In the series "Penal Battalion", the traditional myth of penal battalions was once again replicated, in which the punished Red Army men and prisoners allegedly atoned for their guilt with blood. The fact is that neither the Red Army men, nor the camp "blatars", nor their godfathers were allowed to serve their sentences in the penal battalion. Unfortunately, having used the famous order number 227 in the screensaver of the series, the filmmakers did not bother to read this order. Here is what it says: “... To form within the front from one to three (depending on the situation) penal battalions (800 people each), where to send middle and senior commanders (in the summer of 1942 the term“ officers ”did not exist in the Red Army, he appeared at the beginning of 1943. - Author) and the corresponding political workers of all branches of the armed forces, guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, and put them on more difficult sectors of the front in order to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against the Motherland with blood.
On September 26, 1942, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, General of the Army Georgy Zhukov, ordered: "Persons of middle and senior command, political and command personnel are sent to penal battalions ... from one to three months." Even the size of the salary of the commander who became a penalty box was determined - 8 rubles 50 kopecks. But then the question arises - was it possible that "the opportunity to atone with blood" was provided only to the command staff?
But what about the privates and sergeants? For them, everything in the same order No. 227 was prescribed: “To form within the army from five to ten (depending on the situation) penal companies (from 150 to 200 people in each), where to send ordinary soldiers and junior commanders guilty of violation of discipline out of cowardice or instability, and put them in difficult areas of the army. "
The fundamental difference between a penal battalion and a penal company is defined very precisely. Penalty battalions were in fact purely officer's units, which were fundamentally different from penal companies. These were completely different formations - primarily dissimilar in composition (penal battalions consisted of demoted officers, while penal companies consisted of privates and sergeants, and often from prisoners from camps). Penalty companies were in fact "cannon fodder", which usually received weapons only before the battle (as a rule, exclusively rifles) and were at gunpoint of the NKVD troops. Penal battalions, however, had machine gun, anti-tank and mortar platoons, underwent special training, the level of which other units of the Red Army could only dream of.
Jealous Assassin Pilot
There is a legend about the creation of penal battalions - allegedly a certain pilot killed his wife with a lover and, being sentenced to death, in a letter to Stalin asked to be allowed to die in battle. Stalin, saying: “What if he can kill at least one German,” decided to create penal battalions. But, in addition to legends, there are documents and memoirs of veterans. Alexander Pyltsin, the platoon commander, then the company of the 8th separate penal battalion of the 1st Belorussian Front, wrote with indignation in his memoirs about the authors of modern publications, who did not find "differences between front-line officer penal battalions and army penal companies."
This is how he describes his first combat operation: "The task was as follows: unnoticed by the enemy, cross the front line and, avoiding combat contact with him, with a bold throw to go to his rear." In such an operation, there could be no question of any obstacle detachments. It is very difficult to keep people at gunpoint in the enemy rear. According to Pyltsin's description, they were fed very well: “They also gave us sets of dry food rations. It included small cans of American, unusually pungent-smelling cheese (everything American and English was still called "the second front" in our country) and salty, slightly yellowed, but not losing its charm from this Ukrainian lard. All this was given to us on the basis of 3-5 days of active hostilities. True, it was provided at least once a day with hot meals from our field kitchens, to the regularity and fullness of the portions of which we were so used to during our time on the defensive. The rear services even took good care of the repair and replacement of worn-out shoes. " How different this is from our traditional idea of \u200b\u200bhungry and ragged "cannon fodder".
And they were preparing the penalty battles for the fight in earnest. Mortar men practiced shooting from closed positions almost every day, crews of anti-tank rifles fired at the destroyed German tank. Moreover, even from the scarce trophy faust cartridges, penalty boxes could shoot during training.
From the mass former officers infantrymen were allocated, who were appointed as deputy platoon commanders (officers from the so-called permanent composition, that is, not penalties, were appointed as platoon commanders and above. Those serving sentences were of variable composition). Then the trained and thoroughly armed penal battalions performed the role of shock, purely officer units, solving special tasks. It seems that when they were created, they remembered the White Guard officer battalions Civil War, which was not advertised for obvious ideological reasons. And this is against the background of ordinary, non-penalty, units, where fresh replenishment was often thrown into battle, without even giving out uniforms, in civilian clothes! Many Red Army men went on the attack, having previously fired one or two times. So who was the real cannon fodder?
Penalties won't have a way back
But the tasks for the penal battalions were really difficult. The officer battalions were a reliable combat tool that would not fail under any circumstances. “Our subunits were urgently transferred to the most dangerous direction, strengthening the regiment's combat formations. Mingling with his soldiers, we noticed that there was some kind of animation in their ranks. After all, they understood that next to them in the role of ordinary fighters were recent officers in various ranks and they would go into the attack together. And it was as if some kind of fresh, irresistible force had flowed into them, ”recalled Alexander Pyltsin. The fighters of the penal battalion constantly demonstrated not only boundless courage, but also the highest professionalism. In the German rear, the penalty box ran out of mines - and from Soviet 82-mm mortars, well-trained mortarmen hit with captured 81-mm mines, quickly changing the firing table. It is impossible to approach the building from which the Germans are firing very densely - and from the nearby penalty boxes the "defector" runs to the enemy. In fact, this is a volunteer stocked up with grenades. Having reached the "dead space" under the windows, he throws a lemon at each. An abandoned German self-propelled gun came across on the way - from it the penalties - former tank officers - immediately open fire. During the offensive on Berlin, the penalties were ordered to be the first to cross the Oder and create a foothold for the rifle division. Before the battle, they reasoned like this: “At least some of the more than a hundred penalties of the company, but they will swim, and if they do, they still did not have impossible tasks. And let the small bridgehead be captured, but they will hold it to the last. Penalties will not have a way back. ”
For this successful battle, Alexander Pyltsin was posthumously nominated for the title of Hero. When it turned out that he survived, the battalion commander, with whom Alexander Vasilyevich did not have a relationship, redid the submission for the Order of the Red Banner of Battle. But let's say for a moment that, as sometimes happens with veterans, Alexander Pyltsyn, after so many years, let's say, somewhat exaggerates the combat capability and professionalism of his penal battalion.
There were few losses in the battalion
Front-line writer Vyacheslav Kondratyev is rightfully considered one of the most realistic and truthful authors who wrote about the Great Patriotic War. His works honestly tell about how the Red Army men died and died because of their unpreparedness and command. But even with him, the author, whom no one has ever accused of decorating and varnishing the war, it is the penal battalion that conducts the most victorious battle with the Germans. As expected, an officer. The fines were ordered to take the village, which the ordinary units had unsuccessfully stormed for two months, covering the ground with corpses. And then the former captain Shirshov suggested that the commander of the penal battalion fundamentally change the attack scheme, referring to the already existing experience in solving a similar problem: “We decided on such an operation: by the end of the night, withdraw the battalion to its initial positions and, while it was dark, crawl as long as possible, and then in the attack, and silently, without any "hurray" and without rushing. Run the rest of the field on the move, in spite of any fire ...
- Happened? - the battalion commander interrupted.
