Caesar crossing the Rubicon and the beginning of the civil war. Cross the Rubicon

The expression "to cross the Rubicon", that is, to make a certain defining act that no longer gives an opportunity to correct the decision, is well known. Most are also aware that this expression owes its appearance to Guy Julius Caesar.

Much less is known about what kind of Rubicon and under what circumstances Caesar himself crossed, and why this step of a politician and commander went down in history.

By the middle of the 1st century BC, the Roman Republic was experiencing an internal crisis. Simultaneously with the great successes in the campaigns of conquest, problems arose in the system government controlled... The Roman Senate was mired in political squabbles, and the leading Roman military leaders, who had gained fame and popularity for themselves in campaigns of conquest, thought about abandoning the republican system in favor of dictatorship and monarchy.

The successful politician and military leader Gaius Julius Caesar was one of those who not only spoke out for centralized power, but was not averse to concentrating it in their hands.

In 62 BC, the so-called triumvirate was formed in Rome - in fact, the three most ambitious politicians and military leaders began to govern the Roman Republic: Gnei Pompey, Mark Licinius Crassus and Guy Julius Caesar. Crassus, suppressing the uprising Spartacus, and Pompey, who won brilliant victories in the East, had claims to sole power, but by that time they could not cope alone with the opposition of the Roman Senate. Caesar at that moment was more viewed as a politician who managed to persuade the openly hostile Pompey and Crassus to an alliance. The prospects of Caesar himself as the sole head of Rome looked much more modest at that time.

The situation changed after Caesar, who led the Roman troops in Gaul, won the seven-year Gallic war. The glory of Caesar as a commander equaled the glory of Pompey, and in addition, he had troops loyal to him personally, which became a serious argument in the political struggle.

Bust of Julius Caesar in the museum. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

Caesar vs. Pompey

After Crassus died in Mesopotamia in 53 BC, the question came down to which of the two worthy opponents, Pompey or Caesar, would manage to become the sole ruler of Rome.

For several years, opponents tried to maintain a delicate balance, not wanting to slide into civil war. Both Pompey and Caesar had legions loyal to them, but they were located in the conquered provinces. By law, the commander did not have the right to enter the borders of Italy at the head of the army, if there were no military operations on the peninsula itself. The violator of this law was declared an "enemy of the Fatherland", which in its consequences was comparable to the declaration of an "enemy of the people" in the Stalinist USSR.

By the fall of 50 BC, the crisis between Pompey and Caesar reached its peak. Both sides, unable to agree on a new "division of spheres of influence", began to prepare for a decisive clash. The Roman Senate initially took a neutral position, but then Pompey's supporters were able to win over the majority in his favor. Caesar was refused an extension of the powers of the proconsul in Gaul, which allowed him to command the troops. At the same time, Pompey, who had legions loyal to him at his disposal, positioned himself as the defender of the republican "free system" from the usurper Caesar.

On January 1, 49 BC, the Senate declared Italy on martial law, appointed Pompey commander-in-chief, and set the task of ending the political turmoil. The end of the turmoil meant that Caesar resigned his powers as a proconsul in Gaul. In case of his persistence, military preparations were started.

Caesar was ready to lay down military power, but only if Pompey agreed to the same, but the Senate did not agree to this.

The main decision

On the morning of January 10, 49 BC, Caesar, who was in Gaul, received news of the military preparations of the Senate and Pompey from his supporters who had fled from Rome. Half of the forces loyal to him (2,500 legionnaires) were located on the border of the province of Cisalpine Gaul (now - northern Italy) and Italy itself. The border passed along the small local river Rubicon.

Caesar's troops after crossing the Rubicon. Fragment of an old engraving. Source: www.globallookpress.com

For Caesar, the time has come for a key decision - either, by submitting to the Senate, resign, or with loyal troops to cross the river and move to Rome, thereby violating the laws in force, which in case of failure, threatened inevitable death.

Caesar was not confident of success - he was popular, but Pompey was no less popular; his legionaries were hardened by the Gallic war, but Pompey's warriors were no worse.

But on January 10, 49 BC, Gaius Julius Caesar decided to cross the Rubicon with troops and go to Rome, having predetermined not only his own destiny, but also the further course of the history of Rome.

Having crossed the Rubicon at the head of the troops, Caesar thereby began a civil war. The swiftness of Caesar's actions discouraged the senate, and Pompey, with the available forces, did not dare to meet and even defend Rome, retreating to Capua. Meanwhile, the garrisons of the cities he occupied were going over to the side of the advancing Caesar, which strengthened the confidence of the commander and his supporters in ultimate success.

