Once a long-term assistant L.I. Brezhnev Andrey Andreevich Apeksandrov-Agents told a rather interesting story about his elderly boss.
Brezhnev loved to watch movies, especially the TV movie "Seventeen Moments of Spring" directed by Tatyana Lioznova. People's Artist of the USSR Vyacheslav Tikhonov played the main role in the film. In the role of a fictional Soviet intelligence officer who penetrated under the name of Standartenfuehrer Stirlitz into the Imperial Chancellery of the Third Reich and became the closest collaborator of Himmler, Müller and Schellenberg.
Decrepit at the end of his life Brezhnev no longer saw the difference between truth and fiction, and once, after watching the film “Seventeen Moments of Spring”, he asked: “How did we reward the illegal intelligence officer Stirlitz?”
The answer was an embarrassed silence, to which Brezhnev responded with a remark: “By your silence, I understood that there was no award. Therefore, I propose to award Stirlitz the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. " We managed to get out of this awkward situation as follows: the title of Hero of Socialist Labor was awarded ... to the People's Artist of the USSR Vyacheslav Tikhonov.
Viewers of the television series often ask: "Was there really Stirlitz or another Soviet intelligence agent who became his prototype?" Well, the answer is unequivocal: no. There was not a single illegal, a professional Soviet intelligence agent either in the circle of Mueller or Schellenberg, or in general in the central apparatus of Hitler's special services. Unfortunately.
Stirlitz in the Soviet Union really had no equal in popularity. Invented by the talented writer Julian Semyonov, he worked wonders: he deceived Mueller, walked along the corridors of the imperial chancellery, as if in his own house. He thwarted all German plans, of course, reporting them to Moscow. T. Lioznova's film had, and still has tremendous success. When he was shown, the streets of the city were empty, everyone sat in front of the TV screens. By the way, for the real coverage of the activities of the KGB officers to ensure the state security of the country, Y. Semenov was awarded the badge "Honorary State Security Officer".
But, as it has now become known, in real life there was still a man who worked in the Gestapo and knew his secrets. He was not our professional intelligence officer, but he was a reliable agent of the foreign intelligence of the KGB of the USSR. His name is Wilhelm Lehmann, and his operational pseudonym is Breitenbach. All his life his name was Willie, and as Willie Lehman he appears in Soviet intelligence documents. What will be discussed in this essay is based solely on archival documentary materials.
This is an incredible, but true story, about which the archives have been deeply silent until now.
So, Willy Lehmann was born in 1884 in the family of the teacher Gustav Lehmann in a place near Leipzig. Parents at baptism named their son Wilhelm in honor of the heir to the throne, the future emperor of Germany, Wilhelm II. Willie's father was not a wealthy man and could not give his son a proper education. Willie graduated from high school and studied to be a carpenter. When he turned 17, he volunteered for the German Navy, where he served a total of 12 years. On board a warship of the German squadron, he happened to observe the Battle of Tsushima in May 190S. The courage of the Russian sailors made a huge impression on him. Since then, Willie has developed a deep respect for Russia and the Russian people.
Demobilized in 1913, Willie came to Berlin. At one meeting of the "Union of Africans" Willie met his old friend Ernst Kure, who was already working in the Berlin secret police. Under his patronage, Willie was admitted to the police by a patrol officer in 1913, and a year later, when his probationary period ended, he was enrolled in the state.
In 1914, he was transferred to the counterintelligence department (Abwehr) of the Berlin police presidium as an assistant to the head of the chancellery. In May 1918, a plenipotentiary representation (embassy) of the RSFSR was opened in Berlin, and Lehmann's counterintelligence department was monitoring its employees.
On November 4, 1918, a revolution broke out in Germany, overthrowing Kaiser Wilhelm II. It began with an uprising of sailors in Kiel. In Berlin, a committee of police officers was spontaneously formed, and Lehmann became its chairman as a former naval sailor. He was entrusted with the affairs of the German fleet. It was then that he became friends with the chairman of the Council of Soldiers and Sailors' Deputies, Otto Strubel, with whom they had been friends in the past while serving in the navy.
Gustav Noske, who received the post of Minister of War in the new German government, drowned the uprising of the Berlin workers in blood. After the suppression of the uprising, Willie retired from active revolutionary activities.
