In chapter
In big politics, there is always a plan "A" and a plan "B". It often happens that there are both "V" and "G". In this article we will tell you how in 1939 the plan "B" was drawn up and implemented for the entry of the Baltic republics into the USSR. But plan "A" worked, which gave the desired result. And they forgot about Plan B.
1939 year. Anxious. Prewar. On August 23, 1939, a Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed with a secret supplement. It shows the zones of influence of Germany and the USSR on the map. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania entered the Soviet zone. For the USSR, it was necessary to determine its decisions in relation to these countries. As usual, there were several plans. The main one meant that, through political pressure, Soviet military bases would be deployed in the Baltic countries - the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Baltic Fleet, and then local left forces would achieve elections to local parliaments, which would announce the Baltic republics to join the USSR. But in case of an unforeseen event, plan B was also developed. It is more intricate and complex.
"Pioneer"
The Baltic Sea is rich in all kinds of accidents and disasters. Until the beginning of autumn 1939, one can mention the cases of accidents and deaths of Soviet ships in the Gulf of Finland: the hydrographic vessel "Azimut" on 08/28/1938 in the Luga Bay, the submarine "M-90" on 10/15/1938 near Oranienbaum, the cargo ship "Chelyuskinets" 03/27/1939 near Tallinn. In principle, the situation at sea during this period could be considered calm. But since the middle of summer, a new, alarming factor has appeared - reports of the captains of the ships of the Soviet Trade Fleet (the name of the organization that operated the civilian ships of the USSR in the pre-war period) about mines allegedly floating in the Gulf of Finland. At the same time, sometimes there were reports that the mines were of the "English" type. Even naval sailors do not undertake to report about a mine sample when it is found at sea, but here the report comes from civilian sailors! In the 1920s and early 1930s, the appearance of mines in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland was repeatedly reported. But then the mines of the Russian, German or English models of the First World War and the Civil War were promptly discovered and immediately destroyed, but for some reason they could not find them. The leader in fictitious reports was held by the captain of the motor ship "Pioneer" Vladimir Mikhailovich Beklemishev.
July 23, 1939 the following happened: at 22.21. The Typhoon patrol ship on patrol along the Shepelevsky lighthouse received a signal from the captain of the m / v Pioneer, located in the Gulf of Finland, with a semaphore and a clotick: “Two battleship-type warships were seen near the Northern village of Gogland Island”. (Hereinafter, extracts from the "Logbook of the Operational Duty Headquarters of the KBF" [RGA Navy. F-R-92. Op-1. D-1005,1006]). At 22.30 the commander of the Typhoon asks the Pioneer: - "Tell us the time and course of the unknown ships of the line that you noticed." At 22.42. the captain of the "Pioneer" repeats the previous text, and the connection breaks. The Typhoon commander passed this information to the headquarters of the fleet and, at his own peril and risk (there was no command for this), he organizes a search for unknown battleships near Finnish territorial waters and, of course, finds nothing. Why this performance was performed, we will understand a little later.
To understand the process and the people who participated in it, let us tell you about the captain of the motor ship "Pioneer" Vladimir Mikhailovich Beklemishev. This is the son of the first Russian submariner Mikhail Nikolaevich Beklemishev in 1858. birth, one of the designers of the first Russian submarine "Dolphin" (1903) and its first commander. Having connected his service with submarines, he retired in 1910. in the rank of "Major General of the Fleet". Then he taught mine engineering at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute, worked as a technical consultant at the St. Petersburg factories. Having remained out of work after the October Revolution of 1917, he entered the General Directorate of Shipbuilding, but was fired. In 1924 he became the commander of the experimental ship "Mikula", regularly commanding it between repeated arrests, and retired in 1931. In 1933, as the highest rank of the tsarist fleet (general), he was deprived of his pension. The old sailor died of a heart attack in 1936. (E. A. Kovalev "Knights of the Depths", 2005, p. 14, 363). His son Vladimir followed in his father's footsteps and became a seaman, only in the merchant marine. Probably his collaboration with the Soviet secret services. In the 1930s, merchant seamen were among the few who freely and regularly visited foreign countries, and Soviet intelligence often used the services of merchant seamen.
The "adventures" of the "Pioneer" did not end there. On September 28, 1939, at about 2 am, when the ship entered Narva Bay, its captain imitated the landing of the Pioneer on the rocks near the island of Vigrund and gave a pre-prepared radiogram "about the attack of the ship by an unknown submarine." The imitation of the attack served as the last trump card in the negotiations between the USSR and Estonia "On measures to ensure the safety of Soviet waters from sabotage actions by foreign submarines hiding in the Baltic waters" (Pravda newspaper, September 30, 1939, No. 133). The submarine is mentioned here for a reason. The fact is that after the German attack on Poland, the Polish submarine ORP "Orzeł" ("Eagle") broke through to Tallinn and was interned. On September 18, 1939, the crew of the boat tied up the Estonian sentries and "Orzeł" headed towards the exit from the harbor and fled Tallinn. Since two Estonian guards were held hostage on the boat, Estonian and German newspapers accused the Polish crew of killing both. However, the Poles landed sentries near Sweden, gave them food, water and money to return to their homeland, after which they left for England. The story then received a wide response and became an obvious reason for the scenario of a "torpedo attack" on the "Pioneer". The fact that the attack on the ship was not real and the "Pioneer" was not damaged can be judged by further events. The powerful rescue tug Signal, which had been waiting in advance for the SOS signal, immediately went to the Pioneer, and the rescuer, the diving base Trefolev, left the harbor on September 29, 1939 at 03.43 on an assignment and stopped at the Big Kronstadt roadstead. The vessel, allegedly removed from the stones, was brought to the Neva Bay. At 10.27 on September 30, 1939, “Signal” and “Pioneer” anchored in the Eastern Kronstadt roadstead. But for someone this was not enough. Back at 06.15, the towed Pioneer again “detects” (!) A floating mine in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Shepelevsky lighthouse, which was reported to the patrol minesweeper T 202 Bui. An order was given to the Operational Duty Officer of the Water Region Security (OVR) to warn all ships about a floating mine in the Shepelevsky lighthouse area. At 09.50 the Operational Duty Officer of the OVR reports to the Fleet Headquarters that the “Sea Hunter” boat sent to search for the mine has returned, no mines have been found. On October 2, 1939, at 20.18, the Pioneer transport began to be towed from the Eastern roadstead to Oranienbaum. If the "Pioneer" really hurriedly threw himself onto one of the stone cans near the rocky island of Vigrund, he should have received damage, at least one or two sheets of the underwater hull. The ship had only one large hold, and it would immediately fill with water, causing the ship to be seriously damaged. Only good weather, a wound plaster and pumping out water by the forces of a rescue vessel could save him. Since nothing of the kind happened, it is clear that the ship did not sit on the stones. Since the ship was not even brought into any of the Kronstadt or Leningrad docks for inspection, it can be concluded that it was only on the stones in the "TASS report". In the future, according to the scenario, the Pioneer motor ship was not required, and for some time it safely worked in the Baltic, and in 1940 the Pioneer was handed over to the crew that arrived from Baku and sent (out of sight) along the Volga to the Caspian Sea. After the war, the ship was in operation by the Caspian Shipping Company until July 1966.
