The invasion of foreign invaders caused an unprecedented popular upsurge. Literally all of Russia rose to fight the invaders. The peasantry, as the most powerful class in its spiritual traditions, amicably, in a single burst of patriotic feelings rose up against the invaders.
The invasion of foreign invaders caused an unprecedented popular upsurge. Literally all of Russia rose to fight the invaders. Napoleon miscalculated when, trying to attract the peasants to his side, announced to them that he would abolish serfdom. Not! The peasantry, as the most powerful class in its spiritual traditions, amicably, in a single burst of patriotic feelings rose up against the invaders.
Immediately after the appearance of the enemy army in Lithuania and Belarus, a spontaneous partisan movement of local peasants arose. The partisans inflicted significant damage on foreigners, destroyed enemy soldiers, and upset the rear. At the very beginning of the war, the French army felt a shortage of food and fodder. Due to the death of horses, the French were forced to abandon 100 guns in Belarus.
The people's militia was actively created in Ukraine. 19 Cossack regiments were formed here. Most of them were armed and kept at their own expense by the peasants.
Peasant partisan detachments arose in the Smolensk region and in other occupied regions of Russia. A powerful partisan movement also operated on the territory of the Moscow province. Such folk heroes as Gerasim Kurin and Ivan Chushkin distinguished themselves here. Some of the peasant detachments numbered several thousand people. For example, the detachment of Gerasim Kurin consisted of 5,000 people. The detachments of Ermolai Chetvertakov, Fedor Potapov, Vasilisa Kozhina were widely known.
The actions of the partisans inflicted great human and material losses on the enemy, and disrupted his communication with the rear. In just six autumn weeks, the guerrillas killed about 30,000 enemy soldiers. Here is what is said in the report on the actions of peasant partisan detachments on the territory of only one Moscow province (written by the Governor-General of Moscow F.V. Rastopchin):
REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF PEASANT GUARANTEES
AGAINST THE ARMY OF NAPOLEON IN MOSCOW PROVINCE
In fulfillment of his highest and. in. will be given here to everyone's knowledge of the brave and meritorious deeds of the villagers of the Moscow province, who unanimously and courageously took up arms in whole villages against parties sent from the enemy for robbery and incineration, with the indication of the names and deeds of those merchants, burghers and peasants who in this time most distinguished themselves.
Along the Bogorodsky district Vokhon economic volost, head Yegor Stulov, sotsky Ivan Chushkin and peasant Gerasim Kurin and Amerevsky volost, head Yemelyai Vasiliev, having gathered the peasants under their jurisdiction and also invited neighboring ones, bravely defended themselves from the enemy and not only did not allow him to ravage and plunder their villages, but, reflecting and driving away the enemies, the Vokhon peasants beat and took in full up to fifty, while the Amerev peasants up to three hundred people. Such courageous deeds were attested and approved in writing by the commander of the Vladimir militia, Mr. [Ospodin], Lieutenant General Prince [Yazm] Golitsyn.
Along the Bronnitsky district the peasants of the villages: Shubin, Veshnyakova, Konstantinov, Voskresensky and Pochinok; villages: Salvacheva, Zhiroshkina, Rogacheva, Ganusova, Zalesye, Golushina and Zhdanskaya, according to calls from the zemstvo police, armed horse and pedestrians of up to 2 thousand people gathered on the road leading to the city of Podol, where, under cover in the forest, they waited with the enemy Cossacks, who, passing from Bronnitsy to the designated city, ravaged entire villages. Finally, they saw a detached enemy detachment, which included up to 700 people, which, with the help of the Cossacks, courageously attacked and, putting 30 people in place, they forced others to abandon their weapons and were taken prisoner with their carts and booty. These prisoners were escorted by the Cossacks to our main army. In this incident, the most distinguished for courage and courage, encouraging others to defend against enemies: the village of Konstantinov, the headman Semyon Tikhonov, the village of Salvachevoy, the headman Yegor Vasiliev, and the village of Pochinok, the headman Yakov Petrov.
Seltsa Zalesya, the peasants, noticing that who called himself a Russian native served the French, immediately seized him and handed him over to the Cossacks who were in their village for presentation where he should have been.
Peasant Pavel Prokhorov, peasant Pavel Prokhorov, in the village of Ganusova, seeing 5 French people who were riding towards him, set off on horseback in Cossack dress and, not having a firearm with him, took them prisoner with only one pike and brought them to the Cossacks for sending on command.
In the villages of Veline, Kryvtsy and Sofyina, the peasants, having armed themselves against the French, who had arrived in sufficient numbers to plunder the holy churches and to seduce those living in these places, not only prevented them from doing so, but, having overcome them, exterminated them. On this occasion, 62 courtyards with all buildings and property were burned down from shots from the enemy in the village of Sofyino.
The villages of Mikhailovskaya Sloboda and Yaganov, villages: Durnikha, Chulkova, Kulakova and Kakuzeva, peasants every day up to 2 thousand people gathered for the Borovsky transport of the Moskva River up the mountain, having the strictest observation of the crossing of enemy troops. Some of them dressed in Cossack clothes and armed themselves with cicas for the utmost intimidation of enemies. -They repeatedly hit and chased the enemy away; and on September 22, seeing that the enemy detachment, quite numerous, reached along the other side of the river to the village of Myachkov, many of them, together with the Cossacks, ford across the river and, attacking swiftly on the enemies, 11 people were put on the spot and 46 people were taken prisoner with weapons, horses and two carts; the rest, being scattered, fled.
In Bronnitsky uyezd, when the enemy detachment was defeated and scattered, striving to plunder the village of Myachkov, the peasants of the Durnikhi village showed the greatest courage: Mikhailo Andreev., Vasily Kirillov and Ivan Ivanov; villages of Mikhailovskaya Sloboda: Sidor Timofeev, Yakov Kondratyev and Vladimir Afanasyev; the village of Yaganova: the headman Vasily Leontyev and the peasant Fedul Dmitriev, who encouraged others to cross the river and to attack the enemy. In the village of Vohrina and the villages of Lubniva and Lytkarino, the inhabitants, armed against small enemy detachments, often exterminated the Oles, and the Vokhrinsky residents lost 84 yards with all the structure and property from burning, and in Lubnino two master's yards were burned - a horse and a cattle. Two Frenchmen came to the village of Khripav and, taking a horse drawn in a cart behind the courtyards, they got on it and drove into the forest. The peasant of that village, Yegor Ivanov, who was guarding the village, seeing this, chased after them with an ax and threatened to chop them up if they did not leave the horse. The robbers, seeing that they could not get away from him, were frightened, threw the cart with the horse and ran themselves; but the aforementioned peasant, having unharnessed the horse from the cart, chased after them on horseback and first hacked one of them, and then overtook and killed the other.
Along the Volokolamsk district. The peasants of this district, who were constantly armed until the very removal of the enemies from there, courageously repulsed all their attacks, taking many prisoners, and exterminating others on the spot. When the police captain, who commanded over these peasants, was absent to carry out other assignments, then the order and power over them were entrusted to Mr. Gavril Ankudinov, the real secret councilor and senator Alyabyev, who, as well as his wife, Mr. Alyabyev, who were with him, household people : Dmitry Ivanov, Fedor Feopemptov, Nikolai Mikhailov, also the economic Seredinsky volost, the village of Sereda, the volost head Boris Borisov and his son Vasily Borisov, the village of Burtseva, the volost head Ivan Ermolaev, the volost clerk Mikhailo Fedorov, the peasant Philip Kozimov, the village of Podukhina peasants Kozmin and Gozma Semenov, excellently acted against the enemy and were always the first to strive at him, setting an example for others with their fearlessness.
Along the Zvenigorodsky district. When this district was almost entirely occupied by the enemy, except for a small part of the villages lying to the side of the out-of-state city of Voskresensk, which the enemy detachments did not have time to occupy, then the city and surrounding residents, even from places occupied by the enemy, united, decided to unanimously defend the city of Voskresensk. They armed themselves with whatever they could, set up a guard and agreed among themselves that, following the bell ringing from it, everyone would immediately gather there on horseback and on foot. According to this conventional sign, they always flocked in considerable numbers, armed with guns, lances, axes, pitchforks, scythes, and repeatedly drove the enemy parties approaching Voskresensk from the side of Zvenigorod and Ruza. They often fought near the city itself and far from it, sometimes alone, sometimes with the Cossacks, they killed many, took them full and delivered them to the Cossack teams, so that more than 2 thousand people were exterminated by enemies in one Zvenigorod district and some townsfolk. Thus, the city of Voskresensk, some villages and a monastery, called New Jerusalem, were saved from the invasion and devastation of the enemy. At the same time, they distinguished themselves: the head of the economic Velyaminovskaya volost, Ivan Andreev, who, in addition to being busy with the outfit and ordering of people, went on horseback himself to battle and instilled courage in others by his example; the village of Luchinsky, Mr. Golokhvastov, Sotsky Pavel Ivanov, who also not only dressed up people, but always himself with his children was in battles, in which he was wounded with one of his sons; Zvenigorod bourgeois Nikolai Ovchinnikov, tenacious in Voskresensk, went to battle several times and was wounded in the arm; resurrection merchant Pentiokhov, Zvenigorod bourgeois Ivan Goryainov, courtyard people: Prince Golitsyn - Alexei Abramov, lord] Kolonshna - Alexei Dmitriev and Prokhor Ignatiev, lord] Yaroslavov - Fyodor Sergeev, patrimonial elders: the village of Ilyinsky gr. Osterman - Yegor Yakovlev, the village of Ivashkov's lord] Ardalionov - Ustin Ivanov and the peasant of the same village Yegor Alekseev. All of them have been in battles many times and encouraged others to exterminate and drive out the enemy.
Along the Serpukhov district. When the enemy parties split up for plunder, then the peasants who remained in their homes used cunning to exterminate the enemies of the fatherland. They tried first to get them drunk and misguided, and then attacked them. In this way, 7 people were killed in the state-owned village of Stromilov 5, in the village of Lopasne 2, in the village of Teterkakh (lord] Zhukov) 1, in the village of Dubna (lord] Akimov) 2, in the village of Artischevo (lord] Volkov) 7 people. Gr [afa] V.G. Orlova of the village of Semyonovskoye mayor Akim Dementyev and Mr [Afini] AA Orlovoy-Chesmenskaya village of Khatuni clerk Ivan Ilyin and landowner Orlov village of Gorki mayor Nikifor Savelyev, according to rumors that the enemy is walking along the Kashira road , gathered the departments of their peasants and, armed them with lances, pitchforks, axes and rifles for the householder Orlov, boldly awaited the enemy in the village of Papushkina, who, having learned about this and being in small forces, was forced to pass by.
