Historians have an unspoken rule that at least 15-20 years must pass before any reliable assessment can be made. However, in the case of the First Chechen War, everything is completely different and the more time has passed since the beginning of those events, the less they try to remember them. One gets the impression that someone is deliberately trying to make people forget about these most bloody and tragic pages in modern Russia. But society has every right to know the names of the people who unleashed this conflict, in which about three thousand Russian soldiers and officers died and which actually marked the beginning of a whole wave of terror in the country and the Second Chechen one.
The events leading up to the First Chechen War must be divided into two stages. The first is the period from 1990 to 91, when there was still a real opportunity to overthrow Dudayev's regime bloodlessly and the second stage from the beginning of 1992, when the time for normalizing the situation in the republic had already been lost, and the question of a military solution to the problem became only a matter of time.
Stage one. How it all began.
The first impetus to the beginning of events can be considered Gorbachev's promise to give all autonomous republics the status of union and Yeltsin's subsequent phrase - "Take independence as much as you can carry." Desperately fighting for power in the country, they wanted in this way to get support from the inhabitants of these republics and probably did not even imagine what their words would lead to.
A few months after Yeltsin's statement, in November 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, headed by Doku Zavgaev, adopted a declaration on the state sovereignty of Chechen-Ingushetia. Even if, in fact, it was only a formal document, adopted with an eye to gaining greater autonomy and powers, the first bell had already been given. At the same time, a hitherto little-known figure of Dzhokhar Dudayev appears in Chechnya. The only Chechen general in Soviet armywho has never been a Muslim and has state awards per combat operations in Afghanistan began to quickly gain popularity. Perhaps even too fast. In Chechnya, for example, many are still convinced that serious people, sitting in Moscow offices, stood behind Dudayev.
Perhaps these same people helped Dudayev to overthrow the Supreme Soviet with its chairman Doku Zavgaev on September 6, 1991. After the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet, power as such in Chechnya no longer existed. The warehouse of the KGB of the republic, in which there was a rifle regiment for a whole regiment, was looted, all criminals who were there were released from prisons and pre-trial detention centers. However, all this did not prevent on October 26 of the same year the presidential elections were held in which, as expected, Dudayev himself won, and on November 1, the declaration of Chechnya's sovereignty was adopted. It was no longer a bell, but a real ringing of a bell, but the country did not seem to notice what was happening.
The only person who tried to do something was Rutskoi, it was he who tried to declare a state of emergency in the republic, but no one supported him. Yeltsin these days was in his country residence and did not show any attention to Chechnya, and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR did not accept the document on the state of emergency. This was largely due to the aggressive behavior of Rutskoi himself, who stated literally the following during the discussion of the document - "these black-asses must be crushed." This phrase of his almost ended in a fight in the building of the Council and naturally there could be no talk of accepting an emergency.
True, despite the fact that the document was never adopted, several boards with soldiers landed in Khankala (a suburb of Grozny) internal troops, with a total number of about 300 people. Naturally, 300 people had no chance of fulfilling the task and overthrowing Dudaev and, on the contrary, became hostages themselves. For more than a day, the fighters were actually surrounded and, as a result, were taken out of Chechnya by buses. A couple of days later, Dudayev was inaugurated for the presidency, and his authority and power in the republic became unlimited.
Stage two. War becomes inevitable.
After the official inauguration of the Dudayevs as president of Chechnya, the situation in the republic intensified every day. Every second inhabitant of Grozny walked freely with a weapon in his hands, and Dudayev openly declared that all the weapons and equipment that are on the territory of Chechnya belonged to him. And there were a lot of weapons in Chechnya. In the 173rd Grozny training center alone, there were weapons for 4-5 motorized rifle divisions, including: 32 tanks, 32 infantry fighting vehicles, 14 armored personnel carriers, 158 anti-tank installations.
In January 1992, practically not a single soldier remained in the training center and all this mass of weapons was guarded, only by the officers who remained in the military town. Despite this, the federal center did not pay any attention to this, preferring to continue to share power in the country, and only in May 1993, Defense Minister Grachev arrived in Grozny for talks with Dudayev. As a result of the negotiations, it was decided to split all the weapons available in Chechnya 50 to 50, and in June the last one left the republic. russian officer... Why it was necessary to sign this document and leave such a mass of weapons in Chechnya still remains unclear, because in 1993 it was already obvious that the problem could not be solved peacefully.
At the same time, due to the extremely nationalist policy pursued by Dudayev, a massive exodus of the Russian population from the republic is taking place in Chechnya. According to the then Minister of Internal Affairs, Kulikov crossed the border every day up to 9 Russian families per hour.