In April 1920, a secret political police was re-established in Germany. Lehman (together with Kur) returned to his counterintelligence unit and soon "grew" to the post of chief of the chancellery of the department that was engaged in spying on foreign diplomatic representatives. Soon, the leadership of the police presidium appointed him acting head of the office of the department. Here all the correspondence on the intelligence activities of foreign missions passed through his hands.
In 1927, Wilhelm Abdt, an experienced military intelligence officer who was fluent in Russian and Polish, was appointed head of the department.
During his years in the secret police, Lehmann became disillusioned with German politics. In addition, the low salary (about 300 marks a month) did not allow regular treatment for diabetes. Working on the department's file cabinet, he came to the conviction that, in its pure form, Soviet representatives were not conducting any subversive activities against Germany. And Willie decided to offer his services to Soviet foreign intelligence. It should be noted that he did not immediately decide on this step. First, in March 1929, at his request, Ernst Kur, who had become unemployed by that time, visited the Soviet embassy. After a conversation with E. Kur of the OGLU foreign intelligence station officer, the Center came to the conclusion that he was recruited on a material basis. The agent was assigned the A-70 index. He was paid a monthly monetary bonus. He, however, loved to have parties in a restaurant, to waste money, and therefore could come under the supervision of informants of the criminal police. This alerted Lehman, as he was constantly in contact with Chur. This contact interested the Soviet foreign intelligence station, and the Center decided to go to Lehman and find out the possibility of attracting him to work for our intelligence on a material basis.
Through agent A-26, the station collected enough material on Lehman. It was assigned the A-201 index, and its active development began.
On September 7, 1929, the head of the OGPU foreign intelligence service, M. Trilisser, sent a cipher telegram to the Berlin residency:
“We are very interested in your new agent A-201. Our only fear is that you have climbed into one of the most dangerous places, where the slightest carelessness on the part of the A-201 or A-70 can lead to big trouble. We consider it necessary to consider the issue of a special method of communication with the A-201 ”.
Lehman began to extract information that was transmitted to Bon through the A-70. However, Cour was incorrigible and continued to revel. In 1933, by decision of the Kur Center, he was transferred to Sweden, where he maintained a small store with the money of Soviet intelligence. The store served as a "mailbox" for our Stockholm station.
In 1930, the situation in Germany began to deteriorate. The Nazis were openly eager for power. Breitenbach was familiar with many prominent bosses of the Nazi party, including the leader of its assault units Ernst Röhm, the SA Gruppenführer. In February 1933, Breitenbach, on the recommendation of Hermann Goering, then prime minister of the Prussian government, was transferred to work in the Gestapo. Since May 1934 - in the ranks of the SS. On June 30 of the same year, as a confidant of Goering, he participated in Operation Night of Long Knives to eliminate Rem and his stormtroopers.
The Kremlin was in dire need of information about Hitler's future policy towards the Soviet Union. Stalin, realizing that Hitler, who declared his main task to conquer "living space" in the East, would unleash a war against our country. In 1934, Poland began to give signals that it was ready to allegedly move away from its anti-Soviet policy and get closer to the USSR.
Stalin, taking into account the information of the plenipotentiary representative in Warsaw, Antonov-Ovseenko, was inclined to think that it was necessary to respond to Warsaw's curtsey to the Kremlin and probe the ground for a possible conclusion of an agreement with Poland.
At this meeting in the Kremlin, only the chief of foreign intelligence, Artur Artuzov, had a different opinion. Relying on reports from Soviet intelligence, he said that the Poles were playing an unfair game, pretending that they were going to get closer to the USSR, but in fact, they were probing the ground for rapprochement with Germany in the hope that Hitler would share the "Soviet pie" with them in the event of a war against THE USSR.
Life has confirmed Artuzov's rightness. In December 1934, an agreement on good-neighborliness and cooperation was signed between Poland and Germany. Stalin reacted to this information of Artuzov in a peculiar way: on May 21, 1935, Artuzov was relieved of his post as chief of foreign intelligence and transferred to a special reserve of the NKVD.
