and “Midilli”, respectively. The crews on them remained German, but the ships became the property of the Ottoman Empire. The Goeben was a dangerous enemy: the speed reached 28 knots (instead of 16 knots of Russian battleships), powerful armament (10x280-mm and 12x150-mm guns) and excellent optics, quite perfect armor, an experienced and amalgamated crew. He became the main enemy of the Russian battleships. Our officers continued, despite the renaming, "to call him" Goeben ", and soon the cruisers received the nickname" Goeben "became" uncle ", and" Breslau "" nephew ".
The situation in the Black Sea after Turkey's purchase of the Gebe-na became a stalemate: the German could sink any of the battleships of the Black Sea Fleet, but when meeting them as part of the brigade, our battleships already posed a serious threat to him. Then the "uncle" willingly used his speed advantage and quickly left the battlefield. These facts had to be taken into account by our leadership and the command of the enemy: "Goeben" tried to catch our ships of the line one by one, and our command was forced to go to sea only with all its might.
For the Black Sea Fleet, the war began on October 16, 1914 with an attack by the forces of the German-Turkish fleet on the Black Sea ports. In Odessa, Turkish ships sank a gunboat. Sevastopol was shelled by the Goeben, which fired 47x280-mm and 12x150-mm shells. Not a single ship in the port was damaged by its volleys. The enemy battlecruiser walked along the fortress minefield (300 galvanic mines), but its chain was not closed. The order to close the circuit was not received in time. This accident saved the best ship of the German-Turkish fleet from destruction. Our battleships, standing on barrels, did not open fire in the Sevastopol bay. With the exception of St. George the Victorious, which fired three rounds from 152-mm guns. Coastal batteries fired, naval aviation was raised into the air. Departing from Sevastopol, "Geben" damaged the destroyer "Lieutenant Pushchin" with fire and forced the crew of the "Prut" mine layer to sink their ship because of the danger of a mine explosion. On the same day, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral A.A. Eberhard brought the fleet to sea (5 battleships, 3 cruisers, 13 destroyers), but did not find the enemy. The first meeting of the fleet with the "Goeben" took place on November 5, 1914 and went down in history as the battle at Cape Sarych. Russian ships were returning from a three-day cruise after shelling Trebizond, and at 12.05 am, 40 miles from Cape Kherso-nes, they found "big smoke" on the horizon. The battleships began to rebuild. At 12.20, our battleships opened fire on the enemy in a salvo from the Eustathius. The fight lasted
14 minutes "Goeben" answered, he focused the fire on the flagship. The first two volleys of 280-mm guns gave flight and undershoot, fragments covered our flagship, damaged the radio antenna and pierced the middle chimney. The German gunners showed excellent rate of fire and coverings soon began. Three volleys of the "uncle" led to hits: two 280-mm shells hit the right forward 152-mm casemate (5 officers and 29 lower ranks were killed, 24 lower ranks were wounded), another one hit the 152-mm battery casemate in the ship's superstructure, and another one exploded at the starboard side in the nose and riddled it with shrapnel. Two German "gifts" lay next to the board of "Rostislav". Soon "Goeben" increased its speed and left the battlefield. The question of the number of hits on the Goeben is still unclear - Russian officers observed at least 1 hit, our historians wrote about 14 hits, 115 killed and 59 wounded, the Germans generally deny that Yavuz was hit or damaged. Due to various reasons, our battleships were unable to act together in this battle, and in fact it boiled down to an unequal short-lived duel between Goeben and Eustathius. Our flagship was damaged, but managed to fire 12x305-mm shells. "John Chrysostom" fired 6 shots, "Panteleimon" did not open fire, "Three Saints" 12 shots, "Rostislav" managed to fire 2x254-mm and 6x152-mm shots.
