Shevelev Nikolay Nikolaevich - battalion commander of the 451st operational regiment of the North Caucasian district internal troops, lieutenant colonel.
Born on July 29, 1965 in the village of Yelenovskoye, Krasnogvardeisky District, Krasnodar Territory. Russian. From a peasant family. In 1983 he graduated from high school in his native village and entered the Kiev Civil Engineering Institute.
In December 1983 he was called up for military service in the Internal Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. In 1984, from the troops, he entered the Saratov Higher Military command school The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR named after F.E. Dzerzhinsky, which he graduated with honors in 1988.
For service he was sent to the Ural District of Internal Troops, where he successively passed the positions of platoon commander, deputy commander and company commander, deputy battalion commander, and since 1995 - head of the regiment's combat training group. He served in a military unit in the city of Sverdlovsk (since 1991 - Yekaterinburg).
In 1998 he graduated Military academy named after M.V. Frunze. Since that year, he served in the 451st operational regiment of the North Caucasian District of the Internal Troops (Labinsk, Krasnodar Territory) - senior assistant to the chief of staff of the regiment, battalion commander. Second combatant chechen war, made three business trips to Dagestan and Chechnya.
In April 2000, he arrived in Chechnya for the third time. In mid-April 2000, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe entrance to the Vedeno Gorge, shelling of the checkpoints of the internal troops became more frequent. On April 23, near Serzhen-Yurt in the Argun gorge (Shali region of the Chechen Republic), militants defeated a rear column of paratroopers. It was there that the search and reconnaissance group of the explosives, led by Lieutenant Colonel Shevelev, went on an armored personnel carrier and BMP. On April 26, near the same Serzhen-Yurt, scouts found a detachment of militants in the amount of up to 60 people. Lieutenant Colonel Shevelev decided to start fighting, having previously requested reinforcements by radio.
However, then another group of Chechen fighters found themselves in the rear of the Russian detachment, which struck a "dagger blow" from a grenade launcher, and the soldiers had to fire "as if on two fronts" before the arrival of reinforcements.
After the death of the battalion commander, Lieutenant Kalin took command. By the evening of the same day, the militants were defeated. The losses among the Russian military personnel amounted to 10 people. The militants lost at least 25 people.
He was buried in his native village.
Presidential decree Russian Federation ("Closed") dated March 5, 2001 for the courage and heroism shown in the performance of military duty in the North Caucasus region, Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Nikolaevich Shevelev awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation (posthumously).
He was awarded the medal "For Courage" (24.03.2000).
In the native village of Yelenovskoye, a street and secondary school No. 15, which he graduated from. A memorial plaque is installed on the school building. A bust of the Hero is installed on the territory of the military unit of the Internal Troops in the city of Labinsk. The Krasnogvardeisky District of the Krasnodar Territory hosts the annual football tournament in memory of the Hero of the Russian Federation N.N. Sheveleva.
From the book of Khazretbi Iskhakovich Sidzhah:
In August 1999, as is known, Chechen militants led by Sh.Basaev and an Arab mercenary E. Khattab invaded Dagestan and the so-called second Chechen war broke out.
Since that time, Lieutenant Colonel N.N. Shevelev took part in battles on the territory of Dagestan and Chechnya three times, showing himself to be a courageous, strong-willed and brave commander, capable of skillfully and competently solving all assigned tasks. “In conditions fraught with a risk to life,” says the combat characteristic, “he always showed courage, courage and the ability to make the most appropriate decisions in extreme situations. Directly participating in the counter-terrorist operation on the territory of the Chechen Republic and adjacent regions, he competently and skillfully commanded the unit entrusted to him, developed and personally participated in special operations, during which more than 20 settlements were cleared of militants. "
So, on September 10, 1999, during the battle for height 503.5, which was of great tactical importance, by skillful and decisive actions of the battalion, breaking the fierce resistance of the militants, N.N. Shevelev ensured the capture of an advantageous line and, by organizing dense fire on their positions, did not gave them the opportunity to obstruct the advance of federal troops. During this battle, NN Shevelev personally destroyed 2 machine gun crews and a grenade launcher. And what is very important, the battalion had no losses among personnel and military equipment.
