Five unknown facts about the Caribbean crisis. Lessons learned from the Caribbean crisis Who triggered the Caribbean crisis

The calendar of historical memory marks a very important event: the 55th anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis. On September 8, 1962, the first batch of R-12 missiles was delivered to Cuba as part of a secret operation of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, code-named "Anadyr". Others followed.

On October 4, nuclear warheads for these missiles were delivered to Cuba. Soon it became known to the Americans thanks to photographs from the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. The most famous footage of Soviet rockets was captured during the flight on October 14. After that, within two weeks, the escalation of events developed so rapidly that the world was for the first time faced with a real threat of nuclear war.

Fortunately (and thanks to the outright concessions of the Soviet Union, which gave its consent to the withdrawal of missiles from Cuba), the threat of war was then overcome. Since then, the Cuban missile crisis has been included in all textbooks both on the history of international relations and on political decision-making. The work of President Kennedy's crisis headquarters is a classic example that is still being studied in universities around the world.

The Cuban missile crisis has acquired fundamental importance also because it turned out to be a very clear psychological and political watershed in relation to the use of nuclear weapons. After it, it became finally clear that the actual use of nuclear weapons cannot be limited to one or several strikes, but practically guarantees a large-scale salvo from both sides of the conflict. Which, in turn, will lead to the mutual destruction of both the USA and the USSR, and the whole world as a whole. The theoretical model of "nuclear winter" as a global result of a mutual volley received almost universal recognition, and its few critics were extremely marginalized from the point of view of the academic mainstream. Most scientists persistently promoted the idea of \u200b\u200bthe impossibility of nuclear war, since it entails the end of human civilization.

The politicians of both superpowers, as shown by the Cuban Missile Crisis, were also not ready for multi-million casualties from their own populations during several hours of an exchange of nuclear strikes. As a result, the role of nuclear weapons has fundamentally changed. Instead of a real breakthrough weapon as part of a frontline (or even an army) operation (recall, for example, the exercises at the Totsk test site in 1954), nuclear weapons turned into an exclusively virtual instrument of deterring the opposing side. Real wars were planned and waged as if nuclear weapons did not exist (the United States in Vietnam, the USSR in Afghanistan, and others). This was the main lesson of the Cuban missile crisis.

During the decade that followed the Cuban missile crisis, this changed nature of nuclear weapons led to the formation of the so-called “negative deterrence” doctrine, when the main guarantee of non-use of nuclear weapons was considered to be the lack of forces and means to repel a volley from the enemy. The result of this doctrine was the signing of the Soviet-American treaty on the practical prohibition of anti-missile defense in 1972.

As a result, even during the period of the new tough escalation of the Cold War in the first half of the 1980s under Reagan, the question of the actual use of nuclear weapons "here and now" was not raised. Although, however, there is enough historical evidence in favor of the fact that one of the scenarios of the large-scale NATO exercises Able Archer in 1983 envisaged (depending on the reaction of the Soviet Union) their use as a screen for a real nuclear strike by the Americans on the territory of the USSR. But these plans of Reagan were neutralized by his European allies, who did not want to become a collateral victim of the American nuclear war. And this is also the merit of the legacy of the Cuban missile crisis.

However, the same Reagan was the first to look for ways to achieve victory in a large-scale nuclear war and, accordingly, to reverse the transformation of nuclear weapons from virtual to real. This was supposed to be achieved by transferring the arms race to space within the framework of the Strategic Defense Initiative, which received the capacious informal name of the Star Wars Program.

Further, after the end of the Cold War, the Americans began to look for new options for overcoming the situation of guaranteed mutual destruction in a nuclear war. The solution was found in the abandonment of the doctrine of negative deterrence and the creation of a powerful anti-missile defense capable of repelling a retaliatory volley of the enemy. Thus, the Americans untied their hands for their own first salvo, which destroyed a significant part of the enemy's nuclear arsenal, and the weakened response salvo was repulsed by the missile defense system. As a result, the Americans were able to inflict irreparable damage on the enemy, and they themselves avoided it. The practical result of such approaches was the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty at the turn of 1990-2000 and the beginning of its adoption of elements of a global anti-missile defense in the Arctic, Europe and the Pacific Ocean.

The next step towards dismantling the "Caribbean legacy" in US nuclear policy was a dramatic change in the political situation in the world after the Ukrainian crisis. In the course of the scenarios of its possible escalation, a direct military clash between NATO and Russia in the European theater of operations (TMD) was not ruled out (not excluded), which in turn could develop into a "limited" nuclear war in the same European theater of operations.