Pompey never gave a decisive battle to Caesar in Italy, leaving for the provinces and hoping to win with the help of forces located there. Caesar himself, only passing through Rome, captured by his supporters, went to pursue the enemy.

Caesar's choice cannot be changed

The civil war will drag on for four long years, although Caesar's main enemy Pompey will be killed (against Caesar's will) after being defeated at the Battle of Pharsalus. Finally, the Pompeian party will be defeated only in 45 BC, just a year before the death of Caesar himself.

Formally, Caesar did not become emperor in the current sense of the word, although from the moment of his proclamation as dictator in 49 BC, his powers only grew, and by 44 BC he had almost the full set of attributes of power inherent in a monarch.

The consistent centralization of power by Caesar, accompanied by the loss of influence of the Roman Senate, and became the reason for the conspiracy of supporters of the preservation of Rome as a republic. On March 15, 44 BC, the conspirators attacked Caesar in the Senate building, inflicting 23 stab wounds on him. Most of the wounds were superficial, but one of the blows was fatal.

The assassins did not take into account one thing: Caesar was extremely popular among the lower and middle strata of Rome. The people were extremely angry at the conspiracy of the aristocrats, as a result of which they themselves had to flee from Rome. After the death of Caesar, the Roman Republic fell completely. Caesar's heir, his great-nephew Guy Octavius, became the sovereign Roman emperor, now known as Octavian Augustus. The Rubicon has already been crossed.

Date: 50 BC e.

Julius Caesar crosses the Rubicon

December 17, 50 BC Julius Caesar, proconsul (governor and army commander) of Gaul, ordered the troops to cross the Rubicon River, which separated Pisalpine Gaul from Italy.

In doing so, he placed himself outside the law, since the Roman Senate decided to consider anyone who crosses this border with armed force to be a traitor to the homeland.

Since then, the expression "to cross the Rubicon" has been preserved, meaning the violation of all boundaries and prohibitions.

Many famous generals even before Julius Caesar treated republican institutions roughly, but it was Caesar's act that was regarded as a coup d'état that ended the Roman Republic, although the imperial system would be established only under Caesar's successor Octavian Augustus.

Crisis of the Roman Republic

The wars of conquest by the Romans lasted for two centuries (the events took place before our era).

In the East, the Roman generals Sulla and Pompey fought with the king of Pontus (a country on the Black Sea coast, in the north of modern Turkey) Mithridates and defeated him. Pontus, Bithynia (another state of Asia Minor) and then Syria became Roman provinces.

In the West, Julius Caesar conquers Gaul (58–52 BC). This war ends with the revolt of the united Gallic tribes under the leadership of the Arverni leader (the Gallic tribe that gave the name of the Auvergne region) Vercingetorig and their defeat.

Rome receives enormous wealth from the exploitation of its provinces. The loot, however, is used only by the rich. To reach the highest elected office, they have to incur large costs: not only have to campaign, but also to thank the Romans after the elections. Re-elected annually officials do not receive remuneration, but, on the contrary, incur huge expenses (for example, for organizing circus games for voters). After leaving and resigning, they become the rulers of the provinces and there they try not only to reimburse the spent, but also to plunder more than that. The lawyer and politician Cicero, speaking in defense of the Sicilians, in his famous accusatory speech against Verres, the proconsul of Sicily, exposed his extortions and crimes.

Warrior peasants, small and medium-sized farmers, who make up the middle class, are gradually ruined due to endless military campaigns, as they are forced to stay far from their allotments for a long time.

At the end of the II century. BC e. the brothers Tiberius and Gaius Gracchi, the tribunes of the people (a position created to protect the interests of the plebeians), tried to change this trend. Tiberius Gracchus proposed an agrarian law, which obliged the return of public lands seized by the rich and divide them into plots for distribution to poor citizens. The brothers met desperate resistance from the Senators and were destroyed one by one.

Since then, large-scale land use has become the predominant form of land use in Italy. land ownership, "villa", which was processed by slaves under the guidance of a slave manager.

Dictatorship of Julius Caesar

In such conditions, the existence of republican institutions becomes difficult. Even before Caesar, some of the victorious generals - Marius, Sulla, Pompey - treated these institutions with disdain. Sulla, for example, seized dictatorial power without time limits, but renounced it after changing the constitution.

In 60 BC. e. Julius Caesar, an ambitious politician, is still unremarkable, except for huge debts and scandals in privacy, shared power with Pompey and the rich man Crassus. This is how the first triumvirate was born. After serving as consul, he became proconsul of Gaul, which consisted of the province of Narbonne (incorporated into Roman possessions in 121 BC) and Gaul of Cisalpine.

