ACT OF RECEPTION OF THE NARKOMATS OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR
S. K. Timoshenko from K. E. Voroshilov *
ACT
Pursuant to the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of May 8, 1940, No. 690, when Comrade Timoshenko's People's Commissariat of Defense was received from Comrade Voroshilov, in the presence of Comrades. Zhdanov, Malenkov and Voznesensky, the reports of the chiefs were heard central offices and set the following:
ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE CENTRAL OFFICE
1. The current regulation on the People's Commissariat of Defense, approved by the Government in 1934, is outdated, does not correspond to the existing structure and does not reflect the modern tasks assigned to the People's Commissariat of Defense. The newly created directorates: the Main Directorate of the Red Army, the Directorate of Military-Technical Supply, the Directorate of Supply, the Directorate of Food, Conveyance and Clothing Supply, the Directorate of Small Arms and Miner Arms, the Directorate of Higher Military Educational Institutions, the Directorate of Fuel Supply and the Office of the Chief of Infantry - exist under temporary provisions. The structure of other directorates (General Staff, Artillery Administration, Communications Directorate, Building and Apartment Directorate, Air Force Directorate and Inspection Directorate) has been changed, and the provisions on these changes have not been approved.
With 34 independent directorates and departments and an insufficiently clear distribution of responsibilities between the deputies of the People's Commissar, there was often a delay in resolving issues in the non-profit organizations' departments.
* Document not dated. The decision on the need to “hand over and take over non-profit organizations” was made by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on May 8, 1940. K. Ye. Voroshilov was asked to hand over the files to SK Timoshenko “within no more than 10 days”. On the same day, a similar decision was made by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. On the litter document: “Printed in 5 copies. 7.12.40 ". The document was sent out: copy. No. 1 - to I.V. Stalin 12.16.40, specimen. No. 2 - deputy. Chief of the General Staff N.F.Vatutin on January 23, 1941, copy. No. 3. VM Molotov 16.12.40 and specimen. No. 5 - to K. E. Voroshilov 12.12.40, specimen. No. 4 is filed into the case. ** See Appendix 1.
298
2. In the army, there are up to 1080 titles of current charters, instructions and manuals. The main charters - Field Service, Internal Service, Disciplinary and some combat charters of the combat arms are outdated and require radical revision. Missing: instruction in the leadership of large military units (armies), instruction in the attack and defense of fortified areas, and instruction in the actions of troops in the mountains.
3. Most of the military units exist in temporary states, not approved by the People's Commissar. Established and service facilities are launched. About 1400 states and timesheets, according to which the troops live and are supplied, have not been approved by anyone and published for leadership as temporary.
4. Questions of military legislation and systematization of orders of the People's Commissar of Defense have not been established. There are many orders requiring cancellation or revision as outdated and complicating the leadership of the troops.
5. Control over the execution of orders and decisions of the Government was not sufficiently organized. There was no lively effective leadership of the training of troops. Field verification as a system was not carried out and was replaced by the receipt of paper reports.
OPERATIONAL TRAINING
1. By the time the People's Commissariat of Defense was accepted and handed over, there was no operational plan for the war, no operational plans, both general and specific, had been developed and are missing.
The General Staff has no data on the state of border cover. The decisions of military councils of districts, armies and the front on this issue are unknown to the General Staff.
2. Management of the operational training of the highest command personnel and staffs was expressed only in planning it and issuing directives. Since 1938, the People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff themselves did not conduct classes with the highest command personnel and staffs. There was almost no control over operational training in the districts. The People's Commissariat of Defense is lagging behind in the development of questions of the operational use of troops in modern warfare.
3. The preparation of theaters of operations for war is extremely weak in all respects. As a result:
a) VOSO did not show proper maneuverability in the use of available rail vehicles for military transport.
Governance regulations railways in the theater of war, clearly defining the functions of the NKPS bodies and the VOSO bodies, as well as the procedure for transportation, does not exist.
b) The construction of highways is proceeding, slowly and is being carried out by many organizations (Guzdor, Glavdorupr, Gulag of the NKVD), which leads to the dispersion of forces and resources and the absence of a general road construction plan.
c) The construction of communications on the NCC line lags far behind, and on the NCO line in 1940 it was disrupted completely due to the late submission by the General Staff and the Communications Department of applications for construction materials and the non-release of those. Cabling and the use of sealed bronze wires is extremely limited.
d) In terms of aerodrome, the territory of Western Belarus, Western Ukraine, OdVO and ZakVO is extremely poorly prepared.
e) There is no clear and precise plan for the preparation of theaters in engineering terms, following from the operational plan. The main lines and the entire system of engineering training are not defined.
f) The directives approving the construction plan of the SD for 1940 were not given to the districts by the time the Narcrmat was admitted.
The system of the pre-field has not been finally developed, and in the districts this issue is resolved in different ways.
Armament issues for the newly created fortified areas require the earliest resolution, primarily new U Rov on the western border.
g) From a topographic point of view, theaters of military operations are far from being prepared enough and the need of troops for maps is not provided.
TROOPS ARRANGEMENT AND STRUCTURE
1. The People's Commissariat does not have an accurately established actual number of the Red Army at the time of admission. Due to the fault of the Main Directorate of the Red Army, personnel records are in an extremely neglected state.
2. The personnel of the troops consisted of personnel and assigned personnel; the plan for the dismissal of the assigned personnel is in the process of being developed.
3. The regulation on the passage of service of private and junior command personnel, issued in 1931, is outdated, unsuitable for leadership, and no one uses it. No new regulation has been drawn up to determine the order of service.
4. On the organization of troops "- there are no regulations on the control of units (regiments), formations (divisions and brigades). The regulations on the military economy are outdated and require revision. The regulations on field control of troops have not been developed.