On December 5 and 6, 1999, during a special operation to “clean up” the city of Argun, a battalion under the command of N.N. Shevelev, acting in an organized manner, neutralized two landmines planted under multi-storey buildings, detained 8 people suspected of involvement in the militants, and found a warehouse with weapons containing 11 assault rifles, 2 machine guns and more than 20 thousand cartridges for them. Having shown loyalty to military duty and military comradeship, risking his life, Nikolai Nikolayevich personally carried the wounded BMP driver-technician to a safe place and organized his evacuation to the rear.
Group No. 1 (Mozdok) under the command of Lieutenant-General Vladimir Mikhailovich Chilindin, First Deputy Commander of the North Caucasian Military District, included:
- consolidated detachment 131 Omsbr,
- 481 anti-aircraft missile regiment 19 mdd,
- engineer battalion 170 ISBR,
- consolidated squad 22 separate brigade SPN;
- combined parachute regiment 106 airborne division,
- consolidated paratrooper battalion of the 56th airborne brigade;
- 59th operational regiment of the explosives,
- 81 operational regiment of the explosives,
- 451 operational regiment of the explosives,
– 193 separate battalion operational designation explosives.
In total, in the Mozdok direction, there were: personnel - 6,567 people, 41 tanks, 99 armored personnel carriers, 132 BMP (BMD), guns and mortars - 54.1
No. 1 - Mozdok, Bratskoe, Znamenskoe, Nadterechnoye, Ken-Yurt, Pervomayskaya,
№2 - Mozdok, Foothill, New. Redant, Goragorsk, Kerla-Yurt, Pervomayskaya. 2
Route number 1: Mozdok, Bratskoe, Znamenskoe, Nadterechnoye, Ken-Yurt, Pervomayskaya
Lieutenant Colonel Anatoly Gennadievich Nazarov, commander of the base of the 131st Omsb brigade: "Even on December 10, we were sure that the" Forward! "Commands would not give us, that we would only shake our weapons at the border and return. But at six o'clock in the morning, the command sounded." 3
At 8 a.m. 4 consolidated detachment of the 131st Omsb Brigade under the command of the deputy commander. SKVO Lieutenant General V.M. Chilindina moved towards N of the item. May Day. Behind him, at a distance of about 15-30 kilometers5, was 81 pon BB6, as well as 451 pon (in order to take up defensive positions in the "turn of the road (34889) [?], Fork in the west. Podgornoe (2634)" 7).
The commander of the BS of the 131st Omsb Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel A.G. Nazarov: "The column stretched for thirty kilometers. Ahead - a mine clearance tank, light escort helicopters cover from above. We passed 80 kilometers without encountering resistance. People on the way even waved to us."
Commander of the Internal Troops Colonel-General Anatoly Sergeevich Kulikov: “To feel the nerve of the offensive and see the whole picture, I took off in a helicopter. I took videographer Valery Zhovtobryukh with me, instructing him to shoot everything as it is. as if in an exercise, the 81st operational regiment of the internal troops was walking along its route. "9
Resident with. Nadterechno Akhmed Kelimatov: "By 10:00 the lead vehicle of the convoy entered the village and dragged along the entire line of vehicles. She led the convoy along Lenin Street to the center of the village. After a while, this endless line stalled and stopped."
Resident with. Nadterechno A. Kelimatov: “As soon as I saw that the military was fussing, I decided to go out to them. Introducing myself to a group of officers, I asked about the problems. The captain, without looking up from the map, said:“ Yes, we turned the wrong way and got stuck. ”Indeed, the head the cars, having passed the center of the village, went down to the old floodplain of the Terek. The narrow isthmus of the dirt road through the defensive canal of 1941 could not bear the weight of the armored vehicles. Several cars got stuck in the mud and lay on their side.<...> This day was not without adventures. When the column began to enter the main road, seventy-two-year-old Idris Davletukayev, who solemnly received Dzhokhar Dudayev here two years ago, was overjoyed at the sight of russian troops opened fire from a machine gun into the air. Naturally, the cautious soldiers kicked the dashing old man in the ass and took the machine gun. This is how the first trophy of Russian soldiers appeared on Chechen soil. "11
Positions on the Tersky Pass
By 15:00 11.12 [the detachment] concentrated in the area of \u200b\u200b2 km. east Ken-Yurt in full force and without losses. There was no counteraction during the advance. 12 81 Pon VV was located "at the heights in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Petropavlovskaya village" 13, and 451 Pon VV, probably having completed the task, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe settlement of Petropavlovskaya. Podgornoye (2634) 14.