Caesar rushed to the conquest of Gaul, called "hairy" (the main part of Gaul to the banks of the Rhine), in order to get the missing military glory and find a loyal army.

After the death of Crassus in the East in the war against Parthia, in Rome, with the support of the Senate, the sole power of Pompey was established.

It was then that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. He enters Rome, pursues Pompey and his supporters who fled to the East, and inflicts a crushing defeat on them at the Battle of Pharsalus, in Thessaly. Pompeii, who fled to Egypt, is killed

By order of the king's courtiers. Julius Caesar showed generosity, punishing his murderers and placing the beautiful Cleopatra on the Egyptian throne.

For several years, he destroyed all the remaining pockets of resistance.

A statesman and at the same time a writer, Caesar promotes his exploits, describing the campaigns and Gaul and the civil war.

He arrogated to himself all the power and the title of dictator, first for a certain period, then for life. Later he took the title of emperor (from the word imperium, i.e. military power).

However, he did not dare to proclaim himself king, as this title provoked the outrage of the Romans.

March 15, 44 BC e. (on the day of the ids of March) Caesar was killed at a meeting of the Senate by a group of conspirators hoping to restore the republic. Among them was Brutus, whom he loved as a son. Recognizing him among the attackers, he uttered the famous phrase: "Tu quoque, fili" ("And you, my son").

Julius Caesar's legacy

The republic was not restored. Caesar's chief assistant Mark Antony and Caesar's great-nephew and adopted son Octavian came to an agreement with Lepidus and created a second triumvirate. In the end, Antony and Octavian divided Roman possessions: Octanian received the West, and Antony - the East.

The latter settled in Alexandria, married Queen Cleopatra and led the life of an eastern king. It was not difficult to convince the Romans that Antony was plotting to establish a monarchy in Rome. The conflict broke out in 31 BC. e. A decisive battle took place at Cape Aktium, where the Egyptian fleet was defeated. Antony committed suicide, Cleopatra did the same. Egypt ceased to the Roman province.

Becoming the sole ruler, Octavian lulls the suspicion of the Romans, hiding real unlimited power behind a show of respect for republican institutions. He pretended to proclaim himself just a princeps - the first person of the republic (hence our "prince"). The word "princeps" was a euphemism for the word "emperor", the meaning of which we have explained. The heirs of Octavian, moreover, called themselves "Caesars", turning their proper name into a title.

From the Senate, Octavian received the name Augustus (a term of religious origin), which replaced the previous one.

In fact, Augustus established a new regime - an empire that replaced the republic.

Guy Julius Caesar. Rubicon

In July, consular elections were held for 49. Their result was again unfavorable for Caesar. His candidate Sulpicius Galba did not pass, and people who were hostile to him were again elected consuls - Guy Claudius Marcellus (brother of the consul in 51) and Cornelius Lentulus Cruz. The latter, however, was so enmeshed in debt that there was even a rumor about Caesar bribing him. However, further events showed the complete unreliability of these gossip.

The situation remained extremely tense. The threat grew more and more real civil war... The Cato faction did a lot of work, fueling panic, spreading more and more rumors, heating up the situation. So, one fine day Rome was shocked by the terrible news: Caesar, having crossed with the army of the Alps, was moving to Rome, the war had already begun. Then the consul Marcellus immediately called a meeting of the Senate and demanded that Caesar be recognized as an enemy of the fatherland, and the two legions that he had sent from Gaul at one time and which stood in Capua in full combat readiness, now, under the command of Pompey, would be thrown against Caesar himself.

When Curio opposed this proposal of the consul, saying that it was based on false rumors, and threatened with intercession, Marcellus declared: if they prevent me from passing a general decree for the benefit of the state, then I will pass it on my own behalf as consul. After that, he, together with his colleague, and even with the participation of the newly elected consuls (i.e., elected for the coming 49) went outside the city limits, to Pompey. Here he solemnly handed Pompey a sword and ordered him to defend the fatherland, handing over command of the legions already recruited and announcing further recruitment.

Kourion sharply condemned the illegal actions of the consul at a popular gathering, but at the same time he was powerless to oppose anything to them. His power of the tribune of the people did not extend beyond the city limits. In addition, his powers soon expired, so he thought it good to leave Rome and went to Caesar, who at that time was already in Ravenna, in the city closest to the borders of Italy in the province under his control.

Curio, arriving in Ravenna, advised Caesar not to miss the favorable moment, while the recruitment of troops in Italy had not actually deployed, and to start the first military action. However, Caesar still hesitated, not daring to shoulder the entire burden of the initiative in the internecine strife, or, as Aulus Hirtius puts it, “firmly decided to endure everything, as long as there was even the slightest hope of resolving the dispute on the basis of law, and not through war.

