Disaster on the Southwestern Front
It seemed to Kerensky that he had already coped with the Bolshevik uprising, and the free soldiers were about to strike another blow at the enemy, inspired by the fiery appeals of his speeches. In fact, on the German-Austrian front, the time of success was drawing to a close. The almost complete lack of coordination in the actions of the enemy allowed the Germans to freely dispose of their reserves and concentrate their free forces on the Tarnopol direction. On July 19, 9 German divisions under the command of General von Winkler launched a powerful counterattack between the Seret and Strypa rivers. After recent rains, they spilled over, providing an excellent defense for the flanks of the German offensive. It began between Zborov and Seret, in the sector of the second division. She ran, dragging others with her. What followed that shocked not only the Russian command. The Germans who were pursuing our troops were held back only by the actions of Russian artillery 2.
It is characteristic that on that day the official organ of the War Ministry published the following analysis of the state of affairs: “The transition to the offensive of a huge mass of troops after a long period of seemingly hopeless passivity proved the power of the spirit of the reviving revolutionary army and by his example he acted to heal the rest of the troops of the Russian armies, enticing them to active activity and thus bringing closer the time to achieve a lasting peace ”3. The Germans' counterattack was a test of these words. The entire 11th Army, abandoning positions, spontaneously fled to the rear. In this army, things went so far that two infantry divisions (the 126th and 2nd Finland) fled at the sight of three German companies. At first, the Austrians and Germans advanced slowly, which made it possible for small units that kept order to destroy warehouses abandoned by alarmists when rumors about the enemy's proximity 5. Soon the commander had to admit that no one can say with certainty what and where is happening to his subordinates.
A difficult task fell to the cavalry covering the withdrawal. “It was scary and creepy, and at the same time it was painfully insulting to watch,” recalled the commander of the 1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Division, “as the stocks of shells and foodstuffs, which had been so hard prepared for the anticipated spring general offensive, perished” 7. There was no time for evacuation. It was enough for the Germans to fire a few shots from their guns, and the democratic Russian infantry began to withdraw from their positions and flee. On July 6–7 (19–20), the crisis in the Tarnopil direction was already quite clear 8.
Messages from the Southwestern Front have not yet been perceived in the center as evidence of a disaster that has begun. They were detained, hoping they could still be fixed. On July 8 (21), the officialdom of the War Ministry was still praising the excellent new qualities of the revolutionary troops, in which many did not believe so recently: “Information coming from the front about combat episodes that took place in the area of \u200b\u200boffensive of the army corps of general. Kornilov, paint a truly heroic picture in the history of our revolutionary army. First of all, the amazing endurance of the troops and the ability for a long battle, exhausting the enemy and forcing him to introduce more and more reserves are striking ”9. The reason for these praises to the achievements of the new order was simple. On July 7 (20), Kerensky left for Western front, which was about to go on the offensive 10. Thus, the breakthrough of the Germans at Tarnopol had to turn into just a private and, therefore, correctable failure.
Nevertheless, this failure dramatically changed the attitude towards what was happening in the rear. On July 7 (20), before leaving for the front, Kerensky sent a telegram to Revel and Helsingfors, which was to be copied to everyone. It already contained completely different words about the Bolsheviks: “It became clear with certainty that the riots in Petrograd were organized with the participation of German government agents. The riots have now been completely stopped. Leaders and persons who have stained themselves with fraternal blood and crimes against the Motherland and the Revolution will be arrested ”11. On July 8 (21), the government adopted an appeal to the Army in the field: “Troops of the revolutionary armies! Your brothers, who have entered the battle with the red banners, are calling you together with them to a united onslaught to defend freedom in the name of just conditions for a lasting peace. By the will of the Revolutionary people, at the first order of your military commanders, forward, in close ranks, without looking back at the cowards and traitors to the Motherland. Save freedom, save the Motherland! " 12
On July 8 (21), the Headquarters reported: “Our troops in mass, not showing due persistence, and in places not fulfilling combat orders, continue to retreat ...” On July 15, 1917, Hoffman notes in his diary: “Everything is developing according to plan. I would like more prisoners. These guys are running so energetically that we cannot catch someone. To date, there are only 6,000 and only 70 guns ”16. “The armies were retreating in complete disarray,” Denikin recalled. - The very armies that a year ago, in their victorious march, took Lutsk, Brody, Stanislavov, Chernivtsi ... Retreated before the very Austro-German armies that a year ago were defeated and dotted with the fugitives fields of Volyn, Galicia, Bukovina, leaving we have hundreds of thousands of prisoners in our hands ”17.
On July 8 (21), Kerensky again met with the troops in Molodechno, and again, to applause and shouts of "Hurray!" urged them to go on the offensive. “Is it possible,” he asked the Siberian riflemen, “the free troops of the revolution can be weaker than the troops of the soulless tsar” 18. "You can safely go forward, there will be no more traitors behind." - assured the soldier Kerensky. Before leaving for Headquarters, he explained to the audience the basic principles of his leadership of the country: "I will demand from everyone the complete unquestioning fulfillment of their duty to the Motherland and the Revolution." On the same day, the head of the government arrived in Mogilev 20.
The results of the exactingness promised to the soldiers were not long in coming. The leapfrog in the high command continued. On July 8 (21), 1917, General A.E. Gutor was dismissed, who managed to command the 11th Army for only a few months and for a short time - the front. He was replaced by Kornilov 21. On the same day, the new commander-in-chief, who clearly did not yet know about the changes in the government, telegraphed Lvov: “Received the front in extremely difficult conditions of the enemy's breakthrough, due to the decay and collapse caused by the fall of discipline in the armies, which resulted in unauthorized withdrawal of regiments from their positions, refusal in immediate support. The balance of forces is approximately one enemy in five of ours, which is striking proof of the above. This state of affairs is fraught with extremely formidable and grave consequences. I find it absolutely necessary to address the Provisional Government and the Council with a completely frank and direct statement about the use of exceptional measures up to the introduction of the death penalty in the theater of operations, otherwise all responsibility lies with those who think with words to rule in those fields where death and the shame of betrayal reign. cowardice and selfishness "22. The appeals expected by the general did not follow.