- Happened. And there were few losses. The Germans woke up when we were already halfway there. They ran fast, they did not have time to change mortar sights. The whole field is just running! I suppose, since ordinary soldiers could do this, then we - the officer's battalion - even more so. The idea fully justified itself, the officer's attack was extremely successful. “The Germans ran out half-naked, fired back, but the penalty box could not be stopped - twenty minutes later the village, for which so many lives were laid, was taken! Several dozen people in the heat of the battle rushed to pursue the Germans already outside the village, but they were stopped. A heavy machine gun that had arrived in time by that time was shooting those running in the back, until they reached a small fishing line and disappeared in it ... It was all over. There was a victory ... There were few losses in the battalion. "
Order of Glory as a source of trouble
It was possible to please in the penal battalion for a variety of reasons. The captain-pilot crashed two young pilots from the replenishment - in the penal battalion. The intendant has a shortage - there too. Many released officers passed through the penal battalion. A drunken brawl or unjustified use of weapons ended up the same. Once the commander of the penal company got into the penal battalion. After the battle and heavy losses, the company received food and vodka for the already "dead souls". After that, a booze was organized, which was attended by officials from military prosecutor's office... That did not stop them from sending the company commander to the penal battalion for theft. Once a major engineer, convicted of sexual blackmail, got into the penal battalion. He harassed female servicemen, frightening them by sending them to a penal company. In fact, women were not sent to penal units to serve their sentences. As a result, the major himself had to become a penalty box. He was very unpopular among his comrades and because of the perfect, and because of cowardice. He periodically had to be saved from lynching. But cowardice in the penal battalion was extremely rare.
The overwhelming majority of the "variable composition" hoped to honestly earn the return of the lost titles and orders. The reason for this was injury or special differences in battle. It was even possible to receive a new award - most often the Medal For Courage.
But the Order of Glory, actually very respected, the three degrees of which are equated to the Golden Star of the Hero, the command could use as an unpleasant mark for an already released penal battalion. The colonel "washed away the guilt with blood" receives his old shoulder straps, but at the same time wears the Order of Glory intended for soldiers and sergeants on his chest. It immediately became clear - he was in the penal battalion. But over the years and the change of generations in our country, the difference between the officers' penal battalions and "raznochinsky" penal services began to be forgotten. Perhaps, at least by the 60th anniversary of the Victory, it is worth restoring the historical truth?
Based on materials from the Tribune
To begin with, a small educational program, what is a penal battalion and the history of this phenomenon. Penalty units are special military formations in the army, where, during a war or hostilities, guilty servicemen who have committed a variety of crimes are sent as a kind of punishment. For the first time in Russia, penalty formations appeared in September 1917, however, due to the complete collapse in the state and the collapse of the army, these units did not take part in the battles and were subsequently disbanded. Penal battalions in the Red Army appeared on the basis of Stalin's order No. 227 of July 28, 1942. Formally, these formations in the USSR existed from September 1942 to May 1945.
Myth 1. "Penalty units in the Red Army were numerous, half of the Red Army soldiers fought in penal battalions."
Let us turn to the dry statistics of the number of penalties in the USSR. According to archival statistical documents, the number (rounded off) of penalties in the Red Army: 1942. - 25 tons 1943 - 178 t. 1944. - 143 t. 1945 - 81 tons. Total - 428 tons. Thus, a total of 428 thousand people visited the penal units during the Great Patriotic War. Considering that during the Great Patriotic War, the ranks of the armed forces Soviet Union passed 34 million people, the proportion of soldiers and officers who were penalties is not more than 1.25%. Based on the above statistical data, it becomes clear that the number of penal battalions is greatly exaggerated and the influence of penal units on the general situation is at least not decisive.
Myth 2. "Penal units were formed only from prisoners and criminals of the USSR."
This myth breaks down the actual text of Order No. 227 itself. “... To form within the front from one to three (depending on the situation) penal battalions (800 people each), where to send middle and senior commanders and relevant political workers of all branches of the military, guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, and put them on more difficult sectors of the front, to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against the Motherland with blood. " For rank-and-file soldiers and junior commanders guilty of similar violations, from 5 to 10 penal companies were created within the army (from 150 to 200 people in each). Thus, it is worth distinguishing between a penal company and a battalion, these are fundamentally different combat units.
Penal battalions were formed from officers who were guilty before the socialist fatherland, and not criminals who were specially assembled into a separate battalion so that they were "killed by the Germans." Of course, not only servicemen could get into the penal units, persons convicted by the organs of the Soviet Union were also sent, but the courts and military tribunals were forbidden to send convicted persons as punishment to the penal units of persons who were involved in counter-revolutionary activities, as well as persons convicted of robbery, robbery, repeated theft and all persons who had a previous conviction for the above crimes, as well as those who have deserted from the Red Army more than once. In other cases, in order to send a person to serve in the penal units, the identity of the convicted person, the details of the crime and other details of the case were taken into account. Not everyone and not everyone had a chance to atone for their crime with blood before the Motherland.
Myth 3. "The penal battalions were not capable of fighting."
However, on the contrary, penalty battalions were distinguished by serious combat effectiveness and placed these units on the most dangerous and difficult sectors of the front. Penal battalions did not need to be forcibly raised into battle, the desire to return the officer's shoulder straps and rehabilitate themselves before the Motherland was extremely great.
According to the memoirs of Alexander Pyltsin (Russian and Soviet writer, participant of the Great Patriotic War, historian. He was twice awarded the Order of the Red Star, the Order of the Patriotic War II degree, the Order of the Red Banner and the Medal "For Courage"): “Our units were urgently deployed to the most dangerous direction, reinforcing the battle formations of the regiment. Mingling with his soldiers, we noticed that there was some kind of animation in their ranks. After all, they understood that next to them in the role of ordinary fighters were recent officers in various ranks and they would go into the attack together. And it was as if some fresh, irresistible force had poured into them. "
During the offensive on Berlin, the penalties were ordered to be the first to cross the Oder and create a foothold for the rifle division. Before the battle, they reasoned like this: “At least some of the more than a hundred penalties of the company, but they will swim, and if they do, they still did not have impossible tasks. And let the small bridgehead be captured, but they will hold it to the last. The penalty box will not have a way back, ”Pyltsin recalled.
Myth 4. "The soldiers did not spare the penalties and were sent to the slaughter."
Usually this myth goes next to the text from Stalin's order No. 227 "... to put them on more difficult sectors of the front in order to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against the Motherland with blood." However, for some reason they forget to bring special points from the "Regulations on penal battalions of the active army", which states: "Clause 15. For military distinction, the penalty box may be released ahead of schedule on the recommendation of the command of the penal battalion, approved by the military council of the front. For a particularly outstanding military distinction, the penalty box, in addition, is presented for a government award. " Based on this, it becomes clear that the main thing for exemption from punishment by the penal battalion is not death and "shedding blood", but military merit.
Of course, the penal units lost more soldiers than the usual garrisons of the Red Army, but do not forget that they were sent to the "most difficult sectors of the front", while the penal units showed their combat effectiveness. For example, according to the results of the Rogachev-Zhlobin operation in February 1944, when the Eighth Penal Battalion acted behind enemy lines in full force, out of just over 800 penalties, about 600 were transferred to ordinary units of the Red Army, without "bloodshed", namely military services to the Motherland. Rare combat mission executed by penalties, remained without the attention of the command and rewarding of the soldiers. The command was interested in serving the punishment of the Red Army soldiers in penal units and in fulfilling the order, and not in their senseless death at the front. At one time, K.K. Rokossovsky, well characterized the words "redeem with blood" as nothing more than an emotional expression designed to exacerbate the sense of duty and responsibility in the war for one's guilt.
Myth 5. "Penalties went into battle without weapons."