But the anarchy that was happening in the republic influenced not only the Russian inhabitants in the republic itself, but also the inhabitants of other regions. So, Chechnya was the main producer and supplier of heroin to Russia, also, about 6 billion dollars was seized through the Central Bank as a result of the famous story with fake Avisos and, most importantly, they earned money on this not only in Chechnya itself, received financial benefits from this and in Moscow. Otherwise, how can one explain that in 1992-93 famous people arrived in Grozny almost every month russian politicians and businessmen. According to the recollections of the former mayor of Grozny, Bislan Gantamirov, before each such visit of the "distinguished guests", Dudayev personally gave instructions on the purchase of expensive jewelry, explaining that this is how we solve our problems with Moscow.
It was no longer possible to turn a blind eye to this, and Yeltsin instructs the head of the Moscow Federal Service Counterintelligence (FSK) Savostyanov to carry out an operation to overthrow Dudayev by the forces of the Chechen opposition. Savostyanov made a bet on the head of the Nadterechny region of Chechnya, Umar Avturkhanov, and they began to send money and weapons to the republic. On October 15, 1994, the first assault on Grozny by opposition forces began, but when less than 400 meters remained to Dudayev's palace, someone from Moscow contacted Avturkhanov and ordered him to leave the city. According to the information of the former chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Ruslan Khasbulatov, this “someone” was none other than the organizer of the assault on Savostyanov.
The next attempt at storming by opposition forces was carried out on November 26, 1994, but it also failed miserably. After this assault, Defense Minister Grachev will in every possible way disown the Russian tankers who were captured and declare that Russian army would have taken Grozny within an hour with the forces of one airborne regiment.
Apparently, even in the Kremlin itself, they did not really believe in the success of this operation, because a couple of weeks before this assault, a secret meeting of the Security Council had already taken place in Moscow, completely devoted to the Chechen problem. At this meeting, Minister of Regional Development Nikolai Yegorov and Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev made two polar presentations. Yegorov stated that the situation for the entry of troops into Chechnya is extremely favorable and 70 percent of the republic's population will undoubtedly support this decision, and only 30 will be neutral or will resist. Grachev, on the contrary, in his report emphasized that the entry of troops would not lead to anything good, and we would meet fierce resistance and suggested postponing the entry until the spring so that there would be time to prepare the troops and draw up a detailed plan of the operation. In response to this, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin openly called Grachev a coward and said that such statements were not permissible for the Minister of Defense. Yeltsin announced a break and together with Rybkin, Shumeiko, Lobov and several other unknown members of the government held a closed meeting. As a result, Yeltsin's demand was to prepare a plan of an operation for the introduction of troops within two weeks. Grachev could not refuse the president.
On November 29, the second meeting of the Security Council was held in the Kremlin, at which Grachev presented his plan, and the decision to send troops was finally made. Why the decision was made in such a hurry is not known for certain. According to one version, Yeltsin personally wanted to solve the problem of Chechnya before the new year and thus raise his extremely low rating. According to another, Andrei Kozyrev, a member of the international committee of the State Duma, had information that if the Russian Federation resolves the problem of Chechnya in the near future and in a short time, this will not cause a particular negative reaction from the US administration.
One way or another, the entry of troops took place in extreme haste, which led to the fact that five generals at once, whom Grachev proposed to lead the operation, refused this and only in the middle of December Anatoly Kvashnin agreed to this. Less than two weeks remained before the New Year's storming of Grozny ...
Russia waged numerous wars against the invaders, there were wars as obligations to the allies, but, unfortunately, there were wars, the reasons for which are associated with the illiterate activities of the country's leaders.
History of the conflict
Everything began quite peacefully under Mikhail Gorbachev, who, announcing the beginning of perestroika, actually opened the way for the collapse of a huge country. It was at this time that the USSR, which was actively losing its foreign policy allies, received problems within the state. These problems were primarily associated with the awakening of ethnic nationalism. They were most clearly manifested in the territories of the Baltic States and the Caucasus.
Already at the end of 1990, a National Congress of the Chechen People was convened. It was headed by Dzhokhar Dudayev, Major General of the Soviet Army. The purpose of the congress was to secede from the USSR and create an independent Chechen Republic. Gradually, this decision began to be implemented.
Back in the summer of 1991, a dual power was observed in Chechnya: the government of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR itself and the government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria of Dzhokhar Dudayev continued to work there. But in September 1991, after the unsuccessful actions of the State Emergency Committee, the Chechen separatists felt that a favorable moment had come, and Dudayev's armed guards seized the television center, the Supreme Soviet and the Radio House. In fact, there was a coup d'etat.
