Armed conflict in 1994-1996 (first Chechen war)
The Chechen armed conflict in 1994-1996 - military operations between the Russian federal troops (forces) and the armed formations of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, created in violation of the legislation of the Russian Federation.
In the fall of 1991, in the conditions of the beginning of the collapse of the USSR, the leadership of the Chechen Republic announced the state sovereignty of the republic and its secession from the USSR and the RSFSR. The organs of Soviet power on the territory of the Chechen Republic were dissolved, the effect of the laws of the Russian Federation was canceled. The formation of the armed forces of Chechnya began, headed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the President of the Chechen Republic, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Defense lines were built in Grozny, as well as bases for sabotage warfare in mountainous areas.
The Dudayev regime had, according to the calculations of the Ministry of Defense, 11-12 thousand people (according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, up to 15 thousand) regular troops and 30-40 thousand people of the armed militia, of which 5 thousand were mercenaries from Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, the republics of the North Caucasus and etc.
On December 9, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2166 "On Measures to Suppress the Activities of Illegal Armed Formations on the Territory of the Chechen Republic and in the Ossetian Ingush Conflict Zone". On the same day, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted Resolution No. 1360, which provided for the disarming of these formations by force.
On December 11, 1994, the advance of troops began in the direction of the Chechen capital - the city of Grozny. On December 31, 1994, by order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, troops began an assault on Grozny. Russian armored convoys were stopped and blocked by the Chechens in different parts of the city, the military units of the federal forces that entered Grozny suffered heavy losses.
(Military encyclopedia. Moscow. In 8 volumes 2004)
The further course of events was extremely negatively affected by the failure of the eastern and western groupings of troops, the task was not completed and internal troops Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Fighting hard, federal troops took Grozny by February 6, 1995. After the capture of Grozny, the troops began to destroy illegal armed groups in other settlements and in the mountainous regions of Chechnya.
From April 28 to May 12, 1995, in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, a moratorium on the use of armed force in Chechnya was implemented.
Illegal armed formations (IAF), using the negotiating process that had begun, carried out the redeployment of part of the forces from mountainous regions to the locations of Russian troops, formed new groups of militants, fired at checkpoints and positions of federal forces, organized terrorist acts of an unprecedented scale in Budennovsk (June 1995), Kizlyar and Pervomaisky (January 1996).
On August 6, 1996, after heavy defensive battles, federal troops left Grozny after suffering heavy losses. The illegal armed groups also entered Argun, Gudermes and Shali.
On August 31, 1996, agreements on the cessation of hostilities were signed in Khasavyurt, ending the first Chechen war. After the conclusion of the agreement, the troops were withdrawn from the territory of Chechnya in the shortest possible time from September 21 to December 31, 1996.
On May 12, 1997, the Treaty on Peace and Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was signed.
The Chechen side, not observing the terms of the agreement, led the line for the immediate withdrawal of the Chechen Republic from Russia. Terror against the employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and representatives of local authorities intensified, and attempts to rally around Chechnya on an anti-Russian basis the population of other North Caucasian republics.
Counterterrorist operation in Chechnya in 1999 2009 (second Chechen war)
In September 1999, a new phase of the Chechen military campaign began, which was called the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus (CTO). The reason for the start of the operation was the massive invasion of Dagestan from Chechnya on August 7, 1999 by militants under the general command of Shamil Basayev and the Arab mercenary Khattab. The group included foreign mercenaries and Basayev's militants.
For more than a month, federal forces fought with the invading militants, which ended with the militants being forced to retreat from Dagestan back to Chechnya.
On the same days - 4 September 16 - in several cities of Russia (Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk) a series of terrorist acts was carried out - the explosions of residential buildings.
Considering Maskhadov's inability to control the situation in Chechnya, the Russian leadership decided to conduct a military operation to destroy the militants on the territory of Chechnya. On September 18, Chechnya's borders were blocked russian troops... On September 23, the President of the Russian Federation issued a decree "On measures to improve the effectiveness of counterterrorist operations in the North Caucasus region Russian Federation"providing for the creation of a Joint Group of Troops (Forces) in the North Caucasus for the CTO.
On September 23, Russian aircraft began bombing the capital of Chechnya and its environs. Ground operation began on 30 September - armored units russian army from the side of the Stavropol Territory and Dagestan entered the territory of the Naursky and Shelkovsky regions of the republic.
In December 1999, the entire flat part of the territory of the Chechen Republic was liberated. The militants concentrated in the mountains (about 3,000 people) and settled in Grozny. On February 6, 2000, Grozny was taken under the control of federal forces. To fight in the mountainous regions of Chechnya, in addition to the eastern and western groupings operating in the mountains, a new grouping "Center" was created.
On February 25-27, 2000, "West" units blocked Kharsena, and the "East" grouping closed the militants in the Ulus-Kert, Dachu-Borzoi, Yaryshmardy areas. Ulus-Kert was released on March 2.
The last large-scale operation was the elimination of Ruslan Gelayev's group in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village. Komsomolskoye, which ended on March 14, 2000. After that, the militants switched to sabotage and terrorist methods of warfare, and the federal forces opposed the terrorists with the actions of special forces and the operations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
During the CTO in Chechnya in 2002, a hostage-taking was committed in Moscow at the Theater Center on Dubrovka. In 2004, a hostage-taking was committed at school number 1 in the city of Beslan in North Ossetia.
By the beginning of 2005, after the destruction of Maskhadov, Khattab, Barayev, Abu al-Walid and many other field commanders, the intensity of the sabotage and terrorist activities of the militants significantly decreased. The only large-scale operation of the militants (the raid on Kabardino-Balkaria on October 13, 2005) ended in failure.