In fact, the penal battalions had weapons no worse than in ordinary units of the Red Army, and in some places even better, this was due to the fact that these units were sent, as a rule, only to the "most difficult sectors of the front." From the memoirs of A.V. Pyltsyna: “I would like to draw the reader's attention to the fact that our battalion was constantly replenished with new weapons in sufficient quantities. We already had new PPSh assault rifles instead of PPD, which were not yet widely used in the troops. We also received new anti-tank rifles PTRS (i.e. Simonovskie) with a five-round magazine. In general, we have never experienced a shortage of weapons.
I am talking about this because often in post-war publications it was asserted that penalty boxers were driven into battle without weapons or were given one rifle for 5-6 people, and everyone who wanted to arm themselves wished the soonest death of the person who got the weapon. In army penal companies, when their number sometimes exceeded a thousand people, as I was told many years after the war, officer Mikhailov Vladimir Grigorievich (unfortunately, now already deceased), who then commanded such a company, there were cases when they simply did not have time to bring the required number weapons and then, if there was no time left for additional equipment before the urgently posed combat mission, some were given rifles, and others - bayonets from them. I testify: this did not in any way apply to the officers' penal battalions. There were always enough weapons, including the most modern, ”.
Thus, approaching the issue of penal units, in no case can we talk about the uselessness of such units and even more so to deny the heroism of the soldiers who fought for the freedom and independence of the socialist Fatherland just like other parts of the Red Army. At the same time, in no case can we say that everything was kept on the penal units, that there were penal units all around and that they were used as “cannon fodder”. This is a real blasphemy towards people who have gone through the penal units of the USSR.
TsAMO RF. Card file of the Military Medical Museum for the registration of hospitals.
Pyltsyn A. V. “Penalty battalion in battle. From Stalingrad to Berlin without detachments. "
Pyltsyn A. V. "Pages of the history of the 8th penal battalion of the First Belorussian Front".
In the periodicals and published literature there are a number of myths and legends about the penal units of the Red Army: “the penal units turned into a kind of military prison”; for them in Soviet army reconnaissance by force was invented; the penalty boxers cleared minefields with their bodies; penal battalions "were thrown into attacks on the most impregnable sectors of the German defense"; penalty boxers were "cannon fodder", with their "lives they achieved victory in the most difficult period of the Great Patriotic War"; no criminals were sent to penal units; it was not at all necessary to supply the penal battalions with ammunition and provisions; behind the penal battalions were detachments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) with machine guns, etc.
In the published material, on a documentary basis, the process of creation and combat use of penal battalions and companies and barrage detachments is revealed. They were first created in the Red Army during the Civil War. The experience of their creation was used during the Great Patriotic War. The formation of penal battalions and companies and barrage detachments was initiated by Order No. 227 of the USSR People's Commissar for Defense (NKO) I.V. Stalin of July 28, 1942. What caused the appearance of this document, christened with the order "Not a step back!"
Formation of penal battalions and companies
During the successful counterattack of the Red Army near Moscow and its subsequent general offensive, the enemy was thrown back to the west by 150-400 km, the threat to Moscow and the North Caucasus was eliminated, the position of Leningrad was alleviated, the territories of 10 regions of the Soviet Union were liberated in whole or in part. The Wehrmacht, having suffered a major defeat, was forced to go over to strategic defense on the entire Soviet-German front. However, many operations of the Red Army remained incomplete due to the overestimation of the headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) of the capabilities of its troops and underestimation of the enemy's forces, the scattering of reserves, and the inability to create decisive superiority in the most important sectors of the front. This was taken advantage of by the enemy, who again seized the initiative in the summer-autumn campaign of 1942.
The miscalculations made by the Supreme Command Headquarters and the command of a number of fronts in assessing the situation led to new defeats soviet troops in the Crimea, near Kharkov, southeast of Leningrad and allowed the enemy to launch a major offensive in the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. The enemy advanced to a depth of 500-650 km, broke through to the Volga and the Main Caucasian ridge, and cut communications connecting the central regions with the south of the country.
During the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces were: irrecoverable - 2,064.1 thousand people, sanitary - 2258.5 thousand; tanks - 10, 3 thousand units, guns and mortars - about 40 thousand, aircraft - more than 7 thousand units. But, despite heavy defeats, the Red Army withstood a powerful blow and, in the end, stopped the enemy.
I.V. Stalin, taking into account the current situation, on July 28, 1942, as People's Commissar of Defense, signed order No. 227. The order read:
“The enemy is throwing more and more forces to the front and, disregarding great losses for him, he crawls forward, rushes into the depths of the Soviet Union, seizes new regions, devastates and ravages our cities and villages, rapes, plunders and kills the Soviet population. The battles are taking place in the Voronezh region, on the Don, in the south and at the gates of the North Caucasus. The German invaders are striving for Stalingrad, for the Volga and want to seize the Kuban and the North Caucasus with their oil and grain resources at any cost. The enemy has already captured Voroshilovgrad, Starobelsk, Rossosh, Kupyansk, Valuyki, Novocherkassk, Rostov-on-Don, half of Voronezh. Parts of the troops of the Southern Front, following the alarmists, left Rostov and Novocherkassk without serious resistance and without an order from Moscow, covering their banners with shame.
The population of our country, who treats the Red Army with love and respect, begins to be disappointed in it, loses faith in the Red Army. And many curse the Red Army for giving our people under the yoke of the German oppressors, while it itself flees to the east.
Some stupid people at the front console themselves by talking about how we can continue to retreat to the east, since we have a lot of land, a lot of population, and that we will always have plenty of grain. By this they want to justify their shameful behavior at the front.
But such conversations are thoroughly false and deceitful, beneficial only to our enemies.
Every commander, Red Army soldier and political worker must understand that our means are not unlimited. The territory of the Soviet state is not a desert, but people - workers, peasants, intellectuals, our fathers, mothers, wives, brothers, children. The territory of the USSR, which the enemy has seized and is striving to seize, is bread and other products for the army and rear, metal and fuel for industry, factories, factories supplying the army with weapons and ammunition, railways... After the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States, Donbass and other regions, we have much less territory, therefore, it has become much less people, bread, metal, factories, factories. We have lost more than 70 million people, more than 800 million poods of grain per year and more than 10 million tons of metal per year. We no longer have a predominance over the Germans either in human reserves or in grain reserves. To retreat further means to ruin oneself and at the same time ruin our Motherland. Each new piece of territory we have left will strengthen the enemy in every way and weaken our defense and our Motherland in every possible way.
Therefore, it is necessary to radically suppress conversations that we have the opportunity to retreat endlessly, that we have a lot of territory, our country is large and rich, there is a lot of population, and there will always be an abundance of bread. Such conversations are deceitful and harmful, they weaken us and strengthen the enemy, because if we do not stop retreating, we will be left without bread, without fuel, without metal, without raw materials, without factories and plants, without railways.
It follows from this that it is time to end the retreat.
No step back! This should now be our main appeal.
We must stubbornly, to the last drop of blood, defend every position, every meter of Soviet territory, cling to every piece of Soviet land and defend it to the last possible extent.
Our Motherland is going through difficult days. We must stop, then push back and defeat the enemy, no matter what it takes. The Germans are not as strong as the alarmists think. They exert their last strength. To withstand their blow now, in the next few months, means to ensure our victory.
Can we withstand the blow, and then push the enemy westward? Yes, we can, because our factories and factories in the rear are now working perfectly, and our front is receiving more and more aircraft, tanks, artillery and mortars.
What are we missing?