It was assumed that a potential US / NATO nuclear conflict with Russia could develop in two scenarios. The first is a large-scale salvo (about 10 thousand megatons of the total TNT equivalent of the released charges), and here either a situation of guaranteed mutual destruction ensues, or the Americans fight back with the help of missile defense, as mentioned above. Another scenario is that both sides conduct a limited volley or a series of single strikes (about 100 megatons of total charge) and restrain themselves from a full-scale salvo with all available arsenal. In this case, nuclear weapons turn into an instrument of a front-line operation (or, at the most, a strategic operation in a theater of operations) without global consequences. Here, due to the limited volley, the chances of the American missile defense system to effectively repel the strike increase significantly.

In favor of serious practical attention on the part of the United States to the development of just such a scenario, the program that has begun to modernize American B-61 nuclear bombs, which are dropped from an aircraft, also testifies. For a global 10,000-megaton salvo, these bombs are of secondary importance, and the main focus there will be on intercontinental missiles. In the framework of a front-line operation, the role of nuclear bombing from aircraft, on the contrary, increases and, due to the flexibility of the operational situation, can become a priority.

Finally, a completely new dimension of the nuclear conflict has gained its relevance in recent months during the escalation of the situation around the DPRK, largely provoked by US President Donald Trump. Recently, a new series of missile and nuclear tests by the DPRK makes the current anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis not only an academic event, but also puts on the practical agenda the question of the fact that the "Caribbean legacy" of the need to avoid nuclear war by all means is completely losing its significance.

The specificity of possible scenarios for a nuclear escalation of the Korean crisis is that it will not be about a large-scale nuclear clash between the United States and Russia with global consequences, but about a clash between the United States and a much weaker nuclear power, North Korea. As a result, in the "nuclear discourse" in the United States since the spring of 2017, a special emphasis has been placed on the "single use" of nuclear weapons in the Korean conflict. It is clear that in the event of a US military attack on North Korea by the DPRK, the only possibility of resistance is a response in the form of a nuclear strike against US allies in the region. First of all - in Seoul. For this, in principle, no delivery vehicles are even needed, and to defeat Seoul, which is located practically on the border with the DPRK, the North Koreans will only have to detonate a nuclear charge on their territory near the border with the capital of the South. Another possible response / retaliation from the DPRK is a strike on Japan, and in the most ideal case, a strike on Guam. After that, the Americans are practically guaranteed to wipe the DPRK off the face of the earth (perhaps not even resorting to nuclear weapons, but using conventional firepower).

And in this context, the discussions in the US military circles about the fact that such a single use of nuclear weapons by the DPRK seems to the Americans at least quite acceptable, and even even desirable, arouse particular interest. Firstly, after that they get complete freedom of action with regard to the DPRK. And secondly, and much more importantly, the taboo on the use of nuclear weapons as an essential element of the world order after the Caribbean crisis is disappearing in the world. And it is not the Americans who will break this taboo, but the North Koreans. But after that, the rest of the nuclear powers will have a free hand to use it not only in Korea, but also in other front-line operations (in the Donbas, in Iran, in Syria, in the Indo-Pakistani conflict, but anywhere), just not was the escalation of a "single" use in a global salvo.

Thus, the current anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis could become the last anniversary of the world order with a global taboo on the use of nuclear weapons, and the world could enter a completely different era with the realities of nuclear explosions. The responsibility for this will lie not so much with Kim Jong-un as with Trump.

Powerful optics of the spy plane snatches out of the pre-dawn jungle an area the size of a football field. It clearly shows the "tubes" of transport containers of ballistic missiles, air defense positions, tents and military depots. In the center is the launch pad. Pilot Major Richard Heizer, not believing his eyes, makes another circle over the wasteland and is finally convinced: the nuclear weapon of the USSR has appeared on Freedom Island. Exactly 55 years ago, on October 14, 1962, a US Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft discovered the positions of Soviet R-12 medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. This incident is considered to be the beginning of the Cuban missile crisis, which almost escalated into the Third World War. RIA Novosti reports on the events of the days when the world was on the brink of nuclear catastrophe.