On November 6, in Sevastopol, those who died in the battle at Cape Sarych were buried. On November 16, Eustathius underwent repairs, repaired the damage and returned to service. The fleet continued military operations off the Turkish coast. On the evening of December 24, our ships met the cruisers Midilli and Hamidie. "Evstafiy" managed to release 5x305-mm, 4x203-mm, 17x152-mm and 1x75-mm, "John Chrysostom" 1x203-mm and 7x152-mm shells, but they fell short. During a short firefight, Eustathius again got no direct hits, but the shells from the Midilli damaged the rails and made five potholes in the barrel of the right bow 305-mm gun. Battleships continued to bombard the Turkish coast, but the Goeben did not appear. it was repaired after being blown up by 2 Russian mines.
On April 27, the second meeting of the battleships with the Goeben took place near the Bosphorus. Admiral A.A. Eberhard brought the entire fleet out to sea - 5 battleships, 2 cruisers, 2 seaplane vehicles, 15 destroyers and 6 minesweepers. In the morning the Russians divided the forces - "Panteleimon" and "Three Saints" went to shell the Turkish fortifications in the Bosphorus region. The enemy decided to take advantage of this, and "Goeben" went on rapprochement with half of the Russian forces. In such a situation, his chances increased dramatically. At 6.50, our patrol ships found the Goeben. At 07.20 a.m. a combat alert was played on the battleships. Eberhard sought to link up with the 2 battleships as soon as possible, since Rostislav did not pose a threat to Geben. At 7.51, two Russian battleships opened fire, the enemy responded. Our shots were undershot, German volleys began to cover the Eustathius. The flagship was "taken in a fork", it was surrounded by huge water pillars, it was flooded with water, the ship's hull was shaken by dynamic impacts, but there was not a single direct hit on the Eustathius. This is the great merit of the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, who controlled the ship's maneuvers. A few more volleys of the "uncle" and hits could no longer be avoided. Know "Gebena" there was a new enemy - "Panteleimon" forcing cars (he developed a speed of 17.5 knots) approached the place of battle. At 08:05, his guns fired the first shot at the Goeben. With the second salvo from a distance of 100 cables, he managed to hit the middle part of the left side of the "uncle". This was followed by two more hits by "Panteleimon" and at 8.16 "Goeben" withdrew from the battle. He fired 160 shots, but did not achieve a single hit. "Evstafy" fired 60x305-mm and 32x203-mm, "John Chrysostom" 75x305-mm and 4x203-mm, "Panteleimon" fired 16x305-mm rounds,
The Three Saints fired 13x305-mm shells. Russian battleships continued operations off the Turkish coast.
On July 1, 1915, the battleship Empress Maria, the first dreadnought of the Black Sea Fleet, arrived in Sevastopol. This huge ship was armed with 12x305-mm guns and alone could deal with both "uncle" and "nephew". He had not yet passed the test program and on the transition from Nikolaev he was accompanied by veteran battleships. They were going south of the dreadnought and were ready to repel the attack of the Goeben. Soon the main caliber of the dreadnought was tested and it went on the first military campaign. In November, the second dreadnought "Empress Catherine the Great" entered the fleet. This changed the strategic situation on the Black Sea and now the Goeben had only one advantage - speed.
The old battleships were repaired and they were slightly upgraded with anti-aircraft guns and for-trawls. They began to go out to sea less often, but still continued to make trips to the Turkish shores. They shelled Zunguldak, Kilimli, Kozlu and other places on the coast. The veteran ships did not have new meetings with the Goeben. Instead, a new dangerous enemy submarines appeared. In October 1915 Bulgaria entered the war on
side of Germany, and the port of Varna became the base for German submarines. The old battleships Eustathius, Ioann Chrysostom and Panteleimon were sent against it, which were to deliver an artillery strike at the port. On October 22, they conducted the first shelling, but due to the lack of data, they fired “in the squares”. He gave no results. The second shelling on October 27 was combined with an air raid, but it did not give much results either. At the same time "Panteleimon" was attacked by the submarine "UB 7", which fired a 450-mm torpedo from 5 cables. The signalmen found it in a timely manner and an evasive maneuver was timely made. The torpedo passed by. At the same time, diving shells opened fire at the periscope.
