February 15 is the twenty-ninth anniversary of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

MMG PV KGB USSR 68th Red Banner Takhta-Bazar border detachment

This war has already been forgotten, but many Sovietologists believe that the introduction of troops into Afghanistan was a fatal mistake of the Soviet leadership, which led to the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - the largest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century, as the President of Russia called it Vladimir Putin.

Since then, the world has changed beyond recognition: it is gone Soviet Union; some of the former Soviet republics became members of NATO, a military alliance created during the Cold War for armed confrontation with the USSR and the countries of the Eastern bloc; from the former southern republics of the Union, the "soft" ousting of Russian speakers continues; the confrontation for the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh does not stop between Armenia and Azerbaijan; Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan became oriental despots and in their development rolled back into the Middle Ages; The political leaderships of Belarus and Ukraine cultivate nationalism, which has already led to a deterioration in relations between the once fraternal republics and has served to establish a sanctions regime against a number of enterprises and citizens of Russia by the European Union and the United States.

What were the goals of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, who served there, how were our soldiers' everyday life and how did it develop? further destiny We remember the participants in the hostilities with a participant in the hostilities, a veteran of Afghanistan, Sergei Trubin.

Sergey Trubin. 1984 Afghanistan.

Sergey Afanasevich Trubin was born on April 20, 1966 in the city of Kamyshlov, Sverdlovsk Region, in a large family. Childhood was not easy, Sergei was left without a father early. The mother, Trubina Nina Nikolaevna, was engaged in raising three sons. He studied at secondary school No. 1, graduated from SGPTU No. 16 with a degree in assistant driver of a locomotive - electric locomotive.

In 1984 he was called up for military service in Border troops KGB of the USSR. Thanks to his character and playing sports in his youth, he got into the sports company of the garrison. Twice he became the champion of the Far Eastern Military District in sambo. Received the title of Master of Sports in Sambo and Judo. As part of a motorized maneuvering group (MMG), the PV of the KGB of the USSR was sent for further service in the Herat province of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Participated in more than 30 combat exits to escort transport convoys from the USSR. He was wounded twice. Awarded with DRA medals, insignia. After demobilization, he returned to his native Kamyshlov, headed a sports school where he studied sambo, judo, and athletic gymnastics with Kamyshlov's youth. Champion of the Sverdlovsk and Tyumen regions in power all-around. Entrepreneur, currently the founder of Kamyshlovsky Bread LLC.

Married. Father of four daughters.

Reference.

The USSR introduced a military contingent to Afghanistan on December 25, 1979. The reason for this decision was a sharp confrontation within the political leadership of Afghanistan and about 20 requests from the DRA government for the introduction of Soviet troops. In March 1979, an armed insurrection broke out in Herat. On July 3, 1979, US President Jimmy Carter (US President 1977-1981) signed a directive to help opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. Under the supervision of the CIA, the supply of weapons to anti-government armed groups began. On the territory of Pakistan in the Afghan refugee camps, centers for the training of armed groups were deployed. In the country, demonstrations of the Islamic opposition began, riots in the army, in the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the internal party struggle intensified, especially after the events of September 1979, when the leader of the PDPA Nur Mohammad Taraki was arrested and then killed by order of Hafizullah, who removed him from power. Amina.

Under Amin, terror unfolded in the country not only against the Islamists, but also against the PDPA members - supporters of Taraki. The repressions also affected the army, the main support of the PDPA, which caused mass desertions and revolts. The KGB received information about Amin's connections with the CIA in the 1960s and about secret contacts of his emissaries with American officials after the assassination of Taraki. The Soviet leadership feared that a further exacerbation of the situation in Afghanistan would lead to the fall of the PDPA regime and the coming to power of forces hostile to the USSR. As a result, it was decided to prepare the overthrow of Amin and replace him with the leader Babrak Karmal, more loyal to the USSR.

The number of Soviet advisers (including the military) in Afghanistan was dramatically increased: from 409 in January to 4,500 by the end of June 1979. From December 10, on the personal order of the USSR Minister of Defense D.F.Ustinov, the deployment and mobilization of units and formations of the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts was carried out. The 103rd Vitebsk Guards Airborne Division was raised at the signal "Collection". On December 12, 1979, at a meeting of the Politburo, a decision was made to bring in troops. On the evening of December 27, units of the 103rd Airborne Division and the 345th Guards Parachute Regiment blocked and took control of the military units of the Kabul garrison, the TV and radio center, the Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs, Soviet special forces stormed Amin's palace, during the assault, Amin was killed.

During the period from December 25, 1979 to February 15, 1989, about 620 thousand servicemen served in the troops on the territory of Afghanistan. In addition, in the Soviet troops during this period there were 21 thousand civilians in positions of workers and employees. According to official statistics, during the hostilities in Afghanistan, 417 servicemen were taken prisoner and went missing. Some sources estimate irrecoverable losses in the Afghan war (killed, died of wounds, diseases and in accidents, missing) 15,031 people.

They formed columns in Kalayi-Nau and accompanied them to Herat, sometimes went further, to the vicinity of Shindand.

RR: - Sergei, before the service, what did you know about Afghanistan, the events that are taking place there, what did you have to face?

S. T: - My brothers and I grew up ordinary Soviet boys, go to school, sports clubs. Since we did not have a father, we always counted only on ourselves, our strength. Mom, Trubina Nina Nikolaevna, worked as a cook in kindergartenThat is why I left home very early in the morning, worked a lot, did three jobs at the same time, was tired. My brothers and I always tried to help, we did everything around the house ourselves. Before the service I knew practically nothing about Afghanistan, there was little information, only in the program "I Serve the Soviet Union", which we, the boys, watched regularly. But there they only showed how our soldiers build schools, plant trees, only good. In 1982, Oleg, my older brother, was drafted into the Soviet army. Immediately after training, he was sent to serve in Afghanistan, to Kunduz, a settlement near the Soviet-Afghan border. He wrote that everything is fine, serves as a sapper, has awards from the DRA government. We didn't even have time to meet and talk, I was called in 1984, and Oleg just demobilized, came home.

I didn’t think that I would end up in Afghanistan, because families where someone had already taken part in the hostilities were no longer sent to hot spots. Moreover, I ended up in the KGB Border Troops, served in the Far East. But apparently not in my case. Since childhood I have been engaged in sambo, judo, boxing. Immediately after being drafted, he took part in garrison competitions and won. I was enrolled in the sports company. At that time, each garrison had such units, the soldiers of which defended the sporting honor of their military unit. He twice became the champion of the Far Eastern Military District in sambo and judo, received the title of master of sports in these sports. The district command encouraged - granted leave. He left the okrug for his border detachment for paperwork, and there, instead of leave, he was sent to the Turkmen SSR, to Kushka. Now there is no city with that name. In Kushka they were already preparing for a business trip to Afghanistan. The participation of border troops as part of the contingent was not advertised at that time, so we replaced the border guards' uniform with a combined-arms one, received an AKM instead of an AK-74, formed a motorized group and departed on our own to the point of deployment near Kalayi-Nau, Badgis province, and in 1986 relocated to Karezi-Ilyaz , province of Herat. So he served as a foreman in the Motor-Maneuvering Group of the PV of the KGB of the USSR of the 68th Red Banner Takhta-Bazar border detachment from 1984 to 1986.

My mother was very worried about me. At first, in letters home, I wrote that I was serving in Mongolia.

Afghanistan is a completely different culture, a different religion. We were Soviet boys then, religion for us was something of a distant past, pre-revolutionary, we knew nothing about Christianity then, but here radical Islam, their order remained medieval, especially in the villages. Of course it was a shock for us. Women in burqas, illiterate people, dirty children, ragged children. A desert with knee-deep dust untouched for centuries - the car will pass, the dust hangs in the air for several days, mountains, stones, lack of water, daytime heat, night cold. Of course, they were not ready for all this.

RR: - What combatants were in front of your unit?

ST: - We are border guards, and the main task was to protect the border of the Soviet Union, but on the other side of the border. They served at posts located on the tops of mountains and hills in the vicinity of Kaloyi-Nau, conducted combat raids, set up barriers, ambushes. We worked proactively. Thanks to this on southern borders The union was calm. By the way, in the very first year after the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, there were 250 attempts to infiltrate the territory of the USSR by bands of various numbers. The most sensational is the attack on the border post of the Moscow PO. Many children died then and almost all were wounded and shell-shocked. Caravans from Afghanistan with drugs went. Before the withdrawal, we intercepted and destroyed them. In the USSR, no one knew about drugs.

Our mine detection dog - sometimes only she could find Italian plastic mines.

In addition to border posts, the tasks of our MMG included the protection of the Kalayi-Nau-Herat road. Constantly escorted convoys with cargo and water from the Union. We called it “the road of life”. They formed columns in Kalayi-Nau and accompanied them to Herat, sometimes went further, to the vicinity of Shindand. Sappers and cover are going ahead, one armored personnel carrier in front, one in the middle, one closing the column. So they went from several hours to several days. Then they returned to the point, rested for a day or two, and again accompanied. Our mine detection dog was very helpful - sometimes only she could find Italian plastic mines. The mine detectors did not hear them, you cannot always reach them with a probe, the spirits bury them deeply, 50 - 70 cm. A mine in a plastic case, it contains two and a half or six kilograms of explosives. It is difficult to find them. The action of the "Italian" is unpredictable. It is "inflatable". A dozen cars can drive along it until it "inflates" and explodes. Unpredictable. The road had to be cleared again before each column was wired. The spirits were constantly mining. And not only at night. They observe - the detachment has passed, and new ones are immediately put up.

"Italian". A mine in a plastic case, it contains two and a half or six kilograms of explosives. It is difficult to find them.

They often fired at from brilliant green. The spirits had weapons of all kinds, the "Boer" rifles were English, old, but they hit far and were powerful. You go in an APC, it is noisy, you can't hear or see what is happening around, suddenly once - a ray of light, once - another one. Bullets from the "borax" pierce the armor and the sun shines through the holes.

When I just arrived at the point, I didn’t believe that the donkey would withstand me, I’m big, and even with a combat load, but nothing, I drove!

In the mountains, to the peaks where our posts were located, the equipment could not pass, they left only on foot and on donkeys. The donkey is small, his legs are thin, but he carries loads. When I just arrived at the point, I didn’t believe that the donkey would withstand me, I’m big, and even with a combat load, but nothing, I drove! We went out early in the morning, went up for twelve hours, in the heat in the mountains. They were often fired upon. Then a week really without water and food, under mortar fire at the top and down to the point. It took about eight hours to descend.

The helicopter pilots tried not to risk it. They flew out from behind cover, threw a wineskin with water and immediately went down the mountain from the shelling.

R.R. - Sergei, you said "plainly without food and water." Didn't you get everything you needed, food, water, ammunition?

S.T. - All they could - carried with them, loaded onto donkeys and went to the mountains. But it's hot in the sun. Food is heated during the day, and cold at night - it cools down, and so for several days in a row, it quickly deteriorates. There is always a shortage of water. They brought it to us from the Union. And you can't carry a lot to the point in the mountains on yourself, they were delivered by helicopter. But at the top, everything was shot through. We are in trenches, dugouts, behind stones, we are usually a little more than thirty people, I am in the rank of foreman - the commander. There should be 50 people and an officer at the point, but there were always not enough people. Covering a helicopter for landing and unloading is difficult. Mortars, machine guns and snipers are constantly shooting from the side of the spirits. The helicopter pilots tried not to risk it. They flew out from behind cover, threw a wineskin with water and immediately went down the mountain from the shelling. The wineskin was torn from falling - how much water they had time to collect, they pulled. Everyone ran, some with what - basins, bottles. Thirst always tormented.

R.R. - Ambushes and barriers, you also participated in them, why were they carried out, what was the point in them?

S.T. - These are preventive measures. We warned of an attack from the militants. We, the border guards, had a good intelligence service. I must say that our officers made a lot of efforts to explain to the local tribes the purpose of our presence in Afghanistan, some of the gangs, thanks to this work, sided with the DRA government, helped to protect villages in the area of \u200b\u200bresponsibility of our border detachment from attacks by other gangs. There are also tribal relations, Uzbeks against Tajiks, and both are against Pashtuns. Informants provided intelligence about the time and place of the caravans. We took positions on the way of the caravan and waited. A caravan appeared - they stopped it, inspected it, if necessary, we detain it and hand it over to the scouts, if they resisted, we destroy it. Correct tactics. When the policy of reconciliation began, it was abandoned, and losses among our staff immediately increased.

Once a gang was detained, about thirty people, all with weapons.

Once a gang was detained, about thirty people, all with weapons. They took it, and then looked after the whole day, while our officers and scouts dealt with their chief. In my opinion, they let me go later.

R.R. - How did the local population treat you?

S.T. - The Afghans were wary of us. This is a different culture, different traditions, religion. We interacted with whoever they could. The rest tried not to disturb once again if they adhered to neutrality. It is normal for locals to trade during the day, to sell you something, and at night they go to plant mines, and they carry weapons on raids or with caravans. They were not afraid of us. The culture is like that, they fight from birth, children already have a gun, shoot quickly, accurately.

Afghans were wary of us. This is a different culture, different traditions, religion. We interacted with whoever they could.

R.R. - is there something that you remember most?

S.T. - We had a fighting episode. We went out to intercept the caravan. The task was completed successfully, the caravan was stopped, the militants were disarmed, the search began, and then there were bags of money and women. I have never seen so much money again: dollars, Afghani, Iranian and Pakistani bills.

It's good that we left there. It is a pity that on such unfavorable conditions, they did not leave their bases there, they abandoned people who believed us. Many lives would have been saved for both its citizens and Afghans.

Interviewed by Evgeny Belonosov

"Chmoshniki"

After the fighting we stopped at Bagram, spent the night, and from there we returned to Kabul. In Bagram, I met a friend from my studies. I looked - near the "bulldozer" (in Afghanistan this was the name of the regimental cafe, in Gayzhunai it was usually called "buldyr") a kid who looked like a homeless person was sitting and eating a loaf of bread from the end. He pulls out the pulp, breaks it and slowly eats it. I went to a cafe, took something. I went out, I pass by - like a familiar face. He came up - he jumped up: "Hello, Vityok!" Me: "Is that you? .. And why are you sitting here like a" chmoshnik "?" - "Yes, so I wanted to eat." - “Why are you eating here? Sit down at least a step, otherwise you hide in the corner. " He: "It's okay!" It was the same guy from Minsk whose mother was the director of a confectionery factory.