© Photo: U.S. Air Force

Do the impossible

For the first time, Nikita Khrushchev announced the idea of \u200b\u200btransferring ballistic missiles and military contingent to Cuba on May 20, 1962 at a meeting with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky and First Deputy of the USSR Council of Ministers Anastas Mikoyan. By that time, the planetary confrontation between the two superpowers had reached its peak. A year earlier, the Americans had transported fifteen Jupiter medium-range ballistic missiles near Turkish Izmir, capable of destroying Moscow and other large cities in the European part of the USSR in less than ten minutes. The party elite rightly believed that such a "trump card" in the hands of the United States could deprive the Soviet Union of the opportunity to deliver a full-scale retaliatory strike.

At that time, the USSR was seriously losing to the Americans in terms of the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). They had in their arsenals 144 SM-65 Atlas ICBMs and about 60 SM-68 Titan. In addition, 30 Jupiters with a range of 2,400 kilometers were deployed in Italy, and 60 PGM-17 Thor missiles with similar capabilities were deployed in the UK. In the Soviet Union by 1962 there were only 75 R-7 ICBMs, but no more than 25 units could be launched at the same time. Of course, the USSR had 700 medium-range ballistic missiles at its disposal, but it could not deploy them close to the US borders.

The threat was obvious. Already on May 28, a Soviet delegation flew to Cuba. It did not take long to persuade Raul and Fidel Castro: the revolutionary brothers were seriously afraid of an American invasion of the island and saw the USSR as an influential and powerful ally. And on June 10, Defense Minister Marshal Malinovsky, speaking at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, presented a plan for the missile transfer operation. He proposed the deployment of two types of ballistic missiles in Cuba: 24 R-12 with a range of about 2,000 kilometers and 16 R-14 with a range twice that. Both types of missiles were equipped with nuclear warheads each with a megaton yield. For comparison: the intercontinental Topol missiles currently in service with the Strategic Missile Forces have about the same power.

Operation "Anadyr"

In addition to missiles, the group of Soviet troops included a Mi-4 helicopter regiment, four motorized rifle regiments, two tank battalions armed at that time with the latest T-55, 42 Il-28 light bombers, two cruise missile units with 12-kiloton warheads, several batteries of barreled anti-aircraft artillery and 12 S-75 air defense systems. The transport ships were covered by a naval strike group consisting of two cruisers, four destroyers, 12 missile boats, and 11 submarines. In total, it was planned to involve 50 thousand people in a unique operation. Our country had no experience of transferring such a powerful group to another hemisphere either before or after the Cuban missile crisis.

The operation was named "Anadyr". It was developed by the best military strategists of the country of the Soviets - Marshal Ivan Bagramyan, Colonel General Semyon Ivanov and Lieutenant General Anatoly Gribkov. Naturally, the transfer of troops had to be carried out in the strictest secrecy so that Western intelligence did not find out about it. Therefore, it was carried out according to legend, according to which the personnel were serving for exercises in the northern regions of the USSR. Soldiers and officers, who did not know what exactly they had to do, were given skis, felt boots, army sheepskin coats, white camouflage gowns.

85 ships were allocated for the operation. Their captains knew nothing of the contents of the holds and their destination. Each of them was given a sealed package with instructions to open at sea. The papers ordered to follow to Cuba and not come into contact with NATO ships.

“The fast and organized training of troops for dispatch bore fruit, and this gave grounds to report to Khrushchev on July 7 about the readiness of the Ministry of Defense to implement the Anadyr plan,” General Anatoly Gribkov later recalled. “The transportation of personnel and equipment by sea was carried out on passenger and dry cargo ships. merchant fleet from the ports of the Baltic, Black and Barents Seas ".

It is worth noting that this operation is a real feat of military and civilian sailors of the USSR. Many ships went to Cuba overloaded - in addition to people, they needed to transport over 230 thousand tons of material and technical equipment. The soldiers and officers huddled in the holds, in a strong cramped atmosphere and stuffiness. It was especially hard for the infantrymen and tankers, many of whom had never been on a voyage before, they were tormented by seasickness, which was of the nature of an epidemic. The transportation of goods cost the Soviet treasury $ 20 million, but the result was worth the money. American intelligence was never able to find out the true reason for the activity of the Soviet merchant fleet near its shores until the discovery of missiles ready for launch.

And yet the "bustle" in the Atlantic has raised serious suspicions in the United States. Since July, NATO reconnaissance aircraft have regularly flown over Soviet ships at ultra-low altitudes. On September 12, this led to a tragedy: another "spy" approached the bulk carrier "Leninsky Komsomol" and after the next call hit the water and sank. And from September 18, American warships began to constantly request the transports of the USSR about the nature of the cargo. However, the Soviet captains managed to successfully deny.