On July 8 (21), attempts began to attack on the North, on July 9 (22) - on the Romanian fronts. There was no coordinated action, although preparations for them were very active 23. On the Western Front, near Kreva, where on July 21, after a three-day artillery preparation, which was very effective, the infantry initially occupied the enemy's trenches with almost no losses. Some of the regiments, such as the 42nd Siberian, honestly fulfilled their duty. However, in other units, things were not so good. In one of the regiments, the soldiers left their positions, and about 50 soldiers and several senior officers remained in the trenches 10 km away. They went on the attack. “The attackers,” recalls Dovbor-Musnitsky, “did not remain on the first line (of the enemy's trenches. - AND. O.), but went on, to seek death or bondage. Honor them! " 24 Death threatened the attackers from their own trenches, from where they were often shot in the back. It remains only to be surprised that, despite the harsh conditions, the attackers managed to achieve some success.
Ludendorff noted: “The Russians broke through the Landwehr division there, which defended unusually bravely, but was stretched out on a very wide front. For several days the situation was very serious, until our reserves and our artillery fire recovered the situation. The Russians cleared our trenches. These were no longer the former Russian soldiers ”26. The memoirs of Dovbor-Musnitsky are almost literally repeated in his diary by a contemporary and eyewitness to these events, Lieutenant Colonel Maitland-Edwards: at their posts on the front line, which emerged from the trenches on September 1 with the firm intention never to return alive. This is the only picture that gives me the opportunity to think that someday Russia can take a place among worthy nations ”27.
On the Western Front, after the Russian attacks, German counterstrikes also followed. The effect was the same as at Tarnopol. Whole divisions began to withdraw from positions. "Heroic efforts, - read the message of the Headquarters on July 10 (23), - it is worth the officers to keep the soldiers from leaving the rear on a massive scale." The heroic self-sacrifice of the officers was the basis of the Russian offensive, according to the British military attaché 29. This remark is fully supported by statistics. If in 1916 there were 1.5 officers and 6.9 soldiers for every 10 killed and wounded, then in 1917 these figures increased almost seven times for soldiers and less than twice for officers. The difference between the indicators of officers and soldiers, which in 1916 was 1.8, in 1917 increased to 4.6 30. As N. N. Golovin noted: “At the turn of the winter campaign of 1916–1917. and the summer campaign of 1917, there is a sharp new turning point in the relationship between bloody losses and prisoners, but this time for the worse. There can be no doubt that we are dealing here exclusively with the corrupting influence of the revolution. The mass of Russian soldiers does not want to fight, and for every ten heroes who shed blood for their Motherland, twelve-thirteen those who dropped their weapons ”31.
The disruption of the strike at Kreva, which Kerensky had the audacity to attribute to the pessimism of General Denikin, who allegedly left Front 32, greatly facilitated the task of defense for the Germans; several coordinated strikes were not possible. It was in the absence of coordinated actions on the Russian side that Ludendorff saw the reason that the Russian offensive did not become a real threat to the German-Austrian Eastern Front. The retreat of the armies of the Southwestern Front quickly turned into a flight, accompanied by massive looting and violence. The units, loyal to the Oath and maintaining discipline, covered the flight, having to pay for the calls of the revolutionary demagogues and the actions of their listeners. The chief of staff of Wrangel describes what features the "army of free Russia" took: "The army, mainly the infantry, restrained by their officers, at first retreated as if with battles, and then simply started to run, throwing their guns. The infantry, it's hard to believe, made the transitions 60 versts a day, just to get to the Russian border as soon as possible. The cavalry faced a difficult task, and they fought bravely, holding back the advancing enemy. Retreating, the soldiers plundered and burned everything that came to their hand, their own and that of others. Warehouses, villages, haystacks were burning, and whole houses were set on fire in cities without any sense. ”35
“The tactical counterstrike turned into major operation- recalled Ludendorff. - The collapse of the Russian front spread more and more to the south. The southern, 3rd and 7th Austro-Hungarian armies, which included a particularly large number of German troops, went on the offensive. The Eastern Front went into motion, capturing even part of Bukovina. The Russian army retreated in disarray - its brain was obsessed with the disease of the revolution ”36. The chief of the Imperial General Staff of Great Britain these days wrote: “The Germans simply carried out a counterattack as the usual and best means of stopping the Russian advance and then, perhaps to their surprise, the Russians broke down, as a result of which three Russian armies, numbering 60 to 70 divisions, were good equipped with artillery and ammunition, they are now fleeing from some 18 Austrian and German divisions ”37.
An ordinary soldier agreed to go into battle not in order to achieve victory in a separate sector of the front, but in order to achieve peace. When this goal was not achieved through complete victory, it collapsed. Since the desired peace could not be won, it could be achieved simply by stopping the fighting. These sentiments manifested themselves after the failure of the offensive. AM Vasilevsky recalled: “The fermentations among the privates especially intensified at the end of June, when the offensive of the troops of the Southwestern Front near Lvov failed. The Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik delegates who came to us
I All-Russian Congress The Soviets called in vain to continue the war. The soldiers were rushing home ”38.
Individual units maintained order and remained combat-ready: as a rule, these were artillerymen, who often detained the Germans and Austrians who were no longer expecting any resistance. It is characteristic that it was they and the aviators who became the targets of the German-Austrian propaganda, which from the spring of 1917 had called upon the infantry to deal with them 40. Sometimes other pockets of resilience arose. On July 8 (21), the Transbaikalians covering the escape from Tarnopol met with the only combat-ready infantry formation. It was the Petrovskaya brigade of the 1st Guards Division - the Transfiguration and Semenovites. Then they acted together 41. On July 11–12 (24–25), 1917, west of Tarnopol, the Petrovsk brigade successfully repulsed the attack of the Prussian guard with bayonet counterattacks. The losses were very significant: the Preobrazhensky regiment under the command of Colonel A.P. Kutepov lost about 1300 people, but the guards did their duty and stopped the enemy offensive for 48 hours and thus made it possible to withdraw the carts and heavy artillery from the threat. "This was the last military tension of the Russian guard," recalled the chief of staff of the 11th Army, "the last effort of officers and non-commissioned officers who overcame the revolutionary relaxation of the soldier masses."