"Metalist"
The newspaper Pravda No. 132 dated September 28, 1939 published a TASS message: “On September 27, at about 6 pm, an unknown submarine in the Narva Bay area torpedoed and sunk the Soviet steamer“ Metallist ”with a displacement of up to 4000 tons. From the crew of the steamer in the amount of 24 people, Soviet patrol ships picked up 19 people, the remaining 5 people were not found. " Metalist was not a merchant ship. He was the so-called "coal miner" - an auxiliary vessel of the Baltic Fleet, a military transport, and carried the flag of auxiliary vessels of the Navy. Metallist was mainly assigned to the two Baltic battleships Marat and Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya and, before the conversion of both battleships to liquid fuel, supplied them with coal during campaigns and maneuvers. Although he had other tasks. For example, in June 1935, Metallist provided coal for the transition of the Krasny Horn from the Baltic Fleet to the Northern Fleet. By the end of the 30s, Metalist, built in 1903 in England, was outdated and of little value. They also decided to donate. In September 1939, Metalist stood in the Leningrad commercial port, waiting for coal to support the operations of the Baltic Fleet. It must be remembered that this was a period when, for foreign policy reasons, the fleet was put on high alert. On September 23, the ship that had just been loaded for loading received an order from the Operational Duty Officer at the Fleet Headquarters: "Send the Metallist transport from Leningrad." Then several days passed in confusion. The ship was driven in anticipation of something from Oranienbaum to Kronstadt and back.
To describe further events, you need to make a small digression. There are two layers in this description: the first is the factual events recorded in the documents, the second is the memories of a former Finnish intelligence officer who published his memoirs after the war in Switzerland. Let's try to combine the two layers. Finnish intelligence officer Jukka L. Mäkkela, fleeing from the Soviet special services, was forced after Finland's withdrawal from the war in 1944. go abroad. There he published his memoirs "Im Rücken des Feindes-der finnische Nachrichtendienst in Krieg", They were published in German in Switzerland (publishing house Verlag Huber & Co. Frauenfeld). In them, among other things, J. L. Mäkkela recalled the captain of the 2nd rank Arsenyev, who was captured by the Finns in the autumn of 1941 in the Bjorkezund area, allegedly in the past - the commander of the training ship "Svir". (Not to be confused with Grigory Nikolaevich Arsenyev - Acting Commander of the Island Naval Base on Lavensaari Island, who died on May 18, 1945). The prisoner testified that in the fall of 1939 he was summoned to a meeting, where he and another officer were tasked with imitating the sinking of the Metallist transport submarine in Narva Bay by an unknown submarine. "Unknown" was assigned to the submarine Shch-303 "Yorsh", which was being prepared for repairs, in which the crew was being completed. The "Metallist" transport team will be "rescued" by the patrol ships that have left the bay. The rest of the clarifications will be announced before the release. Sounds fantastic, doesn't it? Now let's look at what happened in the Narva Bay. According to the established practice in the Baltic Fleet, "Metallist" played the role of "enemy" and designated battleships and aircraft carriers. So it was that time. Under the terms of the exercise, Metalist anchored at a given point. This place was in the Narva Bay, within sight from the Estonian coast. This was an important factor. At 16.00 Moscow time, three patrol ships of the "bad weather" battalion appeared - "Whirlwind", "Sneg" and "Tucha". One of them approached the transport, and the command sounded from its bridge: - “Bleed off steam at Metalist. The crew get ready to leave the ship. " Throwing everything, people ran to launch boats. The patrol boat, who approached at 16.28, took the command off. The "rescued", except for Arsenyev, who had been summoned to the bridge, were placed in the cockpit with portholes battened down on their armor. An orderly stood at the entrance, forbidding them to go out and have contacts with the Red Navy men. They expected a loud explosion, but it did not follow. "
At 4.45 pm Metalist again flew around MBR-2 aircraft, reporting: “There is no command. A dinghy is flooded at the side. The deck is a mess. " Estonian observers did not record this overflight of the aircraft, nor was it reported that from 19.05 to 19.14 Sneg was again mooring to Metallist. [RGA Navy. F.R-172. Op-1. D-992. L-31.]. At about 20.00, the "TASS message about the sinking of Metallist" appeared. Since the Estonian observers (recall that Metalist was anchored in sight of the Estonian coast) the same explosion was not recorded, then two options can be assumed:
The vessel was not sunk. For some reason, there was no torpedo salvo from the submarine. Not far from this place, the construction of a new naval base "Ruchyi" (Kronstadt-2) was underway. Closed area, no strangers. For a while, Metalist could be there.
In his book "On the Distant Approaches" (published in 1971). Lieutenant General S. I. Kabanov (from May to October 1939 was the Head of the Rear Services of the KBF, and who else, if not him, knew about the ships subordinate to the Rear Services), wrote: that in 1941 the Metallist transport cargo for the Hanko garrison and was damaged by enemy artillery fire. In the 70s of the 20th century, S. S. Berezhnoy and the employees of the NIG General Staff of the Navy connected to him worked on the compilation of the reference book "Ships and auxiliary vessels of the Soviet Navy 1917-1928" (Moscow, 1981). They did not find any other information about Metalist in the archives of Leningrad, Gatchina and Moscow and came to the conclusion that this transport was left on Hanko on December 2, 1941, in a submerged state.
The option that Metalist was still flooded is unlikely. The explosion was not heard by either the sailors from the patrol ships, and the Estonian observers on the shore did not see it either. The version that the steamer was sunk without the help of explosives is unlikely.
"Marine collection", No. 7 1991, publishing the heading "From the chronicle of military operations of the Navy in July 1941," stated: "On July 26, the Metalist TR was sunk by artillery fire on Hanko."
The fact is also a radiogram broadcast by radio at 23.30. This was a message from the Commander of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation “Sneg” to the Chief of Staff of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet: “The place of death of the transport“ Metallist ”: latitude - 59 ° 34 ', longitude - 27 ° 21' [RGA. F.R-92. Op-2. D-505. L-137.]
Another little nuance. Of course, he does not speak directly about anything, but still. On the same day when Metalist was “blown up” at 12.03 a command boat of the “YAMB” type (high-speed sea yacht) with the People's Commissar of the Navy and the Commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet left Kronstadt for the Gulf of Finland. [RGA Navy.F.R-92. Op-2. D-505. L-135.]. For what? To personally control the progress of the operation?
Conclusion
Everything that is described in this article is perceived as fantasy. But there are documents from the archive. They do not reveal the political intention, they reflect the movement of ships. The logs of the operational duty officer in the fleet reflect all events that occurred in the area of \u200b\u200bresponsibility and the movement of ships and vessels in it. And these displacements, superimposed on political processes (reflected in the officialdom of those times - the newspaper "Pravda"), allow drawing conclusions. Our history has many unexpected twists and turns and many secrets ...
Original taken from nord_ursus in the Black myth of the "Soviet occupation" of the Baltic States
As you know, the current Baltic states - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, whose fate in the 20th century is almost the same - currently adhere to the same historiographic policy in relation to this period. The Baltic states have been counting their de jure independence not from 1991, when they separated from the USSR, but from 1918, when they gained independence for the first time. The Soviet period - from 1940 to 1991 - is interpreted only as the Soviet occupation, during which from 1941 to 1944 there was also a "milder" German occupation. The events of 1991 are interpreted as the restoration of independence. At first glance, everything is logical and obvious, but upon detailed study, one can come to the conclusion that this concept is untenable.
In order to make the essence of the problem under consideration more understandable, it is necessary to give the background and circumstances of the formation of statehood of all three countries in 1918.
