The story is repeated twice: once tragedy, another time as a farce.
On March 1, 1942, the commander of the 58th Infantry Division General Friedrich Alpichter gathered headquarters to the meeting. In the past, the teacher of the Dresden Military School, doctor of philosophy, the author of labor on the upbringing of officers and a wonderful teacher, he knew how to competently and intelligibly put the task with his subordinate:
"- Gentlemen, we have to fulfill the task, the total situation depends on the decisive extent. In front of the 58th division, a task is set as a drumble closure to the VOLHOVA from the southern direction and surround the bumping force of the enemy. "
After these words, the Altrichter approached the big map hanging on the wall, and, stopping at her left side, continued his report, at the same time, gently showing a pointer, firmly compressed in the left hand, all highlighted with red and blue colors:
"You see the current situation: the Russians are large for the breakthrough in our deep rear. The frontal suppression will not succeed, because for this we do not have the relevant reserves, so that it will not lead to nickname, except in the abyss. The only opportunity is to attack the Russians on the initial positions, in the Bresca itself, to cut down and thereby cut off the breakdowns. On our happiness, the 126th and 215th infantry divisions were able to re-create a strong defense line on the borders of the Breaks, under the protection of which we had the opportunity to focus our forces. The breakthrough place we will attack from the south. And from the north will come the police division of the SS. The meeting place is "Erica". Shelves of the 126th Infantry Division and all other parts acting there, first of all battalions of the Spanish "Blue Division", perfectly proven themselves so far, go to our submission. We will be able to achieve these forces to make the task assigned before us. And they must achieve its implementation, because otherwise the 18th army expects to defeat. If we manage to flush the "boiler" cover, then the main forces of the two Russian armies will be in it. "
The meeting in the Kremlin ended on the night of March 8th. Lieutenant-General Vlasov came out of the office of Comrade Stalin Rivne at 24.00. 30 minutes before this was ready the following directive for №170136:
"The bid of the Supreme Commander appoints: 1. Lieutenant General Vlasov - Deputy Commander (troops) of the Volkhov Front, freed him from the obligations of the Commander of the 20th Army ..."
And on March 10, Andrei Andreevich flew out on Douglas from Moscow to the Small Vishera together with K.E. Voroshilov, G.M. Malenkov, A.A. Novikov, A.E. Golovanov and S.I. Rudenko.
Ekaterina Andreeva in his work "General Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement" comments this as:
"Be that as it may, but the fact that the Vlasov arrived from the bet on the plane together with Voroshilov, Malenkov and the deputy commander of the air forces A.A. Novikov, says that the appointment of Vlasov was an important event. "
A.N. Konyaev speaks about it like this:
"... Andrei Andreevich flew to the small Vishera in the company Voroshilov, Malenkov and Novikov - persons clothed with emergency powers."
However, none of the authors say that at the Volkhov Front, along with the Vlasov, already a total of three aviation generals flew. That is, besides Novikova - still Golovanov and Rudenko. No, they did not accompany Andrei Andreevich to a new place of service. They had their own task raised on March 8 at 23 h 30 min (Directive No. 170137):
"The rate of the Supreme Command orders from 10 to 20 March to organize massoids of aviation on combat orders and defensive structures of the enemy at the forefront and in the depths of the onset of 4, 59 and the 2nd armies of the Volkhov Front and the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front , as well as on the main highways of the enemy, for what:
1. The organization of strikes to impose on the Deputy Commander of the Red Army of the Red Army General Lieutenant Novikov and the Commander at His disposal far aviation Major General Aviation Tov. Golovanova.
2. To strike, bring eight aviation soldiers of the General Command, Aviation of Far Action and Aviation of these fronts and armies as needed, at the discretion of the Deputy Commander of the Air Force. Novikova.
3. Mass accomplishments of aviation are closely linked to the actions of ground troops, conducting them in the following sequence: in combat order and defensive structures before the impact grouping of the 59th army on Chu Dovsky direction - first of all; Before the drum group of the 4th Army in the area of \u200b\u200bKirishi, Larionov, the island - in the second place, before the shock groups of the 2nd shock army and the 54th Army in the districts of the Red Gorka and south of the weather - in the third place ... "
The troops needed powerful support from the air ...
The Leningrad Front had in the front of the Air Force of the Front and the Commissars Army - 12 airlines, including eight fighter, one assault and three bombing.
The Air Force of the Volkhov front has 23 separate airliators, of which 13 regiments were combined with two (2nd and 3rd) backup airgroups, which, respectively, interacted with the 59th and 4th total army of the front. The Deputy Commander of the Air Force for the development of the Aviation Action Plan was attracted by the command and headquarters of the Communist Party of the Volkhov Front, who arrived with him General Rudenko and its operational group consisting of three officers of the Air Force headquarters. Considering the situation and the absence of a divisional front line in the Air Force, it was decided to create a temporary aviation group (the commander - General S.I. Rudenko and the head of the headquarters - Major M.N. Kozhevnikov) from eight airlrafts for action mainly neither right flank in the troops 54th Army.
It should be said that the actions of our aviation had a substantial assistance to the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts. For the first time during the war, the Aviation Action Coordination of the Senior Aviation Head was carried out in the interests of the troops not one, and two fronts. It was definitely a new phenomenon in the strategic interaction of the Soviet Air Force with ground forces.
AviaGroup (reserve, temporary, maneuverable, drums) played a positive role in the combat actions of the Red Army in the first year of the Great Patriotic Warsince, having such groups, Rate of vgk. And the command of the Air Force of Strategic Destinations had the opportunity to maneuver the aviation forces along the front, increasing aviation groups in strategic and operating directions.
Nevertheless, in all the reports from the Army divisions of the Front, there was a strong impact of enemy aviation. Her domination has affected all the length of the Lyuban operation. The opponent's aviation literally hung over the front troops, pressing them to the ground.
In March 1942, the troops of the 54th Army broke through the enemy defense in the Shal area (15 km east of the weather) and, expanding the breakthrough to 25 km, advanced 20 km south in the direction of Lyubani, they were cleared of the opponent, and captured large settlements and Resistance assemblies on the approaches to Lyuban. However, by the end of March, her divisions were stopped at the turn of the river. Cygodes came up with new major operational reserves of the enemy.
Only in January - March Germans were sent to strengthen the 18th Army from the 16th Army (from Germany, France, Yugoslavia) Seven divisions and a brigade, and in addition, in the offensive band of the Volkhov Front, about four divisions were regrouped from under Leningrad attracted to 250 bombers of the 1st air Fleet.. Significant rearrangement of the enemy's troops, as well as the inaction of the 4th Army of the Volkhovsky Front (the Germans removed the part of the forces in her strip and transferred them against the coming 54th army) changed the ratio of forces in the Lyuban direction in favor of the Germans.
The troops of the 2nd shock army by mid-March wedged into the defenses of the Germans to a depth of 60 - 70 km and captured a large woodist-swampy area between the railways of Chudovo - Novgorod and Leningrad - Novgorod. The advanced parts of the army approached the defensive position of the Germans on the approaches to Lyuban. Only 15 km separated them from the city and 30 km from the troops of the 54th Army, which were coming from the north. However, stretching at the front to 140 km and not having reserves, the 2nd impact army was practically not able to develop further offensive.
Thus, in the first half of March, attenuation began in all directions.
The 2nd percussion cured by the major enemy was forced to go to the defense and beat the opponent's counterdowers on their flanks. And besides, the sharp warming that began at the end of March the maneuver of the troops. Melted snow roads, the columns were spawned, laid through swampy sites and forest arrays. Again there were interruptions with supply, a serious lack of ammunition, fuel and lubricants, armaments and food was felt. There was a bond and control of troops.
A large grouping of the enemy troops, squeezed in a neck with a neck of 30 km, apparently, could no longer be crushed. The Volkhov Front exhaled, and the opponent, on the contrary, activated his blows primarily on the flanks of the neck of a breakthrough and interception of communications of the 2nd shock army. Under the conditions of the dissolution of the severity of this army only aggravated.
On March 5, the bet ordered the headquarters of the headquarters of the 2nd Major Stick Major Sizhlin for "bad work" and appoint the division commander. The head of the operational department of the army Colonel Pakhomov "For bad work and false information" was lifted.
The Military Council of the Volkhov Front, which was attended by the command of the 2nd strike, called one of the reasons for the non-fulfillment of this army of tasks: inconsistency in the work of the Military Council and the headquarters of the army and, as a result, the lack of a clear and firm leadership of the troops.
Army General K.A. Meretkov recalled:
"There were cases of dismissive attitude towards receiving replenishment: marching companies during the path of hot food were not provided, there were no heating points for them. Personal accounting of the wounded and killed was in the neglected state, they did not even know about approximate losses in the army. Head of the Operational Department Colonel Pakhomov improper information was misled by the command of the army and the front. Before the last battles, the headquarters of the 2nd strike army made gross miscalculations in time to prepare troops for the fight. Order To perform combat missions, some parts were obtained for a day. "
Instead of Vizzhilina and Pakhomov, a colonel PS was appointed accordingly. Vinogradov and Kurumen Combrigs. The same order for the deputy commander of the 2nd strike army was appointed Major General P.F. Alfeyev.
But these and other rates adopted in March 1942 were no longer able to radically change the provisions created in the lane of the Volkhov Front.
Lieutenant General N.K. Fangs:
"In March, the 2nd shock suffered the trouble: the enemy went around her meat boron from the flank and went out into the rear. Our base in the walkways was destroyed. Began fierce battles for the release of the corridor. "
Major General I.M. Antyufeev:
"In the second half of March, the entire 2nd shock army moved to defense. The opponent, the main efforts moved to the neck of our breakthrough - to the area of \u200b\u200bSpassk Polysty and meat boron. "
From the diary F. Galder:
"March 12. It is still impossible to start an offensive in the Volkhov site: unhealthy weather. In the area of \u200b\u200btime, the situation is sharpened.
March 13. The offensive on the Volkhov site, scheduled originally at 13.3., Postponed. Disagreements between the command of the land and air forces.
March 15th. At the Volkhov site began the onset of our troops, there are insignificant success on the southern wing, in the North - significant promotion.
March 16. At the Volkhov site, the offensive of our troops is developing gradually. In the area of \u200b\u200bthe weather, the enemy is discarded, but there is still no complete guarantee that there will be no difficulty again.
March 18. The offensive of our troops on the Volkhov site, the runner of the roadside road from the north, develops with difficulty. The troops coming from the south cannot move forward, as the enemy leads strong counterattacks here. In the Volkhov boiler, the offensive rush of the enemy gradually weakens, but in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Russian weather, although not quickly, but continuously and methodically moving forward, so the situation here still have to evaluate as rather tense.
20th of March. In Volkhov, the opponent is weakly attacking the position of our troops, eliminating the gap. It was noted pulling up fresh strength from the east. In the area of \u200b\u200btime, the situation has improved.
March 25. If time, the enemy, rather deeply inclined in our location, apparently, was detained for a while. The mining regiment pulls up for a counterattack.
26 March. The situation has not changed almost unchanged. The fighting is insignificant. Due to the danger of icing aircraft, aviation activity did not show.
... in the area of \u200b\u200btime, where the situation continues to develop unfavorable (deep breakthrough of enemy 52-ton tanks). Everywhere thaw. In this regard, it was difficult to move the troops.
March 28. In the Volkhov section, the enemy again wedged into the location of our troops and in the same place where the former gap was eliminated. In area, the area is still intense.
March 29. At the Volkhov site again formed a gap. The situation is not happy at all. The enemy is preparing new attacks on the "bottle of throat." The general situation suggests that the enemy makes desperate attempts to succeed even before the beginning of thaws. "
Even judging by these missing records in the diary of the head of the General Staff of the Ground Forces of Germany, it is possible to judge an extremely complex setting at the Volkhov site for both two fronts of the Red Army and for the 18th Army of the Army Group North.
On March 15, the TGC rate in his next directive set the task of the troops of the Leningrad Front:
"... In collaboration with the troops of the Volkhov Front, the seizure of the city of Luban and the defeat of the enemy's lynching group, and the main forces of the army should be sent here.
Before the capture of Luban for actions in the direction of the Tosno for the purpose of falling down and the taper of the enemy's forces, the Supreme Commanding rate considers it appropriate to allocate one or two rifle divisions and one tank brigade. With the capture of Luban, depending on the situation, can be turned towards the main forces of the main group of the 54th Army. You can additionally select the troops for the 54th army at the moment cannot be allocated. "
On the same day, the Germans began an operation in which it was widely used primarily a thick network of roads with a solid coating, which was at their disposal (coming from Novgorod, rays and soils).
The main actions were activated by them against the 2nd shock army, mainly on its stretched flanks. And especially at the foundation of the Army breakthrough site in the area of \u200b\u200bSpasskaya Polysty and meat boron.
And on the 17th in the evening the rate sent a directive to Volkhovsky:
"The opponent with counterattacks on the part of the Spassk Polysty on the walkways and from Lyubov and Zadditsa on meat boron is trying to cut off the 2nd shock army from its communications.
The bid of the Supreme Commander orders:
1. In all possible, developing the operation of the 59th Army on the seizure of the miracle and by the defeat of the miracle group of the enemy, at the same time the efforts of the left-handing compounds of the 59th Army, together with the 52nd army, not only prevent the adversary with the opponent of communications of the 2nd shock army, but also completely defeat and destroy the counterattaking parts of the enemy.
2. To fulfill this task, the Supreme Command Commission rate permits to transfer the 376-year p. Division from the 4th army to the meat boron area.
3. Personal management by the operation to eliminate the opposition of the enemy by the Spassk Polysty and Lyubility, the Nadditsa Commander Tov. Meretkov take over.
4. Immediately to eliminate the counteroffensive enemy to provide for the forces of the 52nd army operation with the task before the onset of the spring disabilitian to master Novgorod. Your considerations on this operation are in the bet no later than March 20. "
But as well as the sharp turn of the 54th army of the Leningrad front in the direction of Lyuban, a completely unexpected for the enemy and had a significant success and organized actions of the left-handing compounds 59 of the army together with the 52nd army could no longer change the critical position of the 2nd shock.
On March 19, the Germans cut her communications. Paul Karel wrote so in his book: "This is (Erika") the name to pain is familiar to every participant in the battles under Volkhov. It means dull and stubbornly defended Forest Delica. At the beginning of the log layered, which was laid by a driving road, which goes on this request and, which was previously carried out by the help, some unlucky infantryman strengthened the sign with the inscription: "Here the ass on the world originates."
And also: "overcame. Break is closed. On the pros of "Erica" \u200b\u200bexchanged hands, marked by the conversational military supply of the broken Soviet 2nd strike army. "
And nevertheless, on March 21, Meretkov's army general planned to begin a Novgorod operation by the 52nd Army forces, but before completing the defeat against the counterpart enemy. The calculation of forces and funds, according to the commander, could be four divisions, three Guards mines. Shelf and one tank battalion. However, it was necessary to replenish these rifle divisions by 2, 5 - 3 thousand people, since together with the reasons in each there were only 5 thousand to March 27 - 28, the 52nd Army was ready to accept people, carry out regrouping, laying column pathways and Accumulate material and technological means, and on the 29th to start the operation. On overcoming 34 kilometers (up to the northwestern approaches to Novgorod), the headquarters planned 8 - 9 days, and on April 6 - 7, an offensive on Novgorod.
To intercept the ways to approach Novgorod, an airborne operation was assumed to conduct an airborne operation by the forces of the airborne brigade. For successful operation K.A. Meretkov asked for a bet: "... 2. to 23.3. Submit on art. Small Vishera 12,000 (people) replenishment from among those on the way.
3. In the period from 28.3. 3.4.1942 to submit 10,000 (people) replenishment to cover losses during the operation.
4. Provide transport aircraft carrying out an airborne operation, allow an airborne brigade (coniferous) ... "
But already March 30 K.A. Meretkov reported that the "total offensive to Novgorod the 52nd army cannot spend now." The thing is that the elimination of the enemy, breaking into the junction of the 52nd and 59th armies, although developed successfully, but was not completed.