The latest events in Europe every day confirmed the correctness of Artuzov's conclusions. But Stalin could not forgive him that in February 1934, the intelligence chief allowed himself to publicly challenge the secretary general's point of view. On January 11, 1937, Artuzov was dismissed from the post of deputy chief of the intelligence department of the Red Army. On May 13 of the same year, he was arrested at the direction of N. Yezhov. On August 21, 1937, the legendary Chekist Artur Artuzov was convicted by the Troika as a spy for Polish and other intelligence services and was shot on the same day.
During the years of Yezhovism, the executioners of the NKVD destroyed almost all operational foreign intelligence officers who worked in the "legal" and illegal residencies in Germany.
Now back to our hero again. In 1935, on the initiative of Goering, the Gestapo began to purge "unreliable elements".
Lehman also fell under suspicion, but thanks to his good service characteristics, he managed to retain his post in the Gestapo.
The head was Reinhard Heydrich, who was also the head of the Security Service (SD) of the Nazi party. Together with him to Berlin, he took several dozen professional forensic experts from Munich, including Heinrich Müller. Breitenbach began working in the counterintelligence department. In December 1933, he was handed over for communication to the illegal scout Vasily Zarubin ("Betty"). He would later become a general.
Taking advantage of the patronage of the US Consul General in Berlin, Dean Robertson, Zarubin rented a luxurious mansion in Potsdam, also paid a visit to Breitenbach's former friend, Streubel (now he holds the post of Deputy Minister of Propaganda of the Third Reich) and enlisted him all kinds of support.
During his visit to the US Consul General, Zarubin met many businessmen. The information received from the representative of the oil company "Standard Oil" Mr. Taylor was of great interest to the Kremlin. Through the same persons, Zarubin received reliable information about the rearmament of Germany with the help of the United States, its creation of a submarine fleet, the serial production of the latest Messerschmitt fighters, the construction of cruisers, etc.
Zarubin received valuable information about the structure and personnel of the 4th Directorate of the RSHA (Directorate of Imperial Security). This information literally had no price in the face of the impending threat of Nazism.
In March 1935, Breitenbach told Zarubin that the Gestapo had become interested in illegal intelligence agent Albert Takke. By that time, Takke managed to work in Moscow and again went on a business trip abroad. In Germany, he was passing through. Thanks to the measures taken, Takke and his wife Junona Sosnovskaya-Takke urgently left Germany, avoiding arrest.
Of course, there are all sorts of paradoxes in life. The Gestapo failed to arrest the Takke couple. But they arrested, unreasonably, their leaders from the NKVD and both were shot. As seen in the footnote above, they were later rehabilitated.
Breitenbach warned not only his intelligence about the planned actions, but, using his capabilities, sought to draw the attention of the Gestapo to the activities of the Polish special services in Germany. In 1937, the Gestapo arrested a prominent Polish intelligence officer, Sosnowski, who neglected the security method and acquired connections in the most important departments of the Third Reich. Sosnovsky managed to recruit a cipher officer of the General Staff, a typist from the personal office of Rosenberg, the ideologue of Nazism and the future Reich Minister for the Eastern Territories. He also had his own people in the General Directorate of the Imperial Chancellery. Sosnovsky was imprisoned. Soon he was taken to the courtyard where his agents, mostly women, were stationed. In front of Sosnovsky's eyes, they all had their heads cut off.
Then the Poles managed to exchange Sosnovsky for two major agents of the Abwehr, and they placed him in a prison in Lvov. In 1939, Soviet troops entered the western regions of Ukraine. Sosnovsky ended up in the hands of Soviet intelligence. From Breitenbach, our intelligence knew all the details of Sosnovsky's interrogation by the Gestapo, and when in early 1941 he was interrogated by the scout Zoya Voskresenskaya-Rybkina and the illegal scout Vasily Zarubin, they cited such details of his work in Germany that a strictly limited circle of people knew about. Our intelligence's knowledge of all the details of Sosnovsky's work in Germany made such a strong impression on him that he immediately told everything that he knew. The information was of exceptional value to Soviet intelligence.
As for Breitenbach, measures were taken to enhance his security. In particular, the Center prepared a passport in a false name, into which a photograph of the agent was pasted. In case of danger, a detailed scheme was worked out with him to take him out of Germany in accordance with the deteriorating state of health of Breitenbach, who suffered from acute renal colic due to diabetes: sometimes he even lost consciousness. To Zarubin's message about the agent's serious illness, the Center responded with an urgent cipher telegram: the agent must be rescued at all costs, and if money is needed for the treatment, provide Willie with financial assistance. Fortunately, the doctors managed to prevent the development of the disease.