Resident with. Nadterechno A. Kelimatov: “On this day, the troops marched to the village of Ken-Yurt and on the branches of the river near the Terek ridge began to set up camps, surrounding them with a thorn. documents.<...> In Znamenka, on the right after the crossroads, the brigade of General V.V. Fedotov, which was supposed to provide the military with communications, and behind the garages was the headquarters of the 2nd tactical group (TG-2).
On December 11 and 12, the troops continued the invasion around the clock. The central highway between Mozdok and Tolstoy-Yurt was completely occupied military equipment... The air movement was accompanied by helicopters. "15
Route number 2: Mozdok, Piedmont, Nov. Redant, Goragorsk, Kerla-Yurt, Pervomayskaya
On route number 2 (senior - deputy airborne commander on combat training, Lieutenant General Sigutkin A.A.) advanced - the combined regiment of the 106th Airborne Division and the battalion of the 56th Airborne Brigade [and after it - the Airborne Division], the advance was carried out without hindrance and by 18:00 concentrated 5 km south-west. Komarovo.
The Holy Traffic Regiment of the 106th Airborne Division during the advancement encountered difficulties in overcoming the Tersk ridge. Due to the steepness of the ascent, ice and congestion of automobile equipment, the ascent to the pass was carried out using tractors.16
Outcome
The divisions, in general, coped with the assigned tasks without incurring losses in manpower. This is due to the fact that the areas of nomination were controlled by the anti-Dudaev opposition and the population, on the whole, treated well the army columns in their territory. In the course of completing the tasks, difficulties arose, mainly of a technical nature: they got off the road, equipment got stuck, etc.
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1 Kulikov A. Heavy stars. M., 2002.S. 249. (http://1993.sovnarkom.ru/KNIGI/KULIKOV/KASK-7.htm)
2 Potapov V. Actions of formations, units and subunits of the ground forces during the special operation on the disarmament of illegal armed groups in 1994-96. on the territory of the Chechen Republic. ( http://www.ryadovoy.ru/geopolitika&war/voenteoriya/dok_SKVO_1.htm)
3 Maksimov V., Maslov I. Chronicle of the death of the 131st Maikop brigade // New Newspaper. 1997.29 December. (http://www.allrus.info/APL.php?h\u003d/data/pressa/15/nv291297/nv7ct011.txt)
4 Kulikov A. Heavy stars. M., 2002.S. 255. (http://1993.sovnarkom.ru/KNIGI/KULIKOV/KASK-7.htm)
5 Kulikov A. Heavy stars. M., 2002.S. 261. (http://1993.sovnarkom.ru/KNIGI/KULIKOV/KASK-7.htm)
6 Potapov V. Actions of formations, units and subunits of the ground forces during a special operation to disarm illegal armed groups in 1994-96 on the territory of the Chechen Republic. (http://www.ryadovoy.ru/geopolitika&war/voenteoriya/dok_SKVO_1.htm)
7 Potapov V. Actions of formations, units and subunits of the ground forces during a special operation to disarm illegal armed groups in 1994-96. on the territory of the Chechen Republic. (http://www.ryadovoy.ru/geopolitika&war/voenteoriya/dok_SKVO_1.htm)
8 Maksimov V., Maslov I. Chronicle of the death of the 131st Maikop brigade // Novaya Gazeta. 1997.29 December. (http://www.allrus.info/APL.php?h\u003d/data/pressa/15/nv291297/nv7ct011.txt)