There is a lack of order and discipline in companies, battalions, regiments, divisions, in tank units, in air squadrons. This is now our main drawback. We must establish the strictest order and iron discipline in our army if we want to save the situation and defend the Motherland.
It is impossible to tolerate further commanders, commissars, political workers, whose units and formations willfully leave their combat positions. It cannot be tolerated further when commanders, commissars, political workers allow several alarmists to determine the situation on the battlefield, so that they can drag other soldiers into retreat and open the front to the enemy.
Alarmists and cowards should be exterminated on the spot.
From now on, an iron law for every commander, Red Army soldier, political worker should be a requirement - not a step back without an order from the high command.
The commanders of a company, battalion, regiment, division, the corresponding commissars and political workers who retreat from a combat position without an order from above are traitors to the Motherland. Such commanders and political workers should be treated like traitors to the Motherland.
This is the call of our Motherland.
To carry out this order means to defend our land, save the Motherland, destroy and defeat the hated enemy.
After their winter retreat under the pressure of the Red Army, when discipline in the German troops was loosened, the Germans took some harsh measures to restore discipline, which led to good results. They formed more than 100 penal companies from soldiers who were guilty of violating discipline through cowardice or instability, put them on dangerous sectors of the front and ordered them to atone for their sins with blood. They formed, further, about a dozen penal battalions from commanders who were guilty of violating discipline through cowardice or instability, deprived them of their orders, placed them on even more dangerous sectors of the front and ordered them to atone for their sins. They formed at last special squads barriers, put them behind unstable divisions and ordered them to shoot on the spot alarmists in case of an attempt to unauthorized abandonment of positions and in case of an attempt to surrender. As you know, these measures have had their effect, and now the German troops are fighting better than they fought in the winter. And so it turns out that the German troops have good discipline, although they do not have a lofty goal of defending their homeland, but there is only one predatory goal - to conquer a foreign country, and our troops, having an exalted goal of defending their abused homeland, do not have such discipline and endure in view of this defeat.
Shouldn't we learn from our enemies in this matter, as our ancestors learned from enemies in the past and then gained victory over them?
I think it should.
The Supreme High Command of the Red Army orders:
1. The military councils of the fronts and, above all, the commanders of the fronts:
A) unconditionally eliminate the retreating sentiments in the troops and with an iron hand suppress the propaganda that we can and should allegedly retreat further to the east, that there will be no harm from such a retreat;
B) unconditionally remove from their posts and send them to Headquarters to bring to court-martial the commanders of the armies who allowed the unauthorized withdrawal of troops from their positions without an order from the front command;
C) to form within the front from one to three (depending on the situation) penal battalions (800 people each), where to send middle and senior commanders and relevant political workers of all branches of the army, guilty of violating discipline through cowardice or instability, and put them on more difficult sectors of the front to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against the Motherland.
2. Military councils of armies and, above all, commanders of armies:
A) unconditionally remove from their posts the commanders and commissars of corps and divisions who allowed the unauthorized withdrawal of troops from their positions without an order from the army command, and send them to the military council of the front to be brought to court-martial;
B) to form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (up to 200 people in each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them in case of panic and indiscriminate withdrawal of divisional units to shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot and thus help honest fighters divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland;
C) form within the army from five to ten (depending on the situation) penal companies (from 150 to 200 people in each), where to send ordinary soldiers and junior commanders, guilty of violating discipline through cowardice or instability, and put them in difficult areas army to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against the Motherland with blood.
3. Commanders and commissars of corps and divisions:
A) unconditionally remove from their posts the commanders and commissars of regiments and battalions who allowed the unauthorized withdrawal of units without the order of the corps or division commander, take orders and medals from them and send them to the military councils of the front to be brought to court-martial;
B) provide all kinds of assistance and support to the barrage detachments of the army in strengthening order and discipline in the units.
Read the order in all companies, squadrons, batteries, squadrons, teams, headquarters. "
In order no. 227, there is no mention of the experience gained in the Civil War, but a reference is made to the experience of the enemy, who practiced the use of penalty battalions. The enemy's experience undoubtedly needed to be studied and creatively applied in practice. But the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin, who during the Civil War was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the Revolutionary Military Council of a number of fronts, had an idea of \u200b\u200bthe creation of such formations in the Red Army.
Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, evaluating order No. 227, writes in his book The Work of All Life: “This order immediately attracted the attention of all personnel of the Armed Forces. I witnessed how soldiers in units and subunits listened to him, officers and generals studied him. Order No. 227 is one of the most powerful documents of the war years in terms of the depth of its patriotic content, the degree of emotional tension ... I, like many other generals, saw some harshness and categorical assessments of the order, but they were justified by a very harsh and alarming time. In the order, we were primarily attracted by its social and moral content. He attracted attention by the severity of the truth, the impartial conversation between the People's Commissar and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin with Soviet soldiers, from an ordinary soldier to an army commander. Reading it, each of us thought about whether we give all our strength to the struggle. We realized that the cruelty and categorical demands of the order came on behalf of the Motherland, the people, and it was important not what punishment measures would be introduced, although this was important, but that it raised the consciousness of the soldiers' responsibility for the fate of their socialist Fatherland. And the disciplinary measures that were introduced by the order have already ceased to be an indispensable, urgent necessity even before the Soviet troops went over to the counteroffensive at Stalingrad and the encirclement of the Nazi group on the banks of the Volga.
Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov noted in his "Memoirs and Reflections": "In some places in the troops panic moods and violations of military discipline reappeared. In an effort to stop the decline in the morale of the troops, I.V. Stalin issued Order No. 227 on July 28, 1942. This order introduced tough measures to combat alarmists and violators of discipline, and strongly condemned "retreat" sentiments. It said that the requirement "Not a step back!" Should be an iron law for the troops in action. The order was backed up by intensive party political work in the troops. "
During the Great Patriotic War, the attitude towards Order No. 227 was ambiguous, as evidenced by the documents of that time. So, in a special message from the head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front, senior major of state security N.N. Selivanovsky, sent on August 8, 1942 to the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR to the Commissioner state security 3 ranks V.S. Abakumov, it was emphasized: “Among the command staff, the order is correctly understood and evaluated. However, amid the general upsurge and correct assessment of the order, a number of negative, anti-Soviet defeatist sentiments are recorded, which are manifested among some unstable commanders ... ". Similar facts were cited in the report of the head of the political department of the Volkhov front, brigade commissar K. Kalashnikov, dated August 6, 1942, to the head of the Main Political Department of the Red Army.
After the publication of order No. 227, measures were taken to bring it to the attention of the personnel, to form and determine the procedure for the use of penal and barrage units and units. On July 29, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) A.S. Shcherbakov demanded that the chiefs of the political departments of the fronts and districts and the chiefs of the political departments of the armies "personally ensure that the order of the People's Commissar was immediately communicated to the units and subunits, read and explained to the entire personnel of the Red Army." In turn, the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet N.G. Kuznetsov, in directive No. 360 / sh of July 30, ordered the commanders of fleets and flotillas to accept order No. 227 "for execution and leadership." July 31, People's Commissar of Justice N.M. Rychkov and the USSR Prosecutor K.P. Gorshenin signed Directive No. 1096, which ordered military prosecutors and chairmen of the tribunals to take "decisive measures to provide the command and political agencies with real assistance to fulfill the tasks set in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense."
