Literature:
A. F. Belogolovtsev Lenizdat. 1970
Compiled by K. K. Grishchinsky. Lenizdat, 1977
Viktor Averin. Moscow. 1971
"NEVSKY PIELT" - a memorial complex as part of the "Green Belt of Glory", on the 51st km of the Leningrad-Petrokrepost highway, on the left bank of the river. Neva, below Mt. Includes: an obelisk on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers who fell in 1941-43 while defending the Nevsky bridgehead near Moscow Dubrovka (1952, architect A. I. Lapirov, sculptor G. P. Yakimova); a T-34 tank and an artillery piece mounted on pedestals and the “Frontier Stone” monument marking the southern border of the bridgehead (1971, bronze, granite, architects M. L. Khidekel, O. S. Romanov, sculptor E. Kh. Nasibulin); a memorial complex on the site of the village of Arbuzov destroyed by the Nazis (1985, architects M. L. Khidekel, O. S. Romanov). The remains of trenches and traces of funnels have been preserved in the area of the memorial.
Saint Petersburg. Petrograd. Leningrad: Encyclopedic reference book. 1992
NEVSKY BRIDGE HAND(Nevsky "piglet"), a bridgehead on the left bank of the Neva (in the area of \u200b\u200bMoscow Dubrovka), which the troops held for almost the entire time.
During the Sinyavino operation of 1941, on the night of September 20, formations of the Leningrad Front crossed the Neva in the area of Neva Dubrovka (the right bank of the Neva; now an urban-type settlement) and captured a bridgehead 4 km along the front and up to 800 m in depth.
The first to cross the river were units of the 115th rifle division(Major General V.F. Konkov) and the 4th Marine Brigade (Major General B.N. Nenashev). As a result of repeated attacks, the enemy managed to reduce the bridgehead to 2 km along the front. The fierce struggle for this bridgehead continued uninterrupted for almost 7.5 months. The defenders of the N. p. repulsed 12–16 enemy attacks a day, and up to 50,000 shells, mines, and air bombs fell on them per day. On April 29, 1942, after several days of fierce fighting, the Nazi troops liquidated the bridgehead. However, on September 26, the troops of the Neva Operational Group again captured the N. p. During the breakthrough in January 1943, the 45th Guards Rifle Division (Major General A. A. Krasnov) advanced from the bridgehead. For about 400 days, Soviet soldiers held the N. p. The Guards of the Leningrad Front were born here - the 70th Rifle Division was the first in the front and was transformed into the 45th Guards. One of the companies (captain N.A. Britikov) of the 329th regiment of this division entered the history of the defense of Leningrad as an order-bearing company - all 114 people of its personnel were awarded orders and medals. In memory of the heroic defense of N. p. in post-war years in Dubrovka, the Museum of Military and Labor Glory was created, on the site of the bridgehead - the memorial "Nevsky Piglet".
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Monument "Frontier stone". Photo - May, 2012 The monument is a cast-iron and granite cubes cut into each other and raised by 7 meters. The text on the monument: “You, the living, know that we did not want to leave this land and did not leave. We stood to death by the dark Neva. We died so that you may live." |
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from the book - Sights of the Leningrad region. Lenizdat. 1977. Pg. 262, 268-270
The Great Patriotic War
On the outskirts of Leningrad
In the autumn of 1941, the command of the Leningrad Front took a number of measures to break through the enemy encirclement. In the second half of September, several landings were made on the Neva and the coast of Lake Ladoga.
For the transfer of our troops to the Neva Dubrovka on the right bank of the river, several hundred boats were delivered from Leningrad. Primary funds were concentrated in a ravine near the village. On the night of September 20, 1941, the battalion of the 115th Infantry Division of General V.F. Konkov began crossing to the left bank near Moscow Dubrovka. The battalion was commanded by Senior Lieutenant V.P. Dubik.
Soviet soldiers captured a small foothold on the left bank - about two kilometers long and several hundred meters deep. It was very important: the road to Sinyavino and Mga went from here.
Following the soldiers of the 125th Infantry Division, the Neva was crossed by the sailors of the 4th Marine Brigade, Major General B.N. Nenasheva.
This is how the legendary Nevsky Piglet arose.
fiery frontiers
By the end of September 1941, the front line near Leningrad had stabilized. To the west of Leningrad, immediately behind the Ligovo station, it rested on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland and from here through Ligovo went south, to the village of Staro-Panovo, passed one kilometer south of the village of Pulkovo, crossing the Kiev highway, stretched along the left bank of the Kuzminka River. To the north of the city of Pushkin and the village of Yam-Izhora was its southernmost section. From here the front line rose to the north, to the mouth of the Tosna River. Then she walked along the right bank of the Neva - to the Neva Dubrovka and opposite this village went to the left bank of the Neva, where from the end of September 1941 to April 1942, and then from the fall of 1942 until January 1943 there was a small bridgehead of our troops - Nevsky "piglet". Finally, from the "piglet" to Ladoga, the Soviet troops and enemy troops were again separated by the Neva.
The Soviet units that fought on the Nevsky "patch", the 54th army, making its way to the Neva from the direction of the Volkhov, threatened to encircle the fascist group that had come out to Ladoga. The wars of the 115th Rifle Division and the 4th Marine Brigade fought fierce battles for the expansion of the Nevsky bridgehead. Because of these battles, the fascist command was forced to delay the transfer of a motorized and two tank divisions to Moscow.
The defenders of the Nevsky "piglet" had to rush into attacks and counterattacks several times a day, a continuous flurry of enemy mines and shells fell upon them.
Especially fierce battles flared up here after the Nazis captured on November 8, 1941, approached Volkhovstroy and there was a threat of their exit to the rear of the 54th Army. From here, from the Nevsky bridgehead, the Soviet soldiers sought to break through to join the 54th Army.
Soldiers and commanders of the 86th, 20th, 168th, 10th and 177th rifle divisions fought courageously. In November 1941, three shock regiments were created from volunteers on the Nevsky "patch". On November 9, the first of these regiments attacked heavily fortified enemy positions. On November 11, the second regiment attacked, and on November 13, the third. But, despite the fearlessness and heroism of the soldiers of the shock regiments, it was not possible to break through the enemy defenses.
After most of the troops were evacuated from the "piglet" in the winter of 1942, one 330th rifle regiment of the 86th division remained there.
At the end of April 1942. when ice went down the Neva and the transfer of reinforcements, ammunition and food to the "patch" became impossible, the fascist troops moved here significantly superior forces. supported by artillery.
357 fighters of the 330th regiment for five days in unequal battle courageously defended the Nevsky Piglet. The last radio message from them was received on April 29: they reported that they would fight to the end.
At the cost of heavy losses, the Nazis managed to occupy this piece of Soviet land. The defenders of the Nevsky Piglet died like heroes.
In the fall of 1942, Soviet troops resumed hostilities in the area of Nevskaya Dubrovka. On September 26, 1942, after artillery preparation and a bombing attack by several companies, the 86th and 70th divisions melted to the left bank and held the captured positions in heavy fighting. In the evening, the crossing of new units began. Fierce bloody battles on the Nevsky "patch" resumed, but no attempts by the Nazis to restore the situation reached their goal. Piglet was held by Soviet troops until the January offensive Soviet army in 1943.
In 1952, an obelisk was erected on the mass grave of Soviet war heroes who defended the Nevsky Piglet. And in September 1971, on southern border of the former Nevsky bridgehead, a monument was erected to its legendary defenders. It was called the "Boundary Stone" ...
The legendary Nevsky Piglet. Opening of the monument "Frontier Stone" on the southern border of the bridgehead.
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from book -V. Arkadiev. Kirovsk. Cities of the Leningrad region. 1974
"Land of Fearlessness"
Having been defeated in frontal attacks on Leningrad, the Nazi troops decided to surround the city. More and more new divisions were thrown by the Nazis on Leningrad. On September 8, after fierce fighting, they captured Shlisselburg, cutting off all land communications linking Leningrad with the country.
Having gained a foothold on the left bank, the Nazis repeatedly tried to cross the Neva in order to further move north and join the Finnish troops. They have already made such attempts in the sections of Porogi - Sheremetyevka, at the mouth of the Mga, in the area of the village of Maryino - workers' settlement No. 1, but every time they met with a rebuff.
In mid-September, a directive was received from the headquarters of the Leningrad Front: the 115th Infantry Division, reinforced by the 4th Marine Brigade, would prepare to cross the Neva and advance towards Mga to join units of the Volkhov Front.
Nevsky bridgehead in November 1941
The crossing was planned to be carried out in the area of Arbuzovo - Moskovsky Dubrovka - 8th GRES. The choice of location was not accidental. Here is a relatively narrow part of the Neva - 500 meters; it is on this section that the shortest distance - 16 kilometers - to the Soviet units of the Volkhov Front.
The reconnaissance of the left bank was carefully carried out, the location of enemy firing points was revealed, and means of crossing were prepared. In a few days, about 200 fishing boats were prepared, 100 boats were delivered from Leningrad. They were hidden in ravines and hollows, in the valley of the Chernaya River. In the depths of the forest, pontoons prepared rafts and pontoons from durable logs for crossing guns. In early September, units of the 115th Infantry Division arrived in Nevskaya Dubrovka and took refuge in the coastal forest. To ensure the secrecy and surprise of the operation, the command decided to cross the Neva without prior artillery preparation.
1942
Finally, everything is ready for the crossing. The paratroopers are tasked with recapturing a section of the coast on the left bank, gaining a foothold on it, and holding it at all costs until new reinforcements arrive.
The purpose of this operation was not only to prevent enemy attempts to cross the Neva, but also to divert enemy troops from the impending assault on Leningrad. In addition, it was planned to launch an offensive from this bridgehead to join forces advancing towards Leningrad from Volkhov.