9 Kulikov A. Heavy stars. M., 2002.S. 257. (http://1993.sovnarkom.ru/KNIGI/KULIKOV/KASK-7.htm)
10 Kelimatov A. Chechnya: in the claws of the devil or on the way to self-destruction. M., 2003.S. 395.
11 Kelimatov A. Chechnya: in the claws of the devil or on the way to self-destruction. M., 2003.S. 396.
12 Potapov V. Actions of formations, units and subunits of the ground forces during a special operation to disarm illegal armed groups in 1994-96. on the territory of the Chechen Republic. (http://www.ryadovoy.ru/geopolitika&war/voenteoriya/dok_SKVO_2.htm)
13 Kulikov A. Heavy stars. M., 2002.S. 261. (http://1993.sovnarkom.ru/KNIGI/KULIKOV/KASK-7.htm)
14 Potapov V. Actions of formations, units and subunits of the ground forces during a special operation to disarm illegal armed groups in 1994-96. on the territory of the Chechen Republic. (http://www.ryadovoy.ru/geopolitika&war/voenteoriya/dok_SKVO_1.htm)
15 Kelimatov A. Chechnya: in the claws of the devil or on the way to self-destruction. M., 2003.S. 396.
16 Potapov V. Actions of formations, units and subunits of the ground forces during a special operation to disarm illegal armed groups in 1994-96. on the territory of the Chechen Republic. (
The longer you defend your rights, the more unpleasant the aftertaste.
Mass riots in Tbilisi in 1956: the role of military unit 3219
Military unit 3219 - now the 378th separate Red Banner operational battalion of the Internal Troops (formerly the 451st operational regiment), stationed in the city of Labinsk, Krasnodar Territory, is usually mentioned in connection with the hostilities in the North Caucasus. At the same time, about the previous combat path parts are known to obscene little. Here we will talk about one of its most important milestones - the participation of the then 19 motorized rifle detachment of the internal security (this is how the regiment of internal troops was designated in 1951-1968) of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in the elimination of riots in the Georgian capital in March 1956.
Many of the available descriptions of the Tbilisi events are inclined to demonize the "8th Regiment" (the old actual name of military unit 3219, better remembered in Tbilisi and from there into literature), and even Vladimir Kozlov, the author of a fundamental study on the unrest in the Union, did not escape repetition of erroneous information: "... as F. Baazova testifies, when after midnight (the night of March 9-10 - N.A.) the 8th regiment armed with tanks entered the city, its soldiers unexpectedly, without any warnings, began to shoot schoolchildren and students point-blank".
An analysis of archival documents of the military unit 3219 itself, as well as materials of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, allows one to see a different picture.
How it all began
On March 4, 1956, a crowd gradually gathered in Tbilisi near the monument to Stalin on the embankment of the Kura River, numbering, according to various estimates, from 1 to 2 thousand people. There were mainly young people who were going to honor Stalin's memory on the eve of the next anniversary of his death. This was not the first time of such meetings - mourning meetings took place in March 1954 and 1955.
Although the events were informal, local authorities did not interfere with their conduct and they passed without incident. This time, the police also did not intend to take any special measures, but 25 soldiers, led by an officer, were sent to the department next to the scene of the events from military unit 3219, just in case.
The period from 5 to 7 March was marked by processions, the participants of which paid tribute to the late General Secretary, and an increase in the number of those present at the monument. Perhaps everything would have really worked out relatively painlessly, but big politics intervened. On February 25, Khrushchev made a secret report on Stalin's personality cult, and information leaked on March 6 about the event gradually electrified the crowd. Both the Stalinist sympathies and the national feelings of the Georgians, for whom Stalin was not only a leader, but also a compatriot, were hurt.
(Monument to Stalin in Tbilisi)
On March 8, students with flags and portraits of Stalin, Lenin and Molotov staged a procession along the central streets of the city. Together with the townspeople who joined (there were at least 3 thousand people in total), they began to demand that March 9, the day of Stalin's funeral, be given the status of a mourning day off.
Having voiced the demands, the crowd began to seize all vehicles that came to hand, and at about 11 am a motley convoy of 200-300 buses, trucks and cars, accompanied by those who could not fit on them, moved along Myasnikov Street (now Gorgasali Street) towards the exit from Tbilisi.
The heated demonstrators were going to meet with Marshal Zhu De, the Vice-President of the PRC, who was visiting the USSR at that time. It was impossible to hesitate any longer, and almost at the same time as the advance of the convoy, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia, Lieutenant General Vladimir Dzhandzhgava, ordered to stop the further movement of people and seized vehicles to the government dacha in Krtsanisi, where the marshal was staying.
