State of Italy in 1850. After the revolutionary explosion of 1848 and the reaction of 1849, Italy seemed to have become again what the Congress of Vienna wanted it to be - only a geographic concept. As a result of her inability to defend national independence and political freedom with united forces, she was now apparently as far from achieving either goal as in 1815. Fragmented and shackled, as in the days of Metternich, she again fell almost entirely under the rule of foreigners.
Austria, having conquered Venice and Milan, regained its dominance on the Apennine Peninsula; the Italian monarchs still became her slaves and at the same time tyrants of their subjects. Military terror reigned in the Lombard and Venetian provinces, where the generals of Franz Joseph behaved as in a conquered country and did not spare either the person or the property of the inhabitants. The Duke of Parma, Charles III, and the Duke of Modena, Francesco V, played the role of medieval "podestas" who were as harsh to their own people as they crawled in front of the Viennese court. In Tuscany, Leopold II, less overwhelmed by a sense of revenge than the aforementioned princes, abolished, however, all constitutional liberties, imprisoned or expelled the noblest patriots and renewed religious persecution, and for greater loyalty surrounded himself with a guard of 12,000 Austrian soldiers. In the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Ferdinand II ("the bomb king") abolished the constitution of 1848, restored privileges and the kingdom of arbitrariness. The police enjoyed unlimited power, many people were executed for political crimes, galleys and prisons were overcrowded with the best citizens, and the people became stiff in ignorance and poverty.
In the Papal (Church) area, the Austrians occupied Romagna, where the papal legates subjected the patriots to merciless persecution. In eight years, over 500 people have been sentenced to death and executed. In Rome, the presence of French troops (which Louis-Napoleon did not dare to withdraw for fear of losing support catholic church) did not allow such extremes, but even in this city the government showed extreme severity and did not deviate one iota from theocratic absolutism, which since the flight to Gaeta had become an inviolable dogma for Pius IX. In vain, the head of the French government, blushing at the thought that he might be considered an accomplice to such a wild reaction, begged and then demanded from “St. father ”to show more leniency, secularize the administration, reform laws in a modern spirit and introduce some free institutions. Pius IX, under the influence of the despotic Cardinal Antonelli, did not agree to any concessions or made them purely formally, reserving the right to appoint all posts and make final decisions on all issues, retained, along with church courts, outrageous and outdated legislation and was extremely disgusted with all progressive innovations. Pius IX had true sympathy only for Austria. It is no wonder that the very high priest whom all Italy enthusiastically welcomed in 1846 as a patriot and a liberal has long since lost all popularity.
Victor-Emmanuel and the first years of his reign. Now the Italians expected freedom not from Rome, but from Turin. Since 1849, the only Italian monarch reigned here who remained faithful to the national cause and did not restore the despotic regime. After the defeat at Novara, Victor-Emmanuel, having barely ascended the shaky throne left to him by Karl-Albert, began to adhere - both in external and internal affairs - to the most dignified, loyal and firm policy. This young and courageous king, although not gifted with great intelligence, hid a lot of common sense and discernment under the purely soldier's roughness of grasp and speech. He understood perfectly well that, covered from the rear by the Alps and supported by France, which, out of hatred for Austria, had to come to his aid sooner or later, Piedmont could become the center of rallying of forces for the Italian patriots and attract all sympathy.
For this, it was necessary that the head of this small state (Piedmont) lived in good harmony with his people, abide by the constitution that was violated and destroyed by the rest of the sovereigns of the peninsula, and, finally (and this was most important of all), boldly behave towards Austria. Therefore, he did not dare to abolish the Basic Statute of 1848 and destroy the liberties that ensured its application. In vain the Viennese court, when signing the peace treaty on August 6, 1849, proposed to exclude some of the more onerous articles if Victor-Emmapuil agreed to abolish the constitution and openly abandon the national demands, for which Karl-Albert was a fighter. Victor-Emmanuel preferred to submit to all the difficult conditions of the winner, if only no one could reproach him for concluding a deal with foreigners, and instead of restoring his own banner of the Kingdom of Sardinia (Piedmont), he proudly kept the tricolor Italian banner - a symbol of revenge and national liberation.
Thanks to him and his clever minister d'Azelio, Piedmont became a haven for a large number of emigrants who fled from various Italian states, their loyalty and promises supported the king's faith in the future.It seemed that the entire Italian homeland for the time being concentrated within this small state. But everyone understood perfectly well that the day was near when Italy would expand these borders and again carry its banner to the Adriatic and Sicily. In the meantime, Piedmont was strengthening thanks to the rapid development of trade and industry, armed its fortresses, reorganized its army, firmly defended its rights and did not he succumbed to intimidation even on the part of Austria, instinctively trying to get closer to the French government, whose head, despite the Roman expedition, retained unchanging sympathy for the Italian people and never ceased to cherish the desire and hope to sooner or later free them from the Austrian yoke.
After the coup d'état on December 2, 1851, Victor-Emmanuel, continuing to play the assumed role of constitutional king, did not fail to show Louis-Napoleon the well-known signs of attention, which the latter was very touched by. A few months later, with the most friendly haste, he recognized him as emperor. Therefore, at the end of 1852, Napoleon III did not hesitate to address the Sardinian envoy, the Marquis of Villamarine, with the following words: "The time will come when both of our countries will become comrades in arms in the struggle for the noble cause of Italy." Some time later, in February 1853, the Piedmontese diplomat heard the following statement from the emperor: "We must wait until any threat to Piedmont from Austria gives us a favorable opportunity." And in March of the same year, Napoleon III spoke to Villamarine about major territorial reshuffles that would make possible the revival of the Italian nationality.
Cavour and his politics. The good intentions of the French emperor regarding Piedmont were carefully supported and deftly exploited by a remarkable statesman who had originally been promoted as an associate of the Marquis d'Azelio and whom Victor-Emmanuel, on a happy instinct, invited on November 4, 1852 to the post of first minister. fell to the lot of the realization of the dream of Italian unity.
Count Camillo-Benzo Cavour, born in 1810 into an old noble family, was at first an officer engineering troops, but the military service soon bored him, and he retired. For several years in a row he traveled for the purpose of self-education, engaged in agriculture and studied political economy, and in 1847, together with Balbo, founded the newspaper Renaissance (Bisorgimento). Elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1849, he received the portfolio of Minister of Agriculture and Trade in the Azelio Cabinet the following year. In this position, he concluded trade agreements favorable to Piedmont with several states and, not without success, tried to develop the country's natural resources and expand it commercial relations The Sardinian Parliament owes him that spirit of discipline and consistency, without which the implementation of vast plans would have been impossible.Thanks to his efforts, an agreement (connubio) of the right center, of which he was a soul, and the left center, led by Ratazzi, was formed, and a majority was formed, able to understand his leader at a glance, ready to work with self-denial for the future and demand from the country all the sacrifices necessary for the implementation of broad plans, calculated for a long time. Temporarily removed from the ministerial post (May 16, 1852), Cavour soon returned as chairman advice. From this moment he is as if alive in plotting the fate of Italy.
Distinguished by an outward good nature, a cheerful and simple disposition, which had long given him considerable popularity, Cavour was an incomparable diplomat who, with the same skill, knew how to force events or wait and prepare them, advance or yield - just as well. The presence of the spirit never left him; no one was able to capitalize on obstacles along the way and make them serve their purposes so quickly. Daring and at the same time evasive and cautious, not too conscientious in times of need, devoted body and soul to the party of unification, Cavour, naturally, was not particularly scrupulous in the choice of means. But it must be admitted that to begin with, he only resorted to honest and legal methods each time.
To make Piedmont not only a well-governed country, but also a wealthy and well-armed state capable of instilling confidence in its patrons, was his primary concern initially. Therefore, he tried to vigorously develop agriculture, industry and trade and, not stopping at considerations of imaginary economy, at great costs covered the country with a network of railways, after which state revenues soon doubled. At the same time, he brought the Piedmont fortresses into a defensive position, filled the arsenals and significantly increased the Sardinian army, which, under the command of Lamarmor, soon became, if not one of the most numerous, then at least one of the best organized in Europe.
Loving freedom no less than power, Cavour, with even greater firmness than d'Azelio, defended the rights of civil society against the Catholic Church and was not afraid of the prohibition of mendicant orders (1865) to openly offend the Roman curia. the Italians greeted with all the great sympathy that at this very time the Austrian government seemed to become entirely a vassal of the "Holy See" and was about to conclude a concordat of 1855, which represented the complete surrender of secular power to the spiritual.
On the other hand, Cavour prudently refrained from supporting the revolutionary party, which, at the instigation of London émigrés (Mazzini and others), continued at times to resort to violent means such as uprisings or terrorist acts. He wanted to convince the European monarchs, and especially the emperor of the French, that his policy was not aimed at overthrowing the thrones, but, on the contrary, at strengthening them, because it gave him the opportunity to restrain and lead the revolutionary movement.
Role of Piedmont during the Crimean War. Austria, which well understood what Cavour was striving for, began to threaten him, but was unable to intimidate him. The patronage that the Lombard emigrants found in Piedmont led in 1853 to the severance of diplomatic relations between the courts of Vienna and Turin. But Cavour was embarrassed by this incident all the less because at that very time he planned to provide Piedmont with the protection of the two great powers in case of a conflict with Austria. France and England were then preparing to start a big war with Russia to protect Turkey. If the Austrian emperor joins them (despite the important service rendered to him by Tsar Nicholas in 1849), then Victor Emmanuel, according to Cavour, will have to follow his example, in the hope that Franz Joseph, having seized vast and rich territories in east, agree to cede the Lombardo-Venetian region to the Sardinian king; if the Austrian emperor does not want to get involved in the war, then the offer of services from Piedmont will be even more pleasant to the Western powers and will subsequently be rewarded with the greater generosity, the less reason these powers have to be pleased with Austria.
It is known that France and England, which opened military actions against Russia (in April 1854), were not supported by the Viennese court, whose two-faced and insidious policy forced the allied armies to leave the Danube principalities and go to Crimea, where they exhausted their forces by the siege of Sevastopol. After long and fruitless negotiations, the allies, seeing that Austria was fooling them, decided to take advantage of the offer of Sardinia.
In November 1854, Napoleon III's attorney, Persigny, went to Turin, where he easily negotiated with Cavour, who was just waiting for an opportunity to enter into an alliance with the Western powers. Minister Victor-Emmanuel understood that by providing assistance to these powers in the Crimea, Sardinia (Piedmont) would thus receive the right to participate in the congress, which would be convened at the end of the war, that at this congress she would have a reason to raise the Italian question to the whole of Europe and England and France will support her, and Russia, happy with the opportunity to punish Austria for ingratitude, will not object. As for Prussia, there was no doubt that Austria had nothing to expect any help from her.
Be that as it may, the union was concluded on January 26, 1855. With a view to subsequently demanding the highest possible payment for its services, Sardinia wished to join the coalition not as a simple mercenary of the allied powers (as England assumed), but as a counterparty, equal with other contracting parties, at its own risk. In view of this, she proposed setting up an auxiliary corps of 15,000 men, which was to remain under the command of the Piedmont general, and agreed to accept the subsidy given to her by England for the maintenance of this small army only as a loan. We can say that the unification of Italy was born from this treaty.
The Piedmont Parliament understood the patriotic significance of this alliance and joined Cavour's bold policy without much resistance. Shortly thereafter (in April 1855), the troops under the command of General Lamarmora went east. They fought very well there, especially at the Battle of the Black River (August 16), and contributed to the successful ending of the war.
Therefore, when Austria, fearing that Napoleon III in spite of her did not stir up a revolutionary movement in Italy, finally prompted Russia to lay down arms with her threats, she could no longer prevent the appearance of Piedmont at the Paris Congress. In July 1855, Napoleon III announced his intention to involve Sardinia (Piedmont) in both the dangers and benefits of war: "Dangers, honors, benefits," he said, "everything must be divided equally." Shortly thereafter, Victor-Emmanuel and Cavour were received in both Paris and London with marked benevolence, and the Crowned Carbonarius asked them to state what he could do for Italy (November-December 1855).