The Russian army successfully operated in the Caucasus, captured a number of cities and fortresses. The old battleships Rostislav and Panteleimon were involved in supporting the offensive of our troops. In 1915 the Batumi detachment was formed. In 1916 it was headed by "Rostislav", which with fire from 254-mm and 152-mm guns suppressed batteries, fired at the positions of the Turkish army. The old battleship covered amphibious operations, accompanied huge convoys with troops and cargo for the army with its presence, giving "solidity" to the escort of destroyers, minesweepers and high-speed boats. After the occupation of Trebizond, which became the main supply base of the Caucasian army, battleships-veterans came to Batum to protect sea lanes from a possible attack by the "Geben". But the "uncle" never showed up. In the autumn they returned to Sevastopol.
In August-October 1916 "Rostislav" operated at Constanta. He led a special detachment consisting of 10 destroyers, 10 speedboats, 9 minesweepers, 4 messenger ships and 2 transports. He covered communications off the coast of Romania, operated off the coast of Bulgaria and in the Bosphorus region. Here, "Rostislav", while performing the tasks of the command (support by fire of the Romanian troops, suppression of enemy batteries), had to face another danger from enemy aircraft. On August 20, 25 bombs were dropped on the battleship. One of them hit the edge of the vertical armor of the main turret of the battleship. 16 sailors were wounded.
In February 1917, a revolution took place in Russia and the Romanov dynasty was overthrown. Democratic transformations began in the country. Anarchy ensued in the Baltic, in the Black Sea, thanks to the authority of the commander A.F. Kolchak, it was possible to maintain relative order: ship committees were formed on the ships of the fleet, but there were no killings of officers, the ships still went to sea for military operations to the shores of Turkey. In March "Panteleimon" was given back the name "Prince Potemkin-Tavrichesky", which he had during the uprising. But its crew did not want such a renaming and on April 28 the ship was renamed Freedom Fighter. In the summer, the discipline of the Black Sea people began to loosen thanks to the influence of envoys from the Baltic. Numerous rallies began. In the fall, power in the country passed into the hands of the Bolsheviks, and anarchy began on the Black Sea, officers were killed, sailors began to defect, ships stopped going to sea, the crews did not follow orders from the command. The old battleships also stopped going on campaigns, they were placed at the berths of the South Bay of Sevastopol. Soon they were empty and the sailors left them.
In May 1918, German troops entered Sevastopol. They captured the old battleships, but did nothing with them, tk. they were more interested in the contents of the naval warehouses. Although during the occupation, a number of valuable equipment and materials disappeared from the veteran ships. In November they were replaced by British and French interventionists. They also had little interest in battleships. In April 1919, when leaving Sevastopol, they blew up the cylinders of the main machines of all old battleships. Soon the Whites captured Crimea again. They decided to use the Rostislav as a floating battery. It was towed to Kerch, and then installed in the Kerch Strait. He guarded the approaches from the north to the strait and fired at the Red units on the Taman Peninsula. His team consisted of former officers, high school students, students, cadets and cadets. In November 1920, the Whites, leaving Sevastopol and the Crimea, flooded the Rostislav in the fairway. And "Fighter for Freedom", "Eustathius", "John Chrysostom" and "Three Saints" became trophies of the Red Army.
After the end of the Civil War, various authoritative commissions examined the veteran ships several times, which were still stationed in the South Bay of Sevastopol, which had become a "ship graveyard". There were no carriages on them for a long time and traces of desolation and looting were visible everywhere. The condition of the hulls was not bad, no one followed the artillery, the blown-up cylinders of the main vehicles required replacement. There was nowhere and no one to do this. As a result, they were found unsuitable for restoration and decided to send them "on pins and needles." In the 1920s. they were all dismantled in Sevastopol. The artillery was deposited. Several guns from battleships in the 20-30s. was installed on coastal batteries near Sevastopol.
Black Sea Fleet. Campaign of 1914.
The military operations of the fleets in the First World War covered almost the entire World Ocean. But most intensively they were carried out in the North Sea, in the northeastern part Atlantic Ocean, on the Mediterranean, Baltic and Black seas.