Black Saturday

Dozens of books have been written about what happened after October 14, 1962. The very next day after the historic reconnaissance mission of Major Richard Heizer, photographs of the launching positions of Soviet missiles were shown to President John F. Kennedy. He appeared on television on October 22 with an address to the nation and admitted that the USSR had placed nuclear weapons in the "underbelly" of the United States. The head of state announced a complete naval blockade of Cuba, which came into force on October 24. Nevertheless, some Soviet dry cargo ships managed to "slip through" and reach their destination.

Picket under the slogan "Hands off Cuba!" in Moscow during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis

The next day, President Kennedy, for the first time in the history of the United States, issued an order to raise the combat readiness of the country's Armed Forces to the level of DEFCON-2. Simply put, this is almost a war. For comparison: the less "serious" DEFCON-3 was announced only on September 11, 2001. The situation was rapidly heating up. The UN headquarters has become a field of bitter verbal battles between American and Soviet diplomats. The United States was preparing to launch an invasion of Cuba, our politicians repeatedly promised to give a serious rebuff. The confrontation reached its peak on October 27, "Black Saturday", when the launchers of the C-75 anti-aircraft missile division shot down a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba. Historians believe that on this day the world was closest to a global nuclear war.

Oddly enough, the incident, instead of provoking an escalation, seriously cooled hotheads on both sides of the Atlantic. On the night of October 28, President Robert Kennedy's brother met with the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, and conveyed a message from the American government, which agreed to give guarantees of non-aggression against Cuba. In the evening of the same day, the Minister of Defense of the USSR Rodion Malinovsky gave the order to start dismantling the launch sites in Cuba. On November 20, when the Soviet Union removed the last missiles from the island, John F. Kennedy ordered an end to the blockade of Cuba. A few months later, the US removed its Jupiters from Turkey. The Cuban missile crisis was finally resolved.

It is worth noting that in the history of the 14-day confrontation between the two superpowers, there are many blank spots. New details are extremely rare. In particular, in September 2017, the Russian Ministry of Defense published for the first time data on losses among Soviet servicemen, one way or another involved in the "missile crisis." According to the military department, from August 1, 1962 to August 16, 1964, 64 citizens of the USSR were killed in Cuba. The details, of course, were not disclosed. But even according to the available data 55 years ago, it was very hot in the Caribbean.

Soviet submarine B-59. Archive photo

So, on October 27, a group of eleven US Navy destroyers led by the aircraft carrier USS Randolph blocked a Soviet diesel-electric submarine B-59 with nuclear weapons under the command of Second Rank Captain Valentin Savitsky in neutral waters near Cuba. The Americans tried to force the boat to surface in order to identify it, and began to bombard the B-59 with depth charges. One can only guess how the submariners felt at this moment, for sure they thought that the world war had started after all. Savitsky gave the order to attack a cluster of ships with a torpedo with a nuclear warhead. However, his senior officer, captain of the second rank Vasily Arkhipov, managed to convince the commander to show restraint. The submarine transmitted the signal "Stop provocation" to the enemy ships, after which the situation was somewhat defused. The destroyers stopped attacking the B-59, and she continued on her way. And how many similar cases, which ended not so well, are still classified "top secret"?

55 years ago, in October 1962, the world was teetering on the brink of atomic disaster due to the conflict between the USSR and the USA

After the deployment of American nuclear missiles in Turkey, which reached the territory of our country in 15 minutes, the Soviet Union responded by deploying its nuclear weapons in Cuba. What would happen if an agreement failed? Alas, the balance of power was not in our favor. At the time of the Caribbean (Cuban) crisis, the USSR had only three hundred nuclear warheads capable of reaching US territory. Whereas the United States had about 6,000 missiles and bombs capable of hitting the territory of the USSR. But America would hardly be celebrating a victory. Together with all of humanity, it would have been thrown back in development 200 years ago. And Europe would be reduced to ashes, not to mention Cuba.

Five unknown facts

One of the four Soviet diesel submarines sent to the coast of Cuba, the Americans attacked. But the torpedoes did not reach their target.
Commander of the Soviet group on Liberty Island General of the Army Issa Plievhad full authority to use nuclear weapons in the event of a full-scale US invasion of Cuba.
October 22, Commander of US Strategic Aviation, General Thomas Power contrary to all existing instructions, he announced the state of nuclear alert on the air in plain text. On October 24, in the same way, on short waves, he reported the increased danger: “This is General Thomas Power. I appeal to you to emphasize the seriousness of the situation in which the nation finds itself ... "The Soviet command intercepted these messages, but considered them a bluff. Or it could have ordered a preemptive strike ...