MOBILIZATION TRAINING
1. In connection with the war1 "and the significant redeployment of troops, the mobilization plan was violated. The People's Commissariat of Defense has no new mobilization plan.
Regulatory mobilization measures are not finished with development.
2. The People's Commissariat of Defense has not yet eliminated the following shortcomings of the mobilization plan, an autopsy during a partial mobilization in September 1939:
a) the extreme neglect of the accounting of the reserve liable for military service, since the re-accounting has not been carried out since 1927;
b) the absence of a unified registration of persons liable for military service and the existence of a separate special registration of railway workers, water transport and the NKVD;
c) the weakness and poor work of the military enlistment offices;
d) the lack of priority in the mobilization of units, which led to an overload of the first days of mobilization;
e) the unrealistic plans for the deployment of troops during mobilization;
f) the unreality of the plan for the supply of uniforms during mobilization;
g) uneven growth in the mobilization of conscripts, horse-drawn personnel and vehicles;
h) the lack of a firmly established order in the reservation of labor for wartime;
i) unreality and unsatisfactory state of registration of horses, carts, harnesses and vehicles.
3. Among the reserves liable for military service are 3,155,000 untrained people. The People's Commissariat of Defense has no training plan for them. Among the trained personnel are registered military reserves with insufficient training and in a number of specialties; the mobilization need for specialists is not covered. The People's Commissariat of Defense also does not have a plan to retrain specialists and retrain poorly trained personnel.
4. Manuals on mobilization work in the troops and military registration and enlistment offices, recognized as obsolete, have not been revised.
STATE OF STAFF
By the time the People's Commissariat of Defense was accepted, the army had a significant shortage of command personnel, especially in the infantry, reaching 21% of the regular strength on May 1, 1940.
It was found that the annual graduation from military schools did not provide the creation of the necessary reserves for the growth of the army and the formation of reserves.
The quality of the training of command personnel is low, especially at the platoon-company level, in which up to 68% have only a short 6-month training course for junior lieutenant.
The training of command personnel in military schools is unsatisfactory due to the poor quality of programs, disorganization of classes, insufficient workload of study time and especially weak field practical training. Improvement of the command staff of the cadre is not properly organized. The disadvantage of training programs for commanders in military educational institutions is: conducting classes mainly in classrooms, insufficient field studies, saturation of programs with general subjects to the detriment of the military.
In matters of conferring military ranks, there is no firmly established system, and in a number of cases there was a campaign of campaigning. This was facilitated by the lack of periodic certification of command personnel. The existing certification procedure does not reveal the business qualities of the commander and the work of the commander in the combat training of his unit. This happens because the commanding staff have largely withdrawn from the certification and selection of personnel, which is often carried out by political agencies.
The records of the command personnel are set unsatisfactorily and do not reflect the command personnel with combat experience. There are no candidate lists.
When appointing the command staff, the Personnel Directorate did not sufficiently attract the chiefs of the corresponding branches of the troops and services.
The norms for replenishment of command personnel for wartime have not been developed. Accounting and preparation of the command staff of the reserve are in an unsatisfactory state.
There was no plan for the preparation and replenishment of the reserve commanders for the complete mobilization of the army in wartime.
COMBAT TRAINING OF THE TROOPS
The main drawbacks in troop training are:
1) Low training of the middle command personnel in the company-platoon level and especially poor training of the junior command personnel.
2) Poor tactical training in all types of combat and reconnaissance, especially small units.
3) Unsatisfactory practical field training of troops and their inability to perform what is required in a combat situation.
4) Extremely weak training of combat arms for interaction on the battlefield: the infantry does not know how to cuddle up to the barrage and break away from it, artillery cannot support tanks, aviation cannot interact with ground troops.
5) Troops are not trained in skiing.
6) The use of camouflage is poorly worked out.
7) The troops have not worked out fire control.
8) The troops are not trained to attack fortified areas, to set up and overcome obstacles and to cross rivers. The reasons for this are:
1) Incorrect training and education of troops.
In the combat training of troops, many conventions are allowed, troops are not trained in an environment close to combat reality, in relation to the requirements of theaters of operations.
The widespread use of the system of conventions in the training and education of troops created in the troops a wrong idea of \u200b\u200bthe harsh reality of war.
The troops are little trained in the field for the practical implementation of everything necessary for combat. "Endurance, physical conditioning and the desire to carry out orders unquestioningly, accurately and quickly, in spite of any difficulties and overcoming them, are not trained and instilled enough.
Instead, false democracy is often allowed, undermining the authority of the commander.
2) The programs and plans of combat training are incorrectly constructed, leading to the fact that the branches of the armed forces are engaged in isolation, the periods of training and live firing of their identical subdivisions do not coincide in time and are insufficiently provided for materially.
STATE OF THE BRANCHES OF THE Troops
1. Infantry: a) the organization, armament and training of the infantry is not given due attention;
b) the infantry is prepared weaker than all other types of troops;
c) the accumulation of a prepared infantry stock is insufficient;
d) the command staff of the infantry is poorly trained and has a large shortage;
e) infantry armament lags behind modern combat requirements and is not provided with mortars and machine guns.
2. Voyenn about-in air forces. The material part of the Red Army Air Force in its development over the past three years lags behind the aviation of the advanced armies of other countries in terms of speed, range, engine power and aircraft armament. The People's Commissariat of Defense (Directorate of the Air Force) did not show sufficient initiative and persistence in introducing more modern types of aircraft. The Directorate of the Air Force did not determine the direction of development of military aviation. For this reason, the Air Force does not have dive bombers and is lagging behind in the introduction of modern types of aircraft. In terms of armament, the introduction of large-caliber weapons lags behind.
Development of new aircraft models, testing and fine-tuning them are extremely slow.
The state of accounting for aircraft and engines is unsatisfactory, and high-quality accounting is completely unorganized and not maintained.