Cavour at the Paris Congress. At the congress, which opened in February 1856, Sardinia took a place that was completely at odds with its real significance. A number of difficulties were settled thanks to the mediation of Cavour, which significantly increased his own prestige, and therefore the prestige of his country. In the end, all the powers, with the exception of Austria, began to show him signs of attention. It was no secret to anyone that the aspirations of Piedmont met with support from Napoleon III. Therefore, no one was surprised when, after the signing of the Paris Treaty, the President of the Congress Walewski, Minister of the French Emperor, based on a note handed to him on March 27 by Cavour about the sad situation of Italy, considered it necessary to draw the attention of the high assembly to the abnormal and deplorable situation in the Church area. According to him, the time has come for the pope to abandon the presence of Austrian and French troops in his possessions, and for this he must consolidate his power with the help of good institutions. Turning then to an overview of the situation in the remaining states of the peninsula, Walewski said that in some of them, especially in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the extremes of absolutist reaction and the unheard-of arbitrariness prevailing there prepare new revolutionary outbursts with fatal inevitability. So, the powers represented at the Congress should turn with a warning to those monarchs who, like, for example, the Neapolitan king, abuse repressions in relation to people "lost, but not corrupted."
These proposals, supported by Cavour, provoked, as one would expect, a sharp protest from Austria, so that Congress did not dare to pass any resolution on this issue. But Walewski, summing up the debate, could state that the Austrian delegates did not object to the need to withdraw foreign troops from the papal possessions, if only this operation would not threaten any danger of St. throne ”, and that the majority of the commissioners recognized the importance of the humane measures that should be taken by the governments of the Apennine Peninsula and, in particular, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (April 8, 1856).
Soon after that, when the Congress was already drawing to a close (April 16), Cavour addressed the Paris cabinet with a very energetic note, in which he definitely put the Italian question on the agenda and argued that Europe, without risking its own peace, could no longer ignore it. The state of affairs on the peninsula, he said, was more serious than ever, owing to the rampant political reaction and the presence of foreign troops. The main responsibility for all troubles falls on Austria. Since this power in every possible way interferes with the treatment of the disease, in the near future there will undoubtedly be a new outbreak of revolutionary fermentation south of the Alps. The Viennese court upset the balance established in Italy by the treatises of 1815; he threatens Piedmont, encourages it to undertake devastating weapons and at any moment is able to compel it to "extreme measures." Piedmont was the only state in Italy that managed to restrain the revolutionary movement and at the same time preserve national independence. If he had fallen, the omnipotence of Austria in the Apennine Peninsula would have met no more obstacles.
Cavour's note invited the Western powers interested in preventing such an outcome to take appropriate measures. Cavour knew perfectly well that they would do it. Therefore, the Turin parliament understood him at a glance, when he (May 6, 1856) gave an account of his actions, arguing that if at the moment Victor-Emmanuel did not achieve any tangible benefits with his participation in the Crimean War, nevertheless Piedmont wasted its gold and shed its blood for a reason.
Napoleon III and the politics of nationalities. "Calm down," said Napoleon III to Cavour at parting, "I have a presentiment that the present world will not last long." Indeed, this romantic and courageous theorist, for whom the politics of nationalities had become a real monomania, dreamed of the complete destruction of the treatises of 1815 and of the remaking of the political map of Europe.
The most urgent task seemed to Napoleon III to restore the national unity of Italy, for which he felt an invincible sympathy. Once he himself participated in conspiracies in the name of her freedom. Deep down, he still shared the views of the old Carbonari from 1831. His relatives, almost entirely Italians - Canino, Pepoli, Cipriani and others - vying with each other begged him to come to the aid of their unfortunate fatherland. Alcove influences acted on him in the same spirit. Finally, his cousin, Prince Napoleon, for both personal ambition and revolutionary instinct, urged him to come out in defense of Italy. At the same time, the emperor was well aware that since the time of the Roman expedition, all his former Italian friends have looked at him as an apostate, worthy, according to some, even death. If he does not rush to atone for at least part of the evil done to him, then how long will he be able to elude the fanatic's dagger?
On the other hand, Napoleon III could not help but understand that, having given the signal for a revolution in Italy, he must inevitably frighten and anger the pope, to whom he returned secular power by force of arms and to whom he promised his protection. He thus risked losing the support of the clergy, so necessary for him to rule over France, and turning against himself the universal suffrage that served as the basis of the Second Empire. This is precisely what some ministers, a significant part of the Legislative Corps and the vast majority of the Senate thought along with the Empress.
But the crowned dreamer came up with what he thought was a sure-fire way to reconcile his personal sympathies with his own benefits. According to him, the liberated Italy should have formed not a single state, but a confederation led by Piedmont, independent from Austria and tied to France with a sense of gratitude and political considerations. The Pope, forced to lose only Romagna, would have retained the throne and would no longer need French protection. But to think that the Italian monarchs on the one hand and the Italian people on the other will agree to such a combination; that the sovereigns under Austrian influence would allow themselves to be "mediated" in favor of Piedmont, or rather, in favor of France; to think that a nation, called upon to arrange its destiny, wishes to stop halfway; that the matter will not be complicated by the intervention of the powers concerned; it was an unforgivable naivete for which Napoleon III and his country had to pay dearly afterwards to think that, having caused a storm, it would be possible to set limits to it at will.
The first portents of the Italian revolution. Soon after the Paris Congress, clouds thickened over Italy. The Neapolitan king, whose behavior during the Crimean War, England and France could not be particularly pleased, received from these two powers harsh ideas about his government system and a proposal to change it. Confident of the support from Austria, he replied that this interference in his affairs was not justified in any way, that he would not reckon with him at all and would even intensify repression against his disgruntled subjects. Therefore, after an exchange of harsh dispatches between Naples, Paris and London, both governments - French and English - withdrew their envoys accredited at the Neapolitan court (October 1856).
On the other hand, Napoleon III could not get the Pope to agree to any of the reforms, the loyal implementation of which would allow, in his opinion, to withdraw the troops from the papal possessions. Supported in his resistance by Cardinal Antonelli, encouraged, moreover, by the undoubted strengthening of his authority throughout Christendom, Pius IX was no better than the King of Naples in taking the advice that the Turilrian cabinet allowed him to give and which was by no means approved by the Austrian government. The latter, of course, did not want to withdraw his troops from the legates. But it is equally understandable that this reluctance only intensified the deep enmity that the Emperor of the French had towards Austria.
The Viennese court was by no means willing to abandon its dominant influence in Italy. Therefore, he followed with the greatest suspicion all the steps of the Sardinian kingdom, which, feeling the support of France, remained the only state on the peninsula that resisted Austrian influence. When Cavour announced in a sitting of parliament that the day of the holy war (May 1856) would soon come, the Austrian government protested and declared the brave minister the instigator of the revolution. But Cavour, not at all embarrassed by this circumstance, continued his propaganda. In 1856, Manin, Pallavicino and Lafarina founded the National Society under his patronage, which sought to unite in its ranks all the living forces of the nation for the upcoming struggle. At this time, Cavour founded a large naval arsenal in La Spezia, accelerated the construction of Mont Cenisca railroad, fortified Alexandria, and ordered to open a public subscription to arm this fortress with cannons, the success of which in Milan and Venice did not bode well for the Austrian government.
It is not surprising that the Viennese cabinet was extremely hostile to the Turin one. He sharply rebuked Cavour for allowing the Piedmontese newspapers to attack Emperor Franz Joseph and his ministers. Minister Victor Emmanuel coldly replied that the Basic Statute does not give the Piedmont government any right to shut up the press. Soon diplomatic relations between the two courts were interrupted (March 1857), and war became inevitable.
If it did not flare up at that moment, it was only because Napoleon III did not have time to prepare for it and, in addition, some complications (the Neuchâtelian question and the question of the Danube principalities) that arose after the Paris Congress, somewhat distracted his attention from Italian affairs. However, the Piedmontese government made good use of this involuntary reprieve.
The state of affairs on the peninsula became more and more serious. Irritation against Austria and the Italian despotic governments gripped all of Italy. The revolutionary party, defeated in 1849 and then losing its leaders, who were expelled from the fatherland, again began to show signs of life everywhere; Cavour turned a blind eye to her activities in Piedmont. His tactics were as follows: he tried to scare and captivate Napoleon III with the consideration that if he did not rush to give a signal for war, then he would be outstripped by the popular agitators operating on the peninsula, that he, Cavour, and the king of Sardinia (Piedmont) would be swept away demagogy and that the republican movement, having broken out in Italy, will no doubt not slow down to spread to France.
Returning from America a few years ago, Garibaldi openly became one of the leaders of the National Society, into which he tried to bring the most militant spirit. The eternal conspirator Mazzini was in Genoa, where he almost did not find it necessary to hide. In this city in June 1857, on his initiative, an attempt was made to revolt. On his instigation, several expeditions were undertaken from the Genoese port, and revolutionary landings landed in Livorno, Terracina and on the Neapolitan coast. True, all these attempts ended in failure, but they stirred up a new fermentation throughout Italy. Cavour used them to maintain this fermentation. When the Sardinian ship, on which Mazzini's friends went to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, was seized by the Neapolitan authorities, Cavour had the courage to demand his return, and after the refusal, Francesco II took such a threatening position in relation to this sovereign, as if he wanted to cause a military conflict (end of 1857 ).
The conspiracy in Plombier. This was the state of affairs in Italy when the assassination attempt by Orsini (January 14, 1858), which was preceded by a whole series of other conspiracies against Napoleon III by Italian revolutionary circles, prompted this sovereign not to postpone a more final solution of the question. Chapter V of this volume describes the impression this event made on Napoleon III; the letter, in which Orsini, before his death, begged for the return of Italy's freedom, received the widest publicity thanks to the emperor, and Cavour, through the emperor's secret agents, received an invitation to appear to him for a consultation on the further fate of Italy.
A secret agreement, which was to lead to the great war of 1859, took place between the minister Victor-Emmanuel and the French emperor at Plombier (20-21 July 1858). Napoleon III and Cavour decided that France and Piedmont would drive the Austrians out of Italy by joint forces; the war was to begin next spring. Piedmont was to receive Lombardy, Venice and, perhaps, the Duchies of Parma and Modena, as well as Romagna, and thus make up a state numbering from 10 to 12 million people. France was to receive Nice and Savoy; some provinces of the Papal (Ecclesiastical) region may be annexed to Tuscany; Italy, thus composed of four powers, forms a union state under the de facto hegemony of the Sardinian (Piedmontese) king and under the nominal supremacy of the pope as the Roman sovereign. Prince Napoleon (to whom the emperor thought to give the Tuscan throne) was to be married with the eldest daughter of Victor Emmanuel. Finally, only France should have given the signal for war.
Cavour did not mind this strange combination. At the same time, he perfectly understood that once the revolution began, Napoleon III would not be able to curb it. In addition, he knew by what means it was possible to stir up the revolutionary movement, expand it and give it irresistible strength - especially since he had such a powerful weapon in his hands as the National Society. Thus, Minister Victor Emmanuel clearly saw where he was going. But how did his royal accomplice not notice this and allow himself to be carried away into this business?
Preludes to the Great War. From Plombier, Cavour went to Germany. There he could be convinced that Prussia in no way had the desire to get involved in the war because of Austria, and full of hope returned to Turin, where from December 1868 he began to openly prepare for war and continued secret negotiations with France. As for Napoleon III, conniving with newspapers demanding a war with Austria and the liberation of Italy soon led the public to suspect his true intentions. And soon he himself took the trouble to reveal them to the whole world.
On January 1, 1859, at the New Year's reception of the diplomatic corps in the Tuileries Palace, the emperor addressed the Austrian envoy with the following words: "I am sorry that our relations with your government have become less friendly than before ..." These words aroused extreme excitement in Vienna. Several Austrian army corps were sent to the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, and a few days later Victor-Emmanuel spoke to the Piedmontese legislative chambers about the clouds that obscured the sky, about the patriotic duty of Sardinia and the fact that he could not remain indifferent to the sorrowful cries coming from all sides oppressed Italy.