Along the shores of Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania, maritime communications, very important for Turkey, passed through which reinforcements and supplies were delivered to the troops of the Caucasian Front, coal, oil (from Romania before it entered the war on the side of the Entente), agricultural products to Constantinople and other cities western part of Turkey. The blockade of the Bosphorus and the disruption of Turkey's maritime communications in the theater were one of the main tasks of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
The equipment and defenses of the Russian bases (with the exception of Sevastopol) by the beginning of the war were in an unsatisfactory condition. Coastal artillery was especially weak.
The enemy's coast had no means of defense. Only the Bosphorus region was fortified.
The hostilities in the Black Sea began with a treacherous (without declaring war) attack by the German-Turkish naval forces on Russian bases and ports. In the early morning of October 16 (29), they fired on Odessa, Sevastopol, Feodosia and Novorossiysk.
Two Turkish destroyers Gayret and Muhavenet took part in the attack on Odessa. Taking advantage of the suddenness of the raid, enemy ships sank the gunboat Donets and inflicted damage on the minelayer Beshtau, the gunboat Kubanets, 4 steamers, port facilities, as well as a sugar factory and a tram station in the city; there were human casualties.
The raid on Sevastopol made battle cruiser "Goeben" accompanied by two destroyers. Approaching almost close (45 cables) to the entrance to the Northern Bay, in 17 minutes he fired 47 280-mm and 12 152-mm shells in volleys at Sevastopol. Three shells hit the battleship George the Victorious and two shells hit the coastal batteries. One boiler was disabled on the battleship. Eight batteries and "St. George the Victorious" fired back. But the latter, due to poor visibility in the fog, managed to fire only three shots. Coastal batteries fired up to maximum distances, using up 360 rounds of up to 280 mm caliber.
While retreating from Sevastopol, the German cruiser attacked the Russian destroyer patrol boats and the Prut minelayer, returning from Yalta to Sevastopol, west of Cape Chersonesos. The destroyer "Lieutenant Pushchin" was seriously damaged, and a strong fire broke out on the "Prut" and its crew was forced to sink the ship, as there was a direct threat of explosion of 710 mines on board. The hostile destroyers who were with the Goeben picked up 75 people from the Prut team from the water and captured them.
Feodosia came under fire from the Turkish light cruiser "Hamidie", which fired 150 shells at the port and city, as a result of which fires broke out in port warehouses and a railway depot. The shelling of Novorossiysk was carried out by the German light cruiser Breslau and the Turkish mine cruiser Verk. Over 300 shells were fired at the city, which destroyed the radio station, damaged several steamers, an oil tanker, and grain stores.
In addition to shelling, enemy ships set up minefields near Odessa (28 minutes), Sevastopol (60 minutes) and at the entrance to the Kerch Strait (60 minutes). On the same day, the Russian steamships Kazbek and Yalta were blown up and sank on mines placed near the strait.
After shelling and laying mines, enemy ships headed for the Bosphorus. On the afternoon of October 16 (29), the main forces of the Russian fleet (5 battleships, 3 cruisers and several destroyers) came out to search for them. Until October 19 (November 1), they cruised in the southwestern part of the sea and, not finding the enemy, returned to Sevastopol. This is how the German-Turkish fleet managed to raid Russian naval bases and ports with impunity.
The higher Russian military command forgot the lessons of Port Arthur. Wanting Turkey to maintain as long as possible neutrality, which in reality was fictitious, it condemned the command of the fleet to passivity. Without the permission of the Supreme Commander, the Black Sea Fleet had no right to go far out to sea and even conduct reconnaissance with warships in the southern part of the theater. Only after the enemy attacked did the fleet commander gain freedom of action. The command of the fleet, in turn, showed exceptional carelessness, not organizing in advance the defense of ports and bases from the sea. There was no coordination between the naval and ground commanders in actions in the event of an enemy attack.
In this situation, the treacherous attack of the German-Turkish fleet could have led to more significant consequences if the enemy command had not dispersed its forces over several objects far from each other. The enemy's initial calculations to weaken the Russian Black Sea Fleet were not justified.
After the raid of enemy ships, the command of the Russian fleet began to stir. Measures were taken to strengthen the defense of the coast. A state of siege has been declared in Sevastopol. The setting up of defensive minefields began. In November - December in the Odessa region, at the entrance to the Dniester estuary, in the Kirkinitsky gulf, near Sevastopol, in the Kerch Strait and off the Caucasian coast, 4423 mines were laid. Coastal artillery was also reinforced at the theater, especially in Batum, which had weak defense before the war.