Warehouses of aircraft mechanical property are insufficient and do not meet the needs of aviation units.
The airfield network is insufficient and does not ensure the normal operation of air units, and its development lags behind the growth of the air force.
The organization of the air force, due to the significant growth of aviation, is outdated and requires revision and integration into larger air formations (divisions).
The existing organization of air bases does not provide maintenance of advanced operational airfields and their maintenance in working order throughout the year.
Flight and technical personnel are insufficiently trained in bombing, in flights in difficult meteorological conditions and in shooting.
Aviation schools graduate weak pilots, trained mainly on old equipment, and as a result, young pilots have to be retrained in units.
The issues of service by the flight technical personnel have not been worked out, as a result of which, since 1938, there has been an incorrect situation when the Red Army military service after a year of training in schools, junior specialists are graduated in the category of middle commanding staff. Despite the large shortage of navigators, their training is not organized.
Accidents and accidents in aviation continue to remain high due to poor training of flight personnel, lack of knowledge of the material part, low discipline, disorganization of flight operations and irresponsibility of unit and brigade commanders for accidents and disasters that have occurred.
3. Airborne units have not received proper development.
Organization airborne units (low-power brigades) lags behind modern requirements and requires a revision towards the creation of stronger formations and the development of parachuting.
The existing duality of subordination - through UBP (combat training) and through the Air Force (supply with special equipment and provision of aircraft) negatively affects the management and combat training of airborne units.
4. Armored troops. The armament of tank units in its development lags behind modern requirements due to the fact that modern thick-armored tanks were introduced into service with a delay.
In the use of tank units, the organization of interaction with other types of troops has not been sufficiently developed.
Repair of armored vehicles in the presence of a sufficient repair base is delayed.
The existing repair kits, both in quantity and in their specification, are poorly designed. The most running parts for them are made in small quantities and do not meet the needs.
The issues of organizing the current and average repair of combat vehicles in the field are resolved incorrectly. According to the existing procedure, it is envisaged to send combat vehicles for repair to the rear workshops, which delays repairs and does not ensure their timely commissioning.
The operation of the existing automobile and tractor fleet has been unsatisfactory, as a result of which there is a large number of vehicles in the army that require repair.
The existing tractor park is insufficient and does not fully ensure the lifting of the material part of the artillery on the mechtyag.
5. Artillery. Due to the fact that sufficient attention was paid to the organization and preparation of artillery units, the presence of the material part of artillery in medium and small calibers ensures the deployment of artillery units, but lags behind in large calibers and zenith artillery. The provision of the largest calibers - 203 mm and above is especially insufficient.
For ammunition - the army's need for medium systems is not sufficiently provided. Special artillery shots (armor-piercing, incendiary, as well as shots for anti-aircraft artillery) are extremely scarce.
Artillery is not sufficiently provided with control devices and binoculars.
The presence of storages does not fully ensure the storage of existing stocks. The organization of the storage facilities is unsatisfactory. By the time of acceptance, due to the lack of storage facilities and the congestion of warehouses with unnecessary materials, there was a large amount of ammunition and weapons in the open air.
6. Small arms. The introduction of modern models of small arms (submachine guns and a self-loading rifle) by the People's Commissariat of Defense is carried out with a delay and extremely slowly.
In terms of the number of rifles, the mobilization requirement of a deployed army is met without taking into account the loss of rifles and for new formations during the war.
7. Minn about-m weapon armament. The People's Commissariat of Defense did not attach importance to mine and mortar weapons. As a result, the Red Army was not provided with mortars and not prepared for their use.
By the time the People's Commissariat was taken over, the Red Army had not yet been fully provided with mortars. The units have a large shortage of mortars, and large caliber mortars exist only in samples.
The issues of the use and application of infantry and anti-tank mines remain completely unresolved. The production and manufacture of these mines is not organized, and there are only prototypes.
8. Engineering troops. In terms of their organization and armament, they lag behind the general development of other types of troops.
The provision of existing engineering units with the main types of engineering weapons is weak. The newest engineering equipment: digging holes, deep drilling tools, new road vehicles - are available only in samples and have not been introduced into the armament of the engineering troops.
Ferry facilities are insufficient in number, especially in heavy parks.
Security is extremely low engineering troops along the barbed wire.
In the training and armament of the troops, they did not receive development and such fundamental questions as the problems of overcoming the Ditch, barriers and defenses, especially mine, fell out.
9. Signal troops. At present, they are armed with many outdated types of telegraph and telephone sets and radio equipment. The introduction of new means of radio engineering is extremely slow and inadequate. The troops are poorly provided for almost all types of communications equipment.
A big drawback of the signal troops is the lack of high-speed and classified devices.
The existing lag in the development of communication technology and the lack of clarity in the organization of communication led to the fact that during the campaign in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus *, as well as during the war with the White Finns, the communication troops did not have a stable and continuously operating communication.
10. Chemical troops. Attention to chemical weapons in the People's Commissariat of Defense has weakened.
The existing degassing means do not provide the requirements for them in terms of quantity and quality. The degassing machines in service (ARS and AHI-5) are hardly passable, and from degassers there is only bleach.
The chemical training of troops has been set unsatisfactorily, which is explained by the underestimation of the importance of chemical means of attack on the part of general military commanders.
Research work on the development of chemical weapons
delivered poorly, and developed new samples are being introduced in the army slowly.
11. Cavalry. The condition and armament of the cavalry are satisfactory. The weakness and underdevelopment of the organization of mining cavalry units is noted.
STATE OF THE INTELLIGENCE WORK
The organization of intelligence is one of the weakest areas in the work of the People's Commissariat of Defense. There is no organized intelligence and systematic receipt of data on foreign armies.