Power passed into the hands of the separatists, and on October 27 parliamentary and presidential elections were held in the republic. All power was concentrated in the hands of Dudaev.
Nevertheless, on November 7, Boris Yeltsin considered it necessary to introduce a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic and thereby created the reason for the start of a bloody war. The situation was aggravated by the fact that there was a large amount of Soviet weapons in the republic, which they did not manage to take out.
For some time the situation in the republic was contained. An opposition was formed against Dudayev, but the forces were unequal.
At that time, the Yeltsin government had neither the strength nor the political will to take any effective measures, and, in fact, Chechnya in the period from 1991 to 1994 became practically independent from Russia. It has formed its own authorities, its own state symbols. However, in 1994, the Yeltsin administration decided to restore constitutional order in Chechnya. On its territory were introduced russian troops, which was the beginning of a full-scale war.
The course of hostilities
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Federal aviation attack on airfields in Chechnya. The destruction of militant aircraft |
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The entry of federal troops into the territory of Chechnya |
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Federal troops approached Grozny |
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The beginning of the storming of Grozny |
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Capture of the presidential palace |
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Creation of the group "South" and the complete blockade of Grozny |
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Conclusion of a temporary truce |
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Despite the truce, street fighting continues. Militant detachments leave the city |
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The last region of Grozny was liberated. Formed pro-Russian administration of Chechnya headed by S. Khadzhiev and U. Avturkhanov |
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Taking Arghun |
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Shali and Gudermes taken |
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Fights near the village of Semashki |
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April 1995 |
End of battles in lowland Chechnya |
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The beginning of hostilities in mountainous Chechnya |
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Taking Vedeno |
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The regional centers Shatoi and Nozhai-Yurt were taken |
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Terrorist act in Budennovsk |
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First round of negotiations. Moratorium on fighting For undefined period |
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Second round of negotiations. Agreement on the exchange of prisoners "all for all", the disarmament of the CRI units, the withdrawal of federal troops, the holding of free elections |
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Militants seize Argun, but after the battle are driven out by federal troops |
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Gudermes was captured by militants and a week later cleared by federal troops |
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Elections were held in Chechnya. Defeated Doku Zavgaev |
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Terrorist attack in Kizlyar |
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Militants attack on Grozny |
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Liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev |
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Meeting in Moscow with Z. Yandarbiev. Armistice agreement and prisoner exchange |
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Attacks on militant bases resumed after federal ultimatum |
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Operation Jihad. Separatist attack on Grozny, assault and capture of Gudermes |
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Khasavyurt agreements. Federal troops were withdrawn from Chechnya, and the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001 |
Results of the war
Chechen separatists took the Khasavyurt agreements as a victory. Federal troops were forced to leave Chechnya. All powers of power remained in the hands of the self-proclaimed republic of Ichkeria. Instead of Dzhokhar Dudayev, Aslan Maskhadov took power, who was not much different from his predecessor, but had less authority and was forced to constantly make compromises with the militants.
The war that ended left behind a ruined economy. Towns and villages were not restored. As a result of the war and ethnic cleansing, all representatives of other nationalities left Chechnya.
The internal social environment has changed critically. Those who previously fought for independence, slipped to a criminal showdown. The heroes of the republic have turned into ordinary bandits. They hunted not only in Chechnya, but also throughout Russia. Kidnapping has become a particularly lucrative business. The neighboring regions especially felt this.
Ever since the beginning of Gorbachev's "perestroika", nationalist groups began to "raise their heads" in many republics. For example, the National Congress of the Chechen People, which appeared in 1990. He set himself the task of getting Chechnya out of the Soviet Union. The primary goal was to create a completely independent state entity. The organization was headed by Dzhokhar Dudayev.
When Soviet Union disintegrated, it was Dudayev who announced the withdrawal of Chechnya from Russia. At the end of October 1991, elections were held to the executive and legislative bodies. Dzhokhar Dudayev was elected President of Chechnya.
Internal disagreements in Chechnya
In the summer of 1994 in public education clashes began. On one side were troops who had sworn allegiance to Dudayev. On the other, the forces of the Provisional Council that are in opposition to Dudayev. The latter received unofficial support from Russia. The parties found themselves in a difficult position, the losses were enormous.
Entering troops
At a meeting of the RF Security Council at the end of November 1994, Russia decides to send troops to Chechnya. Then Minister Yegorov said that 70% of the Chechen people would be for Russia in this matter.
On December 11, units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs entered Chechnya. The troops entered at once from 3 sides. The key blow came from the west and east. The northwestern grouping advanced best. Already on December 12, she came close to the settlements located only 10 kilometers from the city of Grozny. Other divisions of the Russian Federation advanced to initial stage successfully. They occupied the north of the republic almost unhindered.