In the Ruzsky district. The peasants, armed and setting up bells in every village, hurriedly gathered when enemy detachments of up to several thousand people appeared and attacked the enemy parties with such unanimity and courage that more than a thousand of them were exterminated by them, not counting the Cossacks taken with their help. captivity. Last October, on the 11th, having gathered up to 1500 people, they helped the Cossacks and completely expel the enemy from Ruza.
Along Vereiskomts uezd. When the enemy in the last days of August and early September repeatedly attacked the Vyshegorodskaya estate of [Athena] Golovkina, he was always repelled by the patrimonial elders Nikita Fedorov, Gavril Mironov and the courtyards of the same landowner, scribes Alexei Kirpichnikov, Nikolai Uskov and Afanasyev * Shchenamieglov with peasants. In October, when the enemy, returning from Moscow, attempted to cross the Protva River (on which a flour mill with five entrances was built) to plunder the Church of the Assumption of the Most Holy Theotokos and those located near the manor house and the state grain store, in which more than 500 quarters of rye were stored, at that time, the aforementioned scribes - Alexey Kirpichnikov and Nikolai Uskov, having gathered up to 500 peasants, tried by all means to repel the enemy, who had up to 300 people in his detachment. Peasant Pyotr Petrov Kolyupanov and her woman, c [Afini] Golovkina, peasant Emelyan Minaev, who were workers at the mill in the Mozhaisky district of the economic Reitarskaya volost of the Ilyinsky settlement, tore off lavas on the dam and, dismantling the boards, released water, in the village of Lobanovoy. , which kept the enemy party and saved the aforementioned church, a landlord's house with all services, a bread shop, also church houses and an embankment settlement, in which there are 48 peasant houses. Equally, the villages of Dubrova and Ponizovye were saved with their churches, by the defense of these peasants and villages close to them, which were especially encouraged by the advice and admonitions of the Verona cathedral priest John Skobeev, who was in the village of Dubrovo, to whom the sexton also contributed a lot to the Assumption Church Vasily Semyonov, who not only encouraged others, but himself participated in repelling the enemy.
This news. sent and witnessed from the commander-in-chief in Moscow, General of Infantry, Gr [afa] FV Rostopchin. Mentioned in it, the leaders of the people are imperially told to distinguish with the St. George 5th grade badge, and the others with a silver medal on the Vladimir ribbon with the inscription: "for love of the fatherland." Without hesitation, many excellent and courageous deeds of other peasants, according to the information that has not reached them, remain unknown.
Along with the peasants, there were army partisan detachments formed by order of the command for reconnaissance and military operations behind enemy lines. The first army partisan commander was the hussar lieutenant colonel Denis Vasilyevich Davydov. This is how he himself recalls how he became a partisan:
“Seeing myself as useful to the fatherland no more than an ordinary hussar, I decided to ask myself a separate command, despite the words spoken and extolled by mediocrity: not to ask for anything and not to refuse anything. On the contrary, I was always sure that in our craft he only fulfills his duty, who oversteps his line, does not equal in spirit, like shoulders, in a line with his comrades, asks for everything and does not refuse anything.
With these thoughts in mind, I sent a letter to Prince Bagration with the following content:
“Your Excellency! You know that I, leaving the post of your adjutant, so flattering for my pride, and joining the hussar regiment, had the subject of partisan service both according to the strength of my years, and from experience, and, if I dare say, according to my courage. Circumstances lead me to this time in the ranks of my comrades, where I have no will of my own and, therefore, I can neither undertake nor perform anything remarkable. Prince! You are my only benefactor; let me appear before you to explain my intentions; if they please you, use me according to my desire and be reliable that the one who bore the title of Bagration's adjutant for five years in a row, he will support this honor with all the vehemence that the plight of our dear fatherland demands. Denis Davydov ".
On the twenty-first of August, the prince called me to his place; I presented myself to him and explained to him the benefits of guerrilla warfare under the circumstances of that time. “The enemy is following one path,” I told him, “this path has gone out of measure by its length; transports of life and combat food of the enemy cover the space from Gzhati to Smolensk and beyond. Meanwhile, the vastness of the part of Russia lying in the south of the Moscow Way contributes to the twists and turns not only of the parties, but also of our whole army. What are the crowds of Cossacks doing at the vanguard? Leaving a sufficient number of them to maintain the outposts, it is necessary to divide the rest into parties and let them into the middle of the caravan following Napoleon. Will strong units go against them? - They have enough room to avoid defeat. Will they be left alone? - They will destroy the source of strength and life of the enemy army. Where will she get the charges and food from? - Our land is not so abundant that the roadside part could saturate two hundred thousand troops; arms and powder factories - not on the Smolensk road. In addition, the return of our appearance among the villagers scattered from the war will cheer them up and turn the military war into a popular war. Prince! I'll tell you frankly: my soul hurts from the daily parallel positions! It's time to see that they do not close the bowels of Russia. Who does not know that the best way to defend an object of enemy striving is not in a parallel, but in a perpendicular or, at least, in an indirect position of the army relative to this object? And therefore, if the kind of retreat chosen by Barclay and continued by his lordship does not stop, Moscow will be taken, peace is signed in it, and we will go to India to fight for the French! .. Now I turn to myself: if I must perish without fail, then I’d better lie down here! In India I will perish with a hundred thousand of my compatriots without a name and for the benefit, alien to Russia, and here I will die under the banners of independence, around which the peasants will crowd, murmuring at the violence and godlessness of our enemies ... And who knows! Maybe an army determined to operate in India! .. "
The prince interrupted the immodest flight of my imagination; he shook my hand and said: "Today I will go to my lordship and tell him your thoughts."
In addition to the detachment of D.V. Davydov, the detachments of A.N. Seslavin, A.S. Figner, I.S.Dorokhov, N.D. Kudashev, I.M. Vadbolsky also successfully operated. The guerrilla movement was such an unexpected and unpleasant surprise for the French invaders that they tried to accuse Russia of violating the rules of war; Chief of the General Staff of the French Army, Marshal Berthier, even sent Colonel Bertemi to MI Kutuzov's Headquarters with a letter full of indignation. To which Kutuzov replied with a letter of the following content:
Colonel Bertemi, whom I have allowed to be admitted to my headquarters, handed me a letter that Your Grace instructed him to convey to me. About everything that constitutes the subject of this new appeal, I immediately presented him to the Imperial Majesty, and the transmitter of this was, as, no doubt, you know, Adjutant General Prince Volkonsky. However, given the long distance and bad roads at the present time of the year, it is impossible that I could already receive an answer on this matter. Therefore, I can only refer to what I had the honor to say on this matter to General Lauriston. However, I repeat here the truth, the significance and power of which you, the prince, will undoubtedly appreciate: it is difficult to stop a people hardened by everything that he has seen, a people who have not seen wars on their land for two hundred years, a people who are ready to sacrifice themselves for homeland and which makes no distinction between what is accepted and what is not accepted in ordinary wars.
As for the armies entrusted to me, I hope, prince, that all will recognize in their mode of action the rules that characterize a brave, honest and generous people. During my long military service I never knew other rules, and I am sure that the enemies with whom I have ever fought have always given due justice to my principles.
Please accept, prince, the assurances of my deepest respect.
Field Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Armies
prince Kutuzov
The partisan and militia movement made a huge contribution to the defeat and extermination of the enemy. Cutting the enemy's communications, exterminating his troops, instilling fear and horror on him, hour after hour, it brought closer the inevitable defeat of the invaders. And the experience gained by the people in 1812 was very useful in the subsequent.
Russian Civilization
2.1 Participation of the detachments of A. S. Figner and D. V. Davydov in the defeat of Napoleon's troops.
Kutuzov put a very deep meaning into the concept of "small war". Its main task was to keep the enemy communications under attack and create a constant threat of his encirclement in Moscow. This task was to be solved by detachments of military partisans and people's militias.
Soon after the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov organized special light detachments from part of his cavalry, which were to operate in conjunction with peasant partisan detachments. These detachments were entrusted with the task of disrupting the communications of the French troops and forcing the enemy to leave significant forces to protect their communications.
To carry out this very difficult form of hostilities, bold, energetic and proactive commanders and troops were needed, capable of acting in any conditions. There was no shortage of officers in Kutuzov's army who were eager to wage a dangerous struggle with the enemy. The first detachment that was created by Kutuzov to conduct a small war was the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel D.V. Davydov, formed at the end of August, consisting of 130 people.
Already in early September, Davydov's detachment brutally taught a gang of French marauders who robbed the peasants of one of the surrounding villages (Tokarevo). Attacking at dawn on the French, accompanying the train with the things looted from the peasants, Davydov captured 90 people, the rest were killed during the skirmish.
No sooner had the peasants disassembled the things plundered by the French, as the scouts told Davydov that another detachment was approaching the village. The defeat of the French was complete, the Cossacks and hussars broke into the middle of the convoy and captured 70 prisoners, who were sent under escort to the nearest town of Yukhnov.
The first success greatly encouraged the partisans, and Davydov decided to make an attack on some enemy wagon train going along the main Smolensk road.
It was a clear, cold September evening. It had rained heavily the day before. Davydov's detachment secretly and quickly made their way through the hollow along the path leading to the village of Tsarevo-Zaimishche.
Before reaching 6 km, Davydov noticed the enemy's patrol. But, fortunately for the partisans, the French could not notice them.
Davydov quickly gave the order to the Cossack sergeant Kryuchkov, so that he with 20 Cossacks surrounded the patrol and took him prisoner. A brave and energetic Cossack with 10 partisans headed forward along the ravine and cut the path of the enemy's patrol, while 10 other Cossacks, suddenly jumping out of the ravine, hit the French in the forehead. Seeing themselves surrounded, the French first rushed about, then stopped and soon surrendered without a fight. This patrol consisted of 10 French cavalrymen, led by a non-commissioned officer.
Davydov, who was fluent in French, immediately began interrogation. The prisoners showed that in the village of Tsarevo-Zaymishche there is a French transport with artillery shells. This transport was guarded by a cavalry detachment of 250 men.
The success of an attack on such a significant transport depended primarily on the surprise of the attack.
Davydov therefore decided to get close to the village as inconspicuously as possible. He turned off the road and began to move carefully across the fields, hiding in the hollows. But about 3 kilometers before Tsarevo-Zaymishche the partisans met a detachment of French foragers - about 40 people. Seeing the Russians, the French immediately rushed back to their own. It was necessary to act quickly and decisively.