The independence of Latvia was proclaimed on November 18, 1918 in Riga, occupied by German troops, the independence of Estonia - on February 24, 1918, Lithuania - on February 16, 1918. After that, in all three countries there were civil wars for two years, or, in the tradition of the Baltic countries themselves, wars for independence. Each of the wars ended with the signing of an agreement with Soviet Russia, according to which it recognized the independence of all three countries and established a border with them. The treaty with Estonia was signed in Tartu on February 2, 1920, with Latvia in Riga on August 11, 1920, and with Lithuania in Moscow on July 12, 1920. Later, after the annexation of the Vilna region by Poland, the USSR continued to consider it the territory of Lithuania.
Now about the events of 1939-1940.
To begin with, mention should be made of a document that modern Baltic historiography directly links with the accession of the Baltic to the USSR, although it has only an indirect relationship to it. This is a non-aggression pact between the USSR and Nazi Germany, signed by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M.Molotov and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany I. Ribbentrop in Moscow on August 23, 1939. The treaty is also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. At the present time, it is customary to condemn not so much the pact itself as the secret protocol attached to it on the division of spheres of influence. According to this protocol, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and the eastern territories of Poland (Western Belarus and Western Ukraine) were transferred to the USSR's sphere of influence; later, when the Treaty of Friendship and Border was signed on September 28, 1939, Lithuania also ceded to the sphere of influence of the USSR.
Does this mean that the USSR has already planned the inclusion of the Baltic states in its composition? First, there is nothing out of the ordinary either in the treaty itself or in the secret protocol, this is a common practice of those years. Secondly, the clauses of the secret protocol mentioning the division of spheres of influence mention only the following:
«
In the event of a territorial and political reorganization of the regions that are part of the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania is at the same time the border of the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR. At the same time, the interests of Lithuania in relation to the Vilna region are recognized by both parties.
»
As you can see, the clause raising the question of the potential entry of the territories of the Soviet sphere of influence into the USSR is absent. At the same time, let us turn to another similar precedent - the division of spheres of influence in Europe between the USSR and Great Britain after the Second World War. As you know, for almost 50 years, the USSR's sphere of influence included the states of Eastern Europe - Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. However, the USSR did not seek to include them in its composition; moreover, it refused to accept Bulgaria into the Union. Consequently, the accession of the Baltic States to the USSR to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact has nothing to do with it.
But what influenced this decision of the Soviet government? This was influenced by the strong pro-German orientation of the authorities of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and, as a result, the potential threat of turning these countries into an outpost of Nazi Germany as a result of the voluntary admission of German troops by the authorities of these countries to their territory, in connection with which the Germans could not attack from near Brest , as it happened on June 22, 1941, and from near Narva, Daugavpils, Vilnius. The border with Estonia ran 120 km from Leningrad, and there was a real threat of the fall of Leningrad in the first days of the war. Here are some facts that substantiate the fears of the Soviet leadership.
On March 19, 1939, Germany presented Lithuania with an ultimatum demanding the transfer of the Klaipeda region. Lithuania agrees, and on March 22, an agreement is signed on the transfer of the city of Klaipeda (Memel) and the adjacent territory of Germany. According to the text of the internal memorandum of the chief of the German Foreign News Service Dertinger of June 8, 1939, Estonia and Latvia agreed to coordinate with Germany all defensive measures against the USSR - in accordance with secret articles from the non-aggression treaties between the Baltic countries and Germany. In addition, the "Directive on the unified training of the armed forces for war 1939-1940", approved by Hitler, reported the following: The position of the limited states will be determined exclusively by the military needs of Germany. “With the development of events, it may become necessary to occupy the limitrophic states up to the border of old Courland and include these territories in the empire» .
On April 20, 1939, in Berlin, the chief of staff of the Latvian army M. Hartmanis and the commander of the Kurzeme division O.Dankers, as well as the chief of the Estonian General Staff, Lieutenant General N. Reek were present at the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of Adolf Hitler. In addition, in the summer of 1939, the head of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Lieutenant General Franz Halder and the head of the Abwehr, Admiral Wilhelm Franz Canaris, visited Estonia.
In addition, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since 1934 have been in the anti-Soviet and pro-German military alliance called the "Baltic Entente".
In order to prevent the appearance of German troops in the Baltic States, the USSR first temporarily tries to get Germany to abandon claims to these territories, and then seeks to deploy its troops there. A month after the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact, the Soviet Union consistently concludes treaties of mutual assistance with the Baltic countries. The agreement with Estonia was concluded on September 28, 1939, with Latvia on October 5, and with Lithuania on October 10. From the Soviet side, they were signed by Molotov, from the side of the Baltic republics - by their foreign ministers: Karl Selter (Estonia), Wilhelms Munters (Latvia) and Juozas Urbshis (Lithuania). Under the terms of these treaties, states were obliged "Provide each other with all kinds of assistance, including military, in the event of a direct attack or threat of attack from any great European power."The military assistance provided by the USSR to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania consisted in supplying the armies of these countries with weapons and ammunition, as well as in deploying a limited contingent of Soviet troops on their territory (20-25 thousand people for each country). This position was mutually beneficial - the USSR could secure both its borders and the borders of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. According to the agreement with Lithuania, the USSR also transferred the Vilna region to Lithuania, as the former territory of Poland (as mentioned above, the USSR recognized it as the territory of Lithuania occupied by Poland), occupied by Soviet troops in September during the Polish operation. It is worth mentioning that during the signing of the agreements, the Soviet side put some diplomatic pressure on the ministers of the Baltic countries. However, firstly, if we proceed from the realities of time, this is logical, because when a world war begins, any reasonable politician will act harshly in relation to unreliable neighbors, and secondly, even the fact of the pressure that took place does not cancel the legality of the signed agreements ...
The deployment of a limited contingent of Soviet troops on the territory of neighboring states with the consent of their governments, albeit as a result of diplomatic pressure, does not contradict the norms of international law. It follows from this that, from a legal point of view, the entry of the Baltic republics into the USSR is not a consequence of the entry of Soviet troops into their territory. In accordance with this, it can be argued that the Soviet government had no plans to Sovietize the Baltic states. Any attempts to prove that the Soviet leadership has such plans, as a rule, boil down to lengthy discussions about the "imperial essence" of Russia and the USSR. I, of course, cannot exclude the possibility of Stalin's intentions to annex the Baltic states to the USSR, however, it is impossible to prove their existence. But the opposite evidence exists. Stalin's words from a private conversation with the General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern Georgy Dimitrov: “We think that in the pacts of mutual assistance (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) we have found the form that will allow us to place a number of countries in the orbit of influence of the Soviet Union. But for this one must endure - strictly observe their internal regime and independence. We will not seek their Sovietization ".