The section of the left bank was defended by an airborne and several infantry divisions of the enemy. The Nazis thoroughly fortified the high bank: they installed machine guns in trenches along the Neva, placed mortar batteries in the forest, and artillery behind the edge of the forest. The Nazis turned the 8th GRES with its one and a half meter walls into a reinforced concrete fortress.
On the night of September 18-19, the crossing began. The signalmen and sappers of the 638th regiment of the 115th rifle division, the 576th regiment and the battalion of the 4th Marine Brigade under the general command of Colonel A.E. Kalashnikov were the first to cross the Neva.
Acting covertly and swiftly, the troops landed on the left bank. They fought and occupied the first lines of trenches; entered into hand-to-hand combat, expanded the captured bridgehead. Soon other units of the 115th Infantry Division came to the aid of the paratroopers. They were already crossing under heavy artillery and mortar fire.
On October 6, the main forces crossed the Neva - two regiments of the 115th Infantry Division and firmly entrenched themselves on the Nevsky "patch".
At this time, the 54th Army of General I. I. Fedyuninsky launched offensive battles from the Volkhov side, trying to connect with the paratroopers of the Nevsky bridgehead.
The Nazis saw this as a threat to the encirclement of their troops, breaking through to Lake Ladoga near Shlisselburg. Therefore, they sought to return the "piglet". The Nazis threw more and more units against the paratroopers, brought tanks into battle. aircraft, brought down hundreds of mines and shells on a section of the left bank. But the infantrymen and sailors courageously repulsed the attacks of the enemy.
The village of Arbuzovo, located three kilometers south of the 8th GRES, changed hands several times. Our fighters nevertheless managed to capture this strong defense center, from where the Germans fired on a vast bridgehead up to two kilometers wide and 500-600 meters deep. Parts of the 86th and 265th rifle divisions of the NKVD crossed here.
On October 20, the troops of the Leningrad Front began fighting to break the blockade of Leningrad. The military council of the front set the task of encircling and destroying the grouping of enemy forces in the area south of Lake Ladoga.
Under enemy fire, the hero of the Nevsky Piglet went on the offensive in order to unite with the troops of the 54th Army, but they failed to achieve success.
In mid-October, the Nazis launched an offensive in the Tikhvin region, trying to break through to the Svir River to connect with the Finnish units and thereby finally close the blockade ring around Leningrad, deprive it of communication with the country through Lake Ladoga. Several divisions operating on the Neva were transferred to the Tikhvin direction. The scale of military operations in the area of the Nevsky Piglet has been reduced.
On November 3, the command of the Leningrad Front, in order to divert the Nazi troops from Tikhvin, launched a new offensive from the Nevsky bridgehead and the Volkhov direction.
The 20th division of the NKVD held out on the Nevsky "patch" for about a month. In continuous battles, the division was drained of blood, 300 people remained in it.
On November 2-3, a new replenishment arrived at the "piglet" - the 168th division under the command of Lieutenant Colonel A. L. Bondarev. The fighters of this division already had experience in fighting on the Karelian Isthmus, as well as in the area of Pavlovsk and Yam-Izhora.
The headquarters of the 168th division conducted a deep reconnaissance. Artillery was concentrated on the right bank of the Neva, it was well camouflaged and fired at previously reconnoitered targets. An underwater cable was thrown across the Neva, a conditional signaling was installed. After a short preparation, the Bondarevites went on the offensive.
The soldiers on the Nevsky "patch" overcame incredible difficulties. The fighters did not have the opportunity to warm up, rarely received hot food. They could not dig deep into the ground - the sandy soil crumbled. It happened that everything that was done during the night - trenches, communications, the next day was destroyed by mortar fire and air strikes.
Sand got into the eyes, ears, the barrels of rifles were clogged with sand, and they failed. Rescued grenades, light mortars. And yet, the fighters and commanders steadfastly held on to the "patch", showing courage and perseverance.
The fascists made great efforts to destroy the bridgehead - they threw tanks, dozens of dive bombers into battle, and fired fiercely from cannons and mortars. But not once did the enemy manage to break through the defenses of the defenders of the Piglet.
The most difficult sections were the communists. In the forefront of the advancing fighters of the 260th regiment was the secretary of the party bureau, senior political instructor A. A. Sergeev. An advanced foundry worker, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, he was one of the founders of the Stakhanov movement. During the attack Sergeyev died a heroic death.
His place was taken by political instructor Dmitriev, who, together with the regiment commander, senior political instructor Guskov, led the fighters on the offensive. When in one of the battalions of the regiment the commander, commissar and chief of staff were killed at once, they were replaced by Dmitriev.
On November 9, 1941, the 1st shock communist regiment under the command of Colonel Vasiliev crossed the Neva. An hour after the landing, the regiment went on the offensive. On the night of November 10-11, the 2nd regiment crossed to the left bank, and the 3rd regiment a day later. The Leningrad communists showed exceptional heroism in battles. Later, all three communist shock regiments merged into the 168th division.
All the units that fought on the Nevsky "patch" diverted significant enemy forces, which at that time rushed to Moscow and developed an offensive in the Tikhvin region.
The historic victories of the Soviet troops near Moscow and Tikhvin frustrated these plans of the enemy. The Nazis could no longer fight in the winter of 1941/42 to join the Finnish troops. The road of life passing through the ice of Ladoga was saved. And this is a considerable merit of the heroes of the Nevsky "piglet".
A piece of land two kilometers from the 8th GRES played the role of an armor shield for Leningrad.
In April 1942, the Soviet command began a gradual withdrawal of troops across the Neva. Every night our troops silently crossed back, unnoticed by the enemy. Only a part of the 330th regiment of the 86th rifle division remained on the "patch" - 357 fighters.
The last fierce battles on the "patch" were fought from 25 to 27 April. In three days, the defenders of the Nevsky bridgehead destroyed more than 1,500 enemy soldiers and officers.
On April 28, 1942, the last shots were fired. stopped combat life Nevsky "piglet", where since September 1941 six divisions of the enemy were ground.
Literature
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NEVSKY "PITTLE" Alexei Fedorovich Belogolovtsev Lenizdat. 1970 Land of fearlessness - Nevsky "piglet", An asphalt highway stretches like a wide ribbon along the left bank of the Neva from Leningrad to Petrokrepost. It passes through Ivanovskoye, Ust-Tosno and Moscow Dubrovka, through the city of Kirovsk, the village of Maryino and Petrokrepost (former Shlisselburg). Quiet streets, gardens, front gardens... Great Patriotic War there were bloody battles. 40 kilometers from Leningrad, in the area of Moscow Dubrovka, the highway crosses a small field. Here stands a granite obelisk. On its plinth is a cast-iron plate with the inscription: Here From here, a little more than a kilometer to the reinforced concrete building of the 8th hydroelectric power station. It stands higher along the Neva on a steep bank. The ruins of this station from September 1941 to January 1943 were silent witnesses of the fierce battles against the Nazi invaders that took place here.
Left bank of the Neva There is not a person in Leningrad who survived the blockade, who would not have heard about a piece of land, called at one time the Nevsky "piglet". This "patch" was recaptured in September 1941 on the left bank of the Neva, occupied by fascist troops, in the area of Moscow Dubrovka ... |
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Nevsky Piglet Memoirs of participants in the battles near Neva Dubrovka in 1941-1943 Compiled by Konstantin Konstantinovich Grishinsky Lenizdat, 1977 A small piece of land recaptured from the enemy on the left bank of the Neva, opposite the Neva Dubrovka, was a true bastion of the battle for Leningrad, played an important role in breaking the blockade and defeating the Nazi group south of Lake Ladoga. The defenders of Nevsky Piglet showed an example of the greatest stamina and legendary courage. The book, compiled from the memoirs of the participants in the battles - the soldiers of the Neva Operational Group and the 8th Army of the Leningrad Front, is of interest not only to veterans, but also to young readers interested in the history of the Great Patriotic War. Courage tested by ironSeptember 1941. Heavy fighting unfolded near Leningrad. The fascist German command, despite the huge losses of its troops, the heroic resistance of the soldiers of the Leningrad Front, took all measures to capture the city on the Neva. The front line was getting closer and closer to Leningrad. After the Nazi troops bypassed the Krasnogvardeisky fortified area, fighting began already at the turn of Gorelovo - Finnish Koyrovo - the village of Volodarsky. These were anxious days.It was at this critical moment that the Headquarters sent a group of generals to the besieged city, headed by the Deputy Supreme Commander General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, who on September 13 took command of the front. Even before the arrival of G.K. Zhukov in Leningrad, a group of Nazi troops advancing from Novgorod and Chudov cut off both railways connecting Leningrad with Moscow. The enemy went to the Neva in the area from the Ivanovsky rapids to Shlisselburg. The new commander, together with the Military Council of the front, took decisive measures to prevent the danger of the enemy breaking through to Leningrad. 42nd Army, reinforced by the 5th Division militia, the 10th Rifle Division and the 701st Rifle Regiment of the 142nd Rifle Division, received the strictest order - to prevent the invasion of Nazi troops into the city through the Pulkovo Heights and Gorelovo (the command of the 42nd Army was entrusted to the author of these lines). At the beginning of the second decade of September, the battle at the Pulkovo Heights reached a great intensity. On September 17, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front sent a combat order to the Military Councils of the 42nd and 55th armies - to stop the enemy at all costs! His main thought: not a step back! Do not rent a single inch of land on the nearest approaches to the city of Lenin. At the beginning of the third decade of September, a turning point occurred in the course of hostilities. The enemy went on the defensive, began building long-term fortifications, and began to burrow into the ground. The 41st German tank corps was withdrawn from Leningrad. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to use the favorable moment to try to unblock Leningrad with strikes from the east - by the forces of the newly formed 54th Army and from the west - by the forces of the Neva Operational Group of the Leningrad Front. The 115th Rifle Division, already advanced here, and units of the 4th Separate Marine Brigade, which were on the way, were supposed to force the Neva in the area of \u200b\u200bNevsky Dubrovka. As you know, the Shlisselburg-Sinyavino ledge, which was formed as a result of the breakthrough of the Nazi troops to Ladoga, in the place where our counter actions were planned, was rather narrow - only 12-13 kilometers. Having crossed the Neva on the night of September 19-20, units of the 115th division under the command of Major General V.F. Konkov captured a bridgehead on the left bank and launched a series of decisive attacks ... |
Links
- seven days of January. Breaking the blockade of Leningrad on January 12-18, 1943. Lenizdat, 1987
- - Encyclopedia
Nevsky Piglet - the conventional name of the bridgehead on the left (eastern) bank of the Neva opposite the Neva Dubrovka, captured and held by the Soviet troops of the Leningrad Front from 09/19/1941 to 04/29/1942 and from 09/26/1942 to 02/17/1943 during the defense of Leningrad.