Therefore, hope in the cheerful report of the commander remained doubtful: "Communications of the 2nd shock army are exempt from the enemy, and it can be expected that in the next two days will be completed by the defeat of his group, defending to the south-west of Spasskaya Polysty, and restored position in the area Destroy at the area of \u200b\u200bthe 52nd Army. Especially since: "The offensive of the 2nd shock army to Luban in the direction of the Red Gorka, did not receive Corkino. Multi-day offensive battles in extremely difficult conditions of road off-road, the wooded terrain of positive results did not bring. In this direction, the enemy managed to create a strong system of supporting points in the forest, and further attempts to break through the defense of the enemy will entail an even greater depletion of troops. Therefore, the 2nd shock army in the Lyuban direction is necessary in the shortest possible time to regroup its strength to the right flank ... "
There, the commander assumed to focus four rifle divisions, two rifle and one tank brigade, 200 guns, 250 mortars and 2 heavy guards mortar shelf to suppress the enemy a mass of mortar-artillery fire and the strike of aviation break through the front, developing an offensive in the northeast. And to Lubani come from the south.
The arrival of General Vlasov to Volkhovsky very interestingly noted in his diaries K. Tokarev - the correspondent of the newspaper and biographer Andrei Andreevich with the consent of the north-western department of Milizdat: "General Vlasov, a huge, similar to a raised bear, in eyepieces on a wide nose, with a zealous face" Caves "(so nicknamed his soloists of our ensemble) ..."
It was known that the commander of the front K.A. Meretkov at the meeting "complained" that he did not ask Vlasov to his deputy. But the rate insisted, sending it to "applying the experience of the Victory Moscow region."
And indeed, the relationship between the commander with his new deputy clearly did not work out. It was perfect different figures. This is how I remembered the Vlasov K.A. Meretkov:
"On the same plane, Lieutenant General A.A. flew to the post of Deputy Commander of the Troops of the Volkhov Front Vlasov. He was sent a bet ... In the meantime, I just tell me how he behaved during the one and a half months, when he was my deputy. Apparently, Vlasov knew about his upcoming appointment. This adventurer, trustly devoid of conscience and honor, and did not think about improving affairs at the front. I watched with a bewilderment, I watched my deputy, deposited at meetings and did not show any initiative. My orders of Vlasov performed very sluggish. I grew irritation and discontent. What's the matter, I was not known then. But the impression was created that Vlasov is the position of deputy commander of the front, deprived of a clearly defined circle of responsibilities, which he wants to get a "more tangible" post. "
It is difficult to say whether the Vlasov knew about his upcoming appointment, but I can assume that he could well be a deputy post. The fact is that at all times, including now, Deputy Commander of the District, for example, may easily agree to go to the position of commander of the army. For the civilian person it looks down. But it is not so. The rank and there is also equivalent, despite the fact that the army commander has much more opportunities and the authorities than the Deputy Commander of the district (front) ...
But what appraisal to General Meretkov gave Vlasov himself at interrogations in captivity: "Egoist. Very nervous, scattered personality. " A calm business conversation between the commander of the front and the commanders of the armies was almost impossible.
In general, Meretsk and Vlasov could not find a common language. Meretskov had already commanded the front for several months, of which only about two months, under pressure, the bet was trying to eliminate the lyuban group of the enemy, and the Vlasov had his exorbitant ambitions, which were unambiguously, apparently annoyed. Then Meretskov and appoints Vlasov a tactical adviser (consultant of the 2nd shock army).
In early April, Spring entered into their rights. Roads and column paths laid through the swampy areas of the terrain and forest arrays have become almost impassable. Violated supply, communications and control of troops.
For the entire 200-kilometer front of the army, the enemy managed to create a durable defensive line, not allowing her further promotion. It was at this time that General Vlasov is in the 2nd shock army at the head of the Front Commission. "Three days Commission members talked with commander of all ranks, with political workers, with fighters," and on April 8, "the commission was read, and in the evening she dropped out of the army.
"Everything," the fangs said gloomily, saying goodbye to the Commission. "
With this Klykovsky "All", for example, N. Konyaev connects a lot: "Perhaps, the last day, the impact army was still able to escape from the environment (the Germans fifthly closed the meat boron again), but to lead the offensive to surround the seventy-fitness Germans, she simply could not.
This could not not understand the Meretskov himself ... The reaction of General Klyovkov is known. Having received the Meetsky Message, he immediately fell ill, and he was taken out on the plane in the rear. But then the question arises, but didn't you seek Kirill Afanasyevich? Is his plan to neutralize the "diseased" klykov part of intrigue directed against Vlasov? "
Well, I will try to refute the brave assumptions of the writer.
Since the beginning of the spring of 1942. Commander Front K.A. Meretkov came to three options for solving the problem of Volkhov:
1. When the front is strengthened, at least one army before the onset of a complete dismantle to achieve operational success.
2. Divide the 2nd shock army from the area employed and with a favorable setting to seek solutions to the operational task in another direction.
3. Go to the tough defense on the reached frontiers, wait for the rolleritz, and then, accumulating strength, resume the offensive.
K.A. Meretkov recalled:
"We adhered to the first option. He gave the opportunity to use the results already achieved and finish the operation until the end of the winter campaign. Did not object to him and the rate. The advantage of this option was that he had a direct impact on mitigating the situation under Leningrad, and with a favorable outcome of the operation replaced the blockade.
The front command did not objected and against the outlet of the 2nd shock army for the line of iron and road roads Chudovo - Novgorod. This option, as it seemed to us, was also right, because he guaranteed the preservation of the forces of the army and holding the bridgehead in the West Bank. Volkhov ...
The third option disappeared unconditionally, since leaving the army in a wooded-swampy area, with easily vulnerable communications, could lead to a breakdown of its supply to everything necessary or even to surround. "
But as is known, neither the first nor the second options became desirable reality. The rate did not strengthen the front in time, did not authorize the discharge of the 2nd shock army before the first environment. Then it was too late.
But at the same time, no intrigue and the "fence" plan "of Klyov", directed against Vlasov, was not in risen. This is only the fantasy writer and nothing more.
I can assume that the reports of the consultant 2nd shock up completely could be biased. But even on them it was impossible to convince the bosses in the insolvency of General Klykov. Meretkov knew the commander too well to believe unfamiliar and unwanted Vlasov. However, the fangs are really seriously ill, and other versions, including removal (removal) it from office, is simply untenable. Very many sources are confirmed by this fact: in mid-April, due to severe illness and the need to hospitalize, the laser of the fangs dropped into the rear. By the way, why not. If Vlasov in the 42nd was 41 years old, then the canine was already for 50. At this age in conditions of extreme tension in the very serious section of the front, Comandarm could seriously get sick.
He himself recalled this as:
"In April 1942, I was seriously ill. I had to go to the hospital. My place was appointed a new commander. Before leaving, I reported to the commander of Meretkov's commander, justified the need to create reference bases within the army location. I asked him at least for the time of the spring, the dissolves to abandon the attempts to capture Lyuban. The fate of the Lyuban operation has developed, however, otherwise. "
And after 2 months, the fangs returned from the hospital. So he was not filmed, as N. Konyaev writes about this.
From the recording of negotiations on the direct wire of the commander of the Volkhov Front with the command of the 2nd shock army:
"Member of the Military Council of Zuev: We have no candidates for this post. I consider it necessary to report to you about the feasibility of appointing the commander of the army of Lieutenanta Vlasov.
Vlasov: Temporary execution of the position of the commander of the army must be assigned to the headquarters of the Army headquarters of the Colonel Vinogradov.
Meretkov and Zaporozhets (Vlasovo): We consider Zueov's proposal correct. How do you, Comrade Vlasov, feel about this sentence?
Vlasov: I think, judging by the situation that, apparently, it will have to stay in this army longer. And in relation to the destination for a permanent position, then if this will be your decision, I will certainly fulfill it.
Meretkov: Well, after our conversation follows the order. "
Thus, in the command of the 2nd shock army, General Vlasov entered on April 15, 1942, but only part-time for the time of Calykov's illness.
On April 20, 1942, the rate of its Directive No. 170282 "approved the appointment of the Deputy Commander of the Troops of the Volkhov Front of Lieutenant General Vlasov Commander of the 2nd Shock Army of Compact.
The commander of the Volkhov Front of Metskov accepted the candidacy of Vlasov on the proposal of a member of the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army (with Zuev Vlasov was a sign for a long time).
There was no intrigue in this destination, because the 2nd percussion was in a very critical position and the front command perfectly understood it. In addition, General Vlasov was the tactical advisor of the 2nd shock army. And in his appointment there is nothing surprising. K.A. Meretkov would never go for the fact that because of personal, even hostile, relationships to chase the army, chanting the operation, which still having a single chance for success.
K.A. Meretkov did not know General Vlasov as a commander, but, apparently, heard a lot about him, including the victories of the 20th Army near Moscow, which he commanded. There were conversations about Vlasov's meetings with Stalin. But this could be used very profitably. For example, the leader could help with people, tanks, artillery and ammunition to his promoter and a colleague for spiritual education. Yes, and who knows, and suddenly the Vlasov will show itself and change the position of the army, including the front. The position of Comandarm had a vividly discharged circle of responsibilities, unlike the Zam Metskova. It was, according to Cyril Afanasyevich, the same "more tangible" post! "Let him try, but suddenly," he thought.
Apparently, the Vlasov did not want to fulfill the duties of the commander, perfectly realizing, in which complex position is the army and what responsibility will have to take on. But as a tactical adviser to the 2nd shock, as the deputy commander of the front, he should have replaced Klykov, especially since it was only about replacing his illness.
By the way, the Vlasov, not hesitating, hinted with his biographer Konstantin Antonovich Tokarev, that in the event of a successful offensive for Luban, he will become the commander of the front, and Meretkova will respond in the bet. But where does such self-confidence come from? If you compare two biographies K.A. Metskova and A.A. Vlasov to the Great Patriotic War, it can be easily convinced that against the background of the army general as a military leader, the image of Lieutenant General, applying to this role, is undoubtedly faded.
Until 1941 K.A. Meretkov - a participant in the Civil War, where he was a commissar of the detachment, Pom. nach Brigade headquarters, Pom. nach Division headquarters.
From the post of headquarters of the army decreased by a military adviser to the warring Spain. In the Soviet-Finnish war - the commander of the 7th Army, after which he was appointed chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.
A.A. Vlasov before the war participation in hostilities did not accept. From 1920 to 1922, he is just a platoon commander. In 1937 - appointed commander of the regiment.
K.A. Meretkov at this time was already deputy head of the General Staff. In September 1938 Vlasov - commander rifle Division, and Meretkov is the commander of the troops of the Volga Military District.
Suffice it to say that Vlasov in 1920 ends Nizhny Novgorod infantry courses, and Meretskov in 1921 - Military Academy RKKA. After Civil Meretskov - Head of the Division Staff, Pom. nach Corps headquarters, division commander. Vlasov - commander of the company, headquarters of the regiment, and since 1930 - teacher tactics, etc.
I think that further comparison is simply unnecessary. But as it is now, in 1942, did not everyone know about these biographical details of the "Stalinsky commander".
a) In the junction of the 59th and 52nd armies of communications of the 2nd shock army from the enemy, the opponent was discovered and created in the defense of the enemy with a width of up to 6 km, which is clearly not enough to reliably ensure communications.
b) For further expansion of the breakthrough, the 59th army leads an offensive in the South-west of Spasskaya Polysty and the 52nd Army part of the forces in the area to the west of Teremets - Kurland. The offensive of the 59th Army develops unsatisfactory; The enemy, despite the big losses, continues to stubbornly hold on to the forests.
c) in the Lyuban direction 2nd Impact Army, having met the organized defense of the enemy at the turn of the river. Tiyod, success did not have. The main reason is the poor organization of the battle, the tired of the troops due to continuous fighting and fear of the command of the 2nd shock army for their communications. "
In accordance with the situation, the commander of the Volkhov Front offered the following action plan:
1. To achieve the expansion of a breakthrough in the miracle direction.
2. The 52nd army is firmly providing communications of the 2nd shock army from the south, to gain a fixed position, create reserves. Part of the forces to finish cleaning from the enemy of the forest to the south of the turn of the high. 43, 1 and 40, 2.
3. The 2nd shock army temporarily stop attacks on the r. Tiyoda, give rest for troops, replenish them, conduct an opponent's exploration and thorough preparation for the renewal of the offensive.
Front headquarters planned to strengthen the 59th Army and after organizational events, the overall offensive began on April 12 from the west to the Spasskaya polister and simultaneously from the East. To support and ensure the offensive, 250 guns, 200 mortars and three guards mortar regiments were focused. Aviation was prepared in the afternoon and at night.
From the diary F. Galder:
12th of April. In the area of \u200b\u200btime after a very large voltage, the situation seems to be somewhat stabilized again.
April 21. Not counting the renewal of Russian offensive on Volkhov, in general, on the whole front calmly. "
Despite the fact that K.A. Meretkov on April 8 reported in the bid on the release of communications of the 2nd shock army and creating a break in the defense of the enemy equal to 6 km, in fact, this gap did not exceed 2 km.
For such a narrow passage, only small groups of people, guns, wagons, using a column path with a storm in swampy places could move. And on April 9, the enemy south-west of the Spasskaya Polystati nominated and the passage narrowed even more. Thus, despite the active offensive of the Army of the Volkhov Front, already in April, a critical situation was created, which can be explained only by the inconsistency of the actions of our troops and especially between the 2nd shock and the 54th army. Only, thanks to this position, the Germans were able to reflect their blows alternately, without any particular obstacles and maneuver all their forces and means. Now everything you need for the troops of the 2nd shock army and some compounds 59 of the army, which were surrounded, had to be delivered only with the help of transport aviation.
Lieutenant General N.K. Fangs recalled:
"... In anticipation of a long struggle in the conditions of the environment, we took action on the harvesting of food: they cut on the sausage of horses, they lost the issuance of bread, laid down in an inviolable stock of crunches. Aviation helped us with ammunition and a small amount of food. It was decided to break through the ring of surroundings with joint actions. To meet us, our efforts of the 52nd and 59th Army were sent.
The blow from the inside was unexpected for the enemy. Two hours after the start of the battle, the initial position was restored - the corridor was cleared of the enemy. Yes, major food warehouses were captured, which we were very useful.
It is not important to note that the trophy bread, tightly wrapped in cellophane and packed six pieces in the box, was baked back in 1937-1938. Despite such a long shelf life, it was quite suitable for use. It was only required to moisten and warm it up ...
By the enemy by us, the support points were well provided with everything necessary for long defense. They had small arms, a large amount of ammunition, stocks of bread and canned, mineral water, etc. ".
Thus, when the threat of a complete environment of the 2nd percussion was eliminated, the front command began to prepare a new attack on Luban.
The formation of the 6th Guards Rifle Corps on the basis of the edge of the Rifle Division was bred. The body was intended to strengthen the 2nd shock army, which in the number of forces and means was much stronger than the latter in its original composition.
This gave a certain hope for success, but something happened that no one expected ...
In the second half of April, the commander of the Leningrad Front MS arrived at the rate Hozin and reported that the failure of the Lyuban operation was due to the lack of real interaction between the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts.
He suggested organize him in place and time, and besides, allocate reserves to the fronts, without which, in his opinion, it was impossible to expect to bring the operation to a logical end.
From the memories of Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky: "I think that he believed in the correctness and feasibility of his plan."
Apparently, Hozin's proposal had to Stalin in the soul, especially since he even agreed to the immediate transfer of the 6th Guards Rifle Corps and Rifle Divisions to the North-Western Front, which Meretskov allocated on strengthening the 2nd shock army.
In an estimated chosen version, the problem of exemption from Leningrad blockade was reduced only to the abolition of one front control and permutation of personnel.
Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov made a categorically against such a proposal, AI I.V. Stalin, on the contrary, stood on the position of Hozin. As a result, it was decided to eliminate the Volkhov Front and the transfer of his troops to the Leningrad Front. On April 21, the rate ordered from 24 hours a 23 of the number to unite the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts into a single Leningrad Front as part of two groups - Leningrad and Volkhov destinations.
The commander of the front of the front was appointed Hozin, and the command of the Volkhov direction group was also entrusted to him. The commander of the group of troops of the Leningrad Direction was appointed Lieutenant General Govanov.
From the memories of Marshal K.A. Metskova:
"This decision was complete surprise for me. I could not understand in any way, for what a similar association was taken. In my opinion, there was neither operational, nor political, nor any other expediency ...
I learned about everything that happened only on April 23, when General Hozin with a directive in his pocket and in a very cheerful mood appeared at the headquarters of our Front. Having read the directive, I first drew the attention of General Hozin to the need to strengthen the 2nd shock army and advised him to preserve the 6th Guards Rifle Corps. But M.S. Hozin, apparently, had his opinion and disagreed with me. Then I, before leaving the front, called in the bet on the 6th Guards Corps. I was answered that I could not worry about the fate of the 2nd shock army, but I agreed to hear my report.