On January 30, in Turin, the wedding of Prince Napoleon and Princess Clotilde took place. Around the same time, under the title Napoleon III and Italy, a pamphlet was published, inspired by the emperor of the French, and was nothing more than a retelling of the secret agreement at Plombier. Finally, the inevitability of war became clear to all when, at the request of Cavour, the Sardinian Parliament approved a loan of 50 million florins for the defense of Piedmont (February 9). Troops hurriedly gathered in Italy, and soon about 200,000 Austrians were concentrated on the shores of the Ticino.
England tried to prevent the opening of hostilities. This power feared that the war would lead to an excessive strengthening of France. But english sentence mediation broke on the resistance of Napoleon III and the Russian emperor (who at that time was highly desirable humiliation of Austria). In mid-March, the French and Russian sovereigns proposed that the Italian question be submitted to a special congress, which in essence was tantamount to a desire to make it insoluble. Indeed, the Viennese court, confident of victory, demanded that Sardinia (Piedmont) be expelled from this congress (while the rest of the Italian states were allowed there) and that she alone immediately proceed to disarmament.
The Turin government tried in every possible way to bring Austria to such irritation, when. where the voice of reason falls silent and people rush headlong into the traps set for them. Cavour addressed the Italian patriots with a thunderous appeal, incited the Piedmontese press to the sharpest antics and formally commissioned Garibaldi to form a corps of volunteers. In a word, at the beginning of April, the Viennese court firmly decided to go on the offensive, and all the efforts of England could postpone the implementation of this decision only for a few days. Cavour, convinced that Austria was ready to commit this irreparable mistake, considered it possible to take a conciliatory position without any risk: on April 21, he announced that he accepted the principle of general disarmament put forward by the London cabinet.
At this time, he already knew that the Austrian government had decided to send Sardinia (Piedmont) an ultimatum demanding immediate disarmament - Piedmont alone - under the threat of an immediate opening of hostilities. Indeed, this demand was passed on to the Sardinian government on 23 April, with only a three-day deadline, after which the Sardinian government resolutely refused. Now the war was inevitable. The French government was quick to declare that it would not abandon an ally to fend for itself. England's last attempt at mediation was unsuccessful, and on April 29, 1859, Austrian troops under Gyulai's command crossed Ticino. But on that very day, the first columns of the French army were already crossing the Alps. From all points of view, Austria is bad, starting a game that was fatally to be lost.
II. Formation of the Italian Kingdom
Napoleon III in Milan. For two weeks Gyulay hesitated and did not dare to go beyond Novara. And when he finally wanted to move forward, it turned out that four French corps, numbering 100,000 people, and 50,000 soldiers of Victor-Emmanuel were covering the capital of Piedmont. The Fifth French Corps, under the command of Prince Napoleon, was heading for Tuscany, from where it was to rush to the banks of the Po. Finally, the emperor, in a proclamation on May 3, proudly announced his intention to liberate Italy to the shores of the Adriatic Sea, and then left Paris to become the head of his army (May 10).
As soon as he arrived in Italy, the allies went on the offensive. In the north, Garibaldi, with his Alpine riflemen, outflanked the Austrians from the right flank, captured Varese, and in a few weeks victoriously reached Lake Como itself. But the decisive blows were not delivered from this side. When the French army pretended that it intended to concentrate south of Po and threaten Piacenza, Gyulay with the main forces moved to this fortress and faced the enemy at Montebello, where the Austrians suffered their first defeat (May 20). With this unsuccessful maneuver, Gyulay laid bare the way to Milan. The Franco-Sardinian army, quickly turning to the left, rushed to the Sesia River, which it crossed at Palestro (May 31), and two days later the French managed to cross the Ticino. at Turbigo and Buffalo.
The Austrian commander-in-chief, who also withdrew his troops to the north, tried to stop the allies at Magent, where for several hours (June 4) he successfully fought Napoleon III, who, being almost cut off with his guards, was at one time exposed to the greatest danger. But the timely arrival on the battlefield of General MacMahon, who attacked the enemy's right wing at the end of the day, turned the emperor's defeat into a brilliant victory.
Four days later, while Varague d'Ylle was finishing off the remnants of the defeated Austrian army at Meignano and threw them back behind Mincio, Napoleon III and Victor-Emmanuel made their entry into Milan, and the French emperor, intoxicated with success, was imprudent to turn to the Italian people with an appeal, to which he was ready to respond with the greatest eagerness, "Unite," Napoleon III said to the inhabitants of the peninsula, "with the common goal of liberating your fatherland. Organize in a military fashion, hurry under the banners of King Victor Emmanuel ... and, ignited by the sacred fire of patriotism , be today first of all soldiers; tomorrow you will become free citizens of a great country. "
Revolt of Central Italy. At this time, Napoleon III succeeded in overthrowing the Derby ministry in England (June 11, 1859), which gave way to the Palmerston ministry, which was much more sympathetic to the cause of Italian liberation. The French emperor entered into relations with Kossuth with the aim of causing an uprising in Hungary; in a word, he seemed to be lucky in all respects. But the emperor soon noticed that the victories he won, more than shocks, could harm him. Having provoked a revolutionary movement in Italy in his interests, he now saw with amazement that it was covering the central part of the peninsula and was ceasing to obey him. He had to make sure that he was not able to contain the scope of this movement and that Cavour, like all Italian patriots, seeks not at all to create an Italian federation, but to form a unified Italian state.
At the end of April, Tuscany revolted and expelled the Grand Duke Leopold, and clearly showed that she did not want to recognize Prince Napoleon as her sovereign. In Parma and Modena, the people also forced their sovereigns to flee (May - June 1859). The legates, purged by the Austrians after the defeats at Magenta and Meignano, became agitated and in a few days shook off the yoke of papal rule. The pope and the young Neapolitan king Francesco II, who succeeded his father Ferdinand II on May 22, were forced to sit quietly due to the presence of a French garrison in Rome.
Napoleon III had no right to interfere with these uprisings, which primarily entailed the strengthening of the Franco-Piedmontese army, but at the same time he could not hide from himself that the result of them would be the annexation of the rebellious regions to Sardinia. In Parma, Modena, Bologna, power was already in the hands of Cavour's agents. The Emperor of the French was embarrassed and almost completely at a loss. From the empress and from his minister, Walewski, he received the most disturbing reports about the internal state of the empire, where the rich classes and the rural population, under the influence of the clergy, began to show extreme dissatisfaction with the policy so contrary to the interests of the "holy throne", and about the mood of Europe, where, according to them , extreme complications could arise, because the position of Germany in relation to France became openly threatening.
Solferino and Villafranca. Meanwhile, the Austrian army received reinforcements, and Franz Joseph himself became its head; the Austrians moved towards Mincio and settled on the heights stretching from Castiglione to San Martino. It was here that the allies almost unexpectedly encountered them. On June 24, the battle of Solferino began, in which a total of 350,000 men took part, stretching along a front of five miles. After fifteen hours of resistance, the Austrian forces, broken through in the center and on the left flank by the French, and on the right flank by the Piedmontese, were again defeated and retreated with huge losses.
The Allies won a glorious victory, no doubt. But Napoleon III took advantage of it only in order to offer Franz Joseph as soon as possible peaceful conditions, which amazed Europe with their moderation. Shocked by the terrible bloodshed, embarrassed by the prospect of a further struggle for the Mincio line and for the possession of a formidable "quadrangle" of fortresses, where Austria could resist his efforts for a long time, alarmed by the discontent of the king, who did not want the Hungarian revolution, and especially by the behavior of the German Confederation, which had already begun to mobilize his troops, frightened by the irritation of the Ultramontan party in France, Napoleon III did not hesitate to take the lead in negotiations with the Austrian emperor.
On July 8, an armistice was concluded, and three days later, during a personal meeting of both emperors in Villafranca, preconditions peace treaty: Lombardy was given to France, which in turn ceded it to Sardinia; Austria kept Venice; this province was to become part of the Italian confederation, which was supposed to be placed under the honorary rule of the pope; the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena must return to the failures of the state; the pope was asked to introduce the necessary reforms in his domain; and, finally, a general amnesty was granted to persons compromised in recent events by both sides. The impotence of Napoleon III before the Italian revolution. The Villafranca agreement came as a huge surprise to Europe, especially the Italian nation. By all accounts, Austria lost very little from the war, and its influence on the Apennine peninsula remained threatening, since it retained the Venetian quadrangle in its hands and entered the Italian confederation, where its old vassals, petty sovereigns, were at its service. She was still able to support the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena and provide them with material assistance.
The Italian people considered Napoleon III a traitor, and demands were heard from all sides to join Piedmont. Upon receiving the news of the peace treaty, Cavour displayed the greatest anger; On July 13, he resigned and was replaced by Ratazzi. But in reality, he remained completely cool. As a private person, he again received full freedom of action and made extensive use of it. Under his influence, even before the end of July, provisional governments were established in Florence, Modena and Bologna, formally independent, but in reality subordinate to the Turin court. Encouraged by the English government, which now regarded the Italian cause with greater sympathy than Napoleon III, they hastened to organize a plebiscite (16-20 August) in favor of joining the Kingdom of Sardinia.
Napoleon III, a friend of the Italians and a principled supporter of universal suffrage, not daring to either approve of the actions of the revolutionaries of the peninsula, or openly take up arms against them, begged Pius IX to join the confederation, carry out reforms and grant autonomy to the legates. At the same time, he sent diplomatic agents to Tuscany and Emilia to persuade the interim governments to voluntarily submit to the terms of the Treaty of Villafranca. In this spirit, he published articles in Moniter and wrote to Victor-Emmanuel (October 20).
But all the efforts of Napoleon III were in vain. The Roman curia refused to carry out any reforms until the population of Romagna showed complete submission. Residents of the rebellious areas replied that they were not asked for advice when concluding the Villafranca Treaty, and, therefore, the provisions of this treaty were not binding for them. The Sardinian (Piedmontese) king, for his part, indicated that if he decided to resist the wishes of the patriots, he would himself be overthrown by the revolution, that Garibaldi and his comrades would proclaim a republic in Italy, and such an example could be contagious. If he did not allow his relative, the Prince of Carignan, to go to Modena, where he was invited to take up the post of regent of the Central Italian League, he instead allowed Buoncompagni, who, as everyone knew, was a Piedmontese agent, to go there.
In short, the annexation of Central Italy to Piedmont was actually achieved. Meanwhile, the plenipotentiaries of France, Sardinia and Austria, assembled in Zurich, with philosophical serenity concluded three treaties aimed at ensuring the fulfillment of the Villafranchian preconditions (November 10). True, these new conventions did not formally decide, as was done in the preliminary agreement, that the deprived of the throne of the Italian sovereigns would be returned to their former possessions, but they definitely stipulated their rights. The final decision on this issue was to be made by a special congress proposed by the emperor of the French. But whether such a congress would ever be called was a matter of great doubt, for England wanted the Italians to be given complete freedom to decide the question of the return of the sovereigns; The Italians did not want to hear about these sovereigns, while Austria made its participation in the Congress dependent on the preliminary restoration of these sovereigns in their rights.
Napoleon III, Cavour and the Treaty of Turin. Napoleon III himself made it impossible to convene this congress, making an unexpected new turn in order to get out of the ridiculous situation in which he found himself. Convinced of the inevitability of the annexation of the Italian regions to Piedmont, he decided to adapt to the circumstances and try at worst to get some benefit from them. To begin with (in December 1859) Napoleon III ordered the distribution of an anonymous pamphlet (Pope and Congress), in which the Pope was asked to give up most of his possessions; then he turned to Pius IX with a letter advising him to cede at least Romagna (December 31). The Pope responded with a harsh encyclical "in which the opponents of his secular power were declared subject to the same anathema as the enemies of his spiritual authority (January 8, 1860).