The work of the Intelligence Agency is not work-related General Staff... The People's Commissariat of Defense does not have, in the person of the Intelligence Directorate, a body that provides the Red Army with data on the organization, condition, weapons, and preparation for the deployment of foreign armies. By the time of reception, the People's Commissariat of Defense did not have such intelligence data. Military theaters and their preparation have not been studied.
ANTI-AIR DEFENSE
The air defense of troops and guarded points is in a state of complete neglect. The current state of air defense does not meet modern requirements.
The armament of active antiaircraft artillery air defense systems was not given sufficient attention. The provision of anti-aircraft artillery control devices is completely insufficient. Rangefinders, which are in service, do not provide shooting at altitudes of more than 6.2 km, and PUAZO devices are imperfect.
The preparation of anti-aircraft units is unsatisfactory, and their training is carried out with obsolete types of aircraft. There is no practice with modern airplanes.
Searchlight units are poorly developed, not all objects are provided with searchlights, and as a result, the anti-aircraft artillery available in them is capable of repelling an air enemy only during the day.
The VNOS service is poorly organized, poorly trained, poorly armed and does not provide timely detection of enemy aircraft and notification. Radio intercepting devices (RUS and REDUT) * are available only in separate samples. It is not clear to whom the VNOS service is subordinate - the commander of the Air Force or the air defense department.
By the time of reception, the People's Commissariat of Defense had not fulfilled the Government's decree on the introduction of assistants to the air defense commander in the border districts.
The leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the work of local air defense posts is unsatisfactory and weak.
Given the current state of the leadership and organization of air defense, adequate protection against air attack is not provided.
ARRANGEMENT AND SERVICE
1. Management of the organization of the rear and rear training of commanding personnel and rear services institutions is weak. Over the past two years, there has not been a single special logistical exercise in the army, there were no training camps for the commanders of the logistic service. Although by order of the People's Commissar it was required not to conduct a single exercise without practicing the rear, in fact, in some parts of the exercise, exercises were not conducted with the rear. The charter of the rear is classified, and the command staff does not know it. The charter requires revision.
2. The territories that became part of the USSR in 1939/40 * have not been prepared for the arrangement of the rear.
3. Mobilization application 1937/38. is outdated and requires rework.
4. The plan of armament and supply for 1940 in the districts has not yet been launched due to the fault of the GUK, which does not make it possible to work out the security of the troops for peacetime and wartime.
5. Quantitative and qualitative accounting in the central supplying directorates is poorly organized and does not make it possible to correctly determine the security of troops.
6. The mob funds for food fodder spent in the winter of 1940 have not been restored, and in Kamchatka, Sakhalin and the Mongolian People's Republic they are completely absent. The dislocation of mob funds requires a radical revision.
7. Financial estimates for the first month of the war are outdated, unusable and require revision.
MILITARY SUPPLIES
The decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of August 9, 1935 on bringing the military economy and the entire matter of the military-economic supply of the army in an exemplary order was not fulfilled.
The military economy continues to be in disrepair. Property accounting and reporting are not well established. In the combat operations of 1939/40, the army and military rear services worked unsatisfactorily.
1. Organization and supply system. The organization and system of ¬stema, clothing and food supply and housing provision of spacecraft in peacetime were absolutely not adapted to wartime.
Introduced in 1936, company assistants and company clerks were soon reduced. They were restored again only from the end of 1939, when property accounting was entangled in all the lower levels.
The current supply standards, especially for clothing, are outdated or unusable, and when they are revised, there is a full opportunity to bring economy.
On issues of supply and management of the economy, the troops are guided by a large number of orders issued by NGOs over the past two decades. A large number of parts, especially those formed during last years, do not have these orders.
There is no provision on the rights, duties and personal responsibility of the commanders of units and formations for the economic state of the unit, for the loss, damage, squandering and illegal use of public funds.
2. Food supply for the army. The current supply of the troops with food and fodder passes without interruption. The irreducible carryover stocks of foodstuffs available in the troops provide the entire army with basic products for 15-30 days.
The People's Commissariat of Defense and Industry were not prepared for the war for the production of crackers and concentrates **. Uprodsnab and the General Staff underestimated the importance of these products in supplying the army.
In parts there is no proper order in the expenditure, accounting and reporting of food ¬ food and fodder.
3. Apparel supply of the Red Army. The troops were not provided with clothing property in a timely manner according to the 1939/40 winter plan.
The release of uniforms to the units was delayed until January 1940. The issues of providing warm things (earflaps, gloves, felt boots) were not worked out and were not raised in time by the People's Commissariat of Defense.
The experience of the war has shown that the military councils and command staff of the districts do not know the actual provision and needs of the units for clothing. Therefore, the units were sent to the front unsecured or provided in excess of the norm on exaggerated claims and threw property during the performance.
The storage of uniforms and footwear in the district warehouses, and especially in the warehouses of parts, has been unsatisfactory.
The lack of personal identity in the use of linen after washing and the insufficient requirement of command personnel to save uniforms, linen and shoes by the Red Army leads to unnecessary expenses and premature wear of uniforms and linen and a decrease in the general military appearance.
Property accounting started. During the period of large training sessions in many parts of the NZ property was mixed with the property of the current allowance. During the war with Finland, there was confusion in the accounting for the presence of goods and items in units and administrations. Registration by order of the NKO No. 12 - 1940 in the army has not yet been established.
Bath and laundry service is very complicated and needs to be streamlined.
4. About bozn about-x zyayitnoe supply of the Red Army. The supply of wheeled convoys to the army is in serious condition. The production of wheeled wagon train systematically decreases.
Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) 1935. on the creation of the fund “Oborone - a cart with harness” * has not been fulfilled. The Department of Supply and Economic Supply and the Main Directorate did not control and did not seek the creation of this fund.
The introduction of leather substitutes in saddlery and other industries (regulation SNK No. 039 - 35) is carried out poorly.