From midnight on April 16, 2009, the National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAC) of Russia, on the instructions of President Dmitry Medvedev, canceled the CTO regime on the territory of the Chechen Republic.
The material was prepared based on information from open sources
The reasons are, on the one hand, objective circumstances, and on the other, subjective. Various things are usually named as reasons and prerequisites: terrible threats from Chechnya that had to be urgently prevented; an awful amount of oil, or vice versa - the need to lay an oil pipeline through which an awful amount of oil from the Caspian had to be pumped; protection of the rights of the Russian-speaking population. And a lot of other things. But upon closer inspection, it turns out that none of them worked as an incentive.
They were concerned about the rights of the Russian-speaking population only when they got involved in the whole war. Nobody thought about it before. There is practically no oil in Chechnya. It was pumped out over a century of field exploitation, now about 2 million tons per year are mined there, this is complete nonsense. Yes, there was a large oil refinery in Chechnya, powerful factories, but nothing remained of them: something was bombed, and what was left was cut and scrapped by ferrous metallurgists. For some reason, the pipeline from the Caspian Sea was not very popular. About Chechen crime is a myth built from our modern day. The fact is that the Chechens turned out to be incapable of the mafia. Rather, they are capable of the same degree as statehood. The Chechen, anarchic structure of society (approximately from the 16th century) did not imply the building of hierarchical systems.
As of 1992-93, Chechnya in many ways suited everyone in Russia. She arranged the special services as a kind of offshore, where it was possible to ship weapons to third world countries through the Northern Airport; as an offshore company where fighters could be recruited to perform a variety of tasks. For example, in Abkhazia they fought russian weapons with Russian instructors, but detachments of the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus under the command of Shamil Basayev.
As an offshore, Chechnya suited large oil (then state-owned) companies, because it was possible to drive oil through it and lie about the fact that all taxes were paid there, and send it further for export.
It would seem that it suits everyone, but what happened? What happened then was a completely internal Moscow event. By the end of 1992, the confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin and the parliament, where Ruslan Khasbulatov was, escalated. At the same time, in November 1992, Yegor Yakovlev, a man with a conscience, was removed from Ostankino. And the main propagandist, as it already happened, was Mikhail Poltoranin (an old party cadre under Yeltsin, known for his biased attitude towards Jews). But then what to do: there is a parliament, there is a speaker, and he is a Chechen. And here the entire propaganda machine, within the framework of the confrontation with the Parliament, is being rebuilt to "hah this Chechen Khasbulatov!"
That is, if we go back to the texts of 1993, it turns out that we have not a bad parliament there, but Khasbulatov is bad, and under him 70-odd objects in Moscow are controlled by the Chechen mafia. It turns out that the White House security department guarded about 70 more objects, but at the same time they had nothing to do with the Chechens. By October 1993, this had intensified to such an extent that if you listen to the radio communications on the night air on October 3-4, it turns out that the militiamen preparing for the assault were going to take either Grozny or Kabul. They were going to fight either with the Chechens (because Khasbulatov), \u200b\u200bor with the Afghans (because Rutskoi had the misfortune to be in captivity in Afghanistan, and for some reason he was accused of it). Either way, the campaign was taken up. And about the Chechen mafia it was then that the talk started. Then a surprise happens: we took a little bit of the White House and burned it down a little on October 4, and on October 12 - bang! - and for some reason there is no majority in the elections. Communists and Zhirinovites took many seats in parliament. And then the political strategists (who were not yet called that way) had a bright idea: in order to intercept the electorate, it is necessary to intercept the slogans of the opponents. We need to do something national and patriotic. For example, to return a fallen province to the bosom of the Empire. Nothing raises the rating like that.
In the second half of December, Shakhrai's plan for Chechnya, signed a month ago (and drafted), was suddenly pulled out from under the cloth: a plan of negotiations amid forceful pressure, which should ensure a solution to the problems of the separatist region. It turned out that the negotiations were very bad, but very good with the use of force. All sorts of political strategists and analysts from this project were cut off after six months. It was controlled by the security forces (which then included the Minnats, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB). This project was supervised in part by Sevastyanov, head of the Moscow department of FGC ( federal Service counterintelligence). But something went wrong. We give the anti-Dudaev opposition money, they take money, but Dudaev is not overthrown; we give weapons - also Dudayev is not overthrown; We give weapons to the crews - on November 26, 1994, the storming of Grozny takes place (supposedly the opposition, but in fact the tanks were officers hired by the FSK in the Moscow Region units). They fought in a hybrid way. Tanks enter Grozny. In Grozny they think: “Wow, there was someone who could build 40 tanks in a column and reach Grozny! My mother! Yes, he can be given power! ”Because there was no such person in Chechnya at that time. But suddenly non-locals crawled out from under the armor, and everything changed. They were burned and taken prisoner. Further, as always, foxes are hidden in the forest, and small blood can only be washed off with large blood. No one has addressed the analysis of errors and return to the previous stage during the year. Further - the beginning of the war. What's funny is that the war did not raise this rating. By the beginning of 1996, Yeltsin had it at the background level. And the elections were won partly because it was then that his team said: "Peace!", "Peace!" Nazran negotiations, Yandarbiev arrives in Moscow to talk, he is picked up at a special ABC facility in Tyoply Stan. At this time, Yeltsin flies to Chechnya, says: "That's it, peace has come." Yeltsin was elected in the second round, but at the same time, he took the third to his team (and Lebed was the third then), appointed him secretary of the Security Council. And Lebed decided to become the winner. His former deputy for Transnistria, Tikhomirov (who then commanded an army group in Chechnya) was given carte blanche to win. And in July 1996, the war resumed as soon as the results of the second round of elections were officially announced. I must say that the victory did not work, because three days before Yeltsin's inauguration, the Chechens entered Grozny and occupied the city. Not really superior forces, there were about 800 of them. And no one dared to spoil the master's mood with bad news. Therefore, for three days paralysis reigned, during which time the Chechens were surprised to strengthen themselves in the city and it was already impossible to kick them out. After which Lebed, when the fighting resumed, arrived at the scene, realized that there was nothing to catch here and concluded the Khasavyurt agreements. That is, here we had one driving force, a simple one: neither oil, nor money, nor anything else. And power, which is more important than oil, money, and much more.