It was very difficult to do this, since most of the soldiers of even these regiments agreed to fight only on own territory: This was the result of the popularity of the slogan "no annexations and indemnities" 44. Nevertheless, officers and non-commissioned officers still remained in the brigade, the internal cohesion of the units had not yet been completely broken, and normal, trusting relations between soldiers and officers were preserved. Edit general position this battle could no longer be at the front. The enemy occupied Tarnopol, threatening the flank and rear of the neighboring 8th Army of General Kornilov. On July 20, Chernivtsi fell, where the headquarters of the 8th Army was located for a year 46.
The heroic death of the shock battalions, composed mostly of officers, was in vain. The "democratized army", not wishing to shed its blood to "save the conquests of the revolution," fled like a herd of sheep. " In the last stages, only artillery held the defense, holding back the Germans and covering the flight of the former Guards infantry. “It was unbearably difficult to observe the dull indifference on the faces of the soldiers,” recalled one of the gunners, “to see the unfortunate officers chained to the ranks of these once glorious regiments” 48. Some units, having thrown down their weapons, with distant attention, disdainfully watched what was happening as if everything that happened did not concern them at all. “We are passing the nearest place,” one of the artillery officers noted in his diary on 12 (25) July. “It is teeming with those who disgracefully left the trenches and betrayed their comrades. They look at us indifferently and gnaw seeds. The land around the huts is strewn with husks ”49.
This was not the case in the Russian army in its most difficult days. “Having lost all human form,” the cavalry officer recalled, “crushing the innocent population on its way, abandoning artillery, carts, shells, throwing the wounded out of sanitary trains, the distraught armies of the Southwestern Front fled. Not only were all the trains coming from the front packed full of deserters, but the highways and country roads were also full of them. The outfits at the stations were doubled, but, despite this, it was impossible to cope with this human avalanche ”50. The 40-kilometer road from Kalush to Stanislavov was completely packed with fugitives and looters. “What, what parts and who, who was not here ?! - recalled the cornet of the Tekinsky cavalry regiment, moving with its riders to the rear to guard Kornilov's headquarters. - A huge amount of artillery, transport, ambulance and quartermaster carts blocked the path, not allowing the foot to go forward, not to mention the horse. All these carts and the path were covered with comrades fleeing from the front, who had huge bundles of good on their shoulders. ”51
The scale of the flight can be judged by the fact that in one night alone in the vicinity of the town of Volochisk, the shock battalion detained about 12 thousand deserters. In Shepetivka, in one day, detachments of the Guards cavalry detained 2,340 fugitives, in Kazatin - 1,518. At the railway stations there was not enough room for the detainees, and they had to be released. The only thing that the commanders of the barrage detachments could do was to disarm the fleeing, liberated and democratized masses. For the civilian population, it proved to be more dangerous than the advancing enemy 52.
In this situation, they had to resort to tried and tested, albeit unpleasant, means. After L.G. Kornilov's order of July 9 (22), which allowed executions, the running mass of the "freest people", that is, deserters and robbers, began to lose their leaders and become calmer. The junker shock battalion, formed from volunteers to participate in the front breakthrough, arrived at the South-Western Front with a delay and was sent to restore order at the Proskurov railway station. Here, the cadets were shot in two days by 3 people - two railway workers who refused to obey the orders of their superiors and even beat them up, and one soldier-agitator in a large group of deserters 53.
The Executive Committee of the Southwestern Front, the 11th Army's army committee and its commissar sent a telegram to the government describing the complete collapse of the army: “There is no longer any talk of power and obedience, persuasions and convictions have lost their force, they are responded with threats and sometimes execution. Some units leave their positions without permission, without even waiting for the enemy's approach. There were cases that the order given to hastily come out for support was discussed for hours at rallies, why support was delayed by a day. At the first shots of the enemy, the units often abandon their positions. For hundreds of miles to the rear, there are lines of fugitives with and without guns, healthy, vigorous, who have lost all shame, feeling completely unpunished. Sometimes whole parts go off like that. The members of the army and frontline committees and the commissars unanimously admit that the situation requires the most extreme measures and efforts, because one cannot stop at anything in order to escape from death. Today, the commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front and the commander of the 11th Army, with the consent of the commissars and committees, have issued orders to fire at the fleeing. Let the whole country know the whole truth about the events taking place here, let it shudder and find in itself the determination to ruthlessly fall upon everyone who, with cowardice, ruins and betrays Russia and the revolution ”54.