The storming of Grozny
The assault on the capital of Chechnya began a few hours before the chiming clock, which marked the beginning of the New 1995 year. About 250 pieces of equipment were involved. The problem was that:
- The troops were initially ill-prepared.
- There was no coordination between divisions.
- The soldiers did not have any combat experience.
- Maps and aerial photographs of the city are out of date.
At first, armored vehicles were massively used, but then the tactics changed. The paratroopers went into action. In Grozny, grueling street fighting broke out. Only on March 6, the last detachment of separatists, led by Shamil Basayev, retreated from the city. A new pro-Russian administration was immediately formed in the capital. These were "elections on the bones", because the capital was completely destroyed.
Control over plain and mountainous areas
By April, federal troops had occupied almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya. Because of this, the separatists switched to sabotage and partisan attacks. In the mountainous regions, it was possible to take control of a number of important settlements. It is noted that many separatists managed to leave. Militants often deployed part of their forces to other areas.
After the terrorist attack in Budennovsk, where a large number of people were injured and killed from 2 sides, it was possible to achieve the introduction of an indefinite moratorium on further hostilities.
At the end of June 1995, we agreed:
- about the exchange of prisoners according to the formula "all for all";
- about the withdrawal of troops;
- on holding elections.
However, the truce was violated (and more than once!). Throughout Chechnya, small local clashes took place, so-called self-defense units were formed. In the second half of 1995, towns and villages passed from hand to hand. In mid-December, Russian-backed elections were held in Chechnya. They were nevertheless recognized as valid. The separatists boycotted everything.
In 1996, militants not only attacked various cities and villages, but also attempted to attack Grozny. In March of that year, they even managed to subjugate one of the districts of the capital. But federal troops managed to repel all attacks. True, this was done at the cost of the lives of many soldiers.
Liquidation of Dudaev
Naturally, from the very beginning of the conflict in Chechnya, the Russian special services were faced with the task of finding and neutralizing the leader of the separatists. All attempts to kill Dudayev were in vain. But the secret services received important information that he likes to talk on a satellite phone. On April 21, 1996, two Su-25 attack aircraft, having received coordinates thanks to the bearing of the telephone signal, fired 2 missiles at Dudayev's cortege. As a result, it was eliminated. The militants were left without a leader.
Negotiating with the separatists
As you know, in 1996 presidential elections were to be held in Russia itself. Yeltsin needed victories in Chechnya. The war dragged on, it aroused mistrust among the Russians. Our young soldiers perished on "foreign" land. After the May negotiations, an armistice and an exchange of prisoners were announced on June 1.
Following the consultations in Nazran:
- elections were to be held on the territory of Chechnya;
- the militant units were to be completely disarmed;
- federal troops will be withdrawn.
But this truce was again violated. Nobody wanted to give in. Terror attacks began again, blood flowed like a river.
New battles
After Yeltsin's successful re-election, fighting in Chechnya resumed. In August 1996, the separatists not only fired at checkpoints, but also took Grozny, Argun and Gudermes by storm. More than 2,000 Russian servicemen died in the battles for Grozny alone. How much more could there be to lose? Because of this, the authorities in the Russian Federation agreed to sign the famous agreements on the withdrawal of federal troops.
Khasavyurt agreements
August 31 was the last day of summer and the last day of hostilities. In the Dagestani city of Khasavyurt, sensational armistice agreements were signed. The final decision on the future of the republic was postponed "on the back burner". But the troops had to be withdrawn.
Outcome
Chechnya remained an independent republic, but no one legally recognized it as a state. The ruins remained as they were. The economy has been extremely criminalized. Due to the incessant ethnic cleansing and active fighting, the country was "crucified". Almost the entire civilian population left the republic. There was not only a crisis in politics and economics, but also an unprecedented growth of Wahhabism. It was he who served as the reason for the invasion of militants into Dagestan, and then for the beginning of a new war.
Causes: On September 6, 1991, an armed coup took place in Chechnya - the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was dispersed by armed supporters of the Executive Committee of the National Congress of the Chechen People. The pretext was that on August 19, 1991, the party leadership in Grozny, in contrast to the Russian leadership, supported the actions of the State Emergency Committee.
With the consent of the leadership of the Russian parliament, from a small group of deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and representatives of the OKChN, the Provisional Supreme Council was created, which was recognized by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation as the highest authority in the republic. However, less than 3 weeks later, the OKChN dissolved it and announced that it was taking over the full power.