Davydov's detachment burst into the village just at the very moment when the frightened French rode there. An unimaginable panic arose in the French transport. All rushed to run wherever they looked. The defeat of the French was complete. Only one group of 30 people tried to defend themselves, but was killed by Russian hussars and Cossacks. As a result of this dashing raid, the partisans captured 119 soldiers, two officers. Only a few enemy soldiers fled. The partisans had at their disposal 10 food carts and 1 cart with cartridges.
When Davydov's detachment received the bitter news of the occupation of Moscow by the enemy, it did not in any way break their resolve to beat the enemy in any conditions. The soldiers and officers of the detachment had one desire: to take revenge on the insolent enemy for the loss of Moscow.
Davydov gathered his detachment on Yukhnov Square and solemnly set out on a campaign. By evening, the detachment arrived in the village of Znamenskoye, where 170 Cossacks from the Bug and Teptyarsky regiments joined it.
At night, Davydov's detachment quickly but carefully made its way to Vyazma, occupied by the French. The Cossack, sent to the forward patrol, reported that there was a French transport in front of it, consisting of 30 carts and three hundred cover people.
The detachment began to stealthily approach the enemy. The surprise of the attack so overwhelmed the French that most of them did not even try to defend themselves. About 100 French infantrymen were chopped up by hussars and Cossacks, the rest surrendered without any resistance. The detachment captured, in addition to 270 prisoners of war and 6 officers, large and valuable booty. In the hands of Davydov were 20 carts, loaded to the brim with food, and 12 carts with artillery ammunition. Davydov gave the order to send two carts with cartridges and 340 rifles to Znamenskoye for the militia.
Thus, Davydov's detachment not only caused considerable damage to the supply of food and ammunition to Napoleon's army, but also made it possible to well arm a detachment of peasants who joined the ranks of the militia at the call of Davydov.
Soon at night, Davydov's partisans captured up to 70 French marauders who were rummaging along the great Smolensk road. And early in the morning, having learned that a large number of enemy carts were moving along the road, the partisans dismounted, took prisoner 250 soldiers and two officers, and also took possession of a large amount of food.
Of course, such an active and successful activity of Davydov could not remain unnoticed for the French. The French governor, who was sitting in Vyazma, was furious, receiving continuous reports of successful raids by Russian partisans. He decided at all costs to destroy Davydov's detachment. For this purpose, he allocated 2,000 soldiers and officers. He ordered the chief of this detachment to clear the entire space between Vyazma and Gzhatsk, to defeat Davydov's detachment and capture him, alive or dead.
On September 15, Davydov received information that this French punitive detachment was on its way. And soon he learned about the approach of this detachment. Davydov decided to outwit the enemy. By side roads and paths, he crossed with his detachment to the northeast of Vyazma. The French were looking for Russian partisans on the road between Vyazma and Smolensk, and they were again already on the road between Vyazma and Gzhatsk. Now Davydov went to Vyazma itself. He decided to divert the attention of the punitive squad in the other direction with a strong firefight near the city itself.
Hearing shots, the French detachment began to respond, but did not dare to leave the city. At night, Davydov's detachment secretly retreated.
The scouts reported that the punitive detachment turned in the direction of Gzhatsk, and now Davydov was quickly moving westward from Vyazma to the village of Monina by side roads. Towards evening, cautiously approaching almost the village itself, the detachment stopped. The guerrillas quickly loaded their rifles. Everything was ready for a surprise attack on the French, who calmly settled in Monin for the night.
And when the partisans, on this signal, rushed to the train, the French were so taken aback that no one thought about resistance. This time, the detachment took possession of 42 wagons with food and 10 artillery decks (wagons with shells). 120 soldiers, led by the officer who guarded this transport, surrendered.
MI Kutuzov closely followed Davydov's brave partisan raids and attached great importance to the expansion of the partisan struggle against the French. Therefore, the commander-in-chief decided to send 500 Cossacks at the disposal of Davydov.
Now at his disposal was already a significant force - up to 700 people. It was no longer possible to be afraid of an attack by a punitive detachment. On the contrary, now Davydov himself really wanted to attack him. And after the exercises, he was finally convinced that his detachment was quite ready for an enemy attack. Davydov divided his detachment into three parts. On October 4, two hours before dawn, all three detachments set out on a journey.
After a series of attacks and battles, as a result of the actions of all three detachments, Davydov captured 496 soldiers and 5 officers and captured 41 carts. Davydov left some of the captured horses for the detachment's Cossacks, and distributed the rest to local peasants. About a successful attack on the French, Davydov immediately sent a report to the main apartment to Kutuzov.
But it was important to complete the main task - to destroy the French punitive detachment directed against the partisans.
From his scouts, Davydov received accurate information about the division of the punitive detachment into two parts. One of them was very close to Vyazma, the other was along the big Smolensk road, away from the city. And Davydov decided to beat the enemy in parts.
In the night clash with the first detachment, many enemy soldiers were killed and wounded, there were fewer prisoners than usual. There were only 376 soldiers and 2 officers. However, an unfortunate oversight occurred during the attack on the second detachment of the French.
When Davydov approached the village where the French were staying, the partisans saw a small group of foragers, who warned their detachment. But this did not in the least prevent the partisans from defeating the enemy, who, after unsuccessful resistance, rushed to flee. The chase continued until noon. The partisans captured officers, soldiers and horses. The victory over the punitive detachment was won.
When Davydov received the news that Napoleon with his army was retreating from Maloyaroslavets to the Smolensk road, he gathered his entire detachment - both cavalry and infantry - into one fist and rushed to the great Smolensk road.
Davydov told in his "Notes" that three miles before the main road they began to come across a myriad of carts and a cloud of marauders who did not offer the slightest resistance.
Once, having undertaken his next search, Davydov faced the nucleus of Napoleon's army. This time in front of him was the old guard of Napoleon - the best and most efficient part of his entire army. She was not on a hike, but on bivouacs.
The French were quite alarmed when they suddenly saw the Russian partisans in front of them. All the soldiers rushed to their guns, even opened cannon fire. The firefight continued until the evening. And this time Davydov managed to capture 146 soldiers with 3 officers and 7 wagons. But most important of all, Davydov's raid thwarted plans for a surprise attack by Napoleon with all his might on the vanguard of the Russian army.
Once Davydov's patrols informed him that a large detachment of the French General Augereau had been found in the village of Lyakhovo. The detachments of Seslavin and Figner joined with Davydov. The forces became much more, but not enough to successfully attack the whole corps of the French. Then Davydov decided to turn with a request to the Guards General Orlov-Denisov, who was not far from his large partisan detachment.
After a short meeting of the chiefs of the detachments, the partisans set out on a campaign. The advanced units - the vanguard - were led into battle by Davydov himself. He decided to direct his forces across the Smolensk road. Such a maneuver by the partisans deprived the French detachments of the opportunity to join up when the Russians attacked them.
As soon as the French saw the partisans, everything was in disarray in their camp. They began to line up in disorder, the soldiers separated from the columns and ran out from behind the huts to meet the Russians. Davydov's Cossacks dismounted, and immediately the battle began to boil.
The fight lasted until the evening. And only in the evening twilight did the partisans begin to distinguish the envoy moving towards them. The negotiations lasted no more than an hour, and their result was the surrender of 2,000 privates, 60 officers and 1 general.
At a time when Kutuzov with the main army was heading for Krasnoye, Davydov, together with the detachments of Orlov-Denisov, boldly met with the main forces of the retreating French army.
The partisans soon ran into columns of enemy infantry. At dusk, Napoleon's old guard moved, about 20 thousand people. She walked in great order. Noticing the partisan detachments not far from the road, the soldiers of the guard only took their rifle by the trigger and continued marching, without adding a step. No matter how hard the Russian partisans tried, neglecting the mortal danger, to tear at least one soldier from the tightly closed ranks of the Napoleon's guard, nothing came of it. The old guard still retained all their former discipline and remained a formidable fighting force.
The main forces of the French army fell behind the French guard, one column incessantly following another.
Davydov could not be satisfied with the damage that his attacks caused to the enemy, so in the evening of the same day he ordered Chechensky and his Cossacks to immediately go forward and destroy bridges on their way, arrange blockages on the road and in every way impede the enemy's further retreat. The rest of the partisan forces constantly appeared on both sides of the road and harassed the French vanguard with their shots.
Davydov's detachment, like the detachments of other Russian partisans, all the time followed on the heels of the enemy army, not giving it a minute of peace.
At the end of December, the entire detachment of Davydov, on the orders of Kutuzov, joined the vanguard of the main forces of the army as his vanguard.
In addition to Davydov's detachment, there were many other well-known and successful partisan detachments.
Kutuzov from Podolsk, that is, during a flank march to Tarutin, advanced to the Mozhaisk road a detachment of Major General I.S.Dorokhov, consisting of three Cossack, one hussar and one dragoon regiments and half a company of artillery. Dorokhov was instructed not only to observe this road, but also to inflict blows on the enemy. Having completed the task, Dorokhov withdrew to Krasnaya Pakhra by September 15 (27).
At the end of August, the Wincenerode detachment was also formed, which included 3,200 people. Initially, this detachment was entrusted with the task of monitoring the corps of Viceroy Eugene Beauharnais during the offensive of the Napoleonic army to Moscow. Kutuzov kept in touch all the time with Vincengerode, who sent very valuable information about the enemy. It has already been noted that after leaving Moscow, Kutuzov considered it necessary to be one of the first to inform Vincengerode about the upcoming flanking maneuver. Then (September 3) Kutuzov wrote to him that he intended to stop for three or four days at Podolsk, from where he would be able to send parties to the Mozhaisk road. He ordered Vincengerode to occupy the road to Tver with troops, leaving one of the Cossack regiments on the Yaroslavl road. This regiment was supposed to maintain communication with the Cossack post located in Pokrov (on the Vladimir road), the one with the post in Yegoryevsk, and so through the chain of posts communication was established with the location of the army, which allowed Kutuzov to receive daily reports about the enemy.
Having withdrawn the army to the Tarutino position, Kutuzov formed several more army partisan detachments, in particular the detachments of A. S. Figner, I. M. Vadbolsky, N. D. Kudashev and A. N. Seslavin. (Appendix 3)
The detachment of IM Vadbolsky, consisting of the Mariupol hussar regiment under his command and 500 Cossacks, was to operate on the Mozhaisk and Ruza roads. To do this, he moved to the village of Kubinsky in order to attack the enemy carts and drive away his party, seizing the road to Ruza. A detachment of Colonel I. F. Chernozubov, numbering 300 people, was also sent to the Mozhaisk region. A detachment of A. Kh. Benckendorff operated to the north. A detachment of ND Kudashevasila of 500 people received the task of operating on the Serpukhovskaya and Kolomenskaya roads. A.N.Seslavin with a detachment of 500 people (250 Don Cossacks and one squadron of the Sumy hussar regiment) was instructed to operate in the area of \u200b\u200bthe road from Borovsk to Moscow. Figner's detachment operated in the same area; with him Seslavin was recommended to establish the closest relations. The Ryazan road was intercepted by the detachment of Colonel I.E. Efremov, with whom the Cossacks of Pobednov, Ilovaisky and others interacted.