The maintenance and storage of goods and services is poorly organized in a number of parts.
FUEL SUPPLY QUESTIONS
1. Fuel reserves are extremely low.
The construction of gas storage tanks was carried out in completely insufficient sizes due to the systematic failure of the People's Commissariat of Construction and other construction organizations to fulfill the plan for the construction of gas depots.
2. The troops are extremely poorly provided with containers for fuel for wartime.
Transportation of fuel from supply bases to places of consumption is extremely difficult due to the lack of containers and means of transportation and refueling. Probable theaters of war do not have enough fuel bases, especially for aviation.
3. There is a lack of respect for the collection and regeneration of used oils. So, for example, from aviation oils obtained in 1939, only 2331 tons were collected and handed over for regeneration, which is 30% of the subject to be returned for regeneration.
The struggle for economical consumption of fuel is being carried out weakly, as a result of which there is an overspending of fuel in peacetime.
POLITICAL GOVERNANCE
1. The biggest drawback of political work in the army is that this work was not organically connected with the tasks of combat training, strengthening discipline in the army and raising the authority of command personnel.
2. The cadres of the leading political personnel were insufficiently replenished by grown-up young political workers.
Most of the political composition of the army does not have sufficient military training. The political administration has not determined what military knowledge the political staff of different degrees should have, and until recently has not organized military training for the entire political staff.
In the program of the Military-Political Academy, not enough time is allocated for military disciplines.
3. The instruction of the All-Army Conference of Political Workers in 1938, approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) *, on the elimination of the "vride" ** in the political composition within two months, the Political Administration did not fulfill.
Since 1938, the political administration does not fulfill the established procedure for the annual business and political attestation of political personnel and has replaced it with the receipt of formal certificates.
4. The Political Administration was not engaged in certification of personnel of the political composition of the reserve. The enrollment of the political personnel of the reserve was violated in connection with the war, however, the Political Administration unacceptably delays the revision of the assignment of the political personnel of the reserve and the introduction of the necessary changes into it.
5. As of 1.1.40, there were 64,797 candidates with overdue service in the army, of which 3135 people with 8 years of experience and 226 with 10 years of experience.
6. The political administration violates the procedure established by the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) for issuing within 10 days of party documents adopted by the CPSU (b) and delays this issuance for up to a year. Until now, 9166 party cards and 16 729 candidate cards have not been issued yet. The political administration violated the three-month reporting period and did not report to the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) for 211,000 party documents issued.
7. In political studies with the Red Army and command personnel, the Political Administration missed the study of neighboring countries and their armies.
The political administration did not pay enough attention to work among the troops and population of the enemy.
8. In the directive on the autumn inspection of political studies in 1939, the Political Administration proposed to evaluate them by groups, and to give an assessment to the whole group as "excellent" if the group has at least 25% excellent, 35% good, 30% mediocre and not more than 10% of bad ratings. Such an indication is essentially incorrect and pushes on the path of lowering requirements.
9. By decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), a department for the personnel of Osoaviakhim was created in the Political Administration. This department for Osoaviakhim does almost nothing and is attracted by the Political Administration to carry out other work.
SANITARY SERVICE
The sanitary service in the Red Army, as shown by the experience of the war with the White Finns, was not sufficiently prepared. Through the fault of the Sanitary Administration, there was a shortage of medical personnel, especially surgeons, where they were most needed.
Field training of medical personnel and reserve personnel, especially in matters of military field surgery, organization and tactics of the sanitary service, turned out to be unsatisfactory.
The issues of evacuating the wounded, taking into account the timely return of the lightly wounded, require revision.
The biggest drawback of the Sanitary Administration during the Soviet-Finnish War was that it stood aside from the matter of burying the dead on the battlefield.
The established norms for the refreshment of medicaments were not always observed.
MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
The network of higher military educational institutions consists of 16 military academies and 10 military faculties, 132 land military schools and schools, 52 aviation and aviation technical schools and schools under the jurisdiction of the Directorate of Higher Military Educational Institutions, the Directorate of Military Educational Institutions and the Directorate military educational institutions of the Air Force.
A major disadvantage of military academy programs is that they devote little time to special disciplines, which affects the quality of training.
Military academies and military schools are not sufficiently provided with new models of weapons. In military academies and military schools, low exactingness is noted, there is an overestimation.
The training of students in military academies and cadets in military schools has a number of significant drawbacks, of which the main ones are:
a) insufficient knowledge of the material part;
b) lack of practical skills;
c) poor knowledge of foreign languages.
MILITARY INVENTION
Military invention, set aside in an independent department of the People's Commissariat of Defense, is torn away from the directorates in charge of weapons and technical supplies. As a result, valuable inventions are delayed by their introduction into the army and are not implemented in a timely manner.
The Department of Inventions deals only with the consideration of incoming inventions, without being able to independently implement them.
Non-profit organizations' departments in their specialty do not pay due attention to incoming inventive proposals.
FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE MILITARY PUBLISHING
In terms of the release of books by the Military Publishing House, it is necessary to provide for the publication of literature on such topical issues of army combat training, such as: on general tactics, tactics of small units, headquarters service, rear service and armies of neighboring countries, as well as reference literature for the command personnel of special branches troops.
The Voenizdat apparatus requires strengthening both by freeing it from unsuitable workers and by replenishing it with qualified military editorial personnel.
The practice of squandering funds for all kinds of advances to authors for unwritten works and royalties for poor-quality manuscripts should be eliminated.