On October 1, 1991, by the decision of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, the Chechen-Ingush Republic was divided into the Chechen and Ingush Republics (without defining borders).
At the same time, elections were held for the parliament of the Chechen Republic. According to many experts, all this was just a staging (10-12% of voters participated, voting took place only in 6 out of 14 regions of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic). In some areas, the number of voters has exceeded the number of registered voters. At the same time, the executive committee of the OKChN announced a general mobilization of men between the ages of 15 and 65 and brought its National Guard to full combat readiness.
The Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR officially announced the non-recognition of these elections, since they were held in violation of the current legislation.
By his first decree on November 1, 1991, Dudayev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI) from the RSFSR, which was not recognized by either the Russian authorities or any foreign states.
Effects
On December 1, 1994, a decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On some measures to strengthen law and order in the North Caucasus" was issued, which ordered all persons who illegally possess weapons to voluntarily surrender them by December 15 to Russian law enforcement agencies.
On December 11, 1994, on the basis of the decree of the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin "On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic," units of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs entered the territory of Chechnya.
On August 16, 1996, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev and Alexander Lebed in the village of Novye Atagi announced the creation of a supervisory commission to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire conditions, as well as a supervisory council, which was to include the secretaries of the Security Councils of Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria.
On August 31, 1996, the Khasavyurt agreements were concluded between the Russian Federation and the CRI, according to which the decision on the status of the CRI was postponed until 2001. It was also supposed to exchange prisoners on the principle of “all for all”, about which human rights activists discretely said that “this condition was not observed by the Chechens”.
In 1997, Aslan Maskhadov was elected president of the CRI.
2I am company:
It started in 1999 and actually lasted until 2009. The most active combat phase fell on 1999-2000
RESULTS
Despite the official cancellation of the counter-terrorist operation, the situation in the region has not become calmer, rather the opposite. Militants leading partisan war, became more active, more frequent cases of terrorist acts. Since the fall of 2009, a number of major special operations have been carried out to eliminate bandit formations and militant leaders. In response, a series of terrorist attacks were committed, including, for the first time in a long time, in Moscow. Fighting clashes, terrorist attacks and police operations take place not only in Chechnya, but also in Ingushetia, Dagestan, and Kabardino-Balkaria. In some territories, the CTO regime was repeatedly introduced temporarily.
Some analysts believed that the escalation could escalate into a "third Chechen war."
In September 2009, the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Rashid Nurgaliev, said that in 2009 more than 700 militants had been neutralized in the North Caucasus. ... The head of the FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, said that almost 800 militants and their accomplices were detained in the North Caucasus in 2009.
Beginning on May 15, 2009, Russian security forces stepped up operations against militant groups in the mountainous regions of Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan, which triggered a retaliatory intensification of terrorist activities by the militants.
Artillery and aircraft are periodically involved in the operations.
Culture of the USSR at the turn of the 1980s-1990s
Culture and restructuring. At the turn of the 80s and 90s, there were changes in government policy in the spiritual life of society. This was expressed, in particular, in the refusal of cultural authorities from administrative methods of managing literature, art, and science. Periodicals - the newspapers Moskovskie Novosti, Argumenty i Fakty, and the Ogonyok magazine became an arena for heated public debate. The authors of the published articles attempted to understand the reasons for the "deformations" of socialism, to determine their attitude to the perestroika processes. The disclosure of previously unknown facts of Russian history of the post-October period caused a polarization of public opinion. A significant part of the liberal-minded intelligentsia actively supported the reformist course of Mikhail Gorbachev. But many groups of the population, including specialists and scientists, saw in the reforms being carried out a "betrayal" of the cause of socialism and actively opposed them. Different attitude the transformations taking place in the country led to conflicts in the governing bodies of creative associations of the intelligentsia. At the end of the 1980s, several Moscow writers formed an alternative to the USSR Writers' Union committee "Writers in support of perestroika" ("April"). An identical association was formed by the Leningrad writers ("Commonwealth"). The creation and activity of these groups led to the split of the Union of Writers of the USSR. The Union for the Spiritual Revival of Russia, created on the initiative of scientists and writers, announced support for the democratic reforms taking place in the country. At the same time, some representatives of the intelligentsia negatively greeted the course of perestroika. The views of this part of the intelligentsia were reflected in an article by N. Andreeva, a teacher at one of the universities, “I cannot compromise my principles,” published in March 1988 in the newspaper “Soviet Russia”. The beginning of "perestroika" gave rise to a powerful movement for the liberation of culture from ideological pressure.