And only then the guys from our training, who ended up in the 345th regiment in Bagram, told that he really was a "chmoshnik" (in army jargon - untidy, not taking care of himself, unable to stand up for himself. Abbreviation for "person morally backward. ”- Ed.). I didn't think that I would get to Afghan, but I did. And he was so killed there! I even felt sorry for him. Although in training I did not like him: after all, I had to carry the personal one on crosses and marches all the time literally on myself, he tortured me completely.

And the story with this guy ended in failure. The deputy commander of their regiment, my fellow countryman, told me about this later. In the 345th regiment there was a "flight": a PKT machine gun (Kalashnikov tank machine gun - Ed.) Was stolen from the BMP-2. It looks like it was sold to dushmans. But who needs it? This is no ordinary machine gun with a stock. Of course, you can shoot manually from the PKT. But this is a tank machine gun, it normally shoots through an electric trigger.

They searched and found out inside the regiment so that the matter would not go any further - they would give it in the neck! But they never found it. Then on the armor we drove to the village and announced over the speakerphone: “The machine gun is missing. Whoever returns will be greatly rewarded. " A boy came and said: “I was sent to say that there is a machine gun. We bought it. " - "How much money do you want?" - "So much." - "When will you bring it?" - “Tomorrow. Money up front". - “No, now - only half. The rest is tomorrow. If you leave with the money and don’t return the machine gun, we will level the village to the ground ”.

The next day, the boy returned the machine gun. Ours: "We'll give more money, just show me who sold it." Two hours later, everyone who was in the park was lined up. The Afghan boy showed - this one, blond. It turned out that the machine gun was sold by the son of the director of the confectionery factory. He got it for five years.

At that time, he only had about a month to serve him ... He had no money, everything was taken from him. And he wanted to return home with a normal demobilization. After all, "chmoshniks" were sent to demobilization as "chmoshniks": they were given a dirty beret, the same vest. They got into the "chmoshniki" for various reasons. In our platoon, for example, there was a cross-fire guy. Our people were surrounded. We were shooting back. The wounded appeared. And then a helicopter came to them, but only for the wounded. The wounded were loaded. And then the guy ran to the side, wrapped his leg with something and shot. And I saw this demobilization!

The crossbow was from our call, but we did not even communicate with him. After all, paratroopers are paratroopers, no one likes injustice. If I plow and do everything right, and the other is taking time off, does not want to do anything, then slowly he becomes a "chmoshnik". Usually they were sent to some bakery or to carry coal. They did not even appear in the company. In our company we had one such from Yaroslavl, the other from Moscow. The first was a bread slicer, he cut bread for the whole regiment, and the other boiler was stoked. They did not even come to spend the night in the company - they were afraid that the dismissal would be beaten. Both lived like that: one in a stoker, the other in a bread slicer.

Tragedy struck the one who heated the boiler room. Once he went to the grain-grower, who gave him bread. And this was seen by the warrant officer, who was the senior in the dining room. The ensign was very boring, he gave almost no one bread. The ensign took the bread from the stoker, put it on the table and gave it to the guy in the "melon"! He fled to his stoker. After some time, he became ill, he went to the doctor. The doctor saw another soldier, he says - sit down. The guy felt really bad ... Suddenly he lost his sight. The doctor took him to his place and began to ask: "So what happened, tell me?" He managed to tell that his warrant officer hit him in the dining room ... And - died ... He had a cerebral hemorrhage.

The ensign was immediately pecked: “Who are you yourself? You don’t go to the military ”. Although he was not imprisoned, he was transferred somewhere. It was a specific "flight". How to hide such a case? And they awarded the deceased guy the Order of the Red Star posthumously. Of course, the guy himself was sorry. His mother, the director of the school, then wrote us letters: “Guys, write what a feat my son has accomplished! They want to name the school after him. " We think to ourselves like a soldier: wow! Such a "chmoshnik", and in his honor the school is named! This is how it happened: many of us could have been killed a hundred times in combat, but we survived. And he avoided difficulties, and so everything ended tragically for him.

There was also one "chmoshnik". His name was Andrey. He wrote poetry. Once after Afgan, my friends and I met on the day of the Airborne Forces at VDNKh. I stand waiting for my people. I see - there is a guy standing, paratroopers who did not serve in Afghanistan are crowded around. And he says so pompously: we are there this and that, that and that! .. I listened, listened - well, I don’t like the way he talks. And then I recognized him! "Andrew! It's you?!.". He saw me - and ran away with a bullet. They ask me: "Who is he?" - "Never mind".

He was morally weak, he could not stand the battle. Therefore, they left him in the company, they did not take him anywhere. And on top of that, he didn’t take care of himself: every day he had to be hemmed - he wasn’t hemmed. And he didn't wash at all, he walked dirty.

We ourselves constantly kept ourselves in order, we washed our clothes. On the street, under the regimental washbasin (these are pipes twenty-five meters long with holes) there is a concrete hollow through which water flows. You put your clothes there, smeared it with a brush - shirk-shirk, shirk-shirk. Turned over - the same thing. Then I washed the brush and use it to remove the soap from the clothes. I washed it, called someone, twisted it together, ironed it with my hands - and put it on myself. In the summer, in the sun, everything dries up in ten minutes.

And Andrei did not wash these clothes at all. Forced - it's useless. But he wrote good poetry. They come from the military, demobilize him: “My girlfriend's birthday is coming soon. Come on, think of something Afghan: war, helicopter planes, mountains, love-carrots, wait for me, I'll be back soon ... ”. Andrey: "I can't do that!" - "Why can not you?". - "I need a special condition ...". - “Ah, imagination! Now I will give you imagination! " And takes the boot. Andrey: "Everything, everything, everything ... Now it will be!" And then he composes the necessary verses.

He was a creepy lazy person; he fell asleep everywhere. Already being demobilized, I was in a company dress, he was with me. It is clear that the demobilization is not worth the orderly, there are young people for this. I come - it's not on the nightstand. And this nightstand is the first in the battalion. The battalion commander comes: "Where is the orderly?!." I run out sleepy: "I!". - "Who is on duty?" - "I". - "And who then the orderly?" - "I ran away to the toilet." - "Why didn't they put anyone in?" - "Because I'm an idiot, probably ...". I had to say something. - "Get up yourself!" Here everything began to boil for me: there is a huge difference between those who go to the military in the mountains and those who do not. It seems that all this is the Airborne Forces, but it is different, like the infantry and pilots. Some in the mountains are constantly at risk, and on the armor, the risk is much less. And I have to stand on the bedside table! ..

I found him: "Are you sleeping?!.". He: "No, I'm resting ...". And zero emotions, sleeping for myself ... (Probably, I slept in the same way when I fell asleep on the run on the post after Kandahar.) I punched him with some kind of boot: "Well, quickly on the nightstand! ..". And literally kicked him into the corridor.

to be continued…

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. On February 15, 1989, the nine-year war officially ended. This war is more and more overgrown with legends. Ivan Ivanov sent us his memories of this war. He wrote everything as he saw it himself - to an individual soldier from a separate airborne unit. Below is the first part of Ivan's memoirs.

It is constantly being added and updated.

Additions and updates are inserted in chunks throughout the text, not just at the very end.

"Nobody except us". This is the motto of the Airborne Forces.

No one but us could complete many military tasks.

Nobody but us can tell the whole truth.

As before, in war, I am ready to take the whole blow on myself. For all the soldiers and officers who were called cannon fodder in Afghanistan.

And there will be blows, including from "our own". This is war.

25 years ago, they trumpeted the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

In memory of this country, I have 2 wounds left, one in the arm and 14 fragments in the head, 3 hernias on the spine, 2 medals "For Courage", the blue takes the Airborne Forces with a vest in the closet, several photos and sergeant shoulder straps in a box under the bed.

Something I remember well, something I have already forgotten. Time has passed. I managed to graduate from a special higher educational institution, go to another war in the former Caucasian Soviet republic and again in an embrace with a machine gun.

The "fairy tales" about the Afghan war of the Soviet Union have grown very strongly in us, veterans of Afghans, and in society as a whole. So much so that the veterans themselves and society already sincerely believe in this and do not want other legends and, probably, will never want to.

I can say honestly and sincerely: the KURKI paratroopers never retreated without an order, even under the threat of total destruction, this unspoken rule was observed sacredly, without murmurs and threats. Also, the paratroopers tried not to throw killed, wounded and weapons on the enemy's hand. It was possible to lie down with the whole company because of one wounded or killed. Leaving a killed or wounded colleague to the enemy, leaving a part of the weaponry to the enemy, seeing the enemy and not killing him at any cost - this was considered during my service in the DRA (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan) an indelible shame. It was even impossible to imagine that a company or platoon commander would negotiate with the Mujahideen about the possibility of unhindered passage or about non-aggression against each other. It was a shame and amounted to treason. I saw the enemy, you know where the enemy is - destroy him, then you and the paratrooper. No dealings with the enemy. So then we were brought up in the 350th Airborne Regiment.

Those who deviated from these rules were waiting for general contempt both in Afghanistan and in civilian life in the Union. There would be no life for such a moral ugliness until death.

Then, after my service, from the middle of the war to the end, it was often different. With the mujahideen soviet officers and the commanders of the units already often negotiated, they agreed on a non-aggression, and asked not to touch our soldiers when they passed certain territories. When officers and soldiers from the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA), who had returned from Afghanistan, told us this, we were shocked. For us it was tantamount to shame.

Even now, two conflicting feelings are fighting in me. On the one hand, of course, I want as many children as possible to stay alive. On the other hand, we gave the oath: “… and to the last breath be loyal to our People, our Soviet Motherland and the Soviet Government.

I am always ready, by order of the Soviet Government, to defend my Motherland - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, as a warrior of the Armed Forces, I swear to defend it courageously, skillfully, with dignity and honor, not sparing my blood and life itself to achieve complete victory over enemies ...

If I break this solemn oath of mine, then let the harsh punishment of the Soviet law, the universal hatred and contempt of the working people befall me ... "

During my service, the paratroopers also did not like to crawl in front of the Mujahideen on their belly, and where possible, they tried to go to their full height. Perhaps it was not everywhere, but a couple of times or three times we proudly attacked the spirits directly, to the envy of the rest of the troops who sat behind stones, rolling up our sleeves and puffing out our chest in a vest. Probably, this is how the legends were made about the paratroopers who never bowed before the enemy, or spiritually - "STRIPED".

The last time we demonstrated such courage was on Panjshir. The guys were pinned there tightly. They were not cowards, but a psychological breakdown was needed. And we were running in dashes and bending down, and we were very tired. Well, and the Commander's thirty-second speech over the radio that the only hope is on us. We walked in vests, taking off the HeBchiks' jackets and lowering their coveralls to the waist, without taxiways, with machine guns for the advantage. They looked at us with hope and delight. The landing is coming. The Mujahideen scrambled like hares, except that they did not squeal. And how we revel in ourselves. Airborne forces in one word. The Airborne Forces is not afraid of death. We go to full height, shoot. Well, they helped the guys, and a piece of Panjshir was combed. The heat, the sun, the mountain river is seething, the greenery climbs and we, the handsome men, are going by.

When they drew in front of my face,

In the distant sky, with a boot to the devil,

Which blinded the shadow of terror

Of souls bowed to a vain dream.

I saw the wind, I looked through the silence.

And so I wanted to see you over her.

I drank my fill of the damned war.

I learned to wait and hate.

Newborn funnel, child of war.

The floor of the foreman fell to the bottom, gritting his teeth.

And the snow was streaming red from the meat,

Someone with a splinter, some with a high-explosive, half a company in no

And I kept racing over my boots, and I flew.

And straining for the whole district, Hurray sang to them.

We still have so much to do in this World.

I wanted to howl, but in pain I dreamed of singing to you.

Heaven, you open up to me,

Through cracks, teeth - clouds.

You bother me there today,

For countless udders of centuries.

In general, I have my own ideas about the "bravest" troops of Ahmad Shah Massoud, who controlled the Panjshir Gorge. On Pagman, at the beginning of the summer of 1984, two incomplete platoons of the 5th Company of the second battalion of the 350th Airborne Regiment, our division, covering the withdrawal of the main troops, stood to death for a day against several thousand Masudians, driven by Soviet troops from Panjshir. They occupied the hill, which, like a cork in a bottle, kept the Mujahideen in a small gorge. Well, the meat grinder went. They called for artillery fire and bombing. The Masudians have dozens of large-caliber DShKs, thousands of bayonets, and mortars. The boys have only machine guns and one machine gun. The guys carried out the order in full, the forces of the Masudians pinned themselves for almost a day, they did not surrender the mountain, they did not abandon their weapons, the wounded and the dead, and then, after fulfilling the order, another good fifteen kilometers themselves, carrying the killed and wounded, with the Masudians on their tail, walked to the nearest armor. They went on foot, they did not take the turntables away from the company, the helicopter pilots refused to fly in, they said the high density of shelling. The main troops were able to withdraw without casualties, the Masudians were immobilized by a daily battle. Not really who were awarded. The fight was a notable, rare fight, even for Afgan. Victorious. But somehow forgotten, and never really discussed. I met guys who were fighting on that hill. Ordinary Russian boys. There was an order, there was a task. Death, not death, Motherland said.

But these are only 2 postulates that were steadily fulfilled, precisely in the Airborne Forces, the so-called "triggers" (from the word automatic trigger), conscripts and junior officers commanding them (platoon and company commanders) directly participating in hostilities and continuously, all one and a half years of service, climbing mountains in search of gangs of majahideen, lice, injuries and terrible fatigue.

The view of the company returning from the battles was not picturesque. Tired, dirty, gray, unshaven, soaked through with dust and sweat, someone in bandages, a detached and angry look from inflamed eye sockets, machine gun belts and helmets hanging from backpacks, machine guns and machine guns thrown over their shoulders. The company column went to their tents, and no one dared to cross its path. The staff were blown away like the wind. A month of continuous combat work in the mountains. Kurki understood that this whole war rests only on their shoulders and lives. Everything else was around them and for them. Everything ... except food, sleep, normal living conditions, decent wages, normal support, human relations, necessary medicines, except for well-deserved awards and well-deserved respect of the superior commanders of all types of headquarters.

At the end of the service, I really wanted our entire platoon to suddenly be in Moscow, on Red Square. Exactly what it is on the battlefield. In full combat build and with weapons. For people to look and feel. So that the eerie sight of exhausted, dirty, overgrown, bandaged guys was imprinted on the retina of the well-fed and cheerful citizens.