Obviously, Caesar at this time, although he considered war very likely, still did not exclude the possibility of an agreement. In any case, he was ready for serious concessions: he expressed his consent to surrender the command of eight legions and control of Transalpine Gaul by March 1, 49, leaving behind only Cisalpine Gaul with Illyricum and only two legions until the election. By the way, at this stage of the negotiations, Cicero, who returned from his province, made an attempt to take part in them. He returned in a joyful mood, in anticipation of triumph, and at the end of November 50 landed in Brundisium.

Caesar was not at all averse to attracting Cicero to his side, wrote to him and tried to influence him through people loyal to him, but, as it is easy to trace from Cicero's correspondence with his friends, he clearly leaned on the side of Pompey, although he probably considered the most favorable option of reconciliation of rivals.

While Cicero traveled from Brundisium to Rome, he twice met and talked with Pompey. During these meetings, Cicero tried in every possible way to persuade his interlocutor to accept Caesar's terms. Pompey, although he did not believe Caesar's peacefulness, expected all the worst from his new consulate and considered war inevitable, nevertheless, he was not completely free from hesitation either. He probably wanted Caesar's proposals to be rejected, but not by him, but by the Senate. As a matter of fact, this is what happened: Cato, Marcellus, Lentulus - the de facto leaders of the Senate - did not even want to hear about the negotiations now, and Caesar's proposals remained unanswered.

Moreover, when the tribune of the people, Mark Anthony, spoke at the meeting and read out Caesar's letter, in which he proposed that both rivals be freed from their provinces, from the command of the troops and then report back to the people in their activities, then, of course, this action of Caesar did not meet with sympathy in the senate, and Cato bluntly stated that Pompey, going to this or that peace proposal of Caesar, would make a mistake and only let himself be deceived not for the first time.

The turn of events inevitably led to a civil war. Obviously, Cicero was right, explaining the failure of his projects for a peaceful solution to the conflict by the fact that both on one side and on the other there were many influential people - clear supporters of the war. And yet Caesar made another, final attempt at reconciliation.

On January 1, 49, the day the newly elected consuls first assumed their duties and presided over a meeting of the senate, Caesar's new letter was read out. It was delivered by Kourion, who traveled in three days from Ravenna to Rome at an incredible speed for those times. But it was not enough to deliver the letter to the Senate; it still had to be read. This turned out to be not at all so simple, because the consuls opposed the reading of the letter, and only thanks to the "greatest persistence of the tribunes of the people" the reading did take place.

Caesar's letter contained, first of all, a solemn list of his deeds and services to the state, then it was said that the Senate should not deprive him of the right, granted to him by the people, to participate in elections before he surrendered the province and the command of the troops; at the same time, the letter reiterated his readiness to resign from all powers simultaneously with Pompey. But there was apparently a new note in this letter: Caesar declared that if Pompey retains power, then he will not give it up and even be able to use it. Obviously, it was this moment that gave Cicero a reason to characterize Caesar's letter as "harsh and full of threats."

The reaction of the Senate to the letter is described in some detail by Caesar himself in his "Notes on the Civil War." Although the tribunes managed to achieve, despite the resistance of the consuls, the reading of the letter, it was still not possible to ensure that on the basis of the letter a report was made to the Senate and, therefore, an official response to it was discussed. The consuls made a general report on the state of the state. But in essence it was just a procedural trick - all the same, the discussion of the general report could not pass by the questions put forward in Caesar's letter.

Consul Lentulus declared that he was ready to act decisively and without hesitation, if only the senators showed due firmness and did not, as was observed more than once before, curry favor with Caesar. Father-in-law of Remembering Scipio spoke in the same spirit and added that Pompey would not refuse his help to the Senate either, but it was necessary to act immediately, otherwise it would be too late. He also proposed to make a decision obliging Caesar to resign by a certain date (apparently, by July 1), otherwise declare him an enemy of the fatherland, plotting a coup d'etat.

Even some of Caesar's obvious enemies were opposed to such extreme and hasty decisions. So, the former consul Mark Marcellus spoke in the sense that such actions should be taken only after the set of troops announced by the Senate has been completed. Caesar's supporter Marcus Calidius, supported by Celius Rufus (Cicero's correspondent), suggested that Pompey should go to Spain, believing that if both rivals were outside Rome, this would lead to general peace. However, the consul Lentul attacked all the speakers. He said that Kalidia's proposal had nothing to do with the report under discussion and he would not even put it to a vote. Mark Marcellus himself refused his offer. Thus, under the pressure of the consul, the Senate, by a majority vote, adopted the decision formulated by Scipio. It goes without saying that the tribunes of the people Mark Antony and Cassius Longinus imposed a ban on this decision.