I must say that after Khasavyurt they tried to forget about Chechnya, like about a bad dream. We did not get our prisoners out, although in the fall of 1996 it could have been done. Hostage-taking began, the situation was seams, and they tried to forget about Chechnya. And so we come to 1999. In the winter of that year, a representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was kidnapped in Chechnya; a year later, his remains will be found in the mountains. And that was the last straw. Prime Minister Stepashin said that we will use force. The war machine spun. For example, the formation of the 77th Marine Brigade in Dagestan began (this is not funny, at that time the Marine Corps were the only units that had at least some mountain training). A transfer of tactical missiles went south. And here, even against someone else's will, we were irresistibly heading towards war, because from the other side the car started spinning. Why? We go over to the other side and notice that in 97th year Maskhadov won the elections in Chechnya (convincingly won), and Shamil Basayev took the second place. It was terribly unstable there, because Basayev had detachments. Not that great, but he knew how to unite under himself very restless local comrades. At some point, Maskhadov let him steer, for six months (somewhere at the turn of 97-98, Basayev headed the government). It must be said that he achieved brilliant success: the budget replenishment fell 20 times. After which, it seemed, his career was over. After leaving, as promised, six months later from this post, he immediately spoke at the congress of the Congress of the peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan, stating the powerful goals of expansion. Preparations began for what ultimately resulted in the invasion of Dagestan.
Basayev, being a political marginal, found himself on the brink of death, not only political, but also physical. The only thing that saved him from such a prospect was the beginning of a war, which would inevitably lead to the rallying of all and save him from death (at least delay this death). And so it happened.
In 1999, in the summer, Basayev was already accumulating his forces in the Tsumadinsky district in Dagestan. And what went bang there at the turn of July-August 1999 could have banged a little earlier, it could have banged a little later. One way or another, the war began, which was declared a counter-terrorist operation (although there were no explosions in the cities yet). I do not want to say that these explosions were staged by the special services, except for the "Ryazan exercises" the role of the special services has not been proven anywhere. But the point is different. The fact that this war was used. If you look at Vladimir Putin's rating for August-November 1999, you will see that it suddenly began to grow from negligible background values. Every week, some kind of brutal statement like "soak in the toilet." And the hop rating - 7% jumped up until he went to sky-high heights. Actually, this is exactly the situation when we can say something like the following: we do not know who arranged all this, but we know exactly who used it.
Ironically, what was not possible in the first war (to use it as an electoral tool) was perfectly successful in the second. Further the war, of course, was of no use to anyone. For example, already before Putin was elected president, they tried in every possible way to declare that “Victory, guys! That's it, already a victory! There - in the Komsomolskoye battles. " However, the terrorist attacks in every possible way reminded of the opposite. But they were again used to further strengthen the power. But attempts to assert that the subsequent large-scale terrorist attacks were organized by the special services, they are also, in my opinion, untenable. Nevertheless, we see that the reason here turns out to be a thing much more attractive than oil and than money. Power. Uncontrolled power that does not stop to play with fire in order to preserve this power.
December 1991 elected President of the Chechen-Ingush Republic former general Soviet army D. Dudayev announced the creation of the Republic of Ichkeria and its secession from Russia. Since the summer of 1994 they have returned to Chechnya once fighting between the "prodayevskie" militants and the opposition forces. December 9, President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin signed a decree "On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic."
Photographer V. Podlegaev. Commander of the United Group of Federal Forces of the Russian Federation in Chechnya, Lieutenant General A.A. Romanov (center) and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic A. Maskhadov (left) during negotiations. Chechen Republic. June 16, 1995. RIA Novosti
Two days later, units of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia entered the territory of Chechnya, and on December 31, bloody battles for Grozny began. Using aviation and heavy weapons, the United Group of Forces (UGV) gradually expanded its controlled territories, squeezing the militants into the mountains. In June 1995, a detachment of militants took hostage hundreds of people in a hospital in Budennovsk (Stavropol Territory). To save the lives of citizens, the Russian government agreed to start peace talks with representatives of Ichkeria.
However, negotiations were disrupted in October 1995 and hostilities continued. The conflict became a difficult test for Russia and its power structures... In the eyes of the world community, Russia's authority has suffered serious damage. Inside the country, anti-war sentiment intensified. In August 1996, taking advantage of the lack of clear political instructions to the UGV command from the Russian leadership, the militants seized Grozny. Under these conditions, the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin decided to hold peace talks. On August 30, in the city of Khasavyurt, an agreement was signed on the withdrawal of troops and the "freezing" of the status of Chechnya for five years.
Photographer V. Vyatkin. Paratroopers of the separate artillery battalion of the 247th Stavropol regiment of the Russian Airborne Forces at the forefront. Chechen Republic. November 1, 1999. RIA Novosti
Continuous terrorist acts, attacks, kidnappings have turned the south of Russia into a front zone. In August 1999, Chechen fighters invaded Dagestan and seized several villages in the border areas. As a result of the military operation of the North Caucasus Military District in August-September 1999, the bulk of the militants were eliminated.