I spoke to the commander a couple of years ago. He now lives in Moscow. Although he himself comes from a small mining town. And from a mining family. True, with the surname on ich. I played the violin all my childhood. He also wanted to show the company to the people and the government in the middle of Red Square. In all its combat "glory". Thoughts coincided. But he was a little commander, with two little stars on each chase. He is brave and daring. The commander for Afghan "Red Star" and "For Courage". I would give him five more times that much. He honestly earned it. Every soldier in the company owes him a piece of his life.

His grandfather has five orders for the Patriotic War. The commander had several more dangerous business trips in his life, he looked like a bull terrier, knocked down muscle, knuckles of fists in calluses. What kind of violin is there already. But could a great violinist succeed.

Swinging on the chest, beating in the heart, a medal.

Silver, cross ribbon, red enamel.

Tank and airplanes, the pendulum of war

I returned, Mom, from a foreign country.

I arrived in the morning sober and sick

Now I have become my homeland.

The company sways behind its back for life,

I brought it with me as a gift.

I will bring armor to Red Square,

I will create a dawn for the sleepy people.

Bright - scarlet - red, warm as blood,

I am full of love, I am love itself.

Here, they are soldiers. We are building a pedestrian course.

Dusty jackets, pick a platoon.

Cheeks of unshaven gloom, gray bandages,

Fill the pits of emptiness with conscience.

Ay, my people, gentle, get on your knees,

Children are fallen, you look into their eyes.

The boys of the Country who believed in the best,

I stayed, mom, on the side of the war ...

I stayed, mom, with them and with me,

One was left with an interrupted fate.

Smoke smells from camel delicacies

I melt in my teeth with a grenade young.

I melt, I fly home in a cloud

Today, mom, I am quiet and dumb.

Today, mom, I will come running in a dream,

Barefoot, small, if not in a war ...

I watched on TV a program where they directly told how the highest members of the USSR government and individual generals betrayed the soldiers who fought in Afghanistan, passing on the plans of our attacks to the dushmans and warning them in advance about the upcoming military operations. Scum, they are scum everywhere, it's good that they began to talk about it openly.

Special officers in Afghanistan said that drugs and precious stones were taken to the Union in soldiers' zinc coffins. There are many mines of precious and poppy fields in Afghanistan. He himself threw rubies at the birds. The remains will be taken out with honors, buried under fireworks and tears of the parents. Then, at night, they will dig it up, open it, take the drugs and stones, and bury the coffin back. Thousands of people were buried all over Russia. The windows on the coffins were covered with white paint from the inside. Zinks were never allowed to be opened, even if you smash your mother's forehead against the coffin. Yes, and machine gunners from the "honor" guard with the military commissar next to, go open, "the law forbids."

14.09.2014

1982 to 1984 served as an urgent in Afghanistan in the 350th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 103rd Guards airborne division in different positions. From October 1982 to June 1984 - squad leader, submachine gunner and machine gunner in the 5th Airborne Company of the 2nd Parachute Battalion (with a break of 4 months - from May to August 1983). In 1983 he was twice demoted to the rank and file.

He took part in the military operations of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. He was wounded in battles - in the shoulder and multiple shrapnel in the head.

In 1988-1989. participated in special peacekeeping operations in the Caucasus.

For military service and wounds in Afghanistan he was awarded two medals "For Courage". In 1988 and later he was awarded other state and departmental orders and medals.

Currently a poet, writer, artist, entrepreneur. Officially nominated for Nobel Prize in literature, was twice nominated for the national literary prize "Poet of the Year" and once for the literary prize "Heritage". It has literary awards, diplomas and awards.

"Nobody except us". This is the motto of the Airborne Forces.
No one but us could complete many military tasks.
Nobody but us can tell the whole truth.

As before, in war, I am ready to take the whole blow on myself. For all the soldiers and officers who were called cannon fodder in Afghanistan. For all, undeservedly forgotten, for all morally and physically crippled. For the real truth about the Afghan war.

And there are and will be blows, including from the former "friends" and even from those on whose protection and rehabilitation this story is aimed. They have already begun and are going in an endless wave, and for now I am holding this front, practically, alone.

This is still our Afghan war. Unfortunately, it continues. They are very afraid of the truth, they hate the truth, however, it puts everything in its place, that's why it is true.

Everything that is written below is also a very bitter truth.

There are no guilty or right in this story, there is my and someone else's personal life, time and realities that make us then be just like that.

It's time for veterans, society and the state to reconsider their attitude to the Afghan war, repent to each other, forgive each other, distribute debts and start living in a new way for the front-line soldiers, the state, and society, and not repeat similar mistakes with ... .y cruelty towards each other.

Each of us, even those who want truth and justice, including myself, wants to look the purest and best, believing that it is he who is the very truth-lover who can stamp anyone with his accusatory word.

But the truth is also that of all the many hundreds of thousands of soldiers, officers, generals and officials who went through the Afghan war of the Soviet Union and were in one way or another involved in it, only a few did not get dirty in this or that disgusting and disgusting mud of this terrible, deceitful, filthy and shameless still ongoing carnage.

The war, which, above all, was and is being fought by us against each other and against any normal and moral principles of love, sympathy, equality, humanity, conscience and morality.

We died not only there, we continue to die to this day. To die not from old age, to die from indifference and sometimes even hatred for each other.

We closed ourselves in a hellish circle of lies, callousness and show.

This war not only claimed tens of thousands of the best boys' lives (and indeed it was almost always the purest and best ones who perished), it inflicted an immeasurable moral trauma on all the survivors, all the ascended, all glorified and affectionate, all known, forgotten, all survivors, all the fallen, all the wounded and maimed. To the entire Russian people, for many generations to come.

This double war not only devoured us, it continues to devour our children and grandchildren with deceitful heroism and deceitful patriotism, and will devour our great-grandchildren, if we do not restore all the truth and justice about it and try to teach future soldiers, officers, generals and officials not to repeat our direct and indirect crimes against each other, both in war and now.

25 years ago, they trumpeted the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

In memory of this country, I have 2 wounds left, one in the arm and 14 fragments in the head, 3 hernias on the spine, 2 medals "For Courage", the blue takes the Airborne Forces with a vest in the closet, several photos and sergeant shoulder straps in a box under the bed.

Something I remember well, something I have already forgotten. Time has passed. I managed to graduate from a special higher educational institution, go to another war in the former Caucasian Soviet republic and again in an embrace with a machine gun.

These are the memories of an individual soldier from a separate unit of the Airborne Forces, and I write exactly as I saw everything with my eyes, and heard it with my ears. Do not take this for the ultimate truth.

The "fairy tales" about the Afghan war of the Soviet Union have grown very strongly in us, veterans of Afghans, and in society as a whole. So much so that the veterans themselves and society already sincerely believe in this and do not want other legends and, probably, will never want to.

We embellished everything that seemed unprepossessing to us, created legendary idols of commanders, almost painted virtual icons from them, lied to ourselves and led society by the nose with heroic stories, covering up any inconsistencies and dirt.

Then we forgave everyone and everything, the bad quickly forgot, the good multiplied a hundredfold. We, hungry for honesty in the communist eyewash and fake pioneer-Komsomol space of our childhood and youth, the then Soviet Union, watched patriotic films about the Great Patriotic War, wanted us to have our own piece of the great justice of life and "heroic everyday life".

Naive in our military youth, we carried this childish and youthful and naive perception of real combat reality down to gray hairs throughout our lives, passing on this popular picture to all subsequent generations.

Our platoon and company commanders were not far from us either. They are not far off in terms of age, consciousness, and perception.

I can say honestly and sincerely: the KURKI paratroopers of my service time never retreated without an order, even under the threat of total destruction, this unspoken rule was observed sacredly, without murmurings and threats.

Also, the paratroopers tried not to throw killed, wounded and weapons to the enemy to make money. It was possible to lie down with the whole company because of one wounded or killed. Although, shameful exceptions did happen, but only by order of higher commanders, the soldiers did not abandon their own.

Leaving a killed or wounded colleague to the enemy, leaving a part of the weaponry to the enemy, seeing the enemy and not killing him at any cost - this was considered an indelible shame during my service in the DRA (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan).

It was even impossible to imagine that a company or platoon commander would negotiate with the Mujahideen about the possibility of passing freely or about non-aggression against each other. It was a shame and amounted to treason. I saw the enemy, you know where the enemy is - destroy him, then you and the paratrooper. No dealings with the enemy. So then we were brought up in the 350 airborne regiment. They weren't brought up by political officers. The demobilization was brought up by platoon commanders.

Those who deviated from these rules were waiting for general contempt both in Afghanistan and in civilian life in the Union. There would be no life for such a moral ugliness until death.

But these are only 2 postulates that are steadily fulfilled precisely in the 350th Airborne Regiment, the so-called "triggers" (from the word automatic trigger), conscripts and junior officers commanding them (platoon and company commanders) directly participating in hostilities and continuously, all one and a half years of service, climbing the mountains in search of gangs of mujahideen, lice, explosions, injuries, diseases and terrible fatigue.

Then, after my service, from the middle of the war to the end it was often different. With the mujahideen, Soviet officers and unit commanders often conducted peace negotiations, agreed with them on non-aggression, and asked not to touch our soldiers when they passed certain territories.

When the officers and soldiers from the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) who returned from Afghanistan, who served after us, told us this, we were shocked. For us it was tantamount to shame. We met our fighting guys, slapped them on the shoulder, drank vodka for the meeting, helped them to adapt in society, but a sediment was deposited in our souls. They did not do like us, they already had a different vision of battle and war, which we, who served earlier, unconsciously condemned inside, as weakness and even a manifestation of cowardice.

Even now, two conflicting feelings are fighting in me. On the one hand, of course, I want as many children as possible to stay alive. On the other hand, we took the oath: "... and to the last breath to be devoted to your People, your Soviet Motherland and the Soviet Government."

“I am always ready, by order of the Soviet Government, to defend my Motherland - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, as a warrior of the Armed Forces, I vow to defend it courageously, skillfully, with dignity and honor, not sparing my blood and life itself to achieve complete victory over enemies.

If I break this solemn oath of mine, then let the severe punishment of the Soviet law, the universal hatred and contempt of the Soviet people befall me ... "

Exactly:

But this, when they believed the oath, they gave it with all their hearts and with a pure soul.

In fact, it was like this: a person was born in the USSR, without asking him, he was identified as a resident of a communist country, put his nationality in his passport (sometimes such that not everyone wanted to show his passport), drove in October, pioneers and Komsomol members, without asking, were taken to The army, and without asking, shoved the text of the oath into their hands and hung a machine gun around their neck.

Later, after taking the oath, a person was thrown to the Afghan front and given no choice.

If you don’t want to be a citizen of the USSR, you’ll be a dissident with placement in a psychiatric hospital or prison.

If you do not want to be an Octobrist, a pioneer or a Komsomol member, you will be an outcast of society.

If you don't want to join the Red Army, take the oath and stomp to the front, go kid to prison.

Not everyone had enough sweetheart against such a background, and even sacrifice their lives for the "cruel" Motherland.

By the age of 18, too, not everyone had enough brains to understand the intricacies of the Soviet government.

So they went, either from under the gun, or watching patriotic films, or with a boy's delight in a real war, or with a courtyard fighting spirit of the ability to get out of any life scrapes, or with the worker-peasant doom of a farm laborer - a citizen of the USSR.

The Afghan greeted everyone with food gruel, household and moral filth, the indifference of the commanders, the corpses of colleagues and a fist in the face. So they broke down in tens of thousands, ran away, adapted, dodged, shot, exploded, fought, pissing, injected, took drugs, stole.

There remained those who did not know how to dump and those who considered themselves strong. They made up the front-line backbone of the fighting wolves, which in the 350th Airborne Regiment were called by the capacious word "trigger".

The rest in the bulk poured into the service staff and the clerk. Although there were unique exceptions to the rules, more on that below ...

Now many historians argue how poorly and hastily trained in Soviet military training, eighteen-year-old boys in the Airborne Forces successfully resisted the seasoned and well-trained mujahideen and elite special forces, special forces, special forces, mercenaries, the USA, France, and other countries, often several times superior to adult men. They opposed, having on hand worse weapons, food, worse generals ...

As in the old tale about Boy Kibalchish, foreign historians are looking for a terrible secret of the strength of Soviet snotty soldiers.

There was no particular secret. The airborne troops for the most part consisted of courtyard kings, hooligans and strong street boys, capable of fighting for their principles and territories until complete victory, without retreating even half a step.

School, GPTU, army. This was our main biography.

These were not flimsy nerds and balabolas pampered by intelligent quirks. This was largely the elite of courtyards, gateways and streets, the elite of schools and GPTU. And this street elite put on blue berets and vests and got a submachine gun. Everyone who was next to this elite broke into it, and under it, with the crunching of facial bones, the gnashing of naked meat, the crackle of knocked out teeth and the smell of real personal blood.

If these guys were given combat mission, they did it no matter what. From the cradle, they knew how to solve formidable matters and at the same time stay alive. And they knew how to give themselves to the real boy's honor completely, without whining, requests, bargaining and entreaty. Honor was and is always dearer to them than their own lives.

Airborne trigger - this title could only be obtained by honor.

During my service, the paratroopers did not like to crawl in front of the mujahideen on their belly, and where possible, they tried to go to their full height. Perhaps it was not everywhere, but a couple of times we proudly attacked the spirits directly, to the envy of the rest of the troops (usually motorized riflemen) who sat behind stones, rolling up our sleeves and protruding our sternum in our vest. Probably, this is how the legends were made about the paratroopers who never bowed before the enemy, or spiritually - "STRIPED".

The last time we demonstrated such courage was on Panjshir. The guys were pinned there tightly. They were not cowards, but a psychological breakdown was needed. And we were running in dashes and bending down, and we were very tired. Well, and a thirty-second speech by the commander on the radio that the hope is only in us. They walked in vests, taking off the jackets of the habchiks and dropping their overalls to the waist, without taxiways, with machine guns for the advantage. They looked at us with hope and delight. The landing is coming. The Mujahideen scrambled like hares, except that they did not squeal. And how we reveled in ourselves. Airborne forces in one word. The Airborne Forces is not afraid of death. We go to full height, shoot. Well, they helped the motorized riflemen, and a piece of Panjshir was combed. The heat, the sun, the mountain river is seething, the greenery climbs and we, the handsome men, are going by.

When they drew in front of my face,
In the distant sky, with a boot to the devil,
Which, the shadow of horror blinded,
Of souls bowed to a vain dream.
I saw the wind, I looked through the silence.
And so I wanted to see you over her.
I drank my fill of the damned war.
I learned to wait and hate.