The changes taking place in the capital set General MV Alekseev in a sad mood. On July 9 (22), 1917, he wrote to Vice Admiral A. I. Rusin: “The claims of the socialist ministers will be hastily implemented; the whole government will become socialist. Russia will have to go through this last and bitter misfortune. We are not yet ready for the fulfillment of new, dangerous and extremely harmful figures, plunging the state into the abyss of disasters, we, the officers, must now show our will, especially if we are required to take an oath to a new one. state system... This construction was declared in violation of all human laws, in violation of the obligations assumed by the Provisional Government, no matter who it was. The dispersal of the Duma is a violation of the rights of the people. Playing on the bad instincts of the masses by unjustly solving the land question. If we were united, we could refuse the oath (or rather, we should have). A crime against Russia cannot be encouraged by a new agreement with him. Circumstances call for accelerated action, even with full awareness that the masses are being bribed and bought by the socialists. Probably, the action itself will have to be performed in Petrograd, since only impetuosity will have to influence the imagination. Defeat at the front complicates the whole matter. In itself, it is a new grief for Russia and an ordeal sent to her. But how could our leaders have missed it? How hard it is to worry these days, when, if possible, at least by participating in the work, to soften the sorrow of the event. It seems to me that even in the difficult days of 1915 there was no such dangerous strategic position, especially in the presence of the criminal behavior of the troops; what is needed is power, strength, and not the cheating, which our leaders are intensively engaged in. The salvation of the army also cannot be postponed for a long time. ”55
The public was shocked by the incident. The flight of the armies after the much-touted success of the early days of the offensive caused a severe shock. In the rear, they started talking about the possibility of the fall of Minsk, Moscow and even Petrograd 56. Kerensky decided not to postpone the salvation of the army and dealt with it in his own way. “Much more than the Southwestern Front was shaken by Kerensky himself, who had barely had time to be proclaimed the organizer of the victory in St. Petersburg, when these laurels crumbled to dust,” recalled General Gerua. - Of course, the generals were declared guilty. Displacement and reshuffling began. ”57 On 10 (23) and 11 (24) July, two more commanders of the armies of the Southwestern Front were replaced. They were simply reversed. The government feared the top of its own army. The new leapfrog of the senior command staff could have only one goal - to prevent the generals from gaining strong control over their subordinates. In this respect, he went hand in hand with those circles in the soldiers' councils who least of all desired the restoration of discipline. It is quite symptomatic that the officers who managed to restore discipline among their subordinates and resist the advancing enemy became their victims on the ground after the end of the flight from the Austrians.
The Allies looked at these processes in Russia with apprehension. "Kerensky's reprisals against Russian generals, whom he treated with disdain, constantly moved from one command to another," recalled the Russian diplomatic representative in England, "the introduction of committees in the army, the systematic destruction of discipline gave representatives of the allied armies full reason to fear the collapse of the army." But Kerensky was not afraid of this. Apparently, his predecessor was not afraid of this either. In his farewell interview, Lvov expressed his complete conviction that everything will end very well soon. In his opinion, confidence in the future was fully justified. “My optimism is especially strengthened,” he said. last days inside the country. Our deep breakthrough on Lenin's front is, in my deep conviction, incomparably more important for Russia than the breakthrough of the Germans on our Southwestern Front. ”60
Judging by the actions of the government, it already considered this breakthrough on the "home front" a final victory. On July 10 (23), criminal investigator P. A. Aleksandrov received an order from the prosecutor of the Petrograd Court of Justice N. S. Karinsky to proceed with the investigation "on the July 3-5 uprising" 61. At the same time, the process of liberating a number of prominent Bolsheviks and their supporters began almost simultaneously. For example, on July 11 (24), O. M. Nakhamkes (Yu. M. Steklov) was released from arrest 62. He was arrested after the July events by counterintelligence for active participation in the preparation of the rebellion. He behaved defiantly, since he had no doubts that he would be released, which happened with the active participation of Chkheidze 63. On July 12 (25), 51 of the 67 arrested members of the delegation were released Baltic Fleet 64. On the same day, the government demanded that the population of Petrograd and the district carry out disarmament within three days, promising that from July 16 (29) it would consider the possession of military firearms and melee weapons as theft 65. Disarmament was not nearly as intense as liberation. By the end of August, over 140 people arrested in connection with an attempted coup d'etat were released 66.
The mood of the front and the capital was completely different. On July 11 (24), the commissar of the armies of the Southwestern Front Savinkov, his assistant V.P. Gobechia and the commissar of the 11th Army M.M. will "67. Even Brusilov supported this demand, however, he did it in his cautious and ambiguous manner. Thanking Savinkov “as a citizen”, he declared that he “shared” his opinion 68. The general remained true to himself. The only thing he allowed in these difficult days was to issue an order on July 10 (23) banning rallies and meetings at the front 69.
Sober assessments and fears of an imminent catastrophe were already loudly heard in the press. One of the articles of “Russkiye Vedomosti” came out with a very symptomatic heading - “We've Got Game”. Its author summed up the achievements of the new system: “An indelible shame at the front, a cruel lesson in Petrograd - these are the results of four months of the revolution, such is the result of Russian freedom. And in the future - the inevitable and rapid collapse, the collapse of all state adhesions, complete anarchy, the collapse of the entire revolution ”70.
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Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front, in fulfillment of a common mission " defeat the Austro-Hungarian armies, meaning to prevent the withdrawal of significant enemy forces to the south beyond the river. Dniester and west to Krakow", decided to go over to a general offensive on August 18-21, setting the following specific tasks for the armies: the 8th Army was the first to launch an offensive from August 18 to the Khodorov-Galich front, trying to prevent the enemy from retreating beyond the Dniester River. with the 8th Army, at the same time went over to the offensive between the Dniester and Prut rivers.The 3rd Army from August 19 began an offensive against Lvov, on the Kulikov-Mikolaev front, helping to fulfill the mission of the 8th Army.
Southwestern Front 1914.
The 4th and 5th armies, which were late in their deployment (they were partly brought in from the Moscow and Kazan military districts), from August 21, began to move only their vanguards to the Vilkolaz - Izbitsa - Grubeshov - Vladimir-Volynsky line, pulling up the main forces of the corps, respectively, with the vanguards ... On August 23, both armies launched a general offensive: the 4th Army - in the general direction of Przemysl, while keeping in mind to prevent the enemy from retreating to the west to Krakow, and the 5th Army - to the Moscisk - Lvov front, facilitating the implementation of task 4 th army. In addition, the 4th Army was tasked with operating on the left bank of the river. Vistula, where it was ordered to monitor enemy troops and provide both their right flank and the flank of the entire front.
In setting this decisive task, the front headquarters did not ensure overall superiority in forces; in addition, on the most important section of the front between pp. Vistula and Bug of the 4th and 5th armies, consisting of 16.5 infantry. and 6.5 cav. divisions actually performed a supporting role. The main blow was delivered by 22 infantry. and 8 cav. divisions of the 3rd and 8th armies from the east, from Volyn and Podolia. At the same time, the plan did not use the advantageous operational direction along the left bank of the river. Vistula to block the enemy's retreat to Krakow.