From this bridgehead, Soviet troops repeatedly tried to launch an offensive on Mga and Sinyavino towards the troops that attacked from the east and thereby break the blockade of Leningrad. All attempts to expand the bridgehead and develop the offensive ended in failure.
The obvious military-tactical futility of holding the Nevsky Piglet and huge losses in manpower did not force the Soviet military leadership to abandon such a bloody defense, since this bridgehead had a symbolic meaning for the command as the fact of the presence of Soviet troops on the eastern coast occupied by German troops. Traditionally, little was considered with the losses of their soldiers in the Red Army, and such a mind-boggling figure - 250,000 dead Soviet troops on an area of \u200b\u200babout 2 square kilometers in 11 and a half months, apparently did not impress the front command and the Headquarters of the supreme command.
The bridgehead Nevsky "piglet" was located on the left bank of the Neva in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Dubrovka, approximately 12 kilometers downstream from Lake Ladoga. In this place, the Neva forms a bend and has a width of only 270-350 m and rather gentle banks. Directly opposite the Nevsky "piglet" was a difficult terrain with numerous quarries, covered with shrubs and forests.
The features of the terrain in the bridgehead area most directly influenced the course of hostilities. On the one hand, the presence of the railway line Petrokrepost - Nevskaya Dubrovka on the right bank of the Neva and the relatively small width of the river in the Dubrovka region allowed the Soviet command to quickly deliver reinforcements to this area and transport them to the left bank. On the other hand, due to the bend of the Neva, the enemy could fire from strong points on the territory of the Nevsky "patch" and the crossings across the Neva from all sides. Every day, up to 50,000 shells, mines and air bombs fell on the defenders of the Piglet. Losses of rifle units reached 95% of the original strength. Moreover, most of the total losses were irretrievable losses, since the evacuation of the wounded to the right bank was difficult. The crossing from one bank to the other until mid-November was carried out mainly at night, and after the formation of a strong ice cover on the Neva, at dusk or even during the day, since at night there was a very high risk of falling into a polynya and drowning.
In addition, exceptionally severe weather conditions (in November-December frosts reached -25 °), the lack of equipped dugouts and dugouts, and problems with providing soldiers in the bridgehead with food contributed to an increase in the number of various diseases, which increased the already large losses.
The dead, with very rare exceptions, were buried right on the bridgehead in funnels and trenches. Some were buried twice and thrice - explosions of shells and mines raised the remains from the graves, and then the corpses were again covered with earth.
Yu. R. Poresh, veteran of the 115th Infantry Division, participant in the battles on the Nevsky Piglet in November 1941: “By the time of the landing of our company, all the trenches, communication passages were clogged with frozen corpses. They lay on the entire area of \u200b\u200bthe patch, where they were overtaken by a bullet or shrapnel. It is difficult to remember this, but it was so: the shelter in which my two comrades and I happened to be accommodated was blocked by stiffened corpses instead of rolling, the walls were partially lined with corpses, loopholes for firing were equipped between the corpses laid along the trenches instead of parapets. The entire square of the patch was a cemetery of unburied soldiers and officers. Not a single tree or bush, not a single brick on brick - everything was blown away by fire ... All this against the background of the constant roar of our and German cannonade, the specific smell of mine powder, the disgusting sound of German attack aircraft, the groans of the wounded, the obscenity of the living, covering the Germans, the war and this dead piglet, and sometimes our artillerymen, who were hitting their positions.
At the end of April 1942, an ice drift began on the Neva, which significantly hampered the communication of the Piglet garrison with the main forces of the Neva Operational Group on the right bank. The German command decided to take advantage of this and eliminate the bridgehead. In total, on the left bank of the Neva, in the Shlisselburg-Ivanovskoye section, the Germans had forces in 9-10 battalions numbering about 5200 people.
At that time, the 330th regiment of about 1000 people held the defense on the "patch". The regiment took up defense on a front of 4 kilometers - from the ravine north of Arbuzov to the outskirts of the 1st Gorodok. The depth of the bridgehead was 500-800 meters on the right flank and in the center, and on the left flank - only 50-70 meters.
On the evening of April 24, after artillery preparation, German troops launched a surprise attack on the left flank of the Soviet defense in the bridgehead. Parts of the 43rd and 1st regiments of the 1st German infantry division, after a fierce battle, went to the Neva and cut off the 2nd battalion from the main forces of the 330th regiment. In the morning, new attacks followed, as a result of which the enemy managed to push the 3rd battalion 100-150 meters. All attempts by the bridgehead garrison to restore the situation on their own were unsuccessful.
On April 25-26, reinforcements of 250 people were sent to the bridgehead. On the afternoon of April 27, the Germans, striking from the north and south in converging directions, went on the offensive. Despite the desperate resistance of the defenders, after two hours of fierce fighting, most of the bridgehead was in the hands of the Germans. At the end of April 27, the last radiogram was transmitted from the bridgehead - communication with the 330th regiment was interrupted. The chief of staff of the regiment, Major A. M. Sokolov, was sent to the right bank with a report, who, being wounded three times, still managed to swim to the opposite bank and tell about the critical situation of the defenders of the bridgehead. Further resistance was of a focal nature. Attempts by units of the 284th regiment to force the Neva and counterattack the enemy were not successful.
In early September, it was decided by the forces of the Neva Operational Group to cross the Neva in the Annenskoye - 1st Gorodok section, and then advance towards Sinyavino. On September 10, all attempts to cross the Neva failed, and on September 11, several more groups managed to cross the river, but could not gain a foothold and were driven out from the left bank by enemy counterattacks. 12-th of September VGK rate ordered to stop the operation, “since the Leningrad Front was unable to intelligently organize the crossing of the Neva and, by its actions, stupidly ruined a large number of commanders and fighters” .
On September 26, Soviet troops began a new crossing of the Neva and managed to gain a foothold on the left bank in several places, but the German troops managed to eliminate two bridgeheads. Only the "piglet" in the Moscow Dubrovka area remained under the control of the Soviet units.
On October 5, 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the withdrawal of the main forces of the Neva Operational Group to the right bank of the Neva due to the operational inexpediency of further holding a bridgehead on the eastern bank.
On January 12, 1943, Operation Iskra began. The 67th Army was to cross the Neva on a wider (13 kilometers) sector of the front than in previous operations - from Shlisselburg to the Nevsky Piglet and advance east to join the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front.
On the first day of the offensive, the 131st regiment of the 45th guards division, striking directly from the bridgehead, managed to move forward only 500-600 meters. All attempts by the enemy to counterattack were repulsed, but the Soviet units again failed to move forward.
On February 13, units of the Soviet army went on the offensive with large forces. Directly from the bridgehead, the 138th Rifle Brigade, which replaced the 46th Division, delivered a blow. Pursuing the retreating enemy, by the morning of February 17, the main forces of the 67th Army reached the Nevsky Piglet and joined up with the 138th Brigade. Success was achieved thanks to effective artillery support.
The number of dead and wounded Soviet soldiers in the battles for the Nevsky Piglet differs significantly in different sources, but, according to absolutely all estimates, the losses in the battles for the bridgehead were huge.
In the 1960s, the Pravda newspaper published for the first time the figure of 200,000 soldiers who died on the Nevsky long time established itself in the domestic military-historical literature. IN last years there are other estimates. According to the calculations of the historian G. A. Shigin, the Soviet troops in the battles for the bridgehead (only in 1941) lost 64,000-68,000 people killed and wounded, and V. V. Beshanov gives the figures - 140,000 wounded and 250,000 killed.
The dimensions of the Nevsky "piglet" were constantly changing: from 4 to 1 kilometer wide and from 800 to 350 meters deep, sometimes literally in a day.
The losses of German troops in the battles in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Nevsky Piglet are not known for certain. According to rough estimates, they amounted to 10,000 to 40,000 soldiers and officers killed.
As of 2005, there were 16 fraternal military graves with the remains of 17,607 soldiers and commanders of the Red Army on the territory of the memorial; the names of only 1114 of them have been established.
During the Great Patriotic War, on the left bank of the Neva River, between the village of Pavlovo and the city of Kirovsk, on a tiny plot of land, later called the Nevsky Piglet, there were bloody battles between the Soviet troops and the Nazi invaders. Indeed, the size of this key foothold is small - 800 m from the coastline and 2 km along the river. According to historians, in one day 52 thousand shells and bombs were dropped on this piece of land.
From the east, the Nevsky Piglet memorial is limited by a 76-mm gun mounted on a pedestal. From the south - the so-called Boundary Stone, which is granite and cast-iron cubes of different heights intersecting with each other (project by O.S. Romanov, E.Kh. Nasibulin, M.L. Khidekel). One of the construction cubes has a high relief depicting warriors. At the place where the troops landed on September 20, 1941, there is now a granite stele. Before the start of the war, the village of Arbuzovo was on the site of the Nevsky Piglet.