However, in the spring of 1940, the situation changed. Supporters of the thesis of the "Soviet occupation" of the Baltic states prefer to take events in the Baltic out of their historical context and not consider what was happening in Europe at that time. And the following happened: on April 9, 1940, Hitler's Germany occupied Denmark with lightning speed and without resistance, after which, within 10 days, it established control over most of Norway. On May 10, the troops of the Third Reich occupy Luxembourg, after 5 days of military operation, the Netherlands surrenders, Belgium surrenders on May 17. Within a month, France falls under German control. In this regard, the Soviet government expresses fears about the possibility of an early opening by Germany of the eastern front, that is, an attack on the Baltic countries, and then, through their territory, on the USSR. The contingent of Soviet troops that was at that time in the Baltic States was not enough to successfully confront the Wehrmacht. In the fall of 1939, when Soviet military bases were located in the Baltic countries, the leadership of the USSR did not count on such a turn of events. To fulfill the terms of the Mutual Assistance Treaties, concluded in the fall of 1939, it was necessary to enter into the territory of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania an additional contingent of troops, which would be able to resist the Wehrmacht, and, accordingly, thus provide assistance to the Baltic countries, which was provided for in the treaties. At the same time, the pro-German orientation of the authorities of these states continued, which in essence could be regarded as non-compliance by these states with mutual assistance treaties. These states did not leave the Baltic Entente. In addition, during the Soviet-Finnish war, Latvia and Estonia provided assistance to the Finnish army by intercepting Soviet radio signals (despite the fact that the RKKF ships participating in hostilities against Finland left the Gulf of Finland from a naval base near the city of Paldiski in Estonia ). In connection with the above circumstances, the Soviet Union is taking rather tough, but completely justified actions in relation to the Baltic neighbors. On June 14, 1940, the USSR presented a note to Lithuania, where in an ultimatum it demanded that a friendly Soviet government be formed within 10 hours, which would fulfill the Mutual Assistance Treaty and organize free admission to the territory of Lithuania for an additional contingent of Soviet armed forces. The Lithuanian government agrees, and on June 15 additional Soviet units enter Lithuania. On June 16, similar claims were made to Estonia and Latvia. Consent was also obtained, and on June 17, Soviet troops entered these countries. The introduction of additional troops in June 1940 is considered to be the beginning of the "Soviet occupation". However, the actions of the Soviet Union are absolutely legitimate, since they correspond to the provision recorded in the mutual assistance treaties, according to which the countries "Undertake to provide each other with all kinds of assistance, including military, in the event of a direct attack or threat of attack from any great European power"... In June 1940, the threat of attack increased greatly, which means that the troops intended to provide assistance in the event of a potential threat should have been increased accordingly! This circumstance justifies the actions of the Soviet government in the direction of ultimatums. As for whether these actions were occupation (a number of politicians also use the concept of "armed aggression" or even "attack"), the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania agreed to the introduction of additional troops, albeit not entirely voluntarily, but consent. In this case, they had a choice - they could not accept the ultimatums and offer resistance to the Red Army. Or they could not even have done so - in this case it would still have turned out that the Red Army entered their territory without consent. Then you could still talk about the Soviet occupation. But it turned out differently. The troops were admitted with official consent. Consequently, there can be no talk of occupation either.
Before the entry of troops, additional agreements were concluded between the USSR and the Baltic countries, which determined the procedure for the entry and location of Soviet military units, and officers of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian armies participated in the coordination of the troops. The President of Latvia Karlis Ulmanis on June 17 at 22 o'clock addressed the people of Latvia by radio, where he said that the introduction of Soviet troops was taking place "With the guidance and consent of the government, which follows from the friendly relations between Latvia and the Soviet Union"... Acting President of Lithuania Antanas Merkis similarly notified the Lithuanians.
Supporters of the opposite point of view prefer here to draw a parallel with the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. The scheme is the same: on the evening of March 14, 1939, Hitler presented an ultimatum to the President of Czechoslovakia, Emil Gache, demanding, by 6 am on March 15, to sign an act on the liquidation of Czechoslovakia's independence. At the same time, Gakha was faced with the fact that at night the German troops would cross the border with Czechoslovakia. The president was pressured and threatened with execution if he refused. Reich Aviation Minister Hermann Goering threatened to wipe Prague off the face of the earth with carpet bombing. Emil Gakha signed the consent four hours later. BUT! .. First, the ultimatum was presented when the German troops had already received the order to cross the border, and the Soviet troops did not receive the order until the response to the ultimatum followed. Secondly, when Gakha signed the agreement, the German troops had already crossed the border. The difference, I think, is obvious.
The population of the Baltics, whose pro-Soviet sentiments were extremely strong, greeted the Soviet troops with jubilation. These moods, thanks to the events that took place, intensified; rallies for joining the USSR were held in a number of cities. Contemporary Baltic politicians engaged in falsifying history prefer to assert that these demonstrations were allegedly organized and financed by the "occupiers", and that the population as a whole allegedly resisted.
Demonstrations in Kaunas, Riga and Tallinn. July 1940
Extraordinary parliamentary elections were held on July 14-15, 1940 in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. As a result, the candidates of the "Unions of the Working People" received: in Estonia - 93% of the vote, in Latvia - 98%, in Lithuania - 99%. The elected new parliaments on July 21 transformed Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into Soviet socialist republics, and on July 22 they signed declarations of accession to the USSR, which were considered and approved by the Soviet Union on August 6.
Here, advocates of the concept of occupation draw a parallel with the occupation (Anschluss) of Austria in March 1938. They say that a plebiscite was held there in the same way, and the majority of the population voted for reunification with Germany, but the fact of the occupation does not cancel this. But meanwhile they do not take into account the significant difference that German troops entered Austria on March 12, 1938 without any consent from the government of this country, and the plebiscite, in which 99.75% voted for the Anschluss (German. Anschlüß - reunion), was held on April 10. Thus, the plebiscite can be considered illegitimate, since it was held at a time when the occupation of Austria by German troops had already been carried out. The fundamental difference from the Soviet troops already stationed in the Baltic states is that the governments of the Baltic countries gave their consent to their deployment, even if only after diplomatic pressure. Moreover, according to the instructions for the Soviet troops in the Baltics, the contacts of the Red Army soldiers with the population were limited, and they were strictly forbidden to support any outside political forces. It follows from this that the Soviet troops present on the territory of these three countries could not influence the political situation. And the mere fact of their presence does not change anything. In the end, using the same standard, one can call into question the legal status of the pre-war Baltic states, since they were proclaimed in the presence of the troops of imperial Germany.
In short, the USSR government never planned to include the Baltic states in the USSR. It was only planned to include it in the Soviet orbit of influence and make the Baltic states allies of the USSR in a future war. In October 1939, the Soviet leadership considered it sufficient for this to deploy Soviet troops there so that German troops would not subsequently be deployed there, or rather, in the event of an invasion of German troops there, to fight them already there. And in June 1940, more serious measures had to be taken - to increase the number of troops and force the authorities of these countries to change their political course. On this, the Soviet government fulfilled its task. The new governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have already completely voluntarily signed declarations on joining the USSR, with the existing support of the pro-Soviet course by the majority of the population.
Proponents of the occupation thesis often try to prove the opposite by the presence, already in the summer of 1939, of plans for war with Estonia and Latvia and the fact of the concentration of Soviet troops near the border, sometimes citing an Estonian phrasebook for interrogating prisoners of war as an argument. Yes, there really were such plans. Such a plan was for the war with Finland. But, firstly, the goal was not to implement these plans, the plans themselves were developed in case the situation could not be settled peacefully (as happened in Finland), and secondly, the military action plans were not aimed at joining the Baltic states The USSR, and instead of changing the political course there by means of military occupation - if this plan were realized, then, of course, one could talk about the Soviet occupation.
Of course, the actions of the USSR in June 1940 were very harsh, and the actions of the authorities of the Baltic states were not fully voluntary. But, firstly, this does not cancel the legality of the introduction of troops, and secondly, in the legal status of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the period from 1940 to 1991, they could not de jure be in a state of occupation, since even after the introduction of troops into these states continued to operate their legitimate authority. The personnel of the government was changed, but the government itself did not change; talk that the "people's governments" were puppet and were brought in with the Red Army bayonets is nothing more than a historical myth. These same legitimate governments made decisions to join the USSR. A mandatory sign, according to which a territory can have the legal status of an occupied one, is the power brought on the bayonets of the occupying army. There was no such power in the Baltics, but legitimate governments continued to operate. But in the same Czechoslovakia, this scheme took place - on March 15, 1939, when German troops crossed the German-Czechoslovak border, the territory of the Czech Republic (Slovakia became an independent state) was declared a German protectorate (Bohemia and Moravia) by Hitler's personal decree, that is Germany has proclaimed its sovereignty over this territory. The Reich Protectorate became the occupation power of the Czech Republic, brought by the German army. Formally, Emil Hakha still continued to be the current president, but was subordinate to the Reich protector. The difference with the Baltics is again obvious.