Newborn funnel, child of war.
The floor of the foreman fell to the bottom, gritting his teeth.
And the snow was streaming red from the meat,
Someone with a splinter, some with a high-explosive, half a company in no

And I kept racing over my boots, and I flew.
And straining for the whole district, Hurray sang to them.
We still have so much to do in this World.
I wanted to howl, but in pain I dreamed of singing to you.

Heaven, you open up to me,
Through cracks, teeth - clouds.
You bother me there today,
For countless udders of centuries.

In general, I have my own ideas about the "bravest" troops of Ahmad Shah Massoud, who controlled the Panjshir Gorge.

On Pagman, at the beginning of the summer of 1984, two incomplete platoons of the 5th company of the second battalion of the 350th parachute regiment, our 103rd Airborne Division, covering the withdrawal of the main troops, stood to death for a day against several thousand Masudians, knocked out by Soviet troops from Panjshir. They occupied the hill, which, like a cork in a bottle, kept the Mujahideen in a small gorge. Well, the meat grinder went. They called for artillery fire and bombing. The Masudians have large-caliber DShKs, thousands of bayonets, mortars. The boys only have machine guns, three rounds of a grenade launcher and one company machine gun. The guys carried out the order in full, the forces of the Masudians pinned themselves for almost a day, they did not surrender the mountain, they did not abandon their weapons, the wounded and the dead, and then, after fulfilling the order, another good fifteen kilometers themselves, carrying the killed and wounded, with the Masudians on their tail went to the nearest armor.

They walked on foot, did not take the company’s turntables, the helicopter pilots refused to fly, they said that because of the high density of shelling. The main troops were able to withdraw without casualties, the Masudians were immobilized by a daily battle. Not really who were awarded. The fight was a notable, rare fight, even for Afgan. Victorious. But somehow forgotten, and never really discussed. I know the guys who fought on that hill. Ordinary Russian boys. There was an order, there was a task. Death, not death, Motherland said.

At that time, the kurki soldiers knew one task: they must constantly scratch the mountains in search of bandit formations and, having found them, destroy them at any cost ( "... not sparing his blood and life itself to achieve complete victory over enemies ...").

We knew and believed that it was for this that we, the paratroopers of the 350 Airborne Regiment, 103 Airborne Division, were in Afghanistan.

Some must find enemies and destroy enemies, while others provide for those who found and destroyed.

The main part of the paratroopers did this. Good or bad, it depended on our personal preparation. And I bow with great respect to everyone who did it (no matter how he did it, he did what he had the strength to do) and despise those who were supposed to fight and provide for the fighters, but fled from the war and from helping the triggers, like hell from incense ( "... not sparing his blood and life itself to achieve complete victory over enemies ...").

That is why, almost all the old soldiers of the Kurka went to our last combat operation, not trying to sneak home from it with the first sides ( "... not sparing his blood and life itself to achieve complete victory over enemies ..."). Almost all.

And the opportunity to fade was, than all the same, some old-timers took advantage of the trigger.

We will not judge strictly those who have already sipped the war in full, and are simply tired of it, and cunningly took the opportunity to finish their personal Afghan before the brothers in the company. They will be condemned by their dead and living comrades in the war.

Cowardice and betrayal of their fighting friends and fellow soldiers overtakes a weak-smelling soldier anywhere and at any time of service. Even on demobilization.

Someone broke down from the youth of the service, and got up later, someone broke down at the end, and this crossed out all their previous merits. Young people broke down with the help of bullying colleagues and with the help of the indifference of the commanders. The old-timers were faint-hearted precisely and only because of personal cowardice.

But back to the Fifth Company.

There is in this great and heroic battle some kind of mystery or mystery, as you wish.

Why was the 5th company sent so far from the armor on the very last day of combat?

Why did no one come to the aid of the company, which fought with such an armada of mujahideen for almost a day?

Why did not a single helicopter come for fire support?

REFERENCE # 1 (from the book "Dangerous Skies of Afghanistan. Experience combat use Soviet aviation in a local war. 1979-1989 "author M.A.Zhirokhov):
June 5, 1984, combat loss of a Mi-24 helicopter. Carrying out the attack on the target near the village of Pishgor, the helicopter of Captain E. Sukhov was fired upon by the enemy, the pilot-operator was wounded. While avoiding the object of the attack, it came under fire from air defense systems again and was shot down. The crew was killed.

Maybe this played a role, and they decided not to risk the turntables anymore? Or was this helicopter flying to the fifth company?

Why did the company itself drag the dead and wounded after a daily battle to the armor?

Why did the turntables refuse to arrive to pick up at least the killed and wounded 5 companies after the battle?

REFERENCE # 2 (from the book "Dangerous Skies of Afghanistan. Experience of Combat Use of Soviet Aviation in a Local War. 1979-1989" by M.A.Zhirokhov):
June 6, 1984, combat loss of the Mi-24 50 OSAP helicopter (Kabul). Helicopter captain V. Skoblikov wingman in pair performed a strike on guidance from the ground. At the exit from the attack, the ammunition on board detonated, probably due to being hit by fire from the ground. When an explosion occurred in the cockpit, the pilot-operator of senior lt V.Put, realizing that there was nothing to be done, dropped the flashlight and jumped from a height of 150m. The parachute opened at the very ground. Neither the commander nor the flight technician, senior flight engineer A. Chumak, had time to escape.

And again, regretted the helicopters? Already regretted for the killed and wounded? Are these 2 factors of the death of the turntables influencing the fatal refusal to support the fifth company? Or maybe these guys, helicopter pilots, died flying to the fifth company to help?

REFERENCE №3 (from the memoirs of Major General Evgeny Grigorievich NIKITENKO):
“… Passivity on the roads led to impunity for the actions of the rebels, especially when insufficient forces were allocated to escort the convoys. So, on June 5, 1984, a convoy of 150 vehicles was attacked in the Shindand area and suffered heavy losses, since only two BRDM and two anti-aircraft mining installations were allocated to guard this convoy ... "

Another fact of sloppiness?

All these "mad" losses of Soviet troops in a short period from May to early June 1984 could easily lead to elementary career panic among the senior officers and generals, as a result of which companies and battalions were thrown anywhere and at random. Perhaps the fifth company could have been thrown so irresponsibly.

Why was the fifth company denied fire support for the first few hours of the battle, when the company persistently called fire on itself by radio?

Calling artillery fire on yourself at that dashing time was not something out of the ordinary. The paratroopers in Afghanistan, squeezed by the mujahideen, often resorted to this type of assistance, and the superior commanders never refused such "assistance" to anyone.

In this battle, such fire support should have been provided at the first request, but they were not provided for several hours, as if someone wanted the company to simply be destroyed.

Only after multiple hours of requests was a small artillery strike and air bombing carried out.

In such battles, assistance from other units was also obligatory. In this case, no one came to the aid of the 5th company.

On all the questions about this fight, I ran into either a dull silence, or throwing the telephone receiver in a conversation, or unwillingness to talk about this topic.

On my own behalf, I can give the following soldier facts:

1. The fifth company was already sitting on the armor to go to the regiment, when the soldiers were told that the Mujahideen had clamped down on the first battalion and an urgent need to go to their aid.

2. When the 5th company passed the positions of the first battalion, the soldiers of the first battalion said that no one was pinching them, and they absolutely did not need any help to cover. Moreover, some fighters of the 1st battalion said that it was just their battalion commander who made the 1st battalion leave for the regiment before the 2nd battalion.
Did the fighters of the 1st battalion have other information? It made no sense to them to lie and invent. The soldiers of the fifth company saw with their own eyes that the first battalion was not squeezed by anyone and the companies of the first battalion were free to rest.

3. Before this battle, the battalion commander flew to Kabul from Bagram airport. Combat operation not finished yet, the battalion commander leaves the battalion and flies to Kabul. Why? To whom was the first battalion left? Who released the battalion commander of the first battalion from the combat before the end of the operation and the arrival of his battalion in the regiment?

4. The soldiers of the 5th company heard their officers and the company commander arguing that the company commander had made a mistake on the map and had led the company several kilometers further than it should be, right into the rear of the Mujahideen. Was there really a mistake on the map or not?
When the company walked, it passed by numerous bonfires, near which the Mujahideen were sitting.
Why did the company officers and the company commander not contact the regiment commander by radio and tell him that the 5th company was moving in the rear of a large bandit formation? Or they contacted, but received an order to move forward.
And indeed, to advance at 19:00 on June 4, 1984 to "help" the first battalion and arrive at the position only at 4:00 am on June 5, 1984. Too big transition, for simple cover of the withdrawal of the regiment and division to the places of permanent deployment.
The fifth company marched past the positions of the first battalion at 20:00 on 4 June. Why didn't they just change the first battalion in positions? Why still walked 8 hours and a bunch of kilometers further? Where really, by whom and why was the 5th company sent?

5. Why did the intelligence not know that such a large army of mujahideen was, in fact, almost at the side of the location of the division and regiment? Why did the intelligence not know that such forces of Ahmad Shah were not destroyed on Panjshir, but simply secretly left and quietly waited for the main forces of the Russians to leave Panjshir?
Or they knew, but kept silent. Or maybe they didn’t keep silent, and spoke, but none of the generals wanted to listen.

6. No one helped the fifth company, which fought for 24 hours against superior enemy forces. There was no artillery assistance for several hours, despite numerous, many hours of pleading requests under heavy fire. The Mujahideen company simply shot from numerous DShKs at point-blank range (for information, DShK is a very large-caliber machine gun, with three bullets capable of disrupting the turret of a light tank). The company was not just shot from the DShK, it was beaten with explosive bullets for many hours without ceasing.
There were no helicopters. Before the armor, after the fight, the hammers stomped themselves. We fought ourselves. Nobody sent any support or help. No tanks, no helicopters, no troops.
The help of artillery and bombers was almost symbolic and more like not the support of the fighting unit, but the planned shelling of a square of terrain in the mountains. Such attacks were carried out quite often, when, according to intelligence data, another gang of Mujahideen was "listed" in a certain square. Type a little noisy, maybe someone and hook. How to splash water from a plastic glass onto the crowd of fighting.
So it is here. They made a little noise and that's it. And the company is beating, the company asks for dense fire on itself. There is no fire. Beat the company yourself, die.

7. Almost no one was awarded for this battle, except for those killed. Well, the killed, of course, are always rewarded. The living were not fully rewarded, even the wounded.
The battalion commander of the second battalion, to which the fifth company was assigned, personally promised all the officers of the commanders and one of the best sergeants (the platoon commander from Chelyabinsk, in fact, the guy kept half a mountain himself and commanded the battle in his area himself, did not let any of the spirits go) to the stars Heroes of the Soviet Union, all those killed to submit to the Orders of the Red Banner, all wounded to the Orders of Soldier's Glory 3rd Class, all living to the Orders of the Red Star, and personally rewrote the names, and personally ordered the clerks to document all this. There are witnesses to this.

8. When the wounded came to the armor, they were only then transported by helicopter to the tent of the deployed army medical battalion. There were no regimental or divisional medics, they left for Kabul (so they said to the wounded). And again there is no medical assistance for 2 hours. Then, after bandaging and providing first aid, in the tent of army "pills", again by helicopter, the wounded were taken to the Kabul airport.
There they were unloaded at takeoff and left. The helicopter pilots get in touch by radio and ask to send a car for the wounded, but they are told that the 350th regiment is in place, the 5th company has died, there are no survivors, and these are not their wounded, but most likely from another unit.
From the Kabul airport, wounded on their own, we walked almost two kilometers to the medical battalion. There was not a single doctor or surgeon in the medical battalion. They also knew nothing about the incoming wounded. They knew nothing about the fight.
It couldn't be. Doctors were always ready to wait for the incoming wounded for days, they never let down. When asked where the doctors were, the nurses replied that the regiment had been in the position for a long time, everyone was resting and celebrating the victorious Panjshir operation.
The soldiers of the fifth company are sitting, blood is flowing from under them, the orderly runs and rubs it on the floor with rags and substitutes the basins. They simply did not remember the beating 5th company, they did not even prepare the surgery. Maybe they hoped that there would be no one to operate? Or even then it was insolently decided to delete the battle from the history of the Afghan war.

So far, only one very terrible version emerges from the scanty soldiers' facts: the company was doomed to death, in the hope that it would be completely destroyed by the mujahideen, either in battle, or when the company would go with the dead and wounded long kilometers to the armor.

Who and why sent the 5th company so far from the main forces on the very last day of the operation?

All major battles in this operation are described in detail on the Internet. Nothing about this battle of the 5th company. Vacuum emptiness of information. Still.

The complete picture of the situation is as follows:

In April-May 1984, our and Afghan troops carried out one of the largest operations in the entire Afghan ten-year war in the Panjshir Gorge. Marshal Sergei Sokolov, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, personally supervised the operation.

When the main forces of Ahmad Shah were allegedly "driven out" from the Panjshir Gorge, Soviet army began combing the surrounding areas.

By the end of a huge two-month military operation to liberate the Panjshir gorge from bandit formations Ahmad Shah Massoud, the battalion commander of the first battalion was already a "legendary" battalion commander who became famous for having the lowest percentage of casualties among personnel during his battalion command. Although he could not save his soldiers from murders on the basis of hazing.

Let's not blame the battalion commander for this. To get away from non-regulation and come to respect the soldiers, it was necessary to change the entire army system of work and thinking of the officers of the entire Soviet Army at that time.

Margelov was no longer there, there was no one to respect the soldier, "love" him.

At the age of 30, a brave commander, the first battalion commander, who has the Order of the Red Star and the Red Banner, who is wounded in battle, enjoys the love and respect of his soldiers, and higher commanders, a paratrooper officer is a legend, has served by this time in Afghanistan is almost two and a half years old. Six months more than the due date. This is two and a half years of the hardest psychological load of real life at the front. By this time, the battalion commander was first presented to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and was preparing to receive this title soon.

Without waiting for the battalion to arrive in the regiment, the first battalion commander, leaving his battalion (with the permission of the regiment commander? Division?), Leaves the Panjshir operation for Bagram, and from there, by plane An-12, flies to the regiment's location.

It's time to fly home. The aircraft flew to the USSR extremely irregularly, you will miss "your" plane, and sit, kukui for several months, until flights will open again. Yes, and it is necessary to prepare a farewell with military friends officers.