But Napoleon III, not being embarrassed by this, entered into an agreement with the British government, and both contracting parties recognized the principle of non-interference in Italian affairs and the legality of the Italian states joining Piedmont if legally elected representative assemblies demanded it. On the other hand, Napoleon III was preparing the return to power of Cavour and the annexation of Savoy and Nice to France, which he did not dare to demand in 1859 and which were now supposed to be a price to pay for new concessions to Sardinian politics. On January 20, 1860, Cavour, "a participant in the meeting at Plombier," again became chairman of the council of ministers; On January 27, he announced his intention to convene a parliament in which the regions of Central Italy would be represented on a par with the old Piedmontese provinces, and on February 3, the emperor publicly expressed the idea that if Central Italy would be annexed to Piedmont, then France would also have the right to round off its borders from the Alps.
At first this declaration made a rather unfavorable impression in England, but soon the British calmed down at the thought that France's exactingness towards Italy would undoubtedly lead to a chill between the two countries. Based on the same considerations, Austria also decided not to interfere with the annexation of Savoy and Nice to France. Thus, in order to implement his plan, Napoleon III had only to take some precautions due to the delicate situation in which Cavour found himself before the Italian nation in general and the Piedmontese people in particular, agreeing to the cession of both provinces.
In order not to lose his popularity, Cavour tried to assume the appearance of a man acting under duress. Napoleon III agreed to fulfill his desire and, in order to comply with the form, invited the Sardinian king to abandon Tuscany and be content with the title of the Pope's viceroy in the church domain. In response to this proposal, the Turin cabinet referred to the principle of popular sovereignty and to a plebiscite: the population of Tuscany, Emilia and the legacies, just called to express their opinion, almost unanimously voted (March 13-16) the annexation of these regions to the Kingdom of Sardinia (Piedmont).
Victor-Emmanuel expressed (March 18-20) his agreement with this decision, and on April 2 a new parliament was convened. Now the impression was created that Cavour, willy-nilly, was forced to sacrifice Savoy and Nice. But since he continued to play the role of a man who could not come to a definite decision, Napoleon III sent a special agent to him, Venedetti, who was instructed to speak in decisive language. Victor-Emmanuel and Cavour, pretending to concede to a kind of ultimatum, finally concluded in Turin (March 24, 1860) an agreement under which the named two provinces were given to France on the condition that their population would be questioned. The plebiscite took place on April 15 and 22; Savoy and Nice spoke in favor of joining France ...
New army dads. Lamorisier. “So you have become our accomplices,” the cunning minister said cheerfully to the French commissioner when signing the treatise on March 24. This unusually correct remark was justified by the subsequent course of events. After all that has happened in recent times in Italy everyone was well aware that the Roman and Neapolitan governments could not be sure.
in tomorrow. Napoleon III really wanted to save them from death, but he also wanted them, on their part, to do everything necessary for their salvation, while these governments, having completely lost their heads, seemed to themselves strive into the abyss.
The Pope excommunicated Victor Emmanuel and his ministers (March 26) - a measure that somewhat hurt Napoleon III. Pius IX tried to incite the French bishops against the emperor; in order not to need the imperial troops (which the emperor himself would be glad to withdraw), the pope organized a boastful and undisciplined army, which was replenished with French Legitimists and publicly manifested in honor of Henry V. He entrusted the leadership of this army to the December exile, the sworn Emperor, General Lamorisier. The Pope arrogantly rejected the grant and guarantee of territorial integrity offered to him by the French government, as well as a new request for the necessary reforms (April 1860). The annoyed emperor was apparently ready to withdraw his troops, but he feared that Cavour would not take advantage of the removal of the French garrison from Rome and, under the pretext of some new "sorrowful cries", would not begin new "liberations" and territorial conquests.
Garibaldi in Sicily. The Neapolitan government pursued an even more unreasonable and implacable policy than the Roman curia. The successor to the "bomb king", an ignorant and narrow-minded young man, King Francesco II, who was entirely in the hands of a fierce and cowardly camarilla, sought salvation exclusively in absolutism - in denunciations and terror. For a whole year, he paid no attention to the suggestions of Napoleon III, who advised him to give his subjects a constitution and enter into an alliance with Sardinia. Meanwhile, in the whole country there was the greatest unrest, and very soon an uprising broke out in Sicily (April 3, 1860). This movement was the signal for a decisive campaign in favor of Italian unity, launched shortly thereafter by the revolutionary party.
In Genoa, where volunteers flocked from all sides to summon Garibaldi, the latter openly formed an expeditionary force to lead it to the insurgent island. Cavour and Victor-Emmanuel, who, if they wished, could easily prevent this intention, turned a blind eye to Garibaldi's actions, reserving the right to deny him if they failed, and if successful, to take advantage of the fruits of victory under the pretext of saving Italy and Europe from anarchy. Thus, on the night of May 5-6, the brave condottiere managed to put his small detachment (less than 2,000 people) on two ships, helpfully let by the Piedmontese squadron of Admiral Persano, all May landed with his volunteers in Sicily. Here Garibaldi gathered a real army around him in a few days; the population entirely went over to his side; he seemed to fly from victory to victory. “In early June, after a desperate struggle, Garibaldi took possession of Palermo, and at the end of the same month the whole island, with the exception of Messina and some minor points, was in his power.
Revolution in Naples. Upon receiving news of this expedition, some powers, including France, became agitated and began to accuse Cavour of complicity with Garibaldi. The minister denied the validity of this accusation, but here he pointed out that if Austria and France do not forbid their subjects to enter the service of the Neapolitan king or the pope, then it is quite natural that Sardinia does not treat with greater severity those of its subjects who act in protection of the oppressed people. When the Neapolitan king, who had recently turned to Napoleon III for help, decided on the latter's advice to propose an alliance of Sardinia, Cavour questioned whether it makes sense for Victor Emmanuel to compromise his popularity in Italy just to strengthen the wavering throne of one of his worst enemies.
In any case, he did not formally reject the proposal of the Neapolitan king, but agreed to enter into an alliance with him only on the condition that Francesco II would give his subjects a constitution and immediately put it into effect. The king of Naples promulgated this constitution on June 30, but no one took it seriously. The court camarilla advised the young king to break this word and organized absolutist demonstrations, which caused riots everywhere that did not promise anything good to the dynasties. At the end of July, the king announced that his promised parliamentary elections were postponed indefinitely. On his part, it was in the full sense of the word an act of suicide; his own generals, advisers and even relatives began to leave him and cheat on him, and the overwhelming majority of his subjects eagerly turned their eyes towards the Strait of Messina.
The brave condottiere, having received an official demand from Victor Emmanuel to stop, replied that, to his greatest regret, he was forced to disobey (July 27). After such a categorical refusal, the king thought it good not to insist any more. The French government would gladly send a squadron to the Messina lighthouse, but England, having received assurances from the Turin cabinet that no new territorial concessions to France would be made, saw no obstacles to the further expansion of Piedmont. She reminded Napoleon III that he had once recognized the principle of non-interference in Italian affairs, and the French emperor, who at that moment especially needed friendly relations with the London cabinet, finally gave up the idea of \u200b\u200binterfering with Garibaldi's campaign.
Thus, Garibaldi with his thousand, with which he, starting his campaign, sailed from Marsala, could cross the Strait of Messina on August 8, 1860. The Tuileries Cabinet contented itself with sending out a diplomatic note in which it made England responsible for. serious events that may occur in Italy. The London court, which did not want to quarrel with either France or Austria, hastened to declare that it would consider illegal any Garibaldi attack on Rome or Venice. But could anyone guarantee that such an attack would not follow?
Garibaldi was rapidly approaching Naples. Abandoned by all, Francesco II retreated on September 6 to Gaeta. The next day, Garibaldi solemnly, without any convoy, entered Naples, surrounded by a jubilant crowd, established a provisional government, and announced his intention to go further north. He said that he wanted to proclaim Victor-Emmanuel the king of Italy from the height of the Quirinal. At the time, it seemed that Garibaldi was completely under the influence of the Democratic Party. Mazzini rushed to Naples; his friends rallied around the dictator, and the Italian revolution, which began in the name of the monarchy, threatened to end in the triumph of the republic.
Cavour and his “accomplice”; the battle of Castelfidardo and its aftermath. Cavour, who strongly wanted to stop Garibaldi, out of fear that he could ruin the Italian cause with his reckless courage, sent to Naples, even before Francesco II was removed from there, several ships and 2-3 thousand bersagliers, who landed on the departure of the king, but not could even dream of blocking the road of the revolutionary army and its leader. Cavour was able to derive the greatest benefit from a complication, which he could not prevent. At the end of August, he sent his colleague Minister Farini and General Cialdini to Napoleon III, who was then traveling in Savoy, with the task of explaining to the emperor the need to stop Garibaldi, who was ready to march on Rome; they also had to convince him that France, unable to turn its cannons against the Italian revolution or allow Austria to carry out a counter-revolution, and on the other hand, not wanting to get involved in a new war with this power, should leave Sardinia with the care of saving the monarchy.
The Piedmontese army had to move towards the Neapolitan border, and for this it had to pass through Marchia, guarded by the Lamorisier corps. The question arose whether this should be considered a violation of international law? Did not the papal army openly threaten the former legates and Tuscany? Didn't the people of Markhia call on Victor-Emmanuel? Napoleon III remembered the incriminating obligations with which he tied himself to Cavour, who kept all the evidence in his hands, and he was decidedly dissatisfied with the Pope. Therefore, he made it clear that, being forced to verbally express disapproval of the new Piedmontese policy, he would not actually interfere with it. Fate presto! (Act quickly!) - he said to the envoys of Cavour and, as if wishing to avoid the spectacle of the impending events, hastened to leave for Algeria.
Act quickly! That was exactly what Cavour had intended. On September 7, he demanded that the papal government dissolve Lamorisier's army, and before even a refusal could be obtained in Turin, General Cialdini crossed the border of Umbria. A few days later, the papal troops were defeated at Castelfidardo (September 18), and then their leader, besieged in Ancona, was forced to surrender to surrender (September 29). Since the French occupied Rome and a small area known as the patrimony of St. Peter, then the Piedmontese did not touch either one or the other; but they occupied Umbria, Marchia, and by the beginning of October reached the border of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.
Although Piedmont was not at war with the Neapolitan king, Sardinian troops nevertheless crossed this border. Garibaldi's actions gave the Sardinian government an ever-increasing concern. The dictator, apparently, intended to postpone the plebiscite in the Kingdom of Naples to join Piedmont until the conquest of Rome. He ruled the country at random, following the instructions of the revolutionary group that surrounded him, which had no particular sympathy for Cavour and even for the Sardinian king. And Garibaldi himself demanded the removal of the great Piedmont minister to resign. To put an end to these intrigues, Cavour convened a parliament in Turin, which first of all was to authorize the king to annex the newly occupied papal provinces and the kingdom of the Two Sicilies to his possessions.
Meanwhile, the troops of Francesco II went on the offensive and on the shores of Volturno inflicted a bloody defeat on Garibaldi. His indecisive victory at Capua (October 1), he owed solely to the help of the Piedmontese bersagliers who arrived from Naples. Thus, from the point of view of Cavour, the movement of General Cialdini towards Naples was justified by a double necessity. In a circular addressed to the European courts, the Sardinian minister pointed out that, having left his capital, Francesco II actually abdicated the throne, and therefore no one was taking anything away from him; and besides, it is necessary to save Italy from the anarchy that threatens her. He spoke with the Italians in a different language: according to him, Victor-Emmanuel had to reckon with the voice of the people who called him from all sides.
At this time, the Piedmont king was already on his way to Naples. On October 21, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies recognized him as its sovereign by a solemn plebiscite, and the same was done by Marchia. A few days later he met with Garibaldi, who, without much eagerness, but still loyally gave him his place. Meanwhile, Francesco II, driven out by the Piedmontese troops from his positions on the banks of the Volturno, locked himself in the only fortress that remained in his hands - Gaeta - and was going to put up decisive resistance there, trying at the same time with sharp but fruitless protests to interest Europe in his fate.