Photographer I. Mikhalev. Russian soldier before the start of hostilities. Chechen Republic. May 12, 1996. RIA Novosti
In retaliation for the losses in September, militants carried out a series of terrorist attacks with hundreds of deaths, blowing up residential buildings in Buinaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk. In October 1999, a counter-terrorist operation began in Chechnya. During the winter-spring period 1999/2000, the troops of the United Group of Troops (Forces) (UGV (s)), created by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, drove the Chechen extremists southward, cutting off the mountainous regions of Chechnya from the flat part of the republic.
Photographer H. Bradner. The movement of militants towards the presidential palace under artillery fire. Grozny. Chechen Republic. January 1995. Photo courtesy of J. Butler (UK)
On February 7, 2000, Grozny was released. The Russian troops were faced with the task of eliminating numerous groups of militants in the mountainous regions. The enemy introduced tactics guerrilla warfareacting in the territories of both Chechnya and neighboring republics. As a result of the operation, illegal armed formations of Ichkeria were defeated. However, battles with bandit formations continued for another long eight years.
Photographer Yu. Pirogov. Russian servicemen killed in battle. Severny airport area, Chechen Republic. January 10, 1995. RIA Novosti
The counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya was canceled only on April 16, 2009. General Staff The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, in total during the period of hostilities in 1992-2009 without return losses of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and other law enforcement agencies in Chechnya amounted to more than 8,500 people killed and deceased, 510 people captured and missing, and over 70,000 wounded.
Dzhokhar Dudayev congratulates his guard on Independence Day. Chechen Republic, Grozny. 1994 year.
A column of armored vehicles enters Grozny. Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. (Otherwise the Chechen Republic). RF. December 12, 1994.
Chechen women during an anti-Russian action in front of the parliament building. Grozny. Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. (Otherwise the Chechen Republic). RF. December 15, 1994.
Photographer Eric Bouvet. Russian soldiers say goodbye to their deceased comrade. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. 1995 year.
The separatist rests during the fighting. Grozny, Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. January 1995.
Photographer Yu. Tutov. Russian servicemen during a break between battles. Chechen Republic. January 12, 1995. RIA Novosti
Photographer N. Ignatiev. Engineering reconnaissance of the railway line on the bridge over the river. Terek. Chechen Republic. January 1995. Photo courtesy of J. Butler (UK)
Photographer Christopher Morris. Chechen fighters in the basement of a residential building. Grozny. Chechen Republic. RF. January 1995.
A soldier of the federal forces in between battles. Grozny. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. January 1995.
Russian soldiers during the storming of Grozny. Chechen Republic. RF. January-February 1995.
The crossing of the Russian army units across the Sunzha River. Grozny. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. February 7, 1995.
Photographer Yu. Tutov. Presidential palace. Grozny. Chechen Republic. February 17, 1995. RIA Novosti
A composite detachment of fighters from the Tyumen OMON, SOBR, Ural RUBOP conducts a counter-terrorist operation in the combat zone. Grozny. Chechen Republic. RF. April 1995.
Sergeant Misunov. 7th Guards Airborne Division. Suburbs of Shatoi. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. 1995 year.
Tanker Alexey Stepanov. 7th Guards Airborne Division. Under Shatoi. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. 1995 year.
Photographer Oleg Klimov. Checkpoint of the Federal Forces. Grozny. Chechen Republic. May 1995.
Photographer Eric Bouvet. Russian soldiers. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. May 1995.
Photographer Eric Bouvet. Russian soldiers. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. May 1995.
Photographer Eric Bouvet. Russian soldiers. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. May 1995.
Photographer Eric Bouvet. Russian soldiers. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. May 1995.
Photographer Eric Bouvet. Russian soldiers. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. May 1995.
Photographer Eric Bouvet. Russian soldiers. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. May 1995.
Photographer Eric Bouvet. Russian soldiers. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. May 1995.
Life on the streets of the city. Grozny, Chechen Republic, Russian Federation. May 1995.
Photographer I. Mikhalev. Soldiers of the United Group of Federal Forces of the Russian Federation on a halt. Chechen Republic. May 25, 1996. RIA Novosti
Photographer V. Podlegaev. Surrender of weapons by illegal armed groups. S. Zandag. Chechen Republic. August 16, 1995. RIA Novosti
Photographer I. Mikhalev. Russian soldiers before the start of hostilities. Chechen Republic. May 12, 1996. RIA Novosti
Photographer S. Gutsiev. View of the Minutka Square in Grozny. Chechen Republic. May 15, 1996. RIA Novosti
The commander of a detachment of Chechen fighters, terrorist Shamil Basayev during the seizure of a hospital in Budennovsk. Budennovsky district. Stavropol Territory, RF. June 19, 1995.
Photographer Alexander Nemenov. Russian soldier. Chechen Republic. RF. 1996 year.
Photographer D. Donskoy. Meeting of the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin with soldiers and officers of the 205th motorized rifle brigade of the federal forces of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus. Chechen Republic. May 28, 1996. RIA Novosti
A child on the street of Peace. Grozny. Chechen Republic. RF. August 1996.
Photographer - Thomas Dworzak. Punishment for drunkenness according to Sharia law. Grozny. Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. (otherwise the Chechen Republic). RF. August 1996.
Photographer I. Mikhalev. Member of illegal armed groups during the battle. Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny, Chechen Republic, August 14, 1996, RIA Novosti
Chairman of the CRI government Shamil Basayev presents a personalized pistol to Iosif Kobzon "For support of the CRI". Grozny. Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (aka Chechen Republic). RF. Summer 1997.