The desire for a philosophical understanding of the past touched the art of cinema (T. Abuladze's film "Repentance"). Numerous studio theaters arose. New theater groups tried to find their way in art. Exhibitions were organized by artists little-known to a wide circle of spectators of the 80s - P.N. Filonov, V.V. Kandinsky, D.P.Shterenberg. With the collapse of the USSR, the all-union organizations of the creative intelligentsia ceased their activities. The results of perestroika for the national culture turned out to be complex and ambiguous. Cultural life has become richer and more diverse. At the same time, the perestroika processes for science and the education system turned out to be significant losses. Market relations began to penetrate into the sphere of literature and art.
Ticket number 6
Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union in the late 20th - early 21st century
On June 25, 1988, an agreement on trade and cooperation between the EEC and the USSR was signed, and on June 24, 1994, a bilateral agreement on partnership and cooperation between the European Union and Russia (entered into force on December 1, 1997). The first meeting of the EU-Russia Cooperation Council took place in London on January 27, 1998.
In 1999-2001. The European Parliament adopted a series of critical resolutions on the situation in Chechnya.
"If we began to conduct a normal dialogue with Maskhadov and Dudayev, I think there would be no such bloodshed"
“You don’t expect beautiful stories from me about the Chechen war,” my interlocutor begins. - I don't know how to tell them. And war is filth. How can you tell about dirt beautifully? War is also pain. Is there any romance in pain?
I agree with him. War must be talked about simply and honestly. Or be silent. However, no, you cannot be silent. And now, after dozens of films have been shot about the Chechen war, hundreds of books have been written, we are remembering it again. Including in order to find out whether all wounds have been licked? Who are Chechens today for “Chechens” (soldiers who went through the war)?
Valery YURIEV, deputy commander of one of the reconnaissance units of the Airborne Forces, went through both Chechen campaigns from start to finish. Its unit lost 46 fighters, 11 received the title of Hero of Russia (there were more than 800 people in total).
REFERENCE "MK"
Valery Yuriev was born in 1957 in Mariupol. Colonel of the Reserve Guard. Military service was in intelligence Airborne troops and in the GRU General Staff. He was the commander of a reconnaissance platoon, a company, an airborne battalion, chief of staff of an airborne regiment, a teacher at the Military Diplomatic Academy, etc. Participated in hostilities in Afghanistan, in two Chechen campaigns, in Dagestan; in resolving interethnic conflicts - in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh; in a peacekeeping operation - in Bosnia and Herzegovina (former Yugoslavia). He was awarded two Orders of the Red Star, two Orders of Courage, the Order for Military Merit, the Medal for Military Merit and other medals, personal firearms.
"Novorossia reminds me of Chechnya"
- You probably asked yourself the question more than once - could this war be prevented? Found the answer?
- I did not ask, because I always knew it was possible. The leaders of Chechnya, Dudayev and Maskhadov, were professional soldiers. One is a general, the other is a colonel. Literate people, not religious fanatics, not Nazis. If a normal dialogue had been started with them from the very beginning, then I think there would not have been such bloodshed. But they were simply ignored, as the Donetsk and Lugansk republics are now ignored in Ukraine.
- Aren't you afraid to draw such historical parallels?
- Not. The Ukrainian authorities in Donetsk and Lugansk would have allowed to speak Russian, they would have given some kind of independence, and there would have been no war. But the leadership of today's Ukraine did not make concessions. And this is what is happening now ...
A similar situation was then with Chechnya. If Yeltsin and his entourage had entered into a dialogue (it's no secret that Chechnya is financed better than many regions now, so why didn't they give it money from the very beginning?), They would not have generated such popular resistance.
- Tell us how Chechnya met you then, 20 years ago.
- About a month and a half before the start of hostilities, our unit was concentrated at the airfield in Mozdok (North Ossetia). I, as the deputy commander of the unit, was responsible for combat training. And in spite of all the prohibitions (it was impossible to shoot there), I organized firing from all types of weapons, except for heavy machine guns. He taught the guys tactics. I knew what war was, and I trained soldiers seriously. But we were not faced with specific tasks.
The reconnaissance groups of our unit by that time, of course, were already on the territory of Chechnya. That is, until the official entry of troops (this date is December 11, 1994).
- What were they doing there?
- The main task was to understand whether there would be resistance from the local population and, if so, to what extent.
- So you had a hope that everything would work out?
- Yes! We didn’t believe there would be a big confrontation. But then intelligence reported that the situation was serious. My subordinates talked with the leaders of the gangs - they unequivocally said that they would go to the end.
- You personally with local residents communicated? What did they say?
- You see, I communicated with them when this war was already unleashed. The first Chechen campaign began with the storming of Grozny, the massive use of troops, when everyone mixed in a bloody mess - both Chechens and ours. There is no time for talking.
