At the plant, he was called "Ivan Zhelezny" for his willpower and toughness, and his main character traits were recognized as exactingness, commitment, firmness and justice. At the same time, he always showed sincere concern for his subordinates.
Ivan Fedorovich Beloborodov was born on December 23, 1909 in the city of Spas-Demensk (currently Kaluga region) in the family of a railway worker. In 1935, after graduating from the Tula Mechanical Institute, he was sent to work in Izhevsk. He worked at the Izhstal plant in the blacksmith shop as the head of the technical bureau, foreman, deputy head and head of the shop. In 1939, the Izhstal plant was divided into the Izhevsk Machine-Building and Izhevsk Metallurgical Plants. The blacksmith shop, where Beloborodov worked, turned out to be part of Izhmash, to which he devoted his entire future working life. Of the 50 years given to the plant, for almost a quarter of a century, Ivan Fedorovich invariably led a team of many thousands. None of his three dozen predecessors could boast of such longevity at the highest factory post.
People who worked with Ivan Beloborodov and knew him personally note that even during his lifetime he became almost a legend, one of the most prominent Soviet leaders across the country. A whole era of achievements in the history of the development of domestic industry, the Izhevsk Machine-Building Plant and our city is associated with his name.
The tasks of post-war construction and strengthening of the country's defense potential required the modernization of production and an increase in the volume of products. Ivan Beloborodov devoted all his strength, will and indomitable energy to the implementation of a radical technical re-equipment of the enterprise. During his leadership, the plant occupied the leading positions in the country in terms of the scale of modernization, and many enterprises adopted his experience.
Under the leadership of Beloborodov, motorcycle, weapons, machine-tool, metallurgical production, and a precision mechanics plant were actually rebuilt. In the sixties, the country's newest car assembly plant was built, and thanks to this, Izhevsk reached a new level technical development. In a short time, the complex tasks of the government on the development of new types of products, sometimes not characteristic of the profile of the enterprise, were carried out. In particular, the production of electrovacuum devices (magnetrons) was mastered. In addition, the enterprise launched the production of optical sights for weapons, created the production of solid-propellant meteorological rockets.
For selfless work during the Great Patriotic War and the successful implementation of production plans in the post-war period, the plant was awarded the orders of Lenin, the October Revolution, the Red Banner of War and the Red Banner of Labor.
Ivan Beloborodov also paid much attention to social and housing construction, which significantly changed the face of Izhevsk - hospitals, residential buildings, schools, kindergartens were built. Up to a thousand housewarmings were celebrated annually by Izhmash workers.
Beloborodov paid great attention to the development of sports. Izhmash owned the best sports facilities in the city: the Zenit stadium, the Sports Palace with the first swimming pool in Izhevsk. More than four hundred masters of sports of the USSR brought up SC "Izhplanet".
With Izhevsk weapons, Soviet shooters won the largest international competitions, and Izhevsk motorcycles had no equal in the country.
For outstanding services, Ivan Beloborodov was awarded three Orders of Lenin, two Orders of the Red Banner of Labor, the Order October revolution, medals, was twice awarded the high title of Hero of Socialist Labor.
Ivan Fedorovich died on August 22, 1985, he was buried at the Khokhryakovskoye cemetery in Izhevsk, where a monument was erected to him.
On December 22, on the eve of the 105th anniversary, relatives of I.F. Beloborodova and Izhmash veterans laid flowers at the monument and remembered their director with a kind word.
Years later, Ivan Fedorovich Beloborodov remains the legendary director of Izhmash. Here they honor his memory and are proud of his name - the name with which the years of well-deserved glory of the Izhevsk plant are associated.
Beloborodov Ivan Naumovich R. unknown - mind. 5(16).9.1774], an associate of E. I. Pugachev. A native of peasants assigned to the state. copper smelter in Copperheads of the Kuigursky district (now the Kungursky district of the Perm region). In 1759-66 he served as a soldier in art and Vyborg and at the gunpowder factory in Okhta. In Jan. 1774 with a detachment of Bashkirs, he joined E. I. Pugachev (see Peasant War led by E. I. Pugachev 1773 - 75). He proved to be a capable organizer. Appointed by Pugachev military collegium, "chief ataman and field colonel." He especially distinguished himself during the capture of Kazan (July 1774). In one of the fights he was taken prisoner. Executed in Moscow.
Used materials of the Soviet military encyclopedia in 8 volumes, v. 1
Beloborodov Ivan Naumovich (1741 - 1774) - Kungur peasant, Pugachev colonel and ataman.
In 1759-1766. served in the artillery units of the Vyborg garrison and at the Okhtensky powder factory in St. Petersburg. Having retired with the rank of corporal, he settled in the village of Bogorodsky near Kungur. He joined the Pugachev uprising in early January 1774. Having recruited a detachment from fellow villagers and peasants of the surrounding villages, he went on a campaign to Yekaterinburg, on the way there he captured a number of fortresses, factories, villages, and on January 20 he settled at the Shaitansky plant, which became the main base of his detachment, grown to 3 thousand people.
Using past army experience, Beloborodov introduced strict discipline in the detachment, organized military training and personally showed excellent skill as an artilleryman. His detachment, along with others operating in the Middle Urals, blockaded Yekaterinburg, interrupting its communication with the Kama region, the Southern Urals and Siberia, and successfully repulsed the attempts of the garrison to break through the blockade ring. However, from mid-February 1774, the situation here began to take shape not in favor of the rebels, which was associated with the approach of the punitive team of Major H. Fisher and the offensive that began from Kungur of a large military unit of Major Gagrin. At the end of February - the first half of March, Beloborodov was defeated in battles with punishers near the Utkinsky plant, near the Bagaryakskaya settlement, near the Kamensky and Kasli plants. Fleeing from persecution, he and his remaining people went to the Satka plant, where, taking advantage of the lull in hostilities due to the onset of mudslides and flooding of the rivers, he stood for several weeks.
In early April, Pugachev sent him a decree instructing him to form the "Siberian military corps" and hastily follow the connection with the "Main Troop". Fulfilling the command, the ataman gathered a detachment of peasants, Iset Cossacks, Bashkirs, and on May 7 led him to the Magnetic Fortress, which had just been taken by Pugachev. From that day on, he and his detachment were part of the rebel army, which made a campaign in the Urals and the Kama region, participated in the capture of the Steppe, Peter and Paul and Trinity fortresses, Osa, the Izhevsk plant, as well as in field battles against the troops of General Dekolong and Lieutenant Colonel Michelson. Pugachev valued Beloborodov's military experience and listened to his advice and judgment. Pushkin noted that he was "one of Pugachev's most intelligent accomplices" (2).
Together with Pugachev, Beloborodov conducted a reconnaissance of the fortifications of Kazan and participated in the discussion of the plan to storm the city. In the battle that took place on July 12, 1774, he commanded one of the three Pugachev columns - the very one that first broke into the streets and went to the Kremlin. His assault was unsuccessful, as the fire that started forced the rebels to leave the city. On the evening of that day (and later, on July 15), the insurgent army twice entered into battle with Michelson's corps, which had pulled up to Kazan.
On July 15, Pugachev suffered a heavy defeat and, with three hundred Cossacks, fled north to Kokshaisk. Beloborodov hesitated; four days later he was detained and taken to Kazan, interrogated by a secret commission. He was sentenced to corporal punishment (100 lashes) and, further, to death (8). The verdict was approved by Catherine II herself. After the execution, the convict was sent to Moscow, where he was beheaded on Bolotnaya Square on September 5, 1774 (9).
From the canvas of Beloborodov's biography given above, it is clear that he first met Pugachev on May 7, 1774 at the Magnetic Fortress. Meanwhile, in the text of Pushkin's "History of Pugachev" it is reported that already in the autumn of 1773 this man was among the closest Pugachev's associates in his headquarters near Orenburg, "enjoyed the full power of attorney of the impostor", together with T.I. Podurov "managed Pugachev's written affairs" ( 2). In the role of one of the main confidants of the peasant leader, Pushkin depicted Beloborodov in the XI chapter of The Captain's Daughter, which deals with the meeting of Pyotr Grinev with Pugachev in the "sovereign palace" of Berdskaya Sloboda. According to the author's description, the ataman looked like "a frail and hunched old man with a gray beard, he had nothing remarkable in himself, except for a blue ribbon worn over his shoulder over a gray Armenian coat." Pugachev, addressing him, called him "field marshal", and he behaved independently with him, boldly contradicting him (7). The information given by Pushkin in "The History of Pugachev" and "The Captain's Daughter" regarding the presence of Beloborodov in Berdy, about his place and role among Pugachev's closest associates, does not correspond to reality. The source of unreliable data was the manuscript of an article by the historian D.N.
The named person is mentioned in archival preparations for the "History of Pugachev" (1), the text of the "History" itself and draft fragments of its manuscript (2). There are references to him in Rychkov's Chronicle (3) and in Izvestiya by Platon Lyubarsky (4). Separate information is contained in the record of the legends of I.I. Dmitriev (5) and the synopsis of the article by D.N. Bantysh-Kamensky (6).
Notes:
1. Pushkin. T.IX. pp. 635, 650, 655, 656, 703;
2. Ibid. pp. 28, 34, 55-57, 59, 60, 68, 151, 189, 406, 423, 426, 429, 430, 435, 436;
3. Ibid. S.343;
4. Ibid. S.363;
5. Ibid. S.498;
6. Ibid. S.776;
7. Pushkin. T.VIII. S.346-350;
8. Protocol of the testimony of I.N. Beloborodov during interrogation at the Kazan secret commission on July 30, 1774 // Pugachevshchina. M.-L., 1929. V.2. pp.325-335;
Curriculum vitae reprinted from the site
http://www.orenburg.ru/culture/encyclop/tom2/m.html
(Authors and compilers of the encyclopedia: Dr. historical sciences
Ovchinnikov Reginald Vasilievich , Academician of the International Academy for the Humanization of Education
Bolshakov Leonid Naumovich )
Literature:
Martynov M. N. Pugachevsky ataman Ivan Beloborodov. Perm, 1958.
Read here:
Persons:
Pugachev Emelyan Ivanovich+1775 - head of the largest popular movement
Khlopusha(real name and surname - Afanasy Timofeevich Sokolov) (1714-1774), one of the closest associates of E. I. Pugachev
Chica(Zarubin Ivan Nikiforovich) (1736-1775), Yaik Cossack
Shigaev Maxim Grigorievich, Yaik Cossack, associate of E. I. Pugachev. One of the leaders of the Yaik Cossack uprising of 1772. During the Peasants' War led by E. I. Pugachev 1773-75 Sh. - Pugachev's closest assistant, member. "military board" and judge. He commanded troops during the siege of Orenburg. 7 Apr. 1774 captured in the Iletsk town. Dec 31 1774 sentenced to death, executed together with Pugachev and other leaders of the uprising. Lit .: Yu. A. Limonov, V. V. Mavrodin, V. M. Paneyakh. Pugachev and the Pugachevites. L., 1974.
(1741 )Biography
By origin - a peasant, originally from the village of Medyanka, Kungur (Perm) province of Kazan province. The village was assigned to the Irginsky copper smelter of the Osokin industrialists. At the age of 18, in 1759, he was recruited, served in an artillery unit in the city of Vyborg, and then at the Okhta gunpowder factory, received the rank of corporal. In 1766, in order to get his resignation, Beloborodov "...began to pretend to limp with his right foot, saying that he was ill with it, for which he was sent to the infirmary." After six months of being in the St. Petersburg Artillery Hospital, on the basis of the decision of the Artillery Office, he was “resigned from service for lameness by a gunner, with a passport, for his food.”
After retiring, he settled in the village of Bogorodsky, Kungur province, married Nenila Eliseeva from Kungur, the daughter of a townsman, "lived in his own house, trading in wax, honey and other goods."