April 24, being in the bet, I again raised the question of the difficult situation of the 2nd shock army. During the report, I.V. Stalin and G.M. Malenkov.
- The 2nd impact army completely exhaled, - I said. - In the existing composition, it cannot be either attained or defended. Her communications are under threat of shots of German troops. If there is nothing to do, then the catastrophe is inevitable. "
K.A. Metskova appointed first by the deputy commander of the Western Front, and then at his request - the commander of the 33rd army of the same Front.
In the submission of Hozin, it turned out to be nine armies, three separate buildings and two operational groups acting in the same six isolated directions. It turned out that to control such a number of troops and in such conditions when the troops were also divided by the enemy zone, not only difficult, but also impossible. Unfortunately, the rate did not take into account the feasibility of the redistribution of armies with the preservation of two fronts, when one front would rule the troops only on the blocked area, and the other is beyond its limits. It was a regular error of Stalin, which in turn only complicated the management of troops and wing - sewed their interaction. Apparently, at the rate did not take into account the spring dismotence, which turned the road to kilometers by viscous mud and so that shells and food fighters were delivered in their hands for 20 - 30 km.
"By mid-April, the bread was given less than half of the norm, there were no other products at all. But people did not fell in spirit. We persistently defended the busy frontiers, the tireless troves were silent: they cut the forest, they built dumps, drove the roads. The coming spring rushed us - because we were in the swamps. "
But what he recorded in his diary V.A. Kuznetsov - Responsible Secretary of the Editorial Office "Brave Warrior" of the 2nd Shock Army:
"April 19. Outdoor spring. Water streams flooded everything. From the tent to the tent in our camp you have to wade through the stuffing bodies ...
April 27th. Found silence. The last days on our site are marked by a significant activity of the Nazis. They put pressure on both sides: in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Eleger - the most distant paragraph of our breakthrough in the west direction - and towards the new village. In the East - without stopping the guns rumble. Slightly light from the West, German aircraft stretched, fly to meat bore. "
Already on April 30 - an offensive in the Lyuban direction had to stop. General Hozin, having familiarized himself with the situation, decided that without fresh replenishment of divisions, without increasing the front with air defense with air defense and aircraft, as well as without means of ensuring anything on the onset of speech could not be. And he gave an order about the temporary transition to the defense: April 24 - the 59th Army and April 30 - the 2nd shock.
Lieutenant General Mikhail Semenovich Khozina in 1942 was 45 years old. Participant of the First World and Civil Wars. Before the revolution, the ensign, and in the civil - commander of the battalion, shelf, brigades. In 1925 he graduated from the commissioning courses at the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze, and in 1930 - courses of partpolith preparation of commanders - uni-chairs at the Military Political Academy. In the period from 1925 to 1939, Khosin commanded the division, the corps, was the Deputy Commander, and since 1938 the commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District.
Since 1939, he is the head of the Military Academy. Frunze. During the war, he led the rear arm of the reserve armor, was the Deputy Head of the General Staff, the head of the headquarters of the Leningrad Front. From October 1941, the commander of the Leningrad Front.
In general, Mikhail Semenovich Hozin was an experienced warlord, but I can assume that it apparently lacked academic education. In his book, N. Konyayev, as always writes about some kind of "brilliant staff intrigue", which General M.S. Hosin spent in Moscow. "
But the case was not at all in the intrigue. Just Hozin considered that it would cope with the task of the rate and actually help blocade Leningrad. For this, he had her own considerations that he really wanted to implement in practice. But the general apparently overestimated his capabilities and the possibilities of the troops entrusted to him. Perhaps he really wanted to distinguish itself, show himself before the bet, before the leader - finally. Therefore, it is impossible to call all this "brilliant staff intrigue" at least because this intrigue was not brilliant. In fact, the new appointment of Hozin did not raise him on the service staircase above (he remained the commander of the Leningrad Front), but, on the contrary, put in the worsmost position (in the Volkhov direction) than it was before, on the Leningrad direction in the same position . Hozin with his offer went to a huge risk. And most importantly - he believed that this risk is justified!
On May 2, General Hosin reported to Stalin's considerations on the maintenance of the operations of the Leningrad Front at the Volkhov direction:
"one. The main task of the troops of the front - the liberation of Leningrad from the blockade - will be carried out by conducting a number of consecutive front operations ... "
According to the Commander's plan and his headquarters of the 59th Army, completing the enemy's enemy's elimination in the forests of the South-west of Spasskaya Polysty, immediately had to go to the operation to eliminate the enemy in the Tregubovo region, Spasskaya Polysh, Utynino, in order to expand the neck of the breakthrough 2nd shock army.
The operation was planned on May 6. 54 The army was supposed to continue to develop an offensive on the Lipovik and further than the OWS. Holmogor in order to eliminate the army of the enemy, operating in the Kirishi region, Posading Island, Lipovik, mouth r. Three years. At the same time, 54th begins to prepare a follow-up operation in the direction of Smendnya, Luban. Lyuban operation was planned in the second half of May. The 4th Army after the completion of private operations to eliminate the enemy on the eastern shore r. Volkhov in the Kirish district and in the Georgian park was supposed to transfer to the West Bank. Volkhov one small division and in the future, receiving two divisions, the forces of four divisions go to the offensive on the miracle.
And the 2nd Army, being in defense, was supposed to submit two Rifle divisions into submission of the 59th Army to create a shock grouping and at the same time be prepared for the conduct of the Lyuban operation. It was planned to include the 6th Guards Corps in three divisions and two rifle brigades. The transition to the onset of the 2nd percussion was planned in the last decade of May. She should have applied from the Krivino area, streams at Art. Babino in order to cut off and eliminate the miracle group of opponent in collaboration with the 59th Army.
By May 4, the 13th Cavalry Corps was displayed in the reserve, where it was supposed to receive replenishment and be prepared for participation in operations to the 15th day.
It was planned to be used to develop the success of the 2nd shock army. The Hozin rate requested 55 thousand ordinary composition and younger commanders, one ammunition over the established norm on May, three shelf of fighters and two shelves of attack aircraft and bombers (100 aircraft).
On May 3, the rate approved the plan for the intended operations of the troops of the Leningrad Front for May month. But the question of the requested front of the gain and replenishment was not immediately resolved. In the rates directive, it was indicated: "The question of the increasing means of gain and replenishment will be considered to receive your refined, reasonable applications."
The blow, applied by the 59th Army in the area of \u200b\u200bSpasskaya Polysty, was weak and did not bring success. And at this time the enemy continued to strengthen his groups on the flanks of the 2nd shock army. Under these conditions, the command found it appropriate to take her troops to a more profitable line. On May 12, the Directive was sent from the headquarters of the Leningrad Front:
"In order to allocate from the 2nd shock army of additional forces to defeat the enemy, threatening from the north to communicate the 2nd shock army, and the subsequent development of success in conjunction with the 59th army in the direction of Spasskaya Polysis, I order a miracle:
1. The 2nd Impact Army consistently withdraw the troops on the line of Olkhov, Horch, Lake Cygoda and take this line for persistent defense ... special attention (to pay) to the direction of Olkhov. To proceed to the engineering preparation of this turn immediately. "
The output to a new frontier was to start at the forward signal.
With access to a new line of defense to the 2nd impact army, the front commander planned to include the troops of the 59th army acting at the turn of the river. Deputy, and 19th GW. SD 52nd Army.
However, the rate on the night of March 13-24, 1942 prepared the following directive for the Leningrad Front, in which the task of the 2nd shock was somewhat different:
"The outlet of the 2nd shock army on the turn of Olkhovsky, Oz. Tiyoda does not give us great benefits, as it will take at least four-five SD to hold this line and, in addition, with the army's discharge by Olkhov, Oz. Tiyoda is not eliminated by the threat to army communications in the area of \u200b\u200bmeat boron. "
The rate ordered the 2nd shock army from the district it occupied and simultaneous blows of the 2nd from the west to the East and the 59th Army from the east to the west to destroy the enemy in the area of \u200b\u200bPriutino and Spasskaya Polyst. In order to fulfill the task, the troops of the 2nd strike should have focused in the area of \u200b\u200bSpassk Polysty and meat boron, in order to firmly consolidate the Leningrad railway, highway and bridgeheads on the West Bank. Volkhov together with the 59th and 52nd armies.
However, Hozin did not agree. And on May 15, he reports Stalin U, defending his outlet plan for the 2nd shock: "The operation on the Operation of the 2nd shock army consists of several stages.
The first stage of the operation is set out in No. 24. The main task of this phase is that a consistent tap from the turn of freeing the forces to strike from the west to the East - on the performance of South. Spassky Polysty. For this purpose, the most favorable line of Olkhov, Lake Cygoda is scheduled. Only providing this line, the 2nd UD. The army can strike east. It is this line that should hold the 2nd UD. The army also because he covers the only road (Olkhovka - a new kerity), necessary to deploy the impact grouping of the second shock army in its actions - east.
The second stage of the operation will be the fulfillment of the ultimate goal of the action - the further conclusion of the 2nd shock army, as well as parts of the forces of the 59th and 52nd armies on the line, directly ensuring the fastening of the Leningrad Railway, the highway and a deccent on the West Bank of Volkhov.
May 16, the rate still approved this plan. Rate in the face of com. Stalin until the last moment trusted Khozina. And he continued to make mistakes, one after another.
The first error is - union of fronts. The second is an offensive without additional forces. The fact is that the 2nd impact army was only listed by the shock, and in fact barely restrained the offensive of the Germans. In addition, their active actions interfered with the neck of the bag.
General Hozin still decided on the diverse of the 2nd shock for dustcompletion and rest, but also a serious mistake was made here - the third: they were missed precious time.
Even before May 16, some connections and parts were derived from the boiler, and then without reserves, the army was simply impossible. Moreover, at the same time, fierce battles turned out in the south under Kharkov and with reserves in the bet was extremely tight. On May 21, the rate ordered the commanding troops of the Leningrad Front:
1. Nearest tasks for the troops of the Volkhov group of the Leningrad Front have:
a) a durable defense at the front of the 54th and 8th armies in order to prevent the enemy's breakthrough from Art. MGA on worshi;
b) no later than June 1, 1942. Clean the enemy East Coast r. Volkhov in the area of \u200b\u200bKirishi, Georgian. Preparation of these operations and ensure them in fireproof take themselves personally. In the next 4 - 5 days, with specially allocated aviation of long-range action, destroy railway bridges through r. Volkhov in Kirish and Art. Volkhovo, 6 km south-east. Mihoy;
c) the troop of the 2nd shock army, in order to, firmly bonded at the turn of Olkhovsky, Oz. Cygoda from the West, the strike of the main forces of the 2nd shock army from the West, with the simultaneous strike of the 59th Army from the East, destroy the enemy in the ledge of Priulino, Spasskaya poliste ...
Then he followed the "Forces of the 59th, the 2nd shock and the right wing of the 52nd armies, firmly to ensure the bridgeheads on the Zap. The bank of the Volkhov River in the area of \u200b\u200bSpasskaya Polysty, meat boron, turbid, the Leningrad Railway and the highway in order to prevent the connections on these roads of the Novgorod and Childan grouping of the enemy and restoring the Railway Novgorod - Leningrad ... "
For the convenience of control after the enemy's elimination in the area of \u200b\u200bSpasskaya Polysty, the rate ordered to reorganize the Volkhov group of troops, creating two groups from it: Ladoga as part of the 54th and 8th armies at the front from Lake Lake to P. Volkhov in Kirisha and Volkhovskaya in the composition of 4, 59, 2 and 52nd armies at the front of Kirishi, Georgian, Spasskaya Polysty, Destroy and Next by p. Volkhov to Oz. Ilmen, with the appointment of commander of these groups and headquarters.
Now the Military Council and the headquarters of the Leningrad Front from the direct command of the Volkhov Group were released.
When a large German group hung over the 2nd shock army from north, the rate repeatedly demanded from General Hozin to take the army's troops on the line of R. Volkhov, but the front headquarters was late.
The necessary orders were given only on May 25, and in a few days the main communications of the army were cut. According to Pom. Head of the Special Department of the NKV d USSR Art. Major State Security Moskalenko, Lieutenant-General Hozin Medlel with the fulfillment of the order of the bet, referring to the inability to withdraw equipment on the off-road and the need to build new roads. Thus, by the beginning of June, the part did not begin to divert, but in the general headquarters of the Red Army signed by Hozin and NCH. Steel Starmach Front was sent to the beginning of the start of the army's parts. But they deceived the General Staff, since by this time the 2nd shock army was just beginning to delay the rear.
After receiving the headquarters of the front headquarters about the release of the 2nd shock army from the turn of a new village, streams, a cow stream, a red hill, a platform of the enemy, torn, the island, the Palinino, the Fern meadow, a deaf bow of the Volkhov River, the headquarters of the army headquarters Colonel Vinogradov was compiled Operational plan on the turnout turns. Front approved it. Especially strongly on the fulfillment of the plan of operational decision on the departure from the first and subsequent intermediate milestones of defense, the depletion of the personnel of the army's troops was affected. It was difficult to solve the issue of supplying products and ammunition. If in the first days of the surroundings, the aircraft "Douglas" and U-2 could land in the army location, then in the following days there was no such possibility. Airplanes usually arrived at night and discarded the cargo, mainly food, on parachutes. Often, our aviation fell under the fire "Messer-Schmittov" even at night.
From the memories of the commander of the 327th rifle division, General I.M. Antyufeev:
"May was on the outcome when the signal came from the army to start waste. With the onset of twilight, part of the division left defensive positions at the Red Gorka. And at that moment we were convinced once again, to what extent the fighters were weakened by systematic malnutrition. They barely rearranged their feet. From the enemy, we broke off unnoticed only before dawn, when there were 8 - 10 kilometers from the Red Gorka, the enemy opened a hurricane fire from all types of weapons under our positions left. Then he moved to pursue us. But off-road, forests and swamps this time became our allies ...
At first, the Nazis could not use tanks for persecution. And to get around us with a side without tanks by enemy infantry was also not easy. This allowed us to get safely to the first defensive line and gain themselves on it. "
May 27. We started moving towards meat bore, minutely lingering in traffic jams on the road.
For the mastery of the neck, fierce battles were walking. On May 30, 1942, the Germans noticed the departure of the 2nd shock army and switched to the offensive, and on June 2, the opponent was repeatedly closed the corridor, having fully surrounded. Since that time, the power of the army by ammunition and food began to be carried out by air.
"The actions for the destruction of the enemy in the area of \u200b\u200bSpasskaya Polysty and the Nutin are extremely slow. The enemy not only is not destroyed by you, but, on the contrary, turning to active actions, blocked the way out of the 2nd shock army, because I solved your maneuver to conclusion. Attempts of the troops of the front to break through the fighting order of the enemy turn out to be small. The main reason for this should be considered not only the slowness of your events, but also the output of forces in parts instead of hitting the 2nd shock army ...
Deletion and indecision in this matter are extremely dangerous, for all this gives the enemy the opportunity to continuously consolidate on the way of removal of the 2nd shock army intercepted them. "
And yet how did it happen that the 2nd shock army was surrounded?
Back in April, General Hozin brought three divisions to the front reserve: 2nd (4th and 24th) - the 6th Guards Rifle Corps and the 378th Rifle Division. Germans skillfully took advantage of this. They built a narrow-skinned railway in the forest west of Spasskaya Polysty and almost unhindered began to accumulate troops to strike for communications of the 2nd shock army meat boron - a new kerity. Front headquarters defense of the 2nd army communications did not strengthen. Its northern and southern roads covered the weak 65 SD - the 52nd Army and 372 SD - the 59th Army, elongated in a line without sufficient fires on insufficiently prepared defensive borders.
The 372th Rifle Division covered by the South Road by this time was occupied by a plot of defense with a combat composition of 2796 people with a length of 12 km, the 65th division, covering the North Road, held a section of a length of 14 km with a combat composition of 3708 people.
It was against the 372th CD that the opponent focused his main forces, but, unfortunately, there was no action to strengthen defense, although the reserves at the front had at that time.
On May 30, the Germans after the artillery and aviation training of the tank attack began the offensive on the right flank of the 311st regiment of the 65th Rifle Division. 3 companies of this shelf, losing 100 fighters and 4 tanks, retreated. Then the Rota of car guns was thrown to restore the position, which suffered losses and moved away. The Military Council of the 52nd Army remained nothing, how to quit the last reserve of the 54th GW into battle. rifle regiment 19 gv. SD with replenishment of 370 people, which, with the first contact with the enemy, was blocked.