Pupils of the Military College of the Armed Forces of the CRI. The unrecognized republic of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (otherwise the Chechen Republic). RF. 1999 year.
Photographer: Vladimir Vyatkin. During the entry into the city of federal forces. Gudermes. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. January 1999.
Photographer: Oleg Lastochkin. Residents of the village of Znamenskoye, Nadterechny District, located in the combat zone, are leaving their homes. Chechen Republic. RF. October 1999.
Photographer O. Lastochkin. Combat helicopter Mi-24 patrols over the location of Russian troops. Chechen Republic, October 16, 1999. RIA Novosti
The BMP-2 crew on the road to Grozny. The village of Samashki. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. December 1999.
Photographer Yu. Kozyrev. Russian paratroopers repel an attack by Chechen militants after being ambushed near Tsentoroi. Chechen Republic. December 16, 1999. Photo courtesy of Yu. Kozyrev
Photographer Yu. Kozyrev. Removal of the wounded from the battle. District of Tsentoroya. Chechen Republic. December 16, 1999. Photo courtesy of Yu. Kozyrev
Photographer Yu. Kozyrev. Removal of the wounded from the battle. District Tsentoroya, Chechen Republic. December 16, 1999. Photo courtesy of Yu. Kozyrev
Photographer Yu. Kozyrev. Paratroopers after the battle. District Tsentoroya, Chechen Republic. December 16, 1999. Photo courtesy of Yu. Kozyrev
Photographer A. Kondratyev. And about. President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin among the soldiers of the federal forces of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus. Chechen Republic. December 31, 1999, RIA Novosti
Photographer Yuri Kozyrev. Russian soldiers during a break between battles. Grozny. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. January 2000.
Photographer Natalia Medvedeva. Consolidated detachment of the 2nd separate special purpose brigade of the GRU. Shatoisky district. Chechen Republic. RF. February 2000.
Soldiers of the 101st Special Brigade operational purpose Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. The inscription on the BMP - "Even if she is wrong - she is my Motherland!" Grozny. Chechen Republic. February 9, 2000.
Scouts of the platoon of the Guard Lieutenant D.S. Kozhemyakin shortly before the battle at Vysota 776. Shatoisky region. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. February 29, 2000.
Photographer Sergey Maksimishin. The child is playing with a cat at one of the checkpoints. Grozny. Chechen Republic. RF. year 2000.
45th separate guards regiment special purpose patrols in the mountain gorge of the Bass River. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. March-April 2000.
Photographer V. Vyatkin. The death of Sergei Timoshin, a serviceman of the 6th company of the 10th regiment of the Russian Airborne Forces. Chechen Republic. April 1, 2000. RIA Novosti
Photographer V. Vyatkin. Rest after a combat operation. Chechen Republic. April 1, 2000. RIA Novosti
After the assault on the Komsomolskoye village. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. year 2000.
Photographer V. Vyatkin. A special operation of a Russian Airborne Forces unit to identify and destroy the base camps of Chechen gangs in the mountain gorge of the river. Bass, Chechen Republic. April 1, 2000. RIA Novosti
Photographer V. Vyatkin. Operation of the special reconnaissance detachment of the 45th regiment of the Russian Airborne Forces to identify and destroy bandit formations in the mountain gorge of the river. Bass, Chechen Republic. April 1, 2000, RIA Novosti
Militias from among the local residents at the parade in memory of the dead Dagestani soldiers and local residents during the invasion of Chechen fighters. The village of Agvali. Tsumadinsky district. The Republic of Dagestan. RF. October 2000.
Raid by a special forces reconnaissance group airborne troops in the vicinity of the Baath River. The outskirts of the villages of Khatuni, Kirov-Yurt and Makhkety. Vedeno region. Chechen Republic. Russian Federation. October 5, 2000.
Some of the photographs are taken from the book: Military Chronicle of Russia in photographs. 1850s - 2000s: Album. - M .: Golden-B, 2009.
In Grozny, it all began in the early morning of August 6, 1996, when militants suddenly attacked the railway station, the city commandant's office, the Government House, the republic's FSB building, the Interior Ministry's Coordination Center and almost all checkpoints. At the same time, safely bypassing the checkpoints, hundreds of armed people moved into the city from suburban villages and soon up to 6,000 fighters for independent Ichkeria dispersed here.
The militants were led by the most experienced separatist commanders, Israpilov,. For the sake of truth, I will say: more than 130 roads lead to Grozny, but the federal forces controlled only 33, there was not enough money or people for more.
"The times when Russian generals and Yakov Baklanov or Soviet Marshal Lavrenty Beria made policy in the Caucasus are irrevocably gone."
A document from that time from the archives of the Russian Security Council says: “The tension in Grozny did not decrease. The significant forces of law and order concentrated here provided only the appearance of maintaining public safety and protecting citizens from criminal encroachments. At night, the city essentially came under the control of criminal elements and militants who had penetrated into residential quarters, since the police did not carry out patrolling and visits to the scene during this period ... "
These words, in my opinion, reflect the essence of the current situation. So the "surprise" was quite predictable. In addition, military intelligence reported about the impending attack, sparingly shared information with the FSB, and reported upward the information received through its channels by the operative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
It is difficult to give a chronology of those tragic days. Events developed with incredible speed. Today there is enough evidence about them, but there is still a lot of unclear, and light on the dark spots in this story remains to be seen. I will try to the best of my ability.
The command of the United Group instructed the units of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs to defend Grozny: there were about 12 thousand employees of the department in the city (of which there were no more than 6,000 military personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation). Fighters and individual brigades operational purpose (defense), located in the former, guarded 22 checkpoints, five commandant's offices and two commandant areas, several OMON and SOBR detachments strengthened the commandant's offices and the protection of administrative buildings. Formations of the Zavgaevskaya militia were in Grozny, but an operation was planned on August 6 in the suburbs of the Chechen capital, and some of these forces were withdrawn.