With the beginning of the Pugachev uprising, Beloborodov was drafted into the government team of Ensign Dyakonov, but immediately after the call, Beloborodov left the team and returned to his home. On January 1, 1774, representatives of the Kanzafar Usaev detachment arrived in Bogorodskoye, they read Pugachev's decrees and manifestos. With a part of his fellow villagers, Beloborodov went out to meet Usaev's detachment, during a stop in the village he settled the Bashkir colonel in his house. Usaev accepted into his detachment 25 people from Bogorodsky, who chose Beloborodov as their senior. The detachment went to the Demidov Suksunsky plant, seizing it, destroying all the documentation of the factory office, including promissory notes for 54 thousand rubles. The rebels did not touch the factory buildings. Usaev replenished Beloborodov's detachment with people, conferring on him the title of centurion. Bissertsky and Revdinsky factories were captured next, on January 6 - the Achita fortress. From that moment on, Beloborodov's detachment began independent operations.
On January 18, Beloborodov’s detachment, whose number had grown to 600 by that time, occupied the Bilimbaevsky Plant without a fight and on January 19, 1774, captured the Demidov Shaitan Plants as the main base of their operations. Factory people greeted Beloborodov's detachment with bread and salt, handing over 2,000 poods of rye flour at his disposal. Beloborodov sent guards along all roads in order to collect information about the actions of government troops. Thanks to this, the rebels were able to repel attempts to recapture the Shaitan factories from them. According to the memoirs of the scribe of the Bilimbaevsky plant Verkholantsev, on January 20, Beloborodov “surprised everyone with his art of shooting from cannons” in a battle with a government team near the village of Talitsy. According to the report of the officers, in this battle the Pugachevites fired clumsily, "hitting only the tops of the forest and branches", but the advantage in manpower was so great that Kostin thought it best to retreat.
On January 29, Beloborodov arrived at the state-owned Utkinsky plant, ordering the local priest to swear the factory population to "Pyotr Fedorovich", Beloborodov's detachment accepted reinforcements from 200 factory peasants. On February 1, Beloborodov's detachment attacked one of the largest Ural metallurgical plants - the Demidov Utkinsky plant. The plant was surrounded by a rampart and a wall, under the protection of which a government detachment of 1000 people with 15 guns defended. Unable to take the plant on the move, Beloborodov gradually cut off all roads to it, and occupied the village of Kurya as a camp for the detachment. On February 9, a fierce assault began, which did not stop for three days and ended with the capture of the plant by the evening of February 11. Leaving a detachment of 700 people at the Utkinsky plant, Beloborodov returned to the Shaitansky factories. At the same time, Beloborodov refused to send part of his detachment to storm Kungur, explaining that he was preparing to capture Yekaterinburg: "... the army that is with me to subdue Yekaterinburg is now fragmented to different places and then it can not be sent." Nevertheless, Beloborodov shared artillery with the detachments near Kungur: first "four large cannons, and cannonballs and buckshot", then "six of the same cannons".
At the captured factories, Beloborodov tried to organize the production of weapons, for example, at the Revdinsky plant, more than 500 pounds of iron were spent on forging peaks and sabers, but it was not possible to correct the situation with the lack of weapons. In the meantime, help arrived in Yekaterinburg from the commander of the Siberian Corps, Decolong - two regular companies under the command of Second Major Fisher, who, having gathered all the available forces from the "assigned Cossacks", drove Beloborodov out of the Shaitansky factories on February 14 and completely burned them, depriving the rebels of their habitable and the nearest base to Yekaterinburg. At the same time, another government detachment under the command of Major Gagrin defeated the rebels near Kungur, the Achita fortress and the Bissert plant, and on February 26 drove the Pugachevites out of the Utkinsky plant. On February 29, Beloborodov tried to recapture the Utkinsky plant, but was defeated by Gagrin's detachment, which made a sortie, retreating, suffered further defeats at Bagaryakskaya Sloboda, on March 1 at Kamensky and on March 12 at Kaslinsky factories. Taking advantage of the spring thaw, Beloborodov's detachment was able to break away from persecution and occupied the Satka plant for rest.
In April 1774, Pugachev, defeated near Orenburg and gone beyond the bend of the Belaya River, ordered all the detachments of the rebels in the Southern Urals to advance to join him. But the spring thaw and river floods did not allow this to be done until the beginning of May. Only on May 7, Beloborodov’s detachment arrived at the connection with the main army of Pugachev in the Magnitnaya fortress, taken the day before by the Pugachevites.
After the defeat of Pugachev's army in the battle near Kazan on July 15, 1774, Beloborodov was captured and taken to Kazan, where he was interrogated by the leader commission of inquiry P. S. Potemkin. He was sentenced to 100 lashes and the death penalty. Beloborodov was executed on September 5, 1774 in Moscow, on Bolotnaya Square.
Ivan Beloborodov in fiction
During the period of work on the “History of Pugachev”, the name of Beloborodov did not immediately interest Alexander Sergeevich Pushkin, and for the first time his name appeared in the poet’s working notes after Nicholas I approved the version of the book for publication, Pushkin made an entry in “Remarks on the rebellion”: “Ivan Naumov son of Beloborodov, retired gunner, stuck to Pugachev<в>In 1773, he was granted the rank of colonel and field atamans, and then at the beginning of 1774 he was promoted to senior military chieftains and field marshals. He was cruel, knew the letter, observed strict discipline in the gangs. Not having access to the investigation files of the Pugachevs, Pushkin relied on inaccurate information in the notes of Rychkov, Lyubarsky, in the notes of Dmitriev's legends and the synopsis of the article by Bantysh-Kamensky, in particular, that Beloborodov was familiar with Pugachev during the siege of Orenburg and together with Podurov "He was in charge of the written affairs of Pugachev." Pushkin did not know many details of the biography of the retired corporal, who was 32 years old during the uprising, giving the following description of Pugachev’s “field marshal” in The Captain’s Daughter: “One of them, a frail and hunched old man with a gray beard, had nothing remarkable in himself, except for a blue ribbon worn over the shoulder over a gray coat.
Notes
Literature
- Aksenov A. I., Ovchinnikov R. V., Prokhorov M. F. Documents of the headquarters of E. I. Pugachev, insurgent authorities and institutions / otv. ed. R. V. Ovchinnikov. - Moscow: Nauka, 1975. - 524 p. - 6600 copies.
- Andrushchenko A.I. Peasant War 1773-1775 on Yaik, in the Urals, in the Urals and in Siberia. - Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1969. - 360 p. - 3000 copies.
- Dubrovin N. F.. Pugachev and his accomplices. An episode from the history of the reign of Empress Catherine II. Volume II. - St. Petersburg: type. N. I. Skorokhodova, 1884. - 424 p.
- Dubrovin N. F.. Pugachev and his accomplices. An episode from the history of the reign of Empress Catherine II. Volume III. - St. Petersburg: type. N. I. Skorokhodova, 1884. - 416 p.
- ed. Mavrodin V.V.. Peasant war in Russia 1773-1775. Pugachev's uprising. Volume II. - L .: Publishing house of the Leningrad University, 1966. - 512 p. - 2000 copies.
- ed. Mavrodin V.V.. Peasant war in Russia 1773-1775. Pugachev's uprising. Volume III. - L.:
The name of Ivan Naumovich Beloborodov was well known to Emelyan Pugachev and the "autocrat of the All-Russian" Empress Catherine II, the Ural working people, peasants assigned to factories, and their owner, the all-powerful millionaire Demidov, the Bashkir, Tatar, Mari population of the South Urals and the Siberian governor Chicherin, Alexander Sergeevich Pushkin, the author of "The History of Pugachev" and the Moscow commander-in-chief Prince Volkonsky. For some, this name evoked burning hatred and fear, for others deep respect and sympathy. What did the ascribed peasant become famous for, then a soldier, a working man at the Okhta plant in St. Petersburg, a "retired gunner" and, finally, a poor merchant in one of the remote villages of the provincial Kungur district? The formation of Beloborodov as the leader of the masses is inextricably linked with the events of the peasant war of 1773-1775. The leader of the Ural working people and ascribed peasants in the struggle against the factory owners and the tsarist administration, a talented organizer and "chief marching ataman of the Siberian corps", devoted to the cause of the uprising, he gained immense popularity with his activities among the multinational population of the Kama region, the Urals, the Trans-Urals and Bashkiria. The confidence of the masses and the experience gained during the uprising made him a true leader of the peasant war.
By the time of the uprising, this intelligent, firm and resolute man had gone through a difficult life school that taught him to hate the oppression and oppression that reigned in Russia. His biography largely reveals the reason for the transition to the side of the rebels of the retired soldier and that personal devotion to the fight against the royal servants and factory owners, for which he paid with his life.
The biographical data preserved in the protocol of the interrogation of Beloborodov in the Secret Investigative Commission, as well as materials on the work and life of ordinary people in St. Petersburg and the Urals, allow us to restore the biography of the future ataman before the start of the peasant war. His biography is typical for thousands of Russian people of that time. Perhaps that is why it is so interesting, because this biography is not only of one of the talented leaders of the uprising, but also of many artisans, soldiers, and ascribed peasants.
Ivan Naumovich Beloborodov was born in the early 40s of the 18th century. He came from the peasants of the village of Medyanka, Kungur district. The village was assigned to the Irginsky copper smelter, owned by Ivan Osokin. According to contemporaries, the Irginsky plant and its settlements were relatively large trading centers, resembling urban-type settlements. "This plant [Irginsky] can be considered a small town, where you can get everything you need not only for factory residents passing through, but also for roundabout people."
When Beloborodov turned 18, he was "turned into recruits one by one." In 1756 Beloborodov arrived in Vyborg. Here he changed his civilian "clothes" to the form of the artillery department. From the arsenal he was given a coarse-cloth overcoat, a cap, a dark green frock coat with a red lining, and white trousers. The coat had black epaulettes and white metal buttons. The outfit ended with a tie. Beloborodov was enlisted in the local artillery garrison. The days of indefinite have begun military service, filled with hours of front and artillery exercises. But Beloborodov had to learn not only the hardships of soldiery.
During this period, the factories of the artillery department experienced a shortage of labor. Part of the soldiers from the artillery was transferred to the military enterprises of the capital. Among them was Beloborodov, who "was sent to St. Petersburg to work in gunpowder factories." He was enrolled as a private, "student" at the Okhta gunpowder factory.
Beloborodov's service began with a visit to the Peter and Paul Cathedral, where all the artisans and newly arrived "disciples" were sworn "in fidelity to the service." Then the new working people were assigned to Okhta.
The Okhta powder plant during the period of Beloborodov's work on it was engaged in the production of high-quality saltpeter and prototypes of gunpowder. In addition, the plant was intensively testing "mortar", musket and cannon powder, making firework rockets, crackers, "funny lights" for endless court festivities.
The working day began one hour before dawn (in summer from 4:30 am, in winter from 7 am) and lasted until 7-8 pm, i.e. ended an hour after sunset. Students were required to be the first to arrive at work. Then the apprentices arranged a roll call and reported to the master, "they are all in the collection or not." The teachings of Beloborodov, like other recruits, took place in the process of work. The student had to help the master, "look closely" at the work, "look and note, so that you can know for yourself." The most severe cane discipline flourished at the factory. Masters and numerous paramilitary guards strictly followed the daily routine. Pupils were forbidden to rest during work, talk to each other, move from one "workshop" to another. They had to work "unceasingly and decently", "without any festival" and "incessantly". Misdemeanors of working people were severely punished by gauntlets.
Work at the "state factories" was extremely difficult. The "production process" was mainly "based" on the use of manual labor, hard physical work. Working conditions were harsh. The working premises were cold, dark, damp, poorly heated even in winter. Work in the gunpowder factories was extremely dangerous. The slightest spark could cause an explosion or fire. So, for example, in 1764 at the Okhta plant there was a grandiose fire of saltpeter dryers, where there were 170 pounds of saltpeter.
For his hard labor, Beloborodov received a monetary and "bread" salary, that is, provisions (flour, cereals, salt). After several years of work, Beloborodov was paid about 15 rubles. per year of cash salary and were given provisions for 4 rubles. 20 kop. He received "salary" three times a year: in January, May and September. On average, for each month, Beloborodov accounted for 1 ruble. 25 kop. money and 35 kopecks. products. Even at that time, such earnings were considered beggarly.
For residence, students of "gunpowder and nitrate cases" were located near the factories in the Okhta settlements. These settlements were inhabited by working people of factories, carpenters, turners, carpenters employed in construction in the Admiralty, lower employees of the Office of City Affairs, retired soldiers, otkhodniks and fugitives. Here lived the lower classes of the city, the working hands of the capital. The abundance of "mean people" made Okhta show "special attention" to the police department of St. Petersburg.