Pompey, since he possessed proconsular power, could not be in Rome itself, and therefore, naturally, did not take part in the meeting of the Senate. But since he was somewhere not far from the city, that same evening he invited all the senators to his place and during the conversation he praised those who were for decisive actions, condemned and at the same time encouraged those who waved. The city began to fill up with soldiers; Pompey summoned his veterans with promises of awards and promotions, and also summoned many of the two legions sent by Caesar. In this tense atmosphere, Calpurnius Piso, censor and father-in-law of Caesar, together with his former legate and now praetor Lucius Roscius, were asked to give them six days for a last attempt at reconciliation.

But the factio of Cato, that is, Cato himself, Scipio and the consul Lentulus, and behind the scenes, undoubtedly, Pompey, have already crossed the line that still separated them from the war. On January 7, a state of emergency (senatusconsultum ultimum) was declared at a meeting of the Senate. Consuls, praetors, tribunes and those with pro-consular powers under the city received unlimited power, which they could exercise and use so that "the state did not suffer any damage." This, in particular, made it possible to use such power against the recalcitrant tribunes. Then Mark Antony, calling all sorts of punishments and troubles on the heads of those who dared to make such a decision and, therefore, encroach on the inviolability of the tribunal power, left the Senate meeting. Cassius and Curion withdrew with him, especially since one of Pompey's detachments had allegedly already surrounded the building. That same night, the three of them, disguised as slaves, secretly fled to Caesar in a hired carriage, fearing for their safety and even for their lives.

On January 8 and 9, meetings of the Senate take place outside the city limits in order to give Pompey the opportunity to take part in them. The proposal and formulation of Scipio is approved as an official decision of the Senate, which could not be made at the meeting of January 1, 49, since then the tribunes were prohibited. The decision to recruit troops throughout Italy was again confirmed, Pompey was given the right to receive funds from the state treasury and from the municipalities. There is a distribution of the provinces: Scipio gets Syria, the Caesarean provinces are transferred to Domitius Ahenobarbus and Considius Nonian: the first - Cisalpine Gaul, the second - Transalpine. These decisions, as Caesar notes, are carried out in an extremely haste, disorderly manner, and all rights - both divine and human - are violated.

By the way, Pompey spoke at one of these meetings. Once again approving the firmness and courage of the senators, he informed them that he had nine legions, which were ready to act at any moment. As for Caesar, they say, the attitude of his own soldiers towards him is well known: they not only do not sympathize with him and are not going to protect him, but they will not even follow him.

As a result of all these meetings, decisions and statements, the situation becomes extremely clear, at least for Caesar. On January 12 (or 13), he gathers a gathering of soldiers of the 13th Legion, the only one of his legions who was with him on this side of the Alps. In his, as always, skillfully constructed speech, Caesar first of all complains that his enemies seduced Pompey, to whom he was always friendly, helping him in every possible way in achieving honors and a high position in the state. But perhaps even more distressing is the fact that the rights of the tribunal intercession, rights that even Sulla have left untouched, have been violated by violence. A state of emergency has been declared, that is, the Roman people have been called to arms. Therefore, he asks the soldiers to protect from enemies the good name and honor of the commander, under whose leadership they won so many brilliant victories for the glory of their homeland for ten years. The speech had the due effect: the soldiers, with a unanimous cry, expressed their readiness to defend their commander and the tribunes of the people from offenses inflicted by him.

It has long been noticed that this speech and the soldiers' meeting at which it was delivered. Caesar dated to the events preceding the crossing of the Rubicon, while the later tradition attributes it, as a rule, to the moment when Caesar's meeting with the tribunes that had fled to him had already taken place in Arimina. It was argued that Caesar in this case admits this inaccuracy quite deliberately in order to create the impression that he made the crossing over the Rubicon with the full consent of his army.

Whether this is true or not, it is indisputable that Caesar, giving a rather detailed account of his speech, describing all the events of the last decisive days, does not mention in a single word in the Notes about the famous crossing of the Rubicon. But more and more later historians and biographers dwell on this episode in detail, reporting various colorful details. So, it is known that Caesar had the following forces at the time of his speech: 5 thousand infantrymen (that is, the mentioned 13th legion) and 300 horsemen. However, as usual, counting more on the surprise of actions and bravery of the soldiers than on their numbers, he ordered to call the rest of his troops from across the Alps, nevertheless did not wait for their arrival.