On October 26, an Atlas rocket was launched from Vandenberg Base, California. The Americans simply did not bother to cancel the planned tests. Meanwhile, it was known in the USSR that all missiles at the base were equipped with nuclear warheads. Moreover, they were put on alert. By some miracle, the launch was not noticed by Soviet tracking systems.
On the morning of October 28, literally a few minutes before Nikita Khrushchev announced its readiness to withdraw Soviet weapons from Cuba, the American radar installation in Moorestown (New Jersey) signaled the launch of a missile from Cuba. Fortunately, the plant operators came to the conclusion that the radar had detected a “friendly” object.

CARIBBEAN CRISIS

The dangerous confrontation between the US and the USSR, known as the Cuban missile crisis, began 55 years ago. At that time, the American and Soviet armed forces were on full alert. One erroneous decision made by the US administration or the political leadership of the USSR could set in motion a gigantic mechanism of military blocs of two opposite socio-political systems with the use of nuclear missiles. The world was one step away from nuclear collapse.

It seemed that the Cuban missile crisis, after its successful resolution, left a serious mark on the historical memory of mankind, and the political leaders of the United States and the USSR realized that their armies were capable of destroying human civilization. However, the events that followed the collapse of the USSR clearly show that the US leadership has not learned the lessons of the Cuban missile crisis.

WHO PROVIDED THE CARIBBEAN CRISIS

The overwhelming majority of foreign researchers cite the deployment of Soviet medium-range missiles in Cuba as the main reason for the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, which threatened to escalate into a third world war with the use of nuclear missiles. However, if we objectively assess the international situation that had developed by the beginning of the 60s of the twentieth century, and the nature of the military-strategic situation in the American-Soviet direction, then the conclusions from the analysis of that situation will be diametrically opposed to those that were asserted and continue to be asserted by Western and some Russian "Political scientists" and "historians".

In 1961, after the failure of the Washington-inspired attempt by the forces of Cuban counter-revolutionaries to overthrow the legitimate Cuban government, the White House decided to begin preparations for a new operation, codenamed Mongoose (in the Russian transcription of Mongoose). To ensure the success of the action to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro and restore the pro-American puppet regime in Cuba, in addition to the organization (by the CIA) in Cuba of the rebel movement, it was planned to involve the US armed forces. The Pentagon planned to inflict air strikes with aircraft of the Air Force and Navy (several hundred bombers), prolonged fire destruction of the territory and the subsequent landing of assault forces by two airborne, one armored, two infantry divisions and one marine division. The operation period is October-November 1962.

Under these conditions, in response to a request from Havana for military assistance in order to protect Cuba from aggression and in agreement with the Cuban leadership, the Soviet government decided on May 18, 1962 to deploy a Group of Soviet Forces on the Island of Freedom. The Group included: a missile division (40 launchers of medium and intermediate-range missiles), military units and subunits of other types of nuclear weapons, which ensured the real ability of our military group to keep the enemy from invading. When determining the combat strength of the Group, the complexity of the military-strategic situation around the USSR was taken into account. The Soviet Union was actually surrounded by groupings of US forces and their allies in the west, south and east. They were armed with a large number of nuclear weapons. In terms of the number of nuclear warheads, the USSR was 11–12 times inferior to the United States. The United States was capable of delivering nuclear strikes against the bodies of the highest state and military administration, industrial centers, groupings of strategic nuclear forces, and other vital facilities of our country. The United States itself, in the event of a sudden nuclear missile attack on the USSR, remained practically invulnerable to a retaliatory strike due to the lack of means of delivery of intercontinental nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union at that time. The state sovereignty of our country was not guaranteed to be protected.

By the decision of the Soviet government, the main task of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba was “to ensure the joint defense of the Republic of Cuba and the USSR”. In other words, the very fact that Soviet nuclear weapons were deployed 90 miles off the American coast was not dictated by preparations for aggression against the United States, but, to use modern terminology, solely in order to induce Washington to deter. The operation to transfer the Group to Cuba was codenamed "Anadyr". The Soviet command managed to ensure the secrecy of the preparation and conduct of the operation.