The inhabitants of Okhta lived in poverty. Gardens and the sale of milk and butter were a great help to the artisans. "This commerce" was "revered" by the "profitable trade of women," in the words of a contemporary. They huddled in small wooden houses and huts, where the newcomers working people and soldiers were quartered. Apparently, Beloborodov also had a similar apartment. Each house was filled with tenants. Overcrowding and tightness gave rise to terrible unsanitary conditions. After hard physical work, the artisans could not properly rest in their "apartments". For both the hosts and the guests experienced "considerable oppression and resentment", "besides, there were always" "quarrels, fights and loss".
The militarized nature of production left its mark on the life of working people. Without the permission of the authorities, they could not leave the settlement. Everyone went to bed at a certain time. At night, the masters were supposed to check "for" the establishment of those absent. On holidays, working people were allowed to visit each other, play cards and dice, attend church. Even "libation to Bacchus" was regulated. The instructions of that time read: "for the sake of fun, a married man with his wife and children is allowed to drink a hryvnia for his entire house", "one altyn is allowed to drink to each single man."
Complete lack of rights is characteristic of the position of the working people of the "state factories". They could not dispose of not only personal property acquired on a salary, but even the fate of their children.
Lack of rights, poverty, exploitation coexisted side by side with magnificent court festivities, balls, masquerades, fireworks at night, horn and Italian music, joyful rides on the white nights along the Neva, the heroic tragedies of Corneille and the crafty comedies of Molière on the stage of the St. Petersburg theater. A few versts from the dark Okhta houses there are majestic bulks of palaces and mansions of the nobility. Brilliant carriages pulled by a train rolled along the Neva "perspective", this main artery of "the most magnificent city of Europe", the center of a vast empire. The contrasts of the capital city were truly striking, as striking as the position of the many millions of hungry and downtrodden people and their "masters" - the nobility and officials, "living in luxury."
Beloborodov not only knew the hard work, the terrible living conditions of working people and saw the monstrous contrasts of St. Petersburg reality, but also became an eyewitness of events that forced contemporaries to think about the "non-building" of the empire. These events were of great importance for the entire subsequent history of Russia and the armed struggle of its masses.
It was restless in St. Petersburg in the early 60s of the XVIII century. The death of Elizabeth, the accession to the throne of Peter III, rumors of a new order gave rise to excitement and confusion not only in the minds of the nobility. The demagogic decrees of the new emperor on the transfer of part of the factory peasants to the treasury, on the return to the peasants of the lands seized by monasteries, on the cessation of the persecution of schismatics, to a certain extent contributed to the popularity of the name of the heir to Elizabeth. These decrees did not reduce the exploitation of the common people, but aroused hopes for some vague unconscious changes. The unexpected end of the Russian-Prussian war, the open dissatisfaction of the guards with the new emperor, his wild and ridiculous antics, the preparation of Catherine's plot, the abdication and murder of Peter III, and, finally, the "hasty" oath to the new "empress" stirred up the entire capital. The fierce struggle of the "boyars" for power during this period took such rude and scandalous forms that it could not but become the subject of open discussion among the common people of St. Petersburg. The lower classes of the capital reacted in their own way to all the vicissitudes of Petersburg reality. In general, while still under the influence of tsarist ideology, the masses accused the nobles - "boyars" and the nobility of oppression, robbery and crimes. The lower classes of Petersburg wanted to believe in a good, kind tsar who would fix everything. Already in the spring of 1763, in St. Petersburg, a sergeant of the Ingermanland regiment, Ivan Pyatakov, spread the rumor that "Tsar Pyotr Fedorovich is alive." And two years later, "Pyotr Fedorovich" appeared alive in the Nizhny Novgorod province. It was Ivan Mikhailov, aka Evdokimov, former soldier Vyborg regiment stationed in St. Petersburg. Anonymous letters were distributed in the capital, which directly appealed to the common people. In the autumn of 1763, a forged decree of the Senate was in circulation in St. Petersburg. Its content was passed from mouth to mouth through the soldiers' barracks and huts of the working people. The decree was directed against the nobles, guilty of "that Russian people orphaned". It ended with a direct threat to the exploiters: "Measure with the same measure, it will be measured to you."
Protest, indignation, open dissatisfaction with the feudal order, hatred of the exploiters also penetrated into the Okhta settlements, into the dark, smoky workshops of the "sovereign's factory". Cases of mass escapes have become more frequent. In 1764 alone, 233 people fled from the gunpowder factories. All this influenced Beloborodov and pushed him to take a decisive step. He made an attempt to free himself from the royal service.
In 1766, Beloborodov, as he testified a few years later in the Commission of Inquiry, "began to feign limp with his right leg, saying that he was ill with it, for which he was sent to the infirmary." The Petersburg artillery hospital, where Beloborodov ended up, was a small house, in which, in addition to office space, there was only a part of the "not very large cells" that served as hospital wards. Naturally, the infirmary, designed for 50 people, was always crowded, especially in spring and autumn, during the cold and damp Petersburg weather. The entire staff of the medical staff of the hospital consisted of two "healers" - a "doctor" and his assistant "under-doctor".
Beloborodov's complaints about pain in his leg could not arouse suspicion in anyone. Hard physical work, the specifics of gunpowder and nitrate production, terrible living conditions were such that artisans and soldiers working in factories could be injured daily at enterprises or get sick in their apartments. The diagnosis - "the leg is chopped", "the leg is broken", "the right leg is broken" - every now and then was entered into the hospital matricules.
Beloborodov was in the hospital for six months. Staying in the infirmary was for him a rest after seven years of hard labor. Living conditions in the hospital, despite the overcrowding, were much better than "home". The patient was placed on a separate bed with linen sheets and a "boiled hair" pillow. They gave him linen: two shirts and pants. Followed the "cleanliness of the body." The linen was changed twice a month. They fed well in the infirmary. Each patient was entitled daily to 1 and 1/2 pounds of bread, 3/4 pounds of meat, fresh vegetables, 1/2 pounds of cereals, 1/14 pounds of butter, 5 spools of salt, a mug of beer and a glass of wine. Probably, the "enterprising" quartermasters and hospital servants did not follow the accuracy of the food layout very strictly, but nevertheless the ration was more plentiful than that which Beloborodov had "in the wild" at the rate of 1 and 1/6 kopecks of "fodder money" per day.
Finally, in 1766, on the basis of the decision of the Artillery Chancellery, Beloborodov was "because of a lameness from service, he was dismissed by a gunner, with a passport, for his livelihood."
So, for Beloborodov, the Petersburg period of life ended. Now he was freed from hard labor at the factory, from the drill of officers, from the chicanery of craftsmen. But life in the capital did not go unnoticed for Beloborodov. He fully knew the soldier's front and the forced life of artisans - the lot of thousands and thousands of Russian people. All this influenced the consciousness of the soldier and the "student" of the Okhta plant. A protest broke out in him against oppression, against the royal service. At that moment, the protest turned into a deliberate evasion of service, in the future it will take other forms. Petersburg, the army, the Okhta plant largely influenced the general formation of the character of Beloborodov. The "retired gunner" no longer looked like a young Ural boy, as he was before the army. Life in the capital, work at a factory, communication with artisans enriched his observations, expanded his spiritual and mental horizons, introduced him to professional skills. Beloborodov was a strong-willed, sharp-witted, disciplined man. It was this discipline, together with a firm calculation, "sobriety", which later amazed his friends and enemies so much, that Beloborodov formed during the difficult and deprivation years of his life in St. Petersburg.
Beloborodov returned to his native Kungur district. Here he settled in the village of Bogorodskoye, got married "and lived at his home, trading in wax, honey and other goods." By the nature of his activities, Beloborodov had to deal with both Ural working people and ascribed peasants. He could see with his own eyes the monstrous exploitation in the mining factories. During this period, working people rebelled against their oppressors several times. From the mid-1960s to 1770 there were unceasing disturbances of Demidov's huge Kyshtym-Kasli factories. In 1771 there was an uprising in the Middle Urals in the area of the Shaitan factories.
Terrible arbitrariness reigned at the Shaitan plant, which belonged in the 70s of the 18th century. Efim Shiryaev. The workers were horribly exploited. They received little pay for their work. Work at the factories went around the clock, in two shifts of 12 hours. Days off were not allowed. They did not work only on "great holidays": Christmas, Easter, Epiphany. For the slightest misconduct, they were punished with rods, whips, sticks, and, according to the memoirs of contemporaries, "often beaten to death." They used the most savage torture. The worker was put on an iron flyer on his head, shackles on his feet, a two-yard chain with a pound weight was tied to his neck. The punished could hardly move from one place to another. But he was forced to work in this position. Women's and children's labor was widely used. Even workers with babies were not exempted from hard physical work. Women were also subjected to terrible punishments. The culprit was put in a slingshot resembling a cage, on the sides and on the back of which iron bars stuck out, preventing her from bending over. The punished woman had to sit motionless all the time. The plant owner Shiryaev personally participated in the executions. Repeatedly when visiting the factory, he beat his workers with an iron cane.
Driven to despair in 1771, the working people, by common agreement, committed reprisals against their master. He was killed by a group of runaway peasants led by Andrei Plotnikov, nicknamed Ryzhanka. Terrible facts of exploitation and torture were revealed at the trial. But neither the court nor the investigation changed the position of the workers. The workers were burdened with "overwork", they were just as severely punished. There was even a special register for executions: "Everyday magazine for all sorts of cases and circumstances."
The position of working people in the Shaitan factories was not exceptional. Similar hard labor reigned in dozens of other enterprises in the Urals. That is why the news of the uprising against the tsarist officials and factory owners was greeted with such joy in this region.
In the winter of 1773, when an uprising broke out in the Kungur district, Beloborodov, as a retired military man, was taken into the command of ensign N. Dyakonov. This team was supposed to "reconnoiter" the actions of the rebels. Soon Beloborodov left the detachment of N. Dyakonov and returned home. Apparently, he simply evaded military service. Here is how Beloborodov himself describes further events: “And this year, on January 1, 1774, when their villages were all in the bazaar, they came to this village: first, the Kungur district of the village of Altynnova, the peasant Danila Burtsev, and publicly read a manifesto to all the people in the bazaar on behalf of Sovereign Emperor Peter the Third, and then five Bashkirs - and they also announced publicly to everyone that Colonel Kanzafar Usaev, called by them, with five hundred Bashkirs through their village was going to Kungur to bow the people to Tsar Peter Fedorovich and find him not far from the village ... ". Beloborodov went to meet the colonel, who, upon arrival in the village, stopped at the house of a "retired gunner". Kanzafar Usaev "recruited 25 Cossacks" from among the inhabitants of the village of Bogorodsky.
The new "Cossacks" elected Beloborodov as centurion. Kanzafar Usaev transferred 12 more people to his detachment. Further fate Beloborodova is closely connected with the course of the uprising. Here we note that Beloborodov quite deliberately went over to the side of the rebels. Having experienced a lot himself, he saw the everyday picture of forced labor and exploitation of working people and peasants. The reason for Beloborodov’s entry into the army of the rebels is rooted not only in his personal protest, but also in the desire to destroy the order that thousands of ordinary people Urals to the position of serf slaves.
The uprisings in the Yekaterinburg mining department began from the west and southeast. Almost simultaneously, unrest swept the areas of the department, bordering on the Iset province and Kungur district. In the early days of January 1774, detachments of rebels led by Kanzafar Usaev and Ivan Beloborodov were active in the east of the Kungur district and in the western regions of the Yekaterinburg mining department. During this period, they took the Suksun plant, located approximately 48 versts southeast of Kungur. The Pugachevites and working people did not touch the factory buildings. Subsequently, the administration was forced to admit that "no damage was done to the factory building and factories." However, working people burned all the documents that were in the office. A huge amount (over 54.5 thousand rubles) of debt contracts between the administration and working people for the procurement of ore, coal and for the performance of other works was destroyed. Working people and a detachment of rebels also seized factory supplies.