Even before the publication of Order No. 227, the first penal company was created in the 42nd Army of the Leningrad Front on July 25, 1942. On July 28, the day of the signing of Order No. 227, 5 separate penal companies were created in the active army, on July 29 - 3 separate penal battalions and 24 separate penal companies, on July 30 - 2 separate penal battalions and 29 separate penal companies, and on July 31 - 19 separate penal companies. The Baltic and Baltic companies had their own penal companies and platoons. Black sea fleets, Volga and Dnieper military flotillas.
Who formed penal battalions and companies
August 10 I.V. Stalin and General A.M. Vasilevsky signed a directive № 156595, which demanded that the personnel found in sabotage or sabotage be sent to penal tank companies, as well as to send “hopeless, malicious selfish tankers” to the penal infantry companies. Penalty companies were created, in particular, in the 3rd, 4th and 5th tank armies.
On August 15, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army A.S. Shcherbakov signs Directive No. 09 "On political work to fulfill the order of the NCO No. 227 of July 28, 1942". On August 26, People's Commissar of Justice N.M. Rychkov issued an order "On the tasks of the military tribunals to enforce the order of the NKO of the USSR No. 227 of July 28, 1942". The registration procedure for servicemen sent to penal battalions and companies was determined in directive No. 989242 General Staff Red Army on 28 August.
September 9, 1942 People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin signed Order No. 0685, which demanded "fighter pilots who evade combat with an air enemy to be brought to trial and transferred to the infantry's penal units." The pilots were sent not only to the penal infantry units. In accordance with the regulation developed in the same month at the headquarters of the 8th Air Army, it was envisaged to create penalty squadrons of three types: fighter squadrons on Yak-1 and LaGG-3 aircraft, assault on Il-2, light bomber on U-2.
September 10, 1942 Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Major General of Artillery V.V. Aborenkov issued an order, according to which it was ordered to immediately send to the penalty rifle battalions "Guilty of a negligent attitude to the military equipment entrusted to them" from the 58th Guards Mortar Regiment.
On September 26, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov approved the provisions "On penal battalions of the active army" and "On penal companies of the active army." Soon, on September 28, signed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Army Commissioner 1st Rank E.A. Shchadenko issued order number 298, which announced for the leadership:
"1. Regulations on penal battalions of the active army.
2. Regulations on penal companies of the active army.
3. Staff No. 04/393 of a separate penal battalion of the active army.
4. Staff No. 04/392 of a separate penal company of the active army ... ".
Despite the fact that the staffs of penal battalions and companies were clearly defined by the relevant provisions, their organizational and staff structure was different.
Order No. 323 of October 16, 1942, signed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Army Commissar of the 1st rank E.A. Shchadenko, the provisions of Order No. 227 were extended to military districts. Direction to the penal units in accordance with the order No. 0882 of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense E.A. Shchadenko of November 12 were subject to both military servicemen and military personnel who feign illness and the so-called "self-injuring". By order No. org / 2/78950 of the Main Organizational and Staff Directorate of the Main Directorate of the Red Army dated November 25, a single numbering of penal battalions was established.
December 4, 1942 Deputy People's Commissar of Defense A.S. Shcherbakov signs order No. 0931, according to which, for “a soullessly bureaucratic attitude to the material and everyday needs of political workers who are in the reserve of GlavPURKKA at the Military-Political School named after. M.V. Frunze ”were removed from their posts and sent to the active army in the penal battalion, the assistant to the head of the school for material and technical support, Major Kopotienko, and the head of the transport and clothing supplies of the school, senior lieutenant of the quartermaster service Govtvyanits.
According to order No. 47 of January 30, 1943, signed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Colonel-General E.A. Shchadenko, a junior lieutenant of 1082 was sent to the penal battalion for a period of 3 months, with demotion to the rank and file infantry regiment Karamalkin "for criticism, an attempt to slander his superiors and the disintegration of discipline in his unit."
According to Directive No. 97 of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commissar of the 1st Rank E.A. Shadenko of March 10, 1943 was required "after a quick check, to immediately send to the penal units" former servicemen who "at one time surrendered to the enemy without resistance or deserted from the Red Army and remained in the territory temporarily occupied by the Germans, or, being surrounded in their place of residence, they stayed at home, not trying to go out with the units of the Red Army. "
By order No. 0374 of the People's Commissar of Defense of May 31, 1943, it was ordered by the decision of the Military Council of the Kalinin Front to send to penal battalions and companies "those in command who are guilty of interruptions in the supply of food to soldiers or shortage of food to the soldiers." The employees of the Special Departments did not escape the fate of the penalty boxers. On May 31, People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin, based on the results of checking the work of the Special Department of the 7th Separate Army, issued order No. 0089, by which investigators Sedogin, Izotov, Soloviev were dismissed from the counterintelligence bodies and sent to a penal battalion "for criminal errors in investigative work".
Order No. 413 of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin dated August 21, 1943, the commanding staff of military districts and inactive fronts were given the right to send servicemen to penal formations without trial “for unauthorized absence, desertion, failure to comply with orders, squandering and theft of military property, violation of the statutory rules of guard duty and other military crimes in cases where the usual disciplinary measures for these offenses are insufficient, as well as all detained sergeant and rank-and-file deserters who have fled from units of the active army and from other garrisons.
Not only men, but also women were sent to the penal formations. However, experience has shown that it is inappropriate to send female military personnel who have committed minor crimes to the penalty boxes. Therefore, on September 19, 1943, the General Staff directive No. 1484/2 / org was sent to the chiefs of staff of the fronts, military districts and individual armies, which demanded not to send women servicemen convicted of crimes to the penal units.
In accordance with the joint directive of the NKVD / NKGB of the USSR No. 494/94 of November 11, 1943, Soviet citizens who collaborated with the invaders were also sent to penal units.
In order to streamline the practice of transferring convicts to the active army, on January 26, 1944, order No. 004/0073/006/23 was issued, signed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria, People's Commissar of Justice N.M. Rychkov and the Prosecutor of the USSR K.P. Gorshenin.
By order No. 0112 of the First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal G.K. Zhukov dated April 29, 1944, the commander of the 342nd Guards Rifle Regiment of the 121st Guards Rifle Division, Lieutenant Colonel F.A. was sent to the penal battalion for a period of two months. Yachmenev "for non-observance of the order of the Military Council of the army, for leaving the enemy advantageous positions and failure to take measures to restore the situation, for displayed cowardice, false reports and refusal to fulfill the assigned combat mission."
Persons who admitted carelessness and lack of control were also sent to the penal units, as a result of which servicemen died in the rear, for example, according to the order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin, signed in May 1944.
Practice has shown that in the implementation of this order, significant violations were committed, the elimination of which was directed by order No. 0244, signed on August 6, 1944 by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky. Approximately the same order No. 0935, concerning the officers of the fleets and flotillas, was signed on December 28, 1944 by the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet N.G. Kuznetsov.
Military units were also transferred to the category of penalties. On November 23, 1944, the People's Commissar for Defense Stalin signed order No. 0380 on the transfer of the 214th Cavalry Regiment of the 63rd Cavalry Korsun Red Banner Division (the commander of the Guards Regiment Lieutenant Colonel Danilevich) to the category of penalties for the loss of the Battle Banner.
The formation of penal battalions and companies was not always carried out successfully, as required by the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff. In this regard, the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. On March 24, 1943, Zhukov sent the front commander directive No. GUF / 1902, which required:
"1. Reduce the number of penal companies in armies. Collect penalty boxers in consolidated companies and, thus, keep them in a set, preventing aimless finding in the rear and using them in the most difficult sectors of hostilities.