In September 1962, CIA Director John McCone reported to US President John F. Kennedy: "... After extensive discussion and research, American intelligence came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union did not intend to turn Cuba into a strategic base ..." It was concluded that the Cuban government does not have the strength to opposition to the implementation of the plan for Operation Mongoose and it will be carried out successfully. The preparation of the operation has entered its final stage.

Thus, the preparation of the American military invasion of Cuba and the extremely unfavorable military-strategic situation created by the US ruling circles for the USSR ultimately provoked the Caribbean crisis. Soviet military intelligence played an important role in resolving the crisis.

THE UNPRECEDENTED MISSION OF THE SOVIET INTELLIGENT

In 1961-1962, an unprecedented incident occurred in the activities of Russian military intelligence. An officer of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Colonel Georgy Bolshakov, on the eve of and at the height of the Cuban missile crisis, had a chance to directly ensure the exchange of personal confidential messages between the Soviet and American leaders. The messages were presented orally, the communication of the Soviet military intelligence officer with the US President's confidant was carried out in English, and Bolshakov was personally responsible for the error-free transmission of the positions, proposals and decisions of the leaders of both states to each other.

In early September 1962, the topic of the transfer of Soviet military cargo to Cuba and the possible deployment of Soviet missiles there began to be discussed in American political circles and in the press. Operation Anadyr has not yet ended. It was necessary to take measures to ensure the completion of the operation and the completion of the construction of launch sites for missiles.

To this end, the Soviet government decided to inform the American President that the USSR has no plans to attack the United States. For this, Bolshakov, who was on vacation, was summoned to Khrushchev. He was tasked with ensuring that this information was communicated to Kennedy.

Moscow closely followed the development of the situation in the Caribbean Sea basin. The intensification of the landing forces of the US Atlantic Fleet and the flights of American reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba indicated that preparations for the invasion had entered their final phase. The tension was building.

On October 13, 1962, based on the results of a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft flight over Cuba, the US Department of Defense concluded that Soviet medium-range missiles were deployed on the island. The news sparked panic in the White House. In Washington, apparently, they began to realize that with Soviet troops in Cuba, it became extremely dangerous to carry out the final stage of Operation Mongoose.

The deployment of a Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba changed the balance of forces both in the Caribbean and beyond. The White House had to make a decision to cancel or postpone the operation to invade Cuba. But this significantly weakened President Kennedy's position in the American establishment, since he was already subject to obstruction by the "hawks" who advocated extreme measures against the Soviet Union.

PLAYING WITH FIRE

On October 20, Washington decides to declare a naval blockade on Cuba, preventing the transfer of Soviet weapons to the island. This measure grossly violated basic international norms, but, according to Washington, was supposed to demonstrate the determination of the US government.

In Moscow, the establishment of the US blockade of Cuba was regarded as "unprecedented aggressive actions." The Soviet government said in a statement: "The peoples of all countries must clearly understand that by embarking on such an adventure, the United States of America is taking a step towards unleashing a world thermonuclear war."

On October 22, Kennedy delivered a message to the American people. But in terms of its content, it was addressed primarily to Khrushchev. Kennedy said: "We do not intend to risk unnecessarily and plunge the world into a nuclear war, in which the fruits of victory will be ashes, but we have the courage to take such a risk any time it becomes necessary." And further: "I ordered the US military to be prepared for any unexpected event."

In the USSR, in the Strategic Missile Forces, the Air Defense Forces and in the submarine fleet, the dismissal of older ages was delayed, vacations were canceled for all personnel. The troops were brought to an increased degree of combat readiness.

On October 23, the US president approves a decree ordering the US military to intercept any naval vessels and aircraft allegedly bound for Cuba. The decree stipulated: "All ships or aircraft taken under arrest will be sent to the proper US port or destroyed."

SEARCHING FOR RESOLUTION TO THE CRISIS

On October 24, Bolshakov, through a confidant of the American president, receives information that Kennedy is concerned about developments in Cuba and does not want to launch an invasion. Washington's goal is to eliminate Soviet missile bases in Cuba.

Bolshakov sent an urgent report to the Center, in which special attention was paid to three important circumstances:

- the United States is confident that there are Soviet medium-range missiles in Cuba;

- the Kennedy administration is ready to compromise the settlement of contradictions;

- The US President proposes to involve UN observers in resolving the crisis and asks for this time to suspend the advance of new Soviet ships with weapons to the shores of Cuba.

On the same day, Bolshakov was additionally brought to the attention of the American president's proposal for a possible deal: the elimination of Soviet missiles in Cuba in exchange for the closure of the American missile base in Turkey.