In early January, the rebels also took possession of the Bisert plant, located on the Bisert River, the eastern tributary of the Ufa River, on the territory of the Yekaterinburg department. The plant belonged to P. Demidov and consisted of about 500 artisans. The working people voluntarily, without any resistance, went over to the side of the rebels. "Having gathered the inhabitants and by common worldly consent, they sent from the world to meet him, Beloborodov, up to several people, who entered" at the Bisertsky plant. The rebels and workers seized supplies, tools and household property. Part of the artisans joined the detachment of the Pugachev ataman Beloborodov operating in the area.
He went over to the side of the rebels and such a large metallurgical plant as Revdinsky P. Demidov. It was located at the confluence of the Revda River with the Chusovaya River, 42 versts from Yekaterinburg. The plant annually smelted 210 poods of pig iron and employed 1,620 people.
The unrest that took place at the plant a few years before the peasant war and left a definite mark on the moods and aspirations of the Demidov serfs, the further intensification of exploitation could not but affect the attitude of the peasants and working people towards the rebels. The latter could count on open sympathy, help and support from the factory people. Both the owner of the plant and his administration perfectly understood this. That is why the news of the approach of the Pugachev detachment caused panic and confusion among the faithful servants of P. Demidov. A curious evidence of the situation at the Revdinsky plant at the end of December 1773 has been preserved: “The villainous party for the same evil went to the evo [P. Demidov] Revdinsky plant, why, hearing such great fear and effort of the villains, from its Revdinsky and Besertsky factories, leaving the entire factory administration under the patronage of God's providence alone, clerks, servants and partly artisans were forced to leave for Yekaterinburg, and the rest of the artisans and workers, as disassembled on a patrol for caution, while others fled to save themselves, scattered through the forests ... " . The Revdinsky plant was taken without any resistance from the population.
Finally, on January 6, 1774, the Achita fortress passed to the rebels. In the hands of the Pugachevites was an important point located on the Moscow Road. The local administration attached particular importance to the fortress, covering the path that connected Yekaterinburg with the European part of Russia. Immediately after receiving news of the beginning of unrest in the autumn of 1773, additional military teams were sent there from Yekaterinburg. But the teams, replenished by "Cossacks" from the peasants, could no longer change the situation that had developed in this area. The troops of the Pugachevites approached the fortress. Finally, an uprising was brewing in the Achita fortress itself. The commandant of Voinov intensively began to send "Cossacks" on the road "to watch the villains." One of these groups, sent by Voinov "to leave", secretly went to the Revdinsky plant, which shortly before that had passed into the hands of the Beloborodov detachment. The "Cossacks" of the Achita fortress agreed with the Pugachevites to send help. On the night of January 6, the "Cossacks" together with the "villains" from the Revdinsky factory returned to the fortress. The guards were warned in advance. When the detachment approached, they did not raise an alarm and let the rebels pass without hindrance. The fortress without a single shot passed into the hands of the Pugachevites. The rebels dispersed to "apartments" to disarm the garrison. The unfortunate commandant of the Warriors' fortress was captured in his house, sleeping. The Pugachevites demanded that he hand over the keys to the powder magazine. The rebels seized a large number of guns, two cannons, several pounds of gunpowder in the Achita fortress. More than 150 "Cossacks" and 10 soldiers of a regular military team surrendered. They were "assigned" to the detachment of the rebels.
On the morning of January 7, a manifesto was read to the local residents and it was announced that the fortress had passed "under the hand of Tsar Peter Fedorovich." Here is how the eyewitness Anton Kopylov, who himself was a member of Voinov’s team, and after the capture of the fortress, fled to Yekaterinburg, described this event: “The inhabitants were announced a false manifesto, and that they were dismissed from all taxes for 10 years, and then they would be treated like under the great sovereign Peter The first emperor was *, they confirmed that news should not be sent to near Yekaterinburg. The Pugachevites also "told the residents that if there was an offensive against them from Yekaterinburg, they would come to the rescue." In the afternoon, the rebels, together with the garrison that had gone over to their side, set out from the Achita fortress. The detachment that captured the Achita fortress belonged to the "army" of the "chief ataman and field colonel" Beloborodov. In early January, this name was first heard in Yekaterinburg, which terrified the tsarist administration and the breeders of the Urals throughout the first half of 1774.
* (Apparently, we are talking about the size of the poll tax. It was increased under Catherine II in comparison with head tax, which was under Peter I, almost 2.5 times, from 1 rub. 10 kop. from the male soul to 2 rubles. 70 kop.)
The beginning of the new year of 1774 was marked by an exceptional rise in the popular movement in the western and southern parts of the Yekaterinburg mining department. The uprising at the factories, the invitation of detachments of the rebels "by the world", that is, by the entire community of working people and ascribed peasants, became a mass phenomenon. After going over to the side of the Pugachevites of the Achita fortress, Beloborodov moved towards Yekaterinburg. The fortresses of Bisertskaya, Klenovskaya and Grobovskaya, standing on the Great Moscow Road and covering Yekaterinburg from the west, surrendered to the rebels without a fight. Everywhere there were agitators with "villainous letters". Even before the approach of the main forces of the rebels, manifestos of "Peter III" about freedom were sent to the Grobov and Bisert fortresses. The action of the manifestos, the stories of agitators significantly influenced the mood of the residents. The population welcomed the news of the destruction of the power of breeders and the tsarist administration. As clerk Nikita Evshev from the Bisert fortress reported to V. Bibikov, the "manager" of the Yekaterinburg mining department, "the inhabitants left to meet them [the rebels] on horseback." By mid-January, the fortresses covering Yekaterinburg, which, in the words of Beloborodov himself, "voluntarily surrendered to him", were in the hands of the rebels. The rebel army grew to 500 people with 5 guns. Detachments of the rebels from the west were approaching Yekaterinburg.
The actions of the rebels in January 1774 caused panic and confusion in the military and civil administration of Yekaterinburg. V. Bibikov and local authorities were faced with the facts of a general uprising at the factories of the Yekaterinburg department. Numerous pickets placed on the roads of the region, consisting "for the most part of the Cossacks recruited from the peasants," proved to be an unreliable defense against the rebels. As the local Yekaterinburg official Okhlyabin rightly noted, none of them was "prepared" "neither for service, nor for how they should understand Pugachev." Naturally, in "small numbers" the detachments sent were either defeated by the rebels, or simply went over to the side of Beloborodov. Under the circumstances, in early January, Bibikov was forced to convene a military council, which brought together the military and civil administration. The chief head of the Yekaterinburg Mining Department informed the members of the council about the "disastrous" situation in the Iset province, which was in the grip of an uprising, about the defeat of military teams on the territory of the department itself. At the end of his report, Bibikov declared that he "cannot, with so many people, not only protect the Yekaterinburg district, but even save the city." Okhlyabin very vividly conveyed the impression that Bibikov's message made on the officials. Everyone was so confused that they could not make a single concrete proposal that day. Okhlyabin noted with bitter humor: "It is natural that such a proposal [about the surrender of the city] touched everyone present, that day they did not decisively do anything, but everyone decided to submit their argument the next day." But only on February 8 the local authorities got together to resolve the issue of the situation. Officials put forward several proposals for the procurement of food and fodder, for the preparation of Yekaterinburg for a siege, for the repair of city fortifications. However, Bibikov insisted on surrendering the city. He stated that he did not find funds for the defense of the city and decided "according to the military article with the 120th head, leave the city, and leave the nobles from it." Only the speeches of some officials with sharp criticism of Bibikov's position forced the council to postpone the issue of evacuating the city.
Meanwhile, the position of the Yekaterinburg government authorities was extremely difficult. Yekaterinburg was indeed under attack by the insurgent troops and could be captured relatively easily by the insurgents. In a letter dated January 11, 1774, Major General Y. Dananberg to the Siberian governor D. Chicherin with a request for help directly states: surrounded by villains and traitors and is in every possible danger.
The external danger was aggravated by the unrest of the masses in Yekaterinburg itself. Dissatisfaction with the administration reigned in the city, in some cases turning into open disobedience to the authorities. So, out of 700 recruits temporarily sent home due to food shortages in the city, only a part was collected. The townspeople openly expressed sympathy for the rebels. Eyewitnesses noted that "heaps of people were climbing to all the streets, and indignation was to be expected every hour." There were rumors about the intention of the city's lower classes to capture the very manager of the Yekaterinburg Mining Department during his flight from the city. Bibikov even drew up a special draft "Appeal" to the townspeople. In this "Appeal", which was supposed to be "published" during the evacuation of the city, it was directly stated that the surrender of Yekaterinburg occurred due to the "infidelity" of the population to the authorities. Fear of an uprising in the city itself aggravated the already panicky mood of the local bureaucratic world and factory owners. Everyone remembered Kungur, which was abandoned due to fear of captivity by the local administration, merchants and industrialists. Large breeders who were in Yekaterinburg, at the end of December, fled along the Verkhoturskaya road to the north. So, from one letter sent in January 1774, we learn that the factory owner "Turchaninov has long fled the city with all his estate and retinue." The panic was so great that among officials and factory owners they talked about the need to flee to Moscow. Bibikov also began to openly prepare for his departure: he collected about 50 carts near his house, prepared to burn the documents of the Mining Chancellery and fuse copper money.
As a result of the "beginning indignation", the city officials, who feared for their fate, decided to create their own police protection in the city. The court adviser Rode organized a detachment of "people of the mining department", with whom he "did his own trips through the night" around the city and only, according to an eyewitness, "stopped the beginning indignation" in Yekaterinburg itself.
The situation in the city, the center of the mining Urals, in the first half of January is very significant. The approach of the rebels to the city not only caused panic among the exploiting elites, but also aggravated class conflicts. In Yekaterinburg itself, indignation and spontaneous resistance among the city's lower classes was ripening.
But Yekaterinburg was not destined to fall under the power of the rebels. The rebel detachments of Beloborodov headed to the north-west, thereby missing an advantageous moment to capture the city. It can be assumed that, despite the weakness of the "villain" troops, Yekaterinburg, unfortified, deprived of outside help, in which an uprising was brewing and the defense of which was carried out by a small number of regular troops, in the event of an active assault, could be taken by the rebels. However, Beloborodov did not dare to storm the city.
In mid-January, the main blow of the insurgent troops was directed northwest of Yekaterinburg to the area of the Shaitansky and Bilimbaevsky factories. With the approach of detachments of rebels at these factories, unrest arose among working people and ascribed peasants, work stopped, reprisals began against the factory administration and the master's clerks. Verkholantsev, an eyewitness to the events, an employee of the Bilimbaevsky plant, recalled: “The stories about Pugachev’s actions, about his hatred for the landowners and boyars, everywhere revolted the people against the bosses. soon the great sovereign will be here, they said. One of them even threw me into the ore pit. I was forced to flee from my team;
The factory administration reported the danger to Yekaterinburg in early January. Lieutenant Sergeev was sent to the Bilimbaevsky plant with 250 "Cossacks". This team was given by the factory authorities another 450 people mobilized from the artisans. The excitement of working people, which grew into open indignation and "rebellion", the message that the Grobovskaya fortress had fallen, that the rebels occupied the village of Cheremshanka 12 versts from the Bilimbaevsky plant, forced the lieutenant to immediately "retreat" to the Shaitansky plants, and from there near Yekaterinburg to the village of Reshety. “I don’t know what for the sake of with the whole team and guns,” wrote the clerk Andrei Shirokov, not without poison, informing I. Lazarev, the tenant of the Bilimbaevsky plant, about the “tactical actions” of the “brave” lieutenant.
On the night of January 18, the Bilimbaevsky plant was occupied by the troops of the rebels under the command of Beloborodov. The plant was a large metallurgical enterprise, producing annually an average of 196,000 poods of pig iron, and employed about 1,000 working people. The population was looking forward to the rebels. On the day the detachments entered the plant, there was great excitement "among the people." More than 300 people joined the army of the rebels. fear, stuck; among them were servants. "Peter Parkachev, a participant in the unrest in 1771 at the Shaitansky factory, later an assistant and captain of Beloborodov, also joined the detachment. Working people smashed the factory office.
All contracts concluded by the administration with craftsmen and ascribed peasants were destroyed. "The office papers and the archive were taken out into the street and burned."
Beloborodov's army did not linger at the Bilimbaevsky plant. On the same day, the rebels, together with a new detachment formed from local residents, marched against the Shaitan factories. The army at that moment numbered several hundred people and had artillery consisting of 5 guns.