Europe and the Italian Kingdom. The French government, in order to maintain decency, found it necessary to express its displeasure and recalled its envoy from Turin; but it left a charge d'affaires there, showing that the break was not serious. The Berlin cabinet limited itself to a purely platonic protest over the latest actions of Cavour and was not at all offended when the Sardinian minister replied: "I set an example and I am confident that Prussia will soon follow him with pleasure."
But the Austrian government pretended to use this opportunity to declare a new war on Piedmont, and it would probably attack Victor-Emmanuel if it could confidently count on the support of Russia. But although the king did not approve of the deprivation of the Neapolitan king of his possessions, he could promise Austria benevolent neutrality only if Victor Emmanuel decided to attack Austria first, and even then the king promised benevolent neutrality only in agreement with the French emperor. And since Napoleon III said that he would in no way help Sardinia (Piedmont) to attack Austria and only intends to guarantee Piedmont - in all circumstances - the benefits provided for by the Villa-Frankish Treaty, Alexander II, on a personal meeting in Warsaw, convinced Franz -Joseph did not start a war (October 22-26), and the Austrian emperor, in whose possessions general fermentation was noticed, did not consider it necessary to insist on his warlike plans.
Around the same time (October 27), the British government, through the mouth of John Rossel, spoke out in favor of the population of the Italian states, which recognized Victor Emmanuel as their king, and began to defend the thesis that nations have the right to remove their governments at any time. Exposing this principle, Rossel aimed mainly at Napoleon III, the recognized apostle of popular sovereignty and universal suffrage; the English minister wanted to give himself the insidious pleasure of beating him with his own weapon.
The emperor of the French still showed some interest in relation to the Neapolitan king to please the pope, who openly sided with Francesco II. At the same time, by guaranteeing this sovereign personal freedom, Napoleon III reserved the opportunity to somewhat embarrass the calmness of Victor-Emmanuel. The Sardinian fleet could not block Gaeta from the sea, since a French squadron was cruising in front of this fortress. But the British government, in the name of the principle of non-interference, was not slow to demand its removal, and Napoleon III, who, because of the Chinese and Syrian affairs, was forced to value the favor of Great Britain, hastened to give her satisfaction in this matter (January 19, 1861). From that moment on, Gaeta was doomed to perish; On February 13, she was forced to surrender to surrender, and Francesco II left for Rome to Pius IX, who considered it his duty to show hospitality to the son of Ferdinand II, who brought him refuge in Gaeta in 1848.
In contrast to the failure of this sovereign, before the eyes of Europe, unheard-of successes of the House of Savoy followed one after another. All regions that joined Piedmont were asked to elect deputies; first italian! Parliament met in Turin (February 18, 1861) and proclaimed Victor Emmanuel King of Italy (March 7). Cavour's policy paid off and the political unification of the peninsula became a fait accompli. True, the restored Italian fatherland still lacked Rome and Venice, but the great minister was full of faith in the future. Therefore, he did not hesitate on 27 March to induce the Chamber of Deputies in principle to declare Rome the capital of Italy.
Pius IX and the "pop possumus" policy ... A supporter of a free church in a free state, Cavour did not lose hope of convincing the pope of the need to voluntarily renounce the last remnants of secular power. Through Abbot Stellardi, Doctor Pantaleoni, and Father Passagli, he tried to prove to Pius IX that for renouncing insignificant and burdensome secular power, he would be generously rewarded with the guarantees with which Italy would hedge his spiritual power. For the Vatican, these arguments did not represent any value, but they had some success in the Tuileries, as Napoleon III strongly wanted to end the question of the occupation of Rome once and for all. True, he never wanted to quarrel with the Catholic Church.
The death of Cavour, who died almost suddenly on June 6, 1861, struck all of Europe and deeply saddened Italy. The emperor of the French, not wanting to aggravate the predicament in which this loss could have put Victor-Emmanuel, hastened to recognize the new kingdom. A little later, by strict supervision organized in the papal domains, he helped Victor Emmanuel to curb in the Neapolitan provinces the bandits who acted on behalf of the Bourbons and received support from Rome thanks to Francesco II and the Pope; with the greatest difficulty, General Cialdini managed to cope with these bandit gangs (July-September 1861).
Ricasoli, who replaced Cavour in the ministry, received the most energetic assistance under the Roman curia from the French envoy to the Vatican, Lavalette. On January 11, 1862, the French government instructed its representative to request “St. throne "will he agree, without formally giving up his rights," to an actual deal that will return inner world Catholic Church and will make the papacy a participant in the triumph of Italian patriotism? " But the Secretary of State “St. throne "replied that" not a single concession of this kind can be made either by Pius IX, or by any of his successors for ever and ever. "
Ratazzi and Garibaldi in 1862. This pop possumus naturally caused the greatest excitement throughout Italy. The revolutionary party again went out into the streets and began to prepare for another armed expedition. The National Provedimento Committee called for threatening demonstrations on the question of Venice and Rome, and Garibaldi again set out on a campaign. Ricasoli closed his eyes to this, or at least pretended not to notice; therefore, the French government deprived him of its support and joyfully welcomed the transfer of power into the hands of Ratazzi, who took over as first minister in March 1862.
Ratazzi, who was especially valued by Napoleon III (as well as Victor-Emmanuel), took decisive measures to suppress revolutionary agitation. The Tuileries cabinet therefore considered it its duty to come to his aid and instructed Lavalette to formally propose “St. the throne "the following compromise: in the territorial relation in Italy the status quo is preserved; the pope, without renouncing his rights, from now on will actually exercise power only within the domain of St. Peter; diplomatic relations are resumed between Rome and Turin; the Catholic powers jointly provide the Pope with a decent civil list; finally, they guarantee him the possession of Rome and the territory that remained in his hands, if he agrees to present reforms to his subjects that correspond to the spirit of the times (May 30, 1862).
And Antonelli categorically refused this program. At the same time, Pius IX, in an appeal on June 10, 1862, addressed to 250 bishops, already anticipated the anathema with which, two years later, he denounced all the principles of the revolution without exception.
These manifestations irritated Napoleon III, who began to treat the Turin cabinet with redoubled courtesy. Thanks to him, the Kingdom of Italy was recognized by Russia in June 1862, and even before that by Prussia, so that already at that time it was possible to foresee those friendly relations that would later be established between the Berlin court and the Italian government.
The excellent position occupied by the Ratazzi ministry was suddenly spoiled by the insane trick of Garibaldi, whose campaign to Rome turned into an obsession and who could no longer be contained. On July 19, the brave partisan landed in Sicily with 1,500 volunteers, and shortly thereafter, he crossed the Strait of Messina and announced his intention to invade the papal domain. The Italian government hastened to block his path, but it was only possible to stop him with rifle shots. Garibaldi was wounded and captured at Aspromonte (27 August), and his small detachment dispersed. The hero was taken to La Spezia, where, exhausted from the wound, he very soon received an amnesty.
Napoleon III and reactionary politics. Shortly thereafter, Ratazzi's cabinet, as if as a reward for its correctness in this case, ventured to declare to Europe (by a circular of September 10, 1862) that “the whole nation is demanding its capital and that the current state of affairs, which had become completely intolerable, would entail the most undesirable consequences for the royal government, capable of seriously disturbing the peace of Europe and the religious interests of Catholicism. "
This demand, coldly greeted by Russia and Prussia and hostile by Austria, drew the full approval of the British cabinet, which was quite pleased with France's predicament. As for Napoleon III, at heart he would have been glad to yield to the wishes of the Italian people. Prince Napoleon and his supporters tried to influence the emperor in this very sense, but the Empress, Walewski and the leaders of the Conservative Party with all their might resisted such a step. They pointed out to the emperor that the clerical opposition that had arisen in France since 1869 could rob the government of a significant part of the country’s votes in the 1863 elections. Therefore, the emperor turned sharply backward, recalling Venedetti from Turin, and Lavalette from Rome, handed over the portfolio of foreign affairs to Drouin de Luiz, who enjoyed the sympathy of “St. throne ”(October 15), and informed the Turin cabinet that at the moment he did not find it possible to agree to the proposals set out in the circular of September 10.
The result of this announcement was the fall of the Ratazzi ministry (December 5). Victor-Emmanuel was forced to form a business cabinet and take a wait and see attitude. The Franco-Italian friendship seemed virtually over.
New turn; convention September 15, 1864. Throughout 1863 and part of 1864, the Italian government (under the ministries of Farini and Mipgetti) was, apparently, exclusively concerned with internal difficulties (putting in order finances, closing monastic orders, etc.). At the same time, Polish and Danish issues absorbed all the attention of the great powers. It is known that the events associated with them greatly discredited the French government. Napoleon III maneuvered so poorly that he managed to turn Russia, Prussia and Austria against himself at once; at one time he was even forced to fear that these powers would unite against him and restore the Holy Alliance. And since at that moment, for a number of reasons, he could not expect any help from England, he had only one possible ally - Italy.
Therefore, he once again turned the front and in June 1864 resumed diplomatic relations with Turin, which had been interrupted in 1862. This time, the diplomatic agents of Victor Emmanuel (Nigra, Pepoli, etc.), supported by Prince Napoleon, Benedetti and Lavalette, were wary of demanding Rome, but they reminded Napoleon III of his promise to free Italy to the Adriatic Sea. To this the emperor objected that he could give the Italians Venice only after the war with the three northern powers. Pepoli and Nigra did not dare to insist, but allowed themselves to note that if Italy does not start a war, then sooner or later she herself will be attacked by Austria. In the latter case, it certainly needs a strategic capital in the full sense of the word, located in a safe place, and Florence, covered by the Po River and the Apennines, is much more secure than Turin.
The French government did not contradict. Then the Italian diplomats began to argue that the transfer of the government to Tuscany would make the most bad impression on the entire peninsula, and that if Italians, eager to have the capital of Rome, were destined to experience such deep disappointment, it would be fair to give them at least some consolation by ending the occupation of the Papal (Ecclesiastical) ) area by foreign troops. At the same time, as diplomats explained, the secular power of the pope would not be exposed to the slightest danger; Victor-Emmanuel will not touch the present papal possessions, and in case of need he will even protect them from any encroachments.
Napoleon III was just waiting for convincing arguments. In this way, the convention was concluded on September 15, 1864, according to which Italy undertook not to attack the possessions of “St. throne "and even protect them, and France promised to withdraw its troops when the pope's own army is organized, but at least not later than two years later. "St. father "could form his army in the form in which he pleased, but with the indispensable condition that it would in no case turn into a weapon of attack on Italy. Finally, Italy had to take on a certain share of the debt of the former church estates in proportion to the size of the territory that it would receive.
This agreement was obviously full of reservations and ulterior motives. If a revolution broke out in Rome, which the Italian government would have had no difficulty in provoking, it would, of course, hasten to occupy the city under the pretext of restoring order. But in anticipation of this possibility, the French government, for its part, reserved complete freedom to intervene. At one time one could think that the September convention would serve as a guarantee of reconciliation between Italy and Napoleon III, but later it turned out that it was she who brought them to a final break.
Pius IX and Syllabus. This treaty, concluded without prior consultation with the Roman curia, was naturally bound to anger the pope. Pius IX responded with an act that was to greatly increase the difficulties of the French emperor. On December 8, 1864, he published the encyclical Quanta whitefish, and then soon became public and accompanying this encyclical, Syllabus, which listed a number of provisions that the Pope, on behalf of the Catholic Church, anathematized as impious and heretical. This double confession of faith, imbued with a truly medieval spirit, was a radical rejection of all modern liberties; with crude and naive frankness, it condemned the elementary principles of state law proclaimed by France in 1789 and adopted by its example by almost all of Europe (in particular, Italy).
Prussian-Italian Union. The publication of the papal manifesto, which Victor Emmanuel passed over in contemptuous silence, but with which Napoleon III was extremely irritated (for this document increased the audacity of the French clergy), again brought France and Italy closer together. To appease the impatience of the Italians, whose cherished dream was still the possession of Rome, Napoleon III expressed his readiness to make it easier for them to acquire Venice. To achieve this goal, he did not declare war on Austria, but simply helped Italy to get closer to Prussia, which after the end of the war for the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein was looking for quarrels with Austria.