Turning to the consideration of the Austro-Hungarian plan, it is necessary to take into account that the delay in the concentration of the 2nd army transported to Galicia from the Serbian front made the Austrians fear that the initiative of action could go over to the side of the Russians, whose forces were increasing every day to a greater extent than their own. Therefore, the Austrians, who, moreover, by allied obligations to begin the operation by invading Poland, decided to send the main mass of their forces assembled in Galicia - 21.5 out of 33 divisions - to defeat the 4th and 5th Russian armies, which had not yet completed their concentration between pp. Vistula and Bug. At the same time, Konrad hoped, as was promised to him in peacetime, for a joint offensive by German troops from East Prussia in the general direction of Sedlec.
The initial plan of the Austro-Hungarian command set the following particular tasks for the armies: the 1st Army (Dunkl) by August 21 was to take its starting position on the line from the mouth of the river. San to r. Tanev, north of Tarnograd, having a strong left flank, from where the army's attack on Lublin was planned from August 23. The troops of the Kummer army group were supposed to provide on the left bank of the river. Hanging up the holding of the latter and pulling up to the left flank of the 1st Army during its further advance. The 4th Army (Auffenberg) was concentrated by 23 August in its initial position in the Tereshpol-Potylich region, from where it was planned to advance, together with the 1st Army, to the north in the general direction of Kholm-Grubeshov, as soon as the concentration of the 3rd Army near Lvov. The 3rd Army received the task of holding the Lvov area and repelling a possible enemy invasion from the Sokal-Brody front. On August 23, the III corps, concentrated to the southeast of Lvov, passed into its composition. The army group of Keves was supposed to delay the enemy offensive in the Tarnopol direction, covering the crossings across the river. Dniester and the concentration of the VII and IV corps of the 2nd army. South of the r. Dniester to r. The Prut area was covered by the 43rd Landsturmist Division and the 35th Landsturmist Brigade.
In general, having sent the 2nd Army to the Serbian Front, the Austrians were not able to create an overwhelming superiority of forces in the 1st and 4th armies by the beginning of the operation in the direction of the main attack between pp. Vistula and Bug, neither have sufficient forces in the shield, providing the main operation to the north.
In accordance with the outlined plans and the grouping of both opponents, from August 18 to 19, a rapprochement began, which gradually, from August 23, turned into a grandiose 33-day head-on collision between pp. Vistula and Dniester 8 armies on the front 320 km. This battle in the history of the World War is called the Battle of Galicia and is a complex strategic operation.
This general operation can be divided into two particular ones: 1) the invasion of Poland by two Austrian armies, covering the oncoming battles at Krasnik between the 1st Austrian and 4th Russian armies, and the Tomashevsky battle between the 4th Austrian and 5th Russian armies; 2) the invasion of the 3rd and 8th Russian armies into Galicia, which led first to a counter battle on the Golden Lipa (from 26 to 28 August), and then to a battle on the river. Rotten Linden (29 to 31 August).
Since September 1, the Austrians have regrouped their forces, allocating the 4th army to the south, which leads to the Gorodok battle (September 5 to 12) west of Lvov and the second offensive of the 9, 4 and 5 Russian armies, the success of which forces the Austrians September 12 to begin the departure for the river. San.
During deployment, the 8th Army was concentrated backward with a ledge and, having started the offensive only a day earlier than the 3rd, it would not have had time to advance enough to cut off the retreat path beyond the river. Dniester.
Being one of the two main theaters of military operations of the First World War, the Western Front certainly ranks first in terms of its military and political significance. It was here that the German command in August - September 1914 made a decisive bet on victory, and its failure led to the final defeat of Kaiser's Germany, which was unable to withstand a protracted war of attrition against the combined potential of the Entente powers. Primarily important for Germany on the one hand, and Great Britain and France on the other, the Western Front existed until the conclusion of the Compiegne Armistice in November 1918.
After declaring war on Russia on August 1, 1914, Germany presented France with an ultimatum, demanding that it maintain neutrality, but France declared that it would fulfill its allied obligations to Russia, and on August 3, Germany declared war on it under the pretext of the alleged bombing of German territory by French airplanes. Since the German plan for a lightning war (Schlieffen plan) envisaged the invasion of the main forces of the German army into France through the territory of Belgium, the refusal of the Belgian government to let German troops pass led to the violation of the neutrality of Belgium by the latter, which served as the basis for the entry into the war of Great Britain, connected by military-political agreements with France and Russia.
Campaign of 1914
During the Battle of the Frontier in August 1914, French forces and the British Expeditionary Force were unable to contain the advance of seven German armies pouring across the borders of Belgium and France. The German plan for waging a war on two fronts was to quickly defeat the troops of its opponents in the West with a powerful blow, seize Paris and force France to surrender, after which transfer the main forces of German troops to the Eastern Front and in cooperation with the Austro-Hungarian army inflict a decisive defeat on Russia. However, this plan was thwarted by the active actions of the Russian troops in East Prussia. Despite the fact that the Russian 2nd Army of General Samsonov ultimately suffered a heavy defeat at Tannenberg, the German command, having very limited forces against the Russians, was forced to prepare reserves for sending to the East - two army corps designed to strengthen the attack grouping to Paris. This played a decisive role in the defeat of the Germans at the Battle of the Marne.
Battle of the Marne (Marne).
On September 5, 1914, the French 6th Army of General Monoury, concentrated east of Paris, launched a counterattack on the enemy's undefended right flank on the Marne River. The German command did not have free forces to parry the blow, and the commander of the right-flank German 1st Army, General von Kluck, deployed two corps against Monuri's army, and then two more divisions, exposing the joint with the neighboring 2nd Army. This allowed the French 5- 1st Army and British troops to deliver a second counterstrike into the opening that had opened. The German 2nd Army faced the threat of encirclement and was forced to retreat northward, pulling the neighboring 1st and 3rd armies with it. By September 12, German troops had retreated 60 km, taking up defenses along the lines of the Aisne and Vel rivers. Thus, the German plan to defeat France with one blow failed, which predetermined the unfavorable outcome of the entire war for Germany.