The Shaitansky (Upper and Lower) factories, owned by the merchants Shiryaevs, were located 50 versts northwest of Yekaterinburg. The factories operated a blast furnace and 3 hammers. About 400 artisans and 1,000 bonded peasants living in neighboring settlements were employed directly at the factories.
With great joy, the population of the plant greeted the news of the appearance of a new tsar, Peter Fedorovich, who promised complete freedom from landowners, serfs, factory owners, from hard labor in factories. The Shaitansky plant stopped production of cast iron already on January 7, as soon as the rumors about the "rebellion" became reliable, the blast furnace was "cooled", the hammers were inactive. The workers openly expressed sympathy for the rebels. Factory authorities fled in fear to Yekaterinburg. Part of the working people hastened to meet Beloborodov's detachment with a request to expedite the arrival. On February 19, the troops of the rebels entered the plant. Artisans led by Ivan Demidov and Sazon Rebrov organized a solemn meeting. The rebels "were met against the master's house on platinum with bread and salt." On the same day, working people seized the papers of the factory office. All IOUs and bonded contracts were burned. Working people and Cossacks from the Beloborodov detachment confiscated the factory treasury (about 170 rubles) and food supplies (several hundred pounds of flour). The inhabitants of the Shaitan plant organized their detachment, where about 150 people of working people and ascribed peasants voluntarily joined. This detachment subsequently took an active part in the siege of the Utkinsky plant.
The Shaitansky plant became the main base of Beloborodov's troops for a long time. When counting on a long siege of Yekaterinburg, which, as we see, the rebels were striving for, such a choice must be considered successful. It should be noted that for the most part the population of the district was devoted to the cause of the uprising, to the cause of the struggle against the exploitation of the factory owners. This provided a reliable rear for the rebel army. The location of the Shaitansky plant was also beneficial from the point of view of the tactics of the rebels, who were trying to capture the northern factories of the Urals and cut off the only route connecting Yekaterinburg with the whole country - the Verkhoturskaya road.
Realizing the danger of organizing the main base of the uprising near Yekaterinburg, the local administration made a lot of efforts to expel Beloborodov from the Shaitan factories. On the afternoon of January 19, Captain Erapolsky, who was standing with troops in the village of Reshety, was delivered 3 people from among the working people of the Shaitansky plant. The artisans testified that they allegedly fled on purpose from "Shaitanka", where there is a small almost unarmed detachment under the command of a retired soldier, and that "you can now take the aforementioned villains - they don't have gunpowder, they don't have artillery." Erapolsky immediately reported this to Yekaterinburg, and sent two artisans for interrogation to Colonel Bibikov. On the same day, an order came from the "manager of the Ural factories" to the village of Reshety: "Erapolsky ... to go to Shaitanka ..., a reserve was sent to the fortification, which had previously stood at Reshety, under Sergeant Markov. An order was sent to Sergeant Kurlov to agree with Erapolsky and hit the thieves in the rear, speaking from the Utkinsky plant.
The next day, government troops marched to the Shaitan plant. The detachment consisted of 20 horse "Cossacks from artisans, 40 people on foot with two soldiers, and up to 50 Cossacks from the Revda plant." Yerapolsky took with him one of the defectors. Soon after the team left, the guards of the rebels discovered it and reported it to their base. When approaching the Shaitanka, the defector fled into the "villainous crowd". Here is how a participant in the battle, who fought on the side of government troops, describes the further course of events: "Opposite our factories, plural villains, of whom one can be seen that of the leaders of the army, and asked our party: "Who do you believe?". Ours answered: "To whom are you?" They said: "To Sovereign Pyotr Fedorovich." And ours announced that we believe in God and the gracious Empress Ekaterina Alekseevna. Of which the villains shouted with an admonition that ours should be handed over to them, calling all of ours by their names and nicknames, it is clear that, as they say, acquaintances - Shaitan, Bilimbaev, leaning peasants from the Irginsky and Suksunsky factories.
Erapolsky gave the order to open fire. The rebels responded in kind. Government troops came under cannon fire, which fired at them with grapeshot. Rifle and cannon fire upset the front of the detachment of punishers, who dispersed, fearing "to stay in one position, so as not to allow themselves to be attacked by invisible passages behind the forest." Government troops "due to disorder had indiscriminate firing." The rebels continued to shoot from the cannon, but "most of them retired to the forest and pretended to attack there." As a result, government troops retreated. Part of the Erapolsky detachment tried to go behind the lines of Beloborodov's army and at first succeeded, captured guns and 10 prisoners. But the rebels, pushing the main detachment of government troops, "found on them and guns and took away prisoners from them, and captured several of them themselves." In total, about 60 people were captured - more than half of the Yerapolsky detachment. Thus ended the first attempt by the Yekaterinburg administration to destroy Beloborodov's base at the Shaitansky plant. Led by a skillful leader, using the advantage in artillery (Beloborodov personally fired cannons and surprised everyone, as an eyewitness recalled, "with his art"), the rebels won.
Meanwhile, in Yekaterinburg, the victory of government troops was announced. The message about this was read with a full concourse of people. Colonel Bibikov had already been forced to issue "an award from Her Majesty's treasury" to the participants in the battle "for loyalty and diligence", although no one in Yekaterinburg's bureaucratic circles doubted that it was not the "villains" who suffered the defeat. Captain Erapolsky was directly accused of being incapable of leading the troops and that he "came into cowardice and makes a retreat to the city."
By this time, the local administration managed to strengthen Yekaterinburg. Several hundred troops were concentrated in the city. But, despite the fact that "the people chosen for the Cossacks and armed are very satisfied," as one of the residents of Yekaterinburg wrote, "considerable fear and horror" reigned in the city. Under such conditions, the local administration made a new attempt to seize the Shaitansky factories, the capture of which not only made it possible to control an important strategic area that covered the path to the northern factories of the department, but also to raise the morale of the population and the defenders of the besieged Yekaterinburg.
On January 21, a military team was again sent to the Shaitan factories. Instead of Captain Erapolsky, who was accused of cowardice, it was headed by Lieutenant Kostin, a participant in the Russian-Prussian war. The detachment consisted of 400 people, of which 60 people were regular soldiers. The team was given 7 guns. By the evening of January 22, a detachment of government troops arrived at the Talitskaya yelani, located 3 versts from the Shaitan plant. Kostin's attempt to quietly send soldiers to reconnoiter the guards of the rebels failed, "because the thieves have them in the forests, covered with needles and snow, without distant fortification, but so that they can send them news to the factory with one cry." On the morning of the next day, Kostin, having built his detachment, approached the plant. Government troops opened fire from cannons. They were answered from the side of the plant by firing from rifles and 11 guns. The shootout lasted about 4 hours. The cannons of the rebels caused damage to Kostin's detachment, although the "villains", who did not have a sufficient number of experienced artillerymen, could not always conduct aimed fire. Kostin tried to seize the guns, but failed. "Cossacks" from the government team, "unagile people", guns "did not dare to take". But, apparently, it was not only the "courage" or "agility" of Kostin's troops. Artillery Beloborodov was covered by a barrier of infantry in accordance with all the rules of the then tactics. This was noted even in the official report: "they also had their artillery covered." As a result of the skirmish, government troops upset the front: "One regular team remained in order, while the rest crowded in heaps." Skillfully using cavalry on the flanks, Beloborodov forced Kostin's team to retreat. "It was almost like our [Yekaterinburg] party was not encircled around, that seeing our party the commander of their incomprehensible crowd against himself was also forced to retreat." The rebels took prisoners. The squad returned. So, the second attempt of the Yekaterinburg administration to seize the Shaitan factories was again unsuccessful. "Kostin, who dealt with them [the rebels], was forced to return without any success with the loss of people," the Yekaterinburg official Okhlyabin wrote bitterly in his diary.
With the capture of the Shaitan factories, unrest of working people began in the north of the Yekaterinburg department. At the end of January, non-commissioned master Pavel Zhubrinsky, sent by the population of the state-owned Utkinsky plant, arrived at the Shaitanka. He informed Beloborodov about the request of working people to come to the plant, and also gave him 1.5 thousand rubles taken from the factory office for the needs of the uprising. Beloborodov promoted a messenger to Yesaul and entrusted him with the formation of detachments from working people. A few days later, on the night of January 29, the rebels arrived at the Utka State Plant. They were met by working people headed by Zhubrinsky. Beloborodov ordered the local priest to swear allegiance to the new emperor. A detachment of local residents was formed to help the rebels. It consisted of about 200 people.
Soon, Beloborodov's detachments moved to an important point of defense of government troops in the north of the Yekaterinburg department - the Utkinsky Demidov Plant. This enterprise was located 90 versts from Yekaterinburg, on the Srednyaya Duck River, a tributary of the Chusovaya. The plant was one of the largest Ural enterprises. It smelted up to 287,000 poods of pig iron a year; over a thousand working people worked on it, not counting the attached peasants. The plant was excellently fortified: surrounded by a wall, a rampart, on which 15 guns were installed. With the approach of the rebels, large government detachments were concentrated on the territory of the factory settlement, with a total number of a thousand people. Sergeant Kurlov, sent from Yekaterinburg, commanded the garrison. The first attack of the rebels took place on February 1, 1774, when the rebel troops, having occupied the Chusovskaya Sloboda, tried to seize the plant. However, the attempt was not successful. The attack was repulsed. From that moment on, almost the entire first half of February, the actions of the rebel troops were aimed at capturing the Utkinsky plant. On February 3, the attack was resumed. The "battle" lasted all day, but the rebels were driven back. However, government troops were in a difficult position. Taking advantage of the fact that the plant was not completely blocked, the besieged sent desperate calls for help demanding troops and ammunition (primarily gunpowder). “We are now on fire,” one of the factory clerks wrote, demanding reinforcements from the Nizhny Tagil office, “what are you, fathers, doing, I don’t know, please [i.e. help] with people and support. Our business is bad ...” . Soon the battle resumed. The rebels used their usual tactics: they gradually surrounded the plant, cutting off all roads, and created their base in the village of Kuri not far from the factory village. To the besieged, most of whom consisted of forcibly mobilized, the rebels managed to smuggle "anonymous letters", manifestos of Peter III. Detachments of Beloborodov on February 9 again attacked the plant. “We have been under siege from the enemies at the local factory on the 9th ... since midnight, and a strong battle has been going on all day,” wrote Demidov’s clerk. During this period, Beloborodov concentrated a huge army on the Utka, apparently numbering several thousand people. Fierce fighting broke out near the plant on February 10 and 11. The rebels repeatedly went on the attack, hiding from rifle shots and buckshot by specially made moving structures - a shaft of "shallow thickets" and snow. Finally, on the evening of February 11, the Utkinsky plant was busy. Here is how an eyewitness, who was among the besieged, describes the final episode of the battle: “At about 9 o’clock in the afternoon, with all their might, they suddenly attacked all the places approved against them, first ... with cavalry on the pond ... so that the thief by that pond near the dam to office, secondly, against our [government's] main battery along Vyatskaya Street, thirdly, against the city tower, fourthly, against the city wall, in increased strength with great shouting and screeching. on the run, and out of such anger at her, the yards were set on fire behind the pond, the second - by Sergeant Kurlov and three cannons, such a strong blow was thrown that the villains were forced to leave their battery. breaking through the yards into the street, Sergeant Kurlov with a team with three guns with him was surrounded from the rear. Kurlov was hacked to death, most of his troops surrendered. The Utkinsky plant was in the hands of the rebels.
The first days of February were marked by a new success of Beloborodov's detachments in the Middle Urals. On February 2, "submissives", i.e. rebel agitators, "outraged" the villages of Bagaryatino and Shchelkunskoye, assigned to the Sysert plant. On February 7, Colonel Bibikov received a report that Beloyarskaya Sloboda should "follow the thieves." In early February, the rebels captured the Kamensky plant, located 90 miles southeast of Yekaterinburg. On February 7, the Beloborodov rebels took the village of Makarova, located on the road to the Revdinsky plant. The rebels were getting closer and closer to the plant. Finally, on February 11, a detachment of rebels attacked the main base of government troops, the village of Reshety, and was driven back only 5 miles from the city. By the beginning of February, during the climax of the uprising, about 20 factories located in the northern part of the Yekaterinburg Mining Department had gone over to the side of the rebels.