Appendix: List of the availability of the main types of weapons as of May 1, 1940 *.
passed - accepted -
K. Voroshilov S. Timoshenko
Participated in the delivery and acceptance -
Zhdanov
Malenkov
Voznesensky
Publ. according to the journal. Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 1. S. 193-208. TsAMO, f. 32, op. 11309, d. 15, ll. 1-31
1. Alexander Chernyshev
Cavalier, scout, diplomat and hero-partisan of the war of 1812, he took an active part in the investigation of the "case of the Decembrists", for which in 1826 he received the title of count from Nicholas I, and in August 1827 he headed War Department... Having successfully carried out the Turkish and Hungarian campaigns, suppressing the uprising in Poland, the minister enjoyed the emperor's confidence for many years. In August 1852, His Serene Highness Prince Chernyshev, at the age of 66, left the post of minister, which he held for 25 years ( 9132 days).
2. Dmitry Milyutin
Parallel to military career Milyutin (an artilleryman, a participant in the war in the Caucasus) was engaged in science and was a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences. As chief of the General Staff of the Caucasian Army in 1859, he suppressed Shamil's uprising. From November 1861 to May 1881 ( 7134 days) - was the Minister of War. Under him, military districts were created, shpitsruten were abolished, a general conscription and shortened the service life, reformed the military education system, won the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, conquered Central Asia.
3. Pyotr Vannovsky
Adjutant General Vannovsky, before his appointment in May 1881 as the head of the Ministry of War, managed to take part in the Hungarian campaign of 1849, the Crimean and Russian-Turkish wars. As head of the military department, he was engaged in the construction of fortifications and replenishment of mobilization reserves. Under him, the famous "three-line" - the Mosin rifle of the 1891 model was adopted. Left the post of Minister of War "due to illness" on January 1, 1898, having worked for almost 17 years ( 6068 days).
4. Clement Voroshilov
Member of the RSDLP since 1903, Klim Voroshilov took the post of People's Commissar for the military and maritime affairs November 6, 1925 - after the sudden death of Mikhail Frunze. Repeatedly demonstrated his personal devotion to Joseph Stalin (whom he had known since 1906). After soviet-Finnish war, May 7, 1940, removed from the post of People's Commissar of Defense, which he held for almost 15 years ( 5296 days). During the Great Patriotic War, he unsuccessfully tried to prove himself as a military leader, after which he supervised the partisan and headed the Trophy Committee.
5. Rodion Malinovsky
In 1914, 16-year-old Malinovsky ran away from home, becoming a carrier of cartridges in the machine-gun team, and a year later received the St. George's Cross. In addition to the First World War, he participated in the Civil, Spanish and Great Patriotic Wars... He became Minister of Defense on October 26, 1957, replacing the disgraced Georgy Zhukov in this post. One of his most successful operations was the support of Leonid Brezhnev during the removal of Nikita Khrushchev in 1964. Served as minister 3443 days, until March 31, 1967.
6.Andrey Grechko
Appointed Minister of Defense of the USSR on April 12, 1967. Two years later, the first armed conflict on the territory of the USSR occurred after 1945 - a clash with the Chinese army on Damansky Island. However, little is known about Grechko's role in this conflict: the minister himself was in Hungary at the height of the fighting, according to the direct participants in the events, the only instruction received from him was "to save ammunition." Led the Ministry of Defense 3302 days- until his death on April 26, 1976.
7. Dmitry Ustinov
Prior to his appointment as Minister of Defense, he had no military experience (with the exception of participation in battles with the Basmachi in 1923), but in 1941-1953 he was People's Commissar of Armaments, then Minister of Defense Industry, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR. He became the head of the military department on April 29, 1976. He was one of the most influential politicians of the Brezhnev era. In 1979 he became one of the initiators of the introduction of troops into Afghanistan. He died on December 20, 1984, after serving as a minister 3157 days.
8. Leon Trotsky
A few days after the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Germans, on March 14, 1918, Trotsky was moved from the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs to the newly established post of People's Commissar for Military Affairs. Having shown incredible activity during Civil War, after its end, no less actively fought for power in the leadership of the CPSU (b). Having lost this fight, at the end of January 1925 he was removed from his post, which he held 2510 days... In 1929 he was expelled from the USSR and in 1940 killed by NKVD agents in Mexico.
9. Vladimir Sukhomlinov
Participant russian-Turkish war 1877-1878 years, Sukhomlinov from 1905 combined the posts of the commander of the troops of the Kiev district and the governor-general. On March 11, 1909, he took over as Minister of War. After the outbreak of the First World War, mistakes were revealed in the organization of the supply of the army. Sukhomlinov was accused of corruption and called "the patron saint of spies." On June 13, 1915, he was removed from his post (where he held 2285 days) and arrested. In September 1917 he was sentenced to hard labor, but in 1918 he was released under an amnesty and emigrated.
10. Alexey Kuropatkin
He served in Central Asia, a member of the "Kokand campaign". He became minister in January 1898. Increased the pay of officers, reformed Main Headquarters... After the start russo-Japanese War left the post of minister (where he held 2221 days) and commanded the Manchu army. After the defeat at Mukden, he was dismissed. He returned to the army during the First World War, commanded the Northern Front, then the Turkestan Military District. After the 1917 revolution, he lived on his estate near Pskov, taught at a school.
* The top ten includes 5 pre-revolutionary ministers and 5 Soviet ones. Neither the most "long-lived" of today's Russian defense ministers, Sergei Ivanov ( 2150 days at the post), nor Anatoly Serdyukov, who was dismissed last week ( 2091 days) did not enter this top 10, taking 11th and 12th places, respectively. True, both "sat out" on the post of Minister Joseph Stalin, who was the People's Commissar of Defense 2053 days.
Prepared by Mikhail Lukin
ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S DEFENSE COMMISSIONER OF THE USSR ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN DEPUTIES OF THE NARKOMA OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR No. 0113
In accordance with the decision of the Government of March 8, 1941, I establish the following distribution of duties between my deputies:
1. To the first deputy Marshal Soviet Union T. Budyonny S.M. In addition to the duties of the first deputy, I entrust the management of quartermaster supplies, non-defensive construction, planning and distribution of material assets of non-profit organizations, housing and maintenance issues, sanitary and veterinary conditions of the Red Army troops.