A small detachment of the bravest soldiers and centurions, armed only with daggers, he secretly sent to Arimin, the first big City Italy, lying on the way from Gaul, in order to seize it by surprise attack without noise and bloodshed. Caesar himself spent the day in full view of everyone, even was present at the exercises of the gladiators. In the evening he took a bath and then dined with the guests. When it got dark, he, either complaining of indisposition, or simply asking him to wait, left the room and the guests. Taking with him a few, closest friends, he left for Arimin in a hired carriage, and at first deliberately (according to another version - getting lost) followed the wrong path and only at dawn caught up with the cohorts sent ahead by the Rubicon River.

This small and until then unremarkable river was considered, however, the border between Cisalpine Gaul and Italy itself. The crossing of this border with the troops meant, in fact, the beginning of a civil war. Therefore, all historians unanimously note the hesitation of Caesar. So, Plutarch says that Caesar understood the beginning of what disasters the transition would be and how the offspring would evaluate this step. Suetonius assures that Caesar, turning to his companions, said: "It is not too late to return, but it is worth crossing this bridge, and weapons will decide everything." Finally, Appian ascribes to Caesar the following words: "If I refrain from going over, my friends, this will be the beginning of disaster for me, but if I go over, for all people."

Nevertheless, having uttered the supposedly historical phrase "The die is cast." Caesar nevertheless crossed the Rubicon with his headquarters. Plutarch even gives this detail: the famous phrase was spoken in Greek. By the way, if only she was said at all, then this is quite plausible, since the phrase is nothing more than a quote from Menander, whom Caesar knew and even loved. In addition, Plutarch and Suetonius mention all sorts of miraculous signs that accompany the transition and seem to justify this fateful step.

So, the civil war began. Who, however, started it, who was its initiator: Pompey with the Senate or Caesar? To give an unambiguous answer to such a question, and the answer is not formal, but in essence, is by no means easy. Perhaps it is worth recalling the words of Cicero, already quoted, that both sides wanted war, and the following addition can be made to this just statement: not only wanted, but also started a war, as is often the case, both sides. And although until now it was about Pompey, then about Caesar, then about Cato, in fact, it was not people who controlled events at all, but, on the contrary, rapidly growing events controlled and disposed of people.

Nevertheless, there is, perhaps, reason to talk about some difference in the positions of Pompey and Caesar on the eve of the civil war. It is usually believed and from the preceding exposition that Pompey since 52, from his third consulate, was already deliberately going for a certain cooling, perhaps even for breaking off relations with Caesar. This was evidenced by the laws of Pompey, adopted during the consulate, although the reservations that accompanied them seemed to exclude the desire for direct and open confrontation. And indeed, at this initial stage of the conflict, a stage that does not yet go beyond, as Plutarch put it, "speeches and bills," that is, beyond the ordinary political struggle, Pompey preferred roundabout ways and behind-the-scenes actions, often hiding behind like a shield , by the authority of the Senate. All his actions were not very consistent and at the same time not very decisive.

For the first time, the real prospect of an armed struggle clearly loomed in front of Pompey, apparently, when, after his recovery from an illness, Italy almost breathed her love and devotion to him, when the officers who brought legions from Caesar from Gaul misinformed him about the relationship between Caesar and the army when he was sure that as soon as he “stamped his foot”, he would have at his disposal an army quite ready for battles and victories. The same Plutarch believes that all these circumstances turned Pompey's head, and he, forgetting his usual caution, acted imprudently, frivolously and overly self-confident.

Plutarch is probably right. But right only to a certain extent. It is hardly possible to explain Pompey's position by only one reason, that is, "dizziness with success." In this explanation, an unwritten rule makes itself felt: if the winners, as you know, are not judged, then the losers are always judged and for the most part unfairly. All deeds and actions of Pompey inevitably fall on the retrospective reflection of his final defeat. What is indisputable is that from the moment the real threat of civil war arose, Pompey began to act differently - much more decisively and more openly. Instead of resorting to the authority of the Senate, he himself now puts pressure on him: he joins up with the most ardent enemies of Caesar, shows intransigence in negotiations and, finally, speaks out quite bluntly about the inevitability of war. One gets the impression that at this late stage of the conflict he even prefers military action against Caesar to political struggle.

It is possible that this is not only an impression. In addition to "dizziness" and self-confidence, it should undoubtedly be about deeper internal reasonsthat pushed Pompey to war. The fact is that at some certain point, Pompey, apparently, quite clearly and irrevocably understood that in the struggle that is or will be waged by political means, his defeat is inevitable and he will never defeat his rival, but if the question arises about armed struggle, this will radically change the situation, here he is in his element, and therefore the result of such a competition may turn out to be completely different. Thus, for Pompey, the chances of victory, of success were associated precisely with the war, and, perhaps, only with the war, especially since in this regard he actually somewhat overestimated his strength and capabilities.