The defeat of the detachments of Erapolsky and Kostin at the Shaitansky plant, the successful siege of the Utkinsky plant indicate that the rebels achieved significant success in the fight against government troops. This success could not be achieved without a certain organization, without the introduction of discipline in the troops of Beloborodov. A number of interesting sources have survived, testifying to attempts to create military units in the Middle Urals from rebellious working people and ascribed peasants.
Beloborodov based the organization of the rebel troops on the principle of forming detachments in hundreds, like the Cossacks. Therefore, the rebels, recorded in hundreds, were called Cossacks. At the head of such detachments were centurions, who were chosen from among people who enjoyed authority among their comrades. The appointment of a commander responsible for the discipline and combat effectiveness of the detachment, apparently, cannot but be regarded as an attempt to introduce unity of command in the troops of the insurgents.
The detachments were replenished at the expense of assigned peasants and working people who voluntarily joined the army. But there were also cases of forced mobilization. Here is how the “mountain clerk” of the Verkholantsev Bilimbaevsky factory, who was captured and later became one of the active participants in the uprising in the Urals, describes the recruitment to the rebel army: “Having learned that I had a team of 500 workers, he [Beloborodov] ordered me the next day [after taking the factory] put them in front and make them a roll call according to the mountain lists. At night I lined up 500 people in one line opposite the colonel's apartment and waited for dawn. Beloborodov got up early, they reported to him about me, and I was immediately admitted ... Beloborodov examined all line and chose up to three hundred people for himself; he did not accept the rest due to infancy and other shortcomings; he commanded the front, pulled out his saber and turned to the foremen and centurions, who instantly followed his example. you guys, with a comrade. "I bowed. They immediately cut my hair like a Cossack and gave me a saber." As you can see, Beloborodov himself played a certain role in organizing the troops. Enjoying great prestige among the rebels, from whom he gained "trust by his sobriety and meek disposition," Beloborodov successfully formed detachments and did much to strengthen discipline in them.
The views of Beloborodov and his assistants on the organization of the troops are of considerable interest, because they are also characteristic of a certain stratum of the population of the Urals - working people. A very interesting document has been preserved - "Instruction", signed by "ataman and chief colonel" Beloborodov. The "instruction" was addressed to Semyon Varentsov, Egafar Azbaev and Oska Oskin, who led the Russian, Bashkir and Cheremis hundreds. This document quite clearly articulates the views on discipline and unity of command in the detachments. Addressing his subordinates, Beloborodov wrote: “By this instruction, I firmly confirm to you that you should keep the Russian and Tatar military team in your hundreds in all severity and [to] you obedience [and], and watch it extremely, so that everyone is in unanimous diligently for the service of his imperial majesty". From the centurions, Beloborodov demanded the merciless eradication of all "arbitrariness" and "disobedience" in the detachments. The "Chief Ataman" suggested that the centurions subject the most malicious violators of discipline to public punishment before the ranks. Beloborodov and his assistants also determined what, in their opinion, should be the commander who led the rebel army. First of all, the commander must be sincerely devoted to the cause of the uprising, a staunch supporter of Pugachev: “And at the same time I firmly confirm to you that the leader should be chosen from among faithful slaves, to whom, according to your satisfied knowledge, his sincere jealousies will show his sincere jealousy to His Imperial Majesty, and not from flatterers, who show their merits only by their appearance and deceit. The commander must be selected from among experienced, brave and determined people. The morale of the army largely depends on the personal qualities of the "leader". In the letter, Beloborodov pointed out that it was necessary "to choose, by the general agreement of the army, a faithful, courageous and, in necessary cases, not timid person, for the army is always encouraged by one kind order against the enemy."
Beloborodov himself strove to attract to his detachment devoted to the cause of the uprising and experienced people. A kind of "headquarters" was formed in his detachment, which tried to control the rebels, carry out administrative functions, and was in charge of correspondence with the commanders of hundreds. Characteristically, Beloborodov and his "headquarters" tried to establish contact with the main center of the peasant war. At the end of January, a delegation was sent from the Urals near Orenburg, to Pugachev, consisting of 5 working people from factories, one captive "Cossack" and 4 Tatars. They brought a report from Beloborodov. After some time, the messengers returned. They brought Beloborodov a decree appointing him ataman and announced that Pugachev was "a true sovereign."
Documents that came out of Beloborodov's "headquarters" have been preserved. These documents - instructions, decrees, tickets, warrants - deal with issues of administrative and military operations. They were signed by Beloborodov* and sealed with the signatures of his assistants. These documents make it possible to determine the names of Beloborodov's inner circle - the leaders of the uprising in the Middle Urals. These are assistants Sergei Shvetsov and Maxim Negodyaev, clerk Gerasim Stepanov, military clerk Pyotr Gusev, translator from Tatar language Smail (Izmail) Imanov. The active organizers of the uprising in the Middle Urals were also the commanders of individual detachments of Yesauls Pyotr Parkachev, Pavel Zhubrinsky and the centurions who led the "national formations", Semyon Barentsev, Egafar Azbaev, Oska Oskin. Some of them, like Beloborodov, remained faithful to the cause of the uprising to the end. So, Gerasim Stepanov, who apparently served in one of the factory offices, actively participated in the uprising in the Urals. Stepanov, like Beloborodov, took part in the campaign against the Volga. He, who knew official office work well, was taken to the Pugachev Military Collegium. Gerasim Stepanov, who was a "great literate man", together with Dubrovsky, the secretary of the Collegium, drew up a manifesto to the people of Kazan.
* (Verkholantsev, a "beeper" from the Bilimbaevsky plant, claimed that it was only during the period of the uprising in the Urals that he taught Beloborodov to read and write. However, this is unlikely. Apparently, Beloborodov knew the letter before. An analysis of his handwriting forces us to reconsider Verkholantsev's statement. Numerous autographs by Beloborodov indicate an already established individual style. It is interesting that Beloborodov's signature is very clear, made with a confident hand, with a characteristic slope, and is of the same type on all documents. It is difficult to admit that it belongs to a person who has just begun to learn to write and whose handwriting must evolve. The earliest document where the signature is preserved is dated 31 January. The latest autograph is in the testimony of Beloborodov to the Investigative Commission ("Ivan Beloborodov had a hand in this interrogation") and refers to July 31, 1774. The handwriting on both documents is identical. There is also doubt that Verkholantsev managed to teach Beloborodov to read and write in two weeks between patrols and battles (Verkholantsev was taken into the rebel army on January 19, the first surviving autograph dates from January 31, 1774). We also note that Beloborodov's service in artillery as a gunner, work at the Okhta plant, where most of the artisans were competent, further trading activities required certain literacy skills.)
The Ural factories were the main supply bases for Beloborodov's troops. Some factories were fortified to protect against the Bashkirs long before the peasant war. Many of them were surrounded by ramparts on which cannons were mounted. With the news of the uprising, guns and gunpowder were specially delivered to a number of factories to "repel the villains." From the factories, the rebels received all the artillery, gunpowder, most of the guns. However, there were not enough trophies. The rebels were poorly armed, this affected their combat capability. Beloborodov made an attempt to establish the production of his own weapons. At the Revdinsky plant, working people forged sabers, swords, spears and other edged weapons. Apparently, its production has reached mass production, because the rebels spent 500 pounds of iron. The rebel detachments also received food and fodder from the captured factories. In the "shops" - warehouses, a large amount of food belonging to the factory owners was stored. Affiliated peasants also provided assistance, who gave the rebels bread and fodder "for no money".
Attempts by Beloborodov and his staff to introduce military discipline, unity of command, the presentation of special requirements for the election of commanders, the manufacture of their own weapons in factories cannot but be regarded as well-known elements of organization characteristic of the uprising of working people. However, the spontaneity inherent in the peasant war, aggravated by Beloborodov’s serious tactical mistakes (refusal to storm Yekaterinburg), poorly established communications with neighboring centers of the uprising (for example, with Kungur), lack of ammunition, untrained personnel, manifested itself especially strongly in battles with large teams of regular troops, led by experienced career officers, and could not but affect the further course of the uprising.
Mid-February - early March 1774 was a turning point in the peasant war in the Middle Urals. During this period, Yekaterinburg had numerous forces. Having received help from General Decolong as part of two companies of regular troops under the command of Second Major Fisher, gathering about 3000 "Cossacks" from nearby villages and factories, arming 400 people of the "coin company", Colonel Bibikov tried to remove the blockade from Yekaterinburg. In mid-February, Lieutenant Ozerov was sent to "cleanse" the Siberian road. However, faced with large rebel forces, he retreated. Kostin's detachment of 400 people was sent to help Ozerov. Having united, government troops pushed back the rebels and raided Beloyarskaya Sloboda.
During this period, Yekaterinburg teams began to practice the tactics of raids everywhere, destroying rebellious villages, stealing residents, and destroying food and fodder supplies. For example, using the numerical superiority in manpower and weapons, on February 14, Second Major Fisher captured the Shaitan plant. The detachment of the rebels was destroyed during the assault and during the retreat along the Bilimbaev road. Fisher got rich booty: many prisoners, 4 guns, ammunition, the entire treasury of the rebel army - 20 thousand rubles. Fischer did not stay long at the plant. Having ruined the village, he captured all the inhabitants (about 1.5 thousand people) and sent them to Yekaterinburg. The plant was set on fire in six places. Most of it with the factory village burned down. Fisher's raid on the Shaitansky plant inflicted significant damage on the rebels: the main base of Beloborodov's troops was defeated.
The actions of the local administration to suppress the uprising on the territory of the Yekaterinburg department were supported by the team of Second Major Gagrin, moving from the west, from the Kungur district. Back in mid-February, Gagrin received a "decree" from Yekaterinburg demanding that the Utkinsk factories that were blocking the road to Verkhoturye be cleared. Having received the order, Gagrin approached the Utkinsky plant. Having broken the resistance of the rebels in the Achit and Bisert fortresses, his team broke into the northern region of the Yekaterinburg department. Gagrin's assumption about the uniting of all the troops of the rebels in this area turned out to be erroneous. At the Utkinsky plant there was a detachment of 700 people, poorly armed, with almost no ammunition. The remaining troops of Beloborodov were dispersed at other factories of the department. On the morning of February 26, after a short assault, Gagrin took possession of the Utkinsky plant. The government team captured over five hundred prisoners and 5 guns. Part of the rebels, led by their commanders, captains P. Zhubrinsky and P. Parkachev, retreated to the area of the Ilim state pier, where they were soon taken prisoner. Beloborodov, who at the time of Gagrin's offensive was at the Shaitan plant, tried to seize the initiative. On February 29, with a detachment of 425 people, he laid siege to the Utkinsky plant. The rebels built defensive ramparts and, with the support of cannon and rifle fire, tried to launch a widespread assault on the fortifications. However, the counterattack made by Gagrin upset the actions of the rebels. The front of the rebels hesitated. The cavalry sent by Gagrin completed the defeat of Beloborodov's troops. The rebels retreated. After the capture of the Utkinsky plant by government troops, a fierce struggle flared up to capture the strongholds of the rebels south of Yekaterinburg. Detachments sent from Yekaterinburg launched a broad attack on the Kamensky and Serginsky factories, on the Bagaryatskaya settlement, which served as the base for one of the local atamans, Samson Maksimov. In late February - early March, large government teams led by Major Fisher and Captain Poretsky began to operate in this area. Beloborodov also concentrated his forces south of Yekaterinburg, leaving the factories located in the western part of the department. Fischer, who spoke as early as the twentieth of February, was moving towards the Kamensky plant, overcoming the resistance of small rebel groups. Dealing harshly with local residents and prisoners, burning the villages, the population of which joined the rebels, on March 1, the punishers seized the Kamensky plant. At the same time, Captain Poretsky approached Bagaryatskaya Sloboda. The rebels, led by Beloborodov, having concentrated several thousand people, marched towards the government troops. A fight broke out. Despite heavy losses, the rebels pressed Poretsky, who was forced to retreat to connect with Fischer. The siege by the rebels in early March of the Kamensky factory was not successful. Despite the numerical superiority, the besiegers lacked ammunition and artillery (Beloborodov had only 2 guns). All rebel attacks were repulsed. Fischer, going on the counterattack, utterly defeated a three thousandth detachment near the village of Evchugovo, consisting mainly of the rebels of the Bagaryatskaya settlement, led by Samson Maximov.