The detachment of A.S. Figner differed from the others in that it penetrated the enemy's rear most of all, remaining unnoticed.
Figner began his partisan activity in Moscow. There, under the guise of a peasant, he began to gather people who fiercely hated the enemy and were ready to defend their homeland at any moment. So he managed to form a small detachment, which made at night bold attacks on the gangs of French robbers rampaging in the city.
During the day, Figner, in his peasant clothes, wandered around the city, rubbed into a drunken crowd of French soldiers, and listened to their conversations. After such a day's reconnaissance, he returned to his comrades and prepared for new night attacks on the enemy.
Upon Figner's return from Moscow, Kutuzov instructed him to form a separate detachment and act behind enemy lines. In a short time, Figner managed to collect over 200 daredevils. With this small group of partisans, he began to attack the French along the Mozhaisk road. During the day, he hid his detachment in the forest thicket, while he himself was engaged in reconnaissance. Dressed in the uniform of a French officer, he rode to the very location of the enemy. To avert his eyes, he masqueraded as a sentry officer and, in impeccable French, began to make remarks to the French soldiers who stood at the clock. Thus, Figner looked out for everything he needed.
As soon as evening fell, the partisans fell like snow on their heads on the French where their attack was especially unexpected. Figner did not limit himself to recruiting only regular army soldiers into his detachment. He diligently attracted peasants to his detachment, collected and armed them.
While making reconnaissance on the Mozhaisk road one afternoon, Figner noticed an enemy artillery detachment with 6 guns.
As soon as night fell, Figner's partisans boldly attacked this detachment, killed the sentries and, without much difficulty, forced all the other gunners to surrender.
Soon Figner's guerrilla activity became known to the French command, and the French generals assigned a large sum of money to whoever would point out Figner's whereabouts and assist in his capture. They began to take decisive measures to destroy the partisan detachment.
In such conditions, Figner's detachment was required to be especially monolithic, consisting of reliable, loyal people. Figner decided to ask Kutuzov himself to allocate soldiers and officers from regular military units for his detachment.
Kutuzov was well aware that in the person of Figner he had found a fearless and courageous head of a new partisan detachment. And the partisans were very, very necessary in the dangerous situation in which the country was after the occupation of Moscow by Napoleon. Kutuzov allowed Figner to take 800 light cavalry men, hussars, lancers and Cossacks with officers of his own choosing. So Figner gathered a large detachment of soldiers and officers and, leading it, became a storm for the French, moving along the road between Mozhaisk and Moscow.
The French were very concerned about Figner's bold guerrilla attacks. Napoleon ordered to allocate one infantry and one cavalry division to fight the partisans on the Mozhaisk road.
The juggernaut had to be in the rear of the enemy a lot. In the French camp, Figner behaved with extraordinary simplicity and composure. He calmly drove up to the fires, talked a lot with the officers and at the same time managed to collect valuable information. And once he managed to get into the location of the main apartment of the chief of the vanguard of the Napoleonic army, Murat.
Particularly important was the participation of Figner's detachment in the capture of Vyazma. The amicable onslaught of Figner's partisan detachment greatly contributed to the success of the actions of the main forces of the Russian army in the occupation of Vyazma.
General Ermolov in his "Notes" for the partisans, in particular for Figner, great services.
In September, 36 Cossack regiments and one team, 7 cavalry regiments, 5 squadrons and one command of light horse artillery, 5 infantry regiments, 3 battalions of rangers and 22 regimental guns acted as part of the flying detachments. Thus, Kutuzov gave the guerrilla war a wide scope.
Kutuzov entrusted the military partisan detachments mainly with the tasks of monitoring the enemy and delivering continuous strikes against his troops.
Observation of the enemy was carried out so well that Kutuzov had complete information about any movements of the French troops on the basis of which it was possible to draw correct conclusions about Napoleon's intentions. Every day, the commander-in-chief received reports on the direction of movement and actions of enemy detachments, broken mail, interrogation protocols of prisoners and other information about the enemy, which were reflected in the war log.
Continuous pressure on the enemy made a profound sense. The French had to keep part of the troops ready at all times to repel the strikes of the military partisans and to conduct their foraging under the protection of significant forces. According to the journal of military operations, from September 2 (14) to October 1 (13), the enemy lost only about 2.5 thousand people killed, 6.5 thousand French were taken prisoner. Their losses increased every day in connection with the active actions of the peasant partisan detachments.
2.2 People's War of 1812.
Many participants in the events testify to the beginning of the movement among the people. A participant in the war, the Decembrist I.D. Yakushkin also emphasized that the inhabitants, when the French approached, voluntarily retired to the forests and swamps, burning their homes, and from there fought against the invaders. A significant part of the nobles remained in place, trying to preserve their estates. A lot of evidence has been preserved that the peasants demanded that the landowners fight the Napoleonic army and destroyed the estates of those of them who resignedly met the enemy.
The deeper the Napoleonic troops penetrated into Russia, the more obvious became the fierce resistance of the people, who did not want to cooperate with the invaders. But if the French did manage to force individual peasants to be guides, then many of them took the opportunity to lead the detachments either into the thicket of the forests, or away from large settlements. The feat of Ivan Susanin was repeated more than once at that time.
By mid-August, there were already several fairly large peasant detachments in a number of districts of the Smolensk province. There were three detachments operating in the Sychevsk region. The first of them consisted of residents of the city of Sychevsk, headed by the mayor P. Karzhenkovsky. This detachment repeatedly repelled the attempts of the Polish uhlans to destroy the villages around the city. The second detachment, headed by S. Yemelyanov, a fighting Suvorov soldier, numbered 400 people, he fought 15 battles, and killed 572 French soldiers. The detachment of the police chief E. Boguslavsky was also active, he destroyed 1,760 enemy people.
There were many women among the folk heroes. The memory of the famous headman of the Gorshkov farm in the Sychevsky district, Vasilisa Kozhina, still lives on, whose detachment took prisoners and exterminated the French. Also known is the "lacemaker Praskovya", a peasant woman from the village of Sokolovo, Smolensk province.
In the Gzhatsky district, the actions of two detachments - Ermolai Vasilyevich Chetvertak (Chetvertakov) and Fyodor Potapov (Samusya) - were widely known.
The actions of the army partisan detachments would not be so effective if they were not supported by the peasants who formed their detachments.
At the head of the partisan peasant detachment was usually one of the peasants, or of the wounded soldiers who had fought back. Virtually every village around Moscow had its own partisan detachments. “In every village,” wrote DV Davydov, “the gates were locked, with them stood young and old with pitchforks, stakes, axes, and some of them with firearms.” Sometimes small groups of partisans united, turning into rather large detachments, with which the French had to seriously reckon. Often numbered from 500 to 2 thousand people, such united detachments acted very actively. Thus, the "warriors-villagers" of the Ruza district exterminated more than a thousand Frenchmen. In the Zvenigorod district, the peasants defended the city of Voznesensk and exterminated more than two thousand people from the enemy's detachments. The residents of the Bronnitskaya district acted in the same way. The peasants of the Sychevsky district, having organized self-defense detachments, did not allow French foragers to visit them. The inhabitants of the city of Sychevka were politely armed and also actively acted. On the territory of this district, the enemy lost more than 1,800 people killed and over 2 thousand prisoners by September 1. The peasants of the Belsk district organized a horse guard army of 100 people, which served as the beginning of almost universal armament of the population. This district was also fenced off from the enemy. Self-defense was also organized in the Roslavl district. Here, too, a "guard army" of 400 people was created, acting in conjunction with peasant detachments.
Kurin's detachment, operating in the Bogorodsky district, numbered from 5 to 6 thousand people, of which more than 500 were horsemen. This detachment defended the village of Vokhnu, where a strong detachment of French foragers sought to penetrate. Kurin formed his detachment in three columns. One column acted from the front, the other two made a roundabout maneuver. As a result of the battle, the French detachment was defeated.
In Moscow, there was a three-thousandth row of Samus (Fedor Potapov), in which there were 200 cavalry. Samus' detachment killed more than three thousand Frenchmen. “Samus introduced an amazing order in all the villages subordinate to him. He performed everything according to signs that were given by means of bell ringing and other conventional signs ... Various beacons and ringing bells of various sizes announced when and in what quantity, on horseback or on foot, to go into battle. "
The actions of the detachment organized and led by the former private of the Kiev Dragoon regiment E.V. Chetvertak (Chetvertakov) aroused just as great interest. E. V. Chetvertak was taken prisoner in the rearguard battle at Tsarev-Zaymishche. Soon he managed to escape from captivity, and in the village of Basmannoy, he organized a detachment of 47 people. Soon this detachment grew to 300 people, and in necessary cases, the Quartet could send an entire army, numbering up to 4 thousand peasants. The detachment of E. V. Chetvertak controlled the entire Gzhatsky district. The detachment of S. Emelyanov acted very energetically in the Sychevsky district. The actions of the detachments of Stepan Eremenko (Eremeenko) and Vasily Polovtsev are also known.
Kutuzov appreciated the patriotism of the peasants and their zeal in defending their homeland. He reported: “The peasants, burning with love for their homeland, arrange militias among themselves. It happens that several neighboring villages put sentries on high places and bell towers, who, seeing the enemy, sound the alarm. At this sign, the peasants gather, attack the enemy with despair and do not leave the battlefield without winning the final victory. They kill enemies in great numbers, and take prisoners to the army. Every day they come to the main apartment, convincingly asking for firearms and ammunition for protection from enemies. The requests of these venerable peasants, true sons of the fatherland, are satisfied as far as possible and they are supplied with guns, pistols and gunpowder. "
The peasants fought with amazing resilience. They sacrificed everything for the liberation of their native land. “With martyrdom they endured,” Kutuzov wrote to Alexander I, “all the blows associated with the invasion of the enemy hid their families and young children in the forests, while the armed men themselves sought defeat in their peaceful homes for the emerging predators. Often, the most women cunningly caught these villains and punished their assassination attempts with death, and quite often the armed villagers, joining our partisans, helped them greatly in exterminating the enemy, and it can be said without exaggeration that many thousands of the enemy were exterminated by the peasants. "
DV Davydov, summarizing the experience of the partisan war of 1812, wrote: “It embraces and crosses the entire length of the routes, from the rear of the opposing army to that space of the earth, which is determined to supply it with troops, food and charges, through which, blocking the current the source of her strength and existence, she exposes her to the blows of her army, exhausted, hungry, disarmed and devoid of the saving bonds of subordination. Here is a guerrilla war in the full sense of the word. " But this, says Davydov further, is not all. Moral Influence Matters Equally
guerrilla warfare, which consists in raising the fallen spirit of the inhabitants of those regions that are in the rear of the enemy army.