Subordinate directly to the first deputy, have:
a) Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army;
b) Sanitary Department of the Red Army;
c) Veterinary Directorate of the Red Army;
d) Department of material assets.
2. On the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Army General t. Zhukov G.K. In addition to directing the activities of the Red Army General Staff Directorate, I am entrusting leadership in matters of fuel supply, communications, air defense of the country and the General Staff Academy.
In the direct subordination of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, have:
a) the General Staff of the Red Army;
b) Management fuel supply to the Red Army;
c) Communications Department of the Red Army;
d) Main Directorate of Air Defense of the Red Army;
e) General Staff Academy.
3. On the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army, Army Commissar of the 1st rank, t. Zaporozhets A.I. in addition to directing the activities of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda, I entrust leadership:
a) Office of the State Military Publishing House;
b) the newspapers Krasnaya Zvezda and Combat Training;
c) the Central House of the Red Army;
d) the Central Theater of the Red Army;
e) Military-Political Academy. Lenin;
f) Military Law Academy;
g) military-political schools of the Red Army.
4. In addition to direct supervision of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, I assign the leadership of the Artillery Academy and the activities of the Chemical Defense Directorate of the Red Army to the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Artillery, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade GI Kulik.
Under the direct subordination of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Comrade Kulik, there is a Chemical Defense Directorate of the Red Army.
5. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for the Air Force, Lieutenant-General of Aviation, T. Rychagov P.V. I entrust the leadership of the Air Force of the Red Army and the implementation of direct communication with the aviation industry on aircraft weapons and ammunition of the Air Force.
Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for the Air Force, Aviation Lieutenant General Comrade Rychagov is the head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force of the Red Army.
6. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Combat Training, General of the Army, Comrade Meretskov K.A. I entrust the leadership of the combat training of the ground forces, all the land higher military educational institutions, except for the Artillery Academy, the Military Political Academy, the Military Law Academy and the General Staff Academy, and land military educational institutions, except for the military-political schools.
Under the direct subordination of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, General of the Army, Comrade Meretskov, have:
a) Red Army Combat Training Directorate;
b) Management of military educational institutions of the Red Army;
c) inspections of all combat arms and, in addition, supervise the activities of combat training directorates of all main directorates, except for the Main Directorate of the Air Force.
7. On the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade B.M. Shaposhnikov. I entrust the leadership of the construction of fortified areas and the activities of the Main Military Engineering Directorate.
Under the direct subordination of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade Shaposhnikov, to have:
a) Management of the construction of fortified areas,
b) The Main Military Engineering Directorate of the Red Army.
8. The Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army, the 3rd Directorate, the Personnel Directorate of the Red Army, the Financial Directorate under the NCO, the NCO Affairs Directorate, I leave directly under my control.
9. I grant the right to the First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade SM Budyonny. and the Deputy People's Commissar for Defense, Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army, Comrade Zhukov GK, to enter the Government to resolve issues of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR
Marshal of the Soviet Union S. TIMOSHENKO
The history of such a totalitarian superpower as the Soviet Union contains many both heroic and dark pages. This could not but leave an imprint on the biographies of those who made it. Kliment Voroshilov is one of such personalities. He lived long life, which was not devoid of heroism, but at the same time there are many human lives on his conscience, since it is his signature that bears on many execution lists.
Kliment Voroshilov: biography
One of the darkest pages in Voroshilov's biography was his participation in the suppression in 1921. After these events, he was appointed a member of the South-Eastern Bureau of the Party Central Committee, as well as the commander of the North Caucasus Military District.
From 1924 to 1925 he was the commander of the Moscow Military District and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR.
Few know that during the same period Voroshilov patronized the Bolshoi Theater and was known as a great lover of ballet.
At the post of People's Commissar of Defense
After the death of M. Frunze, Voroshilov became chairman of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council and headed the country's naval department, and in 1934-1940 - the People's Commissariat of Defense of the Soviet Union.
In total, he spent almost 15 years in this post, which is a kind of record for the Soviet period. Voroshilov Kliment Efremovich (1881-1969) had a reputation as the most devoted supporter of Stalin and provided him with effective support in the fight against Trotsky. In October 1933, he went with a government delegation to Turkey, where, together with Ataturk, he hosted a military parade in Ankara.
In November 1935, by decision of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, he was awarded the newly established title of Marshal of the Soviet Union.
After 5 years, he was removed from the post of People's Commissar, as he did not live up to Stalin's expectations during the Finnish War. However, Voroshilov was not dismissed, but was appointed head of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.
Participation of Kliment Voroshilov in the Stalinist repressions
Death and burial
Kliment Voroshilov, whose career growth had stalled in the last decades of his life due to old age, died on December 2, 1969 at the age of 89. The marshal was buried in the capital, near the Kremlin wall, on Red Square. According to contemporaries, this was the first such large-scale funeral ceremony of farewell to statesman USSR in the twenty years that have passed since the funeral of Zhdanov.
Family and Children
Voroshilov's wife Kliment Efremovich - Golda Davidovna Gorbman - was of the Jewish faith, but for the sake of a wedding with her beloved she was baptized and took the name Catherine. This act angered the girl's Jewish relatives, who even cursed her. In 1917, Ekaterina Davidovna joined the RSDLP and for many years worked as the deputy director of the V.I.Lenin Museum.
It so happened that the Voroshilov family did not have their own children. However, they took on the upbringing of MV Frunze's orphaned children: Timur, who died at the front in 1942, and Tatiana. In addition, in 1918, the couple adopted the boy Peter, who later became a famous designer and rose to the rank of lieutenant general. From him the couple had 2 grandchildren - Vladimir and Klim.