Most of the army units with heavy equipment and weapons, by order of the command, were located in the south of the republic.
Photo by Roman Ilyushchenko and from his archive
In the film by Alexander Sladkov, Lieutenant General Konstantin Pulikovsky, who was acting commander of the United Group at that time, admitted that he did not have enough time or authority to figure out the correctness of the decision on such an alignment of forces - the disposition was approved at the very top.
We, the officers of the 8th detachment, did not have all the information, although the scouts daily brought news, the essence of which was that the silence that was established at the beginning of the summer after the declarative statement of the then President Yeltsin that "the war is over, enough, we have fought." was deceiving. By the way, our detachment was directly related to this propaganda-political action.
During the famous May visit of the EBN to the republic, an armored troop-carrier convoy imitating the withdrawal of troops "accidentally" caught the eye of the Supreme Commander. Yeltsin, it seems, really believed then that "the process was underway", having signed a decree on the armor of one of our "boxes" on the reduction of the service life of soldiers who had served in Chechnya. And the column, having made a detour, returned to base.
Start last operation of the first Chechen campaign, I was found in Rostov-on-Don, where I flew on a business trip from the still “peaceful” Chechnya a day earlier and returned a couple of days later to a completely different, warring one. The first thing that I saw at the takeoff of the Severny airport was a row of cars, from which the bodies of the dead, wrapped in foil, were carried out on a stretcher. There were many of them. I confess, it became scary ...
There was everything - betrayal and feat
We must face the truth: after the attack, control over the city was lost, many were killed and wounded, a blow was struck to the prestige of the state and its power structures. However, this formal truth contains thousands of other truths of direct participants in the defense of Grozny.
On August 6, the group of Captain Alexander Iglin of 20 people was in the Coordination Center (CC) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, adjacent to the republican Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB. The place is not the best for active defense: the building behind a concrete fence with a single entrance, in the middle of a residential area, is locked with checkpoints. From the equipment available - a pair of detachment BTR-80. The senior chief at the facility was the first deputy minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation, police colonel-general Pavel Golubets. He was later accused of withdrawing himself from the leadership of the city's defense, although communication lines were quickly knocked out in battles and the units were left without control. And what could be done when the enemy simultaneously attacked objects, and the airwaves are clogged with a cacophony of battle.
In addition, outright misinformation was broadcast on the radio channels, which was replaced by Maskhadov's appeal to the federals and Chechen police officers with a demand to lay down their arms. For example, there was information that the police fled or completely sided with the militants, which was a lie. Traitors and cowards were found, but most remained loyal to the oath. The fighters staunchly defended the railway station, the bases of the Chechen OMON and the 2nd regiment of the PPSM of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia in the Chechen Republic. So it’s impossible to talk about widespread panic, cowardice or indiscriminate drunkenness of servicemen and police officers who suddenly found themselves surrounded.
The militants attacked the CC of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the government quarter, using one hundred percent of the knowledge of the terrain and weak points of defense. But the defenders acted competently. Captain Eglin ordered two soldiers from the roof of a neighboring house to observe the situation around.
The bandits undertook the first serious attack at about 18.00, and before that all day the special forces were fired upon by snipers. The militants who were advancing from the direction of the furniture factory noticed the secret in time, the attackers were fired upon from grenade launchers, and the assault was repulsed. By midnight, the separatists tried to attack the special forces positions again and again stumbled upon a competent rebuff. Under-barrel grenade launchers went into action, and at the windows of the main post office, from where the attackers fired especially densely, a detachment armored personnel carrier gave several long bursts. The attack was repulsed.
But the militants, confident in their superiority, at about 1 am went to the third assault. From the radio interception it became clear that the bandits believed that there was no one to defend the object, everyone fled, and therefore went into the open. And again they stumbled upon an organized resistance. They no longer tried to assault, but their sniper and machine gunners controlled the perimeter regularly. By the way, the object was never handed over to the enemy.
According to eyewitnesses, in the neighboring buildings of the FSB and the Office for Combating Organized Crime of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the situation was worse. There it came to fighting on the first floors. They had to call in the aviation, which also suffered heavy losses: in the first hours of the attack, the militants shot down three helicopters.
"Minute" of fame
Soldiers and officers The 34th Defense Forces of the Interior Ministry of Russia began with the defense of two strongholds in the area of \u200b\u200bMinutka Square and "Romanovsky Bridge". They fought for two weeks in complete encirclement with a shortage of ammunition, medicine, food and water. 10 people were killed in action and died of wounds. The militants several times offered to surrender, promised safety, but the fighters fought, hoping that they were not forgotten, the situation would change and the victims would not be in vain. And when they heard on the TV reanimated with the help of tank batteries that the main news of the day in the country was the inauguration of the president, and “the situation in the Chechen capital is returning to normal and is under control,” the defenders began to doubt that they were right.
As a participant in those battles, Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Polyakov recalled later, “something inside us then broke, I will not hide. There were questions that had not been raised before. Why should we put the boys? In general, the next day after that "political information" those who were in charge of the defense of the VOP began negotiations with the contacted Khunkar Israpilov, the field commander, who was responsible for the general management of the actions of the militants in the Minutka area ... the ability to freely go to their own together with weapons, the wounded and the bodies of the fallen. Which ultimately happened on August 19 ”.
The language does not turn out to accuse these soldiers and officers of treason or cowardice, although later such attempts were made. They did more than they could and was required of them. Their will was broken by the country's indifference to the fate of the soldiers, the undisguised confusion of the command and lack of will top management state, the treacherous position of many domestic media.