As a result, the Germans pushed part of the 64th division and the left flank was cut off the 305th Rifle Division.
At the same time, the attack on the section 1236 rifle regiment The 372th rifle division, they broke through her weak defense, dismembered the second echelon of the 191st Rifle Division of the 59th Army, reached a narrow-sole railway and connected with the upcoming parts from the south. Only on June 1, the 165th Infantry Division was introduced without artillery support, which lost 50% of personnel, but the situation did not fix.
The commander of the front division from the battle brought and transferred to another site, replacing the 374th rifle division, but that at the time of the change of parts of the 165th moved a few times and was not introduced in a timely manner.
As a result, General Hozin took up the replacement of commanders and the regrouping of troops, which is tightened by Luch until June 10. During this time, the Germans created jotes and strengthened the defense.
On June 4 at 00 h 45 minutes, the commander of the 2nd strike army General Vlasov reported: "I will hit the turn to POLIVET at 20.00 on 4 June. Action of the troops of the 59th Army from the east, we do not hear, there is no long-range action of Artogne. "
Until on June 4, the neck of the bag was substantially narrowed, and on June 5, a narrow corridor of the 2nd and 59th armies was broken by counter strikes of the 2nd and 59th armies, according to which the troops of the 2nd shock army were published.
For almost a day, for the surrounded army, they managed to ride the products and evacuate the part of the wounded, and then the enemy still managed to minimize the combat order of the 2nd shock and break from the West.
On June 6, the neck of the bag was completely blocked. Seven divisions and six brigades were surrounded.
From the diary of the responsible secretary of the editorial office of the newspaper "Brave Warrior" of the 2nd shock army V.A. Kuznetsova:
By evening, the reasons for the passage are found. It turns out that on June 5, the onset of the two of our armies was undertaken at night - the 2nd shock and the 59th - towards each other. The enemy's destructive fire did not allow to expand the breakthrough.
Even on this short and dry passages of direct participants in the events, it is clear that the situation on the Volkhovsky section of the front was not just severe, it was catastrophic!
On June 3, the commander of the Leningrad Front was appointed General L.A. Govorov, and on June 8, the rate ordered to divide the troops of the Leningrad Front into two independent fronts:
"For non-fulfillment of the order of the rates about the timely and fast discharge of troops of the 2nd shock army, for paper-bureaucratic methods of control of troops, for the separation of troops, as a result of which the enemy cut the communication of the 2nd shock army and the latter was delivered to an exceptionally difficult situation." , Lieutenant General Hosin was removed and appointed commander of the 33rd army of the Western Front instead of the General Army Meretkov, who returned to Volkhovsky again on the former position of the Commander. On June 9, 1942, he, together with the representative of the Rate Colonel-General A.M. Vasilevsky arrived at the command post in a small Visharator and took into his hands the leadership of the 2nd shock army from the environment.
After decades, Marshal recalled:
"What was the situation at the front to our arrival?" The situation looked rather gloomy. The 2nd shock army, cut off from the supply bases and surrounded, has experienced acute need in food and ammunition. Her ariragard compounds under the pressure of the enemy slowly moved to the east, and the avant-garde sought to break through the corridor. The troops of the 59th and 52nd armies stretched on a wide front, barely restrained the enemy trying to expand the gap between them and the 2nd shock army. The reserves were absent. We have become feverishly looking for a way out. We managed to free the three rifle brigades and a number of other parts, including one tank battalion. These modest forces, reduced to two groups, was entrusted to the task of proving the Corridor width of 1, 5 - 2 km, cover it from the flanks and ensure the exit of the troops of the 2nd shock army in the environment. The signal to the offensive was given at dawn on June 10. "
From 10 to 25 June, the commander of the Troops of the Volkhov Front with the participation of the representative of the rates directly organized and led by combat actions in the area of \u200b\u200bthe meat boron.
From the memories of the commander of the 327th rifle division, General I.M. Antyufeev:
"On the first defensive border, the division was supposed to delay the enemy for a day. But from the leadership received a new order: to linger at this turn as soon as possible, since the main forces of the army were not yet prepared for the breakthrough. Four days Division held back enemy. She beat off some fierce attacks, even seized several prisoners, including two pilots from his baked airplanes. After some time, the Nazis still managed to go to the flank of the division. In our defense, they focused a strong fire of artillery and mortars, to which we, unfortunately, had nothing to answer. We were forced to leave this line. The next defensive frontier was held in the District of Fineva Meadow. Here we had to fight until mid-June, as an attempt to break through the defense of the enemy by the main forces of the army in the direction of Spasskaya Polysty failed. Now the army troops were preparing for the second blow, changing its direction - on meat boron. In the area, it is some miracle among the swamp, a narrow strip of land has been preserved, in which pedestrians could have mastered at night. "
According to the head of the 2nd strike army of Major Afanasyev, who in his report, the military council of the Volkhov Front wrote on July 26, 1942:
"Despite all the difficult conditions for the assessment of the area, the depletion of the human composition, the lack of replenishment, but thanks to the good political and moral state of the army's personnel, all the marsh terrain technique was exported in advance for a new kerity.
These most connections have become free and promptly perform tasks assigned to them. "
It is thanks to the "good political and moral state of personnel", for all attempts of the enemy to go to the offensive, he received proper rebuffing with big losses for him.
Suffice it to say that the management of all over the turns was built in the presence of two or three spare command items, with a well-developed permanent network of the telegraph telegraph line (two-wire system), in the presence of bypass lines on the front between the rifle divisions and brigades. Thus, the entire period of exit to the river Polystin control troops was uninterrupted. After removing the enemy in the first turn (cow stream, a red hill), the Germans acted through the opposite and took Dubovik. But as a result of the interaction of the forces of 327 diabetes, 382 SD, 59 SDP and 25 RCB enemy was completely broken and destroyed. Parts of the 59th and 25th Rifle Brigades from B. Eagleino came out according to plan without loss. The same was on the second intermediate border (streams, rhodiffs).
On the third border, the enemy was stopped by a stubborn defense of the 23rd rifle Brigade, 92nd, 19th Guards and 327th Rifle Divisions. These compounds provided and ensured the concentration of the shock group aimed at the East, as part of four teams and two divisions in the region. Shuffle.
But since on the third border of defense (Fern Luga, r. Vavan-Crop, Olkhovka) was not a solid front, and the numerical composition decreased, the command of the army decided to strengthen the advanced parts with special parts: with communication, artilleryrs and others in the amount of 1500 people.
"Military Council of the Volkhov Front. We repeat: the army troops for three weeks are buried dressed fierce battles with an opponent ... Personal composition of troops to the limit is exhausted, the number of deaths and incidence of exhaustion increases every day. As a result of the cross-shelling of the army district, the troops carry large losses from the artimetic fire and aviation of the enemy. The combat composition of the compounds decreased dramatically. It is impossible to replenish it at the expense of the rear and special parts ... for the sixteenth of June in battalions, brigades and rifle shelves there are on average several dozen people. All attempts by the Eastern Army Group to break through the passage in the corridor from the West did not have success.
Vlasov. Zuev. Vinogradov. "
According to the General Staff, passenger aircraft by this time was served daily by air for parts of the army 7 - 8 tons of food, with the need for 17 tons, 1900 - 2000 shells with a minimum need of 40,000, 300,000 ammunition (5 cartridges per person).
Despite the fact that K.A. Meretkov with A.M. Vasilevsky did everything that it was possible for the withdrawal of the 2nd shock army from the environment: revised all the resources of the front, outlined parts and units to transfer to the breakthrough site, the time was missed. The enemy did not sit back and, if possible, increased his efforts. Only the west of the Leningrad highway, from the north the part and the division of his four divisions occurred. From the West, three divisions were accessed, reduced to the group, and from Novgorod to the army pressed at least two groups of Germans. On June 19, the 29th Tank Brigade, with the support of the infantry, broke the defense of the enemy and connected with the troops of the 2nd shock, coming from the West.
"June 20. 03 h 17 min. Head of the headquarters of the Front. The parts of the 2nd shock army were connected in the area of \u200b\u200bthe mark 37, 1 and north of it with breakdown tanks and a small group of infantry of the 59th Army. The infantry, operating from the East, has not yet come to the Polysta river. Artillery from the East does not work. Tanks do not have shells. "
"June 20. 12 h 57 min. Head of Gun. Head of the headquarters of the Front. Copy: Korovnikov and Yakovlev. Please understand that parts of the eastern group of Table about bleeding, it is to allocate accompaniment for tanks. The defense of the enemy on the river. Policy is not broken. The position of the enemy unchanged. The infantry of the 52nd and 59th armies on the POLIST River from the East did not come out. Our parts are made by fire enemy and promotion do not have. I ask for instructions on the infantry attack of the 52nd and 59th armies from the east. The broken 11 tanks do not have shells. "
"June 21, 1942 8 h 10 min. Head of Gun. Military Council of Front. Army's troops are three weeks to receive fifty grams of crackers. There were no last days of food. We remove the last horses. People to extremes are exhausted. There is a group mortality from hunger. There is no ammunition.
Vlasov. Zuev. "
By June 21, the compounds of the 2nd shock army in the amount of eight rifle divisions and six shooting brigades (35 - 37 thousand people) with three shelves of the RGC 100 guns, as well as about 1000 cars focused in the area of \u200b\u200bseveral kilometers south of N. Keerstone on Square 6 ґ 6 km. And from 21 to 22 June, part of the 59th Army broke through the defense of the enemy in the area of \u200b\u200bthe meat boron and formed a corridor to 800 m wide.
For the holding of this corridor, the part of the army turned around to the south and north to the north, walked along the narrow-sole railway.
There was an offensive (2nd percussion army) of the 59th army (2nd perk. Army) 1st echelon 46 p. Division and 2 echelon 57th and 25th rifle brigades. Going into the joint with the parts of the 59th Army, these connections went to exit through the corridor in the rear of the 59th Army. Only for the day 22.06 of the 2nd shock army was 6018 wounded and about thousand healthy fighters and commanders.
"Taking advantage of the corridor, a large group of wounded fighters and commanders came out of the 2nd shock army on meat bor. Then it happened what I was most afraid. Parts of the 2nd Impact Army, who participated in the breakthrough, instead of sending their efforts to expand the breakthrough and securing flanks, they themselves pulled out after injured. At this critical moment, the command of the 2nd strike army did not take measures to ensure the flanks of the corridor and failed to organize the exit of troops from the environment. "
June 23 Responsible Secretary of the newspaper "Brave Warrior" V.A. Kuznetsov recorded in her diary:
"The ring is open again, and part of the troops are derived on the parties. Our situation is complicated with every minute. The territory of the army occupied area is shot through. Yesterday, the bombers were not flying away the whole second half of the day. In the air, the "crutch" hung with impunity and the artillery was cruelly fired. At night, the Nazis shot down six of our aircraft, trying to break through with food and medicines. "
From June 12 to June 18, 1942, the fighters and commanders of the 2nd percussion were issued 400 g of conine and 100 g of superstrears. In the following days, the supply rate even more earned (10 - 50 g only about sugar). True, personal driver Vlasov Konkov N.V. In his testimony in August 1942, said: "In lately Fighters of parts of the 2nd shock army were received daily from 80 to 150 g of superstars, ate boiled conine and soup prepared from the grass. "
But there were days when the fighters of the products did not receive at all. The number of exhausted fighters increased, cases of mortality from hunger appeared. In his earnings note, the head of the special department of the NKVD of the Volkhov Front, the Senior Major State Security Community of Melnikov on August 6, 1942 wrote: "Deputy nach The political waste of the 46th division of the teeth was detained by the fighter of the 57th Rifle Brigade of Athenogenov, who cut out a piece of meat from the corpse of the killed red-Armenian. Being detained, Athenogenov died on the way from exhaustion. "
The position of the 2nd shock army is extremely complicated after a breakthrough of the opponent of the defense line of the 327th division in the Finemal Luga area. As a result, the enemy advanced to a new keriest and subjected to the artillery shelling of the rear of the army. So he cut off the main forces of the Army 19th Guards and the 305th rifle divisions, and then the blow from Olkhovka by two infantry shelves with twenty tanks with aviation support, Germans seized the frontiers held by the 92nd Division.
The departure of the troops along the line of the Keriest River significantly worsened the position of the army. The enemy artillery shot the entire depth of the army. The ring around the 2nd shock closed.
"June 23, 1942. 01 h 02 min. The army's troops after a breakthrough forces of the 46th rifle division came on the line of the nameless stream of 900 meters east of the mark 31, 1 and only in the area met with parts of the 59th army. All reports on the approach of parts of the 59th army to r. Policy from the east of treacherous lies ... "
Enemy, forcing r. Kerie, went to the flank, wedged into our combat order and led the offensive on the Army's KP in the wood-based field. A company of a special department consisting of 150 people was thrown on the protection of the command paragraph of the army, which pushed the enemy and led the battle with him during the day on June 23.
"June 23, 1942 22.15. The enemy mastered the new kerity. The passage of the east of the river POLIST is re-closed by an opponent ... Active actions from the East is not heard. Artillery fire does not lead. Once again, I ask you to take decisive measures to clearing the breakthrough and exit of the 52nd and 59th armies to the POLISE River from the East. Our parts are on the West Bank of Polysty.
Vlasov. Zuev. Vinogradov. "
To ensure the exit of parts of the 2nd shock army, remaining behind the front line, the front command prepared a new counter-strike of the troops of the 59th from the East and the 2nd shock army from the West along the narrow-salt road. Attack was preparing for 23 hours on June 23. But due to the strongest bombing from the air of combat orders of troops and the headquarters of the 2nd strike army, the event for the occupation of the initial position for the attack was torn.
On June 24 at 00.45, the Vlasov reported: "There is no passage, wounded to evacuate nowhere - you are misleading ... I ask for your intervention."
But the next text, transmitted by the 2nd shock by the Military Council of the 2nd shock in 19.45: "All cash forces of the army break through the turn of the West Bank. Policy to the east, along the roads and the north of the narrow scene. The beginning of the attack at 22.30. On June 24, 42, I ask to assist from the east of the living force, tanks and artillery of the 52nd and 59th armies, and to cover the troops from 3.00 by aviation. June 25 42 Vlasov. Zuev. Vinogradov. "
On October 22 - 23, the command of the 2nd shock army, organizing the exit of parts from the environment to the generated corridor, for some reason did not expect to exit with the fight and did not take measures to strengthen and expand the main communication among Spasskaya Polysty. Thus, the gate was not kept this time. Everything happened ...
On the night of June 24 at 23.30, the troops of the 2nd shock army began movement. There were tanks with the target of the 29th tank brigade to meet them. Artillery of the 59th and 52nd armies hit the enemy. The enemy in response opened the hurricane artillery fire, and the German bombarding aviation earned over the fighting area.
Marshal K.A. Meretkov recalled:
"At that time I was at the command paragraph of the 59th Army, from where I supported the connection with the headquarters of the 2nd shock army. With the beginning of the movement of the troops of this army, the connection with the headquarters of the 2nd shock army was broken and no longer restored.
By morning, a small corridor was outlined along the narrow-chain railway and the first groups came out of the surroundings of fighters and commanders appeared. They walked from exhaustion. The exit of the troops continued throughout the first half of the day, but then stopped. The Germans managed to take control of the road. By evening, the forces who operated from the East were again broken by the corridor and the road was cleared. According to this corridor, rushed cross-fire on both sides, during the night and morning on June 25, the release of fighters and commanders of the 2nd shock army continued. At 9.30, on June 25, the Germans again slammed the neck, now finally. " On June 24, in the morning, the command of the 2nd shock army was ordered to leave the environment with small groups. According to K.A. Metskova, "This disposal undermined the moral spirit of the troops and finally disorganized the management. Without feeling guidance from the command and headquarters of the army, division divisions and brigades, the ruzyrod moved to the exit, leaving the flanks offek. "
This opinion is confirmed by other sources. Senior Major State Security Melnikov: "On June 24, this year Vlasov decides to bring the headquarters of the army and the rear institutions by capital order. The entire column was a peaceful crowd with messy movement, demasked and noisy.
The opponent running the column subjected to artillery and mortar shelling. The Military Council of the 2nd Army with a group of commanders of the failed and out of the environment. "
It is still believed that General Vlasov is not guilty that the 2nd shock army was surrounded. It is possible that it is so. But there is one small "but". True, that the 2nd shock army of Vlasov really became from mid-April 1942, replacing the sick general of Klykov. However, since March of the month, he was her tactical adviser as Deputy Commander of the Volkhov Front. So, already then had to own the situation, help the commander in the leadership of the troops, as well as to carry all the fullness of responsibility for the decisions made. But as far as it is known, there was nothing of it.