Awards
Klim Voroshilov is a holder of almost all the highest awards of the USSR. Including he twice received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
He has 8 Orders of Lenin and 6 Orders of the Red Banner and many other awards, including those from foreign countries. In particular, the military leader is a hero of the Mongolian People's Republic, holder of the Grand Cross of Finland, as well as an honorary citizen of the Turkish city of Izmir.
Memorialization
Even during his lifetime, K.E. Voroshilov became the most famous military leader of the Civil War, in whose honor songs were composed, collective farms, ships, factories, etc. were called.
Several cities were named in his honor:
- Voroshilovgrad (Lugansk) was renamed twice and returned historical name only in 1990.
- Voroshilovsk (Alchevsk). In this city, the marshal began his labor and party activities in his youth.
- Voroshilov (Ussuriysk, Primorsky Territory).
- Voroshilovsk (Stavropol, from 1935 to 1943).
In addition, the Khoroshevsky district of the capital and the central city \u200b\u200bdistrict Donetsk.
To this day, there are Voroshilov streets in dozens of cities of the former USSR. Among them are Goryachy Klyuch, Togliatti, Brest, Orenburg, Penza, Ershov, Serpukhov, Korosten, Angarsk, Voronezh, Khabarovsk, Klintsy, Kemerovo, Lipetsk, Rybinsk, St. Petersburg, Simferopol, Chelyabinsk and Izhevsk. There is also Voroshilovsky prospect in Rostov-on-Don.
The most well-aimed shooters, approved at the end of 1932 and named "Voroshilovsky shooter", deserve a special mention for awarding. According to the memoirs of people whose youth fell on pre-war years, it was prestigious to wear it, and young people wanted to be sure to be awarded such a badge.
In honor of Klim Efremovich, a series of KV tanks produced at the Putilov plant was also named, and in 1941-1992 it bore his name Military Academy Of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.
The monument to Kliment Voroshilov is installed on his grave. And in Moscow, at number 3 on Romanov Lane, there is a memorial plate informing about this.
Now you know some facts of the biography of the famous Soviet military leader and party leader Klim Efremovich Voroshilov. An excellent family man and a great patriot of his homeland, he, nevertheless, in years stalinist repression sent several thousand people to their death, most of whom were not guilty of what they were accused of and said to be shot.
Order of the NKO of the USSR No. 0037 "On the structure of the People's Commissariat of Defense"
1. In connection with the formation of the main directorates of the People's Commissariat of Defense in order to improve the leadership of the troops as part of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, have: 1) the General Staff of the Red Army, 2) the Main Directorate of political propaganda of the Red Army, 3) the Main Directorate of the Air Force of the Red Army , 4) Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, 5) Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army, 6) Main Military Engineering Directorate of the Red Army, 7) Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army, 8) Directorate of Combat Training of the Red Army, 9) Directorate of Air Defense of the Red Army , 10) Communications Directorate of the Red Army, 11) Directorate of the Military Chemical Defense of the Red Army, 12) Directorate of Fuel Supply of the Red Army, 13) Directorate of Higher Military Educational Institutions of the Red Army, 14) Directorate of Military Educational Institutions of the Red Army, 15) Directorate cadres of the Red Army, 16) Sanitary Directorate of the Red Army, 17) Veterinary Directorate the Red Army, 18) Office of the People's Commissar of Defense, 19) the financial department under the People's Commissar of Defense.
Inspections under the People's Commissar of Defense: 1) Inspection of the Red Army infantry, 2) Inspection of the Red Army cavalry, 3) Inspection of the Red Army artillery, 4) Inspection of the auto-armor tank troops Red Army, 5) Inspection of the Air Force of the Red Army, 6) Inspection of the engineering troops of the Red Army, 7) Inspection of communications of the Red Army.
2. Appointed: Head of the Communications Directorate - Major General II Gapich; Head of the Military Chemical Defense Directorate - Major General of Technical Troops P.G. Melnikov; Head of the Fuel Supply Directorate - Major General of Tank Forces P.V.Kotov; Head of the Directorate of higher military educational institutions - Lieutenant General G.P. Safronov Head of the Directorate of Military Educational Institutions - Lieutenant General Smirnov I.K. Head of the Sanitary Directorate - brigade doctor Smirnov E.I. Head of the Veterinary Directorate - brigovet doctor Borkovsky K.I. Office of the People's Commissar of Defense - Major General Dratvin M.I. Head of the Finance Department under the People's Commissar of Defense - Major General of the Quartermaster Service Ya.A. Khotenko
3. I order: 1) Rename: a) The Political Directorate of the Red Army into the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army. b) Directorate for the commanding staff of the Red Army in the Directorate of personnel of the Red Army.
2) To include the 5th Directorate of the Red Army in the General Staff of the Red Army.
3) To disband: a) the Main Directorate of the Red Army, its functions and affairs shall be transferred to the General Staff of the Red Army. b) Office of the Chief of Infantry, with the appeal of personnel to staffing the Infantry Inspectorate. c) The Department of Inventions of the NKO of the USSR, with the transfer of its functions and personnel to the corresponding main departments. I entrust the dissolution and transfer of the affairs of the department of inventions of the NKO of the USSR to the main departments on my Deputy Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade Kulik. d) the Control Group under the NKO of the USSR, transferring its affairs and correspondence to the Administration of Affairs under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. e) Inspection of Osoaviakhim, transferring the affairs and functions of the Infantry Inspection.
4) Pass: a) Inspection physical fitness and sports of the Red Army to the Infantry Inspectorate. b) Inspection of military bands of the Red Army in the Infantry Inspectorate. c) The economic department of the Central Administration of the NKO in the Administration of Affairs under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR.
4. The Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army shall submit to me the states by August 5, and by August 25, the draft regulations on the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR.
6. Orders of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR in 1939 No. 0156 and No. 0223 to be canceled.