However, Pompey's position as a whole did not look as reckless as Plutarch portrayed. On the contrary, from some authors we come across curious hints that make it possible to form a different idea of \u200b\u200bthe course of affairs. For example, Appian says that it was not at all that Pompey was misinformed by those officers who brought the legions from Caesar, but that he himself bribed these officers so that with their stories they would have a certain influence on a wide public opinion... We know, by the way, that it was this trump card that Pompey used in his speech at one of the last meetings of the Senate before the start of the war.

As for Caesar, his position was different. Apparently, he not only was not afraid of the vicissitudes of political struggle, but, on the contrary, strove for it, for he was sure that in this field he would always prevail over the Senate oligarchy and over Pompey himself. Therefore, he was interested in using all the possibilities for a peaceful solution to the conflict. Of course, we are not talking about some of his innate peacefulness, about the fact that he completely ruled out the military option or was overly afraid of it, but it was just that Caesar in this case was satisfied with the peaceful way, that is, the correspondence consulate, then returning to Rome, even on condition of giving up command and disbanding the legions. By the way, there was one more and by no means unimportant consideration. It was much more difficult for Caesar to play the role of an outspoken instigator of war: Pompey was handed the sword by the Senate and consuls, therefore, those who personified the state in their person; Caesar, after all, rebelled against the "legitimate authorities." These considerations determined his position: not so active aspiration for war, readiness for negotiations (even after the Rubicon!), Rather far-reaching concessions, hesitation right up to the very last moment. Only when all appeals to the Senate were rejected or left unanswered, when a state of emergency was declared and a hasty recruitment of troops across Italy began, when, finally, the tribunes of the people had to flee from Rome - only then Caesar, having made sure of the "impenetrability" of his enemies for actions of this kind, switched to a different course of action - led his troops to Rome.

Two different positions, therefore, two lines of behavior. This is quite natural; paradoxical only is that the behavior of each of the rivals at the last stage of the conflict does not follow at all, but rather even contradicts their position. Thus, Caesar, although he did not strive for war, nevertheless, as soon as he stopped hesitating and began to act, acts, as always, decisively and quickly. Pompey, on the contrary, wanting war, counting on it, this time, as never before, is confused, acts sluggishly, uncertainly, as if not even seriously. All ancient authors testify to this quite unanimously.

The expression “to cross the Rubicon”, that is, to make a certain defining act that no longer gives an opportunity to correct the decision, is well known. Most are also aware that this expression owes its appearance to Guy Julius Caesar ...

Much less is known about what kind of Rubicon and under what circumstances Caesar himself crossed, and why this step of a politician and commander went down in history.

The Roman Senate was mired in political squabbles, and the leading Roman military leaders, who had gained fame and popularity for themselves in campaigns of conquest, thought about abandoning the republican system in favor of dictatorship and monarchy.

Guy Julius Caesar

The successful politician and military leader Gaius Julius Caesar was one of those who not only spoke out for centralized power, but was not averse to concentrating it in their hands.

In 62 BC, a so-called triumvirate was formed in Rome - in fact, the Roman Republic began to be ruled by three of the most ambitious politicians and military leaders: Gnei Pompey, Mark Licinius Crassus and Guy Julius Caesar.

Crassus, who suppressed the uprising of Spartacus, and Pompey, who won brilliant victories in the East, had claims to sole power, but by that time they could not alone cope with the opposition of the Roman Senate.

Caesar at that moment was more viewed as a politician who managed to persuade the openly hostile Pompey and Crassus to an alliance. The prospects of Caesar himself as the sole head of Rome looked much more modest at that time.

Triumvirate - Pompey, Crassus and Caesar.

Caesar vs. Pompey

After Crassus died in Mesopotamia in 53 BC, the question came down to which of the two worthy opponents, Pompey or Caesar, would manage to become the sole ruler of Rome.

By law, the commander did not have the right to enter the borders of Italy at the head of the army, if there were no military operations on the peninsula itself. The violator of this law was declared an "enemy of the Fatherland", which in its consequences was comparable to the declaration of an "enemy of the people" in the Stalinist USSR.

By the fall of 50 BC, the crisis between Pompey and Caesar reached its peak. Both sides, unable to agree on a new "division of spheres of influence", began to prepare for a decisive clash.

Roman Senate

The Roman Senate initially took a neutral position, but then Pompey's supporters were able to win over the majority in his favor. Caesar was denied an extension of the powers of the proconsul in Gaul, which allowed him to command the troops.

At the same time, Pompey, who had legions loyal to him at his disposal, positioned himself as the defender of the republican "free system" from the usurper Caesar.