Communicating with the bosses of the RSHA, Breitenbach gave Zarubin detailed descriptions of Müller, Schellenberg, Heydrich and other leaders. Breitenbach received new data on the German military industry: on the purchase of 70 submarines of various classes at its shipyards at once, on the construction of a secret plant for the production of chemical warfare agents.
On June 17, 1936, a fascist rebellion broke out in Spain, and the Popular Front government at first succeeded in suppressing the rebels. From the American Taylor Zarubin learned that an urgent telegraphic order had come from New York to redirect tankers with aviation gasoline arriving in Hamburg to Spanish Morocco and the Balearic Islands. Breitenbach told Betty that Germany intends to support the forces fighting the Republican regime in Spain and openly side with General Franco. Anshia will support Germany and Italy, and the United States will remain neutral. In 1937, by order of the People's Commissar of State Security
N. Yezhova Zarubin together with his wife responded to Moscow. On February 22, they left for their homeland. Zarubin instructed Breitenbach that he was to maintain contact with the Center through the keeper of the safe house in Berlin, a certain Clemens.
A week after meeting with Leman, Zarubin was in Moscow, where he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for his successful work. In the evening, he and his wife were invited to his home by the new head of the NKVD intelligence Abram Slutsky. He confidentially informed Zarubin that since 1936 N. Yezhov began repressions against the Chekists, so Vasily and his wife urgently need to go on a business trip abroad. The couple soon left for the United States to carry out a special assignment. During the war, Zarubin and his wife Liza successfully worked in the NKVD residency in the United States. Vasily Zarubin became a general, and his wife retired shortly after the war with the rank of lieutenant colonel.
After Clemens Breitenbach was in touch with A. Korotkov's wife Maria Vilysovysskaya, but not for long. In 1937 A. Korotkov and his wife returned to Moscow. Agayants (Ruben), who practically did not speak German, remained the only employee of the Berlin station. All the rest were recalled, and most of them were repressed.
Left without an experienced curator, Breitenbach acted at his own peril and risk, obtaining information that could be of interest to Soviet intelligence. The material basis for cooperation with Soviet intelligence was not the main one for him. Working in the Gestapo, having access to the highest secrets of the Reich in his service, Breitenbach saw where the Hitlerite camarilla, which was preparing a world war, could lead the country. He understood that only the Soviet Union was able to stop Hitler in his quest for world domination, which would inevitably bring misfortune to all peoples, including the Germans.
At the end of 1938, Ruben's last meeting with Breitenbach took place. In December, Ruben was hospitalized and soon died in the hospital. The agent was left without contact with the Center. Breitenbach was without communication with the Center for almost a year and a half, until A. Korotkov arrived in Berlin for just one month. His task was to reestablish contact with the Corsican and the Petty Officer of the Red Chapel anti-fascist organization and Breitenbach. At the end of August, he returned to Berlin again as a deputy resident of the NKVD under the guise of the post of the 3rd secretary of the embassy.
In September 1940, Korotkov met with Breitenbach and reported this to the Center. From the Center came a cipher telegram signed by People's Commissar L. Beria: “Do not give Breitenbach any special assignments. Let him take everything that is within his capabilities. "
Soviet intelligence did not yet know that on August 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21, code-named "Plan Barbarossa". This was a plan to prepare for the war, which was planned for May 1941, "even before the final end of England." Soviet intelligence never managed to get hold of this plan. By the way, it was not received by any of the world's intelligence services. However, our intelligence revealed the real preparations for an attack on the USSR and informed the Center in detail about all the steps of the German High Command. Our reliable and trusted agent Breitenbach played an important role in this matter.
Since the spring of 1941, more and more materials have been received from Breitenbach, testifying to the preparation of a war against the USSR. He soon fell ill and went on vacation. He returned from vacation on June 19, 1941 and urgently summoned employee Zhuravlev for an emergency meeting. The agent said that the Gestapo had just received the text of Hitler's secret order to the troops along the Soviet border. The order ordered to start military operations against the USSR after three o'clock in the morning on June 22. An urgent telegram went to the Center. However, as it later became known, Beria detained her and reported to Stalin only after the chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces G.K. Zhukov and the People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko suggested that the General Secretary send to the military districts the directive of the People's Commissar to repel a possible German attack on the USSR.