On October 25, Bolshakov again receives information from the American side that the actions of the USSR in Cuba are regarded by the President of the United States, among other reasons, as a response to the deployment of American missile bases in Turkey and Italy, and that Kennedy is ready to discuss an earlier proposed deal: the United States will eliminate missile bases in Turkey, and the USSR in Cuba.

Moscow carefully analyzed the proposals received for resolving the Cuban missile crisis and developed its own.

CONFRONTATION INCREASES

Meanwhile, the flywheel of a confrontation that could escalate into a major war was gaining momentum. The troops of the two huge armies were brought to increased levels of combat readiness. Commanders and commanders awaited orders.

On October 24, at 10 a.m. Washington time, GRU technical means intercepted an order from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the US Air Force Strategic Aviation Command (SAC): prepare for a nuclear attack. A GRU resident reported to the Center: “On 23 October, 85 strategic aircraft were flying over the United States. Of these, 22 B-52 bombers. At the same time, 57 B-47 bombers flew from the United States to Europe. ” The resident also said that "there are 30 tanker aircraft constantly in the air." The GRU radio intelligence recorded the transmission of the following order by the SAC command to the commanders of strategic bombers: "Follow the course even if one engine fails ..."

In a report from a GRU resident to the Center, it was reported that the command of the US armed forces was actively deploying hospitals and staffing them with medical personnel according to wartime states, the population was buying food and strengthening bomb shelters.

On October 27, the Center received a message about the statement of the US government that if the construction of missile bases in Cuba is not stopped, the US will invade the island.

A military intelligence resident reported to the head of the GRU:

1. The situation at 24:00 on October 27 remains tense. I consider the next 24 hours decisive.

2. US Secretary of Defense McNamara ordered the Secretary of the Air Force to transfer from the reserve 24 airborne squadrons with support units. Squadrons are intended for the transfer of the first assault echelon during a landing.

3. Reinforced troop movements on Florida roads completed.

4. On Saturday, up to 50% of the personnel continued to work at the Pentagon.

On the same day, the GRU resident reported from Washington to the Center: “Based on an analysis of conversations with Americans, military diplomats, reports of the local press and radio on October 26, I report that in the near future an American invasion of Cuba can be expected under the pretext of eliminating the alleged missile bases. An American officer at a reception on October 25 announced their government's adamant determination to bring the affair with Cuba to an end, regardless of world public opinion. An employee of the British Embassy, \u200b\u200bwho spends several hours daily at the Pentagon, said that, according to his information, the invasion will take place in the next five to seven days.

“- the press, radio and television are intensively preparing public opinion to justify the decisive steps of the United States against Cuba;

- the concentration of troops in Florida continues, where new military units and equipment are constantly arriving;

- among the Cuban emigrants, there is confidence in the landing in Cuba in the coming days;

“The Pentagon and other top military institutions continue to work hard at night.”

On October 27, an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, under cover of a fighter, entered Soviet airspace. Soviet fighters rose to intercept the intruders and forced American pilots to leave USSR airspace.

On the same day, an American plane was shot down during a reconnaissance flight over Cuba. The pilot was killed. Perhaps it was this moment that became the critical point of the Caribbean confrontation. The US President made a difficult decision - not to retaliate.

UNLOADING

The most intense days of the crisis were October 27 and 28. It was during these days in Washington and Moscow that the main question was decided - to be or not to be a war.

The White House realized that the implementation of the plan to overthrow the Castro government suddenly turned against them. President Kennedy made a decision - he is ready to declare that the United States will not conduct an operation against Cuba and will lift the blockade.

On October 27, the White House made a final decision: to abandon the attack on Cuba in addition to the conditions previously approved by the parties - Washington's readiness to liquidate its missile base in Turkey in exchange for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. On the same day, a message from the US President was sent to the Kremlin.

On October 28, in his reply, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev said that today the answer to the American president would be broadcast by radio, and it would be positive.

The orders that would have signed the death warrant for mankind were not issued on October 28, either in Washington or Moscow. At the same time, the White House issued an order to suspend and later to cancel Operation Mongoose. The United States stopped active actions against the Cuban government both on the territory of the Island of Liberty and beyond.

LESSONS IS DANGEROUS TO FORGET

The US administration and the Soviet government went through a very difficult test 55 years ago. John F. Kennedy and Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev realized what disastrous consequences for earthly civilization can result from blackmail and the threat of military force in the conditions of the actual possession of nuclear weapons.