Caesar was ready to lay down military power, but only if Pompey agreed to the same, but the Senate did not agree to this.

The main decision

Caesar was not confident of success - he was popular, but Pompey was no less popular; his legionaries were hardened by the Gallic war, but Pompey's warriors were no worse.

But on January 10, 49 BC, Gaius Julius Caesar made a decision with troops to force the Rubicon and go to Rome, predetermining not only his own destiny, but also the further course of the history of Rome.

Guy Julius Caesar crosses the Rubicon River.

Caesar's choice cannot be changed

Caesar's assassination

On March 15, 44 BC, the conspirators attacked Caesar in the Senate building, inflicting 23 stab wounds on him. Most of the wounds were superficial, but one of the blows was fatal.

After the death of Caesar, the Roman Republic fell completely. Caesar's heir, his great-nephew Guy Octavius, became the sovereign Roman emperor, now known as Octavian Augustus. The Rubicon has already been crossed. link

April 24th, 2014

On January 10, 49 BC, Gaius Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon, turning the course of world history.

Let's remember how it was ...

Much less is known about what kind of Rubicon and under what circumstances Caesar himself crossed, and why this step of a politician and commander went down in history.

By the middle of the 1st century BC, the Roman Republic was experiencing an internal crisis. Along with the great successes in the campaigns of conquest, problems arose in the system of public administration. The Roman Senate was mired in political squabbles, and the leading Roman military leaders, who had gained fame and popularity for themselves in campaigns of conquest, thought about abandoning the republican system in favor of dictatorship and monarchy.

The successful politician and military leader Gaius Julius Caesar was one of those who not only spoke out for centralized power, but was not averse to concentrating it in their hands.

In 62 BC, the so-called triumvirate was formed in Rome - in fact, the three most ambitious politicians and military leaders began to govern the Roman Republic: Gnei Pompey,Mark Licinius Crassus and Guy Julius Caesar. Crassus, suppressing the uprising Spartacus, and Pompey, who won brilliant victories in the East, had claims to sole power, but by that time they could not cope alone with the opposition of the Roman Senate. Caesar at that moment was more viewed as a politician who managed to persuade the openly hostile Pompey and Crassus to an alliance. The prospects of Caesar himself as the sole head of Rome looked much more modest at that time.

Caesar vs. Pompey

After Crassus died in Mesopotamia in 53 BC, the question came down to which of the two worthy opponents, Pompey or Caesar, would manage to become the sole ruler of Rome.

Caesar was ready to lay down military power, but only if Pompey agreed to the same, but the Senate did not agree to this.

The main decision

On the morning of January 10, 49 BC, Caesar, who was in Gaul, received news of the military preparations of the Senate and Pompey from his supporters who had fled from Rome. Half of the forces loyal to him (2,500 legionnaires) were located on the border of the province of Cisalpine Gaul (now northern Italy) and Italy itself. The border ran along the small local river Rubicon.

Caesar was not confident of success - he was popular, but Pompey was no less popular; his legionaries were hardened by the Gallic War, but Pompey's warriors were no worse.

Caesar's choice cannot be changed

However, finding this river in modern Italy was not so easy. First, it is worth remembering what we know about this river? The word Rubicon itself is derived from the adjective "rubeus", which means "red" in Latin, this toponym appeared due to the fact that the waters of the river had a reddish tint due to the fact that the river flowed on clay. The Rubicon flows into the Adriatic Sea, and is located between the cities of Cesena and Rimini.

Under the rule emperor Augustus the border of Italy has been moved. The Rubicon River has lost its main purpose. It soon disappeared altogether from topographic maps.

The plain along which the river flowed was constantly flooded. So modern river seekers have failed for a long time. The researchers had to delve into historical references and documents. The search for the famous river took almost a hundred years.

In 1933, many years of work were crowned with success. The now flowing river, called Fiumicino, was officially recognized as the former Rubicon. The present Rubicon is located near the town of Savignano di Romagna. After the Rubicon River was found, the city was renamed Savignano sul Rubicon.

Unfortunately, there is no material historical data on the crossing of Julius Caesar across the river, so the Rubicon does not attract masses of tourists every year and is not of much interest to archaeologists. And from the once mighty river, little is left: the Fiumicino river flowing in the industrial area is polluted, locals they intensively disassemble the water for irrigation, and in the spring the river completely disappears due to natural drying out.

The meaning of this phrase, both now and in those days, could be interpreted in the same way:
1. Make an irrevocable decision.
2. Risk everything to win.
3. Perform an act that can no longer be canceled.
4. Put everything on the line, risk everything.