Shortly before that Victor-Emmanuel had appointed General Lamarmoru, the famous "Prussoman", at the head of the ministry, and Italy's tried-and-true friend, Benedetti, went to Berlin as French ambassador (October 1864). Between Bismarck and Napoleon III, meetings have already begun on the fundamental reworking of all European borders.
Around the middle of 1865, the Prussian chancellor, confident that he would be able to draw his sovereign into the war, made a formal proposal for an alliance to Lamarmor. The terms of this agreement were hastily discussed by the Berlin and Florentine cabinets. But at a decisive moment, King Wilhelm, embarrassed by considerations of a conservative and legitimist order, chose to enter into negotiations with Austria, which, frightened by the Prussian-Italian rapprochement, agreed to the Gastein Convention (August 14, 1866).
Italy, needlessly compromising itself and abandoned to its fate with such unceremoniousness, at first showed extreme discontent, which Napoleon III shared. This sovereign began secret negotiations with Austria and tried to convince her that the voluntary concession of Venice to Victor Emmanuel was in her interests, because otherwise she would have to fight simultaneously on two fronts: with Prussia and with Italy (September 1865). But Franz Joseph rejected this offer as insulting to his honor. And for his part, Bismarck soon came to Biarritz again to try to persuade the emperor of the French. Napoleon III, on the one hand, carried away by this great seducer, and on the other, imagining that he could fool Bismarck at will and at a convenient moment act as the supreme mediator between Austria and Prussia, again agreed to the alliance of Victor Emmanuel with Wilhelm for conquest of Venice.
The Austro-Prussian War could seem close a second time after it became known that General Gowone arrived in Berlin, whom Lamarmor sent to the Prussian capital under the pretext of studying the Prussian fortification system, but in reality to conclude an alliance with the Prussian government (March 9, 1866. ). However, this time Italy decided to take precautions. Under the agreement concluded on April 8, 1866, she pledged to attack Austria with all her forces, but only after she went over to the offensive of Prussia. The latter was left to choose the most convenient moment for declaring war; but if the war had not started within three months, the Italian government had the right to consider the treaty invalid. The Allies pledged not to conclude a separate peace and not to lay down their arms until Italy gets Venice and Prussia achieves a corresponding territorial expansion in Germany. Finally, the Prussian king promised Victor Emmanuel a monetary subsidy of 120 million.
Campaign of 1866 and the appropriation of Venice. The gap was again slowed down by diplomatic complications. The policy of Napoleon III became more and more confused and contradictory. He again began mysterious negotiations with Austria and on June 12 concluded a secret treatise with her, through which he hoped to persuade Italy to a separate agreement with Austria, for which the latter would cede Venice to her. Bismarck, fearing the falling away of Italy from Prussia, decided to speed up the opening of hostilities, which began in Germany on June 16.
Immediately the Italian troops set out on the march, and while Garibaldi, at the head of a corps of volunteers, prepared to invade Tyrol, two large regular armies from the front attacked the Venetian region, one through the Mincio and the other through the lower Po. But the first and most numerous of them, moving in great disarray (under the command of Lamarmora), almost immediately suffered a severe defeat on the already famous heights of Custozza, where Archduke Albrecht attacked the Italian army on June 24 and turned it into a stampede. This beginning did not seem to bode well for the Italians. But a few days later, the brilliant victory won by the Prussian army at Sadovaya (July 3) allowed them to recover.
On the same day after the Battle of Sadovaya, perplexed Austria hastened to turn to the mediation of Napoleon III and offered to cede Venice to him, which, for his part, he had to transfer to Italy. The Emperor of the French really wanted to persuade Italy to end hostilities and thus force Prussia to conclude peace; but for this he would have to make an armed demonstration, on which he could not or did not dare to decide. Italy took advantage of his inaction (or impotence) and remained loyal to Prussia; despite the setbacks she experienced, she did not want to lay down her arms. If Prussia had been defeated, Italy, of course, would have behaved quite differently and would hasten to accept the Venice proposed to her by Napoleon III. But after Sadovaya, she considered it her duty not to show compliance; The Italians were tormented by the thought of defeat at Custozza, and they were eager to restore the honor of their banner and capture Venice by force of arms.
Moreover, the Italians did not want to be content with the Venetian region alone; they also wanted to take possession of Triente and even Trieste. They protested against France's desire to humiliate them and keep them under their tutelage. Therefore, they rejected any proposals for an armistice and on July 8 again tried to invade Venetian territory (where, however, they did not find the enemy). But if they did not meet resistance on land, they turned out to be far from so happy at sea, where their fleet, which they expected to use for landing on the Illyrian coast, was completely defeated at Liss by the Austrian admiral Tegetgof (July 20). To complete the disappointments, a few days after this battle, namely on July 26, Prussia, which, thanks to the unexpected consent of Napoleon III, received full satisfaction on the issue of territorial expansion, without the knowledge of Italy concluded a truce with Austria in Nicholsburg, which was soon followed by the Peace of Prague (24 August).
Italy was deeply outraged by this new betrayal; she protested, but in vain. Bismarck replied that she was promised help in the conquest of Venice - and nothing more; but the possession of this area is now assured to her. Napoleon III sent General Leboeuf to Venice to transfer this territory to the Italians after a plebiscite. Thus, Victor-Emmanuel was forced to sign the preliminary peace terms on August 10, and after some time (October 3, 1866) - the final agreement confirming them. The Italians did not hide their displeasure. A strange thing: they were irritated mainly against France and showed the world the sad spectacle of the people, accepting almost as an insult from a friendly power a gift in the form of territory, which they could by no means conquer on their own.
The Roman Question in 1867. The memory of the humiliations experienced instilled in Italy a desire to atone for their capture of Rome, which she never refused. Now, for the completeness of the territorial unification of Italy, only the capital was lacking; with impatient cries she demanded the annexation of Rome and did not want to wait any longer. At the beginning of 1867, Italy began to put forward its demands with all the more harshness and boldness, that by this time the political bankruptcy of Napoleon III, who was ruining in fruitless negotiations with Prussia the last prestige that still remained with him after the Battle of Sadovaya, had become quite clear.
In the midst of the Luxembourg crisis, Ratazzi again became chairman of the Florentine cabinet (April 10, 1867). This minister, who was after the emperor's heart, never ceased to lavish assurances of his loyalty to him; but when Napoleon III offered him an alliance, he hastened to get rid of empty phrases and declared that between two of his benefactors - France and Prussia - Italy is very difficult to make a final choice. In reality, he did not want to serve either side; Rome was his true target. Garibaldi openly campaigned in the papal domains and formed new detachments, and the minister turned a blind eye to this, confident that the Franco-Prussian conflict would give him the opportunity to plant the banner of Italian unity on the banks of the Tiber with impunity.
True, this conflict was delayed by the London Conference (May 1867), and the House of Savoy had to postpone its projects, but he did not give up his hopes. However, the Garibaldi movement did not stop; he was encouraged by the Prussian government, since it was in the interests of Prussia to maintain the displeasure between the Florentine (Italian) cabinet and Napoleon III. Ratazzi, for his part, did not put obstacles to Garibaldi and, continuing to publicly declare the exact observance of the September convention, on the other hand explained to the emperor of the French that he could not, without risking provoking a revolution, resort to violent measures against Garibaldi, since the Italian nation stubbornly wants to have Rome as its capital.
Napoleon III really wanted to put an end to the Roman question, which tormented him like a persistent nightmare, once and for all, but he did not receive help from anyone. At the end of 1866, he proposed to the great powers to convene a special congress to resolve this issue, but this proposal was in vain. The Roman curia stubbornly continued to deny its subjects any liberal reforms. In June 1867, Pius IX forced 450 bishops to approve the doctrines set forth in the Syllabus, and talked about the convening of an ecumenical council, which was supposed to proclaim the dogma of the Catholic Church not only this outlandish political theorybut also the principle of papal infallibility.
But all these provocations, it seemed, could not shake the benevolent mood of the French government, which, trying to please “St. the throne ", allowed himself at that time such a free interpretation of the September convention that the Florentine cabinet was forced to turn to him with the most bitter complaints. Indeed, in the service of “St. father ”consisted at that time of several thousand Frenchmen, who were called, however, volunteers, but who left the ranks of the French army and in other cases were not even dismissed. Many of their chiefs were listed as officers in the French regiments and, retaining all their official rights, received permission from the imperial government to go under the papal banners. This was the so-called Antibes Legion, for it formed openly in the city of Antibes, had its own reserve battalion there, and continued to recruit new recruits. In June - July 1867, a French general, who was in active service, openly organized reviews for this legion in Rome, subjected it to reorganization and addressed him with speeches that left no doubt about the joint actions of the Tuileries with the Vatican.
Ratazzi protested against this swindle. Napoleon III promised to refuse all support of the Antibes legion, but, for his part, complained about the Garibaldian volunteers, who were getting closer and closer to Roman territory every day. The Florentine cabinet got off with general words, but did not take any measures against Garibaldi's movement. By this time, relations between France and Prussia were again strongly aggravated; all that was missing was the signal, and Garibaldi took it upon himself to send it.
Garibaldi near Montana. In early September, the old partisan went to Geneva, where he was to chair a peace congress, which was attended by representatives of the most advanced revolutionary ideas in Europe. All the way, Italians flocked to meet him. “Be prepared,” he told them, “to be cured of black vomit (vomito negro); death to the black breed! Let's go to Rome to destroy this snake's nest; decisive cleaning is needed! " He spoke no less harshly in Switzerland: “You struck the first blow to the monster,” he said to the Genevan people, “Italy has lagged behind you ... Our duty is to go to Rome. and we'll go there soon. "
The Tuileries Court, to which the strengthening of the revolutionary party was beginning to inspire the most lively concern, wanted to put an end to these incendiary appeals. Therefore, when Garibaldi, who returned to Italy, approached the borders of the papal possessions, the French government demanded that he be deprived of the opportunity to act further. Ratazzi obeyed and ordered the old condottiere to be taken to Caprera, where, according to the minister, the strictest supervision was established over him. But Napoleon III did not triumph for long. Just a few days later (September 28), Garibaldian troops invaded papal territory and in a few weeks reached almost Rome itself.
Of course, Ratazzi hastened to declare that he had nothing to do with this whole story, and offered to occupy the papal possessions simultaneously by Italian and French troops (October 13), to which Napoleon III, who was then wholly under the influence of the Ultramontan party, answered only with a demand “that Ratazzi took steps to ensure the integrity of the Roman border. The Italian minister immediately resigned (October 21), and before Cialdini could form a new cabinet on behalf of the king, Garibaldi fled the island of Caprera; he reappeared in Tuscany, then in Florence, where he issued a proclamation to the Italians (October 22), openly went on a special train to his troops, entered the papal domain and appeared under the walls of Rome.
This time Napoleon III no longer hesitated. The troops, which had been concentrated in Toulon a few weeks before, were ordered to immediately board the ships; and on October 30, the French avant-garde already entered Rome. Great excitement prevailed throughout Italy. Instead of Cialdini, who could not carry out the assignment entrusted to him, General Menabrea hastily drew up a new ministry and to satisfy public opinion for his part, he sent several Italian regiments to the papal possessions. On November 3, papal troops stumbled upon the Garibaldians at Mentan; they almost suffered defeat, but were saved by the French, who won a decisive victory over the leader of the "red shirts". “Chaspo's rifles worked wonders,” wrote the French general de Failly.
Will these guns now turn against Victor Emmanuel's soldiers? Antonelli (the papal advisor) demanded this.
But the French general did not heed his suggestions. However, Menabrea hastened to give the order to evacuate the parts of the church territory occupied by the Italians. At the same time, he ordered (this time for real) the arrest of Garibaldi, whose detachment immediately dispersed. But wanting to prove that in patriotism he would not yield to the defeated hero at Mentana, Menabrea, in a circular of November 9, proudly proclaimed Italy's inalienable right to possession of Rome.