The actions of the partisans forced Napoleon to strengthen the protection of the roads. Of course, the Smolensk road was especially important. To ensure its safety, part of Viktor's corps was pulled up to Mozhaisk, which previously provided the main communications from Vilna to Smolensk. Punitive detachments were sent against the partisans.
Frightened by the losses suffered by the French army as a result of the small war, Napoleon was nervous. He ordered Marshal Berthier: “Confirm my order not to send a single transport from Smolensk except under the command of a staff officer and under cover of 1,500 people ... Write to the generals in command of the corps that we are losing a lot of people every day ... that the number of people taken prisoner by the enemy, reaches several hundred every day ... Write to the King of Naples, the commander of the cavalry, that the latter must fully cover the foragers and ensure from the attack of the Cossacks detachments sent for food ... Finally, let the Duke of Elchingen know that he is daily loses more people than in one battle, which is why it is necessary to better regulate the service of foragers and not to move so far away from the troops. "
It was the actions of the partisans, the people's war that Loriston had in mind, sent by Napoleon to Kutuzov to beg for peace, when, as Kutuzov informed Alexander I of this fact, “most of all spread about the image of the barbaric war that we are waging with them”. “I assured him,” Kutuzov writes in his report to Tsar Kutuzov, “that if I wanted to change this way of thinking among the people, I could not have time for them to honor this war, as if the invasion of the Tatars, and I didn’t able to change their upbringing. "
The same idea was expressed by Kutuzov in his reply to Marshal Berthier's letter.
Around Moscow, occupied by the French, two rings formed, as it were, consisting of light troops - partisans and militias.
They gradually narrowed, threatening to turn the strategic environment into a tactical one.
Thus, with the help of a small war, Kutuzov, firstly, blocked the enemy army, depriving it of the supply of food and fodder, constantly alarming and destroying small detachments, and secondly, he protected his army from enemy actions, at the same time creating the opportunity for himself to always be keep abreast of all events.
Napoleon tried to organize the fight against partisans and flying units. Poniatovsky's corps was moved to Podolsk, the Bessieres corps - to the Tula road; The Mozhaisk road was guarded by Brusye and light cavalry. Cossacks were especially worried about Napoleon. “Neither the losses incurred in battle, nor the state of the cavalry — nothing at all bothered him as much as the appearance of the Cossacks in our rear,” wrote Colencourt.
The people's militias, which made up the second ring of the enemy's encirclement, were also quite active at this time. On the right flank, the Tver militia of 14,500 people operated. It was located between Moscow and Klin, covering the cities of Klin, Bezhetsk, Voskresensk, as well as a number of other points. The Tver militia was
subordinated to General Vintzengerode, who commanded the detachment that covered the St. Petersburg road. In addition to him, Vintzengerode had at his disposal 3200 regular troops, a Cossack detachment of I. Chernozubov, and separate detachments of military partisans (Prendel and others). In total, there were about 20 thousand people in this direction.
Ney's attempt to push back the Tver militia and go to Dimitrov was unsuccessful. The four thousandth detachment of the French was thrown back from Dimitrov. The attempt of the French to gain a foothold in Voskresensk was also unsuccessful: they were also driven back to Moscow.
The Ryazan militia was concentrated in the Dedinov area by the beginning of September. His task was to guard the line along the Oka River. The militia covered the approaches to the cities of Aleksin, Kasimov and Yegoryevsk. The enemy in this direction made only weak attempts to penetrate the border of the Oka River, which were easily repelled by the militia.
The road to Yaroslavl was covered by the Yaroslavl militia, located near the city of Pereyaslavl-Zalessky. But it was formed relatively late and until the beginning of October was almost not engaged in hostilities. The Vladimir militia, numbering 13,969 warriors, was more active on the Vladimir road. Concentrating in the city of Pokrov, it interacted with the military partisans of Efremov and the peasant detachments of Kurin.
Napoleon, counting on a long stay in Moscow, decided to create several large supply bases around Moscow. One of these bases was to be located in the city of Bogorodsk, where up to 15 thousand French troops were sent on this occasion. They managed to capture the city before the formation of the Vladimir militia was completed. The exit of the French detachment to Bogorodsk, to the right flank of Kutuzov's army, posed a certain threat to it. In this regard, Kutuzov sent a detachment of Cossacks numbering about one thousand and 15 thousand warriors of the Vladimir militia to Bogorodsk. These forces blocked the French, preventing them from foraging, and then on October 1 (13) they took Bogorodsk by storm. The French were forced to retreat to Moscow.
The Tula militia was also active. In early September, on the orders of Kutuzov, it set out to the borders of its province, taking over the protection of the cordon from Kashira to Aleksin with a length of 200 km . The head of the Tula militia N.I.Bogdanov on September 5 (17) asked Kutuzov to join the Tula military force one artillery brigade located in Kolomna, so that he could "if necessary, repel the enemy and prevent him from crossing the Oka River." On September 15 (27), he again asked Kutuzov to assign two cavalry artillery companies to the Tula militia for this purpose.
The Tula militia largely contributed to the fact that the Russian army received a quiet rest in the Tarutino camp. It did not allow enemy units to appear in the area of \u200b\u200bconcentration of Russian troops and, in addition, protected the population from looting and murder by French marauders.
In addition to the militia in the province, guard cavalry detachments (900-1000 people) were formed, which developed vigorous activity. Many French troops were killed or captured during their attempts to reach the Tula arms factories.
Even more interesting are the actions of the Kaluga militia. 11 thousand Kaluga residents, first concentrated in Kaluga and Maloyaroslavets, were forced to join the fight in August 1812. Kutuzov set the Kaluga militia to cover Yelnya, Roslavl, Yukhnov and Zhizdra. In the battles for these points, the militias inflicted great damage on the enemy: here he lost up to four thousand killed and more than two thousand prisoners.
During the stay of the "big army" in Moscow, the French command tried to expand the area controlled by it, adjacent to the operational line going to the west. To do this, it sent large forces to Borovsk, Yelnya, Roslavl, which should
Chigvintseva S.V.
Introduction
In our time - the time of grandiose social transformations - the need for a deep understanding of the steep moments in the course of social development, the role of the masses in history, is felt more acutely than ever. In this regard, it seems relevant to us today to address the topic of the partisan movement during the Patriotic War, the 200th anniversary of which our country is celebrating this year.
The purpose of the work is to determine the role of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812, using integrated materials from history and literature.
The objectives of the work are to consider the reasons for the emergence of a wide wave of the partisan movement and its significance in the military events of the autumn-winter of 1812.
The theme of the partisan movement of 1812 is represented by a fairly wide range of sources and research in the historical literature. The range of sources involved allowed us to divide them into two groups. The first includes legal and government documents. The second group of sources includes the diaries of eyewitnesses of the events of the Patriotic War of 1812.
Research methods - analysis of sources, applied a problem-thematic approach to the literature, which clearly showed the importance of the actions of partisans in alliance with the troops of the people's militia during the autumn-winter of 1812.
The novelty of the research lies in an integrated approach to the use of information from literary and historical sources in the analysis of the events of the Patriotic War.
The chronological framework of the study covers the second half of 1812.
The structure of the work corresponds to the set goal and objectives and consists of: introduction, two chapters with paragraphs, conclusions, list of used sources and literature.
ChapterI... The reasons for the development of the partisan movement
Napoleon did not prepare for any of the wars as carefully as for the campaign against Russia. The plan for the upcoming campaign was worked out in the most detailed way, the theater of military operations was carefully studied, huge depots of ammunition, uniforms and food were created. 1,200 thousand people were put under arms. As the great Russian writer Leo Tolstoy justly notes: "Half of the army was stationed within the vast empire of Napoleon to keep the conquered countries in obedience, in which the national liberation movement arose against the Napoleonic yoke."
The historian A.Z. Manfred focuses on what Russia knew about Napoleon's preparation for war. The Russian ambassador to Paris, Prince A.B. Kurakin, starting in 1810, supplied the Russian War Ministry with accurate information about the number, armament and deployment of French troops. Valuable information was provided to him by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Napoleon Charles Talleyrand, as well as by J. Foucher.
In 1810, the rearmament of the Russian army began, the strengthening of its western borders. However, the archaic recruiting system did not allow to prepare the necessary manpower reserves for the coming war. The Russian army numbered about 240 thousand people and was divided into three groups: the first army (M. B. Barclay de Tolly) covered the Petersburg direction, the second (P.I.Bagration) - Moscow, the third (A.P. Tormasova) - Kiev ...
The usual tactic of waging wars by Napoleon was to win 1-2 major battles and thus decide the outcome of the war. And this time Napoleon's plan was to use his numerical superiority in border battles to defeat the first and second armies one by one, then to seize Moscow and St. Petersburg. The strategic plan of Napoleon was thwarted when - in June-August 1812 the Russian armies were retreating, they decided to unite in Vitebsk, and then Smolensk. In the very first days, a partisan movement began (20 thousand peasants rose). G.R. Derzhavin wrote about those days:
“At the dawn of the fiery previous battles:
Every village boiled
Crowds of reddish warriors ...
And, a cunning warrior,
He suddenly called out his eagles
And he burst into Smolensk ...
We covered up here with ourselves
The threshold of Moscow is the door to Russia;
Here the Russians fought like animals,
Like angels! (between 1812-1825)
In August, the army and the people demanded that MI Kutuzov be appointed commander-in-chief. The Battle of Borodino showed the courage of the Russian army, the French withdrew to their original positions, but Moscow had to be surrendered to the French.
Leaving Moscow, Kutuzov made a remarkable maneuver: creating the appearance of a retreat along the Ryazan road, with the main forces moved to the Kaluga road, where he stopped in September 1812 near the village of Tarutino (80 km from Moscow). He wrote: “Always fearing that the enemy would not seize this road with his main forces, which would deprive the army of all its communications with the grain-growing provinces, I found it necessary to detach the 6th corps with the infantry general (infantry - author) Dokhturov: on Kaluga Borovskaya road to the side of the village of Folminsky. Soon after this, the partisan Colonel Seslavin really opened the movement of Napoleon, striving with all his forces along this road to Borovsk. "
The war of 1812 appears in Tolstoy's image as a people's war. The author creates many images of men, soldiers, whose judgments in the aggregate constitute the people's perception of the world.