Photo from personal archive
But in the second Chechen campaign there was time for that. Our unit was part of the "Vostok" grouping, it was headed by Gennady Troshev, who at one time lived in Grozny and knew the Chechen language. And his main course was not to suppress the separatists, but to dialogue. Then there were meetings with local residents (especially with the elders). We persuaded them to believe that armed resistance is pointless, because it will only lead to the destruction of cities and death of people. The elders treated with understanding and did everything to get the gangs out of the settlements that our troops occupied. Sometimes even without a fight. I think it was thanks to the elders that Akhmat Kadyrov came over to our side.
- Military historians believe that the first soldiers were the first chechen war were just cannon fodder. Do you agree?
- Defense Minister Pavel Grachev is a former paratrooper himself. In Afghanistan, he severely punished commanders who had losses. But here politics intervened. And mistakes followed one after another. And each cost lives. Just one example. From the servicemen of the Kantemirovskaya and Taman divisions, supposedly tank units of volunteers were formed, which entered Grozny without any cover. It was not clear why they even entered there ?! I am sure it was a deeply thought-out provocation. As a result, they were surrounded by local formations, taken prisoner, and most of the people were killed.
- Is it true that the troops were often commanded by the special services, and not the Ministry of Defense?
- To some extent. The input of troops should be dealt with by the army command, and sometimes it was not it that was engaged, but it is not clear who. Everything was stupid and unlucky organized. And this was evident even in the smallest details. Once I was returning from an operation and noticed a signal flare in the sky. I approached and saw the following picture: one Russian soldier was standing at his post, unhappy, frightened, not understanding anything. He allegedly guards a small group of servicemen who sleep in the same place. It didn't even take the fighters 5 minutes to lay them all down! Who is fighting like that ?! What is this preparation?
- But when you went to Chechnya, you did not harbor illusions about the political situation? Weren't you scared because the orders coming from above are completely ill-considered or even criminal?
- Not scary. Until they start shooting, many people think that this is not happening to them.
And there is no discussion about the execution of orders in the army. And the murder of a person is essentially a crime. And we all went to kill. You see, since I was from Afghanistan, where I was the commander of a reconnaissance company, I was used to carrying out even stupid orders of the chiefs with the highest quality and with minimal losses. They told me: go straight and capture this settlement. I told them "is!" and walked not directly, but to the left, but captured. In the end, the task is completed, and the winners are not judged.
- Yes, our company took part in this operation, but personally, unfortunately, I was on vacation. When our losses began - four people were wounded in my unit - I returned on my own initiative: I deceived my wife, said that I was being summoned, got on a plane and flew in.
The assault was completely unprepared, and this was not so much the fault of the military as of the politicians. It was they who gave an unexpected command to occupy Grozny, no matter what. Due to the haste, the units were even manned by sailors from the ships! Team hodgepodge, roughly speaking. Plus it was the end of 1994, the army was in moral decline after all the coups. In those years, if an officer walked along a Moscow street in uniform, he could be caught and beaten. Why do you think then the Ministry of Defense allowed officers to go to work in "civilian"?
We in Chechnya did not understand how we should generally act in this or that situation. Once I listened to the negotiations, I learned that our convoy of 200 vehicles in one of the settlements was stopped by the local population. The commanders ask: “What to do? We are not OMON, we do not have the means to disperse the demonstration. " As a result, the column turned around. The task was thwarted.
And against the backdrop of all this, Grozny is storming ...
Terrible during the Chechen war. Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev
"The cards were old, and the soldiers were too young."
- What shocked you in this war?
- The fact that some Chechens acted like savages: they cut their throats, cut off their ears and fingers. I'm sure: mentally normal person can't do that. They used it all for one purpose - to intimidate. You know, I am glad that none of my soldiers was taken prisoner or tortured. All 46 people I lost were killed in battle.
- But at the same time, the Chechens fought competently, professionally?
- Well, how can a peasant fight competently? Of course, nothing like that happened, especially at the initial stage. But they had advantages. Here again I will give a parallel with Afghanistan. Everyone said: they say, Afghans are more enduring and better warriors. We fought with them in the highlands, each carrying weapons and equipment of 40 kg. And the Afghan carried a maximum of 5 kg: a submachine gun, thin pants and a T-shirt, a handful of nuts, a flask of water. Which of us will be tougher? So it is here. The Chechens fought on their own terrain. And we didn’t know where we were going, because the maps were old.
But the main thing is that the Chechens had higher motivation, they knew what they were fighting for. And we just followed the order. Our soldiers are conscripts, youth. And what about them? Grown bearded men who are not afraid to die.