So, the concept of the Soviet occupation is based on the fact that there was diplomatic pressure from the Soviet Union. But, firstly, this was not the only case of the use of diplomatic pressure, and secondly, it does not cancel the legality of the actions taken. The governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, both in October 1939 and in June 1940, themselves allowed the deployment of Soviet troops on the territories of their countries, and already in July 1940, the new legally elected governments voluntarily decided to join the USSR. Consequently, there was no Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries in 1940. Moreover, it did not exist in 1944, when the Baltic republics were already the territory of the USSR, and Soviet troops liberated them from Nazi occupation.
Supporters of the opposite often use the argument: "The Balts were forced to impose a system that they did not choose. So there was an occupation." About "did not choose" has already been said above. This is the first thing. Secondly, is it generally appropriate to talk about what they chose or did not choose with the system that existed in these three countries before 1940? The myth, widespread at the present time, claims that these three states were democratic before joining the USSR. In fact, authoritarian dictatorial regimes reigned there, not much inferior to the Stalinist regime in the USSR. In Lithuania, as a result of a military coup on December 17, 1926, Antanas Smetona came to power. Apparently inspired by the success of Adolf Hitler in Germany, the prime ministers of Estonia (Konstantin Päts) and Latvia (Karlis Ulmanis) carried out coups d'état on March 12 and May 15, 1934, respectively. In all three countries, in the same way, there was no real freedom of speech, there was strict censorship, as well as a ban on political parties, on the basis of which repressions against the communists were carried out. There were also things close to the cult of personality. In particular, Antanas Smetona was proclaimed the great leader of the Lithuanian people, and Karlis Ulmanis in the Latvian press was called "the greatest figure in Europe" and "twice a genius". It follows from this that talk about a system imposed by force and not chosen by the Balts is completely inappropriate here, since the system that existed earlier can be called force imposed with much more confidence.
In addition, modern Baltic historiography mentions repressions against the inhabitants of the newly formed Baltic Soviet republics and, in particular, their deportation to Siberia on June 14, 1941. The greatest lie in this historiography consists, firstly, in the traditional overstatement of the figures in relation to the Stalinist repressions, and secondly, in the allegations of the alleged genocide of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians. In reality, in May 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issued a decree "On measures to cleanse the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSR from anti-Soviet, criminal and socially dangerous elements." From all the Baltic republics taken together, about 30 thousand people were deported. Considering that the population of all three republics at that time was about 3 million, the number of deported is approximately 1%. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that although innocent people were among the deported, of course, there were also, far from the full number and not even the majority of the deported were "anti-Soviet elements"; among them were commonplace criminals, who even before 1940 were held in prisons in the independent Baltic states, and in 1941 they were simply transported to other places. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the deportation was carried out immediately before the war (8 days before its start) and was carried out to prevent cooperation of "anti-Soviet, criminal and socially dangerous elements" with the enemy in the event of a possible Nazi occupation of the territory. The deportation of one percent of the population, among whom, moreover, there were many ethnic Russians (since there were quite a few Russians in the pre-war Baltic states) can only be called genocide of the Baltic peoples if you have an overly rich imagination. The same, however, applies to the larger-scale deportations carried out in 1949, when about 20 thousand people were taken out of each republic. For the most part, those deported were those who, during the war, "distinguished themselves" by their direct collaboration with the Nazis.
Another common misconception regarding the Baltics is that during the Great Patriotic War, most of the Balts collaborated with the Germans, and most of the inhabitants of the Baltic cities greeted the Germans with flowers. In principle, we cannot judge how many people were happy with the arrival of the "German liberators", but the fact that there were people on the streets of Vilnius, Riga and other cities who joyfully greeted them and threw flowers still does not speak of the fact that they were the majority. Moreover, there were no less people who greeted the Red Army in 1944 with the same joy. There are, however, other facts. During the years of the Nazi occupation in the territory of the Baltic republics, as well as in the occupied Byelorussian SSR, there was a partisan movement, numbering about 20 thousand people in each republic. There were also the Baltic divisions of the Red Army: the 8th Estonian Infantry Tallinn Corps, the 130th Infantry Latvian Order of the Suvorov Corps, the 16th Lithuanian Klaipeda Red Banner Infantry Division and other formations. During the war years, 20,042 participants in Estonian formations, 17,368 participants in Latvian formations and 13,764 participants in Lithuanian military formations were awarded with military orders and medals.
Already against the background of the above facts, the assertion about the prevalence of the mood of cooperation with the Nazis among the Balts becomes untenable. The movements of the Baltic "forest brothers", which existed until the end of the 1950s, were not so much national as criminal-criminal, naturally diluted with nationalism. And often civilians of the Baltic republics perished at the hands of the forest brothers, and more often of the Baltic nationalities.
In addition, the Baltic republics within the USSR did not in any way occupy the position of the occupied ones. They were ruled by national authorities, which consisted of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, citizens of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in August 1940 automatically received Soviet citizenship, and the armies of these states became part of the Red Army. Throughout the Soviet period, the population of the Baltic peoples increased, and their national culture developed. In addition, the Baltic republics occupied a privileged position in the "Evil Empire". Huge investments were made in the economy and tourism (Jurmala and Palanga were considered one of the best resorts in the entire Union). In particular, the Baltic republics received about 2 rubles for the ruble of their own funds at the expense of the RSFSR. The Latvian SSR with a population of 2.5 million people received almost 3 times more funds from the budget than the Voronezh region with the same population. In the villages of the RSFSR, per 10 thousand hectares of arable land, there were paved roads on average 12.5 km, and in the Baltic States - almost 70 km, and the Vilnius-Kaunas-Klaipeda highway was considered the best road in the Soviet Union.In Central Russia, per 100 hectares of agricultural land, the cost of fixed assets was 142 thousand rubles, and in the Baltics - 255 thousand rubles. It was the Baltic republics and, to a slightly lesser extent, the Moldavian and Georgian SSRs that had the highest standard of living in the entire Soviet Union. I must say that in the 1990s, a huge number of factories in the Baltic countries were closed and destroyed (in Russia, of course, too, but this is a separate conversation) under the pretext that "we do not need Soviet monsters." The coal shale processing plant in Kohtla-Järve, the machine-building plant in Pärnu (partially functioning) were under the knife, most of the buildings of the Riga Carriage Works were closed(Rīgas Vagonbūves Rūpnīca), which supplied electric trains and trams to the entire Soviet Union, the Riga Electrotechnical Plant VEF (Valsts Elektrotehniskā Fabrika), built before the revolution and significantly expanded during the Soviet years, is in decline, in 1998 the Riga Bus Factory collapsed and has not yet been restored RAF (Rīgas Autobusu Fabrika); other infrastructure facilities also got it, for example, the abandoned sanatorium built in Soviet times in Jurmala.
In addition, there is another interesting circumstance that makes the concept of "restoration of independence" untenable. Namely, the independence of Lithuania on March 11, 1990, Estonia on August 20, 1991, and Latvia on August 21, 1991, was proclaimed by the parliaments of the Lithuanian, Estonian and Latvian SSR, respectively. From the point of view of the existing concept, these parliaments were local organs of the occupying power. If so, then the legal status of the current Baltic states can be questioned. It turns out that indirectly the current Baltic authorities call themselves occupiers in the recent past, but directly - they deny any legal succession from the Soviet republics.