Ahmad Shah and his gang, in fact, were not in the Panjshir mountains. The entire operation to free the gorge was against almost anyone. Thanks to the betrayal, the Shah was warned in advance of the advance of the Soviet and Afghan troops, led the main forces to a safe place and screwed them away himself. In the gorge there were small and scattered parts of the bandit formations that lagged behind the main Mujahideen army.

Additional Information for this on the sites:
1) Chasing the Lion of Panjshir
2) The third military operation of formations and subunits of the 40th Army and Afghan troops in Panjshir against the formations of Ahmad Shah Massoud

The 1984 Panjshir operation consisted of two parts: before the May holidays and after. Between these two halves, Soviet units, including the 350 Airborne Regiment, arrived at their places of permanent deployment for a two-day rest, resupply and to take with them any remaining manpower.

They raked up both turners and bakers, if only there was more power on the armor.

To the temporary shift of the 350th regiment, at the place of its permanent deployment, an airborne regiment standing there flew from Fergana. The poor fellow soldiers of the Fergana regiment were not even told that they were being taken to Kabul in Afghanistan. The soldiers learned that they were in Afghanistan only from us who came to visit them. They did not believe for a long time, they thought that they were being played. I don't know if they were later sent back to the Union.

The appearance of a large and serious military mess was created. The more noise, the more stars on the chest and shoulder straps of all kinds of staff colonels and generals who have anything to do with this hype, from Kabul to Moscow. "Much ado about nothing". Big "heroic" deception.

Before the first half of the Panjshir operation, there was a betrayal of the chief of intelligence of the 149th motorized rifle regimentstationed in Kunduz. The officer in the conflict shot the mayor of Kunduz, took two soldiers with him, and went to the Mujahideen. 783rd separate reconnaissance battalion, who was supposed to, among other things, provide high-quality intelligence to Panjshir, was thrown to arrest the traitor. The search failed, the traitor was not taken. It is possible that an officer of this rank also had information about the impending operation, which he passed on to the dushmans. And on April 19, 1984, the "great", final Panjshir operation against Ahmad Shah Massoud began.

On April 30, almost at the end of the first half of the operation, in the Khazar gorge, the 1st battalion of the 682nd motorized rifle regiment was killed: Soviet losses amounted to about 60 people. It's just that one of the generals gave the wrong order. The commander of the 682nd motorized rifle regiment was transferred to Belarus and demoted. The major general commander of the 108th motorized rifle division was also removed from his post as division commander. The trial took place in Tashkent, in the Military Court of the Turkestan Military District. There were heroic commanders, the accused in court became dejected. Their career was ruined forever.

There is a lot of information about this fight on the Internet.

So there was something to fear for both our regiment commander and our new division commander. For losses and many hours of massacres on the head, the judicial authorities did not pat. If they found out about these losses and massacres. And if they didn’t recognize it, then “there’s no trial”.

Before the second half of the operation, on May 3, 1984, the 783rd separate reconnaissance battalion itself was ambushed and lost 13 people - 3 officers and 10 soldiers. And again, there is no full-fledged intelligence Panjshir.

The Internet is simply packed with information about this fight.

Only about the battle of the 5th company there is nothing.

Moreover, in the first half of the 1984 Panjshir operation, there are now enormous losses, but there is not a huge number of captured and killed spirits, so necessary for victorious reports. But there are also a large number of wounded Soviet soldiers. There are many disabled people who were blown up by mines, both mujahideen and their own unexploded "petals" (mines dropped from Soviet planes and self-destructing a few days later). Such mines did not always self-destruct. There is information on the Internet that about 1,000,000 of these mines were dropped on the 1984 Panjshir, and several hundred of our soldiers were blown up on them.

Short remark: 1,000,000 (think !!! Million !!!) only mines of frogs. Each at a cost price is not 5 or 100 rubles. The dollar then went for 1 ruble for 1 green (even the hucksters changed one to three for an easy one). And the rest of the investments only in this operation !? Equipment, aircraft, helicopters, fuel, ammunition, food, clothing, salary and so on ...

5 billion rubles a year were poured into Afghanistan by the Soviet authorities. Wasn't it easier for this money just to buy all the mujahideen with giblets? Approximately 100,000 rubles a year for any of the most seedy Mujahideen. The CIA spent much less. We could buy up all the gangs in Afghanistan and send them to the direction the USSR needed.

So no. The union needed to shake the whole world with weapons and have a huge training ground, where human meat was the same consumable material as cartridges. Only the cartridges were treated much more carefully.

Commands of all kinds are nervous, and afraid to lose, there were already such close ones, gold stars, orders and extraordinary titles.

For some commanders, the question is simply about preserving their existing titles, orders and freedom, some of them were not up to a new "starfall".

Nobody wants another big loss. And if you hide the death of the fifth company without rescuing it, then you can release its death on the brakes. The company itself, they say, is to blame. It was not clear where it climbed and then it was destroyed. And the signal, they say, did not have time to give the company, so they can see the walkie-talkie flew immediately, or it was broken by bullets. Rota, perhaps, would have been written off retroactively or subsequently and accused of unprofessionalism and self-righteousness of advancing further than necessary.

It turns out that either the company commanders really made a mistake on the map and half of the blame for the battle lies with them, or they actually drove the company where "Makar did not drive the calves to graze" (why?), Or specially sent the company very far (not to Paradise itself for what?). Riddle on riddle.

And if a company is helped by artillery and in moments with helicopters, to put forward large army forces to help it, then h..n he knows how things will go.

What if the number of killed soldiers and officers in the hundreds and even thousands will come out? After all, there are several thousand Mujahideen and the fifth company squeezed them in full. The Masudians tried to get out of the gorge bottle at any cost. At first, they were definitely afraid that all the might of the Soviet Army would fall on them.

Here you cannot write off that the spirits are gone, here there will be a battle of thousands of Soviet soldiers with thousands of Afghan spirits. And how the card will fall is not clear. What if the spirits win? Or they will not win, but they will kill several hundred or even thousands of our soldiers and commanders.

Generals and officers for heavy losses and incorrect orders could not be expected to be simply scolded, a military court was awaiting and real terms prisons. There were examples. Career in parasha, stars and medals in the trash, glory in the bucket.

In short, general and officer ranks, careers and orders with the stars of Heroes flew to hell.

It was necessary to fight for real. Perhaps, for the first time in Afghanistan, it was possible to fight for real, with a huge army of mujahideen, and not with individual gangs.

Staff officers and generals scrambled. Personal well-being became closer to them. H..n with her, with the fifth company, they said.

This is exactly the version. There was no victorious Panjshir operation, nor did it become. There was bullshit.

According to the original plan of the operation, the withdrawal of the regiment and division was supposed to be provided by the first battalion. The plan was approved at the very top and long before the start of the operation. The first battalion commander is absent. The commander of a regiment or division may change his mind on the fly. For cover, instead of the first battalion, the second battalion is moving forward. And to make it look believable, they announce to us that the first battalion, allegedly, has caught the spirits and needs help.

Why? The battalion commander and the regiment commander are good friends. By that time, both, as smart and competent officers, they understand that the Panjshir operation is an exaggerated dummy, the Mujahideen left there in advance. Yes, and all of Anava, even before the operation began, knew that the spirits were gone on Panjshir. Anava must have shared her suspicions with our regimental and divisional officers.

The 2nd Battalion of the 345th Separate Guards Parachute Regiment was stationed in the village of Anava. The battalion headquarters was in the fortress.

Panjshir Gorge blocked 20 outposts of the battalion. And the rest of the 345th regiment of the Airborne Forces generally stood in Bagram, from where the battalion commander of the first battalion flew out. Information among the officers spread quickly, so there was no secret for the battalion commander of the first battalion of the 350th regiment and the commander of the 350th regiment that the forces of Ahmad Shah were walking freely between Kabul and Panjshir in huge numbers.

The battalion commander is the first to understand that his battalion, God forbid, may face the gangs that have left Panjshir. And formally it is he who commands the battalion. The first battalion commander, scrupulous to his personal glory, could ask the regiment commander (or maybe the division commander) to change his first battalion to the second battalion. Just in case. After all, nothing bad is expected. The first battalion was replaced and urgently withdrawn. Away from sin.

And then the 5th company runs into spirits. She should have sent the first battalion to help her, but he is not around. She would have her own battalion to help, and who will cover the division's withdrawal? Stop the division, stop the Army.

The 5th company would have helicopters, artillery to help, and then the self-will of the regiment commander (or division?) And the battalion commander of the first would emerge. And goodbye to career, goodbye to the stars of Heroes of the Soviet Union, goodbye to the legend of the invincible battalion commander first, goodbye to the general rank of the new divisional commander of the 103rd Airborne Division.

Farewell to all the honored officer's honor and glory, hello to the military court, which will ask in full for every violation of the officer's military discipline that led to combat losses of personnel. And the personnel is state property. Marshals broke off, not only officers.

And the terrible begins. The company is fighting, but they are silent about the battle. They do not report on the fight, probably upstairs. And no help is given. Only light bombardment and weak bombardment of the battle square is all that the regiment commander can do for the company. It's all.

The death of the 5th company suited everyone. She arranged for the battalion commander of the first and the commander of the regiment, they did not need an investigation of what happened. Arranged for the division commander and the army commander, because the linden of the Panjshir operation and the failure of this operation did not surface. There is no need to accept a multi-thousand and unpredictable battle with the mujahideen who have appeared out of nowhere, after an operation has already been carried out.

And the captured Mujahideen and their leaders will definitely testify that the Panjshir operation in May 1984 was a mess. And the victorious reports had already gone to Moscow and the ceremonial tunics were already making holes under the victorious orders and stars. The division commander, a colonel, who by that time had served in Afghanistan for only three months, this was the first major operation, the rank of general and a good order, and maybe the title of Hero, loomed ahead.

The company might have been expected to die. We were waiting very much. It couldn't be otherwise. The practice of war showed that in battles and twenty times with a smaller enemy, the companies were simply erased. Yes, the company had to die. Then it could be said that the company had entered the wrong place, its radio was immediately covered, and the company had no time to transmit anything. All the blame could be shoved onto the company itself.

Therefore, even after the battle, the company was not pulled out, but forced to go to the armor itself, in the hope that the Mujahideen would finish it off.

And the company survived. Only seven were killed. True, there are many wounded, but they are lightly wounded, and there are also few seriously wounded. The company is combat-ready and can move itself. With difficulty, but it can. And he can fight. And the radio is intact. And the spirits didn't do it. The 5th Company won.

And the big commanders all pretended that there was no battle. It was not profitable to show this fight. Do not wash, so by rolling. There is not even a mention of this fight anywhere on the Internet. None. About all the others there are, detailed, with maps, lists of the dead, testimonies and memoirs of witnesses, but there is no fifth company about this battle.

I'm an old operative with higher education and although all this is my speculation, but according to the scanty facts I have and the knowledge of the human ... ... and Soviet society, everything looks exactly as it is written above. Although we will not rush, and for now we will consider all this as a version.

They tried to contact the battalion commander, the person simply did not begin to talk about this topic, remained silent on the phone, did not put it on for a very long time, then did not pick it up for repeated calls and disconnected altogether.

But he managed to say that he flew from Bagram to Kabul, leaving the battalion immediately after the Panjshir operation. But this is a violation of the combat regulations. The commander leaves the battalion before he arrives at the unit's location. By whose order and to whom does he leave?

One more fact: when the hammers of the 5th company flew home from Afgan at the end of June 1984, a sergeant from the 1st battalion flew with them, wounded in the leg. The wound was the freshest, during the flight his seams opened, and blood was flowing, he poured it out of his boot.
He was also wounded somewhere during the end of the Panjshir operation.

Maybe the fifth company was really put forward to change the positions of the first battalion, because some part of it collided with the spirits? But which one, and why did the rest of the first battalion, past whose positions the 5th company was, did not know anything about this?

One of the commanders of the 5th company, whose man his soldier found after Afgan, who was also in that battle, which became for the soldier who found him, a friend and a person whose opinion he greatly valued (a soldier for many years, on his way to another treatment, stopped by commander home in Moscow to visit, he lived in his apartment), for a long time did not want to raise this topic, left it by any means (for a soldier then, it was not quite the main thing and he did not insist, and the commander referred to the lack of facts and left everything finding out about the fight, in which he was also himself, for later).

Moreover, at the same time, the commander of this soldier sincerely wanted the soldier to write the history of the 5th company and find out the truth about this battle. At least, he sincerely spoke to the soldier about this desire.

When the soldier specifically and directly got the commander on the phone (and they live in different cities) that he urgently needed some clarifying facts about this battle, which are known to this commander, as a participant in the battle and a junior officer, the commander of this soldier suddenly referred to suddenly busy and asked to call back the next day.

The soldier called back, the commander greeted, again referred to being busy and said that he would call back himself. The soldiers could no longer get through to him, and the commander does not call back or pick up the phone.

This has never happened to this officer before. He is a serious and obliging person, he did a lot of good for the soldier. Maybe he is trying to save his former soldier from big trouble in this way? Maybe for someone the truth about the battle of the 5th company is still scary?

Terrible, even despite the fact that absolutely all the crimes of the Afghan war are amnestied and forgiven by law. Who is not even afraid of the law, but of what? Afraid of the simple truth? Afraid of the condemnation of veterans and colleagues in Afghanistan? Afraid of shame?

I don't want to throw mud at anyone. I don't blame anyone. This is just a version put together by me, a rather experienced specialist with a special higher education, from very scanty and not fully covered and transmitted to me facts (my friends in Afghanistan, former soldiers of the 350th regiment, among them there are also specialists with higher education in such matters, they say that they see no other explanation for the events).

More than anything else, I want her, this terrible version to turn out to be just complete nonsense of my brain and not be confirmed at any point. But I need some facts and answers to simple questions to cover the entire history of the battle of the 5th company.

I am ready to declare all my versions simply ridiculous and stupid versions, but I want a real and honest officer's truth. I don’t want to publish anyone’s surnames until all the circumstances are fully clarified. And then I will not print the names.

The paratroopers weren't the only ones who fought bravely in this bloody 1984. The losses of the 40th Army in 1984 were the heaviest for the entire period of hostilities in Afghanistan and amounted to 2,343 people killed and 7,739 wounded and injured.

The soldiers of the 350th regiment of the Airborne Forces will continue this difficult investigation in the name of the killed and wounded of our comrade soldiers.