Simultaneously with the defensive measures, the Black Sea Fleet launched operations on enemy sea lanes. These communications ran along the Anatolian coast and were of paramount importance to Turkey, since the network of railways and dirt roads was poorly developed. They were used to deliver coal and various raw materials from Zonguldak to the Bosphorus, and military transportations were carried out from west to east, to the land front line. The purpose of the actions of the Russian fleet was not only to interrupt sea communications, but also to block the enemy fleet in the Bosphorus, if he tried to break into the sea, to impose a battle on him.
Until the end of 1914, a squadron of the Black Sea Fleet made six exits to enemy communications in the southern part of the sea. The first such exit was undertaken on October 22-25 (November 4-6). The result was the setting of a minefield (240 minutes) near the Bosphorus, the shelling of the port of Zonguldak and the sinking of 5 transports.
The second exit of the squadron on November 2-5 (15-18) was associated with the provision of mine laying by the Batumi detachment of minelayers ("Konstantin", "Xenia") near southeastern Anatolia. Obstacles (400 mines in total) were set up near Trebizond, Platana, Unye and Samsun. In addition, the ships fired at the port facilities of Trebizond. On November 5 (18), when returning to Sevastopol, the squadron met at Cape Sarych (Crimea) the cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau", sent by the enemy to intercept part of the ships of the Russian squadron. The first military clash took place in the Black Sea. The Russian squadron (5 battleships, 3 cruisers, 13 destroyers) went in the usual marching order: battleships in the wake column, cruisers on patrol, and destroyers behind the battleships.
At 12 hours 10 minutes on November 5 (18), near Cape Sarych, enemy cruisers appeared from the fog. The lead Russian battleship Eustathius immediately turned to the left in order to bring the enemy to a course angle of 90 °, which ensured the most effective use of the main battery guns. The rest of the ships of the line followed. At 12 o'clock 21 minutes "Evstafiy" from a distance of 40 cables opened fire on "Goeben" from bow 305-mm guns and the first salvo covered it, causing a fire on it. The German cruiser immediately lay down on a parallel course with the Russian squadron and responded to Eustathius with fire from all five turrets. But only with the third salvo he was able to hit the Russian ship with two shells. ”Later,“ Goeben ”achieved two more hits on the“ Eustathius ”. At 12 hours 35 minutes he turned sharply to the right and disappeared into the fog. The shooting stopped. The fight lasted 14 minutes. The battleships John Chrysostom, Three Saints and Rostislav also took part in the battle (they fired at the Breslau), but their fire was ineffective, since they fired with the wrong aiming (60 cables).
Thus, the battle was actually reduced to a duel between two ships. The Russian ships did not pursue the enemy, fearing mines that could be placed by the German cruisers during the withdrawal. And it was useless to do this due to the significant superiority of the enemy ships in speed.
In 14 minutes of the battle the battleships of the Russian squadron fired 34 305-mm shells and several dozen medium-caliber shells at the Goeben. The enemy cruiser received 3 hits from 305 mm shells and 11 hits from 203 and 152 mm shells. It killed 105 and injured 59 people. It took two weeks to repair the cruiser.
"Goeben" fired 19 shots from 280-mm guns and achieved 4 hits on "Eustathius", which caused damage to the casemates and auxiliary mechanisms. Russian casualties were 33 killed and 25 wounded.
This time the enemy failed to carry out his plan. His cruisers did not meet with single ships or a weak formation, but with an entire squadron. After a short battle, due to the superiority of the Russian squadron, they ceased fire and hastily withdrew. But the battle at Cape Sarych once again showed the command of the Black Sea Fleet that the sailing of ships alone or in small detachments is very dangerous. Correcting the damage received by Eustathius suspended for the duration of the action of the fleet forces on the enemy's sea lanes. The German-Turkish fleet at this time stepped up its actions. However, this did not last long. On November 19 (December 2), the Russian squadron again went to sea. In December, another 607 mines were set up near the Bosphorus, and Turkish ports were shelled. On December 13 (26), the cruiser "Goeben" was blown up and out of action for 4 months on mines placed near the Bosphorus.