2. In the event of a significant shortage in penal battalions, bring them into battle in small numbers, without waiting for the arrival of new penalties from the command personnel in order to cover the shortage of the entire battalion. "
In the provisions on penal battalions and companies, it was noted that the permanent composition (commanders, military commissars, political instructors, etc.) were appointed to the post by order of the front and army troops from among the strong-willed and most distinguished commanders and political workers in battles. This requirement, as a rule, was fulfilled in the active army. But there were also exceptions to this rule. For example, in the 16th Separate Penalty Battalion, platoon commanders were often appointed from among the penalties who had atoned for their guilt. According to the provisions on penal battalions and companies for all permanent personnel, the terms of service in ranks, in comparison with the command, political and command personnel of combat units of the active army, were reduced by half, and each month of service in penal units was counted when assigning a pension for six months. But this, according to the recollections of the commanders of penal units, was not always carried out.
The variable composition of penal battalions and companies consisted of military personnel and civilians sent to these formations for various misdeeds and crimes. According to our calculations, made on the basis of orders and directives of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense, the People's Commissar of the Navy, the Deputy People's Commissars of Defense, the People's Commissars of the Interior of State Security, about 30 categories of such persons have been identified.
So, in the orders and directives of the People's Commissar of Defense and his deputies, the types of offenses for which servicemen and other persons could be sent to penal units, as well as the circle of persons who had the right to send the guilty and convicted to penal units, were clearly defined. In the fronts and armies, orders were also issued regarding the procedure for the formation of penal units and subunits. Thus, by order No. 00182 of the commander of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant-General of Artillery L.A. Govorov of July 31, 1942, the persons of the command and political personnel of the 85th Infantry Division, who were "the main culprits in the failure to fulfill the combat mission" were sent to the front penal battalion, and the "junior command and rank personnel who showed cowardice on the battlefield" were sent to army penal company. On May 6, 1943, directive No. 005 was issued by the front commander, Colonel-General I.I. Maslennikova, who demanded that servicemen who showed cowardice on the battlefield be sent to a penal battalion or brought to trial by a military tribunal.
The published literature and memoirs of front-line soldiers contain information that the commanders and chiefs did not always adhere to the rules established in orders and directives. This, as the study showed, applied to about 10 categories of penalties:
1. Condemned unjustly, who were slandered and slandered in order to settle scores with them.
2. The so-called "encircled people" who managed to escape from the "cauldrons" and go to their troops, as well as those who fought as part of partisan detachments.
3. Servicemen who have lost their military and secret documents.
4. Commanders and chiefs guilty of "the criminally careless organization of the military security and intelligence service."
5. Persons who, because of their beliefs, refuse to take up arms.
6. Persons who aided "enemy propaganda".
7. Servicemen convicted of rape.
8. Civilian prisoners (thieves, bandits, repeat offenders, etc.).
9. Scammers.
10. Employees of defense enterprises who have committed negligence.
The published literature provides various information about equipping penal battalions and companies with weapons and military equipment. Some authors write that the penalty boxers were armed only with small arms and grenades, being "light" rifle units. " Other publications provide information on the presence of captured automatic weapons and mortars in the penal units. To carry out specific tasks, artillery, mortar and even tank subunits were temporarily assigned to the subordination of the commander of the penalties unit.
The penalty boxes were provided with clothing and food supplies in accordance with the standards established in the army. But, in a number of cases, according to the recollections of the front-line soldiers, there were violations in this matter. In some publications, for example I.P. Gorin and V.I. Golubev, it is said that there was no normal relationship between the permanent and variable composition in the penalty divisions. However, most of the front-line soldiers testify to the opposite: in penal battalions and companies, statutory relationships and strong discipline were maintained. This was facilitated by well-organized political and educational work, which was carried out on the same grounds as in other units of the army.
Penal formations, recruited mainly from the number of servicemen of various military specialties, underwent additional training, if there was time, so that they were able to solve the tasks assigned to them.
According to the work "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century: A statistical study", by the end of 1942 in the Red Army there were 24,993 penalty boxes. In 1943, their number increased to 177,694 people, in 1944 - decreased to 143,457, and in 1945 - to 81,766 people. All in all, during the Great Patriotic War, 427,910 people were sent to penal companies and battalions. Judging by the information included in the List No. 33 rifle units and subunits ( individual battalions, companies, detachments) of the active army, drawn up by the General Staff in the early 60s of the XX century, then during the Great Patriotic War 65 separate penal battalions and 1,028 separate penal companies were formed; 1093 penalty parts in total. However, A. Moroz, who studied the funds of penal units stored in the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, believes that during the war, 38 separate penal battalions and 516 separate penal companies were formed.
The work "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century: A statistical study" states: "Penal units of the Red Army existed legally from September 1942 to May 1945". In fact, they existed from July 25, 1942 to October 1945. For example, the 128th separate penal company of the 5th Army participated in the Harbin-Girin offensive operation, which was carried out from August 9 to September 2, 1945. The company was disbanded on the basis of directive No. 0238 of the headquarters of the 5th army of October 28, 1945
Penal battalions and companies were used in the most dangerous areas
As noted, there is much speculation about how penal battalions and companies were used. Moreover, the most common is the myth that they served as a kind of "cannon fodder". This is not true. Penal companies and battalions during the Great Patriotic War solved practically the same tasks as rifle units and subunits. At the same time, they, as prescribed by Order No. 227, were used in the most dangerous directions. Most often they were used to break through enemy defenses, capture and hold important settlements and bridgeheads, and conduct reconnaissance in force. During the offensive, the penal units had to overcome various types of natural and artificial obstacles, including mined areas of the terrain. As a result, survivability acquired the myth that they "cleared minefields" with their bodies. In this regard, we note that not only penal, but also rifle and tank units have repeatedly acted in areas where there were minefields.
Penalty units, in general, acted bravely and bravely in defense. They took part in forcing water obstacles, capturing and holding bridgeheads, in hostilities behind enemy lines.
Due to the fact that penalty formations were used in the most difficult sectors of the fronts and armies, they, according to the authors of the work "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century: A Statistical Study", suffered heavy losses. In 1944 alone, the total loss of personnel (killed, dead, wounded and sick) of all penal units amounted to 170,298 permanent personnel and penalties. Average monthly losses of permanent and variable composition reached 14 191 people, or 52% of their average monthly number (27 326 people). This was 3-6 times more than the average monthly casualties of personnel in conventional troops in the same offensive operations 1944 g.
In most cases, the penalties were released within the terms established by orders of the People's Commissar of Defense and his deputies. But there were exceptions, which were due to the attitude of the command and military councils of fronts and armies to penal units. For courage and heroism shown in battles, penalty boxers were awarded orders and medals, and some of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Defensive detachments of the Red Army
In the first days of the Great Patriotic War, the leaders of a number of party organizations, commanders of fronts and armies took measures to restore order in the troops retreating under enemy pressure. Among them - the creation of special units that performed the functions of barrage detachments. So, on the North-Western Front, already on June 23, 1941, in the formations of the 8th Army, detachments from the withdrawn units of the border detachment were organized to detain those who were leaving the front without permission. In accordance with the decree "On measures to combat enemy parachute landings and saboteurs in the frontline zone" adopted by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on June 24, by the decision of the military councils of fronts and armies, barrage detachments from the NKVD troops were created.