Leaving the detachment of 25 people mentioned above in place, the commander of the 19th detachment, Colonel P.I. Chernikov used two teams (companies) from the 1st division (battalion) under the command of the chief of staff of the division, Major Kalinin. One team went on a mission without ammunition, the other without weapons at all. Trucks with soldiers were stationed in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Avlabar bridge over the Kura, where it was planned to stop the crowd. Very soon Kalinin realized that Janjgava's order was impracticable - with the available forces, the major could not compete with the avalanche of people and cars.
Both teams rushed further, to the area of \u200b\u200bthe Ortachal hydroelectric station (within the boundaries of Tbilisi). There they nevertheless tried to hinder the demonstration in two ranks, but the cars gradually pushed the soldiers back, and the students and their like-minded people for the first time started showing aggression and began throwing stones and other improvised means. Four of the 19th Detachment, including the senior lieutenant, were injured.
The unrealistic plan of the minister was finally abandoned, and the battered teams were urgently transferred to the dacha to Zhu Te, where there were already 30 cadets from the detachment's training team. They, too, lined up in two ranks already on the near approaches to the dacha to stop those wishing to communicate with the marshal, but, of course, they were powerless in front of a crowd that was a hundred times superior and a hail of stones and bottles.
The only thing left for the soldiers to do was to act as bodyguards for the Chinese guest. From the 24 escort detachment deployed in Tbilisi under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Finenko (military unit 7430), a military reserve of 100 people was allocated for possible operations in the dacha area. However, this time it came through: communication between Tbilisi and Zhu Te took place, and the tension in Krtsanisi began to gradually subside.
(KGB cipher program about the rally in Tbilisi)
By evening, the crowd dispersed, but many of them returned to the Stalin monument.
Janjgava ordered additional patrols from Detachment 19 to be brought out into the streets, and for this purpose, six unarmed groups (platoons) from the very companies that had been busy with violators of the order were sent to different police stations. In addition, the next morning, 40 people from the 24th detachment blocked the Marneuli highway to prevent the influx of additional demonstrators from outside into Tbilisi.
Climax
Although protest activity continued to grow, acquiring an anti-Khrushchev character, until the evening of March 9, the personnel of military unit 3219 did not encounter any serious difficulties. The next few hours more than compensated for this relative calm.
Passions for Stalin were heating up, and shortly before the end of the day, a fatal call was sounded - to move to where the communications and mass media were located in order to inform the country and the world about what was happening in Tbilisi.
According to operational data, up to 30 or even 40 thousand people took part in the protests around the city, and some of these people rushed to the buildings of the Communications House and the editorial offices of the newspapers Komunisti and Zarya Vostoka. All threatened objects were located on Rustaveli Avenue.
Unlike on March 8, this time the law enforcement officers began to prepare for more decisive action, and even before the main warning signals appeared. Already at 20.00, on the order of Janjgava, the patrols of the 19th detachment were removed and went to the unit for weapons. An hour later, a group from the 2nd team that did not participate in the events of the previous days was sent to each edition. At 23.00, a military reserve of 24 detachments - 100 people - was assigned to the duty officer in the city.
Distribution of responsibilities between internal security and The Soviet army for the protection of important facilities, which apparently had an arbitrary character, led to the fact that the personnel of military unit 3219 did not get to the site that turned out to be the most tense that night - the House of Communications. Soldiers of the 1st Mechanized Division (military unit 06770), led by Major General Gladkov himself, fell into this trap (both tactical and later ideological). When the crowd tried to enter the building, shooting started from the street, and at least two soldiers were injured. The warning volleys into the air did not convince people to stop the assault, and as a result, targeted fire was opened, which stopped the onslaught.
"Counteroffensive"
In the first hour of March 10, in another part of Rustaveli Avenue, another crowd approached the newspaper offices, but everything turned out to be surprisingly peaceful: after shouting for a while, the people dispersed. Apparently, the matter was, of course, not in the persuasion of the officers of the 19th detachment, noted in the documents, but simply in the fact that this crowd was initially less aggressive than the crowd at the House of Communications.