Until the time when Washington realized that the reckless policy of the United States could lead to disastrous consequences for the United States itself, the American administration planned an invasion of Cuba in order to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro. And only the determination of the USSR to defend a friendly independent state by all available means restrained the American "hawks" from aggression against both Cuba and the USSR.

The United States and the Soviet Union decided to confine themselves to nuclear confrontation in the context of the strategic parity of the two superpowers achieved soon. Moreover, despite the Cold War, they agreed to a mutual balanced reduction of nuclear and other military potentials, while respecting the equal security of the parties. Strategic parity with the USSR, especially against the background of the substantive lesson that Washington learned during the Vietnam War of 1964-1972, to some extent kept the United States from provocatively aggressive policy of hegemonism.

The United States perceived the self-dissolution of the Warsaw Pact Organization and the collapse of the Soviet Union as its victory in the Cold War and immediately began to move NATO eastward. They bombed and dismembered Yugoslavia. We have occupied Afghanistan. They unleashed aggression against Iraq, executed its president. Destroyed the state of Libya and its leader. In order to eliminate the current leader of a sovereign country, they initiated a terrorist massacre in Syria.

The United States is creating a strategic missile defense system aimed against our country. We began to deploy missile defense systems in Poland and Romania. They are deploying groupings of their troops near the Russian borders. Raised in neighboring states and encouraged by Russophobic nationalist and Nazi forces. They are waging a war of sanctions against our country, stirring up propaganda hysteria. They seize Russian property. Dropped US-Russian relations to the lowest level.

From the UN rostrum, the US President officially threatens to "wipe out" the sovereign state of the DPRK, believing that these senseless threats and blackmail can replace a political solution to the problem of nuclear nonproliferation, which Russia and China are urging Washington to do, condemning Pyongyang for nuclear tests.

On October 13, 2017, the US President announced Washington's plans to torpedo the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran's nuclear issue, ignoring the opinions of other participants and UN Security Council Resolution 2231.

Turning to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, one involuntarily comes to the conclusion: those not so distant lessons to Washington, the American establishment, apparently did not go for the future. Again, but with even greater stubbornness, they try to dictate their narrowly selfish conditions to the whole world, directly threaten some with military force, create a dangerous military-strategic situation for others, believing that someone has the right to do so. An extremely dangerous delusion. Putting your finger on the trigger, one should not forget the lessons of the past: after all, in modern conditions the consequences of such actions can be even more tragic than it could have been 55 years ago, which, fortunately, did not happen then.

Reconnaissance aircraft Lockheed U-2

MOSCOW, October 14 - RIA Novosti, Andrey Kots.Powerful optics of the spy plane snatches out of the pre-dawn jungle an area the size of a football field. It clearly shows the "tubes" of transport containers of ballistic missiles, air defense positions, tents and military depots. In the center is the launch pad. Pilot Major Richard Heizer, not believing his eyes, makes another circle over the wasteland and is finally convinced: the USSR's nuclear weapons have appeared on Freedom Island. Exactly 55 years ago, on October 14, 1962, a US Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft discovered the positions of Soviet R-12 medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. This incident is considered to be the beginning of the Cuban missile crisis, which almost escalated into the Third World War. About the events of the days when the world was on the brink of nuclear catastrophe - in the material RIA Novosti.

Do the impossible

From R-1 to Yars - rare footage of ballistic missile launch

Operation "Anadyr"

"The rapid and organized preparation of the troops for dispatch bore fruit, and this gave reason to report to Khrushchev on July 7 about the readiness of the Ministry of Defense to implement the Anadyr plan," General Anatoly Gribkov later recalled. "The transportation of personnel and equipment by sea was carried out on passenger and dry cargo ships. merchant ships from the ports of the Baltic, Black and Barents Seas ".

Black Saturday

Picket under the slogan "Hands off Cuba!" in Moscow during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis

It is worth noting that in the history of the 14-day confrontation between the two superpowers, there are many blank spots. New details are extremely rare. In particular, in September 2017, the Russian Ministry of Defense for the first time published data on losses among Soviet servicemen, one way or another involved in the "missile crisis". According to the military department, from August 1, 1962 to August 16, 1964, 64 citizens of the USSR were killed in Cuba. Details, of course, were not disclosed. But even according to the available data 55 years ago, it was very hot in the Caribbean.

Soviet submarine B-59. Archive photo