The first time of communication of the 2nd shock army was cut on March 20 - 21, and a week later the corridor was opened. June 2, the corridor is secondaryly closed. It turns out that the army commanded the army and more than two and a half of the month to the surroundings of the Vlasov. Evidence testimonies say that the Vlasov said more than I did:
"Being at the 2nd Impact Army, the Vlasov made it clear that he had a lot of weight, because he repeatedly said that he had a special order of Moscow and that he had a direct connection with Moscow.
In the 2nd shock army of Vlasov, he was well friends with a member of the Military Council Zuev and the head of the headquarters of Vinogradov.
With Zuev, they worked together before the war in the 4th Mechkorpus. In a conversation with Zuev and Vinogradov, the Vlasov repeatedly said that great strategies are about Metskova - brought the army for death.
Vlasov at Tov. Metskova said: "The title is large, and the ability ..." - and did not negotiate further, but he gave to understand. Judging by the conversation of Vlasov, he did not want to understand anyone and wanted to be the owner. Vlasov in the 2nd shock army did not like the head of the Special Department Shashkov, this Vlasov has repeatedly expressed Zuev, and once the Vlasov commanded Shashkov to leave the dugouts. "
Adjutant (Major Kuzin).
No better responded about Vlasov and Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky: "Commander of the 2nd Shock Army of Vlasov, without standing out by large commander's abilities, besides, by nature, an extremely unstable and cowardly, completely inactive. The complex setting created for the army even more demoralized it, he did not attempt to the rapid and secretive tap of the troops. "
While Vlasov did not hold the position of commander and was as it were from the events, he allowed himself to give negative assessments to those who directly commanded the front, the army who carried the full responsibility. This continued after his appointment to the army. Apparently because it was part-time. And most likely because he was confident in his temporary performance of duties. But the treatment of Klyova was delayed, and the catastrophe of the 2nd shock came much faster than someone could think about it. And here the Vlasov was confused.
However, not just confused, but rented. All his reports in June confirm this. It was the third entourage in his life. In addition, the 2nd shock army turned out to be all possible assistance, that is, everything was different than in 1941
Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky recalled:
"I held the post of first deputy head of the General Staff, during these events and I could respond to the very serious concern that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief showed about the fate of the 2nd impact army, about the issues of providing all-effective assistance to them. Certificate of this is a number of directives of the bet written in most cases under the dictation of the most supreme commander-in-chief personally to the commander and the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, to the commander of the Russian Army's Troops and other addresses, not to mention the daily telephone talks on this topic .
After the ring of the environment of the troops of the 2nd shock army was closed and decided to restore the Volkhov Front, on the order of the bet together with the commander K.A. Meretskov in the Small Vishera to Volkhovchnam was also directed, as a representative of the bet. We were supplied by the main task to rescue the 2nd shock army from the environment, at least without heavy weapons and techniques. And I must say that we have been accepted, it would seem that all possible measures to save the surrounded courts, to rescue the Commander Vlasov from the ring, although it was associated with great difficulties. "
Even a whole front-line operation on the withdrawal of the 2nd shock army from the environment was carried out. In the summer of 1942, the event is truly unheard of!
In his book "Russian campaign. Tactics and weapons ", written in the experience gained by the German army in World War II, officer of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Eyka Middeldorf considered the problem of the environment. In it, for example, there are such statements:
"If the enemy managed to accommodate and there are no grounds for successful release, then surrounded by the troops should be immediately given an order to breakthrough and out of the environment.
Without supplying the air, the combat composition of the surrounded troops will quickly decrease and then it is already impossible to count on a successful breakthrough from the environment. "
"The decision on the withdrawal of troops from the environment should be taken as soon as possible, since the time under these conditions works for the enemy. When assessing the situation and the position of the troops, it is necessary first of all to remember that the solution to the exit from the environment or to the release of the surrounded group would not be taken too late. In the same way, it is impossible to slow and with the implementation of the decision on the breakthrough of the rings of the environment.
Unfortunately, in the situation in which the 2nd percussion was, it was impossible to determine what will be discarding. Successful or not? Maybe therefore, the order for a breakthrough and the exit from the environment was not given immediately.
One thing is clear: the supply by air was ineffective due to the complete domination of German aviation. Accordingly, the combat composition of the troops decreased quickly. But at the same time, it is impossible to forget about the high political and moral state of the personnel, which at that time did not have any doubts. It was the fact obvious.
The decision to withdraw the troops of the 2nd shock army was taken late, but for this there were good reasons. Including the operation of the front operation of the army from the environment. In other words, the 2nd percussion was not thrown into the arbitrary of fate. Of the three possible options for troops:
- by breaking through the rings of the environment by the forces surrounded by the troops;
- by debloking them by troops operating from the outside;
- By simultaneously hitting both groups towards each other.
The last and most faithful one was selected.
But he demanded time for the preparation and organization of interaction, and the time is considerable.
According to the memories of eyewitnesses, it is known, despite the fact that on June 21, the headquarters of the 2nd shock army left the CP of the army in connection with the shelling and moved to the command of the brigade in the R-non-meat boron, until June 20, 1942. 2nd Impact Army While surrounded, retained full combat order. Connections and parts, despite their small number, restrained the onslaught of the enemy. The troops skillfully used the main advantage surrounded: quickly maneuvered, had organized flexible fire management and in a short time they created groups for a breakthrough of the rings of the environment. In the army surrounded by the internal organization of troops. Strict control over compliance with the rules of movement maintained discipline and order. All this was as long as the military council, the headquarters and the commander himself believed that the surroundings would be broken. But fear that, with a loss of time, the failure of the discharge and breakthrough will entail much more detrimental consequences and the enemy will violate a solid defense front on the decisive direction, and then dismembering and destroying the army in parts, played its role.
General Vlasov completely confused. The external calm before the troops, replaced by despair, banal panic in the reports and reports to the top, turned into a prostration ...
The highest ranks of the military command were always used by honor. But has it been this title for a long time? And who were those people who managed armies and fronts, top history during one of the most ambitious military conflicts of humanity?
Who are they, generals of the Second World War?
Until 1940 was not in the air force of the Soviet Union of such a title. Its analogues were comes, comkors, commander, commissioners. True, in September 1935, the title of Marshal, who awarded five people. But before the war, only two remained.
In May 1940, for the first time, a little more than a thousand people were presented to the rank of general and admiral. There were 1056 people in this rank. By May 1945, their number reached 5597 people.
Among the dead and missing from 1940 to 1945, 421 General and Admirals are listed.
Let's figure it out in more detail and be called outstanding warlords infeitically.
Commanders by terrestrial fronts
Even being in the highest ranks, the soldier remains a soldier. And he is absolutely not insured against death on the battlefield or for the sake of preserving honor. Although there were and who adhered to another opinion. But we will talk about them in the relevant section.
So, not all generals of the Second World War survived. I.R. APANASENKO, M.P. Kirponos, I.A. Bogdanov, F.Ya. Kostenko, M.P. Petrov, N.F. Vatutin and I.D. Chernyakhovsky heroically died under different circumstances. MG Efremov committed suicide so as not to get the fascists alive, and D. G. Pavlov was repressed.
The remaining generals of the Second World War, the list of which will take not one page, survived and largely contributed to the victory of the Soviet Union in this conflict.
We mention only some. THEM. Bagramyan is represented by the participant of many offensive operations twice.
CM. The weekly is famous not only with his mustache, but also 3 medals "Golden Star", obtained over the years of battles. Participated in and for the Caucasus.
The Hero of the Soviet Union is submitted four times, a member of a variety of battles and operations.
Awarded not only two gold stars. Also in his honor, heavily self-propelled artist - "Klim Voroshilov" is named.
Commands of FRONTS air defense
In general, to win thousands of battles, you need to have knowledge and experience in many areas. For example, to deal with professionally in strategy and tactics, know all the nuances of various troops, their ability to interact. We also need an inflexible will and rapid decision-making. These and other qualities are made from senior commandar officers who can command the armies.
The generals of the Second World War also led the troops of air defense. Among them, you can mention the following surnames: M.S. Gromadin, P.E. Gudeno, and G.S. Caller.
But not everyone was the honor and loyalty to the Motherland above his own life and interests. Among the latter can be called several people.
G.N. Alliles got into German captured under the city of Vyazma. There I gave myself over ordinary and until 1942 served in the Wehrmacht by the usual driver. But she accidentally identified the forester. After interrogation and confirmed readiness, Georgy Nikolayevich meets with Goebrus and is appointed to assistants Vlasov.
In 1945 was detained by the Americans. He reported his Soviet counterintelligence, hoping for cooperation, but after the proceedings was sentenced to death. The hanging execution was made in Butyrsa prison.
V.F. Malyshkin was captive after the "Vyazemsky boiler". Immediately expressed the desire to cooperate. He worked in the propaganda department and since 1943 it becomes assistant Vlasov in this matter.
Also was detained by the Americans, transferred to the Soviet authorities and executed in the Butyrsa prison.
B.S. Richter, F.I. Trukhin also managed to serve both Soviet and German side.
Thus, we see that the generals of the Second World War did not always come heroically. They were ordinary people With your fears and desires, but also with short talents in the military sphere.
Commander of the Troops of Wehrmacht
What happened on the other side of the front? What German generals of the Second World War was especially famous in battles?
Among them are also the dead in battles. This is Günther Background Blev, Fedor Background, Georg von Weizleben, Walter Model, Erwin Rommel and others.
Almost all of them were awarded the Order of the Iron Cross, which was issued since 1939 for three and more successfully conducted hazardous operations.
Among the most successful commander, Hermann Balke, Albert Cesselring, Walter Model, Ferdinand Steerner, who were four times the knights of this order four times.
German traitors generals
However, not everything went so smoothly as it could seem. Among the command of the Wehrmacht were also people who do not agree with the course of events. In search of the best destiny, they found themselves in the lists of traitors of their homeland.
Vinzzznitz Muller, Lieutenant-General. In June 1944, he turned out to be thrown from the 4th Army under Minsk. Tippelskirh, the official commander of this unit, left him all the authority, running away with his headquarters.
As a result, without receiving support, supply, provisions, without even simple cards with intelligence, he was forced to stop resistance and surrender to Soviet troops.
As we can see, many generals of the Second World War changed their views after, without having received support, they were in captivity. Otto Corfes, for example, was captive under Stalingrad and surrendered at a full parade. In the future, he collaborated with Soviet troops, for which his family in Germany was brutally repressions.
Bernard Behler also turned out to be captive under Stalingrad. The main reason why officers began to cooperate with the enemy, was that they vinyl the shortness of Hitler.
It turns out that the generals of the Second World War were ready to serve their country and win battles, but not always the leadership appreciated their zeal. Resentment, disappointment and other feelings pushed to cooperate with the enemy.
Thus, we in the article dealt with a bit in who these generals, and talked about the prominent warlods of World War II.
Head of the eighth.
Commander of the 2nd special abnormal
Far Eastern Odyssey Konev continued. Already in the rank of Complence, he again rides the familiar road, according to which once moved to the battles on the corpressure "Grozny". This time in Khabarovsk. Here was the headquarters of the second separate red-known army.
The purpose of Koscher Konev to a new position was happening on the background if not tragedy, then dramas, some episodes of which and their consequences were rather gloomy. While Konev with his body came into the ground, covering the southeastern borders of the MTR, the Japanese were activated by Lake Hasan. The fate was so pleased that this short war ("events ... few days"), and the conclusions made by its results in Moscow and the personnel permutations among the top command of the Red Army directly touched Konev.
"Top secret
People's Commissar Defense of the USSR No. 0040
On August 31, 1938, under my chairmanship, a meeting of the Chief Military Council of the Red Army in the members of the Military Council was held: TT. Stalin, Scratzhenko, Budyanny, Shaposhnikova, Kulik, Lokokionov, Bluchber and Pavlov, with the participation of the chairman of the SNK of the USSR Tov. Molotov and deputy. People's Commissar of Interior Tov. Frinovsky.
The Chief Military Council considered the issue of events in the area of \u200b\u200bLake Hasan and, having heard the explanations of the Complete Tov. Blucher and deputy. Member of the Military Council of the KDFrite Tov. Mazepova, came to the following conclusions:
1. Martial operations at Lake Hassan were a comprehensive check of mobilization and combat readiness not only those parts that directly accepted participation in them, but also without exception of the KDFRT troops.
2. The events of these few days have discovered huge shortcomings in the state of the KDFRT. The combat training of troops, headquarters and the command and superior composition of the front were at an unacceptable low level. The military units were rapid and unable; The supply of military units is not organized. It was found that the Far Eastern theater to war is poorly prepared (roads, bridges, communications).
Storage, supply and accounting of mobilization and inviolable stocks, both front-line and in the military units, were in the chaotic state.
To all this, it was found that the most important directives of the Chief Military Council and the People's Commissar of Defense with the command of the front for a long time were not proclaimed. As a result of such an unacceptable state of the front troops, we in this relatively small collision suffered significant losses - 408 people killed and 2807 people were injured. These losses cannot be justified by the extraordinary difficulty of the area, which had to operate in our troops, nor through large losses of the Japanese.
The number of our troops, participation in the operations of our aviation and tanks gave us such advantages under which our losses could be much smaller.
And only due to racking, inorganization and combat unpreparedness of the military units and confusion of the command and political composition, starting from the front and ending with the regiment, we have hundreds of killed and thousands of wounded commanders, political workers and fighters. Moreover, the percentage of losses of the command and political composition is unnaturally large - 40%, which once again confirms that the Japanese were broken and thrown out of our border only due to the combat enthusiasm of fighters, junior commanders, medium and senior command-political composition, ready to sacrifice themselves, protecting Honor and inviolability of the territory of its great socialist homeland, as well as thanks to the skillful management of operations against the Japanese Tov. Stern and proper guidelines. Lever actions of our aviation.
Thus, the main task set by the Government and the Chief Military Council of Troops of the KDFRTA - to ensure Far East Full and permanent mobilization and combat readiness of the troops of the front, - turned out to be unfulfilled.
3. The main shortcomings in the preparation and device of troops, detected by the combat actions at Lake Hassan, are:
a) unacceptably the criminal popping from the combat under the divisions of the fighters to all sorts of foreign work.
Chief Military Council, knowing about these facts, in May S.G. With its decree (Protocol No. 8), it categorically forbade diluating redarmeys on various kinds of economic work and demanded a return in part by July 1, this year. All fighters located in such companions. Despite this, the front command did nothing to return to their parts of fighters and commanders, and in parts continued to exist a huge noncomplex in the personnel, the parts were disorganized. In such a state, they made a combat alarm to the border. As a result, in the period of hostilities, it was necessary to resort to a location from different divisions and individual fighters of the part, allowing organizational improvisation, creating an impossible confusion that could not but affect the actions of our troops;
b) The troops spoke to the border on combat alarm completely unprepared. The inviolable stock of weapons and other combat property was not in advance and prepared for the issuance of parts into the hands, which caused a number of screaming disgraces during the entire fighting period. The head of the front control and commander of parts did not know what kind of weapons, ammunition and other combat equipment are available. In many cases, whole art. The batteries were on the front without shells, the spare trunks to the machine guns were not adjacent in advance, the rifles were outstretched, and many fighters and even one of the rifle divisions of the 32nd division arrived at the front at all without rifles and gas masks. Despite the enormous reserves of non-fermented property, many fighters were sent to battle in perfectly worn out shoes, half-sews, a large number of redarmeys were without stakes. Commanders and headquarters lacked the fighting cards;
c) all kind of troops, especially the infantry, found not the ability to act on the battlefield, maneuvering, combine movement and fire, applied to the terrain that in this situation, as in general in the conditions of the Far East, replete with mountains and hills, is the alphabet of combat and tactical learning troops.
Tank parts were used ineptly, as a result of which larger losses in the material part.
4. The culprits in these largest shortcomings and in the relatively small combat clash of excessive losses are commanders, commissioners and heads of all degrees of KDFRT, and first of all - the Commander of the CDF Marshal Blucher.