It is no secret that during the attack on the city, journalists from leading Russian TV channels, sitting in the basement of one of the government buildings, broadcast panicky messages about the surrender of the city. I myself remember this very well: the commandant's offices, including the CC of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, are fighting with might and main, and the journalists have already surrendered them! It is difficult for the enemy to imagine the best service, because panic, reflected by an echo in the thousand-voiced distorting mirrors of the media, can bring down even the most solid defense.
Swan of peace
And then the secretary of the Russian Security Council, Alexander Lebed, arrived in Chechnya with the wish of the Supreme Commander, tired of the war, to end it. I personally, neither then nor now, had any objections to this, and I did not really believe in the ultimatum of generals Pulikovsky - Tikhomirov demanding that Maskhadov leave the ringed city within 48 hours. There were good reasons to doubt, since until very recently the bandits managed to leave the encirclement more than once. When the militants were strongly pressed, the command to “cease fire” and “enter into negotiations” immediately came from above, so I did not indulge myself with the illusion that it would be different now.
But at what price the next storming of the city would have cost, he soon became convinced, having gone with one of the detachment groups to negotiations, which since the second half of August have been actively conducted between the parties to the conflict. On one of the streets of Grozny, in my opinion, Gudermeskaya, we came across a broken military column: the skeletons of shells gnawed by explosions with burnt-out belly of airborne squads, mountains of shell casings and bullet-pierced soldiers' helmets ... The streets are deserted, dead silence, and on both sides of the road - of which death seemed to be watching us. One after another passed the commands: "Do not open the fire" and "Do not jump to the side", which are mined. And then armed people appeared from under the ground and greeted us victorious: "Allahu akbar!"
Field commander Aslanbek Ismailov took part in the negotiations on the part of the militants. I had a chance to talk with the Chechens from his external guard. They celebrated the victory and did not hide it. I remember several episodes. One of the guards pointed to the cap badge with a wolf and added that they were made in Russia, naming a specific plant. Another showed us a "Chechen bulletproof vest", shouting "Allahu akbar!" Three times, assuring that he was not afraid to die. There was one among them who, sincerely rejoicing in the victory, invited me to visit him.
And the mood was gloomy: in the area of \u200b\u200bthe 13th checkpoint, our comrade, scout sergeant Andrey Vasilenko, was ambushed and killed, for whom I had written a presentation for the medal "For Courage" the day before.
Another characteristic picture of those days that remains in the memory is the eyes of the Chechen militiamen who remained loyal to Russia. They were taken with their families and belongings to Khankala, where they wandered about the base, not knowing what to do with themselves. We have betrayed them. But they betrayed us too.
Betrayal is generally the key word for understanding the war, the scenario of which, it seems to me, was written in advance in the quiet of high offices. It seemed that the air of the Chechen capital was saturated with treason, promising defeat instead of victories. Not only defense plans or weapons were indulged and sold wholesale and retail, but also the soldiers themselves, officers, simple people, the interests of the state….
The late Alexander Lebed was appointed to the role of one of the main traitors to the country's interests. But I believe that he was sincere in his desire to give peace to a tired country. The trouble of Alexander Ivanovich was that he did not want to share the laurels of a peacemaker with anyone, which, as it seemed to him then, would open the way to the presidency. And for the sake of achieving this goal, he was ready for much. As time has shown - for a lot. The victims of the ambitions of the Secretary of the Security Council were not only the army planted on a short leash and then actually expelled from Chechnya, but also the international prestige of Russia, which suffered as a result of the shameful Khasavyurt Treaty, akin to the obscene Brest Treaty. I am sure that it was possible to get out of negotiations with the separatists without losing face. Unfortunately, the general who fought well in Afghanistan and stopped the massacre in Transnistria was much better than the diplomat Swan.
Subsequent events showed that it was impossible to resolve the "Chechen issue" without taking into account the opinion of the Chechens and at their expense. The times when Russian generals Aleksey Yermolov and Yakov Baklanov or the Soviet Marshal Lavrenty Beria made policy in the Caucasus are irrevocably gone. This was quickly realized when the new leader of Russia came to power, who was able to find, probably, the only correct solution.
Judging who was a hero and who was a traitor, who is right and who is not, will be God and descendants. But even the many times devoted Russian soldiers and officers continued to fight, believing in victory. In confirmation - a little-known fact: the soldiers of the 101st OSBron of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia (brigade commander - Colonel Yuri Zavizionov), who were the last to leave Chechnya, who had lost more than 80 people, took with them the man who was standing on a pedestal in tank division the symbol of Victory is the T-34 tank. And on the armor of their "boxes" leaving Chechnya amid the hooting of the crowd, these people, deadly tired of the war, wrote: "Let her be wrong, but this is our Motherland!"
P. S. As a result of the fighting in Grozny from 6 to 23 August 1996, according to generalized data obtained from various sources, we lost up to 2080 people (almost 500 killed, over 1400 wounded, more than 180 missing). Up to 18 tanks, 61 infantry fighting vehicles, 8 armored personnel carriers, 30 vehicles were burned on the streets of the city, four helicopters were shot down. The losses of the militants in manpower exceeded ours by two or three times.
Eternal memory to the soldiers of the Fatherland who fell in those battles!
Roman Ilyushchenko, lieutenant colonel, military veteran
Armed conflict in 1994-1996 (first Chechen war)
The Chechen armed conflict in 1994-1996 - military operations between the Russian federal troops (forces) and the armed formations of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, created in violation of the legislation of the Russian Federation.