This place is a memory of one of the most tragic pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War. On this small foothold, there were bloody battles between Soviet and German troops, who for 400 days tried to break the blockade of Leningrad on this tiny sector of the front. On the night of September 19-20, 1941, the fighters of the Leningrad Front crossed the Neva and were able to consolidate their positions near the Neva Dubrovka. All attempts to move forward were unsuccessful. The battles on the Nevsky Piglet went on until April 29, 1942. Our troops were forced to surrender their positions and were able to recapture the bridgehead on September 26. The fighting didn't stop for a moment.
According to historical and archival documents, the losses of the Red Army in this sector of the front amounted to several hundred tens of thousands. In 1960, in one of the publications of Pravda, the figure was 200 thousand. At the beginning of the new millennium, the Committee of Leningrad Veterans corrected the data, and the figure was 50,000. German losses are estimated at 35-40 thousand. Until now, every year the remains of the soldiers of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht are found here.
There is a prevailing opinion that on the Nevsky Piglet, on each of its square meter from 6 to 100 of our soldiers died. These data have been published more than once in the media, historians refer to them. The historian V. Beshanov in his book "Leningrad Defense" says that 17 people laid their heads on each meter of the "Nevsky Piglet". Only 250 thousand soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army. In the documentary film “Leningrad Front”, veteran I. Krasnopeev says that for every meter there were 10 dead soldiers, and our losses were 100 thousand. But it is incorrect to speak or try to make any calculations based on the size of the bridgehead or the number of participants in the battles, given that the area of \u200b\u200bthe combat bridgehead has changed.
Nowadays, the Nevsky Piglet memorial is one of many places on the heroic Leningrad land, where mourning ceremonies and solemn events dedicated to the Great Patriotic war.
The Nevsky Piglet memorial is part of the Green Belt of Glory.
Goal of the work
Show the role of the Nevsky Piglet in breaking the blockade of Leningrad and the heroic deed of the Soviet people who defended the city of Leningrad during the Great Patriotic War
Tasks
study material tragic events on the Nevsky Piglet
Consider the meaning of "Nevsky Piglet" in breaking through the blockade
Relevance
Almost 69 years separate us from that September day in 1941, when a tiny foothold appeared on the left bank of the Neva, which went down in history under the name "Nevsky Piglet". Very many people in Russia and abroad know the battles of the Soviet troops with the Nazi invaders near Moscow, on the Volga, Dnieper, Vistula, Oder, but few people know about the long and bloody epic on the Neva that unfolded on this bridgehead. Meanwhile, this is one of the most heroic and tragic pages of the national military history. There are no walls, no ditches, no ramparts, no bastions. Flat empty space with swollen trenches, dry grass. On the one hand, the river, on the other - the highway, beyond which a rare forest is visible. Several monuments lined with poplars. Brotherly graves. That's all. But it is also a fortress. Site of one of the bloodiest battles of World War II.
Nevsky Piglet
Nevsky Piglet, it was here, on the left bank of the Neva, between the city of Kirovsk and the village of Pavlovo, on a rectangle of land 2 km long and 800 meters wide, which Soviet troops held for about 400 days, four out of five offensive operations to break the blockade of Leningrad, and in January 1943, they managed to break a hole in the ring of the enemy siege during Operation Iskra. The average life expectancy of a soldier was about 52 hours there. In just 3 years, more than 260 thousand people died on the patch.
Fights on the "patch"
Soviet soldiers of the 11th Infantry Division September 1941
Position in the 8th army
The fascist German army group "North" under the command of Field Marshal Leeb completely cut off Leningrad on September 8, 1941. The blockade began. The Soviet command decided to break the blockade ring in the narrowest section - the Shlisselburg-Sinyavino ledge, where the Nazis drove a powerful ten-kilometer-wide wedge between the troops of two fronts - Leningrad and Volkhov. The Germans called this ledge "flaschenhals" - "bottle throat". Using favorable terrain conditions, the enemy in as soon as possible erected three impregnable defensive lines. One line passed in front of the Leningrad Front along the left bank of the Neva to Shlisselburg and further along the southern shore of Lake Ladoga. The other stretched from the shore of Ladoga from the village of Lipki through the workers' settlement No. 8, the villages of Gaitolovo and Voronovo in front of the Volkhov front. The middle defensive line, which ran through the village of Sinyavino, was adapted for a fire attack in both directions - against the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts. On October 20, 1941, the Sinyavino operation began to break through the blockade by the troops of the Neva Operational Group. Battalion 4th separate brigade Marine Corps, a regiment of the 115th Infantry Division and a regiment of the 1st NKVD Division crossed the Neva from the Nevskaya Dubrovka area under heavy enemy fire. Clinging to the cool and steep bank 20 m high, the Red Navy and Red Army men held a tiny bridgehead near Moscow Dubrovka.
Exhausting, bloody battles began. These battles required almost inhuman efforts for both sides. Due to the lack of warm dugouts, equipped trenches, strong, cold winds, Soviet soldiers were forced to endure unthinkably severe tests. Frosts reached minus 25 degrees. What was built overnight was mostly destroyed by artillery during the day. Due to the shortage of personnel, the soldiers were constantly either in battle or on duty. They could sleep no more than four hours. The Germans literally plowed up a patch of land with shells and bombs, on which neither a tree nor a bush remained. From our side, only soldier reinforcements were sent to the bridgehead every night. Of those who fell on the patch, no one came back. The wounded were not transported to the right bank. Hungry, weakened defenders of the bridgehead, inspired by the commissars and political workers, fought to the death. However, they had no other choice.
To hold out longer, Soviet soldiers and sailors dug into the ground like moles. They built underground passages, dismantling for this purpose all the houses and outbuildings of the village of Moscow Dubrovka that had not burned down. At the end of December 1941, the activity of the confrontation began to decline. Both sides were exhausted, and were no longer able to withstand the tension of such fierce battles. It was in those days that a proverb was born among the defenders of the bridgehead: "Whoever has not been to the Nevsky patch, he has not seen grief." The following phrase also became winged: “Whoever passed death near Dubrovka is born a second time.” [O. A. Sukhodymtsev. Leningrad battles of 1941. Nevsky Piglet ”] By the spring of 1942, due to the melting of ice, landings were transferred to the bridgehead less and less. And the piglet melted right before our eyes.
The death of the "Nevsky Piglet" in the spring of 1942
Liquidation of the Nevsky Piglet (April 1942)
In the spring of 1942, the trenches and dugouts turned out to be filled with water, the combat positions on both sides fell into complete disrepair, and regular landings were transferred to the bridgehead less and less often. "Piglet" melted literally before our eyes.
In April, only the 330th regiment of the 86th rifle division was left on the Nevsky Piglet. There were fewer and fewer warriors left on it capable of holding weapons. And when the bridgehead turned out to be cut off from the right bank of the Neva by an ice drift, the Nazis took possession of it completely.
The last line of defense was the command post of the 330th rifle regiment, the famous "Schurovsky" dugout: the last defenders of the bridgehead gathered here. They were led by the head of the political department of the 86th rifle division, battalion commissar A.V. Shchurov. Communication with the "Nevsky Piglet" was interrupted, and in order to inform the right bank about the plight of the bridgehead, he ordered the wounded Major Sokolov to cross to the other side with a report and documents. At night, Sokolov, being under enemy machine-gun fire in icy water, was able to swim to the other side of the Neva, making his way between the ice floes floating along the river.
But the position of the surviving defenders of the bridgehead had already become hopeless. Attempts to break through to the Neva were unsuccessful. Separate groups of fighters offered fierce resistance as early as April 28. Then everything calmed down: "Nevsky Piglet" died, but did not surrender to the enemy.
By April 29, most of the pockets of resistance in the bridgehead were destroyed, but individual fighters continued to resist until early May. Most of the bridgehead defenders died or were captured (according to Soviet data, 972 people), only 123 people managed to swim across the Neva and escape. According to German reports, the total losses of the Soviet side in these battles amounted to 1,400 people. 342 people were captured (according to other sources - 117), including the commander of the 330th regiment, S.A. Blokhin, who was three times wounded. According to the St. Petersburg historian V. S. Pravdyuk, who knew S. A. Blokhin personally, the Germans amputated both legs in the infirmary to the major and handed him over local residents with the words: "This is your hero - you take care of him."
Revival of the "Nevsky Piglet"
Soviet soldiers cross the Neva River
In the autumn of 1942, the military council of the Leningrad Front decided to repeat the attempt to capture the bridgehead. At the end of September, units of the 70th and 86th rifle divisions and the 11th separate rifle brigade. After powerful artillery and aviation preparations, on the night of September 25-26, the crossing of the Neva began in several places at once. The attempt to capture a small bridgehead near the village of Arbuzovo, near the place where the Nevsky Piglet used to be, turned out to be successful. Thus began his second birth. During the night, they managed to transfer the forward groups of the 70th, 86th, 46th rifle divisions and the 11th separate rifle brigade. For some time, confusion arose on the left bank: German infantrymen were hiding in the shell craters, almost next to the Soviet soldiers. Fearing to hit on their own, neither side temporarily used artillery. Over the next day, Piglet regained its former borders, and again fierce battles broke out on it. In the area of the village of Sinyavino, the troops of the Leningrad Front joined with units of the Volkhov Front, breaking through a corridor 8-10 kilometers wide. On the night of October 6, by order of the Soviet command, the Nevsky bridgehead was temporarily abandoned. For two days none of our fighters was on the other side. And an amazing thing: for two days, without reducing the density of fire, the Germans intensively bombed the "division abscess", as they called the patch, with shells and mines, never daring to attack it. On January 12, 1943, Operation Iskra began, ending on January 18 with the long-awaited breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad. However, the offensive from the Nevsky bridgehead was again unsuccessful. Units of the 46th Infantry Division were able to advance only 600 meters. Mindful of previous heavy battles, the German command concentrated two regiments of the 170th Infantry Division on this sector of the front, exposing the Maryino area. It was there that the first successful breakthrough of the 136th Infantry Division was carried out. Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov said: "The Road of Life will not last without the Nevsky Piglet, and Leningrad will not survive without it. The fate of Leningrad is decided here." The Battle of Leningrad and the defense of the legendary "Nevsky Piglet" have no analogues in world history.