Of great importance at the end of the 1914 campaign were the actions of the Batumi ship detachment, which in December was reinforced with the Zharkiy and Zhivoi destroyers. The detachment supported the coastal flank of the Caucasian army with naval artillery fire, ensured the landing of sabotage assault forces behind enemy lines, and prevented the transfer of reinforcements and supplies for the Turkish troops from Trebizond. All these actions helped the Russian troops go on the offensive and push the enemy back across the state border.
The sailors of the Black Sea Fleet and soldiers of the Russian army in 1914 also fought on the Danube. At the beginning of the war, Serbia turned to Russia for military assistance. She asked to deliver small arms, in which there was an urgent need, to send specialist miners and mine-torpedo weapons to fight the enemy's river forces, as well as engineering units to arrange crossings across the Danube and its tributaries. Serbia's request was granted. In August 1914, a special formation was sent to the Danube - the Special Purpose Expedition (EON) under the command of Captain I Rank Veselkin. The expedition consisted of: a detachment of combat and transport ships, a detachment of barriers, a detachment for protecting the Iron Gate, an engineering detachment, and various coastal units.
The special expedition provided very significant assistance to the Serbian armed forces in the fight against the enemy in the Danube basin. Mine, net and other barriers, coastal installations and artillery batteries largely limited the operations of the Austro-Hungarian river flotilla. On October 10 (23), the enemy flagship monitor Temesh was blown up and killed by Russian mines. The creation of river crossings allowed the Serbian command to maneuver their forces in a timely manner during hostilities. 113120 rifles, 93 million cartridges, 6 radio stations and other military equipment were delivered to Serbia. All this helped the Serbs withstand the offensive of superior enemy forces in 1914, and even force the Austrian troops to retreat in a number of sectors.
The actions of the German-Turkish ships after the treacherous attack on Russian bases and ports were mainly limited to ensuring their own sea communications. Their main concern was to prevent the Russian naval forces from clogging up the Bosphorus. At the same time, they did not refuse new raids on the Russian coast and other actions. Thus, the light cruisers Breslau and Hamidie fired at Poti and Tuapse in November, and the battle cruiser Goeben cut the Sevastopol-Varna cable on October 28 (November 10), and fired at Batum in December. On November 24 (December 7), the Turks landed a sabotage assault near Ackerman, which, however, was immediately destroyed by the Russians.
Summing up the results of the 1914 campaign in the Black Sea, it should be noted that neither the one nor the other side achieved the main goal - to change the balance of forces in the theater in their favor. The losses incurred by the fleets affected only minor ships (old gunboats, auxiliary minelayers).
The main content of the combat activity of the Russian fleet in the 1914 campaign was the defense of its coast and operations on enemy sea lanes. However, due to the lack of bases in the southwestern part of the sea, the Russian ships had to operate as part of a squadron, which could not be continuously cruising. After spending several days at sea, she returned to Sevastopol to receive fuel and supplies. The enemy took advantage of this and strengthened the transportation. The effectiveness of the squadron was also affected by the lack of systematic operational reconnaissance in the theater, for which the fleet did not have the necessary forces.
The Russian command pinned great hopes in the fight on enemy communications on minefields near the Turkish coast. But these hopes were not fully justified. First, because of the unjustifiably high consumption of mines for defensive purposes, they were not enough for active obstacles. Secondly, there was no way to protect the exposed obstacles and therefore the enemy could trawl them freely. Nevertheless, the actions of the Russian fleet on sea communications caused serious alarm in the enemy. The German-Turkish command was forced to almost completely abandon active operations and redirect its forces to the protection of shipping. The direct losses of the enemy from the actions of the Russian naval forces on communications also affected. The Turks lost 1 minelayer, 1 gunboat, 11 transports and 120 motor and sailing schooners; The best ship of the German-Turkish fleet, the battle cruiser Goeben, was damaged and out of order for a long time.