Two months after writing the above, the following information was found on the Internet:
"... 5.06.84. 1 battalion of 350 PDP moved closer to the mountains. At the very beginning, 3 PDRs were ambushed. Novozhilov was a company commander in 3 PDR, and platoon commander Tokarev and two fighters Fedulov, Bogolyubov died ... "

This means that there was still a battle of the 1st battalion, and there were killed and there were wounded. Why was this battle also silenced? Why did only one fifth company move to replace an entire battalion, after all, there are three companies in the first battalion? And the fifth company was told that the first battalion was squeezed on June 4, 1984. And here is information about the battle on June 5th. Maybe shifting dates on the Internet?

Understand and understand ...

But still, where was the battalion commander when his soldiers and officers died on June 5, 1984?

I have no desire to squeeze the battalion commander first with this case. And there is no desire to blame him. He is a heroic man, no words, but no more heroic than any normal trigger of our regiment. I know the boys of the 350th Airborne Regiment are no less brave. And whole platoons and companies were personally saved by soldiers, and with severe wounds received in battle while rescuing their colleagues, they went home, and did not have a single medal. And me, with my two Courage for Afghan, is far and far away from their exploits. No, I honestly earned mine, but still ... It's a shame that the guys are Heroes without awards. It is somehow unfair.

And in the first battalion there was the same non-regulation as in any other. And the soldiers there slaughtered each other and young soldiers were killed for not bringing rations of butter to the senior citizen.

There were bullying and beatings, lice, accidents, dystrophy. There were heroism, self-sacrifice and exploits.

The battalion commander became the only Hero of the Soviet Union. And most of the ordinary front-line soldiers went home without a single combat award, despite all their many feats. But the same picture was in the second battalion.

Any ordinary combat soldier triggering the 350 regiment, if he were in the place of any battalion commander or any company commander or platoon officer, would command no worse. Of course, education would not hurt college and somewhere the experience of leading people, but there would be no less courage and courage. Simply, everyone had their own Afghan, at a certain moment in their biography.

Then many of the soldiers who passed through Afghanistan became officers and generals, commanded companies, regiments and platoons in another war, in Chechnya, and did their job no worse than the battalion commander of the first battalion and no less heroic.

So, by Afghan standards, the battalion commander was a normal officer, and there were many such officers. And they performed feats and saved lives, and made mistakes more than once.

By the way, he personally did good to me twice (although he probably doesn't remember) and I remembered him as a very humane officer, and not a soulless jackal.

But personally, I want to know if it was his act that I owe to fourteen fragments in my head and the loss of two best friends.

All kurkov, soldiers and officers who have passed through Afghanistan have their dark spots in their biographies and it is impossible to divide front-line soldiers into white and black, but everyone should ask the fellow soldiers who suffered because of him and God for sincere forgiveness for their sins, which led to death, injuries and the disabilities of combat fellow soldiers.

Ask personally and try with all your might to make amends, if you still won't forgive.

And you have to forgive. We'll have to forgive. It's hard to blame, it's even harder to forgive. To live without forgiving the repentant is a sin.

Direct artillery fire was used to defeat the enemy in engineered shelters, kishlaks, behind the ducks.

The readers of "VKO" are offered regular monthly reports on military operations in Afghanistan (for May-June-July 1984). The materials fully preserve the style and spelling of documents from the headquarters of the 40th Army.

May 1984

The army troops completed the plan of military operations for May, as well as the tasks of assisting local authorities in strengthening state power in the controlled counties and volosts.

Two planned operations were carried out in May. The operation in the provinces of BAGLAN, PARVAN, KAPISA under the leadership of the commander of the army, Lieutenant General L. V. GENERALOV, conducted by the forces of units and subunits 108, 201 mechanized infantry division, 103 airborne divisions, 66, 70 omsbr, 191 omsb, 345 oddp, 2 omsb, continues.

In addition, an operation was carried out in the provinces of HILMEND, KANDAGAR during the period from 3 to 20 May by the forces of the 70th Omsb Brigade, 317 Infantry Regiment, 350 Infantry Regiment, 5th Mechanized Infantry Division under the leadership of the Chief of the Combat Training Department of the Army Headquarters Major General GRUBOGO A. Ya.

The purpose of the operation was:

• defeat newly identified rebel bands in the green zones of the provinces;
• expand the zones of influence of state power and stabilize the situation in the province of HILMAND.

The general rebel grouping in the combat areas in the province of HILMEND consisted of 69 groups with a total strength of up to 1900 people, armed with up to 28 mortars, up to 40 DShK, a large number of RPGs and automatic small arms.

Since May 1982, no operations have taken place in the province of HILMAND, which allowed the rebels to equip powerful strongholds, firing positions for heavy weapons and other defensive structures in engineering terms.

Photo: Andrey Anokhin

Features of this operation:

• with the beginning of the operation, the rebels did not leave their areas and showed stubborn resistance from strongholds;
• highly rugged terrain with a wide network of canals, irrigation ditches, the presence of well-equipped bunkers, DOSs, trenches, dugouts, as well as excellent knowledge of the terrain allowed the rebels to escape from the attacks, hiding behind small groups;
• direct artillery fire was used to defeat the enemy in engineered shelters, kishlaks, behind the ducks;
• the wide green zone significantly impeded the actions of the troops, reduced the rate of advance to 1.5–2 km, especially the armored groups, and allowed the rebels to carry out an organized withdrawal and covertly withdraw from the battle;
• weather conditions did not allow the full use of aviation.

As a result of the operation, 658 rebels were destroyed, 60 people were filtered, 23 rebels were detained and transferred to the KhAD, 2 rebels were taken prisoner.

Captured: small arms - 140 units, ammunition for SO - 12.85 thousand units, DShK - 1 unit, DShK ammunition - 11.4 thousand units, RPGs - 10 units, RPG rounds - 15 units. , recoilless guns - 1 unit, shots for BO - 6, 68 hand grenades, 28 PTMs, cars - 6 units, motorcycles - 5 units, 1 tractor, 60 mines for a mortar, 2 landmines, 1 trailer for a mortar, 1 binoculars, 2 megaphones, 3 IR documents.

Destroyed: small arms - 6 units, ATM - 21 units, land mines - 17 units, strong points - 8, firing points - 72, 2 fail-safe guns, defensive structures - 42, dugouts - 18, DShK - 3 units, ammunition DShK - 2.0 thousand units, mortars - 5 units, mines for a mortar - 251 units, RPGs - 5 units, RPG rounds - 66 units, ammunition depots - 4, fuels and lubricants depots - 10, warehouses with food - 3, warehouses with medical equipment - 1, cars - 4, motorcycles - 4, machine guns - 2, documents 1 IR. Filmed: PTM - 37, PPM - 10, land mines - 14.

Our losses: killed - 6 people, wounded - 34 people (of which 7 officers).

In total, as a result of the operations carried out, the following were destroyed: rebels - 315, filtered - 317, detained - 247, taken prisoner - 76.

Captured: small arms - 646 units, ammunition for SO - 257.53 thousand units, DShK - 5 units, 13 barrels for DShK, DShK ammunition - 69.52 thousand units, RPG - 29 units, shots RPGs - 260 units, BO - 5 units, rounds for BO - 163 units, mortars - 2 units, mines for a mortar - 1335 units, PGU - 2 units, mines and land mines - 1009 units, WG - 386 pcs., Explosives - 660 kg, various warehouses - 86, documents 8 IR, cars - 6, motorcycles - 5, PGU ammunition - 740 pcs., Machine guns - 3, radio stations - 3 items, AGS ammunition - 400 pcs.

Destroyed: SO - 37 pieces, ammunition for SO - 1.0 thousand pieces, DShK - 117 pieces, DShK ammunition - 8.88 thousand pieces, RPGs - 117 pieces, RPG ammunition - 11 pieces, BO - 3 units, mortars - 33 units, mines for mortars - 297 units, PGU - 3 units, mines and land mines - 850 units, WG - 68 units, explosives - 40 kg, strong points - 57 units, firing points - 251, caves - 377, 49 fortresses, 53 different warehouses, 20 Islamic committees, 12 cars, machine guns - 11, pack animals - 90. Mines and bombs removed - 293 pcs.

Our losses: 31 people were killed (5 of them were officers), 132 people were wounded (10 of them were officers). BTR - 1 unit, Su-17 - 1 unit.

In addition to conducting operations, army troops were involved in the implementation of intelligence data in the areas of responsibility received through the lines of Soviet missions and the DRA Armed Forces.

In total, 17 implementations were carried out during the reporting period, of which 16 were effective, which is 96% of the effectiveness (73% in April of this year).

The highest performance was shown by units and subunits of 103 airborne divisions, as well as 1 motorized rifle division.

As a result of the implemented implementations, 179 rebels were destroyed, 283 were filtered, 78 were detained and transferred to the KhAD, and 3 were taken prisoner.

Captured: small arms - 44 units, ammunition for SO - 16.56 thousand units, RPGs - 3 units, rounds for RPGs - 6 units, mines for a mortar - 8 units, hand grenades - 27 units, warehouse - 1, documents 1 IC.

Destroyed: CO - 29 units, RPG - 6 units, mines for a mortar - 41 units, mines and land mines - 37 units, warehouses - 2, 1 Islamic committee, 1 car. Removed 3 PTMs.

Our losses: killed - 2 people (including 1 officer), wounded - 8 people.

In accordance with the plan for organizing ambush actions, army units and subunits widely used ambushes on the probable routes of movement of caravans and rebel bands and in the interests of communications.

In total, during the reporting period, ambushes were set up and search and reconnaissance actions were carried out - 330, of which the result was given - 19, which is 5.7% of the effectiveness (6.4% in April this year).

The highest efficiency with high activity was shown by units and subunits of the 5th mechanized infantry division, 103 mechanized rifle division, 201 mechanized rifle division, the effectiveness of which was 10, 6.9, 19%, respectively.

As a result of ambush and search and reconnaissance actions destroyed: rebels - 90, caves - 1, car - 1, 3 motorcycles. Captured: small arms - 34 units, ammunition for SO - 7 thousand units, RPG - 2 units, RPG rounds - 13 units, mines and land mines - 12 units, RPG - 29 units, explosives - 2 kg ., documents of 1 Islamic committee. Detained - 38 rebels.

Our losses: killed - 3 people, wounded - 17 people (including 2 officers).

The sabotage actions of the rebels in May do not decrease. So, during the reporting period, the rebels committed 54 acts of sabotage, as a result of which our losses amounted to: killed - 30 people (including 7 officers), wounded - 91 people, including 4 officers. By technique: MTLBU - 1, armored personnel carrier - 4, tank - 1, cars - 11, aircraft - 5, helicopters - 3.

By retaliatory actions, the rebels were destroyed - 97, detained - 15.

Captured: CO - 21 units, ammunition for DShK - 400 units, RPG - 1, RPG shots - 2 pcs., BO shots - 5 pcs.

Thus, as a result of military actions of troops in May, the following were destroyed: rebels - 4681, SO - 66 units, ammunition for SO - 1 thousand units, DShK - 117 units, ammunition for DShK - 8.88 thousand units, RPG - 123 units, rounds for RPGs - 11, BO - 3 units, mortars - 33 units, mines for mortars - 338 units, PGU - 3 units, mines and land mines - 887 units, WG - 68 units ., BB - 40 kg., Strong points - 57, firing points - 251, caves - 378, 49 fortresses, various warehouses - 55, 21 Islamic committees, 14 cars, 3 motorcycles, 11 machine guns, 90 pack animals.

Captured: SO - 745 units, ammunition for SO - 281.1 thousand units, DShK - 5 units, 13 barrels for DShK, ammunition for DShK - 69.56 thousand units, RPG - 35 units, shots RPG - 281 units, BO - 5 units, rounds for BO - 168 units, mortars - 2 units, mines for a mortar - 1343 units, PGU - 2 units, mines and land mines - 1021 units, WG - 442 pcs., Explosives - 662 kg., Various warehouses - 87, documents of 10 Islamic committees, cars - 6, motorcycles - 5, ammunition for PGU - 740 pcs., Machine guns - 3 units, radio stations - 3 units. Filtered - 1200 people, detained - 378 rebels, taken prisoner - 79. Removed mines and land mines - 293 pcs.

Our losses: killed - 66 people (including 13 officers), wounded - 249 people (including 16 officers).

By technique: MTLBU - 1 unit, armored personnel carrier - 5 units, tank - 1 unit, cars - 11 units, aircraft - 6 units, helicopters - 3.

June 1984

Army troops completed the plan of military operations for June, as well as the task of assisting local authorities in strengthening state power in the controlled counties and volosts.

In June, 7 operations were carried out, of which: planned - 6, unplanned - 1.

Operations were carried out in the provinces: BAGLAN, PARVAN, KAPISA, KABUL, GERAT, BADAKHSHAN, KUNAR, NANGARKHAR.

Planned operations continue: in the provinces of BAGLAN, PARVAN, KAPISA under the leadership of the commander of the army, Lieutenant General L. GENERALOV; in the province of BAGLAN, under the leadership of the deputy commander of the 201st infantry division, Colonel Tolokov.

The objectives of the planned operation in the PANDJSHER gorge remained the same:

• rout and destruction of bandit formations, Islamic committees, bases and warehouses;
• elimination of the main channel for the supply of weapons and other materiel to the insurgent formations from abroad;
• creation of favorable conditions for the establishment and conduct of political work of party and government agencies DRA with the population in the liberated zone.

• destruction of the enemy grouping in parts;
• finding base areas and warehouses, Islamic committees and their destruction;
• widespread use of tactical airborne assault forces for the implementation of newly obtained intelligence data.

As a result of hostilities in the PANDJSHER gorge in June, the following were destroyed: rebels - 1832, small arms - 79 units, ammunition for SO - 1.6 thousand units, DShK - 62 units, RPGs - 52 units, mortars - 4 units. , BO - 2 units, strong points - 16, firing points - 23, caves - 15, fortresses - 49, hand grenades - 26 units, PGI - 1 unit, various warehouses - 9, machine guns - 2 units, pack animals - 15.

Captured: small arms - 141 units, ammunition for SO - 60.4 thousand units, DShK - 12 units, 1 barrel of DShK, ammunition for DShK - 87.6 thousand units, RPG - 4 units, shots for RPGs - 128 units, mortars - 5 units, mines for M - 271 units, BO - 3 units, rounds for BO - 565 units, mines and land mines - 547 units, RPGs - 278 units, explosives - 27 kg, warehouses - 17, documents of IK - 6, radio stations - 2 units, PGI - 1, fire cord 600 m, KPVT - 1 unit, RPO shots - 12 units.

148 mines and land mines were removed, 56 rebels were taken prisoner, 70 rebels were detained and transferred to the KhAD.