The suppression of the centers of the uprising in the immediate vicinity of Yekaterinburg forced Beloborodov with the remnants of the troops to retreat to the Kasli plant.
In the first half of March, having captured the Shaitan factories, the Ilim state pier and the Grobovsky fortress, and thereby clearing the area north of Yekaterinburg from large detachments of the rebels, Gagrin's team marched south. On March 12, government troops approached the Kasli plant. Despite the desperate resistance of the rebels, Gagrin managed to capture the fortifications and take over the plant. The rebels were defeated. The rebels lost 57 people killed and 420 captured. Beloborodov with a detachment retreated south to the Satka factories.
The destruction of the main centers of the uprising affected the entire course of the peasant war in the region of the Middle Urals. Small disparate detachments could not offer serious resistance to government troops. At the end of March, the uprising in the Middle Urals was largely suppressed.
The position of Beloborodov in late March - early April 1774 seemed catastrophic. All the tactical gains his army had made in the previous two months had been lost. The size of the detachment was much reduced, almost all artillery fell into the hands of the enemy. But the forces of the peasant war in the Urals were far from exhausted. Thousands of ascribed peasants and working people were eager to throw off the yoke of the tsarist administration and breeders. The national liberation movement of non-Russian peoples covered vast areas of Bashkiria and the Trans-Urals. It was this desire of the masses of the people for armed resistance that allowed Beloborodov to continue the struggle with exceptional tenacity, leading the uprising now in the southern regions of the Urals.
The tactical plan of Beloborodov, who was with a detachment at the Satka plant, was to break through the Southern Urals to the western regions of the Yekaterinburg department and in conjunction with the rebels operating east of Kungur. Such a plan soberly took into account the balance of forces of the rebels and punishers, their location and concentration in the Middle Urals. In early April 1774, Beloborodov's detachment set out to the northwest. But the plan of the "chief ataman" was not destined to come true. At dawn on April 9, "courier mail" arrived in the village of Upper Kigi. Messengers delivered to Beloborodov a decree from the Pugachev State Military Collegium. It proposed to speed up the recruitment of the detachment and go to connect with the main forces of Pugachev.
Beloborodov complied with the requirements contained in the decree. He sent his commanders to the Kungur district to recruit new fighters. Those sent were provided with a pass for presentation to the local authorities of the rebels and a special document, the "Instruction", in which Beloborodov clearly formulated the goals and objectives of the assignment. We must pay tribute to the sharpness and mind of Beloborodov, who was well versed in the difficult situation in the Kungur district, whose population consisted of many nationalities. It was precisely in order to avoid misunderstandings and conflicts that could arise between the peoples of the region during the mobilization that representatives of the three main local nationalities were sent for recruitment: Bashkirs, Cheremis and Tatars.
Throughout April 1774, Beloborodov recruited residents of local villages into his "corps", supplied them with weapons and horses. Many working people from neighboring factories, primarily from Satka, joined his army. They and the working people from the factories of the Middle Urals who came along with the "marching ataman" formed the main core of the "corps". Beloborodov established contact directly with the local leaders of the rebels. So, they sent several "orders" - orders to Kuzma Konovalov, the commander of the detachment in the Kungur district. In the "orders" it was prescribed "with the team that you [Konovalov] have with you" to go "to me, Beloborodov, to the Satka plant for connection."
The commanders of the "corps" of Beloborodov also recruited a "marching ataman" among the inhabitants of the Kungur district. Bakhtiar Kankaev showed great activity in this regard. He sent his numerous representatives to the most remote villages of the region. At secular meetings, agitators read letters from Beloborodov and Kankaev, calling for the insurgents to join the army, explained the situation, recorded new fighters, sent parties of these "Cossacks" to the assembly point.
Difficulties often arose during the formation of troops. So, part of the Russian "Cossacks", as Kankaev reported, did not want to join forces with Beloborodov, motivating their refusal by the fact that they were waiting for an attack from Kungur. The resistance of some part of the rebels to the unification with the troops of Beloborodov is quite typical. It is explained by the general features of the spontaneity and locality of the peasant war of 1773-1775. Many detachments and their leaders, due to their irresponsibility and disorganization, striving to protect only "their" home, to deal only with "their" oppressors, acted on the territory of only "their" volost. To completely overcome this in the Kungur district was certainly beyond the power of Beloborodov and his assistants. Another reason that slowed down recruitment into the army was the hostile attitude towards the uprising of some Bashkir and Tatar elders, frightened by the scope of the peasant war and the actions of the punishers.
Despite all the difficulties, the actions of Beloborodov and his commanders bore fruit. At the beginning of May 1774, the ataman, as he testified during interrogation at the Investigative Commission, had a detachment of 700 people. He also had artillery - 6 guns. But, apparently, the indicated number of "corps" is somewhat underestimated by its commander. Interrogation at the Investigative Commission, torture, and the impending massacre did not contribute to the special frankness of the Pugachev prisoners. The actual number of fighters could be deliberately underestimated by the ataman. In a letter dated May 10, 1774, from Ataman Stepan Kuznetsov to the Rozhdestvensky Plant, it is reported that Beloborodov set out with an army of 2,000 people to join Pugachev. Apparently, Pugachev himself mentioned the "corps" of Beloborodov in his testimony when he talked about the arrival of "Russians, Bashkirs up to 2000 people" during the battles near the Magnitnaya fortress.
The organization of the "Siberian Corps" set a new difficult task for its commander. It consisted in establishing an uninterrupted supply of ammunition to the troops. An experienced gunpowder and selitor, Beloborodov decided to set up the production of gunpowder on his own. He sent a decree to Kankaev on the search for natural deposits of sulfur ("shora") in the Kungur district. This case was entrusted to Azga Ayukov. In the 70s of the XVIII century. sulfur deposits were known in the Urals. However, Ayukov did not fulfill the task of Beloborodov. He was intimidated by the local Bashkir elders, who were afraid of the punishers.
The attempt to produce gunpowder by the rebels themselves is a unique fact in the history of the peasant war of 1773-1775. Already during the uprising, he was duly appreciated by the masses. A hundred rumors spread the news about the "making" of gunpowder, and soon Beloborodov's "project" acquired the features of a folk legend. Working people and ascribed peasants of the Yugovsky factories of the Kungur district told, for example, that “the sovereign built gunpowder and cannon factories in the steppe, and they make white and black gunpowder.
The representative of the power of the rebels in the Urals, Beloborodov not only formed and armed his "corps". He was forced, like many leaders of the peasant war, to engage in legal proceedings and civil administration. The decision by the ataman of some issues of court and administration deserves the closest attention, because in many respects it reveals the character of Beloborodov, his personal views and principles and attitude towards the uprising.
The question of private property and its "expropriation" in the understanding of Beloborodov is very interesting.
There were no spontaneous robberies of factory and personal property, about which the factory owners of the tsarist administration wrote so much and stubbornly, when Beloborodov's troops entered the factories. Captured IOUs and ledgers were destroyed by the insurgents or laborers with the general and full consent of the lay meetings. The monetary treasury in most cases went to the needs of the rebels, and this did not cause any protest from the population of the factory settlements, as well as the replenishment by the Pugachevites of their food supplies and ammunition from the master's warehouses - "shops". When dividing the master's property, Beloborodov apparently adhered to the "equalizing principle", that is, everyone should have received an equal share. In April 1774, the commanders sent by Beloborodov to the Kungur district seized the master's ships with flax and resin. Kankaev reported about them to Satka. Beloborodov ordered, and this order was repeated twice, in order to "divide the flax and resin available on the lordly ships into a team." In other words, each unit was to receive an equal share, regardless of who captured those ships.
A similar principle was observed in the division of personal property and factories. Apparently, Beloborodov considered him the most expedient and protected him from all encroachments, no matter where they came from. Esaul Ivan Shibaev, who brought the decree of the Pugachev Collegium to Beloborodov at the beginning of May 1774, on the way back began to commit atrocities at the Kosotursky plant. He plundered the master's house, took away the master's horses and saddles from the inhabitants, which were obtained during the division of the personal property of the factory owner. The population of the Kosotursky plant reported this to Beloborodov. The latter took immediate action. The ataman was not stopped by the fact that the captain was the personal messenger of "father Pyotr Fedorovich." The exiled team of working people from Beloborodov's "corps" arrested the "dashing" Cossack. They took away all the stolen property from Shibaev and put the robber in shackles. Before the arrival of Beloborodov, the chained Yesaul had to sit in custody. In his "tout" to Pugachev on Beloborodov, he even reported that the ataman was going to flog him, Shibaev.
So, Beloborodoe considered the master's property as the property of the rebels or the secular gathering of working people and peasants. The division of property, with the exception of the detachment necessary for the general needs, was to be made equally between the rebels and the inhabitants of the plant. Apparently, Beloborodov’s attitude to property was largely influenced by general psychology peasant masses with its desire for an equal use of tools and land.
A seasoned, strictly disciplined commander, Beloborodov paid special attention to maintaining order in the areas controlled by his troops. He brutally persecuted those responsible for violence, robbery, and outrages. In the village of Upper Kigi, Beloborodov ordered the punishment of the Meshcheryak, who was guilty of insults inflicted on his father. No less resolutely dealt with the "chief marching ataman" and the commanders, if they were guilty of violating order. During the stay of the "corps" at the Satka plant from Pugachev to Beloborodov, a former non-commissioned officer of the guard ataman Mikhail Golev "from the nobility" was sent to help. But Beloborodov did not wait for help from Pugachev's envoy. Golev "made messes" at the factory and drank heavily. The former non-commissioned officer of the guard himself, during interrogation at the Investigative Commission, testified that he did not stay at the plant for long: three days later, "for reproaches for the vain inhabitants of those places of excruciating beatings and all-term ruin, and for many mortal murders," he was, by order of Beloborodov, chained and sent to Pugachev. Apparently, the "chief marching ataman" did not forget to send "Peter III" and the corresponding "epistole". For Golev was demoted by Pugachev from chieftains and given as a simple Cossack to the Yaitsky regiment.
Severely punished Beloborodov those who betrayed the cause of the uprising. In early April, an episode occurred to him that reveals his attitude to the fight against the oppressors of the masses. In the village of Nizhniye Kigi, on the way to Kungur, a stanitsa ataman from the Katav-Ivanovsky factory arrived at Beloborodov, allegedly in order to join the detachment. The real purpose of this "visit" was an attempt to force Beloborodov to "depart" from Pugachev and go over to Catherine's side. Apparently, the calculation was that Beloborodov, defeated from Gagrin and who was in a difficult situation, without an army, without support bases, would agree to surrender and "deserve his guilt before the empress." The chieftain from the Katav-Ivanovsky plant also had a special government appeal - an "exhortation decree" received from the tsarist administration. Beloborodov, having learned about the true intentions of the traitor, severely punished him. The sent scout was hanged. Beloborodov's behavior sufficiently speaks of his hatred of traitors, his personal devotion to the cause of the uprising. This episode is also interesting because in the future Beloborodov had to hear words about "deposition", coming not only from the camp of enemies.
At the end of April 1774, Beloborodoe set out to join Pugachev in the area of the Magnetic Fortress. The meeting, which was given to Beloborodov by the immediate environment of "Peter III" from among the Yaik Cossacks, exceeded all the expectations of the ataman. Already at the exit from the Kosotursky plant, he was overtaken by a group of Cossacks, who announced that he and Beloborodov were ordered to "act with a military hand", that is, they were allowed to arrest him by force because he wanted to "depart" from Pugachev. The denunciation of Shibaev, who, in retaliation for the punishment, accused Beloborodov of treason, did his job. The ataman's assurances that all this was fiction did not help. In the Chebarkul fortress, they tried to arrest him on the basis of a special decree of the Pugachev State Collegium, and only after repeated assurances was Beloborodov allowed to proceed further. Finally, the chieftain with the army approached Magnitnaya. One of the commanders of the Beloborodov detachment recalled: “We saw from a distance how Pugachev and his riders rode around the steppe behind the fortress. He mistook us for enemies, because we walked in order [that is, in military formation]; sent to find out about the approaching force. The sent ones reported to him that his colonels were coming. He rode up to his tents, raised the banner and waited for the squad: we bowed our banners to him ... ". Pugachev was delighted with the skill and discipline of Beloborodov's troops. Meanwhile, the Yaik Cossacks had already taken away personal weapons from the ataman and arrested him. Only after a conversation between "Peter III" and Beloborodov did Pugachev become convinced of his fidelity. However, Beloborodov's "corps" was divided into two detachments. One remained under the command of the former commander, and the same Shibaev became the head of the other. Apparently, the Cossacks did not trust the "retired gunner", their "stanishnik", although guilty of robbery, seemed more reliable.