In the second half of September - October, both sides continued to maneuver, trying to outflank the enemy from the open northern flank (the so-called "Run to the Sea"), as a result of which the front line stretched to the coast of the North Sea, and the war acquired a positional character.
Campaign of 1915
From the end of 1914, the opposing sides buried themselves in the ground, rebuilding dugouts, trenches, machine-gun points, reliably covered with barbed wire and minefields. Attempts to break through such a defense each time turned out to be huge losses for the advancing side with little results. In the changed conditions of hostilities, along with the strengthening of the role of artillery, especially heavy artillery, new means of warfare began to develop, including chemical weapons, airplanes, tanks, specially trained assault detachments of infantrymen and combat engineer units. At the same time, the importance of cavalry, which turned out to be extremely vulnerable to automatic fire, aviation weapons (bombs, airplane arrows) and toxic substances, was reduced to naught. In the spring of 1915, the main efforts of Germany were shifted to the Eastern Front, and the Anglo-French troops tried to take advantage of this situation to go on the offensive. However, the operation in Artua undertaken in May and June was not crowned with success. In two weeks of fighting, the Allies lost 130 thousand people, moving forward only 3-4 km in the French sector of the front and 1 km in the British.
Conferences at the Château de Chantilly.
The failure of the Anglo-French troops in operations on the Western Front, the retreat of the Russian armies in Galicia and Poland seriously worried the military and political leadership of the Entente powers.
In mid-1915, the French government invited the Allies to carry out overall development future operations and introduced the draft of convening a conference where the headquarters of the French army was located. For a year and a half, four inter-allied conferences were held. The first conference (July 1915) discussed the Allied plan for the second half of 1915. The second conference (December 1915) discussed the general plan of the 1916 campaign and recommendations to the governments of the Entente countries on economic and political issues. The third conference (March 1916) reviewed and approved the plan of the 1916 campaign.The fourth conference (November 1916) decided to prepare coordinated operations by the spring of 1917. The conferences also repeatedly discussed the issue of a centralized body for coordinating the actions of the allied armies, but the military-political contradictions between their participants did not allow creating it. The Supreme Military Council of the Entente was formed only in November 1917.
Campaign of 1916
Despite the major successes scored on the Eastern Front in 1915, the Austro-German troops failed to crush Russia and withdraw it from the war, and the German command decided to try again in the West.
Battle of Verdun.
The fortified area of \u200b\u200bVerdun was chosen as the main point of application of forces, against which the Germans were pulling together unprecedented artillery forces in history (1225 guns, of which 703 are heavy, 110 guns per 1 km of the front). It was assumed that in the battle for Verdun, which is the key to Paris, the French would be forced to deplete their resources of manpower, weapons and ammunition. However, during the fierce fighting that lasted from February to December 1916, the German army was able to achieve only very limited success at the cost of huge losses. This was facilitated, in particular, by the fact that during the year the German command had to repeatedly withdraw troops from the front in order to support its ally Austria-Hungary, which found itself in a difficult situation as a result of the offensive of Russian troops (Brusilov breakthrough), undertaken in accordance with the decisions, taken at meetings of representatives general staffs the allied powers at Chantilly.
Battle of the Somme.
In July - November 1916, the Allied Joint Command launched an offensive operation on the Somme River, which went down in history as one of the largest battles of the First World War. Despite the many days of artillery preparation, the offensive developed slowly and at the cost of heavy losses. The total losses of the sides in killed and wounded amounted to more than 1 million people. For the first time in history, tanks were used to break through enemy defenses during this battle. As a result of the operation, the Allies broke through the German front by only 10 km in a 35 km sector. in depth. To prevent the development of a breakthrough, the Germans had to urgently create a new line of defense. The losses at Verdun and the Somme seriously affected the morale and combat capability of the German troops. The strategic initiative passed to the allies for a long time.
Campaign of 1917
The 1917 campaign was marked by renewed Allied attempts to break through the front. This was preceded by the withdrawal of German troops to the rear defensive line (the Hindenburg line), prepared in the winter of 1916-17. By reducing the front line, the German command thereby liberated part of its forces.
The April offensive of the British and French near Arras, which went down in history as the "Nivelle massacre" (named after the French commander-in-chief Robert Nivelle), did not achieve its goals, and the losses incurred during it caused protest moods and riots in the French army due to the unwillingness of soldiers to go to the fight. Equally unsuccessful were the actions of British troops during several operations undertaken in July-November in Flanders (Battle of Paschendale). Their results remained far from desired, but the experience gained made it possible to improve the offensive tactics of the allies, which were successfully used in the operations of 1918.
Battle of Cambrai.
In late November - early December 1917, British troops undertook a large-scale operation against the new German defense line in the Cambrai area, betting on the massive use of tanks (476 units) and new assault tactics of infantry units. On the first day of the offensive, they managed to achieve tangible successes, breaking through the German front in an area of \u200b\u200b12 km by 6-8 km in depth with fairly small losses. However, the delay in the introduction of the Canadian cavalry into the breakthrough allowed the Germans to recover from the initial shock and close the gap. Over the next days, German troops were able to completely stop the enemy's advance, and then launched a counteroffensive and pushed the British back to their original positions.
During the 1917 campaign, both sides exhausted their forces almost to the limit. Only the influence of external factors could decide the outcome of the struggle in favor of one of them. For Germany, this was Russia's withdrawal from the war as a result of the Bolshevik revolution and the possibility of using additional forces transferred from the East on the Western Front; for Great Britain and France - the entry into the war of the United States on the side of the Entente and the arrival of numerous fresh American troops in Europe. In such a situation, Germany could only count on achieving a decisive victory before sufficiently large American contingents appeared on the front.