New hesitation of Napoleon III. Napoleon III found himself in a more difficult position than ever. What to do? Continue the occupation of the papal domain? Italy will not forgive him for this. Clean them up again? But in this case, the clerical party will declare a life-and-death war on him. He spoke again about the European Congress, but too many powers (especially Prussia and England) wanted him to remain in a quandary, and this idea had no chance of success. Moreover, the French minister Rouer, wanting to please the clerical majority of the Legislature, had the imprudence to commit himself never to admit Italians into Rome. Thus the question was decided and the congress became completely useless. “On behalf of the French government,” exclaimed the orator, “we declare that Italy will not take possession of Rome. France will never allow this violence against its honor and Catholicism ”(December 5).
From that moment on, there was no more room for friendly relations between the Parisian and Florentine cabinets, just as there could be no more talk of a European solution to this issue, and they stopped talking about it. The September Convention of 1864 has become a mere memory; French troops continued to protect the pope, and Italy was imbued with hostile feelings towards the French people, who bought her freedom with their blood, and began to wait for his weakening and defeat in order to break open the gates of Rome without any danger.
Italy and Austro-Hungarian Politics in 1868 and 1869.
However, some politicians have not yet given up the hope not only to bring the Parisian and Florentine cabinets closer, but also to tie the ties of close friendship. In the two years preceding the Franco-German conflict of 1870, serious efforts were made in this direction on several occasions. The first attempt in this sense was made by the Austrian government, which, under the leadership of Beist, who continued to remain a stubborn enemy of Wiesmark, dreamed of revenge for Sadovaya, and considered the rapprochement with France to be the most reliable means for preparing this revenge. Napoleon III, who since his failures in 1866 and 1867 also thought about a decisive war against Prussia, was willingly ready to unite with Franz Joseph and offered him his alliance.
In 1868, negotiations took a more definite form. Beist even then did not hide from himself that the alliance of France with Austria is impossible without the participation of Italy; in an alliance with France alone, Austria did not dare to start a war with Prussia: she feared a blow to the flank from Italy, because she remembered that in 1866 the Italians wanted to take away Trieit, Trieste and Istria from her, and knew that they were still ready to demand concessions these territories. Meanwhile, if Austria managed to reconcile Victor-Emmanuel with Napoleon III and if France and Italy formed a triple alliance with Austria, then the war with Prussia would not pose any danger. And in order to win over Italy, it was necessary to give her the opportunity to seize Rome. Beist, for his part, had nothing against such an outcome, since at the moment in question he was dissatisfied with “St. throne ”and did not care at all about maintaining the secular power of the Pope.
It would have been all the more natural for Napoleon III to join such a program because at this time he had more reasons than ever to be dissatisfied with papal policies. On June 26, 1868, Pius IX finally appointed for the next December 8 the convening of an ecumenical council, at which he was going to proclaim the dogma of papal infallibility and authorize the doctrines of Syllabus. Breaking with the historical tradition of the church, he did not invite the ambassadors of the Catholic powers to the council, among whom the French representative should have won first place. And a few months later (in February 1869) Civilta the Catholic (Civilta cattolica), the official organ of the Vatican, set out in very definite terms the program of the upcoming council. “This program,” as one recent historian remarked, “boiled down to the recognition of the unconditional power of the Catholic Church over society, to the complete subordination of all political and civil rights and all the secular authorities of the power of the infallible pope. This was tantamount to a complete denial of the spirit and text of positive laws to which the citizens of all civilized states had long been obliged to obey. "
French democracy was unable to understand how Napoleon III, who called himself "the son of the Revolution", could protect the authors of such theories with his soldiers. But this sovereign, who, as always, hesitated between two diametrically opposed political systems, although he made significant concessions to the liberal party (especially after the general elections of 1869), nevertheless did not dare to openly break with the Ultramontans, whose captive he had been for so long ... In the middle of 1869, secret negotiations for the creation of a tripartite alliance, apparently, tended to a positive result. The stumbling block over which this combination crashed was the Roman question. Napoleon III did not agree to satisfy the demand of the Italians; therefore, negotiations were interrupted between the three powers, which (in August) limited themselves to an unclear promise to adhere to a common political course, while Italy and Austria reserved the right to remain neutral in the event that France did not take the lead in the war on time.
A few months later, Beist, convinced of the inevitability of a Franco-Prussian clash and not wanting to be involved in the war against his will, decided to conclude a treaty with the Florentine cabinet, according to which Italy and Austria were to take a wait-and-see attitude, and at a convenient moment act as an armed mediator between the warring parties. Napoleon III not only knew very well about these negotiations, but even showed his readiness to assist in their successful completion. Archduke Albrecht arrived in Paris in early 1870 to familiarize himself with the military organization of France. “It is curious that he was quite pleased with her, which, no doubt, contributed much to the blinding that the French emperor soon discovered when he started a war with Prussia. But Weist's policy ran into the stubborn reluctance of Napoleon III to allow Italians into Rome. Thus, this policy was paralyzed until the catastrophe that ended the Second Empire. "
Napoleon III and the Vatican Cathedral. Meetings of the cathedral began in December 1869. The Pope, by his own power and completely despotically, established the order of his activities, leaving him only what the Catholic Church calls "freedom of good." He intended to carry out at this council not only the dogma of papal infallibility, but also the canon (the De Ecclesia scheme), which, wholly subordinating all bishops to the supreme high priest and authorizing the principles of Syllabus, was an important encroachment on the authority of the secular state. The Tuileries cabinet, which more than all other governments had reason to fear such claims, at one time, under the influence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Daru, wanted to demand admission to the council of the French ambassador and considered it his duty to invite the Christian powers to jointly oppose papal policies. But the latter, out of indifference or malice, did not respond to his call.
The Roman curia did not reckon with Napoleon III; he could not even get her to submit a memorandum on behalf of the French government to the council. Then he tried to excite and captivate at least Austria and Italy, but the first of these powers did not want to do anything without the second, and the latter stubbornly sought to be given the city of Rome. The idea arose in the Tuileries to renounce all solidarity with the Vatican, but the French government did not dare to take such an extreme measure. Daru retired (April 1870). From that moment on, the imperial government considered it in favor of sticking to a passive policy, declaring that it reserves "freedom of assessment and freedom of further action" (June). Six weeks later (in July) the council voted the canon De Ecclesia and the dogma of papal infallibility. Now the pope, who had become the unlimited ruler of the Catholic Church, could, perhaps, lose the piece of land that remained in his hands: he owned half the world. There was not a single Catholic state left where, with the help of an obedient and disciplined clergy, he could not cause confusion at will; therefore, he now had to be reckoned with more than ever.
Italian politics in July and August 1870. It was at this moment that Napoleon III, carried away by rock, declared war on Prussia. He threw himself into this adventure without allies. On July 11, Austria-Hungary informed him that it would not allow ready-made solutions to be imposed on itself and made him fully responsible for everything he was preparing to do. As for the Florentine court, to which the French government turned again (July 16), he refused the alliance, because France still did not want to cede Rome to him. Italy could obtain from the emperor only consent to the withdrawal of French troops from the papal possessions and to the restoration of the September convention (July 20). But she hoped, through the mediation of the Austro-Hungarian Chancellor, to wrest from him his consent to the sacrifice, which until now France did not want to make.
At this time, Beist was using the greatest efforts to finally establish that Austro-Italian alliance, the dream of which he had cherished for a whole year, and by the end of July it seemed to him that he was close to achieving this goal. It was agreed that both states would join forces for armed mediation and that Austria would send its troops not only to Silesia, but also to Bavaria, where, on its part, the Italian army would move. But Franz Joseph and Victor Emmanuel asked for six weeks to mobilize their armies and did not want to start active operations before the French invaded southern Germany. Finally, Napoleon III had to agree to the entry of the Italians into Rome.
The last condition ruined the whole plan. Supporters of the pope's secular power repeated to the emperor that if he emerged victorious from the war, then Italy would conclude an alliance with him without Rome, and otherwise he would not achieve this alliance at any price. At the moment when Napoleon III left Paris to his army (July 28), nothing had yet been decided. The Italian agent Vimercati went to Metz for a personal meeting with the emperor; Prince Napoleon, for his part, joined his efforts to the efforts of diplomacy. But it was all useless; even on August 5, the emperor could not come to any definite decision. The next day, the French army was completely defeated at Reichshofen, and eight days later the Prussians entered the heart of France.
“Victor-Emmanuel was in the theater when he was informed about the catastrophe that befell the French. “Poor emperor! exclaimed the gentleman king, poor emperor! But I, damn it, - got off cheap! " It is clear that from that moment on, there could be no talk of an alliance. “Alliances are not made with the vanquished,” one of his ministers told Napoleon III. In vain the emperor on August 8 turned for help to those sovereigns for whom he had been a protector and friend for many years. Victor-Emmanuel expressed complete sympathy for France's misfortune, but hid behind his duties as a constitutional monarch. And his ministry did not want to come to the aid of Napoleon III. Victor-Emmanuel armed himself, but only in order to capture Rome, which he hoped to receive now for nothing. "
To put an end to the French intercessions once and for all, Victor-Emmanuel instilled in the London cabinet (August 10) the first thought of a league of neutral powers, which quickly formed and to which Italy officially joined on August 19. But Napoleon III, who felt that the empire was crumbling as a result of a foreign invasion, on the one hand, and under the influence of the revolutionary movement, on the other, did not want to lose hope. He still believed in helping Italy, which he loved so much and which could save him. He sent Prince Napoleon to Florence (August 19) to try for the last time to influence Victor Emmanuel, but this attempt, like the previous one, ended in failure. However, even at this critical moment, the emperor did not dare to express his consent to the occupation of Rome by the Italians. And yet they, with more energy than ever, with the pen of the Visconti-Venosta (August 29), declared that they considered themselves entitled to occupy their capital.
Occupation of Rome. The defeat at Sedan and the revolution of September 4 finally allowed the Italians to take possession of Rome without any risk. The imperial troops have already left the papal possessions. On September 6, the Florentine cabinet informed the government of national defense that from now on it does not consider itself bound by the September convention, and the French government, without entering into the discussion of the issue from the legal side, gave Italy complete freedom of action. On September 8, Victor-Emmanuel sent an ultimatum to Pius IX; the pope, as might be expected, resolutely refused to enter into any negotiations with the Florentine government.
The old pope was well aware that he could not prevent the Italians from entering Rome. But he considered it a matter of honor not to voluntarily renounce his rights and yield only to violence. At the news of the approach of General Cadorna, who was entrusted with the military execution that threatened the Pope, he ordered the city gates to be locked and barricaded. But when the Italians shot a hole in the gate of Pia with cannon shots, the Pope did not want to expose his last defenders to the dangers of a futile struggle and ordered a white flag to be hung on the castle of St. Angela. Thus, Cadorna calmly took possession of Rome (September 20), and Pius IX, as a voluntary prisoner, shut up forever in the Vatican. A few days later (October 2), the population of the small papal state almost unanimously voted to annex this territory to the Kingdom of Italy.
So the misfortune of Napoleon III made it possible to end the great coup, which the power of Napoleon III helped so much to accomplish, and which, without him, Victor Emmanuel, Cavour and Garibaldi could neither finish safely, nor even, perhaps, even undertake.
Notes:
The entire financial policy of the provisional government was reduced to the comprehensive protection of the interests of the financial aristocracy, and shifting government spending onto the shoulders of the working masses. By paying early interest on government securities, setting a compulsory rate for the Bank of France tickets, saving dozens of other banks from bankruptcy, the interim government increased by forty-five percent every franc of four direct taxes that fell on peasants. The revolution for the peasantry was embodied in additional taxes. By its financial policy, carried out under the guise of defending the republic and satisfying the interests of the working class, the bourgeoisie isolated the proletariat from the peasantry and prepared the conditions for the defeat of the proletariat. - Approx. ed.