Instead of honestly give all his forces to eliminate the consequences of the permit and combat training of the KDFRT, and truthfully inform the People's Commissar and the Chief Military Council on the shortcomings in the life of the Troops of the Front, T. Blucher systematically, from year to year, covered his obviously bad work and inactivity to reports On the successes, the growth of the combat training of the front and the general prosperous condition. In the same spirit, they were made a crowded report at a meeting of the Main Military Council on May 28-31, 1938, in which he hid the true state of the CDF troops and argued that the front troops were well prepared and in all respects.
The numerous enemies of the people sitting next to Bhuncher were skillfully hidden behind his back, leading their criminal work on the disorganization and decomposition of the KDFRD troops. But after exposing and withdrawing from the army of traitors and spies, T. Blucher failed or did not want to truly realize the purification of the front from the enemies of the people. Under the flag of a special vigilance, he left contrary to the instructions of the Chief Military Council and the People's Commissar, unsubstantiated hundreds of posts of commanders and heads of parts and compounds, thus deprived of military units of managers, leaving headquarters without workers incapable of fulfilling their tasks. Such a situation T. Blucher explained the absence of people (which does not meet the truth) and thus cultivated the clouded distrust to all the command-bunch of KDFRD personnel.
5. The leadership of the commander of the Marshal Blucher's KDFRON in the period of hostilities in Lake Hassan was completely unsatisfactory and bordered with conscious affliction. All his behavior in the time preceding by combat actions, and during the battle themselves was a combination of duplicate, undisciplining and sabotage of armed withdrawal by Japanese troops who seized part of our territory. Pre-knowing about the upcoming Japanese provocation and the decisions of the government on this occasion, declared. Litvinov Ambassador Sigemitsa, having received the Directive of the People's Commissar of the Defense on July 22 on bringing the entire front to combat readiness, TOV. Blucher limited himself to the return of the relevant orders and did nothing to check for the cooking troops for the enemy eating and did not accept the effective measures to support the border guards by field troops. Instead, he was completely unexpected on July 24, questioned the legality of the actions of our border guards at Lake Hasan. Secretly from a member of the Military Council T. Mazepova, his headquarters headquarters t. Stern, deputy. Commissar of defense t. Mehlis and deputy. Commissar of the Interior Affairs, T. Frynovsky, who were at this time in Khabarovsk, because Blucher sent a commission for height, and without the participation of the boss, the Borderman made an investigation into the actions of our border guards. Created by such suspicious procedure, the Commission found a "violation" by our border guards of the Manchur border for 3 meters and, therefore, "established" our "guilty" in the emergence of a conflict on Oz. Hasan.
In view of this, the T. Blucher will send a telegram to the Commissar of Defense about this imaginary violation by us by the Manchur border and requires an immediate arrest of the head of the border and other "culprits in provoking the conflict" with the Japanese. This telegram was sent by T. Blucher also secretly from the comrades listed above.
Even after receiving an indication of the government to terminate from all sorts of commissions and investigations and about the accurate fulfillment of the decisions of the Soviet government and orders of the Commissar T. Blucher does not change its affected position and still sabotes the organization of armed removal to the Japanese. It came to the fact that on August 1, this year When talking on a straight wire TT. Stalin, Molotova and Voroshilov with t. Blucher Tov. Stalin was forced to ask him a question: "Tell me, t. Blucher, honestly, do you have a desire to truly fight with the Japanese? If you do not have such a desire, tell me how the Communist is like, and if there is a desire, I would believed that you should have to go to the scene. "
From all the leadership of combat actions, T. Blucher did not desire, bias this self-premium by the package of novefront. Sterns to the fighting area without any specific tasks and powers. Only after repeated instructions of the government and the People's Commissar of Defense on the termination of criminal confusion and elimination of criminal disorganization in the management of troops and only after the drugs appointed. Stern by the commander of the hull operating at the Hassan lake, a special multiple request of the use of aviation, from the introduction into the battle of which T. Blucher refused under the pretext of the fears of defeats of the Korean population, only after the order of the T. Bluchuer to go to the place of events t. Blucher is taken for operational guidance. But at the same time, more than a strange leadership, he does not put the troops of the clear tasks to destroy the enemy, prevents the combat work of the commanders subordinated to him, in particular the command of the 1st Army actually removes the leadership of his troops without any reason; Disorganizes the work of the front control and inhibits the defeat of the Japanese troops on our territory. At the same time, T. Blucher, having left for the place of events, in every way evades the establishment of a continuous connection with Moscow, despite the infinite challenges of him on the direct wire of the People's Commissar of Defense. Whole three days in the presence of a normally working telegraph connection could not be conversation with T. Blucher.
All this operational "activity" of Marshal Bluchber was completed by the return on them on August 10, the Appearance of the Call in the 1st Army of 12th age. This illegal act was the incomprehensible that the Chief Military Council in May S.G., with the participation of the T. Blucher and in his own sentence, decided to call in wartime in the Far East only 6 ages. This order t. Blucher provoked the Japanese to declare all the mobilization and could draw us into a big war with Japan. The order was immediately canceled by the People's Commissar.
Based on the instructions of the Chief Military Council
Order:
1. In order to eliminate the elimination of all identified major defects in combat training and the status of the military units of the CDF, the replacement of the unquisitive and discrediting themselves in military and politically, the command and improving the leadership conditions, in the sense of approaching it to the military units, as well as the strengthening of defense training activities The Far Eastern Theater as a whole, - the Office of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front disband.
2. Marshal T. Bluchber from the post of commander of the troops of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front to remove and leave it at the disposal of the Chief Military Council of the Red Army.
3. Create two two in the troops of the Far Eastern Front separate armies, with direct submission to the People's Commissar of Defense:
a) The 1st separate red-known army in the composition of the troops according to Appendix No. 1, subordinating the Military Council of the 1st Army in operational relations of the Pacific Fleet.
Army management deployed - t. Voroshilov. The army includes fully the Ussuri region and part of the Khabarovsk and Primorskaya regions. The distinction line from the 2nd Army - by p. Bikin;
b) the 2nd separate red-known army in the composition of the troops according to Appendix No. 2, subordinating the 2nd Army to the Military Council in operational attitude of the Amur Red Blank Flotilla.
Department of the army deployed - Khabarovsk. In the composition of the army include the Lower Amur, Khabarovsk, Primorsky, Sakhalin, Kamchatka Region, the Jewish Autonomous Region, Koryaksky, Chukotka National District;
c) Personal composition of disbanded front control to apply the controls of the 1st and 2nd separate red-known armies.
4. Approve:
a) Commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army - Comcoore Tov. Stern G. M., a member of the Military Council of the Army - the Divisional Commissioner of Commission. Semenovsky F. A., Head of Staff - Combridge Tov. Popova M. m.;
b) Commander of the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army - Komkore Tov. Koneva I. with, a member of the Military Council of the Army - Brigadic Commissioner Commission. Biryukova N. I., Headquarters - Combridge Tov. Melnik K. S.
5. The newly appointed commander of the armies to form army management for the accompanying project of states No. ...
6. Before arriving in Khabarovsk, the commander of the 2nd separate red-known army of the commercial commercial. Koneva I.S. In a temporary command to enter the comdail. Romanovsky.
8. Head of the Office for the BCQ room, the personal composition of the disbanded control of the Far Eastern Red-known Front to use for staffing the 1st and 2nd separate red-known armies.
9. Head of the General Staff to give the appropriate indication by the 1st and 2nd army on the distribution between the armies of warehouses, bases and so on. Front, property. To keep in mind the possibility of using chiefs of labor of the RKKKA troops and their representatives that are currently in the Far East to quickly perform this work.
10. Military Council of the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army by October 1, S.G. Restore the control of the 18th and 20th rifle cases with dislocation: 18 SK - Kuibyshevka and 20 SK - Birobidzhan.
To restore these cabinet administrations, rework the management of the Khabarovsk operative group and the 2nd army of the KDPRD.
11. Military Councils of the 1st and 2nd individual red-known armies:
a) immediately begin to guide the order in the troops and provide in the shortest possible time their full mobilization readiness, the adopted events and their implementation of the military councils of the armies to convey the People's Commissar of Defense once to the five days;
b) to ensure the full implementation of orders of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 071 and 0165 - 1938. On the implementation of these orders to convey every three days, starting from September 7, 1938
In cases of extreme necessity, the military councils of the armies are permitted only from the approval of the People's Commissar of Defense, to involve military units to work, provided that they are only organized, so that whole divisions led by their commanders, political workers, while maintaining the full combat readiness, For which the units must be changed in a timely manner.
12. On the progress of the management of the commander of the 1st and 2nd separate red-known armies to convey to me in a telegraph in Ciffer 8, September 12 and 15.
People's Commissar Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union
K. Voroshilov
Head of the General Staff of the Red Army Promadarm 1 Rank
Shaposhnikov. "
I did not actually led this document entirely, thus burdened the book is overly a long quote. This document brightly characterizes the situation in the Far East and in Transbaikalia, in which our hero dipped. Among other things, it also testifies to the fact that the tactics of hostilities, which were mined by dashing victories during the period Civil War, went to the past. Together, no matter how severely sounded, with the heroes of the Civil War. A mobile army ranked in the field, rich in military equipment with a large firing power. No longer human masses, but maneuvers, quickly, the interaction of all kinds of troops solved the success of the operation. And it's not by chance that this very short war in the 20th century has advanced the first rows of distinguished young commander. In the Red Army, the new generation of commanders began to set the tone. The era of Bluchber, Tukhachevsky, Budyanny and Voroshilov leaving the past. Sometimes together with your carriers. Unfortunately, Stalin, who by that time became a full-awake dictator in the USSR, understood it with a big delay, after the "cavalrymen" poured several fronts in another war - with Hitler's Germany.
As for the hero of our narration directly, it should be said that the awkward actions of yesterday's idol of many comes and comkers of that pore brought frustration and horseback. Konstantin Simonov in the book "The eyes of a man of my generation" on the basis of conversations with Marshal Konev wrote literally the following: "Blucher, in his opinion, was to the thirty-seventh year by a person with the past, but without the future, a person who is in terms of his knowledge, ideas nearby I left the civil war and belonged to the category that Voroshilov was represented by the beginning of the war, Budyannoye and some other former connames who lived with modern, and past views. It would be impossible to imagine the Blue Bower in the modern war. Apparently, he would have coped with this not better than Voroshilov or Budyanny. In any case, such a small operation as Khassan events, Blucher failed. And besides, lately, he was generally in a serious moral state, he dug a lot, sank. "
After these words, Koney Simonov made a remark: "I'm already looking for it, I thought that this one, the last moment I don't seem to be convincing quite enough, because in that setting that was created to the thirty-eighth year - by the time of the Khassan events, when Blucher felt like a man with his head laid under an ax, it is difficult to judge him for the unsuccessful conduct of the operation. "
"It doesn't seem sufficiently convincing" and this is a later summary of Simonov, as he did him in the years when it was fashionable, and it was beneficial to talk about the bloody Stalinist Top. But the judgments of Marshal Konev, even if in his own way and mistaken, about drunkenness and hint on the domestic difference of the commander of the CDF, seem quite sincere. Horse all my life did not tolerate drunkenness, and in the service he considered criminal and unacceptable.
From the above document, it is also seen as the Far Eastern army for the upcoming war prepared thoroughly. Ahead was Chalchin-goal.
Soon after the appointment, Comkor Konev arrived at the new place of service. The troops of the 2nd special army were scattered on a rather extensive territory. Khabarovsk region, Kamchatka, Chukotka with Island of Wrangel, Yakutia. By area - the secondary European state. The economy of garrisons and parts in the places of their permanent deployment, according to the confession of Konev himself, turned out to be "in the launched state, some parts are not arranged on winter apartments, poorly posted." Military classes and level of combat readiness, the state of weapons and equipment, equipment and horse-drawing in such divisions and garrisons, as a rule, was at the same level. In addition to all the wave of mass arrests of commanders and the Commissioners of the highest composition, some units were actually flawed.
The border with China took place on Amur from Kumera to Khabarovsk. Manchuria controlled Japanese troops. On the numerous islands on Amur, clashes often took place until the shootout. The Japanese appeared near Khabarovsk, in the Duke Dukes Kazakevich.
Two years before, namely, on November 25, 1936, in Berlin, Japan and Germany concluded a contract, the so-called "Anti-Comintern Pack", which obligated the parties to apply the most severe measures against those "who inside or outside the country directly or indirectly acts in favor of Communist International. " If necessary, this article could be interpreted quite arbitrarily. The Pact was supplemented by a secret agreement on joint actions against the USSR. On November 6, 1937, Italy joined the Covenant. February 24, 1939 - Hungary and Puppet State of Manzhou. In March of the same 1939 - Spain, and then Bulgaria, Finland, Romania, Denmark. The military union was gradually issued. The tone in it was asked Germany and Japan. Soon it became obvious that the world would not end all this.
The territory of influence for the second special army got difficult. Suffice it to say that there were no garrisons on remote Sakhalin and Kamchatka. The Japanese looked at these lands with lust. It so worked out historically that, as soon as non-configurations, rebellion and dismay begin in Russia, Japan immediately begins to swim on their courts to these our peninsula and islands.
Intelligence brought the Japanese not only in neutral waters that their seiners swim into Soviet territorial waters and lead illegal fishing. On the islands wicked walking. Comkor Konev solved this problem radically: the 101th Rifle Division of the Kombrigovsky Combridge was transferred to Kamchatka, and the 79th Division of the Makarenko Combridge was introduced into Sakhalin. Archival sources indicate that, for example, the 79th division was formed by a rush order, it can be assumed that it was created to cover the islands. Kombrig Ivan Alekseevich Makarenko will then become a general, during the Great Patriotic War will be commanded by the 12th Amur, and then the 82nd Guards Rifle Divisia will finish the war in Austria. With Avxent, Mikhailovich Gorodnyansky Konev will meet at the front of the summer of 1941. Under Smolensky, they will be in the same summary battalion chain, which will be raised to straighten a difficult position. Division Gorodynansky was part of the 16th army of General Rokossovsky and provided the junction between his and the 19th Army Konev. The Germans hit the junction and broke through, threatening flanks and rear. But about it a little later.
And then, in the Far East, the Japanese stood before them.
Communication with Petropavlovsky-Kamchatsky Koney carried out on the radio. Very often, the commander received such encryption from the head of the Kamchatka garrison: Japanese fishing vessels appeared in the territorial waters, I will send a fighting boats in order. An hour later, a new message: Japanese approached martial vehiclesThey were presented with ultimatum - we illegally placed their troops on the islands, demand to immediately bring troops to the mainland, otherwise threatened to open fire from the ship tools and land on the islands of the landing. Koney answered, trying to withstand a calm tone: Avcentei Mikhailovich, the Japanese underestimate you, believing that you have weak nerves ... But immediately ordered the troops in full combat readiness. Gorodnyansky radished: Ready. During such exacerbations, Konev sometimes arrived in Petropavlovsk and watched binoculars japanese squadronwhich brought to the city trunks of the main caliber.
On Sakhalin, after the 79th Infantry Division settled there, it became quieter. Division in 1945 will take part in hostilities against the Kwantung Army. Draw it after many decades when the state and the army become others, in 1995.
The border on Amuru was the territory of a special tension. After the defeat on the Hassan lake in the summer of 1938, the Japanese were preparing a larger invasion. As you know, on Amur a lot of islands. The demarcation line, held by the Farviter of the Amur and Ussuri rivers, left hundreds of the islands for the USSR. And if earlier it was just "constant places", where local residents The hay was harvested for livestock and engaged in agriculture, they were subsequently equipped with high power reinforces. After the expansion of the Khabarovsky airport over the island of Big Ussuriysky passed the landing glide. In addition, there were also country sections of Khabarovchan. Despite this, in 2004 then the authorities Russian Federation Send China 174 square kilometers of island territory. In the 1930s and the early 1940s, the Soviet fighters and commanders, border guards and Red Armyians were trapped for these islands. Marshal Konev recalled: "... The Japanese tried to capture the islands or sheds, even made attempts to plant small landings, most often in the Kazakevich District. So the end of 1938 and the whole of 1939, I was all the time in a state of combat tension. For all the years of service, first in Mongolia, and then in the Far East, I, of course, there was not a single weekend. I did not go on vacation, and did not even have the question that I could travel to relax. "
Intensive work, a semi-courtyard lifestyle, of course, did not benefit or family relationships or their own health. All this: and non-confessions in the family, and neglecting care about regular nutrition and rest - developed in chronic disease - a stomach ulcer. But the first horseback tried to drown out work, work and work. And the second ... Then the body was young and the youth was the best medicine from all ailments.