On June 27, the head of the Third Directorate (counterintelligence) of the USSR People's Commissariat for Defense, State Security Major A.N. Mikheev signed Directive No. 35523 on the creation of mobile control and barrage detachments on the roads and railway junctions in order to detain deserters and all suspicious elements that have penetrated the front line.
Commander of the 8th Army, Major General P.P. Sobennikov, operating on the North-Western Front, in his order No. 04 of July 1, demanded that the commanders of the 10th, 11th rifle and 12th mechanized corps and divisions "immediately organize detachments of obstacles to detain those who fled from the front."
Despite the measures taken, there were significant shortcomings in the organization of the barrage service at the fronts. In this regard, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, in his telegram No. 00533 of July 26, on behalf of the Headquarters, demanded that the commanders-in-chief of the directions and the commanders of the front forces "immediately personally figure out how the foreign service was organized and give the chiefs of the rear guard comprehensive instructions." On July 28, directive No. 39212 was issued by the head of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, 3rd Rank State Security Commissar B.C. Abakumov on strengthening the work of the barrage detachments to identify and expose the enemy's agents, which are being thrown across the front line.
In the course of hostilities, a gap formed between the Reserve and Central Fronts, for which the Bryansk Front was created on August 16, 1941 under the command of Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko. In early September, at the direction of Headquarters, his troops launched a flank attack with the aim of defeating the German 2nd Panzer Group, advancing to the south. However, having pinned down very insignificant enemy forces, the Bryansk Front could not prevent the exit of the enemy grouping to the rear of the troops. Southwestern Front... In this regard, General A.I. Eremenko turned to Headquarters with a request to allow the creation of barrage detachments. Directive No. 001650 VGK rates on September 5, such permission was given.
This directive marked the beginning of a new stage in the creation and use of barrage units. If before that they were formed by the organs of the Third Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense, and then by the Special Departments, now the decision of the Headquarters legalized their creation directly by the command of the troops of the active army, so far only on the scale of one front. This practice was soon extended to the entire active army. September 12, 1941 Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin and Chief of the General Staff Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov signed directive number 001919, which ordered each rifle division to have a "defensive detachment of reliable soldiers, no more than a battalion in number (one company per rifle regiment), subordinate to the division commander and having at its disposal, in addition to conventional weapons, vehicles in the form of trucks and several tanks or armored vehicles. " The tasks of the barrage detachment were to provide direct assistance to the command staff in maintaining and establishing firm discipline in the division, in stopping the flight of servicemen obsessed with panic, without stopping before using weapons, in eliminating the initiators of panic and flight, etc.
On September 18, the military council of the Leningrad Front adopted Resolution No. 00274 "On strengthening the fight against desertion and the penetration of enemy elements into the territory of Leningrad", according to which the head of the Front's Front Guard was instructed to organize four barrage detachments "to concentrate and check all servicemen detained without documents ".
October 12, 1941 Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G.I. Kulik sent I.V. A note to Stalin, in which he proposed "to organize along each highway going north, west and south from Moscow, a group of command personnel" to organize the repulsion of enemy tanks, which should be given a "barrage detachment to stop the fleeing." On the same day, the State Defense Committee adopted Resolution No. 765ss on the creation of a Moscow zone security headquarters under the USSR NKVD, to which the troops and regional NKVD organizations, militia, fighter battalions and defensive detachments located in the zone were operatively subordinate.
In May-June 1942, during the hostilities, the Volkhov Group of Forces of the Leningrad Front was surrounded and defeated. As part of the 2nd Shock Army, which was part of this group, obstacle detachments were used to prevent flight from the battlefield. The same detachments operated at that time on the Voronezh front.
On July 28, 1942, as already noted, order No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin, which became a new stage in the creation and use of barrage detachments. September 28, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Army Commissar 1st Rank E.A. Shchadenko signed order No. 298, which declared the state No. 04/391 of a separate barrage detachment of the active army.
Defensive detachments were primarily created on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. At the end of July 1942 I.V. Stalin received a report that the 184th and 192nd Rifle Divisions of the 62nd Army had left the settlement of Mayorovsky, and the troops of the 21st Army had left Kletskaya. On July 31, the commander of the Stalingrad Front V.N. Gordov received directive No. 170542 of the Supreme Command Headquarters, signed by I.V. Stalin and General A.M. Vasilevsky, who demanded: “Within two days, at the expense of the best composition of the Far Eastern divisions that arrived at the front, barrage detachments of up to 200 people each should be formed, which should be placed in the immediate rear and, above all, behind the divisions of the 62nd and 64th armies. Subordinate the defensive detachments to the military councils of the armies through their special departments. To put the most experienced special officers in the field of combat at the head of the barrage detachments. " The next day, General V.N. Gordov signed order number 00162 / op on the creation within two days in the 21st, 55th, 57th, 62nd, 63rd, 65th armies, five barrage detachments, and in the 1st and 4th th tank armies - three barrage. At the same time, it was ordered within two days to restore in each rifle division the barrage battalions formed according to the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 01919. By mid-October 1942, 16 barrage detachments were formed on the Stalingrad front, and 25 on the Donskoy front, subordinated to special departments of the NKVD armies.
October 1, 1942 Chief of the General Staff Colonel-General A.M. Vasilevsky sent directive No. 157338 to the commander of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front, which spoke about the poor organization of the service of the detachments and their use not for their intended purpose, but for conducting hostilities.
During the Stalingrad strategic defensive operation (July 17 - November 18, 1942), barrage detachments and battalions on the Stalingrad, Don, and South-Eastern fronts detained servicemen fleeing the battlefield. From August 1 to October 15, 140,755 people were detained, of whom 3,980 were arrested, 1189 were shot, 185 people were sent to penal companies and penal battalions, and 131,094 people were returned to their units and to transit points.
The commander of the Don Front, Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky, according to the report of the special department of the front to the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR on October 30, 1942, proposed using blocking detachments to influence the infantry of the unsuccessfully advancing 66th Army. Rokossovsky believed that the barrage detachments should have followed the infantry units and by force of arms force the fighters to rise to the attack.
Army detachments and divisional barrage battalions were also used during the counteroffensive at Stalingrad. In a number of cases, they not only stopped those fleeing from the battlefield, but also shot some of them on the spot.
In the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, Soviet soldiers and commanders displayed massive heroism and self-sacrifice. This, however, does not mean that there were no cases of desertion, abandonment of the battlefield and alarmism. To combat these shameful phenomena, barrage formations were widely used.
In the fall of 1943, measures were taken to improve the structure of the barrage detachments. In directive 1486/2 / org of the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, sent on September 18 by the commander of the fronts and the 7th a separate army, it was said:
"1. In order to strengthen the numerical strength of rifle companies, non-standard barrage detachments rifle divisions, formed according to the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 001919 of 1941, to disband.
2. In each army, in accordance with the order of the NKO No. 227 of 28.7.1942, should contain 3-5 full-time barrage detachments according to the state No. 04/391, 200 people each.
Tank armies should not have barrage detachments. "
In 1944, when the Red Army troops were successfully advancing in all directions, barrage detachments were used less and less frequently. At the same time, they were used in full measure in the frontline zone. This was due to the increase in the scale of atrocities, armed robberies, thefts and murders of the civilian population. To combat these phenomena, order No. 0150 of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky dated May 30, 1944
Barrage detachments were often used to solve combat missions. The misuse of barrage detachments was mentioned in the order of the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters G.K. Zhukov dated March 29, 1943, the commander of the 66th and 21st armies. In the memorandum "On the shortcomings of the activity of the detachments of the front troops", sent on August 25, 1944 by the head of the political department of the 3rd Baltic Front, Major General A.A. Lobachev to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Colonel-General A.S. Shcherbakov, it was noted:
"1. The blocking detachments do not fulfill their direct functions established by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense. Most of the personnel of the blocking detachments are used to protect the headquarters of the armies, guard communication lines, roads, combing forests, etc.