Thus, we can conclude that the concept of the "Soviet occupation" of the Baltic region is artificial and far-fetched. At the moment, this concept is a convenient political tool in the hands of the authorities of the Baltic countries, where on the basis of this mass discrimination of the Russian population is carried out. In addition, it is also a tool for issuing large invoices to Russia with compensation claims. In addition, Estonia and Latvia are demanding (now unofficially) from Russia the return of part of the territories: Estonia - Zanarovye with the city of Ivangorod, as well as the Pechora district of the Pskov region with the city of Pechora and the old Russian city, and now the rural settlement of Izborsk, Latvia - Pytalovsky district of Pskov area. As a justification, the borders under the treaties of 1920 are given, although they are currently not in effect, since they were denounced in 1940 by the declaration of joining the USSR, and the borders were changed already in 1944 when Estonia and Latvia were republics of the Soviet Union.
Conclusion: the concept of the "Soviet occupation" of the Baltic region has little in common with historical science, but, as mentioned above, is just a political instrument.
One of the accusations that are constantly brought up against the USSR and Stalin is the "conquest" of the Baltic states and the territory of modern Moldova.
At the same time, accusers overlook, knowingly or illiterately, a number of important facts:
In the fall of 1939, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania themselves concluded an agreement of understanding with the USSR, after which the Union received the right to place its military bases on their territory.
In each of the countries, significant groups of the population supported the idea of \u200b\u200bsocialism, not small communist parties operated in them, newspapers were published. In the elections in July 1940, 92.8% of those who came to express their opinion voted for the Union of Working People in Estonia. There were also local “underground workers” in the Baltic countries who were ready to defend the ideals of communism at the cost of their lives.
The residents of Riga meet the Soviet "occupiers" in the summer of 1940.
In Lithuania, recalling the "occupation", for some reason they do not remember that Moscow returned to Lithuania their ancient capital - Vilna and the Vilna region, which in 1923 was captured by Poland.
Since "Sovietization" is equal to "occupation", why the valiant armies of the Baltic countries did not offer resistance, which the Western democracies would undoubtedly support. At least morally, for sure, perhaps even a war would have started, because during the Soviet-Finnish war, London and Paris almost started a war with Moscow. The Red Army "let us down", won too quickly.
The armies of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania simply "joined" the Red Army. In Lithuania, the army became the 29th territorial corps, the servicemen even retained their old uniform, only the insignia were replaced. The officers were supplemented by political workers - commissars, often Lithuanians from the USSR or members of the Lithuanian Communist Party.
Why didn't the partisan movement against the "occupiers" start?
- There are a lot of photographs where residents of the three Baltic states greet the Red Army soldiers with flowers and bread and salt. That is, at least for a significant part of the population, the changes were met positively.
Few of today's politicians admit that restoring the integrity of the Empire was a positive phenomenon for the Russian people and for Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, completely in their interests.
The USSR actually saved the Balts from a real occupation by the Third Reich. During the "occupation" of the Soviet Union from 1939 to 1991, Estonia lost 5-7 thousand people from repression, about 30 thousand more were exiled, we will not go into details for what. From 1941 to 1944, the Nazis killed 80 thousand in Estonia, another 70 thousand fled from the "civilizers". In less than 4 years, half of the industry was destroyed, almost all livestock were taken away, agriculture was practically destroyed. And under the rule of the Soviet "occupiers" the Baltic region flourished, was the "showcase of the USSR".
In Lithuania, during the Soviet era, 32 thousand people were repressed (to clarify - this does not mean that they were killed, maybe exiled, or imprisoned for a year or two), the Nazis only physically killed 270 thousand Lithuanian citizens.
In Latvia, the Soviet authorities repressed about 20-30 thousand people, the Nazis killed 150 thousand.
And if you remember the plans of Berlin (the "Ost" plan and other developments), then the inhabitants of the Baltics were very lucky that the Red Army won. All three peoples were considered inferior and were subject to partly destruction, partly eviction beyond the Urals, partly to be a servant of the new owners, this territory was going to be re-populated by the Germans (there was already the experience of the Teutonic, Livonian orders).
Prosecutors do not take into account the logic of wartime. In Moscow, they were not stupid and knew that a terrible world war was approaching. In years of peace, it is possible to allow artificial formations to exist, and in years of war, it is a springboard. If you do not take this territory ourselves, Berlin will take it, but you cannot "pick out" it from there - this is war. This is a terrible strategic defeat: after the collapse of the Russian Empire, we already lost vast territories, including Finland, Poland, and the western borders shifted into threatened proximity to Leningrad and Moscow. The further Moscow would manage to move the border to the west, the better, the more time it will have to mobilize.
Let's imagine for a moment, we did not take the Baltic states, but Hitler took it. In reality, the Wehrmacht approached Leningrad on September 6, 1941, already significantly "exhausted". There is nothing from Estonia to Leningrad - 120 km, if Army Group North struck from the Baltics, how long would it take them to reach the second capital of the Union? Five days or ten? And the divisions would be fresh.
We must not forget such a military-strategic aspect of the occupation of the Baltic States, and Bessarabia as well, as human and economic resources. They were not fully exploited by the enemy. The Baltic countries put together 11 divisions, one cavalry brigade, two cavalry regiments, one tank brigade, one tank regiment, 12 artillery regiments. In wartime, the Baltic countries fielded a total of more than 420 thousand fighters. If this territory was occupied by Hitler, he would be able to use this force against the USSR. And so Berlin, in addition to punitive forces, was able to form only three SS divisions in the Baltic states. This is despite the fact that 3 corps fought on our side: Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian. Then, in view of their low combat effectiveness, new units were formed: the 130th Latvian Rifle Corps, the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps and the 16th Lithuanian Rifle Division. These units fought quite well. They participated in the liberation of the Baltic States in 1944-1945.
In addition, the Baltic Fleet included 4 submarines from Estonia and Latvia. And one of them, the Estonian "Lembit", became the third most productive in the Soviet fleet, sinking 7 enemy ships and 17 transports.
Red Banner submarine Lembit.
About Bessarabia
The attitude of the Moldovans themselves to the "occupation" of the USSR is evidenced by the fact that they practically did not participate in the war on the side of the Nazis. But there are many Moldovans who honestly fought for the Soviet Motherland.
Moldova as a state was not in. Moldavia is part of the Russian Empire, which was captured by Romania during the collapse of the empire. Nobody in Russia admitted it. Stalin simply demanded that Romania return what was his, which Romania did.
Moscow also created the "embryo" of Moldovan statehood - the Moldavian SSR, cutting off the territory of Little Russia, Transnistria.
The life of the Moldovans from the return to the empire only improved. Modern Moldovans, probably from a good life, go to work in Russia, Romania, countries of the European Union ?!
Romania was hostile to the USSR, moreover, it seized its territory - Bessarabia. Bucharest was torn, with whom to be friends? With Paris and London or Berlin. As a result, he chose Berlin, which was not noticed in the "throwing" of the allies, the example of Poland was before Romania's eyes. The USSR also solved a purely military-strategic problem: as in the case of the Baltic states, it moved the border to the west.
Outcome
The political elite of the USSR acted as the normal leadership of the country should act in the face of the approaching Great War. Moscow acted in the strategic and tactical interests of the state and its people. Moreover, in the interests of both the Baltic peoples and the Moldovans, they only gained from the "occupation" by Moscow, saving thousands of lives and receiving economic benefits. The USSR almost immediately began to invest considerable funds in the development of these territories of the common empire.