In the Tarutino camp, the formation of a new russian army, the troops were given rest, and the partisan detachments tried to replenish their reserves and equipment. NA Durova wrote about those days as follows: “In the evening, our regiment was ordered to be on horseback. ... Now we have become the rearguard and will cover the retreat of the army. "
Historian V.I. Babkin believes that "partisan detachments and parts of the militia of the 1st district were an important element in the plan for the preparation and implementation of the victorious offensive of the Russian army." In our opinion, one can agree with the author, since in his report to Alexander I, M. I. Kutuzov wrote: “When retreating ... I made it a rule for myself ... to conduct an incessant small war, and for that I put ten partisans on the wrong foot in order to be able to take away all the means from the enemy, who thinks in Moscow to find all kinds of food in abundance. During the six-week rest of the Main Army at Tarutin, my partisans instilled fear and horror at the enemy, taking away all means of food. "
However, researcher LG Beskrovny does not agree with our opinion, who believes that the partisans generally acted spontaneously, without coordinating "their actions with the forces of the high command."
While the Russian army was able to replenish itself with new fresh forces in a calm atmosphere, the enemy, surrounded in Moscow, was forced to conduct continuous military operations against the partisans. Thanks, among other things, to the actions of the partisans, in fact, there was no break in military operations against Napoleon during the Tarutino period. Having occupied Moscow, the enemy received neither respite nor peace. On the contrary, during his stay in Moscow, he suffered significant damage from the blows of the popular forces. To help the militia and partisans, MI Kutuzov allocated army flying detachments of regular cavalry to strengthen the blockade of Moscow and strike at enemy communications. In our opinion, the clear interaction of the main elements of the "small war" - militias, partisans and army flying detachments made it possible for MI Kutuzov to create a solid foundation for a victorious counteroffensive.
The campaign in Russia was not like those that Napoleon had to lead before. Armand de Caulaincourt, who was under Napoleon, wrote: “The local residents were not visible, the prisoners could not be taken, the stragglers were not found on the way, we had no spies ... The remaining residents all armed; no vehicles could be found. They harassed horses on trips to get food ... ”. Such was the nature of the "small war". An internal front was formed around the main forces of the French in Moscow, consisting of militias, partisans and flying detachments.
Thus, the main reasons for the rise of a wide wave of the partisan movement were the application of the French army's demands to the peasants for the delivery of food, uniforms, and fodder to them; the plunder of native villages by the soldiers of Napoleon Bonaparte; cruel methods of treatment of the population of our country; the spirit of freedom that reigned in the atmosphere of the "century of liberation" (XIX century) in Russia.
ChapterII... The growing wave of the partisan movement in the fall and winter of 1812
On October 10, 1812, finding himself in isolation, fearing the indignation of his multinational hungry army, Napoleon left Moscow. Moscow burned for 6 days, 2/3 of the houses were lost, the peasants went into the woods. A guerrilla war broke out. In the memory of the Russian people, heroes-partisans remained, whom L.N. Tolstoy called "the cudgel of the people's war" - D. Davydov, IS Dorokhov, AN Seslavin, AS Figner, the peasant Gerasim Kurin, the elder Vasilisa Kozhin. During the war, the partisans killed about 30 thousand enemy soldiers. G.R. Davydov dedicated his poems to D. Davydov. Derzhavin, A.N. Seslavin - FN Glinka, patriotism of the common people was praised by VV Kapnist.
Among historians there are different points of view on the role of partisans in the liberation struggle of 1812. So, if Academician E.V. Tarle notes that G. Kurin's detachment gave successful battles to regular enemy units, exterminated them in hundreds, captured enemy weapons, controlled the region while there was neither occupation nor Russian state power (that is, actually exercising control functions in it), the historian A.S. Markin considers this opinion to be an exaggeration.
If we consider the question of the origin of the partisan movement, here you can see various judgments of historians. E.V. Tarle believes that it originated in Poresensky, Krasinsky and Smolensky districts in July 1812, since the population of these districts first of all suffered from the invaders. But as the enemy army advanced into the depths of Russia, he notes, the entire population of the Smolensk province rose to fight. Its organization was attended by the Sychevsky zemstvo police chief Boguslavsky, the leader of the Sychevsky nobility Nakhimov, Major Yemelyanov, retired captain Timashev and others. Historian Troitsky N.A. asserts otherwise - it showed itself later, in Smolensk in August 1812: “The partisans of the Smolensk province dealt a tangible blow to the enemy, and also helped the Russian army a lot. In particular, the detachment of the merchant of the city of Porechye, Nikita Minchenkov, helped the army detachment to liquidate the detachment of the French under the command of General Pino. "
The episode of the Patriotic War of 1812, associated with the activities of the peasant detachment of Gerasim Matveyevich Kurin (1777-1850), has served for many decades as a textbook illustration of the thesis about the peasant guerrilla war against the Napoleonic invaders.
On September 24, 1812, the foragers of Ney's French corps who arrived from Bogorodsk plundered and burned the Vokhon village of Stepurino. Kurin expected the enemy to appear, dividing his three-thousand-strong squad into three parts, which began to methodically beat the French. On the same day in the evening, Ney's corps, along with other corps stationed around Moscow, received an order to return to the capital. Upon receiving news of the occupation of Bogorodsk by the French, the Vokhon volost gathering, of course, with the approval of the local head Yegor Semyonovich Stulov, decided to form a squad for self-defense, and to hide women, old people, children and movable property in the forests. The gathering also ordered the local peasant Gerasim Kurin to command the squad.
One of the large peasant partisan detachments of up to four thousand people was led in the area of \u200b\u200bthe city of Gzhatsk (Moscow region) by soldier Eremey Chetvertakov. In the Smolensk province in the Sychevsky district, a partisan detachment of four hundred people was led by a retired soldier S. Yemelyanov. The detachment fought 15 battles, destroyed 572 enemy soldiers and captured 325 Frenchmen.
However, it is necessary to note a feature noted by the researcher V.I. Babkin - economic (state) peasants (unlike landowners and monasteries) have always been an island of stability and were not prone to anarchy. For example, by 1812, the Vohon volost consisted mainly of economic peasants, in comparison with their private-owned counterparts, who had long enjoyed greater personal freedom by law.
In our opinion, it is necessary to see the difference between the peasant and army partisan detachments. If the peasant detachments were organized by the peasants G. Kurin, the peasant Vasilisa Kozhina in the Smolensk province, the former private soldier Eremey Chetvertakov, then the first army partisan detachment was created on the initiative of M. B. Barclay de Tolly. Its commander was General F.F. Vintzengerode, who headed the united Kazan dragoon (equestrian), Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the town of Dukhovshchina.
Seslavin Alexander Nikitich (1780-1858) was a lieutenant general, in 1812 a colonel, commander of the Sumy hussar regiment, who, on behalf of M.I.Kutuzov, became the head of a partisan detachment and was tasked with small groups to destroy enemy divisions, coordinate their actions with units the current Russian army.
Denis Davydov's squad was a real thunderstorm for the French. This detachment arose on the initiative of Davydov himself, lieutenant colonel, commander of the Akhtyr hussar regiment. Together with his hussars (riders lightly armed with a saber and a carbine), he retreated as part of the army of P.I. Bagration to Borodin. A passionate desire to bring even greater benefit in the fight against the invaders prompted D. Davydov "to ask for a separate detachment." D. Davydov asked General PI Bagration to allow him to organize a partisan detachment for operations behind enemy lines. For the "sample" M.I. Kutuzov allowed D. Davydov to take 50 hussars and 80 Cossacks and go to Medynen and Yukhnov. Having received the detachment at his disposal, D. Davydov began bold raids on the rear of the enemy. In the very first skirmishes near the villages of Tsarev Zaimishcha, Slavkoy, he achieved success: he defeated several French detachments, captured a wagon train with ammunition.
An Army Guerrilla Flying Detachment is a mobile unit deployed to various areas of hostilities. For example, from Gzhatsk to Mozhaisk, a detachment of General I.S.Dorokhov operated. Captain A. S. Figner with his flying detachment attacked the French on the road from Mozhaisk to Moscow. In the region of Mozhaisk and to the south, a detachment of Colonel I.M. Vadbolsky operated as part of the Mariupol hussar regiment and 500 Cossacks.
Acting, according to the order of the commander-in-chief, between Mozhaisk and Moscow, a detachment of retired soldiers and Colonel A.S. Figner, along with other partisans, helped armed peasants near Moscow in the extermination of small detachments of marauders, intercepting French couriers and carts.
In early October 1812 Napoleon, leaving Moscow, moved to Kaluga, where the food depots of the Russian army were located, hoping to spend the winter there. Russian troops pursued the enemy, inflicting sensitive blows on him. In those years, MI Kutuzov addressed the army with the following words: “... Napoleon, not seeing anything else ahead of him, as the continuation of a terrible people's war, capable of destroying his entire army in a short time, seeing in every inhabitant a warrior, a common ... a hasty retreat. "
Thus, the general offensive of the Russian army was successfully combined with the "small war". Tens of thousands of militia warriors and popular partisan detachments successfully fought the enemy together with the army. On December 25, 1812, Alexander I published a special Manifesto on the expulsion of the enemy from Russia and the end of the Patriotic War. On this occasion, NA Durova noted in her notes: “The French fought with frenzy. Ah, man is terrible in his frenzy! All the properties of the wild beast are then combined in him. Not! This is not courage. I do not know what to call this wild, brutal courage, but it is unworthy to be called fearlessness. "
The Patriotic War of 1812 ended with the victory of the Russian people, who waged a just, liberation struggle. The reason for the rise of the partisan movement in the fall-winter of 1812 was the following: The Napoleonic invasion caused enormous damage to the country's economy, brought innumerable troubles and suffering to the people. Hundreds of thousands of people died, no less crippled; many cities and villages were destroyed, many cultural monuments were plundered and destroyed.
The significance of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War was manifested in the following: the actions of the partisans raised the spirit of patriotism in battles with the enemy, the national consciousness of the Russian people grew; helping the regular army, the partisans made it clear to Napoleon that he would not win the war overnight, and his plans for world domination were ruined.
Conclusion
The historical past of the people, historical memory, the system of universally significant patterns of behavior at such critical moments in history as the Patriotic War - this is not a complete list of those facts that influence the formation of the personality of the 21st century. Hence the relevance of our appeal to the topic of the role of the masses, the organization of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812.
The Patriotic War of 1812 ended with the victory of the Russian people.
In the course of our work, we came to the following conclusions:
If we consider the question of the origin of the partisan movement, E.V. Tarle believes that it originated in the Smolensk province; Troitsky N.A. - it showed itself later, in Smolensk; Manfred A.Z. - during the capture of Mogilev and Pskov.