So Piglet fulfilled his important role in breaking through the blockade, pulling over significant forces of the German troops and forcing them to make a mistake in choosing the direction of the main attack of the Soviet troops. German troops on February 17, 1943, under the threat of encirclement, left their positions in front of the Nevsky Piglet. Having completed its task, the Nevsky bridgehead ceased to exist, which in total lasted about 400 days of the blockade of Leningrad.
Eternal memory to the heroes
Mass grave
Everlasting memory The heroes of the Nevsky Piglet are immortalized by the memorial "Brotherly Military Burial". There are several dozen mass graves on the memorial, some of them are named and unnamed. They contain the remains of tens of thousands of soldiers. The memorial was opened in 1956, in 2001 it was reconstructed - granite slabs were installed, where the names of 6526 fallen soldiers were immortalized. Over 8 thousand more names have been prepared for perpetuation.
Park named after the 330 Infantry Regiment
Another memorable place about those tragic events is the park named after the 330th Infantry Regiment. The legendary 330th regiment, which was part of the 86th rifle division, held the defense on the Nevsky "patch" from October 1941 until the end of April 1942. The initiative to name the park, located at the place where the 330th regiment carried out the crossing, belongs to the veterans of the Nevsky "patch". In 1966, a memorial stele was erected in the park exactly opposite this place on the left bank of the Neva, the 330th regiment heroically fell.
A memorial site of the battles is an observation platform on the right bank of the Neva, where a pillbox (long-term firing point) has been preserved since the war, and where the Poklonny Cross was installed in 2004. This is one of the 8 crossing points on the Dubrovsky bank in 1941-1943 to the left bank of the Neva - to the Nevsky Piglet.
V.V. Putin in the Temple in honor of the icon of the Mother of God with the Book of Memory
"The land of fearlessness - Nevsky Piglet!
Here fell the bravest of the brave.
Descendant! Know the price of your freedom
And learn courage from the brave!"
Mikhail Dudin, 1941 - participant in the battles on the Nevsky Piglet
Conclusion
So, having studied the memories of eyewitnesses about the Great Patriotic War and the besieged Leningrad, the journalistic literature about the tragic events of the war, we can conclude that the Nevsky Piglet played an important role in breaking the blockade of Leningrad. Significant forces of German troops were drawn here, which suffered heavy losses and were forced to retreat. For the German command, the Nevsky Piglet became a strategic mistake in choosing the direction of the main attack of the Soviet troops. This became possible thanks to the selfless heroism, unparalleled courage and incredible stamina of those who defended Leningrad with weapons in their hands and those who worked in the factories of the besieged city. Eternal memory and glory to the heroes of Nevsky Piglet! The material of this work can be used in a history lesson on the topic of the Great Patriotic War, the blockade of Leningrad.
Literature
1. "Nevsky Piglet" from the bridgehead to the memorial: a collection of articles / O-vo "Knowledge" of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region, Museum-Reserve "Breakthrough of the Siege of Leningrad", MO Kirovsky municipal district; [Sukhodymtsev O. A.]. - St. Petersburg: Museum-Reserve "Breakthrough of the Siege of Leningrad", 2007.
2. Bridgehead: Nevsky "piglet", 1941-1943: a collection of articles / Museum-Reserve "Breakthrough of the Siege of Leningrad". - St. Petersburg: Galart, 2013
3. Sukhodymtsev O.A. Leningrad battles in 1941. Nevsky Piglet: monograph / O.A. Sukhodymtsev; St. Petersburg. in-t vneshnekon. communications, economics and law. - St. Petersburg: Knowledge, 2001
Internet sources
4. State Museum "Nevsky Piglet". [Electronic resource].- Access mode: http://npmuzei.org/
5. Leningrad. Blockade. Feat. [Electronic resource].- Access mode:
1. Nevsky Piglet
Let's return to the root cause of writing this article, to a small bridgehead near Moscow Dubrovka - Nevsky Piglet. Due to the fact that the Barbarossa plan began to fail in time (neither Leningrad nor Kiev were captured, the Germans were stopped east of Smolensk), Hitler and Chief of the General Staff Halder came to the conclusion by the end of July that it was necessary to abandon the capture of Leningrad by storm , in which heavy losses will inevitably follow, and surround it together with the Finns in a dense ring and starve it out. On August 27, the Germans, having captured the villages of Ivanovskoye and Otradnoye near the Tosna River, reached the left bank of the Neva. With the capture of Shlisselburg on September 8, the entire left bank of the Neva from the Tosna River to Lake Ladoga was in the hands of the Germans. The Germans hoped that the Finns, advancing, would reach the right bank of the Neva and unite with them, and Leningrad would fall into a complete blockade ring. But the Finns, by the end of August, having reached the old (until 1939) Soviet-Finnish border and deepened 10-20 km from it (as Mannerheim later wrote, to straighten the border line), by order of Mannerheim, they stopped, although there was no more than 80 km. All attempts by the Germans and parts of the Finnish statesmen to force Mannerheim to continue the offensive were in vain. By doing this, he not only saved Leningrad, but also later saved both his own head and all of Finland from the USSR. Therefore, on September 8, as they say, immediately, the Germans tried to cross the Neva, but were driven away by Soviet troops with the support of the artillery of the fleet. To prevent a possible attempt by the Germans to cross the Neva, the 115th division, led by Major General M.F. Konkov, was separated from the 23rd Army operating against the Finns and transferred to the right bank of the Neva in the area of the village of Nevskaya Dubrovka. In addition, on the right bank of the Neva there was an NKVD division and the 4th Marine Brigade. These were all the forces that made up the Neva Operational Group, which was supposed to cover the entire right bank of the Neva from Lake Ladoga to the Ivanovsky Thresholds. On the left bank of the Neva, they were opposed: from Lake Ladoga-Schlisselburg to the Moika River, the 20th Motorized Division, from the Moika River to the Tosna River, the 122nd Infantry Division. Here's how things unfolded there. “On the night of September 12, 1941, five scouts crossed the Neva in a boat, collected data on the movement of vehicles and military equipment in the area of the 8th state district power station, and returned to the right bank without loss” (Lebedev).
Here is how Konkov describes the subsequent events: “On the night of September 18, I returned from the unit to the division headquarters. An anxious Colonel Simonov met me. “Comrade General,” he reported, “he received an order signed by General of the Army Zhukov.” The order obligated me to land on the left bank of the river of the 115th division, together with units of the 4th marine brigade, and, relying on the solid defense of the right bank, part of the forces to seize the bridgehead at the turn of Ivanovskoye-Otradnoye-state farm "Torfyanik" - Mustalovo- Moscow Dubrovka, in order to launch an offensive in the direction of Mga from the morning of September 20. Zhukov's order was not only impossible for the forces of one division, but also generally ridiculous. It is not clear why all the settlements from Moscow Dubrovka were listed, if the distance to the mouth of the Tosno River is 16-20 km? How should one division “part of the forces” move in the direction of Mga (in a straight line this is about 10 km, by roads much more)? Only the army could solve such a problem with difficulty. And it is clear why part of the forces: the command of the Neva Operational Group could not throw all its forces on the left bank of the Neva, leaving the right bank unprotected. At that time - September 20 - our command could not send additional forces there, since until that time the Germans were advancing, and all our forces were aimed at repelling their attacks in the central direction. I must say that the Germans did not have the strength to successfully repel our landing, since the entire left bank of the Neva from the Moika River to Shlisselburg was controlled by one 20th motorized division, which could not throw all its forces into repelling our landing, leaving Shlisselburg and everything else unprotected left bank. The Germans could not allocate additional forces to repel the landing, since Hitler left such small forces near Leningrad that it was impossible to remove a single regiment from another sector of the front so as not to expose the defense sector. On September 24, Leeb wrote in his diary: “There are no more reserves in Army Group North. What she had had to be given to Army Group Center. And indeed, in order to help the 20th Motorized Division repel our landing, two regiments of the 7th Air Force were transferred from Europe by aviation. airborne division, whose arrival helped the Germans to slightly push our forces and reduce the length of the bridgehead from three to two kilometers. From this it can be seen that initially in a fierce battle for the bridgehead, later called the Nevsky Piglet, they took very small, approximately equal forces from both sides. But these battles were very fierce, often turning into hand-to-hand combat. During this first period of approximately 10 days, the losses on both sides were approximately equal. Here's how things unfolded. On the night of September 20, 1941, paratroopers of the 115th Infantry Division under the command of Captain Vasily Dubik successfully landed on the left bank of the Neva near the village of Moscow Dubrovka. But they were not provided with timely assistance, and almost all of them, led by Dubik, died before the arrival of the main units - several units of the 115th Infantry Division (the commander and headquarters of the division, as well as divisional artillery remained on the right bank of the Neva), a battalion of the NKVD division and 4th Marine Brigade. As Zhukov writes, “under the Neva Dubrovka, these units had to cross the full-flowing Neva, the width of which was up to 800 m, under continuous enemy fire, the task, one might say, is impossible.” The question is, why set impossible tasks? Experienced commanders always look for weaknesses in the enemy's defense and strike at them, while incurring minimal losses. As Konkov writes: “I am often asked: what dictated the conduct of such complex operations as crossing the wide Neva, seizing a bridgehead and attacking the Mga station with small forces without the support of tanks, aviation, artillery (except divisional and regimental). Crossing the Neva under heavy enemy fire, advancing through swamps and forests is an extremely difficult task. But there was no other way out, this was required by the combat situation. With the beginning of the battle on the left bank of the Neva, the enemy began shelling from the mortars of our right bank and the paratroopers who were in boats, on rafts, afloat. The water boiled with shells and mines, shrapnel whistled all around.