Kishinev. On June 28, 1940, thousands of people took to the streets to meet the Red Army.
Sources:
Diplomatic Dictionary in three volumes. M., 1985.
Pykhalov I. The Great Obvious War. M., 2006.
Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century: Statistical research, M., 2001.
Taylor A. World War II // World War II: Two Views. M., 1995.
In June 1940, events began, which were previously called "the voluntary entry of the Baltic peoples into the USSR", and since the end of the 1980s are increasingly called the "Soviet occupation of the Baltic states." During the years of Gorbachev's "perestroika", a new historical scheme began to be introduced. According to it, the Soviet Union occupied and forcibly annexed three independent democratic Baltic republics.
Meanwhile, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia by the summer of 1940 were by no means democratic. And for a long time. As for their independence, it has been rather ghostly since its announcement in 1918.
1. The myth of democracy in the interwar Baltic states
Initially, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were parliamentary republics. But not for long. Internal processes, first of all - the growth of the influence of the left forces, striving to "do as in Soviet Russia", led to a reciprocal consolidation of the right. However, this short period of parliamentary democracy was also marked by the repressive policy of the top. So, after the unsuccessful uprising organized by the communists in Estonia in 1924, more than 400 people were executed there. For small Estonia, the figure is significant.
On December 17, 1926, in Lithuania, the parties of nationalists and Christian Democrats, relying on groups of officers loyal to them, carried out a coup d'etat. The putschists were inspired by the example of neighboring Poland, where the founder of the state, Josef Piłsudski, established his sole authority earlier in the same year. The Lithuanian Sejm was dissolved. The head of state was Antanas Smetona, the leader of the nationalists, the former first president of Lithuania. In 1928, he was officially proclaimed "the leader of the nation", unlimited powers were concentrated in his hands. In 1936, all parties in Lithuania, except for the Nationalist Party, were banned.
In Latvia and Estonia, authoritarian regimes were established somewhat later. On March 12, 1934, the state elder - the head of the executive branch of Estonia - Konstantin Päts (the first prime minister of independent Estonia) canceled the re-election of parliament. In Estonia, the coup was caused not so much by the left as by the ultra-right. Päts banned the pro-Nazi organization of veterans ("vaps"), which he believed threatened his power, and carried out mass arrests of its members. At the same time, he began to implement many elements of the "vaps" program in his politics. Having received parliamentary approval for his actions, Päts dismissed it in October of the same year.
The Estonian parliament has not met for four years. All this time, the republic was ruled by a junta consisting of Päts, commander-in-chief J. Laidoner and head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs K. Eerenpalu. All political parties were banned in March 1935, except for the pro-government “Union of the Fatherland”. The Constitutional Assembly, for which there were no alternative elections, adopted a new Estonian constitution in 1937, granting extensive powers to the president. In accordance with it, in 1938 a one-party parliament and President Päts were elected.
One of the “innovations” of “democratic” Estonia was “camps for quitters,” as the unemployed were called. A 12-hour working day was established for them, the guilty were beaten with rods.
On May 15, 1934, the Prime Minister of Latvia, Karlis Ulmanis, staged a coup d'état, abolished the constitution and dissolved the Diet. President Kviesis was given the opportunity to sit out until the end of the term (in 1936) - he actually did not decide anything. Ulmanis, the former prime minister of independent Latvia, was proclaimed "the leader and father of the nation." More than 2,000 opposition members were arrested (although almost all were soon released - Ulmanis's regime turned out to be "soft" compared to its neighbors). All political parties were banned.
In the authoritarian regimes in the Baltics, some differences can be established. So, if Smetona and Pats largely relied on one and only permitted party, then Ulmanis - on a formally non-partisan state apparatus plus a developed civil militia (aiszargov). But they had more in common, to the point that all three dictators were people who were at the head of these republics even at the very dawn of their existence.
The elections to the Estonian parliament in 1938 can serve as a striking characteristic of the "democratic character" of the bourgeois Baltic. They were attended by candidates from the only party - "Fatherland Union". At the same time, the local election commissions were instructed by the Minister of the Interior: "Those who are known to be known to vote against the National Assembly should not be allowed to vote ... They must be immediately taken to the police." This ensured a "unanimous" vote for candidates from a single party. But in spite of this, in 50 out of 80 constituencies, it was decided not to hold elections at all, but simply to announce the election of the only candidates to parliament.
Thus, long before 1940, the last signs of democratic freedoms were eliminated throughout the Baltics and a totalitarian state system was established.
The Soviet Union only had to make a technical replacement of the fascist dictators, their pocket parties and political police with the mechanism of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the NKVD.
2. The myth of the independence of the Baltic states
The independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia was proclaimed in 1917-1918. in a difficult environment. Most of their territory was occupied by German troops. Kaiser's Germany had its own plans for Lithuania and the Ostsee Territory (Latvia and Estonia). At the Lithuanian Tariba (National Council), the German administration forced an "act" to call the Württemberg prince to the Lithuanian royal throne. In the rest of the Baltic States, the Baltic Duchy was proclaimed, headed by a member of the Mecklenburg ducal house.
In 1918-1920. The Baltic States, with the help of first Germany and then England, became a springboard for deploying the forces of the internal Russian civil war. Therefore, the leadership of Soviet Russia took all measures to neutralize them. After the defeat of the White Guard army of Yudenich and other similar formations in the north-west of Russia, the RSFSR hastened to recognize the independence of Latvia and Estonia and in 1920 signed interstate treaties with these republics, guaranteeing the inviolability of their borders. At that time, the RSFSR even concluded a military alliance with Lithuania against Poland. Thus, thanks to the support of Soviet Russia, the Baltic countries defended their formal independence in those years.
With de facto independence, the situation was much worse. The agrarian and raw material component of the Baltic economy forced to look for importers of products of the Baltic agriculture and fisheries in the West. But the West was in little need of the Baltic fish, and therefore the three republics were more and more mired in the quagmire of subsistence economy. The result of economic backwardness was the politically dependent position of the Baltic states.
Initially, the Baltic countries were oriented towards England and France, but after the Nazis came to power in Germany, the ruling Baltic cliques began to draw closer to the growing Germany. The culmination of all was the mutual assistance treaties concluded by all three Baltic states with the Third Reich in the mid-1930s ("Score of World War II". M .: "Veche", 2009). Under these treaties, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were obliged to turn to Germany for help in the event of a threat to their borders. The latter had in this case the right to send troops into the territory of the Baltic republics. Likewise, Germany could "legally" occupy these countries if a "threat" to the Reich arose from their territory. Thus, the "voluntary" entry of the Baltic states into the sphere of German interests and influence was formalized.
This circumstance was taken into account by the leadership of the USSR in the events of 1938-1939. The conflict between the USSR and Germany in these conditions would entail the immediate occupation of the Baltic by the Wehrmacht. Therefore, during the negotiations on August 22-23, 1939 in Moscow, the question of the Baltic was one of the most important. It was important for the Soviet Union to protect itself from this side from any surprises. The two powers agreed to draw the border of the spheres of influence so that Estonia and Latvia fell into the Soviet sphere, Lithuania - into the German sphere.
The result of the treaty was the approval by the Lithuanian leadership on September 20, 1939 of the draft treaty with Germany, according to which Lithuania was "voluntarily" transferred under the protectorate of the Third Reich. However, already on September 28, the USSR and Germany agreed to change the boundaries of the spheres of influence. In exchange for the strip of Poland between the Vistula and the Bug, the USSR received Lithuania.