Campaign of 1918
In March 1918, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Germany and Soviet Russia, German troops launched a series of offensive operations in the West, which went down in history under the general title "Battle of the Kaiser". The Germans managed to significantly press their opponents and again, as in 1914, came to the approaches to Paris. However, Germany's material resources and the morale of the army and the population were completely torn apart. In July, during the second battle on the Marne, the German offensive was stopped, and in August, having broken through the German front near Amiens, the Anglo-French troops went on the offensive, supported by the American troops that had arrived in France. The German command was forced to leave all territories occupied during the offensive and withdraw troops to rear positions. Failures at the front and an extremely difficult situation in the rear led in early November to a revolution in Germany, the monarchy fell, and the interim government that came to power signed an armistice with the Entente powers on November 11 in Compiegne, recognizing defeat in the war and pledging to evacuate all territories. still occupied by German troops at that time.
S.I. Drobyazko,
Candidate of Historical Sciences
Sheet number 29. THE FIRST WORLD IMPERIALIST WAR
The poster shows a map of military operations in the Eastern European theater in 1914-1915.
The headquarters of the supreme commander-in-chief of the Russian troops was at the beginning of the war in the city of Baranovichi, and then in Mogilev.
The supreme commander was appointed grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, and General Yanushkevich was the chief of staff.
To conduct military operations, two fronts were created: northwestern and southwestern.
On the northwestern front, commanded by General Zhilinsky, the Russians deployed two armies against Germany: General Rennenkampf's 1st Army (6½ infantry and 5½ cavalry divisions) on the Neman River in the Kovno region; 2nd Army of General Samsonov (11 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions) on the Nareva River - between Grodno and Lomzha. Against the Russian northwestern front, the Germans deployed in East Prussia the 8th Army of General Pritwitz (15 infantry and 1 cavalry division).
On the southwestern front, commanded by General Ivanov, the Russians deployed four armies against Austria-Hungary: General Salz's 4th Army (6 ½ infantry and 3 ½ cavalry divisions) in the Lublin region; 5th Army of General Plehve (8 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions) in the Kholm - Vladimir-Volynsky area; The 3rd Army of General Ruzsky (12 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions) in the Lutsk - Dubno - Kremenets region; General Brusilov's 8th Army (8 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions) in the Proskurov area.
The troops of the southwestern front were opposed by the following Austrian armies: 1st (9 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions) and 4th (9 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions) on the front from Sandomierz to Przemysl; 3rd (6 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions) in the Lvov-Sambir region; army group of General Keves, which was part of the 2nd Austrian army in the region southwest of Lvov - Tarnopol - Chernivtsi; on the left flank, in the area of \u200b\u200bKrakow, Kummer's group (3 infantry and 1 cavalry division) was concentrated.
In Silesia, for communication with the Austro-Hungarian armies, the Germans concentrated the Voyrsh Landwehr Corps (2 divisions).
As the hostilities developed, the enemy's forces increased significantly.
The Russian front played an outstanding role in the First World War. At the most critical moment of the struggle in the Western European theater, when the fate of France was being decided in the August days of 1914, both Russian armies of the northwestern front approached the German border and on August 17-20 began an offensive into East Prussia. It developed successfully. By noon on August 20, the 1st Russian army won a major victory at Gumbinen. Failure befell the Germans and Goldap. In the rear of the retreating 8th German army, Samsonov's army advanced. Fearing the loss of the entire East Prussia, the German command was forced to take 2 ½ army corps from the shock wing of the armies advancing on Paris and transfer them to East Prussia. This weakened the German forces in the West, contributing to the success of the Allies in the general battle on the Marne. Despite a number of major tactical successes, offensive Russian northwestern front ultimately ended in failure. The Allied success on the western front in 1914 was bought in the blood of Russian soldiers.
Simultaneously with the offensive in East Prussia on August 18, 1914, the 8th Army of General Brusilov went on the offensive against Austria-Hungary, and in the following days the rest of the armies of the southwestern front. The Galician operation lasted more than a month and ended in a brilliant victory for the Russian troops. Almost all of Galicia was occupied by Russian troops. In pursuit of the Austro-Hungarian armies, the Russians push them back across the Dunajec River and to the Carpathians. The fortress of Przemysl with a garrison of 120 thousand was surrounded by Russian troops and on March 22, 1915 surrendered. The defeated Austro-Hungarian troops were not capable of further decisive operations. The Germans were forced to save the day. Fearing an invasion of Russian troops into upper Silesia and Poznan, they transfer several corps from the western front to the left bank of the Vistula and, together with the 1st Austro-Hungarian Army, went on the offensive.
From the end of September to November, one of the largest battles for the possession of the Middle Vistula lasted (Ivangorod-Warsaw operation), and although it ended successfully for the Russian armies, the command was unable to use this success.
In mid-November 1914, the Russians intended to launch a decisive offensive along the entire front. However, the Germans warned the Russians with an offensive in the Lodz area. Trying to surround the Russian troops, the Germans themselves were surrounded, from where they got out at the cost of heavy losses.
Fighting in Western Poland continued until the end of 1914 and played an important role. During the most intense period of the fighting in Flanders, the Russian front diverted German forces from the West, thereby making it easier for the Allies to repel a new German onslaught.
Having failed to achieve victory in the West, the German command decided in 1915 to postpone its main blow against Russia. It concentrates the best corps and new formations on the eastern front. In May 1915, the Germans broke through the Russian front near Gorlitsy. Under the pressure of the many times superior German forces, Russian soldiers were forced to retreat. On June 22, the Russians surrendered Lviv.
On the northern wing of the Russian front, Warsaw was surrendered to the Germans in early August, and then Novogeorgievsk. By the fall of 1915, having suffered heavy losses, the Russian armies left Poland, Lithuania, part of Latvia and Volyn.
The Russian soldier paid with his blood for the industrial and military-technical backwardness of tsarist Russia, for the mediocrity of its generals and the lack of assistance from France and England. By the end of 1915, trench warfare began. The front stretched out in an almost straight line from the borders of Romania to the Gulf of Riga.