Among the reasons for the emergence of the peasant and army partisan movement, historians single out such as: the application to the peasants of the requirement of the French army to hand them over food, uniforms, fodder; the robbery of villages by the soldiers of Napoleon Bonaparte; cruel methods of treatment of the population of our country; the spirit of freedom that reigned in the atmosphere of the "century of liberation" (XIX century) in Russia.
The role of the partisan movement in World War II was as follows:
- replenish the reserves of the Russian army with people and equipment,
- small detachments destroyed the forces of the French army, transmitted information about the French to the Russian army,
- destroyed the convoys with food and ammunition that went to the French in Moscow.
- napoleon's plans for a lightning war against Russia collapsed.
The significance of the partisan movement was manifested in the growth of national self-awareness of the peasantry and all strata of Russian society, a growing sense of patriotism and responsibility for the preservation of their history and culture. The close interaction of the three forces (militia, peasant partisans and army flying units) ensured a huge success in the "little war". The great Russian writer L.N. Tolstoy, conveying the spirit of that time, noted: "... the cudgel of the people's war rose with all its formidable and majestic strength and, without asking anyone's tastes and rules, it rose, fell and nailed the French until the entire invasion had died."
Notes (edit)
From the report of M.I. Kutuzov to Alexander I about the battle at Maloyaroslavets // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day / Comp. A.S. Orlov, V.A.Georgiev, N.G. Georgieva et al. - M .: PBOYUL, 2000, From M.I.Kutuzov's report to Alexander I about the battle at Borodino // Reader on the history of Russia since ancient times to the present day // Tamzhe et al.
Zhilin P. A. The death of the Napoleonic army in Russia. Ed. 2nd. - M., 1974 .-- S. 93.
From M.I.Kutuzov's appeal to the army about the beginning of Napoleon's expulsion from Russia // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day. - M., 2000 .-- S. 271.
Durova N.A. Notes of a cavalry girl. - Kazan, 1979 .-- P. 45.
Tolstoy L.N. War and Peace: in 4 volumes - M., 1987. - Vol. 3. - S. 212.
List of sources and literature used
1. Sources
1.1 Borodino. Documents, letters, memories. - M .: Soviet Russia, 1962 .-- 302 p.
1.2. From the report of MI Kutuzov to Alexander I about the battle at Borodino // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day / Comp. A.S. Orlov, V.A.Georgiev, N.G. Georgieva and others - M .: PBOYUL, 2000. - S. 268-269.
1.3. From the report of M.I.Kutuzov to Alexander I about the battle at Maloyaroslavets // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day / Comp. A.S. Orlov, V.A.Georgiev, N.G. Georgieva et al. - M .: PBOYUL, 2000. - S. 270-271.
1.4. From the address of MI Kutuzov to the army about the beginning of the expulsion of Napoleon from Russia // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day / Comp. A.S. Orlov, V.A.Georgiev, N.G. Georgieva and others - M .: PBOYUL, 2000 .-- P. 271.
1.5 Davydov D.V. Diary of partisan actions // http://www.museum.ru/1812/Library/Davidov1/index.html.
2. Literature
2.1. Babkin V.I.People's militia in the Patriotic War of 1812 - M .: Sotsekgiz, 1962 .-- 212 p.
2.2. Beskrovny L.G. Partisans in the Patriotic War of 1812 // Questions of history. - 1972. - No. 1. - S. 13-17.
2.3. Bogdanov L. P. Russian army in 1812. Organization, management, armament. - Moscow: Military Publishing, 1979 .-- 275 p.
2.4. Glinka F.N. Partizan Seslavin //lib.rtg.su/history/284/17.html
2.5. Derzhavin G.R. 1812 //lib.rtg.su/history/284/17.html
2.6. Durova N.A. Notes of a cavalry girl. Reissue. - Kazan, 1979 .-- 200 p.
2.7. Zhilin P. A. The death of the Napoleonic army in Russia. Ed. 2nd. - M., 1974 .-- 184 p.
2.8. V.V. Kapnist The vision of a Russian in 1812 crying over Moscow ... // lib.rtg.su / history / 284 / 17.html
Russian partisans in 1812
Victor Bezotosny
The term "partisans" in the minds of every Russian person is associated with two periods of history - the people's war that unfolded in the Russian territories in 1812 and the massive partisan movement during the Second World War. Both of these periods were called the Patriotic Wars. A long, long time ago, a stable stereotype arose that partisans first appeared in Russia during the Patriotic War of 1812, and the dashing hussar and poet Denis Vasilyevich Davydov became their ancestor. His poetry turned out to be almost forgotten, but everyone remembers from the school course that he created the first partisan detachment in 1812.
The historical reality was somewhat different. The term itself existed long before 1812. Back in the 18th century, partisans were called in the Russian army servicemen who were sent as part of independent small separate detachments, or parties (from the Latin word partis, from the French parti) for actions on the flanks, in the rear and on enemy communications. Naturally, this phenomenon cannot be considered a purely Russian invention. Even before 1812, both the Russian and French armies experienced the annoying actions of the partisans. For example, the French in Spain against the Guerillas, the Russians in 1808-1809. during the Russian-Swedish war against detachments of Finnish peasants. Moreover, many, both Russian and French officers, who adhered to the rules of the medieval knightly code of conduct in war, considered partisan methods (sudden attacks from the back on a weak enemy) not entirely worthy. Nevertheless, one of the leaders of Russian intelligence, Lieutenant Colonel P.A. Chuykevich, in an analytical note given to the command before the start of the war, proposed to deploy active partisan actions on the flanks and in the rear of the enemy and to use Cossack units for this.
The success of the Russian partisans in the 1812 campaign was facilitated by huge territory theaters of military operations, their length, elongation and weak coverage of the communication line The great army.
And of course, huge forests. But all the same, I think the main thing is the support of the population. Partisan actions were first used by the commander-in-chief of the 3rd Observation Army, General A.P. Tormasov, who in July sent a detachment of Colonel K.B. Knorring to Brest-Litovsk and Bialystok. A little later, MB Barclay de Tolly formed the "flying corps" of Adjutant General FF Vintsingerode. By order of the Russian commanders, raiding partisan detachments began to operate actively on the flanks of the Great Army in July-August 1812. Only on August 25 (September 6), on the eve of the Battle of Borodino, with the permission of Kutuzov, a party (50 Akhtyr hussars and 80 Cossacks) of Lieutenant Colonel D.V. Davydov was sent to "search", that Davydov, to whom Soviet historians attributed the role of the initiator and founder of this movement ...
The main purpose of the partisans was considered to be actions against the enemy's operational (communication) line. The party commander enjoyed great independence, receiving only the most general instructions from the command. The actions of the partisans were almost exclusively offensive. The key to their success was stealth and speed of movement, surprise attack and lightning-fast retreat. This, in turn, determined the composition of the partisan parties: they consisted mainly of light regular (hussars, lancers) and irregular (Don, Bug and other Cossacks, Kalmyks, Bashkirs) cavalry, sometimes reinforced with several guns of horse artillery. The number of the party did not exceed several hundred people, this ensured mobility. The infantry was rarely attached: at the very beginning of the offensive, the detachments of A.N.Seslavin and A.S. Figner received one ranger company each. For the longest time - 6 weeks - DV Davydov's party operated behind enemy lines.
Even on the eve of the Patriotic War of 1812, the Russian command was thinking about how to attract huge peasant masses to resist the enemy, to make the war truly popular. It was obvious that religious and patriotic propaganda was necessary, an appeal to the peasant masses, an appeal to them, was necessary. Lieutenant Colonel P. A. Chuykevich believed, for example, that the people "should be armed and tuned, as in Spain, with the help of the clergy." And Barclay de Tolly, as commander in the theater of operations, without waiting for anyone's help, appealed on August 1 (13) to the residents of the Pskov, Smolensk and Kaluga provinces with calls for "general armament."
Earlier than all, armed detachments began to be created on the initiative of the nobility in the Smolensk province. But since the Smolensk region was very soon completely occupied, the resistance here was local and episodic, as in other places where landowners fought off marauders with the support of army detachments. In other provinces bordering on the theater of military operations, "cordons" were created, consisting of armed peasants, main task which was a fight against marauders and small detachments of enemy foragers.
During the stay of the Russian army in the Tarutino camp, the people's war reached its peak. At this time, enemy marauders and foragers rage, their outrages and robberies become widespread, and partisan parties, individual militia units and army detachments begin to support the cordon chain. The cordon system was created in the Kaluga, Tver, Vladimir, Tula and parts of the Moscow provinces. It was at this time that the extermination of marauders by armed peasants became widespread, and among the leaders of the peasant detachments, G. M. Urin and E. S. Stulov, E. V. Chetvertakov and F. Potapov, the elder Vasilisa Kozhin became famous throughout Russia. According to D. V. Davydov, the extermination of marauders and foragers "was more a matter of the villagers than of parties rushed to report the enemy with a much more important goal, which consisted only in protecting property."
Contemporaries distinguished the people's war from the partisan war. Partisan parties, consisting of regular troops and Cossacks, acted offensively in the territory occupied by the enemy, attacking his carts, transports, artillery parks, and small detachments. Cordons and popular squads, consisting of peasants and townspeople, led by retired military and civilian officials, were located in the zone not occupied by the enemy, defending their villages from looting by marauders and foragers.
Partisans became especially active in the fall of 1812, during the stay of Napoleon's army in Moscow. Their constant raids inflicted irreparable harm on the enemy, kept him in constant tension. In addition, they delivered operational information to the command. Especially valuable were the information promptly reported by Captain Seslavin about the French withdrawal from Moscow and about the direction of the movement of Napoleon's units to Kaluga. These data allowed Kutuzov to urgently transfer the Russian army to Maloyaroslavets and block the path of Napoleon's army.
With the beginning of the retreat of the Great Army, the partisan parties were strengthened and on October 8 (20) received the task of preventing the enemy from retreating. During the pursuit, the partisans often acted together with the vanguard of the Russian army - for example, in the battles at Vyazma, Dorogobuzh, Smolensk, Krasny, Berezina, Vilna; and were active all the way to the borders Russian Empirewhere some of them were disbanded. Contemporaries appreciated the activities of the army partisans and gave them their due. At the end of the 1812 campaign, all the detachment commanders were generously awarded ranks and orders, and the practice of guerrilla warfare continued in 1813–1814.