In the fall of 1939, the Baltic states had an alternative - to be under Soviet or German protectorate. The history did not provide them with anything third at that moment.
3. The myth of the occupation
The period of establishing the independence of the Baltic States - 1918-1920. - was marked in them by the civil war. Quite a significant part of the population of the Baltic States, with arms in hand, advocated the establishment of Soviet power. At one time (in the winter of 1918-1919), the Lithuanian-Belarusian and Latvian Soviet Socialist Republics and the Estland "Labor Commune" were proclaimed. The Red Army, which included national Bolshevik Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian units, occupied most of the territories of these republics for some time, including the cities of Riga and Vilnius.
The support of anti-Soviet forces by the interventionists and the inability for Soviet Russia to provide sufficient assistance to its supporters in the Baltic led to the retreat of the Red Army from the region. Red Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians were deprived of their homeland by the will of fate and were scattered throughout the USSR. Thus, in the 1920s and 1930s, that part of the Baltic peoples that most actively advocated Soviet power ended up in forced emigration. This circumstance could not but affect the mood in the Baltic States, deprived of the "passionate" part of its population.
Due to the fact that the course of the civil war in the Baltics was determined not so much by internal processes as by changes in the alignment of external forces, it is absolutely impossible to establish exactly who was there in 1918-1920. there were more - supporters of Soviet power or supporters of bourgeois statehood.
Soviet historiography attached great importance to the growth of protest sentiments in the Baltics at the end of 1939 - the first half of 1940. They were interpreted as the ripening of socialist revolutions in these republics. The implication was that the workers' actions were led by the underground communist parties there. In our time, many historians, especially the Baltic ones, tend to deny facts of this kind. It is believed that protests against dictatorial regimes were sporadic, and dissatisfaction with them did not automatically mean sympathy for the Soviet Union and the communists.
Nevertheless, given the previous history of the Baltics, the active role of the working class in this region in the Russian revolutions of the early 20th century, and widespread dissatisfaction with dictatorial regimes, it should be admitted that the Soviet Union had a strong “fifth column” there. And it consisted clearly not only of communists and sympathizers. It was important that the only real alternative to joining the USSR at that time, as we have seen, was joining the German Reich. During the civil war, the hatred of Estonians and Latvians towards their age-old oppressors, the German landlords, was quite clearly manifested. Thanks to the Soviet Union, Lithuania returned its ancient capital, Vilnius, in the fall of 1939.
So the sympathy for the USSR among a significant part of the Balts at that time was determined not only and not so much by left-wing political views.
On June 14, 1940, the USSR presented an ultimatum to Lithuania, demanding a change of government to one composed of people more loyal to the Soviet Union and permission to bring additional contingents of Soviet troops into Lithuania, stationed there under a mutual assistance agreement concluded in the fall of 1939. Smetona insisted on resistance, but the entire cabinet of ministers opposed. Smetona was forced to flee to Germany (from where he soon moved to the United States), and the Lithuanian government accepted Soviet conditions. On June 15, additional contingents of the Red Army entered Lithuania.
The presentation of similar ultimatums to Latvia and Estonia on June 16, 1940 met with no objection from the local dictators. Initially, Ulmanis and Päts formally remained in power and authorized measures to create new government bodies in these republics. On June 17, 1940, additional Soviet troops entered Estonia and Latvia.
In all three republics, governments were formed from people friendly to the USSR, but not communists. All this was carried out in compliance with the formal requirements of the current constitutions. Then parliamentary elections took place. The decrees on new appointments and elections were signed by the Prime Minister of Lithuania, the Presidents of Latvia and Estonia. Thus, the change of power was accomplished in compliance with all procedures required by the laws of independent Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. From a formal legal point of view, all the acts that preceded the entry of these republics into the USSR are irreproachable.
The elections to the Seims of these republics, held on July 14, 1940, gave legitimacy to the annexation of the Baltic to the USSR. Only one list of candidates was registered in the elections - from the Union of the Working People (in Estonia - the Bloc of the Working People). This was also fully consistent with the legislation of these countries during the period of independence, which did not provide for alternative elections. According to official data, voter turnout ranged from 84 to 95%, with 92 to 99% voted for candidates on a single list (in different republics).
We are deprived of the opportunity to learn how the political process would have developed in the Baltic countries after the overthrow of the dictatorships, if it had been left to itself. In that geopolitical situation, this was a utopia. However, there is no reason to believe that the summer of 1940 meant for the Baltics the replacement of democracy with totalitarianism. Democracy was gone for a long time. In the worst case, for the Baltics, one authoritarianism has simply been replaced by another.
But at the same time, the threat of destruction of the statehood of the three Baltic republics was prevented. What would have happened to her if the Baltics had come under the control of the German Reich was demonstrated in 1941-1944.
In the plans of the Nazis, the Balts were subject to partial assimilation by the Germans, partial eviction to lands cleared of Russians. There was no question of any Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian statehood.
Under the conditions of the Soviet Union, the Balts retained their statehood, their languages \u200b\u200bas official, developed and enriched their national culture.
The independent Lithuanian state was proclaimed under German sovereignty on February 16, 1918, and on November 11, 1918, the country gained full independence. From December 1918 to August 1919, Soviet power existed in Lithuania, and Red Army units were in the country.
During the Soviet-Polish war in July 1920, the Red Army occupied Vilnius (transferred to Lithuania in August 1920). In October 1920, Poland occupied the Vilnius region, which in March 1923, by decision of the conference of the Entente ambassadors, became part of Poland.
(Military encyclopedia. Military publishing. Moscow. In 8 volumes 2004)
On August 23, 1939, a non-aggression pact and secret agreements on the division of spheres of influence (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) were signed between the USSR and Germany, which were then supplemented by new agreements of August 28; according to the latter, Lithuania entered the sphere of influence of the USSR.
On October 10, 1939, a Soviet-Lithuanian mutual assistance treaty was signed. According to the agreement, the Vilnius Region, which was occupied by the Red Army in September 1939, was transferred to Lithuania, and Soviet troops numbering 20 thousand people were deployed on its territory.
On June 14, 1940, the USSR, accusing the Lithuanian government of violating the treaty, demanded the creation of a new government. On June 15, an additional contingent of Red Army troops was brought into the country. The People's Seimas, elections to which were held on July 14 and 15, proclaimed the establishment of Soviet power in Lithuania and appealed to the USSR Supreme Soviet with a request to accept the republic into the Soviet Union.
The independence of Lithuania was recognized by the Decree of the State Council of the USSR of September 6, 1991. Diplomatic relations with Lithuania were established on October 9, 1991.
On July 29, 1991, the Treaty on the Foundations of Interstate Relations between the RSFSR and the Republic of Lithuania was signed in Moscow (entered into force in May 1992). On October 24, 1997, the Treaty on the Russian-Lithuanian state border and the Treaty on the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf in the Baltic Sea were signed in Moscow (entered into force in August 2003). To date, 8 interstate, 29 intergovernmental and about 15 interdepartmental treaties and agreements have been concluded and are in force.
Political contacts in recent years have been limited. The official visit of the President of Lithuania to Moscow took place in 2001. The last meeting at the level of heads of government took place in 2004.
In February 2010, Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite met with the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the Helsinki Baltic Sea Action Summit.
The basis of trade and economic cooperation between Russia and Lithuania is the Agreement on Trade and Economic Relations of 1993 (it was adapted to EU norms in 2004 in connection with the entry into force for Lithuania of the EU Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement).
The material was prepared on the basis of information from open sources.