It was more difficult in the area adjacent to Rustaveli Avenue Georgiashvili Street (now Chanturia Street), where a crowd of three thousand people besieged the city police officer on duty. The chief of staff of the 19th detachment, Lieutenant Colonel Novozhenov, with the 1st team and a group from the 2nd team was sent to rescue the police and prevent the seizure of weapons in the building. Inquiring about the use of weapons against the attackers, he was instructed by Janjgava, who ordered, when a dangerous situation arose, to first fire a salvo upward, and, if this did not stop the violence, fire to kill.
Trucks with personnel arrived at the scene, and the soldiers, firing several volleys into the air, alarmed the crowd, which threw stones at the building and could break through the frail police cordon at any moment. Taking advantage of the panic that arose, the soldiers of the detachment immediately rushed in a chain to the crowd of young people, and the psychological attack was quickly crowned with success. Thus, it was possible that it was possible to save not only the policemen and weapons from the crowd, but also the crowd from the policemen, because in a moment of despair someone from the circle of the duty officer could well have shot at the violators.
When the threat to important state facilities subsided, it was decided to end the crowd at the monument, and one battalion from the 1st Mechanized Division, headed by the unit commander, Colonel Novikov, using armored vehicles, cordoned off the area from three sides. When the blockade was secured, the 1st and the training teams of the 19th detachment, supported by a group from the 2nd team (about 150 people in total) and 50 police officers, were sent to drive out the public, having a ban on the use of weapons.
Soldiers of military unit 3219, led by Colonel Chernikov, entered from the rear of the monument and, overcoming fierce resistance (a group of people even managed to overturn one of the soldiers onto the pavement and temporarily take possession of his weapon, but the foreman was able to repulse both the soldier and the weapon), began to squeeze protesters and push them off the pedestal.
Suddenly, like at the House of Communications, single shots were heard from the crowd (for example, a man was caught with a TT pistol, who almost shot one of the lieutenants participating in the operation), and the SA battalion opened fire without permission - mostly in the air, but several people still got hit by bullets. The personnel of the 19th detachment also could not stand it and began shooting upwards. Soon the officers managed to calm down the soldiers, and the shocked and beaten crowd began to leave the area in panic along a specially open corridor in the cordon.
This was the end of the active "police" actions for the detachment. Later, he was again involved in patrolling, as well as guarding hospitals, where the bodies of those killed during the riots were removed. According to official data, a total of 21 people were killed, and another 54 were injured of varying severity (the vast majority of all losses were in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Communications House).
Detachment 24 entered the case again, now working together with the police and state security to seize possible instigators and protect them in the internal KGB prison.
In total, on the night of March 9 and in the morning of March 10, about 300 people were indiscriminately arrested, most of whom later had to be released for lack of corpus delicti.
False alarm
Already on March 9, at the rallies, threats were sounded that if the demands of the protesters related to preserving the memory of Stalin and abandoning the course taken by Khrushchev were not satisfied by the 24th, then new protest actions would begin on that day. The state security began to take preventive measures, and the police intensified patrolling, to which the party and Komsomol activists were also connected.
The internal security did not stand aside either. Military unit 3219 allocated 224 people, who until March 26 were involved in the area of \u200b\u200bthe House of Communications, the weapons warehouse of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, police stations and providing road cordons. In addition, one team was sent to the city of Gori, where protest activity was also recorded in the first ten days of March.
But nothing happened either on March 24 or later. It is extremely doubtful that after the events of the night of March 10 and numerous arrests, the people of Tbilisi would have the courage to risk again.
From the facts considered, the following conclusions can be drawn:
Contrary to stereotypes, military unit 3219 was not a ruthless instrument of the “final solution” of the Tbilisi problem, thrown in for reprisals at the last moment, but a “fire brigade” deployed long before things took a very bad turn. Even in the most difficult moments, the soldiers of the 19th detachment did not use weapons to kill, limiting themselves to a frightening effect.
The riots in Tbilisi in March 1956 are surrounded by no less myths than the events that will take place there (even in the same part of the city) in April 1989, and the myth of the "sapper blades" is partly rooted in horror stories about "8 th regiment ". But if attempts to understand what had happened during the years of "perestroika" began immediately, the episode of the "thaw" period waited much longer.
Astashin Nikita Alexandrovich