It was especially difficult for fighters on rafts with guns, which moved more slowly. Sometimes it seemed that they were standing and swaying, and not swimming. The wide river did not make it possible to maneuver manpower, to transport military equipment in a timely manner. The personnel, exhausted by many days of fighting, also received very poor food rations, which fell on the bridgehead intermittently. Food was delivered to the patch only at night.” Losses on the patch of our troops were enormous. Konkov writes that the Germans also had heavy losses, but, of course, they were less than ours, since the attackers always suffer more than those who are in shelters. But how many of our soldiers got to contact with the enemy? As Konkov truthfully writes, our soldiers began to die from artillery fire even on the right bank of the Neva, they died en masse during the crossing and further on the patch, until they came into contact with the Germans. If even in the very initial period of the Piglet’s life, it was possible to transport our troops without great losses - the 115th division and the 4th battalion of marines, then in the following days they lost up to 80 percent in battles with units of the German 20th motorized division. The fighting was extremely fierce, often turning into hand-to-hand combat. It was in these battles that our soldiers with the 20th Motorized Division and with two regiments of the 7th Cretan Airborne Division landed at the end of September had heavy losses on both sides, but we still have more. “It’s better to parachute to the island of Crete three times than to fight one battle on the ground in Russia,” said the German paratroopers, who did not expect such fierce resistance. When they took up positions near Moscow Dubrovka, they found that the trenches were filled with the bodies of those killed in previous battles. Russians lay next to the corpses of German soldiers. As a result of stubborn battles, the two front edges became so close that in moments of calm one could hear the conversation and even the cough of the enemy soldiers with a cold. This is how it is described in the book of the German historian G. Vodazh “Past hell”: “Machine guns, rifles, hand grenades, sapper shovels and bayonets without weapons, with which soldiers rushed at each other from both sides. The terrible outcome of these battles remains in the memory of the former German paratroopers even decades later. In order to support the Piglet garrison, new reinforcements were constantly thrown there, which suffered huge losses. In these battles, in essence, neither children nor young men of pre-conscription age were spared - Jung. “We admired the brave actions of the young company from the island of Valaam in battle. Young men in vests from the boatswain school and the naval school fearlessly went on the attack, sowing panic in the enemy camp. The Nazis abandoned trenches and trenches and fled. It so happened that an anti-tank ditch unexpectedly grew in the path of the attacking youngsters, which the Nazis adapted for defense, saturated with firing points. It seemed that the fighting impulse would die out, pressed to the ground young sailors enemy guns. But Yoongi did the impossible. They, assessing the situation, quickly rushed forward and found themselves in front of a moat. The Nazis did not have time to come to their senses, as grenades fell on their heads. The Nazis shamefully fled, leaving well-equipped fortifications, throwing machine guns and even headquarters maps ”(Konkov). Konkov, so colorfully describing fighting jung, "forgot" to add what percentage of jung survived in this attack. However, it doesn’t matter what percentage of the cabin boy died in this attack, since in subsequent hostilities almost all of them died. In fact, children who did not reach the age of 16 died, and Konkov, who was delighted with their actions and sent them to their death, lived to an advanced age.
As Yuri Lebedev writes: “Unfortunately, it will probably never be possible to accurately determine the number of dead. But realistically assessing the situation, it is necessary to separate the losses in the battles for mastering the bridgehead and on Piglet itself. The largest losses were suffered by our troops on the right bank of the Neva in the places of crossings and when forcing the river. All the forces of the attacking side were concentrated here. At that moment, the soldier was not yet ready for battle and remained completely defenseless, unable to hide from enemy artillery fire. Namely, from him was the greatest damage. Already by the end of September 1941, the Germans had brought to the Neva a division of artillery and instrumental reconnaissance of the 20th motorized division, which calculated the crossings of Soviet troops with an accuracy of up to a meter. After that, three artillery groups "North", "Center" and "South" were created, located on the Nevsky Front from Shlisselburg to Otradnoye. Large-caliber artillery, including French 150 mm and 210 mm mortars, were hidden on the Kepkolovskie heights. From the Sinyavino area, support was provided by the guns of the 227th Infantry Division. The entire water area in front of the Nevsky Piglet was shot through with machine-gun fire. Our troops also suffered heavy losses from aviation. It is estimated that you can focus on the figure of 50 thousand Soviet soldiers who died on Piatachka itself. German losses are estimated at about 10,000. The German command of the Neva sector of the front managed to achieve the main thing: the patch was localized, shot with crossing points on the other side, and the situation was taken under control. The German infantry battalions got the opportunity to equip positions, install wire fences and systematic mining of the eastern coast ”(Yuri Lebedev). From that moment on, the Germans practically stopped losing soldiers. The effectiveness of our artillery, located on the left bank of the Neva, due to poor knowledge of the positions of enemy artillery, was close to zero. It is said that this landing delayed the troops advancing on Leningrad. But what kind of positive delay can we talk about if the Germans completed all the assigned tasks for the blockade of Leningrad, despite all the efforts of Zhukov, and from September 18 they began to build defensive structures along the line of the blockade of Leningrad? Leeb could not single out a single regiment from the North group of troops to repel our landing, and the Germans had to airlift two regiments of airborne troops. And the patch itself was soon blocked by very small German forces. And in general, what important task in this area could be solved by the relatively small number of troops that were originally thrown into the patch? And moreover, as it will be shown, the blockade of the patch itself was carried out by a very small group of Germans - several units of one division. At first, I had a version of why the Nevsky Piglet was created. Zhukov arrived in Leningrad when Hitler gave the order to transfer almost all the equipment to Moscow, and Leeb's troops took up positions convenient for conducting a blockade, and moved from active operations to passive defense. Zhukov was very happy to learn that the Germans had abandoned the assault on the city. But for him a delicate situation was created. The passive defense of the Germans is added to the super-passive defense of the Finns, who, having suffered serious losses in the battles for the southern suburbs of Leningrad, are happy to dig into the ground and rest. The question arises: what does Zhukov do at the front, where there are no active hostilities? This is when the Germans finish destroying the Kyiv grouping of our troops and prepare to attack Moscow. It seemed that the best solution would be to take advantage of the lull and start serious preparations for breaking the blockade of Leningrad. But for serious preparation, serious knowledge was needed, which Zhukov never possessed. The only thing Zhukov knew how to do was to drive the troops under the bullets of the enemy under the threat of execution. In addition, Stalin pulled him all the time, demanding an offensive, breaking the blockade. It was necessary to at least make the appearance of active actions. Finns cannot be touched. Offended and closed the blockade ring. It is also dangerous to touch the Germans who have dug in near Leningrad. Suddenly, offended, they decide to take Leningrad. That Leningrad at that time was the most impregnable city in the world, Zhukov did not believe. And Zhukov finds the most ingenious way out for him. He creates a bridgehead on the Neva outside the blockade line, sets clearly impossible tasks for his soldiers and pretends that he is conducting active hostilities, allegedly with the aim of breaking the blockade of Leningrad, sometimes removing the leaders of the operation. If for the Germans it was a splinter, as some defenders of the creation of the patch wrote, then for us this was a big bleeding wound, which we ourselves pulled all the time, constantly sending people to slaughter. A gigantic trap where our troops died in huge numbers, instead of using them elsewhere to actually break through the blockade of Leningrad. The Germans understood that as long as this trap existed, there could be no question of breaking the blockade of Leningrad. Therefore, they did not seek to eliminate the Nevsky Piglet, and always left our forces necessary for its existence on the patch. What was the purpose of sending Zhukov to Leningrad when he was already surrounded? In the light of Stalin's demand in October-December 1941 - to break the blockade of Leningrad in the Nevsky Piglet area and withdraw the troops of the Leningrad Front through this breakthrough with the possible abandonment of Leningrad ("the army is more important," Stalin said), a version of the true purpose of Zhukov's appointment as commander of the Leningrad Front arises. Stalin, already on August 28, 1941, in a telegram on the occasion of the surrender of Tosno by our troops, feared that Leningrad would be surrounded and, in the face of death from starvation, would be “idiotically stupid” surrendered (that is, without a fight), and the Leningrad divisions were at risk of being captured " .