Our losses: killed - 40 people (including 2 officers), wounded - 101 people (including 8 officers).

In the period from 1 to 10 June, a planned operation was carried out in the green zone of HERAT under the leadership of the commander of the 5th Guards. Major General GA ANOSHIN forces: from 5 MSD - 101 MSD (without MSB and TB), 371 MSD (without MSB, TB), 650 orb, 24 TP (without TB), 1060 AP (without two ADN) ... From 70 omsbr - 2 ms.

From the DRA Air Force - 17th Infantry Division, 21st Infantry Brigade, 466p "K", OB "Ts", HAD units, Tsaranda.

The purpose of the operation was:

• defeat bandit groups, warehouses in the green zone and the old city of HERAT;
• to prevent an organized uprising of the rebels and the counter-revolutionary underground against the people's power;
• help stabilize the situation in the area of \u200b\u200bthe operation.

Features of the operation:

• delivering a massive aviation strike by 76 Su-17, Su-7, Su-25 aircraft against the reconnoitered areas of the rebel concentration in the initial period of the operation, followed by air support for the combat operations of the troops;
• widespread use of tactical airborne assault forces in several echelons to blockade the green zone and the city of GERAT;
• joint actions of Afghan and Soviet units when combing blocked areas;
• the enemy did not put up significant resistance, since the main forces of the rebels were withdrawn from the area of \u200b\u200bthe forthcoming hostilities in advance.

As a result of the operation, 3195 people were filtered, 140 rebels were detained and transferred to the KhAD, 183 rebels were drafted into the army, 7 rebels were taken prisoner.

Destroyed: insurgents - 193, IR - 8, small arms - 74 units, machine guns - 1 unit, RPG - 1 unit, motorcycles - 7, hospital - 1, cars - 2 units, PTM - 12 units.

Captured: small arms - 139 units, machine guns - 3 units, RPGs - 1 units, rounds for RPGs - 30 units, ammunition for SO - 15.66 thousand units, printing house - 1, cars - 8 units. , motorcycle - 1, hospital - 1, radio station - 1, BTR-40 - 1 unit, various warehouses - 4, documents 4 IR, hand grenades - 37 units, PTM - 21 units, telephone - 1, sets of uniforms - 99, binoculars - 1.

Our losses: killed - 4 people, wounded - 6 people.

Losses in equipment: BMP - 1 unit, GTMM - 1 unit.

In the province of Kabul, a planned operation was carried out in the period from June 24 to July 2 by the forces of 350 PDP (without PDB), 1 PDB (without PDR) 357 PDP, RR 356 PDP, 80 ORR, 1179 AP, 3/181 MSR, ADN 181 MSR together with two battalions of Tsaranda. The leader is the acting commander of the 103rd Guards. Airborne Division Lieutenant Colonel E. BOCHAROV.

Objectives of the operation:

• identify and destroy bandit groups and warehouses in the DEKHSABZ district;
• prevent the enemy from breaking through into the Panjshir Gorge and southward, into the Nangarhar Valley;
• assist local authorities in stabilizing the situation and strengthening state power in the area of \u200b\u200bthe operation.

The main features of the operation:

• 3 MSB 181 MSR and 350 PDP when blocking operated in opposite directions: 350 PDP from the south, 181 MSB from the north, north-west, which prevented the rebels from breaking out of the blocked area and escape from the attacks of troops and aviation;
• the blocking of the areas where the rebels were located was carried out in the dark, and the combing - at dawn, which achieved secrecy and surprise of actions;
• the subunits operated on foot without an armored group, with the support of aviation and artillery;
• in the hot part of the day from 10.00 to 16.00 the troops remained at the occupied lines and did not conduct active hostilities in order to preserve strength and activity for operations at night.

As a result, the operation destroyed: rebels - 307, DShK - 19 units, mortars - 3 units, OP - 22, OT - 20, warehouses - 2, BO - 1 unit, Islamic committees - 2, ammunition for DShK and SB - 16 thousand pieces, rounds for BO - 9, mines for mortar - 48 pieces, explosives - 400 kg.

Captured: small arms - 25 units, ammunition for SO - 15 thousand units, DShK - 3 units, ammunition for DShK - 11 thousand units, 4 barrels for DShK, PGU - 1 unit, barrels for PGU - 3 pcs., MANPADS "S-2M" - 1 pc., Rounds for BO - 22 pcs., Mines and land mines - 116 pcs., Warehouses - 8, explosive - 204 kg, RPG shots - 27 pcs., RPG - 1 units, mines for a mortar - 76 units, WG - 35 units, mortars - 2 units, radio stations - 1, lapis lazuli - 120 kg, gas masks - 11 units.

Our losses: killed - 7 people (of which 1 officer), wounded - 30 people, BTR-70 - 1 unit.

In the period from June 25 to July 3, a planned operation was carried out in the provinces of KUNAR, NANGARKHAR by forces of 2, 3 mssb, dshb, tb (without 2 companies), adn (without batr), rr 66 omsbr, 1 omsb together with units 9, 11 pd , 405 pgb under the leadership of the first deputy commander of the army, Major General P.S. Semenov.

The concept of the operation provided for:

• the use of front-line and army aviation, artillery fire on the identified rebel groups and warehouses, inflict defeat on them and active hostilities to blockade certain areas, gorges and check them in order to identify bandit formations within 9 days in the direction of ASADABAD - JELALABAD, along the KUNAR river using TVD defeat rebel groups in the KUNAR river valley, expand the zone of influence of state power and assist local party bodies in establishing and strengthening people's power in the KUNAR river valley.

Features of the operation:

• air strikes and artillery strikes against areas where insurgents are concentrated, bases and warehouses before the offensive of troops;
• the use of TACD to blockade areas and the location of bandit formations with the subsequent combing of these areas by Afghan units;
• consistent blocking of gorges by occupying the dominant heights and combing them in the opposite direction;
• the rebels, using the well-known, inaccessible terrain, withdrew the main forces deep into the mountains, resisting well-trained small groups;
• severe weather conditions, heat reduced the activity of subunits, slowed down the pace of the offensive.

As a result of the operation, the following were destroyed: rebels - 316, DShK - 9 units, BM - 1 unit, mortars - 2 units, OP - 11, OT - 12, fortresses - 3, SO - 20 units, PPM - 12 units. , PTM - 11 pcs., Warehouses with food - 3.

Captured: small arms - 7 units, ammunition for SO - 1.5 thousand units, anti-aircraft guns - 30 units. PTM removed - 128 pcs.

Detained and transferred to the KhAD - 27 rebels.

Our losses: killed - 8 people (including 2 officers), wounded - 9 people (of them 3 officers), died from heatstroke - 9 people.

The concept of the operation carried out in the period from 23 to 29 June in the province of KANDAGAR by forces of 2, 3 MSB (without MSR), TB, ADN (without 2 Batr), RR 70 OMRB, 9 MSR 371 MSR, ADN (without Artillery Battr) 1060 AP 3 omsb together with 20, 34 pp, 7 tbr, 201 orb, OB Tsaranda under the leadership of the deputy chief of staff of the army, Major General A. LUCHINSKY, provided for:

• delivering massive strikes by aviation and artillery, by active actions of troops with the use of TACD to defeat the identified gangs and rebel groups in the vicinity of KANDAGAR;
• expand the zones of influence of state power and stabilize the situation in the combat area.

Features of the operation:

• with the beginning of the operation, the enemy did not leave his areas and put up stubborn resistance to the troops;
• the application of massive air and artillery strikes against the largest rebel groups, bases and warehouses before the offensive, during the offensive, which reduced the number of losses and contributed to the successful completion of missions by subunits;
• access to areas of combat operations were illuminated at night by artillery, which constrained the enemy's maneuver;
• the enemy relied widely on the prepared defensive lines, skillfully maneuvering in familiar terrain;
• high vegetation, the presence of orchards and vineyards impeded the actions of our troops and created favorable conditions for the defense of the enemy, allowed the rebels and their snipers to operate in small groups from ambushes.

As a result of the operation, the following were destroyed: rebels - 261, small arms - 15 units, DShK - 2 units, mortars - 3 units, ATV - 12 units, APM - 2 units, RPGs - 3 units, firing points - 29 units, defensive structure - 1, motorcycle -

1 unit, warehouses with ammunition - 3, 1 food warehouse, pack animals - 10, warehouses - 1.

Captured: small arms - 56 units, ammunition for SO - 7.95 thousand units, ammunition for DShK - 0.65 thousand units, RPGs - 4 units, shots for RPGs - 35 units, shots for BO - 8 pcs., Hand grenades - 30 pcs., PTM - 18 pcs., PPM - 2 pcs., Explosives - 180 kg, fuses for mines - 30 pcs., Bicycles - 10 pcs., 1 radio station, 1 sight for a sniper rifle, honey. warehouse - 1, min to M - 25 pcs., documents of 2 IK, stores to AK - 11 pcs. Removed: PTM - 6 pcs., PPM - 7 pcs., 1 land mine. 5 people were arrested and transferred to the KhAD.

Our losses: killed - 2 people, wounded - 10 people.

The concept of a private operation carried out in the BADAKHSHAN province from June 8 to 28 by the forces of 1 MSB (without MSR), 2, 3 MSB (without 2 companies), RR, ADN, ISR 860 OMS together with units of 24 pp, OB Tsaranda, HAD , under the leadership of the commander of the 860th Omsk Police Department, Lieutenant Colonel SIDOROV, provided for:

• to defeat the rebel groups in the ARGUND valley and the KHAZARA gorge by air and artillery strikes and active actions of the troops;
• stabilize the situation in the combat area;
• check the possibilities and passability of the old Kishim road and the exit to ARTYNDZHELAU.

Features of the operation:

• for the first time 860 omsp operated in full force on equipment
• the use of air and artillery strikes against reconnoitered targets and on call;
• consistent blocking of the areas where rebel groups are deployed by occupying heights and ensuring the advance of the main forces along the bottom of the gorge;
• the armored group and other equipment moved off the roads due to its large destruction.

As a result of the operation, the following were destroyed: rebels - 154, DShK - 2 units, RPG - 1 unit, SO - 7 units, PTM - 3 units, 2 warehouses, detained and transferred to the KhAD - 83 rebels, captured - 4 ...

Captured: small arms - 35 units, ammunition for SO - 1.75 thousand units, machine guns 2 units, warehouses - 18, explosives - 95 kg, WG - 17 units, mines and land mines - 17, documents of 1 IR , mines and land mines removed - 19 pieces.

Our losses: killed - 2 people, including 1 officer, wounded - 9 people.

In addition to conducting operations, army troops were involved in the implementation of intelligence data in the areas of responsibility received by intelligence agencies, through the Soviet missions and the DRA Armed Forces.

In total, 35 implementations were carried out in June (25 in May of this year), of which 26 were effective, which is 75.5% of the effectiveness (96% in May of this year).

The highest efficiency with high activity was shown by units and units of the 5th Guards. MSD, 201 MSD.

As a result of the implemented implementations, the following were destroyed: rebels - 467, CO - 39 units, DShK - 12 units, BO - 1 unit, mortars - 9 units, mines and land mines - 12 units, OP - 7, OT - 14, warehouses - 5, IR - 1, 1 car.

Detained - 90 people, taken prisoner - 3 rebels.

Captured: SO - 91 units, ammunition for SO - 14.4 thousand units, DShK - 1 unit, RPG - 1 unit, rounds for RPG - 2 units, mines and land mines - 38 units, WG - 6 pcs., Documents 2 IR, machine gun - 1 pc.

Our losses: killed - 5 people, including 3 officers, wounded - 8 people, including 3 officers, BRM - 1 unit, Mi-8T - 1 unit.

In accordance with the plan for organizing ambush and reconnaissance and search operations, army units and subunits widely used them on the likely routes of movement of caravans and rebel bands and in the interests of communications.

In total, in June, ambushes were set up and reconnaissance and search operations were carried out - 343 (330 in May of this year), of which the result was shown - 33, which is 9.5% of the effectiveness (5.7% in May). The highest performance was shown by units and subdivisions of the 5th Guards. Msd, 201 Msd, 1, 3 Omsb.

As a result of ambush and reconnaissance and search actions, the following were destroyed: rebels - 491, CO - 47 units, CO ammunition - 80 thousand units, DShK - 7 units, RPG - 1 unit, mortars - 5 units, OP - 7 , fortress - 1, warehouses - 3, IR - 1, cars - 8, motorcycles - 3.

Captured: SO - 122 units, ammunition for SO - 44.17 thousand units, DShK - 3 units, ammunition for DShK - 2.18 thousand units, RPG - 4 units, RPG rounds - 27 units. , BO - 1 unit, BO rounds - 20 pcs., Mortar - 1 unit, mines and landmines - 48 pcs., WG - 45 pcs., Explosives - 3 kg, warehouses - 2, documents 3 IR, cars - 2 units

35 people were detained and transferred to the KhAD.

Our losses: killed - 12 people, including 4 officers, wounded - 8 people.

The sabotage activities of the rebels in the reporting period decreased slightly. So, in June, the rebels committed 44 acts of sabotage (68 in May), as a result of which our losses amounted to: killed - 29 people, including 5 officers, wounded - 72 people, including 4 officers.

Losses in equipment: tank - 1 unit, BMP - 1 unit, armored personnel carrier (BRDM) - 4 units, cars - 8 units, aircraft - 1, helicopter - 1.

Retaliatory actions destroyed: rebels - 62, pack animals - 20, detained - 14 rebels.

Captured: RPG - 3 units, CO - 1 unit.

Photographed: PTM - 32 pcs., Land mines - 8 pcs.

Thus, as a result of military operations in June, 3249 people were filtered, 479 rebels were detained and transferred to the KhAD, and 70 rebels were taken prisoner.

Destroyed: rebels - 3094, CO - 271 units, ammunition CO - about 96 thousand units, DShK - 117 units, RPG - 58 units, BO - 5 units, mortars - 27 units, mines for M - 448 units, PGI - 2 units, mines and land mines - 184 units, WG - 26 units, explosives - 50 kg, OP - 63, OT - 95, caves - 55, fortresses - 53, warehouses - 27, cars - 11 units, motorcycles - 11 units, machine guns - 7 units, defensive structure - 1, pack animals - 30, hospital - 1.