It is indisputable that the partisans became one of those important factors (hunger, cold, heroic actions of the Russian army and the Russian people), which ultimately led the Great Army of Napoleon to a catastrophe in Russia. It is almost impossible to count the number of enemy soldiers killed and taken prisoner by the partisans. In 1812, there was an unspoken practice - not to take prisoners (with the exception of important persons and "languages"), since the commanders were not interested in separating a convoy from their few parties. The peasants, who were under the influence of official propaganda (all the French were "infidels", and Napoleon was "the devil of hell and the son of Satan") destroyed all the prisoners, and sometimes in savage ways (they buried them alive or burned them, drowned them, etc.). But, I must say that among the commanders of the army partisan detachments, cruel methods in relation to the prisoners, according to some contemporaries, were used only by Figner.
In Soviet times, the concept of "partisan war" was changed in accordance with the Marxist ideology, and under the influence of the experience of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, it began to be interpreted as "an armed struggle of the people, mainly the peasants of Russia, and units of the Russian army against the French invaders in the rear of the Napoleonic troops and their communications ”. Soviet authors began to view the partisan war "as a popular struggle, generated by the creativity of the masses", saw in it "one of the manifestations of the decisive role of the people in the war." The peasantry was declared the initiator of the "popular" partisan war, which allegedly began immediately after the invasion of the Great Army into the territory of the Russian Empire, it was argued that it was under his influence that the Russian command later began to create army partisan detachments.
The statements of a number of Soviet historians that a "partisan" people's war began in Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, that the government forbade the arming of the people, that peasant detachments attacked enemy reserves, garrisons and communications, and partially merged into army partisan detachments, do not correspond to the truth. ... The significance and scale of the people's war were exaggerated beyond measure: it was asserted that the partisans and peasants “held siege” the enemy army in Moscow, that “the cudgel of the people's war was nailing the enemy” right up to the border of Russia. At the same time, the activities of the army partisan detachments turned out to be obscured, and it was they who made a tangible contribution to the defeat of Napoleon's Great Army in 1812. Today historians are reopening archives and reading documents, already without the ideology and instructions of the leaders that dominate them. And reality opens in an unadorned and unclouded form.
the author Belskaya G.P.Victor Bezotosny Russia and France in Europe before the War of 1812 Why did the French and Russians fight each other? Is it really out of a feeling of national hatred? Or maybe Russia was possessed by a desire to expand its borders, to increase its territory? Of course not. Moreover, among
From the book The Patriotic War of 1812. Unknown and little known facts the author Belskaya G.P.Victor Bezotosny French influence in Russia The beginning of the reign of Emperor Alexander I was connected with hopes. Society thirsted for change, ideas related to reforms were in the air. And indeed, transformations began in the system of higher
From the book The Patriotic War of 1812. Unknown and little-known facts the author Belskaya G.P.Victor Bezotosny Preventive War? When people talk about the beginning of the 1812 campaign, the question often arises about the preventive nature of Napoleon's war against Russia. Like, the French emperor really did not want this war, but was forced to be the first to cross the border by force
From the book The Patriotic War of 1812. Unknown and little-known facts the author Belskaya G.P.Victor Bezotosny Beginning of hostilities The famous order of Napoleon, dictated by him in Vilkovishki, was read to the corps of the Great Army: “Soldiers! The Second Polish War began. The first ended at Friedland and Tilsit. In Tilsit Russia vowed to eternal
From the book The Patriotic War of 1812. Unknown and little-known facts the author Belskaya G.P.Victor Bezotosny Matvey Platov in the Battle of Borodino The participation of Cossack regiments in the Battle of Borodino is an urgent problem, it still arouses keen interest among researchers. This is largely due to the personality of the Cossack leader - Matthew
From the book The Patriotic War of 1812. Unknown and little-known facts the author Belskaya G.P.Victor Bezotosny Russian intelligence in 1812 Thunderstorm of the twelfth year It has come - who helped us here? The frenzy of the people, Barclay, winter or Russian god? It is interesting that in this quatrain, Pushkin, listing the main factors of the defeat of Napoleon's "Great Army" in 1812
From the book The Patriotic War of 1812. Unknown and little-known facts the author Belskaya G.P.Victor Bezotosny Indian campaign. Project of the Century Had an Indian campaign happened, and history would have gone a different path, and there would not have been the Patriotic War of 1812 and everything connected with it. Of course, history does not tolerate the subjunctive mood, but ... Judge for yourself. Aggravation of relations
From the book The Patriotic War of 1812. Unknown and little-known facts the author Belskaya G.P.Victor Bezotosny The price of victory The country is undoubtedly elevated by the victory won. And it educates and hardens - an exhausting path to her. It is the historian's task to analyze the consequences of the most important historical events, to trace their influence on the subsequent course of history. But
From the book The Patriotic War of 1812. Unknown and little-known facts author The team of authorsRussia and France in Europe before the War of 1812 Victor Bezotosny Why did the French and Russians fight each other? Is it really out of a feeling of national hatred? Or maybe Russia was possessed by a desire to expand its borders, to increase its territory? Of course not. Moreover, among
From the book The Patriotic War of 1812. Unknown and little-known facts author The team of authorsFrench influence in Russia Victor Bezotosny The beginning of the reign of Emperor Alexander I was connected with hopes. Society thirsted for change, ideas related to reforms were in the air. And indeed, transformations began in the system of higher
From the book The Patriotic War of 1812. Unknown and little-known facts author The team of authorsPreventive War? Victor Bezotosny When people talk about the beginning of the 1812 campaign, the question often arises about the preventive nature of Napoleon's war against Russia. Like, the French emperor really did not want this war, but was forced to be the first to cross the border by force
From the book The Patriotic War of 1812. Unknown and little-known facts author The team of authorsBeginning of hostilities Viktor Bezotosny The famous order of Napoleon, dictated by him in Vilkovishki, was read through the corps of the Great Army: “Soldiers! The Second Polish War began. The first ended at Friedland and Tilsit. In Tilsit Russia vowed to eternal
From the book The Patriotic War of 1812. Unknown and little-known facts author The team of authorsRussian partisans in 1812 Viktor Bezotosny The term "partisans" in the minds of every Russian person is associated with two periods of history - the people's war that unfolded in Russian territories in 1812 and the massive partisan movement during World War II
From the book The Patriotic War of 1812. Unknown and little-known facts author The team of authorsRussian intelligence in 1812 Viktor Bezotosny “Thunderstorm of the twelfth year It has come - who helped us here? Frenzy of the people, Barclay, winter or Russian god? " It is interesting that in this quatrain, Pushkin, listing the main factors of the defeat of Napoleon's "Great Army" in 1812
From the book The Patriotic War of 1812. Unknown and little-known facts author The team of authorsIndian hike. Project of the Century Victor Bezotosny Had an Indian campaign happened, and history would have gone a different path, and there would not have been the Patriotic War of 1812 and everything connected with it. Of course, history does not tolerate the subjunctive mood, but ... Judge for yourself. Aggravation of relations
From the book The Patriotic War of 1812. Unknown and little-known facts author The team of authorsThe price of victory Victor Bezotosny The country is undoubtedly elevated by the victory won. And it educates and hardens - an exhausting path to her. It is the historian's task to analyze the consequences of the most important historical events, to trace their influence on the subsequent course of history. But
The partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812 significantly influenced the outcome of the campaign. The French met with fierce resistance from the local population. Demoralized, deprived of the opportunity to replenish their food supplies, the ragged and frozen army of Napoleon was severely beaten by the flying and peasant partisan detachments of the Russians.
Squadrons of flying hussars and detachments of peasants
The highly stretched Napoleonic army, pursuing the retreating Russian troops, quickly became a convenient target for partisan attacks - the French often found themselves far away from the main forces. The command of the Russian army decided to create mobile detachments to carry out sabotage behind enemy lines and deprive him of food and fodder.
In World War II, there were two main types of such detachments: flying squadrons of army cavalrymen and Cossacks, formed by order of the commander-in-chief Mikhail Kutuzov, and a group of partisan peasants, which united spontaneously, without army leadership. In addition to sabotage actions, the flying detachments were also engaged in reconnaissance. The peasant self-defense forces mainly repulsed the enemy from their villages and villages.
Denis Davydov was mistaken for a Frenchman
Denis Davydov is the most famous commander of a partisan detachment in the Patriotic War of 1812. He himself drew up a plan of action for mobile partisan formations against the Napoleonic army and offered it to Peter Ivanovich Bagration. The plan was simple: to annoy the enemy in his rear, capture or destroy enemy warehouses with food and fodder, beat small groups of the enemy.
Under the leadership of Davydov there were over one hundred and fifty hussars and Cossacks. Already in September 1812, they captured a French caravan of three dozen carts near the Smolensk village of Tsarevo-Zaimishche. Davydov's cavalrymen killed more than 100 Frenchmen from the escorting detachment, and captured another 100. This operation was followed by others, also successful.
Davydov and his team did not immediately find support from the local population: at first, the peasants took them for the French. The commander of the flying detachment even had to put on a peasant's caftan, hang an icon of St. Nicholas on his chest, let go of his beard and switch to the language of the Russian common people - otherwise the peasants would not believe him.
Over time, the detachment of Denis Davydov increased to 300 people. The cavalrymen attacked the French units, sometimes having a fivefold numerical superiority, and smashed them, taking the carts and freeing prisoners, it even happened to capture the enemy's artillery.
After the abandonment of Moscow, by order of Kutuzov, flying partisan detachments were created everywhere. Mostly these were Cossack units, each numbering up to 500 sabers. At the end of September, Major General Ivan Dorokhov, who commanded such a unit, captured the town of Vereya near Moscow. The united partisan groups could resist the large military formations of Napoleon's army. So, at the end of October, during a battle in the region of the Smolensk village of Lyakhovo, four partisan detachments utterly defeated more than one and a half thousand brigade of General Jean-Pierre Augereau, capturing himself. For the French, this defeat was a terrible blow. On the contrary, the Russian troops, this success, encouraged and tuned in to further victories.
Peasant Initiative
Substantial contribution to destruction and attrition french units contributed self-organizing to combat troops peasants. Their partisan units began to form even before Kutuzov's instructions. While willingly helping the flying detachments and units of the regular Russian army with food and fodder, the peasants, at the same time, everywhere and in every possible way did harm to the French - they exterminated enemy foragers and looters, often, when the enemy approached, they themselves burned their houses and went into the forests. Fierce local resistance intensified as the demoralized French army increasingly turned into a swarm of robbers and marauders.
One of such detachments was assembled by dragoons Ermolai Chetvertakov. He taught the peasants to use captured weapons, organized and successfully carried out many sabotage against the French, capturing dozens of enemy convoys with food and livestock. At one time, Chetvertakov's compound included up to 4 thousand people. And such cases, when peasant partisans, led by regular soldiers, noble landowners, successfully wielded in the rear of the Napoleonic troops, were not isolated.