On September 8, Leningrad was finally surrounded. That's when Stalin sent Zhukov to Leningrad. But not because Zhukov's defenders falsely write this in order to save the city from an assault. Both Hitler and Stalin were well aware that the Germans did not need to storm the city, while inevitably suffering huge losses, if it was easy to surround it and it, like a ripe apple, would fall at their feet. Therefore, even then, Stalin had the idea to break the blockade of Leningrad and withdraw troops from it, and blow up Leningrad along with the fleet in it. But the leader of the destruction of Leningrad with all its values is required to abandon all moral principles. Probably many who would be required to destroy Leningrad would prefer to shoot themselves rather than follow such an order. This is what it was the main task set by Stalin in front of Zhukov - to follow up with the possible surrender of Leningrad, so that the necessary objects on the coast and the fleet were destroyed. But before destroying Leningrad, it was necessary to break through the defenses of the Germans blocking Leningrad. But Zhukov not only failed to fulfill this task, but also did not make any serious attempts to break through the blockade of Leningrad. In essence, the participants in the battles near the Nevsky Piglet were deceived, saying that they were fighting to break the blockade of Leningrad in order to alleviate the situation of the inhabitants of the city. It was impossible to alleviate the situation of the inhabitants of Leningrad through a breakthrough in the Nevsky Piglet area, even if it took place, since through this breakthrough it was impossible to organize either the supply of food to the city or the evacuation of the elderly, children and the sick, but it would be possible to withdraw troops, part of the light equipment and that part of the population that could cover a long distance on foot on impassable roads. Therefore, paradoxically as it may seem, it turns out that the German troops saved Leningrad from the destruction without thinking about it, preventing our troops from breaking through the blockade of the Nevsky Piglet. On September 22, the Neva Operational Group was created to lead the troops in the Neva region under the leadership of Lieutenant General P. S. Pshennikov. But soon after the big losses on the patch, he was replaced by Konkov. From November 2, the Neva Operational Group became part of the 8th Army under the leadership of Lieutenant General T. I. Shevaldin. In this article, I will not describe in detail the course of the battles for the Nevsky Piglet, especially since, apart from the memories of people close to me - the father of my wife Smirnov Pavel Dmitrievich and the father of my daughter-in-law Colonel Karabanov Mikhail Yakovlevich - I do not have any data other than those described by other authors. Platonov and David Glantz wrote in great detail about the course of the battles near Leningrad in the books of the same name ("Battle for Leningrad"), Salisbury ("900 days. Siege of Leningrad"), Viktor Suvorov ("I take my words back"), Shigin G. A. “The Battle for Leningrad: Major Operations, White Spots, Losses”, V. F. Beshanov (“Leningrad Massacre”, “Leningrad Defense”), G. F. Krivosheev (“The classification has been removed”), Yuri Lebedev (“ Nevsky Piglet. View from both sides "), A. V. Burov ("Blockade day after day"), Hasso G. Stakhov ("Tragedy on the Neva") and a number of other authors. These authors truthfully described the events near Leningrad, but some of them interpreted these events in such a way that one cannot agree with them. And, as Bushkov correctly noted, from September 18, 1941, until the end of the blockade, the German troops became the defending side, and the Red Army became the continuously advancing side. These offensives by Zhukov and his henchmen Khozin and Fedyuninsky were carried out criminally incompetently and always according to the same pattern with huge losses. Especially massive unnecessary losses occurred on the Nevsky patch, on the water approaches to it and on the approaches to the Sinyavinsky Heights. But, while truthfully describing the events on the Nevsky Piglet, none of the authors raised the question of the advisability of conducting an operation to break through the blockade of Leningrad across the wide Neva, and not from a line of direct contact with the enemy about 50 km long, passing along the left bank of Leningrad from the mouth of the Tosna River to Gulf of Finland. Along this entire line there were railroads and highways, which made it possible to maneuver our troops. We could freely bring our tanks there, especially the heavy KV tanks produced by the Kirov Plant. If we say that this line was impregnably fortified by the Germans, then the question is which is easier: to strengthen: a two-kilometer line of defense near the Nevsky Piglet or a fifty-kilometer line from the Tosna River to the Gulf of Finland? Many authors, describing the events near Leningrad, try to bypass the fighting on the Nevsky Piglet. Fedyuninsky, talking about the Peterhof and Strelna landing operations, in which all the paratroopers died, did not even mention the Nevsky Piglet in a single line. Many authors write that the Nevsky Piglet diverted part of the forces advancing on Leningrad. But the first landing in the Moscow Dubrovka area took place on September 20, when the Germans stopped their offensive near Leningrad and went over to the defense of their positions. As shown in Scheme 9, before the landing of our troops, the entire coastline of the Neva from Shlisselburg to the Moika River was defended by one German 20th motorized division. By the force of this one division alone and, later, by the urgently deployed forces of two regiments of the Cretan Airborne Division, the Nevsky Piglet was not only blocked, but its original dimensions were reduced. Soon these troops were replaced by one 96th Infantry Division, which tightly blocked the patch and repelled all the offensives of the Leningrad Front through it. Subsequently, the 96th division was temporarily replaced by the 1st infantry division. But all the time, the positions at the Nevsky Piglet were held by the forces of only one division, occasionally only increasing forces on the most intense days of hostilities on the patch. The Germans suffered the biggest losses of up to one and a half thousand only in the first days of the landing, when the opposing forces fought hand-to-hand. But when the Germans equipped their positions, their losses became minimal. The vast majority of our soldiers died from machine-gun and artillery fire while crossing the Neva and in the first moments of landing on the shore. Our artillery fire was ineffective, since we did not know where the German positions were located. So the ratio of our losses to the losses of the Germans 20 or 30 to one is quite reliable.
Why was this platform created? It seems to be clear: in order to launch an offensive against the connection with the 54th Army from it and allegedly unblock Leningrad. But this task was not only not completed, - we never, during the entire existence of the first Nevsky Piglet, from September 20, 1941 to April 29, 1942 (however, like the second, captured on September 26, 1942), did not break through the blockade ring the very patch, but it could not be carried out, since the Germans could freely, without losses, send their reinforcements by land, and we could do this only across the wide Neva, while suffering heavy losses. Shigin shows that in October-November 1941, when the most fierce battles flared up on the Nevsky Piglet, Stalin demanded that they break through the patch in order to withdraw all the troops of the Leningrad Front through it, followed by the surrender of Leningrad to the Germans. But the most important thing is that even if units of the 54th Army had managed to break through to the defenders of the Piglet and free Shlisselburg and Sinyavino, then Leningrad would not have been released. In 1941, with the complete dominance of the Germans in the air, it was impossible to build railway, let alone the construction of a railway bridge across the Neva. In a word, cargo delivery and communication big land with Leningrad through this area in 1941 were impossible. If the 54th Army had succeeded in connecting with the troops on the Nevsky Piglet, then the situation besieged Leningrad would hardly improve. In order to really lift the siege of Leningrad, it was necessary to liberate an approximately 30-kilometer section of the Ivanovskoye-Mga-Mishino railway with an offensive from the Sapernaya station towards the 54th Army. In my opinion, this was much easier to accomplish than linking up with the 54th Army, incurring huge losses while crossing the Neva, and landing on a patch when it was impossible to transport heavy tanks there. When attacking from the Sapernaya station, with the support of heavy and medium tanks, a large Mginskaya group of Germans would be surrounded, and Leningrad would receive a railway connection with the mainland and would be released. However, Stalin, apparently at the suggestion of Zhukov, ordered to join the 54th Army only through a patch, and his order could not be violated.
But back to the patch. Our main means of transportation in our free time from the ice were low-speed rowing boats and rafts, easily destroyed by German machine-gun and artillery fire. “Of the crossing facilities, we had only fishing boats collected from all over the right bank. A small number of pleasure boats were delivered to us from the city. Several ferry-rafts were made from improvised material ”(Konkov). The troops had no means of crossing heavy KV tanks at all. Several attempts to transport them across the ice ended in sinking. 11 medium tanks transported on November 2, 1941 (according to Zhdanov's report to Stalin, seven) medium tanks were very quickly destroyed by German artillery. Four times our troops tried to break through the defenses of Leningrad from the Nevsky Piglet, suffering huge losses, and not once did they even manage to break through the blockade ring of the Piglet itself. Tactically, the positions of the Germans were better than ours - they were on higher, dry places. Our positions were more open than the Germans. German artillery, and especially mortars, could hit our positions more accurately from a short distance than ours through the Neva. As the commander of the 115th division, General V.F. Konkov, wrote, “... the Nazis looked from the high reinforced concrete building of the 8th hydroelectric power station, from the ash hills, from the narrow-gauge road embankment, from the Figurnaya grove and from the side of Arbuzov, the entire bridgehead up and down. They shot every meter of the patch, its crossings and spared neither shells nor mines. Here is another description of A.F. Belogolovtsev, a participant in the battles, in the book “Nevsky Piglet”: “The transfer of ammunition, equipment and other cargo was carried out on rafts, since out of the 21 boats with which we started crossing, now only two were afloat. Unfortunately, the field kitchens were destroyed during the crossing, and the fighters had to be content with dry rations for the time being. Shells and bombs blew up the patch up and down, raising a cloud of dust. It fell asleep in the eyes, stuffed into the ears, into the mouth, clogged the weapon. The trenches dug in the sand quickly sank and crumbled, and there was nothing to strengthen them with - there was no forest.
How dense was the blockade of Piglet, says the father of my daughter-in-law, a colonel, and then a cadet, Karabanov Mikhail Yakovlevich. With great difficulty reaching the left bank, part of them came under cross fire. Their positions were clearly visible from the tall building of the thermal power plant. There was no way to dig in, they hid behind the corpses of the dead. On the tenth day he was wounded in the leg. With the onset of night, he was ordered to independently crawl over the ice to the right bank of the Neva. The river was illuminated almost continuously by rockets. He crawled between rocket launches, as the Germans fired at single targets. All the way to the right bank took more than an hour, which seemed like an eternity. As V.V. Putin said, his wounded father was transferred from Nevsky Piglet in a similar way, only in broad daylight. “Everyone knew it was suicide, because every centimeter was shot there.” In my opinion, the Germans simply spared the wounded.
On November 2, 1941, with the forces of five divisions, Khozin is trying to break through the German defenses through the patch, going to connect with the 54th Army. But although only one German 96th infantry division opposed them, it was not possible to break through their defenses. For two days of fighting in our 168th division, 200 people remained, in the 2nd rifle division of the NKVD - 300 people. On November 9, three more divisions and one brigade landed on the patch.
Of the 50 tanks allocated to support the offensive, only 11 medium tanks were able to be transported, which were soon destroyed. The Germans, pulling up two more divisions (that's all they had left in reserve), repelled our attacks. In response to Stalin's reproach for the unsatisfactory actions of our troops, Zhdanov replies: “The advancing infantry ran into a fairly well-prepared enemy defense. The artillery preparation was sufficient, but the infantry attacks bogged down, and the seven tanks available in the bridgehead quickly broke down. None of the KV tanks, which were relied upon during the offensive, managed to cross the river due to the loss of crossing facilities. Since the artillery could not cross the river, its firing range was not large enough to provide support for a breakthrough from the bridgehead. On November 8, Stalin personally demanded that a new operation be carried out from the Nevsky bridgehead. In five days, another five thousand fighters were lost to no avail. But the senseless attacks continued. In the last ten days of December alone, we lost over 25,000 killed in the patch. The commander of the Leningrad Front, Khozin, in the article “On a Little-Investigated Operation,” writes that in addition to the poor organization of the operation, there were other reasons: “In the fighting of the Leningrad Front of the 8th Army, when crossing the Neva Dubrovka, in addition to these shortcomings, direct-fire weapons were poorly used to destroy firing points. Artillery preparation without proper reconnaissance and adjustment of fire on targets was ineffective. In addition, their insufficient saturation with tanks and self-propelled artillery had a sharp effect ... offensive battles were provided mainly by fire from 76 mm regimental guns of the 1927 model. As you can see, most of the difficulties pointed out by Zhdanov and Khozin would have been eliminated if the fighting to break the blockade had been carried out in places of direct contact with the Germans - from the Sapernaya area or another area to the west.