Captured: SO - 621 units, ammunition for SO - 180 thousand units, DShK - 20 units, 4 barrels for DShK, ammunition for DShK - 97 thousand units, RPG - 16 units, rounds for RPGs - 369 units, BO - 4 units, rounds for BO - 615 units, mortars - 8 units, mines for M - 367 units, PGU - 2 units, mines and land mines - 917 units, WG - 448 units. , BB - 612 kg., Warehouses - 55, documents of 19 IR, cars - 10 units, motorcycles - 7 units, machine guns - 6 units, radio stations - 5 units, printing house - 1, hospital - 1, BTR-40 - 1 unit, MANPADS “S-2M” - 1 unit, DShK machine - 1, battery for rst - 7 units, PGU barrel - 3 units, machines for detonating landmines - 3 units, fire-line - 200 m.

Mines and land mines removed - 468 pcs.

Our losses: killed - 170 people, including 24 officers, wounded - 351 people, including 48 officers.

July 1984

The army troops completed the plan of military operations for July, as well as the tasks of assisting local authorities in strengthening state power in the controlled counties and volosts.

In July, 4 operations were carried out, of which: planned - 2, unscheduled - 2. Operations were carried out in the provinces of BAGLAN, PARVAN, KAPISA, KABUL, FARAH.

In addition, planned operations in the provinces of KABUL, LOGAR, carried out by forces of 103 airborne divisions, 181 SMR, 56 ODBR, GAZNI by 191 OMR, continue; unscheduled - in the provinces of TOKHAR, BADAKHSHAN by the forces of 860 omsp.

In the province of BAGLAN, in the period from 26.06 to 06.07 1984, a planned operation was carried out by forces of 149 MRR, 122 MRR, 783 orbs, 998 ap, 990 zap together with units of 20 infantry division, operational battalion Tsaranda, HAD bodies under the leadership of the deputy commander of the 201st motorized rifle division, Lieutenant Colonel Tolyukov I. ...

By the beginning of hostilities, the total rebel grouping was about 40 gangs with a total number of up to 1400 people. A large number of bases and warehouses with weapons, ammunition, food and medicine are concentrated in the mountains.

Objectives of the operation:

• the destruction of bandit formations, bases and warehouses in the areas of KHUNUMASHI-DAKHANAYI-GORI, NAKHRIN, BAGLAN;
• contribute to the stabilization of the situation and the strengthening of state power in the area of \u200b\u200bhostilities.

Features of warfare:

• the use of tactical airborne assault forces to blockade the areas where the rebels are deployed while simultaneously deploying armored groups to support the actions of the TAC;
• sequential blocking of villages with subsequent combing them by Afghan units;
• massive use of air strikes and artillery fire to destroy the accumulation of rebels, bases and warehouses, as well as to withdraw the combined-arms commanders;
• lighting of the terrain and harassing artillery fire on possible routes for the advance of the rebels at night in order to prevent counterattacks and breakthrough of the enemy from the blocked area.

As a result of the operation, the following were destroyed: rebels - 107, mortars - 1 unit, DShK - 7 units, mines and landmines - 42 units, caves - 50 units, various warehouses - 4 units, workshops for the production of landmines - 1 unit.

Captured: small arms - 23 units, ammunition for SO - 11.36 thousand pieces, ammunition for DShK - 0.5 thousand pieces, rounds for RPGs - 6 pieces, hand grenades - 10 pieces, machine for DShK - 1 unit, various warehouses - 6, documents for 1 IR, cars - 4 units.

Arrested - 62 rebels, filtered - 291 people.

Our losses: killed - 2 people, wounded - 6 people (including 2 officers).

Losses in equipment: BMP - 2 units, cars - 1 unit.

In the period from 15 to 23 July in the province of KABUL, a planned operation was carried out under the leadership of the chief of staff of the 103rd Guards. Airborne Division Colonel KHIMICH forces 350 PDP (without PDB), 357 PDP (without 2 PDB), 1/181 MSR, 80 ORR, 1179 AP together with units of 37 BR "K", 23 battalion "SN".

Objectives of the operation:

• the defeat of bandit formations, base areas and warehouses in the area northwest and west of KABUL;
• stabilize the situation in the green zone adjacent to the KABUL-CHARIKAR section of the route and clear it of the rebel forces.

Features of the operation:

• the enemy did not offer strong resistance to the troops, but occupied the commanding heights with small, well-armed groups (20–25 people), stubbornly holding them, covered the withdrawal of the main forces into the mountains and ensured the removal of weapons and ammunition from dangerous areas;
• massive use of air strikes and artillery strikes against separated targets, as well as support for troops on call;
• sequential blocking of areas of accumulation of rebels and villages, followed by the combing of these areas by forces of Afghan units;
• combat operations were conducted in high mountains, so the use of the firepower of armored groups was limited and the fire effect on the enemy was provided through air strikes and fire support of artillery.

As a result of the operation, the following were destroyed: rebels - 151, ammunition for SO - 3.74 thousand units, DShK - 3 units, ammunition for DShK - 11, 45 thousand units, shots for RPGs - 23 units, shots for BO - 43 units, PGU - 1 unit, mines for a mortar - 19 units, mines and land mines - 20 units, WG - 13 units, explosives - 450 kg., 1 strong point, 6 firing points, caves - 12 units, Islamic committee - 1, warehouses of various - 12, fuse - 170 m.

Captured: small arms - 30 units, ammunition for SO - 8.6 thousand units, DShK - 10 units, barrels for DShK - 3 units, ammunition for DShK - 57.88 thousand units, RPGs - 3 units, rounds for RPGs - 158 units, mortars - 2 units, mines for mortars - 111 units, BO - 2 units, shots for BO - 439 units, PGU - 2 units, KPVT - 1 unit. , barrel for KPVT - 1 pc., mines and land mines - 128 units, warehouses - 3 units, WG - 16 units, sights for DShK - 5 units, mines and land mines removed - 21 units.

Our losses: killed - 6 people, including 2 officers, wounded - 22 people, including 1 officer.

A private operation continued in the provinces of PARVAN, KAPISA under the leadership of the Chief of the Operations Department of the Army Headquarters, Colonel A. ZINENICH, by units and units of the 108th mechanized infantry division, 345 opdp, dshb, rr 70 omsbr in conjunction with units 8 dd, 444 p "K".

Objectives of the operation:

• by strikes of aviation and artillery, by active actions of the troops, to defeat the newly identified bandit groups of rebels in the PANDJSHER and ANDARAB gorges;
• to prevent the approach of new bandit formations to the indicated areas, replenishment of the rebel forces with weapons and ammunition;
• to assist local and party bodies in managing state power and expanding its influence in areas of hostilities.

Features of the operation:

• the enemy avoids clashes with the troops, but tries to impose guerrilla methods of struggle;
• search for bases, warehouses of the rebels through the landing of tactical airborne assault forces and their destruction with the support of aviation and artillery;
• consistent destruction of newly identified bandit groups and stepping up efforts to prepare deployment points for units and subunits remaining to provide assistance to the people's government.

As a result of the operation, in the period from 1.07 to 25.07 destroyed: rebels - 631, small arms - 21 units, DShK - 22 units, RPGs - 6 units, mortars - 2 units, caves - 3, fortresses - 52, mines and land mines - 9, pack animals - 83.

Captured: small arms - 82 units, ammunition for SO - 10 thousand units, ammunition for DShK - 3.24 thousand units, RPGs - 4 units, rounds for RPGs - 16 units, mines for mortars - 8 pcs., rounds for BW - 39 pcs., mines and land mines - 255 pcs., WG - 92 pcs., explosives - 20 kg, various warehouses - 10, documents 2 IR, machine gun - 1, mines and land mines removed - 42 pcs. ., detained and transferred to the KHAD - 18 rebels, taken prisoner - 2.

Our losses: killed - 22 people, including 1 officer, wounded - 64 people, including 9 officers.

Losses in equipment: BMP - 4 units, BMR - 1 unit, cars - 1 unit, Mi-8 - 2 units.

The concept of a private operation carried out from 5 to 8 July in the green zone of SHINDAND by the forces of units and units of the 5th Guards. mfd together with pgb 7 pgbr, OB Tsaranda under the leadership of the chief of staff of the 5th guards. Ministry of Internal Affairs Colonel E. N. MALAKHOV, provided for:

• to focus the main efforts on the destruction of the rebels in the villages of MAKALLAKHI-KUNDUZ, NASRABAD, KHOJANU, BARTEKHT, PARMAKAN;
• blocking the areas where the rebels are located, combing them with the forces of the 7th brigade and the Tsaranda battalion to identify and destroy the groups of rebels, warehouses.

Features of the operation:

• the rebels continue to shy away from open combat; if it is impossible to leave, they try to join the battle in the evening in order to break through from the blockaded area, using the dark time;
• the control of units and subunits during the advancement and blocking was carried out from the VZPU, which made it possible to reduce the time required for subunits to enter blocking and eliminated gaps at the junctions of subdivisions and units;
• blocking at night was carried out in a tight ring (between vehicles up to 25 m), and dismounted personnel of the subunits occupied a perimeter defense and dug in between the vehicles, which excluded the possibility of the rebels breaking through from the blocked area.

As a result of the operation, the following were destroyed: rebels - 84, mines and land mines - 7, fuel and lubricants warehouse - 1, Islamic committee - 1, cars - 6 units, explosives - 7 kg, points - 8.

Captured: small arms - 21 units, ammunition for SO - 1,035 thousand units, mines and land mines - 4 units.

We have no losses.

In addition to conducting operations, army troops were involved in the implementation of intelligence data in the areas of responsibility received by intelligence agencies through Soviet missions.

In total, 60 implementations were carried out during the reporting period, of which 51 were effective, which is 86% of the effectiveness. The most efficient and highly active implementation of intelligence data from units and subunits of the 5th Guards. mfd, 201 mstd, 103 airborne divisions.

As a result of the intelligence implementations carried out, the following were destroyed: rebels - 332, SO - 5 units, DShK - 2 units, RPG - 5 units, mortar - 1, mines and land mines - 20 units, strong points - 10, Islamic committees - 2 , machine guns - 3 units, car - 1 unit, pack animals - 12.

Captured: SO - 97 units, ammunition for SO - 43.78 thousand units, DShK - 4 units, barrel for DShK - 1, ammunition for DShK - 2.97 thousand units, RPG - 2 units, rounds for RPGs - 86 pcs., mortar - 1 unit, mines for mortars - 72 pcs., BO - 1 unit, shots for BO - 74 pcs., mines and land mines - 36 pcs., documents of 2 IR, warehouses of various - 4, WG - 212 pcs., BB - 230 kg, fire cord - 86 m, machine guns - 3 units, pack animals - 19, mines and land mines removed - 80 pcs., 2 rebels captured, detained and transferred to KHAD 150 rebels, filtered - 1722 people.

Our losses: killed - 1 officer, wounded - 9 people, including 3 officers.

In accordance with the plan, the army's troops carried out ambush and reconnaissance and search operations both on the routes of movement of caravans and rebel bands, and in the interests of communications.

So, during the reporting period in July, ambushes were set and reconnaissance and search actions were carried out - 514, of which the result was given - 60, which is about 12% of the effectiveness.

The most active and with great efficiency are ambush and reconnaissance and search operations of subunits and units of 5th mechanized infantry division, 201st mechanized infantry division, 1, 2, 3 motorized rifle battalions.

As a result of ambush and reconnaissance and search actions, the following were destroyed: rebels - 393, CO - 2 units, ammunition for CO - 40 thousand units, DShK - 6 units, RPG - 2 units, BO - 1 unit, rounds to BO - 20 units, PGI - 1 unit, mortars - 2 units, mines and landmines - 200 units, WG - 4 units, explosives - 2000 kg, cars - 14 units, motorcycles - 4 units, tractors - 2 units, pack animals - 39.

Captured: CO - 2 units, ammunition for CO - 98.11 thousand units, DShK - 2 units, ammunition for DShK - 2.64 thousand units, RPG - 4 units, rounds for RPG - 31 units ., mines for a mortar - 6 pcs., mines and land mines - 172 pcs., documents of 9 IR, warehouses - 2, WG - 89 pcs., cars - 4 pcs., machine guns - 2 pcs., mines and land mines removed - 6 pcs., taken prisoner - 16 rebels.

Detained - 80 rebels, filtered - 81 people.

Our losses: killed - 6 people, wounded - 16, including 1 officer, infantry fighting vehicles - 1 unit.

The sabotage activities of the rebels do not decrease in the summer months. So, in 25 days of July, the rebels committed 45 acts of sabotage, of which: shelling of columns - 12, shelling of posts and PPD - 17, explosions on mines and land mines - 12.

As a result of sabotage, our losses amounted to: killed - 60 people, of whom officers - 17, wounded - 89 people, of which officers - 6. Losses in equipment: BMP - 3 units, armored personnel carriers - 3 units, tanks - 1 unit. , cars - 10 units, helicopters - 4 units.

Retaliatory actions destroyed: rebels - 46, WG - 2 units, captured: SO - 3 units, ammunition for SO - 6 thousand units, mines and land mines - 14 units, captured - 1 rebel, detained and handed over in KHAD - 1 rebel.

Thus, as a result of hostilities in July (excluding aviation), the following were destroyed: insurgents - 1744, small arms - 46 units, ammunition for SO - 43.74 units, DShK - 40 units, ammunition for DShK - 11, 45 thousand units, RPGs - 13 units, rounds for RPGs - 23 units, BO - 1 unit, rounds for BO - 63 units, PGU - 2 units, mortars - 6 units, mines for mortars - 19 units, mines and landmines - 298 units, WG - 19 units, VZ - 2457 kg, strong points - 2, firing points - 14, caves - 65, fortresses - 52, IR - 4, machine guns - 10 units, warehouses of various - 20 units, cars - 21 units, motorcycles - 4 units, fuses - 172 m, tractors - 2 units.

Captured: SO - 374 units, ammunition for SO - 179 thousand units, DShK - 16 units, 4 barrels for DShK, ammunition for DShK - 67.23 thousand units, RPG - 13 units, rounds for RPGs - 297 units, mortars - 3 units, mines for a mortar - 197 units, BO - 3 units, rounds for BO - 552 units, PGU - 2 units, KPVT - 1 unit, barrel for KPVT - 1 pcs., mines and land mines - 598 pcs., documents of 14 IK, various warehouses - 25 pcs., WG - 419 pcs., explosives - 250 kg., cars - 8 pcs., fire cord - 8.6 m, DShK machine - 1 unit, sight for DShK - 5 units, machine guns - 6 units, pack animals - 19. Mines and land mines removed - 163 units.

22 rebels were taken prisoner, 360 rebels were detained, 5263 people were filtered.

Our losses: 96 people were killed, of which 20 were officers, 335 people were wounded, of which 30 were officers.