But Beloborodov silenced everyone who doubted his dedication to the uprising. A few days later, risking his life, he went alone to the commandant of the Karagay fortress and persuaded him to surrender without a fight.
On May 20, Pugachev's troops occupied a major stronghold, the Trinity Fortress. Beloborodov had to command the actions of the rebels at that moment. A. S. Pushkin wrote in "The History of Pugachev": "The battle lasted for four whole hours. All the time Pugachev lay in his tent, suffering severely from a wound received under Magnitnaya. Beloborodov ordered the actions." Troitskaya did not remain in the hands of the rebels for long. After a fierce battle, the troops of General Decolong, who approached from the east, threw back Pugachev's army from the fortress. The general, in his report, happily reported to his superiors that "among the dead, they found the very villain of the first confidant, Lieutenant Colonel Beloborodov."
However, the general's joy was premature. Beloborodov was alive. Together with the remnants of Pugachev's army, he traveled the entire battle route from the Trinity Fortress through the Iset province, Bashkiria to the Kungur district. Apparently, the very plan for the transition of the Pugachev army to the Kama belonged to Beloborodov. Despite fierce battles with the team of Colonel Mikhelson, Pugachev managed to connect with the detachment of Salavat Yulaev, recruit mining workers with the help of Beloborodov, the "retired gunner" showed himself in these battles as an energetic and talented military leader. In the battle near Krasnoufimsk on June 12, he defeated the team of Lieutenant Colonel Popov and pursued it for more than thirty miles. An experienced career officer who participated in battles with the rebels from the beginning of the peasant war, Popov was amazed at the stamina and organization of Beloborodov's troops, and the skillful supply of their ammunition. He wrote: "They [the rebels] had so much gunpowder that the dead were found in pillows of cartridges of 15 and, moreover, in special bags of half a pound of gunpowder."
Beloborodov played a significant role in the capture of the city of Osa, the garrison of which consisted of over 1000 people with 13 guns. At a military council at Pugachev's headquarters, the chieftain offered to load several wagons with hay, brushwood and, under their cover, go to the fortress as close as possible, set fire to them and rush to the assault. The maneuver was a success, unable to withstand the fierce assault, the Wasp garrison surrendered. In this battle, Beloborodov "had a particular jealousy for the attack and was wounded in the leg."
Beloborodov participated in the battles near Kazan. Pugachev's army of many thousands approached the city on July 11, 1774. In the evening of the same day, Pugachev and Beloborodov twice went to reconnoiter the city's fortifications. At a military council convened on July 12, it was decided to storm the city. Beloborodov was appointed commander of one of the assault columns. In the battle, Beloborodov's troops captured the city fortifications, captured artillery batteries, and were the first to break into the city. After the capture of Kazan, Beloborodov was instructed to repulse Michelson's troops, following on the heels of Pugachev. The rearguard battles, which were fought for three days, until July 15, ended in the defeat of the rebels. Beloborodov's detachment was dispersed.
After the defeat near Kazan, Beloborodov hid in the forest for several days with his family, who accompanied the ataman on campaigns. The Pugachev troops were already far away, it was difficult to overtake them, it was impossible to get from the Kazan district to other regions of the country - there were outposts of punishers everywhere. Beloborodov appeared in Kazan, where he identified himself as Ivan Shekleinov, but was identified as a traitor. Mikhelson personally interrogated the detainee.
Beloborodov did not deny it. He was sent to the Secret Commission. The days of endless interrogations and torture began. Finally, the Commission, chaired by P. S. Potemkin, a relative of Catherine's all-powerful favorite, decided to carry out a preliminary execution: Beloborodov received a hundred blows with a whip. The capture of one of the main leaders of the peasant war was reported to St. Petersburg. "The Most Gracious Empress" ordered "to execute him according to the power of state laws." Beloborodov was sent to Moscow. And here, by order of the Moscow commander-in-chief, Prince M. N. Volkonsky, reprisals were "committed". On the market day, September 5, 1774, in the Swamp "with many thousands of caretakers, not only city dwellers, but also villagers," Beloborodov was executed "by cutting off his head."
(1774-09-16 )Ivan Naumovich Beloborodov(- 5 (16) September) - participant in the Peasant War of 1773-1775, one of the associates of Emelyan Pugachev, leader of the uprising in the Middle Urals.
Biography
By origin - a peasant, originally from the village of Medyanka, Kungur (Perm) province of Kazan province. The village was assigned to the Irginsky copper smelter of the Osokin industrialists. At the age of 18, in 1759, he was recruited, served in an artillery unit in the city of Vyborg, and then at the Okhta gunpowder factory, received the rank of corporal. In 1766, in order to get his resignation, Beloborodov "...began to pretend to limp with his right foot, saying that he was ill with it, for which he was sent to the infirmary." After six months of being in the St. Petersburg Artillery Hospital, on the basis of the decision of the Artillery Office, he was “resigned from service for lameness by a gunner, with a passport, for his food.”
After retiring, he settled in the village of Bogorodsky, Kungur province, married Nenila Eliseeva from Kungur, the daughter of a townsman, "lived in his own house, trading in wax, honey and other goods."
With the beginning of the Pugachev uprising, Beloborodov was drafted into the government team of Ensign Dyakonov, but immediately after the call, Beloborodov left the team and returned to his home. On January 1, 1774, representatives of the Kanzafar Usaev detachment arrived in Bogorodskoye, they read Pugachev's decrees and manifestos. With a part of his fellow villagers, Beloborodov went out to meet Usaev's detachment, during a stop in the village he settled the Bashkir colonel in his house. Usaev accepted into his detachment 25 people from Bogorodsky, who chose Beloborodov as their senior. The detachment went to the Demidov Suksunsky plant, seizing it, destroying all the documentation of the factory office, including promissory notes for 54 thousand rubles. The rebels did not touch the factory buildings. Usaev replenished Beloborodov's detachment with people, conferring on him the title of centurion. Bissertsky and Revdinsky factories were captured next, on January 6 - the Achita fortress. From that moment on, Beloborodov's detachment began independent operations.
On January 18, Beloborodov’s detachment, whose number had grown to 600 by that time, occupied the Bilimbaevsky Plant without a fight and on January 19, 1774, captured the Demidov Shaitan Plants as the main base of their operations. Factory people greeted Beloborodov's detachment with bread and salt, handing over 2,000 poods of rye flour at his disposal. Beloborodov sent guards along all roads in order to collect information about the actions of government troops. Thanks to this, the rebels were able to repel attempts to recapture the Shaitan factories from them. According to the memoirs of the scribe of the Bilimbaevsky plant Verkholantsev, on January 20, Beloborodov “surprised everyone with his art of shooting from cannons” in a battle with a government team near the village of Talitsy. According to the report of the officers, in this battle the Pugachevites fired clumsily, "hitting only the tops of the forest and branches", but the advantage in manpower was so great that Kostin thought it best to retreat.
On January 29, Beloborodov arrived at the state-owned Utkinsky plant, ordering the local priest to swear the factory population to "Pyotr Fedorovich", Beloborodov's detachment accepted reinforcements from 200 factory peasants. On February 1, Beloborodov's detachment attacked one of the largest Ural metallurgical plants - the Demidov Utkinsky plant. The plant was surrounded by a rampart and a wall, under the protection of which a government detachment of 1000 people with 15 guns defended. Unable to take the plant on the move, Beloborodov gradually cut off all roads to it, and occupied the village of Kurya as a camp for the detachment. On February 9, a fierce assault began, which did not stop for three days and ended with the capture of the plant by the evening of February 11. Leaving a detachment of 700 people at the Utkinsky plant, Beloborodov returned to the Shaitansky factories. At the same time, Beloborodov refused to send part of his detachment to storm Kungur, explaining that he was preparing to capture Yekaterinburg: "... the army that is with me to subdue Yekaterinburg is now fragmented to different places and then it can not be sent." Nevertheless, Beloborodov shared artillery with the detachments near Kungur: first "four large cannons, and cannonballs and buckshot", then "six of the same cannons".
At the captured factories, Beloborodov tried to organize the production of weapons, for example, at the Revdinsky factory, more than 500 pounds of iron were spent on forging peaks and sabers, but the situation with a lack of weapons failed. In the meantime, help arrived in Yekaterinburg from the commander of the Siberian Corps, Decolong - two regular companies under the command of Second Major Fisher, who, having gathered all the available forces from the "assigned Cossacks", drove Beloborodov out of the Shaitansky factories on February 14 and completely burned them, depriving the rebels of their habitable and the nearest base to Yekaterinburg. At the same time, another government detachment under the command of Major Gagrin defeated the rebels near Kungur, the Achita fortress and the Bissert plant, and on February 26 drove the Pugachevites out of the Utkinsky plant. On February 29, Beloborodov tried to recapture the Utkinsky plant, but was defeated by Gagrin's detachment, which made a sortie, retreating, suffered further defeats at Bagaryakskaya Sloboda, on March 1 at Kamensky and on March 12 at Kaslinsky factories. Taking advantage of the spring thaw, Beloborodov's detachment was able to break away from persecution and occupied the Satka plant for rest.
In April 1774, Pugachev, defeated near Orenburg and gone beyond the bend of the Belaya River, ordered all the detachments of the rebels in the Southern Urals to advance to join him. But the spring thaw and river floods did not allow this to be done until the beginning of May. Only on May 7, Beloborodov’s detachment arrived at the connection with the main army of Pugachev in the Magnitnaya fortress, taken the day before by the Pugachevites.
After the defeat of Pugachev's army in the battle near Kazan on July 15, 1774, Beloborodov was captured and taken to Kazan, where he was interrogated by the head of the commission of inquiry P. S. Potemkin. He was sentenced to 100 lashes and the death penalty. Beloborodov was executed on September 5, 1774 in Moscow, on Bolotnaya Square.
Ivan Beloborodov in fiction
During the period of work on the “History of Pugachev”, the name of Beloborodov did not immediately interest Alexander Sergeevich Pushkin, and for the first time his name appeared in the poet’s working notes after Nicholas I approved the version of the book for publication, Pushkin made an entry in “Remarks on the rebellion”: “Ivan Naumov son of Beloborodov, retired gunner, stuck to Pugachev<в>In 1773, he was granted the rank of colonel and field atamans, and then at the beginning of 1774 he was promoted to senior military chieftains and field marshals. He was cruel, knew the letter, observed strict discipline in the gangs. Not having access to the investigation files of the Pugachevs, Pushkin relied on inaccurate information in the notes of Rychkov, Lyubarsky, in the notes of Dmitriev's legends and the synopsis of the article by Bantysh-Kamensky, in particular, that Beloborodov was familiar with Pugachev during the siege of Orenburg and together with Podurov "He was in charge of the written affairs of Pugachev." Pushkin did not know many details of the biography of the retired corporal, who was 32 years old during the uprising, giving the following description of Pugachev’s “field marshal” in The Captain’s Daughter: “One of them, a frail and hunched old man with a gray beard, had nothing remarkable in himself, except for a blue ribbon worn over the shoulder over a gray coat.
Notes
Literature
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- Dubrovin N. F.. Pugachev and his accomplices. An episode from the history of the reign of Empress Catherine II. Volume II. - St. Petersburg: type. N. I. Skorokhodova, 1884. - 424 p.
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- ed. Mavrodin V.V.. Peasant war in Russia 1773-1775. Pugachev's uprising. Volume II. - L .: Publishing house of the Leningrad University, 1966. - 512 p. - 2000 copies.
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