Just at that time, in the Sapernaya area, Pavel Smirnov, the father of my wife, served as part of a reconnaissance group, who said that they repeatedly penetrated the German defense line. In one of the sorties, Smirnov was seriously wounded in the leg (his leg was amputated to the very base), but was carried out in a cape across the front line. It is clear that it was almost impossible to conduct a search, passing the open space of the Neva back and forth. At the same time, Captain Anatoly Muzhakov writes: “When we were on the Nevsky patch, we could not even adjust the fire, everything was so clearly visible and shot through by the Germans. The earth was mixed with snow, everything was black. Therefore, for the infantry there were very difficult conditions. In April 1942, when the ice began to drift on the Neva, and the patch, in fact, became cut off from the right bank, the Germans decided to destroy it. Yuri Lebedev writes that the Germans allocated one regiment with a sapper battalion attached to it to destroy it. Our troops withdrew, leaving about 500 people on the left bank. An attempt to help them ended in failure - all 20 boats were destroyed on the right bank of the Neva. Those who remained on the patch died heroically, and only 117 people, mostly wounded, were captured. In total, in the final operation, we lost 1,400 people, the Germans - 81 killed and 389 wounded. Here is how the former German non-commissioned officer B. Buff from the 227th Infantry Division described the last days of the first Nevsky Piglet in his diary: “The operation on the bridgehead on February 27, in which we participated, cost the enemy 1400 killed, 9 guns and 6 tanks. When the bridgehead was already in our hands, the Russians made a hopeless attempt to cross the Neva in boats in order to launch a counterattack. What was not destroyed when crossing the Neva in boats was completed during the landing. I don’t know what to be more surprised at: the madness of those who gave the order for this hopeless operation, or the courage of the suicide bombers who carried it out. In general, I believe that the Germans, if they wished, could have thrown us into the Neva earlier, but did not do this, seeing how we were throwing a huge number of our fighters into their trap to kill them. And as soon as ours stopped throwing them up, they immediately destroyed the patch. But we didn't stop there. On the night of September 26, 1942, we again land troops near the place where the first patch was. Again, he was immediately blocked. In the plans for Operation Iskra, the piglet is again given great attention. Two divisions landed on it, but this time it was not possible to break through the blockade of the patch itself, although the Germans additionally allocated two regiments to counter our two divisions. This, as some researchers of these events wrote, was a “serious” diversion of German forces from the direction of the main attack. In February 1943, the patch was released from the outside by our troops advancing towards the Moika River.
Now consider the loss ratio. Only in the initial period of the fighting in the so-called first Sinyavin offensive, out of 71,270 participants (piglet and the 54th army), our irretrievable losses amounted to 22,211 people - 31 percent, the total loss of 54,979 - 77 percent. And the bloodiest battles were ahead. According to our official data, published in the Pravda newspaper, we lost 200,000 in the battles for a piglet, the Germans - 35-45,000. According to some sources, our losses were greater, and the losses of the Germans were much less. Yuri Lebedev writes that the Germans lost about 10 thousand, and this is closer to the truth. These were all the “serious” losses of the Germans on the Nevsky Piglet in total. Shigin, based on an analysis of the forces that officially operated on the Nevsky Piglet, concludes that we lost no more than 64-68 thousand there. But in the situation when Stalin categorically demanded that the blockade be broken through the Nevsky Piglet in order to withdraw all the troops through it, when the heads of the top leaders of Leningrad could fly for failure to comply with his order, so many unaccounted people rushed to the Nevsky Piglet, who repeatedly replenished our units, that the losses on it, and most importantly when crossing the Neva, were in no way less than those 200 thousand that were indicated in the Pravda newspaper. Let's think logically. How could the Germans have had heavy losses there? The losses of the Germans were only when we captured the bridgehead and during unsuccessful attempts expand it. And then, during this period, our losses were much greater than those of the enemy, since the attackers, especially those without proper artillery support, always suffer much more losses than the defenders, especially those with artillery support. This is also proved by the following data: from the first group of fighters who landed on the patch, after a few days, only no more than 20 percent remained. According to our official data, out of 200,000, 50,000 were killed on the patch. Thus, it turns out that the bulk of our losses occurred before the landing, and they could not inflict losses on the Germans. Yes, and at the first moment of landing on the patch, before our soldiers reached the shelter, they suffered heavy unilateral losses. Indeed, the Germans shot very well and hit with an accuracy of 10 meters. The main number of our soldiers died from cannons and machine guns while crossing the Neva. The Germans began to beat us on the right bank of the Neva, beat us at the crossing and finished off on a tiny patch. And there were almost always very few combat-ready, that is, apart from the wounded, in our patch, and they could not conduct active operations against the Germans. The Germans from well-equipped shelters fired at the defenders of the patch at any time they saw fit, without proper opposition from our troops. It should be noted that there is still a very high mortality rate among our wounded. If the Germans, blocking the patch, sent their wounded to the rear without obstacles, then the evacuation of our wounded on the patch was fraught with great difficulties. As V.V. Putin noted, we could not provide qualified medical care on the patch, it was difficult to transport the wounded across the Neva in a timely manner, and in the daytime it was almost impossible. Many of the initially wounded subsequently achieved enemy fire, since they could not be sent to the rear immediately after being wounded. All these additional losses could have been avoided if the fighting had been carried out not across the widest river, but from the line of direct contact with the enemy. The intensity of the German fire on the patch can be judged by the fact that in the 60s the search engines took one cubic meter of soil on the patch, sifted it and removed 10 kg of fragments and 38 bullets. It is clear that there were still many more fragments, but by this time the small fragments had rusted and turned into dust. Sukhodymtsev writes: "The whole array of patches is a mixture of earth, bones and metal." And if we could still calculate our own losses with some degree of accuracy, then how could we know about the losses of the Germans? The German sources say almost nothing about the battles in the patch area, and this is not surprising, since they did not have heavy losses in this place. So, if we accept our official loss data - 200 thousand (according to other researchers, much higher) and the real losses of the Germans, about 10 thousand, then the average loss ratio is 1:20. Therefore, what kind of hostilities can we talk about? It was a one-sided slaughter, as V.V. Putin said, “a monstrous meat grinder”, it was bringing our units under execution. VV Putin says: “I think that there are always mistakes in war. It's unavoidable. But if you fight and think that everyone around you is wrong, then you will never win.” But here is another case. It is clear that in any battle one of the parties is defeated and, possibly, with heavy losses. But here, for six months, they periodically collected compounds and sent them to slaughter. This can no longer be called a mistake - it was a crime. “In order to give at least some sense to the massacre on the “patch”, in which about a thousand Soviet soldiers died every day, our historians in uniform talk at length about some “significant forces of the Nazis” that they managed to forge, and the “damage” inflicted on twelve German divisions. By listing these enemy formations, no one quite consciously complicates himself, since the division has always been one. It’s just that the Germans regularly changed their units for rest and replenishment. (Beshanov) In a word, if we fought not across a wide river, but from the line of direct contact with the enemy, then our losses would be much less. And there was such a line of direct contact. This is a line of internal defense about 50 km long from the Tosna River to the Gulf of Finland (more precisely, the Neva Bay and, more precisely, the Marquis Puddle.) And our forces opposing both this sector of the front and all other sectors of the front, opposing all the forces of Army Group North "There were much more, especially after the departure of the main strike forces near Moscow. The losses alone during the autumn-winter period on the Nevsky Piglet and the losses of the 54th Army, especially during the assaults on the Sinyavinsky Heights and the Pogostye station, amounted to much more than 300 thousand. In a word, the total number of possible defenders of Leningrad was at least two million people (not counting the forces opposing the Finns on the Karelian Isthmus). The entire group of troops "North", even in its initial strength, was about 500 thousand people. scattered along a long line of hostilities: around Oranienbaum, on the line of internal defense of Leningrad, further on the Neva from the Tosna River to Ladoga, and from Lake Ladoga, to the Pogostye station, Kirishi, along the Volkhov River to Novgorod, the total length of which was about 600 km. Apart from the Leningrad Front, the Volkhov Front acted against the group of troops "North". The main efforts of the group of troops "North" during this period were aimed at capturing and holding Tikhvin. Under Leningrad itself, a very limited number of troops remained - three divisions. And the armament of our troops was much better than the armament of the Germans. Our Kirov (Putilov) plant produced heavy KV tanks in sufficient quantities, our Svetlana plant produced rocket charges for Katyusha launchers, various plants also produced various military equipment and ammunition. In a television program dated April 24, 2012 on the 100-TV channel, in documentary"Unknown blockade" is confirmed that only 10 divisions of the Army Group "North" received directly in the blockade of Leningrad. But, in general, our forces near Leningrad were several times superior to the forces of the Germans. They were quite sufficient not only to break through the blockade of Leningrad, but also to completely lift it with their proper use. But instead of all this, they were idiotically stupidly sent for destruction on the Nevsky Piglet and under the Sinyavinsky Heights. But, most importantly, even if the 54th Army had succeeded in the fall of 1941 to connect with the troops of the Nevsky Piglet, this would not have improved the situation of the besieged Leningrad in the least. Operations related to the Nevsky Piglet are, in essence, a knife in the back of Leningrad. If there had not been huge losses on the patch, and a breakthrough towards the 54th Army was carried out from the Kolpino-Sapernaya area, then Leningrad would have been unblocked.