For a year and a half, the service of the commander of the 2nd wheel Konev was left twice from the army's location: both times to Moscow, where he went on call to the Commissar of Defense for the report on the main military advice on the mobilization readiness of the army.
In March 1939, the XVIII Congress of VKP (b) opened in Moscow. Koney took part in his work as a delegate from the Khabarovsk party organization. At the congress, he was elected to the members of the Central Committee of the Party. The final document was raised the task of "strengthening the struggle for the prevention of war, active support of peoples, which endangered enslavement, strengthening business relations with all countries opposing the fascist aggression." At the same time, it was indicated for the need to "in every way to increase the country's defense capability, keep the Soviet Armed Forces in combat readiness." It concerned Konev directly.
"I was invited to a meeting of the Council of Elders in front of the election of the party's governing bodies," Ivan Stepanovich recalled. - When the discussion of my candidacy began, Stalin asked how I appreciate the activities of Mehlis, the head of the Glavpier, and what is my attitude towards him? I replied that I evaluate his activities negatively, because it leads the wrong line towards commander personnel. Straight, openly said that he was started on commanders and political workers black lists. It is unworthy. Stalin asked the second question, asked what kind of relationship with the Stern. Stern was the commander of the 1st eye. He answered that personal relationships are normal, and in the service - bad, since Comrade Stern would like to command the Far East, and I believe that his claims are unfounded. Interestingly, even such a detail did not slip away from Stalin. This is indicative. He knew well shots, knew the relationship. I found it necessary in the presence of everyone to ask such a question, I replied directly as Communist is supplied. "
A very characteristic episode. And for Stalin. And for Konev. Fort two characters collided. Stalin suggested that one of his commander is quite rigid, as they would say now, test. He had long watched a young committee that he would say in response? The complex relationships of the two Far Eastern commander, Stalin was already heard. After the deployment of "King" of the Far East of Blucher Stalin, Stalin divided powerful powers in the most remote garrison itself. But the events took shape so that the command was again needed to concentrate in one headquarters. Konev really answered straight. He and then, when fate will fad to the plate or to the draw, who could follow the disfavor of what was dependent on not only a career, but the life and life of loved ones will be responsible directly.
And in the face of Mehlis Konev gave a worst enemy for many years. Three years later, Ivan Stepanovich will say Stalin about the inexpediency of the presence of the Commissioners in the troops. Stalin was strange to hear from the former commissioner. Maybe therefore he not only heard him, but, in fact, followed by his advice.
After the war Chief Marshal Aviation A.E. Golovanov will tell Writer Felix Chuev. This story: "In the fall of 1942, in my presence in a conversation with the Verkhovna Konev, it was raised about the elimination of the Institute of Commissioners in the Red Army, motivating the fact that this institute is not needed now. The main thing that is now needed in the army, he argued, this is unity.
Why do I need a commissioner when I myself was! - spoke Konev. - I need an assistant, deputy for political work in the troops so that I am calm for this section of the work, and I myself can cope with the rest. The team composition proved its dedication to the Motherland and does not need additional control, and at the Commissioning Institute there is an element of distrust by our command staff.
Reasoning the commander of the front, his confident tone impressed Stalin, and he, as it often happened in such cases, began to find out the opinions on commissionerthe issue among the top command of the Red Army, especially listening to the opinion of the commanders of the armies, corps and divisions commanders. Most supported KONEV, and soon by the Politburo by the Institute of Commissioners in the army abolished, noting that he played a positive role in the initial period of war. "
It should be noted that by this time the Konev Commissioner has already become a commander Konedov, and the commander thinks several other categories, and everyday worries, duties and anxieties were already different. And when he pinned the 2nd special red-known army, when he was put into order in divisions and shelves, where the drunkenness often flourished, irreversible commander, theft, he, of course, first of all, was counting on the aid of commanders. Many commanders at this time were withdrawn from the army, or rather, arrested by the NKVD bodies were convicted as the enemies of the people as Japanese spies and saboteurs. At best, they languished in the camps, at worst - were shot.
In July 1938, the head of the Nachsove Support Department of the RKKA E.A. Schadenko prepared signed by Voroshilov addressed to the Military Council Councils of the district, the following content directive:
"In pursuant to the decision of the Chief Military Council about the purification of the army from the former White Guards, I propose:
1. By August 15 (CBF, RADO, Sibvo, Savo - by September 1), check the team, political and the beginning of the team, previously served in the White Army of Kolchak, Denikin and others and dismiss the RKKA's reserve of all active participants in the fight against Soviet power, former officers And who held the officers of military officials, nonber officers, as well as ordinary volunteers of the White Army.
The question of dismissal by the mobilization of ordinary in the White Arms, currently being a room, to allow for each personally, taking into account his work in the Red Army, political reliability and business qualities.
Persons who occupy posts before the battalion commander are inclusive and equal to them, dismiss the orders of military councils of districts under article 43 points "A" and "B".
... on the rest to submit lists in the control of the room.
2. At the same time, check all former SEROV, Mensheviks, Anarchists, Dashnakov, Missavatists, Borotbists and members of other anti-Soviet parties and persons who have not proven their active work The unconditional dedication of the Lenin-Stalin party and the socialist homeland, and dismiss in the pass, and to submit lists to the highest committee. "
However, this paper did not go into troops. Voroshilov project directive has not signed. On the title page Mark: "NKO has not signed. E. Schadenko. The new wave of repression would dare all the command of the Red Army. Investigators would pull out all: and the former worshiprs from the kitchen sons, and Feldofebel from the wealthy peasants.
Literally on the eve of the arrival of Konev in Khabarovsk in the Far East, a wave of repression on the so-called "Far Eastern Roshtrokist Spy Diversion and Pest Organization" rolled. The author of this grand tragedy was the NKVD Poland in the Far East of Lushkov. In all areas of the region, "participants" and "spies" were "revealed". Including among the military. Since Lushchkov had a special scent, going through the trail of the former White Guards, the last, real and imaginary, and all similar to them were cleaned under the broom. Including from the headquarters of military units, from divisions and regiments. Here are the figures that are calculated by the departmental exploits of the NKVD plenipotentiary in the Far East: from November 1937 to May 1938, 1867 people were fired; Arrested - 642 people. When Lushchkov fled to the Japanese, he called them other numbers: 1200 commanders and polymat workers were sent to prisons and camp and three thousand younger commanders. Apparently, I wanted to show myself to a Yary Fighter with Bolshevism and the USSR. According to researchers of repression in the Far East, over the years, "three or four times the leaders of all areas of regional control and regions were changed, including the NKVD authorities, were beheaded military establishment region. In June 1938, two more "Red Korean" arrived at the Far East: Lion Mehlis and Mikhail Frinovsky - "To clean the leadership of the Pacific Fleet, the border and local NKVD." The wave of repression again overwhelmed the edge. Increase the defense capacity of the troops, these shares, of course, did not contribute. And Konev was forced to silently observe how these stamped birds were batted above the fleet and ground troops, over the brunetners and military towns.
But he broke in Moscow, when Stalin himself asked about Mehlis. Let's try to assume that everything that was on the heart, with all his directness, Konev did not say. Perhaps he would say if Stalin went further. But then Stalin did not go. Apparently, he was enough that he heard. Or maybe he regretted the young Commor, who suddenly began to speak too frankly, what does he think about a person who Stalin immensely trusted? Remember, what ended the revelations for the commander of the Minsk Military District Commander of the 1st Rang Belov? I remembered horseback. And maybe Stalin understood it. To say who at that time had an exceptional authority in the country about "black lists," is to say a lot. Lytz rheel tails. The pride silent or piled a forest in camps. Konev was already forty. Not a young man, at youth, this statement is not wring. Perhaps he felt that the wings of the "Red Korshunov" are closed the sky already over his head? His biography and his track record seemed impeccable. But when such a person, like Lutchkov, was taken for the work ... At any time, the history of the first husband, Anna Efimovna, could be floating and her disappeared daughter, traces of which were lost or in Harbin, or in America. Yes, and he himself did not always leisure himself perfectly in terms of the relationship to the enemies of the party. In 1918 in Nikolsk, through his fingers looked at the activity of the old Zemstvo administration. And for which he was spared, did not finish Durov's peasants? Yes, the Guards Kirassir Regiment, which then appeared on Don ... Such as Lushchkov, everything turned out.
Stalin, by that time, he already noticed Konev and carefully followed his work in the troops, noting him professional growth. Donos came. And he reads them. And some immediately gave a move. But did not allow people from the NKVD to touch those who needed to him who were reliable, and first of all professionally. Stalin was a good breeder, and this will confirm the war.
After the congress, Konev returned to Khabarovsk. But soon he received from Moscow at the signature of the Meroshilov Defense Nickname package with the following prescription: Far East - a single theater of hostilities, therefore, it would be more reasonable to combine all the troops under the edge of the troops under the Unified Command; In this regard, the Far Eastern Military District is formed and its commander is appointed commander of the 2nd rank of Stern. And Koscor Konev was offered to take the position of commander of the Trans-Baikal Military District.
The main events of 1939 in the Far East were again Konev. The new short war with the Japanese, now on the Khalkhin-goal river, was more bloody. For the Soviet-Mongolian troops, she became a victorious. Stern headed front control, which coordinated their actions. And the 57th special building, the same, "Mongolian", Konevsky, which in the period of decisive battles was entrusted the main task, then the famous Comkor Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov was headed. The body has been reinforced by several small rifle divisions, artillery and tanks and became referred to as the 1st Army Group. Stern and Zhukov soon awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
It is generally recognized that the results of powerful attacks that experienced the Japanese army on Khalkhin-goal have greatly focused on the Government of Japan. After signing the nonsense of the nonsense between the USSR and Germany, a government crisis broke out in Japan. The Government of Hiranuma Kietyi Room resigned. Has the so-called "maritime party", which launched its armed forces towards Southeast Asia and islands Pacific Ocean. Stalin fisted. After all, it inevitably led Japan to a collision with the United States. The dynamics of the official relations of the USSR and Japan was as follows:
It should be noted that both sides observed the conditions of these agreements until the end of the summer of 1945. When in December 1941, the center of the Army Center "Center" stood at the gates of Moscow and frozen in her discovered fields, Hitler fiercely demanded from Japan to invade the USSR in the Far East. But the Japanese tanks and infantry divisions remained in the areas of concentration and did not move forward. The impressions received in May-August 1939 were strong. The Japanese people are impressionable.
December 7, 1941, literally in two days after the beginning of the counteroffensiveness of the Soviet troops near Moscow, the Japanese attacked the American sea base of Pearl Harbor and thereby engaged in the United States in the ranks of the main participants in World War II.
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From the book, General Margelov Author Masssels Oleg SergeevichChapter 35 A new commander of the rumor that instead of the broken head of Berger, a new army commander was appointed, quickly spread among the foles. They did not know who he was. Not French surname caused distrust. Dombrovsky appeared for the first time. He rushed there
From the book of the author From the book of the authorChapter 2 In the setting of special secrecy
In April, by the day, when Colonel-General Petrov was appointed Commander of the 2nd Belarusian Front, the total line of the Soviet-German front looked like this. In the south, the union of the Red Army was released on the border of Romania and have already aimed their blows to Bucharest. Their neighbors on the right discarded the Nazis from the Dnieper and approached the foothills of the Carpathians. In the north, completely freeing Leningrad from the blockade, our troops came out to the Church of Lake, Pskov and Novorzhev. Thus, there remained a huge ledge in the direction of Moscow between these flanks that advanced far to the West. He was called the "Belorussian Balcony". The front part of this arc was held along the cities of Vitebsk - Rogachev - Zhlobin and was not so far from Moscow.
Hitler's parts in this protrusion (it was the "Center" armies group, which included more than sixty divisions) Blocked the Soviet troops to the West. And besides, the fascist command, having a well-developed network of iron and highways there, could quickly maneuver and beat the flanks of our troops, coming south and north of this protrusion. From him, the opponent's aviation applied bomb strikes on Soviet groups in the north and in the south. Not excluded was the possibility of raids to Moscow.
At the same time, troops in this protrusion and themselves, thanks to this provision, were under the threat of our flank strikes from the south and from the north and, therefore, under the threat of an environment. But, in order to accommodate such a scale, we needed huge forces. Soviet troops had to defeat the North Army Group in the Baltic States, in Ukraine, the Army Group Northern Ukraine, and only after that it was possible to cover the center of the Center for the Army.
Hitler's command foresaw such a move of our actions. Field Marshal General The model headed by the Army Group Northern Ukraine, for example, categorically argued that the offensive of the Russians will begin through his left flank strike under the foundation of the Belorussian balcony. And the model is not too mistaken. This direction was really very profitable for us. With the liquidation of the "Belarusian balcony" soviet troops Would not only be destroyed by one of the largest groups of the "Center's army" and would be released by the long-suffering Belarus, which was three years old in the occupation, but also, freeding Poland, would have reached the shortest way to the border of fascist Germany and transferred martialctions on its territory.
That is why the Soviet Supreme Commander decided to implement the most complicated operation and began preparations for its implementation. One of the events of such training and was the disaggregation of the Western Front, which was discussed above, dividing it into the 2nd and 3rd Belarusian fronts, which led to the appointment of new commander and other responsible persons, the creation of front-line controls, regrouping of troops and other Significant transformations.
The representative of the General Staff for the entire work was appointed General S. M. Shtemenko. That's what he writes:
"... I left Moscow with my friend at the Academy Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky. By evening, on April 14, we arrived in the town of Red, where the western front team was located before. There I was already waiting for Ivan Efimovich Petrov. It was known in our armed forces as a thoughtful, cautious and highly human head with highly broad erudition and large military experience. His name was inextricably contacted with the heroic defense of Odessa and Sevastopol.
Unlike Petrova I. D. Chernyakhovsky then has not yet enjoyed wide popularity. But he perfectly established himself at the post of commander of the army, had a solid operational training, perfectly knew artillery and tank forces. There was a young (38 years old), energetic, demanding and all the soul was given to his harsh and hard case.
We immediately started work and for several days all organizational issues decided. The Office of the former Western Front turned entirely to Chernyakhovsky, and he left his KP in Krasnoye, and I. E. Petrov had to form a front-line apparatus to re-move to the Mstislavl region. "
I want to pay attention to last words In this quote. The reader already has an idea of \u200b\u200bthe complexity of work on the scale of the front and, I hope, without difficulty, it means to create a new front apparatus, that is, the headquarters of the front. This is a huge organization consisting of many departments and departments, which includes hundreds of officers, specialists in various sectors of military affairs. Create front headquarters are not easy at all, and in a short time, especially. It is even harder to organize and establish his work so that people who have recently located in other headquarters and parts engaged in other work, in a short time would begin to understand each other, mastered with a very new situation and would be able to lead military actions in such large scale which front requires.
In addition, all the work occurred during the battles, which of course did not stop and, even on the contrary, were kept with even greater activity so that the enemy did not notice the changes that took place in our rear.
Simultaneously with this great work and battles, a decision was made to carry out the Belarusian operation. Four fronts were to participate in this operation. It was developed as commander of the fronts and the General Staff under the constant leadership of the Supreme Commander's Rate.
General Shematko writes this:
"The development of a general operational plan, and then a plan of action in the 1944 summer campaign, was carried out at the General Staff based on the proposals of the front commander who knew the situation before the details."
Consequently, General Petrov at this time in very tense conditions also developed proposals on the operation of the operation of its front. The main reason for such tensions was the requirement to observe strictest secrecy. This is what S. M. Shtemenko speaks about this:
"In full, these plans knew only five people: Deputy Supreme Commander, Head of the General Staff and his first deputy, head of operational management and one of his deputies. All correspondence to this account, as well as negotiations on the phone or telegraph, are categorically prohibited, and the strictest control was carried out. Operational considerations of the fronts were also developed by two and three persons, they were usually written by hand and reportedly, as a rule, personally commander. "
As follows from the last phrase, the development of the operation of the 2nd Belarusian front was personally, General Petrov and his headquarters Lieutenant General S. I. Lubarsky. Member of the Military Council of this front Colonel-General L. Z. Mehlis, being dedicated to the general plan, still with specific developments that, as Shtemenko said, was written by the hand and reported personally commanders, "of course not engaged.
"In the second half of April," writes Shtemenko, "in the General Staff, all considerations about the summer campaign took place. It appeared in the form of the system of the largest operations in the history of operations on a huge space from the Baltic States to the Carpathians. At least 5-6 fronts should be attracted to active actions.