The inset shows a map of military operations on the Caucasian-Turkish front. On October 29, 1914, the Turkish fleet bombarded the southern Russian cities. Tied by a military alliance with Germany, Turkey entered the war with Russia. In the battle of Sarikamish in December 1914, the Russians won a major victory, they managed to surround and almost completely destroy two Turkish corps. In the future, Russian troops on the Turkish front are slowly moving forward. In difficult winter mountainous conditions Russian troops won a major victory on February 16, 1916. They took a Turkish fortress and an important road junction - Erzurum. April 18, as a result of combined operations of land and naval forces the Russians are busy with Trebizond. (S. 56-59).
Sheet number 31. BRUSILOVSKY BREAKTHROUGH 1916
In the summer of 1916, Russian troops under the command of General A.A. Brusilov, whose portrait is given on the poster, won a major victory over the Austro-German troops. Brusilov was an outstanding military leader. During his many years of service in the army as a division and corps commander, assistant commander of the district troops, and during the world war as commander of the 8th Army, he studied the Russian soldier perfectly, loved him, believed in the heroism and valor of the Russian troops and himself enjoyed exceptional popularity and sympathy in the army. In March 1916, Brusilov was appointed commander-in-chief of the troops of the southwestern front.
On April 1 (14), 1916, a meeting of the Military Council was held in Mogilev, where the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Nicholas II was located. The poster contains a photograph of this meeting. The king presided; participated in the meeting: Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief General Alekseev, commanders-in-chief of the fronts - Brusilov (southwestern), Evert (western), Kuropatkin (northwestern), chiefs of staff of the fronts, Minister of War Shuvaev, inspector general of artillery, Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich and Adjutant General Ivanov. The plan of offensive actions of the Russian army in 1916 was discussed in accordance with the all-Union plan. The main attack was supposed to be delivered on the Russian western front (formed after the division of the northwestern front in the fall of 1915 into the northern and western ones) from the Molodechno area to Oshmyany - Vilna, the armies of the northwestern front were to deliver an auxiliary strike. The Southwestern Front, recognized as incapable of an offensive, the high command assigned a passive defensive role. Kuropatkin and Evert said that they did not believe in the success of the offensive and believed that it would be better to continue to adhere to a defensive course of action. Brusilov had a different opinion. He believed that the southwestern front not only could but should also advance. “We have every chance of success, of which I am personally convinced,” he ardently argued to the hesitant, indecisive generals and the mediocre, stupid Nicholas II. “I think,” Brusilov continued, “that the disadvantage that we have suffered so far is that we do not pounce on the enemy with all fronts ...”. [Cm. map]
The representative of the high command Alekseev had no choice but to agree in principle with Brusilov's compelling arguments. But he warned Brusilov that, in addition to the forces at his disposal, the southwestern front would receive neither troops, nor artillery, nor shells. Brusilov replied that he was not asking for anything, he would be content with what he had, but he and the troops of the southwestern front would know that their activities served the general benefit and made the work of their comrades easier, giving them the opportunity to break the enemy. After that, Kuropatkin and Evert had to declare that they could also attack, but did not guarantee success. As a result of the conference, it was decided to attack the enemy with the armies of all three fronts, delivering the main blow with the western front, the auxiliary - with the southwestern one, and, if the situation is favorable, go over to decisive actions on the northern front.
Not expecting serious active operations from the Russian troops, which suffered a heavy defeat in 1915, the Germans transferred their main efforts against France at the beginning of 1916, and the Austro-Hungarian armies attacked Italy. Italy's position has become critical. The Anglo-French and Italian command demanded immediate assistance from Russia. Russia launched an offensive ahead of schedule with the forces of the southwestern front.
On June 4, 1916, all four armies (11, 7, 9 and 8) of the southwestern front launched an offensive known as the Brusilov Breakthrough. By using a new breakthrough technique, precisely by means of simultaneous blows crushing the front, it was immediately possible to shake the front of the opposing enemy armies. The map-diagram placed on the poster gives an idea of \u200b\u200bthe direction of the attacks of the armies and the advancement of the troops of the southwestern front in different periods of the offensive. From the very first days, the offensive was successful. The greatest success was achieved by the 8th Army, which captured Lutsk, and the 9th Army, which was advancing into Bukovina. As a result of the Brusilov breakthrough, the entire Austro-Hungarian front was disorganized.
However, the mediocre high command was not able to immediately properly assess the significance of the success achieved by the southwestern front, showed extreme indiscriminateness and was unable to ensure interaction and mutual assistance between the fronts. The commander-in-chief of the western front, General Evert, criminally thwarted the offensive. All this made it possible for the enemy to freely transfer troops from the Russian and other fronts and concentrate large forces in the south. In August, Brusilov's troops fought unsuccessfully on the Stokhod River, and in September the front, as we see on the map, stabilized along the Stokhod, Zlochev River, west of Galich and Stanislavov. The troops of the southwestern front occupied the whole of Bukovina, part of southern Galicia and reached the mountain passes of the Carpathians; defeated a significant part of the Austro-German armies, captured 450 thousand soldiers and officers and seized a large amount of military property. The offensive of the troops of the southwestern front, which forced the Austro-Germans to transfer their troops to the East, saved Italy from defeat, eased the position of the French at Verdun and prompted Romania to enter the war on the side of the Entente.
The Brusilov breakthrough created a turning point in the course of the war, the strategic situation changed in favor of the Allies, and the preconditions for the decisive defeat of the German coalition were created. And if the German coalition suffered a complete defeat in 1918, and not earlier, then the slow strategy of the Allies was to blame. (S. 62-65).
// Album of visual aids on the history of the USSR. Issue 9: Tsarist Russia during the period of imperialism and the bourgeois-democratic revolutions of 1900-1917: explanatory text / comp. G.M. Derenkovsky. - [M] .: Gospolitizdat, 1948. - 91 p.