In the fall of 1991, in the conditions of the beginning of the collapse of the USSR, the leadership of the Chechen Republic announced the state sovereignty of the republic and its secession from the USSR and the RSFSR. The organs of Soviet power on the territory of the Chechen Republic were dissolved, the effect of the laws of the Russian Federation was canceled. The formation of the armed forces of Chechnya began, headed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the President of the Chechen Republic, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Defense lines were built in Grozny, as well as bases for sabotage warfare in mountainous areas.
The Dudayev regime had, according to the calculations of the Ministry of Defense, 11-12 thousand people (according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, up to 15 thousand) regular troops and 30-40 thousand people of the armed militia, of which 5 thousand were mercenaries from Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, the republics of the North Caucasus and etc.
On December 9, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2166 "On Measures to Suppress the Activities of Illegal Armed Formations on the Territory of the Chechen Republic and in the Ossetian Ingush Conflict Zone". On the same day, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted Resolution No. 1360, which provided for the disarming of these formations by force.
On December 11, 1994, the advance of troops began in the direction of the Chechen capital - the city of Grozny. On December 31, 1994, by order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, troops began an assault on Grozny. Russian armored convoys were stopped and blocked by the Chechens in different parts of the city, the military units of the federal forces that entered Grozny suffered heavy losses.
(Military encyclopedia. Moscow. In 8 volumes 2004)
The further course of events was extremely negatively influenced by the failure of the eastern and western groupings of troops, and the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs also failed to fulfill the task.
Fighting hard, federal troops took Grozny by February 6, 1995. After the capture of Grozny, the troops began to destroy illegal armed groups in other settlements and in the mountainous regions of Chechnya.
From April 28 to May 12, 1995, in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, a moratorium on the use of armed force in Chechnya was implemented.
Illegal armed formations (IAF), using the negotiating process that had begun, carried out the redeployment of part of the forces from mountainous regions to the locations of Russian troops, formed new groups of militants, fired at checkpoints and positions of federal forces, organized terrorist acts of an unprecedented scale in Budennovsk (June 1995), Kizlyar and Pervomaisky (January 1996).
On August 6, 1996, after heavy defensive battles, federal troops left Grozny after suffering heavy losses. The illegal armed groups also entered Argun, Gudermes and Shali.
On August 31, 1996, agreements on the cessation of hostilities were signed in Khasavyurt, ending the first Chechen war. After the conclusion of the agreement, the troops were withdrawn from the territory of Chechnya in the shortest possible time from September 21 to December 31, 1996.
On May 12, 1997, the Treaty on Peace and Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was signed.
The Chechen side, not observing the terms of the agreement, led the line for the immediate withdrawal of the Chechen Republic from Russia. Terror against the employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and representatives of local authorities intensified, and attempts to rally around Chechnya on an anti-Russian basis the population of other North Caucasian republics.
Counterterrorist operation in Chechnya in 1999 2009 (second Chechen war)
In September 1999, a new phase of the Chechen military campaign began, which was called the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus (CTO). The reason for the start of the operation was the massive invasion of Dagestan from Chechnya on August 7, 1999 by militants under the general command of Shamil Basayev and the Arab mercenary Khattab. The group included foreign mercenaries and Basayev's militants.
For more than a month, federal forces fought with the invading militants, which ended with the militants being forced to retreat from Dagestan back to Chechnya.
On the same days - 4 September 16 - in several cities of Russia (Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk) a series of terrorist acts was carried out - the explosions of residential buildings.
Taking into account Maskhadov's inability to control the situation in Chechnya, the Russian leadership decided to conduct a military operation to destroy the militants on the territory of Chechnya. On September 18, the borders of Chechnya were blocked by Russian troops. On September 23, the President of the Russian Federation issued a decree "On Measures to Increase the Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorist Operations in the North Caucasian Region of the Russian Federation," providing for the creation of a Joint Group of Troops (Forces) in the North Caucasus to conduct CTO.
On September 23, Russian aircraft began bombing the capital of Chechnya and its environs. On September 30, a ground operation began - armored units of the Russian army from the Stavropol Territory and Dagestan entered the territory of the Naursky and Shelkovsky regions of the republic.
In December 1999, the entire flat part of the territory of the Chechen Republic was liberated. The militants concentrated in the mountains (about 3,000 people) and settled in Grozny. On February 6, 2000, Grozny was taken under the control of federal forces. To fight in the mountainous regions of Chechnya, in addition to the eastern and western groupings operating in the mountains, a new grouping "Center" was created.
On February 25-27, 2000, "West" units blocked Kharsena, and the "East" grouping closed the militants in the Ulus-Kert, Dachu-Borzoi, Yaryshmardy areas. Ulus-Kert was released on March 2.
The last large-scale operation was the elimination of Ruslan Gelayev's group in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village. Komsomolskoye, which ended on March 14, 2000. After that, the militants switched to sabotage and terrorist methods of warfare, and the federal forces opposed the terrorists with the actions of special forces and the operations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
During the CTO in Chechnya in 2002, a hostage-taking was committed in Moscow at the Theater Center on Dubrovka. In 2004, a hostage-taking was committed at school number 1 in the city of Beslan in North Ossetia.
By the beginning of 2005, after the destruction of Maskhadov, Khattab, Barayev, Abu al-Walid and many other field commanders, the intensity of the sabotage and terrorist activities of the militants significantly decreased. The only large-scale operation of the militants (the raid on Kabardino-Balkaria on October 13, 2005) ended in failure.
From midnight on April 16, 2009, the National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAC) of Russia, on the instructions of President Dmitry Medvedev, canceled the CTO regime on the territory of the Chechen Republic.
The material was prepared based on information from open sources