That part of the summer campaign that covered the liberation of Belarus was given - at the suggestion of Stalin - the name "Bagration". According to this plan, there was deep blows of four fronts to defeat the main forces of the Center for the Center for the Center, to release Belarus and create prerequisites for the subsequent attack in the Western regions of Ukraine, in the Baltic States, in East Prussia and in Poland. This intention was to do this way: the simultaneous breakthroughs of the enemy's defense in six sites to dismember its troops and destroy them in parts. At the same time, powerful groups of the 3rd and 1st Belarusian fronts, rapidly coming on the flanks, must fall in the area of \u200b\u200bMinsk, to surround and eliminate the enemy's troops, discarded here by our frontal blows.
So it looked in general terms the plan of operation "Bagration".
About the tragedy of the 2nd shock army of the Volkhov Front, which in the summer of 1942 was almost completely destroyed. Military Chekists conducted their own investigation into the causes of the tragedy of the "Army Vlasov".
In early January 1942, on the plan of the Supreme Command, the 2nd shock army was supposed to break through Leningrad's blockade. Until January 6, 1942, she had to navigate the fiery frontiers, and from January 7, 1942 to start hostilities for the breakthrough of the enemy's defense on the Volkhov River.
However, the special department informed the command of the Volkhov Front on serious shortcomings in the preparation of the offensive, on insufficient supply of nutrition, ammunition, fuel and lubricant materials of parts and compounds of the 2nd shock army. Also there was no sustainable and reliable communication between the headquarters of various levels. Let me remind you that to track the real state of affairs in the troops, at that time it was the most important task of Chekists. It is to track, and not affect. However, this was already written earlier / /. Despite the objections of counterintelligence, the command of the army stated that it could begin an offensive.
On January 7, parts and compounds of the 2nd shock army, not having connections with higher headquarters, began the scattered and inconsistent offensive. By 14 o'clock in the afternoon, military security officers in numerous reports from the places reported that the coming losses carry huge losses, and the attack itself "choked." The leadership of the Volkhov Front hurriedly arrived at the command post of the 2nd strike army and, making sure the veracity of the reports of military security officers, has canceled the offensive. That day the army lost 2118 military personnel killed. As soon it becomes clear - only 2118!
To the opinion of military checklists, the command of the Red Army was not always listened. This is a myth that "individuals" could be arrested and shoot any commander of the Red Army. Of course, they could apply weapons if someone from the servicemen would try to go to the side of the enemy, but then an investigation was carried out for each such fact. Few people know that according to the Statement of GKO "on the procedure for the arrest of military personnel" of August 11, 1941, even "... Red Army lashes and junior notes arrested in coordination with the military prosecutor of the division ...". Only in "the case of extreme necessity, special authorities can delay the persons of the middle and senior notas with the subsequent coordination of arrest with the command and the prosecutor's office."
If the military leader does not control the parts and connections entrusted to him, allowing criminal negligence in organizing their supply to ammunition, food, fuel and lubricant materials, etc., in fact partially or completely removed from the fulfillment of his duties, then military security officers could only report.
You need to consider another important fact. Employees of special departments that are directly on the advanced or at the headquarters of the division, could not be a complete picture of what is happening. They recorded only individual facts. Explain this on a simple scheme. A focused on an advanced security officer reported to his superiors that fighters do not receive hot food for several days and there is no ammunition enclosure. His colleague from the division headquarters reported to where it follows that the division commander instead of performing his job duties, the second day drinks alcohol and is going to shoot. Based on these facts, an employee of the special department of the army may apply for the removal of the division commander from office and replacing it on a combat-ready commander. At the same time, two facts will be presented to the command: a bad organization of the supply of division and self-government from commanding the commander of this compound.
The main weapon of military security officers in situations similar to the January occurrence of the 2nd strike army are reports and messages to their own guidelines, the command of the fronts and the leaders of the Poltorganans.
As a result, the 2nd impact army died, and military security officers conducted their own investigation into the causes of this tragedy. Within a few decades, the results of their investigation were classified. One of the reasons - the tragedy occurred due to the fault or criminal negligence, we will call things about their names, the command of the 2nd shock army. Of course, some of the guilt lies on the higher command.
"According to the agents, surveys of commanders and fighters of the 2nd shock army, who left the environment, and personal departure to the place during the hostilities of parts and compounds of the 2nd, 52nd and 59th armies: Surroundings of the 2nd shock Army consisting of 22, 23, 25, 53, 57, 59th Rifle Brigades and 19, 46, 92, 259, 267, 327, 282 and the 305th rifle divisions The enemy managed to produce only because of the criminal neglect of the front commander Lieutenant General Hozin, who did not provide the fulfillment of the Rate Directive on the timely disgust of the army troops from the Luban and the organization of combat operations in the area of \u200b\u200bSpasskaya Polysty.
Having entered into command to the front, Khosin from the D. Olkhovka and the Marsh of Gear Sopgia brought to the reserve of the Front 4, 24th and 378 rifle divisions.
The enemy, taking advantage of this, built a narrow-skinned railway in the forest. West of Spasskaya Polysty and unhindered began to accumulate troops to strike for communications 2nd [shock] army - meat boron - a new kerity (see Cards No. 1 and No. 2).
The command of the front defense of the 2nd [shock] army was not strengthened. The north and southern roads of the 2nd [shock] of the army were covered with the weak 65th and 372th [Christmas-tree] divisions, elongated in a line without sufficient fires on insufficiently prepared defensive borders.
The 372th Page [church] Division with a combat composition of 2796 people by this time occupied a plot of defense after 12 km from the village of Mostki to Ot. 39.0, which is 2 km north of narrow-rescue gear [weezing] road.
The 65th Red Banner Page [Glush] Division with a combat composition of 3708 people held a plot of defense with a stretch of 14 km from the corner of the South Forest angle of Muk [Omol] plant to Sarah, 1 km from the village of Croich.
The Commander of the 59th Army, Major Major Corovnikov, has approved the unparalleled scheme of defensive structures of the division, presented by the commander of the 372nd Rifle Division by Colonel Sorokin, did not check her defense.
As a result of this, from the 3rd regiment of the same division of the 3rd regiment of the same division, 11 Zets 7 were unsuitable.
The commander of the head of Hozin, Head of the headquarters of the Front, Major General Stelmakh, knew that the enemy against this division focuses the troops and that they would not provide the defense of the Communications of the 2nd strike army, the measures to strengthen the defense of these sites did not take, having at their disposal reserves.
On May 30, the opponent after artillery, aviation preparation with the help of tanks led the offensive on the right flank of the 311st regiment of the 65th Rifle Division.
The 2nd, 7th and 8th companies of this shelf, losing 100 fighters and four tanks, retreated.
To restore the position, the company of car guns was thrown out, which underlined losses, moved away.
The Military Council of the 52nd Army threw the last reserves to the battle - the 54th Guards Rifle Regiment with a replenishment of 370 people. The replenishment was introduced into battle with the go, unconditioned, with the first contact with the enemy, was blocked and was stopped by ceremonies of special departments.
The Germans, sweating the part of the 65th division, came close to the village of Teremets-Kurlyandsky and the left flank was cut off the 305th rifle division.
At the same time, the enemy, coming on the plot of the 1236th [Rifle] regiment of the 372th rifle division, breaking the weak defense, dismembered the second echelon of the 191st Rifle Division, went to the narrow-chain railway in the area of \u200b\u200bOt. 40.5 and connected with parts coming from the south.
The commander of the 191st [Rifle] division has repeatedly set the question to the commander of the 59th Army by Major Major Korovnikov, about the need and appropriateness of the conclusion of the 191st Rifle Division to meat Bor in order to create a solid defense on the North Road.
Corovnikov did not accept measures, and the 191st [Rifle] division, inactive and not removing defensive structures, remained standing in the swamp.
The commander of the front of Hozin and the commander of the 59th Army of Corovnikov, being aware of the concentration of the enemy, nevertheless believed that the defense of the 372th division was broken by a small group of automatic gunners, so the reserves were not introduced into battle, which would have given an opportunity to enemy to cut off the 2nd shock army.
Only June 1, 1942 was introduced into battle without artillery support of the 165th Infantry Division, which, having lost 50% of fighters and commanders, the provisions did not regulate.
Instead of organizing the combat, Hozin Division from the battle brought and transferred to another site, replacing it with the 374th rifle division, which at the time of shift parts of the 165th SD moved a few times.
The existing forces were not introduced in a timely manner into battle, on the contrary, Khosin suspended the offensive and began to move the divisions commanders: he removed the commander of the 165th rifle division of Colonel Solenov, prescribed Colonel Morozov's division commander, freaking him from the post of commander of the 58th Rifle Brigade.
Instead of the commander of the 58th [rifle] brigade, the commander of the 1st Rifle Battalion Major Gusak was appointed.
The headquarters of the division Major Nazarov was also removed, and Major Jüb was appointed to his place, at the same time the Commissioner of the 165th [rifle] division of the Senior Batalion Commissioner Ilish was removed.
In the 372nd Rifle Division, the division commander was removed Colonel Sorokin, and Colonel Sinorubko was appointed in his place.
The regrouping of troops and the replacement of the commanders was delayed until June 10. During this time, the enemy managed to create jots, strengthen the defense.
The 2nd strike army at the time of the environment of the enemy found himself in an extremely difficult situation, in divisions there were two to three thousand fighters, depleted due to malnutrition and overwhelmed continuous battles.
From 12 to 18 June 1942, the fighters and commanders were issued at 400 g of horseradish and 100 g of superstars, in the following days they were issued from 10 g to 50 g of superstars, the fighters of the products did not receive at all, which increased the number of exhausted fighters and there were cases mortality from hunger.
Deputy. nach The political waste of the 46th division of the teeth was detained by the fighter of the 57th Rifle Brigade of Athenogenov, who cut out a piece of meat from the corpse of the killed red-Armenian. Being detained, the Athenogen on the way died of exhaustion.
Food and ammunition in the army came out, bringing them to air because of the white nights and the loss of the landing site in the village of Fine mead, essentially was impossible. The ammunition and food in the army converted by airplanes due to the negligence of the head of the rear of the army of the colonel Kissing were not fully collected.
The position of the 2nd shock army is extremely complicated after a breakthrough of the opponent of the defense line of the 327th division in the Finemal Luga area.
Command of the 2nd Army - Lieutenant-General Vlasov and Division Commander Major Major Antuel - did not organize the defense of the swamps west of the meader, which took advantage of the enemy, going to the flank of the Division.
The retreat of the 327th division led to a panic that the army commander, the Lieutenant-Lieutenant Muslimist, did not accept the decisive measures to delay the enemy, who had advanced to the new Kezest, and subjected to the artillery shelling of the rear of the army, cut off from the main forces of the Army 19th [Guards] and 305 "Rowed divisions."
[B] Alternatively, the provisions [and] [found] and part of the 92nd division, where the blow from Olkhovka by two infantry shelves with 20 tanks, the Germans, with the support of aviation, mastered the frontiers occupied by this division.
The commander of the 92nd Rifle Division Colonel of the tenants showed confusion and at the very beginning of the battle for Olkhovka lost control.
The departure of our troops along the river line the Kerage significantly worsened all the position of the army. The enemy artillery by this time began to shoot the whole depth of the 2nd Army.
The ring around the army closed. The enemy, forcing the Keresta River, went to the flank, wedged into our combat order and led the offensive at the Army KP in the wood level area.
The command clause of the army turned out to be unprotected, the company of a special department was introduced into battle, in the composition of 150 people, who pushed the enemy and led the battle with him during the day - 23 [June] S.G.
The Military Council and the headquarters of the army were forced to change the place of deployment, destroying the means of communication and, in essence, having lost control of the troops.
Commander of the 2nd Army of Vlasov, Chief of Staff of Vinogradov showed confusion, did not lead the battle, and later lost all controls of the troops.
It was used by the enemy who had freely penetrated the rear of our troops and suggested panic.
June 24 S.G. Vlasov decides to bring the headquarters of the army and the rear institutions by capital order. The entire column was a peaceful crowd with disorderly movement, demasked and noise [nuy].
The opponent running the column subjected to artillery and mortar shelling. The Military Council of the 2nd Army with a group of commanders of the failed and from the environment did not come out. Commanders sent to the exit, safely arrived at the location of the 59th Army.
Only in two days (22 and 23 June, this year) came out of the 7,018 people, of which 7,000 were wounded.
The subsequent way out of the entourage of the opponent of military personnel of the 2nd Army passed by separate small groups.
It has been established that Vlasov, Vinogradov, and DR [Out] Guidelines, the headquarters of the army in a panic fled, from the leadership of combat operations did not speak and the place of their location was not declared.
The Military Council of the Army, [in particular] in the face of Zuev and Lebedev, showed the most grateful and not presets of the panic actions of Vlasov and Vinogradov, broke away from them, it strengthened the diverge to the troops.
From the head of the Special Department of the Major Army state security Shashkov did not take timely decisive measures to guide the order and the prevention of betrayal at the very headquarters of the army.
On June 2, 1942, in the most busy combat period, he changed his homeland - moved to the side of the enemy with [cipher] oval documents - Pom. nach The 8th Army Staff Department of the 2nd Range Malyuk Semen Ivanovich, who issued the enemy the location of the 2nd shock army and the place of deployment of the KP army. (I attach a leaflet).
On the part of individual unstable servicemen, there are cases of voluntary passing by the enemy.
On July 10, 1942, the agents of the German intelligence of Nabokov and Kadyrov showed us: when interrogations of the prisoners of the 2nd shock army interrogations in German speakers [and the) authorities were present: Commander of the 25th Rifle Brigade Colonel Sheludko, Pom. nach The operas of the army department Major Verstkin, the intensity of the 1st grade Zhukovsky, deputy. The commander of the 2nd [shock] army on ABTV Colonel Goryunov Comrivers Common, who betrayed the command-political composition of the army by the German authorities.
Having joined the command of the Volkhov Front, the general army general. Meretskov led the group of troops of the 59th army to connect with the parts of the 2nd shock army.
From June 21 to June 22 of this year. Parts of the 59th Army broke through the defense of the enemy in the area of \u200b\u200bthe meat boron and formed a corridor with a width of 800 m.
To hold the corridor, the part of the army turned on the front to the south and north, the combat sections were taken along the narrow-chain railway.
By the time the ports of the 59th Army, the Polysty River found out that the command of the 2nd [shock] army in the face of the headquarters of Vinogradov disinforced the front and the defensive rules on the West Bank did not occupy the river.
Thus, the elbow bond between the armies did not occur.
In the generated corridor on June 22, for parts of the 2nd [shock], the army was delivered a significant amount of food, people and horses.
The command of the 2nd [shock] army, organizing the output of parts from the environment, did not expect to exit the battle, did not take measures to strengthen and expand the main communication at the Spassk Polysty and did not keep the gate.
By virtue of almost continuous aviation raids of the enemy and the shelling of ground troops on a narrow section of the front, the exit for parts of the 2nd [shock] army became difficult.
The confusion and loss of control of the fight on the part of the command of the 2nd [shock] of the army finally aggravated by the situation.
The opponent took advantage of this and the corridor closed.
Subsequently, the commander of the 2nd [shock] army, Lieutenant-Lieutenant Vlasov finally confused, the headquarters of the Army General of the Major Vinogradov took the initiative to his hands.
The last plan was kept secret and did not talk about it. Vlasov was indifferent to this.
As Vinogradov, and the surroundings from the environment did not come out. According to the head of the 2nd strike army of Major-Major Afanasyev, delivered on July 11, on the aircraft U-2 from the opponent's rear, they were headed by the forest in the Oredige region towards Staraya Russa.
The location of members of the Military Council Zuev and Lebedev is unknown.
Nach O [Kompaniya] O [TDDEE] NKVD 2nd [Shock] Army Major State Safety Shashkov, being injured, shot himself.
We continue the search for the military council of the 2nd shock army by raising the agent in the rear of the opponent and partisan detachments. "
What reaction will be the country's leadership after reading such a document?
The answer is obvious.
"…one. Krasnoarmeys and Junior notes are arrested in coordination with the military prosecutor of the division.
2. Arrests of persons of the Middle Nachsostav are made in coordination with the command of the Division and the Division Prosecutor.
3. Arrests of the senior persons are made in coordination with the military council of the army (Military District).
4. The order of arrest of persons of the highest natch service remains the same (with NPO sanctions). "
And only in "the case of extreme necessity, special authorities can delay the persons of the Middle and Senior Nachsostav with the subsequent coordination of arrest with the command and the prosecutor's office" [**].
Quotes for "" Death Spies! " Military counterintelligence of Sverdley during the Great Patriotic War "