E. Tomi says that he offered Marie to use this money to provide benefits to manufacturers who could thus keep their workers and give them appropriate work, but Marie refused, adding that “the government is determined to carry out this experience, which in itself can only lead to good results, since he will prove to the workers themselves all the emptiness and falsity of non-life theories and open their eyes to the harm associated with these theories for them, and when they subsequently come to their senses, their reverent attitude towards Louis Blanc will disappear. Then he will lose all his prestige, all his strength and cease to pose a danger to society. "
Since April Barbes has spoken out against the revolutionary workers and supported a smear campaign aimed at compromising Blanqui. - Approx. ed.
It was on June 25 that General Brea was killed in the suburb of Saint-Marceau, and in the suburb of Saint-Antoine, the Parisian Archbishop Affres, who was walking to persuade the insurgents, was struck down by a bullet.
Thousands of people were shot on June 25, 26, 27, 28 and on other days without any trial in the streets, in the courtyards of barracks and city halls, at home. - Approx. ed.
Born in Turin on March 14, 1820, became the Sardinian king due to the abdication of his father, Charles Albert, on March 23, 1849, the Italian king in 1861; died in Rome on January 9, 1878.
Chairman of the Council of Ministers since 1849.
For example, from the encroachments of the Roman curia, which in 1850 tried in vain to oppose the "Law of Siccardi", which abolished foro ecclesiastico, that is, judicial privileges of the clergy. When the Minister of Commerce Santa Rosa died shortly thereafter, without expressing remorse for his adherence to this law, the Archbishop of Turin refused to bury him. Count Cavour was appointed as Santa Rosa's successor.
For example, he passed a law by which the trial of cases of insult to foreign governments was removed from the jurisdiction of the jury.
The author repeats here the same immensely exaggerated praise for Cavour as the "creator" of Italian unity, which is characteristic of all bourgeois historiography in Italy, France and England. Only the newest monograph by Paul Mattern on Cavour is less sinful than others. Such an exaggeration of the role of the "great" Piedmont minister is not accidental. The exaltation of Cavour aims to reduce the role of Mazzini and the entire long revolutionary struggle for the reunification of Italy and, using the private example of Italy, to reveal the advantages of reformism, gradualism, moderate liberalism over revolutionary methods. At the same time, he is silent about what Cavour was building on the soil prepared by the revolutionaries, and explained what they sowed. - Approx. ed.
In 1853 there was an attempt to revolt, and the following year the Duke of Parma fell victim to secret societies.
It was not the insidiousness of the Austrian policy that forced the Allies to transfer the war to the Crimea, but England's indispensable desire for a "naval" war, that is, the complete destruction of the Russian fleet and Sevastopol, and then Nikolayev and Odessa. The British were also thinking about a landing on the Caucasian coast. - Approx. ed.
Cavour won the favor of the Russian government, facilitating its rapprochement with the French government, and at the same time did not quarrel with England.
From the moment the emperor's son was born (March 16, 1856), Prince Napoleon ceased to be heir to the throne. Therefore, he began to dream of some other crown and did not hide that he would very much like to get, for example, Tuscany.
Several conspiracies have already been organized by the emigres against his life in London and Paris. Pianori's assassination attempt was made shortly before (1855).
Restoration of the Catholic hierarchy in England and Holland (1850-1851); the establishment in France of freedom of secondary and lower education, beneficial for the clergy (1850); the proclamation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception (1854); conclusion of a concordat with Austria (1855), etc.
Manin (the leader of the Venetian Revolution of 1848), lived while an emigrant in France, but like many Italian republicans, out of patriotic motives, he joined the House of Savoy (i.e., Piedmont), which at that time was the only one capable of fulfilling a dream about national independence and the unification of Italy.
Giuseppe Garibaldi was born in Nice on July 4, 1807; first served in the Sardinian Navy. Mixed in a patriotic conspiracy (1834), he left for France, was for some time in the service of the Tunisian bey, then crossed over to America (1836), fought for a long time for the Republic of Rio Grande, and in 1843 entered the service of the Uruguayan Republic, under the banners which he fought on land and at sea with Rosas. Passionately devoted to the idea of \u200b\u200bnational independence and the unification of Italy, in April 1848 he offered his services to the Milanese Defense Committee and, at the head of a legion of volunteers, took part in the first campaign of Charles Albert against Austria. General of the Roman Republican Army in 1849, after the defeat suffered by his party, he was forced to leave Italy again, went to the United States, where he was engaged in industrial activities, then to China (1852), then to Peru; returned in 1854) to Genoa and thereafter for some time commanded a merchant ship.
For example, the Tybaldi conspiracy in 1857.
Napoleon III not only allowed Orsini's defender, Jules Favre, to quote this letter in his defense speech, but ordered it to be published in Mottere - what is even more significant - in the government newspaper of the Kingdom of Sardinia (Piedmont).
Austria counted on help from the German Confederation, as well as on benevolent neutrality, and perhaps on an alliance with England. In addition, she considered herself ready to go on the offensive, and on the basis of rumors spread (with intent) by her opponents, she was convinced that they were not prepared for this.
The fifth corps was to sail from France to the Tuscan port of Livorno, and from there go straight to Po. - Approx. ed.
Buoncompagni in Florence, Farini in Modena, d'Azelio in Bologna.
At least nominally; in fact, the commander-in-chief was Field Marshal von Goess.
The Battle of Solferino cost the French army alone 10,000 men.
That is, four fortresses: Verona and Legnago on the Adige (Ech), Peskiera and Mantua on Minchiotorom; the latter, being the defeated side and not wanting to surrender himself to the power of such an unreliable and demanding ally as Prussia, did not consider it possible to reject the proposals made to him.
The British Foreign Minister John Rossel, in a circular of July 27, spoke in favor of the cleansing of the state by the French and for the recognition of the population of Central Italy the right to freely dispose of their own destiny. It was advantageous for England to use the Italians' dissatisfaction with Napoleon III and to promote the formation not of some confederation in vassal relations with France, but of a strong state, independent from both Austria and France and capable, on occasion, serve as a source of difficulties and anxiety for this last power ...
In September, the governments of Florence, Bologna and Modena formed a league and fielded an army, which was under the revolutionary command of Garibaldi and grew from day to day. In October, Garibaldi made an appeal to all of Italy, opening a subscription to the purchase of a million guns, and announced his intention to move to Marchia (Mark) and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.
The Sicilian expedition involved (before the campaign from Sicily to Naples) a little more than one thousand people. They got it historical name Garibaldian thousand. - Approx. ed.
The Strait of Messina separated the island of Sicily, already conquered by Garibaldi's army, from the Italian mainland. - Approx. ed.
On the occasion of Chinese and Syrian affairs.
Foot rangers of the then Piedmont army. - Approx. ed.
Why the author speaks so dismissively about the interim management of Garibaldi is unknown. Subsequently, in Naples they said (and wrote) that never in the city and in the country such calm reigned, never such order reigned, as in September 1860, when Garibaldi had dictatorial power there; this is also confirmed by the British who were at that time in Naples. - Approx. ed.
The funny and shameful for Victor-Emmanuel "amnesty", which he gave to Garibaldi, excited a lot of excitement in the minds. Garibaldi, who "presented" to Victor Emmanuel the kingdom of the Two Sicilies he had conquered, was wounded by the soldiers of this very Victor Emmanuel and taken prisoner while trying to recapture the city of Rome from the Pope and again give the city of Rome to Victor Emmanuel. Everyone knew that Victor-Emmanuel opposed Garibaldi and went against Garibaldi his troops solely out of a desire to please Napoleon. - Approx. ed.
The commander of the Italian fleet, Admiral Persano, who was subsequently accused of not fulfilling his duty during this battle, was brought before a military court, which sentenced him to demotion.
As you know, in early April 1867, the issue of Luxembourg almost led to a clash between France and Prussia (see next chapter)
On the southern coast of France, near Nice.
Dehdour, Histoire diplomatique de l "Europe, v. II, chap. IX.
On this issue, not only between French and Italian historiography there is a fundamental disagreement in assessing the facts, but also English researchers (like Balton King) and publicists (like Labouchere) decisively disagree with the French. After the Battle of Mentana, the question was quite clear: Italy cannot get Rome while Napoleon III is holding his troops there. And Napoleon III will never withdraw these troops from Rome. Hence, the Italians, with logical inevitability, had to wait for Napoleonic France to suffer some kind of catastrophe that would force the French to leave Rome. Thus, the reproach that our author sends to the Italians is in this case unfair. In addition, the entire Italian policy of Napoleon III least of all pursued the goal of the liberation and reunification of Italy, meeting only the dynastic interests of the French emperor. - Approx. ed.
Julius Zeller in Pius IX and Victor Emmanuel.
A. Debidour, Histoire diplomatique de l "ljurope, v. II, chap. X.
A. Dedour, Histoire diplomatique, v. II, chap. X.
Unification of Italy
The continued fragmentation of Italy after the signing of the Vienna Agreement did not suit the population of the Apennine Peninsula. Certain regions of the country were at different stages of social development.
After the revolutionary events of 1848-1849, Sardinia (Piedmont) became the most developed region. A constitutional monarchy was established here, metallurgy and mechanical engineering, railway construction became more active. Count Camillo Cavour headed the government.
Remark 1
Camillo Cavour is an Italian politician and liberal. He headed the unification of Italy under the auspices of Sardinia. Years of life 1810-1861.
He believed that Sardinia could stand at the head of the struggle for the unification of Italy. The Liberal Party supported underground revolutionary organizations fighting for the national unification of the country. During the Crimean War (1853-1856), Piedmont sent troops to the Crimea to help England and France. In gratitude from these countries, Cavour wanted to enlist their assistance in the reunification of Italy.
In 1858, France provided troops against Austria on the side of Sardinia, for which she received Nice and Savoy. In 1859, the combined forces of France and Sardinia defeated the Austrian resistance. The population of Tuscany, Parma and Romana rose in revolt against Austrian rule. They made a decision at the Constituent Assembly to unite with Sardinia. At such a crucial moment, France betrayed an ally and went over to the side of Austria. Only Lombardy went to Sardinia.
In 1860 in Kingdom of Naples (Sicily) the rebels were led by Giuseppe Garibaldi.
Remark 2
Giuseppe Garibaldi is an Italian politician and military leader. He headed the Risorgimento along with other leaders. Lived 1807-1882.
His Volunteer Corps overthrew the rule of the Bourbons, who ruled in the south of the country. In 1861, the first unified Italian parliament was convened. He proclaimed the unification of Italy and the formation of the Italian kingdom. The Sardinian king Victor-Emmanuel became the ruler. Venice and the Papal States remained independent.
The final reunification of Italy is associated with wars. During the Prussian-Danish War, Venice was transferred to Italy in 1866. The Franco-Prussian War led to the entry of the Papal States into the kingdom in 1870. Since 1871 Rome became the capital of the state.
Unification of Germany
After the Congress of Vienna and the revolutions of 1848-1849, Prussia became the most developed part of Germany. Small German states saw her as a guarantor of stability. The question of completing the unification of Germany under the auspices of Prussia became the main goal of Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck.
Remark 3
Otto von Bismarck - "iron chancellor", a politician who sought to unite Germany at any cost ("iron and blood"). Years of life 1815-1898.
In 1864, Prussia declares war on Denmark. Austria was an ally of Prussia. Denmark was forced to cede the provinces of Schleswig and Holstein to Prussia. After inflicting the next defeat on the former ally of Austria, Bismarck achieved the formation of the North German Confederation.
By 1870, Prussia's rival on the continent, France, was politically isolated. The country began to prepare for war, which was triggered by the question of the Spanish throne. France attacked Prussia and was defeated. She was forced to transfer Alsace and Lorraine to Prussia. The unification of Germany is over.
The importance of the formation of nation states in Germany and Italy
The process of the unification of Germany and the unification of Italy took place in different ways. In Germany, the formation of a nation state took place "from above" under the leadership of Prussia. In Italy, the military actions combined with revolutionary actions of the people. The time of the unification of these countries is approximately the same: 1870 in Italy, 1871 in Germany.