“But we had quite a few contract soldiers who went to kill for money.
- In the first campaign, there were practically none. And it would be wrong to say unequivocally that the contractors went exactly for money. And was it big money? On average, 15-18 thousand. Mercenaries in any foreign army are paid ten times more. There were many who fought for the idea.
- What ?!
- The idea appears when your friend is killed in front of your eyes. Then the desire for revenge is already born. I knew those who in the first campaign were conscripts, and in the second they came as a contract soldier, and precisely because to get even for their murdered friend.
And here's another case "about money." Andrei Nepryakhin worked in the security service of Lukoil, received a lot of money, and went to fight in Chechnya. Why? Because he wanted to save the youth - he had experience, he was the battalion's deputy commander. As a result, he headed one of our groups near Gudermes. She came to the place of death of the 6th company first, ensured the evacuation of the survivors, then took out the bodies of the dead. During another operation, he was wounded, but he remained to cover his group. Received the title of Hero of Russia.
- Were Chechens trained during the second campaign by foreign special services, or is it a duck?
- Yes, but not as massively as they are trying to present. These were special services mainly from the Middle East, Arab. And in the course of the war, the Chechens learned from their own experience, accordingly, the tactics of their actions were constantly improved, based on the experience they received.
- How did you prepare your soldiers?
- Up to a sweat. A soldier should not be spared at all during training, it will save his life in battle. He must know what maneuver to do in what situation. When to shoot, when to lie down, when to run and where. Only in this case he has a chance to survive. When the shooting starts, it is useless to command. You will not be heard. My voice is hoarse, you think, from what? From screaming.
Let me give you another example. For the machine - 450 rounds, each weighing 10 grams, totaling 4.5 kg. I ordered to carry two ammunition sets, that is, 9 kg each. Heavy. But I knew that they were definitely enough for a fighter to fight. It's bad when individual commanders, ostensibly caring for their subordinates, say: come on, don't take a lot of ammunition with you. And, as a rule, if they are surrounded, they run out of cartridges within 10 minutes.
- What about the discipline they had and we? I once spoke with a man who had gone through two Chechen campaigns. He talked about the drugs they had. About drunkenness, which was arranged before the fight in order to gain courage.
- In our reconnaissance company it was ruled out, but in other divisions everything could be. I remember that in Afghanistan the Americans used such tactics as free distribution of heroin to discredit and disintegrate our army. The scourge boys ran along the barbed wire and for the jar of porridge, for the gloves they gave our soldiers a bundle like a package of ascorbic acid. The main task, of course, was not to make money, but to spread this poison.
About alcohol - we did not have any combat hundred grams. But in the markets the Chechens sold alcohol, there was an opportunity to buy and get drunk. And yet I will not say that there was some kind of unrestrained drunkenness. The soldiers were under strong control.
- And the Chechen militants went into battle high?
- Once we arrived in Khasavyurt, a day or two before that there was a bloody battle, and I see: the bodies of militants are lying, and syringes are lying around.
- However, their leadership thought more than soundly. What was only the Khasavyurt agreement worth ... By the way, how was it signed?
- A special detachment of our unit ensured the safety of the delegation headed by Alexander Lebed. Our military was 10 people, and they were actually going to death. We understood that they could be shot at any moment. They rode in Niva jeeps, each car had one authoritative Dagestani as a guarantor of security. But rather it was a formality - his presence would hardly have saved.
The agreement was signed on enslaving terms, it's true. We pledged to withdraw the troops, but the most important thing is that in fact, in 5 years, Chechnya was supposed to secede from Russia.
Unfortunately, it was not without betrayal both in political circles and in the military. Throughout the campaign, secret information was "leaked" to the Chechens. I think for the money. For big money. Who paid? Arabs mostly. But the Americans also took part in this, but what about without them, "relatives" ...
- Did the Chechen commanders give a reward for your head?
- No, as far as I know. But they threatened our families with violence. Our wives and children then lived in a military town - I will not name the place, and they were heavily guarded. Nothing happened to anyone.
- Are the Chechens your enemies now? What is your general attitude to the current leadership of Chechnya?
- No, not enemies. They are part of our people, and this is how I treat them. With their "bounces", of course. But what nationality doesn't have them? I have a close friend - a Chechen. And the Chechens are now “more Russian than the Russians themselves,” and this is the merit of the current leadership of Russia and Chechnya.
- Have you been to Chechnya after the war?
- No never. Probably, I would like to look at modern Grozny. But I can see what he has become on TV. Sometimes I can't even believe it. In my memory, after all, this is a city where devastation, blood, pain, tears reign ...