2. In a number of detachments, the staffs of the headquarters were extremely swollen ...
3. The headquarters of the armies do not exercise control over the activities of the detachments, left them to themselves, reduced the role of the detachments to the position of ordinary commandant companies ...
4. The lack of control on the part of the headquarters has led to the fact that in most of the detachments military discipline is at a low level, people have dissolved ...
Conclusion: Most of the detachments do not fulfill the tasks defined by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227. The protection of headquarters, roads, communication lines, the performance of various economic works and orders, the maintenance of commanders-chiefs, supervision of internal order in the rear of the army is in no way included in the function of detachments of the front troops.
I consider it necessary to raise the question before the People's Commissar of Defense on the reorganization or disbandment of the barrage detachments, as they have lost their purpose in the present situation. "
However, not only the use of barrage detachments to perform tasks unusual for them was the reason for their disbandment. By the fall of 1944, the situation with military discipline in the active army had also changed. Therefore, I.V. Stalin on October 29, 1944 signed Order No. 0349 with the following content:
“Due to the change in the general situation on the fronts, the need for further maintenance of the barrage detachments has disappeared.
I order:
1. Separate barrage detachments should be disbanded by November 15, 1944. Use the personnel of the disbanded detachments to replenish rifle divisions.
In the work "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century: A statistical study" it is noted: "In connection with the change for the better for the Red Army after 1943, the general situation on the fronts also completely disappeared the need for the further existence of barrage detachments. Therefore, all of them were disbanded by November 20, 1944 (in accordance with the order of the NKO of the USSR No. 0349 of October 29, 1944).
Penalty military units in the USSR
Penalty units existed in the Red Army from July 25, 1942 to June 6, 1945; they were sent to the most difficult sectors of the fronts to give the penalty box the opportunity to “atone for their guilt before the Motherland with blood”; at the same time, large losses in personnel were inevitable.
The very first Penal Company during the Great Patriotic War formed the Army Separate Penal Company of the 42nd Army of the Leningrad Front on July 25, three days before the famous Order No. 227. As part of the 42nd Army, she fought until October 10 and was disbanded. The most recent Penal Company was the 32nd Army Separate Penalty Company of the 1st Shock Army, disbanded on 6 June.
For all the years of the Great Patriotic War, according to some sources, 827 thousand 910 people passed through penal units. Considering that during the entire war, 34,476.7 thousand people passed through the army. , then the share of penalties among them is approximately 4.2%.
For example, in 1944 the total losses of the Red Army (killed, wounded, prisoners of war, sick) - 6,503,204 people; of them 370,298 penalties. In total, in 1944 the Red Army had 11 penal battalions of 226 men each and 243 penal companies of 102 people each. The average monthly number of Army Separate Penal Companies in 1944 on all fronts ranged from 204 to 295. The highest daily number of Army Separate Penal Companies (335 companies) was reached on July 20, 1943.
Basic terminology:
- Penal battalion (penal battalion) battalion.
In the Red Army, officers of all branches of the armed forces went there, guilty of violating discipline out of cowardice or instability. These units were formed by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 227 dated July 28, 1942 within the fronts in numbers from 1 to 3 (depending on the situation). They numbered 800 people each. Regular officers were in command of the penal battalions.
- Penalty company (fines) - Penalty unit in company rank.
In the Red Army, private and non-commissioned officers of all branches of the army went there, guilty of violating discipline out of cowardice or instability. These units were formed according to the Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 227 dated July 28, 1942. within armies in the amount of 5 to 10 (depending on the situation). They numbered 150-200 people. Penalty companies were commanded by regular officers.
- Penalty - the colloquial name of a fighter of a penal military unit.
Penalty military units in foreign armies
- Afrika-Brigade 999
To the cinema
- Gu-ha - feature film of the USSR, 1989 Director Vilen Novak.
- The Dirty Dozen - American film by Robert Aldrich based on the short story by Nathanson E.M. (1967).
- Fines - Russian television series (2004).
see also
Literature
- Daines V.O. Penalty battalions and detachments of the Red Army (Series: The Great Patriotic: The Price of Victory) M .: Eksmo, 2008. - 448 p. ISBN 978-5-699-25316-6
- Pyltsyn A.V. Penalty Kick, or How the Officer's Penal Battalion Reached Berlin. SPb .: Knowledge, IVESEP, 2003 .-- 295 p.
- Pyltsyn A. V. Truth about penal battalions: How the officer penal battalion reached Berlin. Ed. 3rd. (Series: The Great Patriotic War. Unknown War) M .: Eksmo, 2008 .-- 512 p. ISBN 978-5-699-21470-9
- Pykhalov I., Pyltsyn A., Vasilchenko A. Penal battalions on both sides of the front (Series: Military-historical collection) M .: Eksmo, 2007.
- Rubtsov Yu. V. Penalties of the Great Patriotic War. In life and on the screen. (Series: Military secrets of the twentieth century) M .: Veche, 2007. - 432 p. ISBN 978-5-9533-2219-5
- Suknev M. Notes of the commander of the penal battalion. Memories of the battalion commander. 1941-1945 (Series: On the front line. Truth about the war) M .: Tsentrpoligraf, 2006. - 264 p. ISBN 978-5-9524-2746-4
Links
- Penalty, assault and disciplinary units Makar Ivanovich Tonin
- Pyltsyn A.V. Penalty Kick, or How the Officer Penal Battalion Reached Berlin
- Pykhalov I. Penalties: Truth and Fiction
- Yuri Veremeev. Lies and truths about penalty boxes. Excerpts from documents are provided.
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Synonyms:See what "Penalty battalion" is in other dictionaries:
Penalty battalion ... Spelling dictionary-reference
SHTRAFBAT, ah, husband. Reduction: penalty battalion. | adj. shtrafbatovskiy, ah, oe (colloquial). Ozhegov's Explanatory Dictionary. S.I. Ozhegov, N.Yu. Shvedova. 1949 1992 ... Ozhegov's Explanatory Dictionary
Sush., Number of synonyms: 1 battalion (10) ASIS synonym dictionary. V.N. Trishin. 2013 ... Synonym dictionary
penal battalion - ShB penal battalion penal battalion military. ShB Dictionaries: Dictionary of abbreviations and acronyms of the army and special services. Comp. A. A. Shchelokov. M .: OOO Publishing House AST, ZAO Publishing House Geleos ", 2003. 318 p., S. Fadeev. Dictionary of abbreviations of modern Russian ... ... Dictionary of abbreviations and acronyms
M. Penal Battalion. Efremova's explanatory dictionary. T.F. Efremova. 2000 ... Modern dictionary Russian language Efremova
penal battalion - fine, but ... Russian spelling dictionary
penal battalion - (2 m); pl. fineba / you, R. fineba / tov ... Spelling dictionary of the Russian language
penal battalion - penalty / t, and ... Together. Separately. Hyphened.
penal battalion - at, h., rozm. The penalty battalion is a veteran fighter, in which he serves as a veteran service officer, who is disciplined punishingly ... Ukrainian Tlumachny vocabulary