On the morning of June 22, 1941, the building of the Soviet embassy on Unter den Linden in the center of Berlin was blocked by the Gestapo. Communication with Breitenbach was lost. But A. Korotkov managed to overcome the blockade and meet with reliable agents of our intelligence, Sergeant Major and Corsican, and give them a radio for communication with Moscow. In August 1931, A. Korotkov, together with the embassy staff, returned to Moscow through Bulgaria and Turkey. At the end of the war, Korotkov was appointed a resident of Soviet foreign intelligence in Germany. The residency was tasked with finding out the fate of its pre-war agents.
While examining documents in the ruins of a building on Prinz-Albrechtstrasse, one of the residency officers discovered a charred account card for Wilhelm Lehmann, in which a note was made that he had been arrested by the Gestapo in December 1942. The reason for the arrest was not specified. This registration card, along with other trophy documents, was sent to the Center. Korotkov was instructed to find out the details of his arrest and death.
Later, it was possible to restore the picture of Breitenbach's death. This is how it was. With the outbreak of the war, all employees of Soviet institutions in Germany were interned and expelled from the country. Together with the Soviet colony, the last curator of Breitenbach, Zhuravlev (Nikolai), also left Germany. Since the conditions of communication with the agent in case of war were not developed, contact with the agent was interrupted forever.
By the spring of 1942, the Center was unable to re-establish contact with any of its agents in Berlin and had no idea what had happened to them.
The radios given by A. Korotkov to the Berliners were weak, and Moscow could not receive their signals. The main reception center was in Minsk, which was occupied by the Nazis in the first days of the war. Breitenbach did not have radio communications at all. Attempts were made to send messengers from London (paratroopers) or from neutral Sweden to contact them. But ... it didn't work out. There was only one possibility: to send a messenger across the front line to ... Berlin!
By that time, the intelligence agencies of the NKVD and the Red Army already had the experience of throwing anti-fascist Germans into the rear of the enemy, including defectors and recruited prisoners of war. German is their native language, and besides, they perfectly knew the customs and customs of the Germans and the traditions of the Wehrmacht. They only had to be trained in intelligence work and work on radio equipment.
A. Korotkov selected two of several candidates. We had several conversations with them on all questions of their forthcoming actions outside the cordon.
And he and the other were immediately ready to take an active part in the fight against fascism in the ranks of the Red Army. But it is one thing to fight at the front as fighters, and quite another thing - alone, with documents in someone else's name, with someone else's biography, carry out complex intelligence missions, risking at any moment to be arrested, exposed, and not killed in battle, but tortured in the dungeons of the Gestapo.
Their names were Albert Hessler and Robert Barth. Both were in their early thirties. Both had experience in anti-fascist legal and illegal struggle. Alas, no one then could have known that both would die. Although today it is difficult to imagine whose fate would have been more tragic. Not through their fault and not through the fault of those who prepared them to be thrown into the capital of the Third Reich, Berlin, to complete a difficult mission.
But even before the Douglas aircraft of the long-range air division took off from the runway of the airfield in Podlipki near Moscow, they were doomed. Because for the third month already, the counterintelligence of the Gestapo and the Abwehr conducted close round-the-clock surveillance of individual leaders of the "Red Capella", checking their acquaintances, identifying more and more new members of the underground.
Albert Hessler was considered an "old" communist and anti-fascist. He emigrated with the Nazis coming to power. In 1935-1936 he studied in Moscow at the Comintern school. In 1937 he volunteered for the international brigade in Spain. Then - injury, evacuation to France, then to the Soviet Union. After his recovery, Hessler worked at a tractor plant in Chelyabinsk. In the same place, in December 1941, he married a nurse, Claudia Rubtsova. With the German attack on the Soviet Union, Hessler joined the Red Army. He passed special training as a scout and radio operator.
Hessler's partner, Robert Barth, is a printer by profession and a communist.
Already in the first years of the Nazi regime, he was arrested and briefly imprisoned. In 1939, Bart was drafted into the Wehrmacht. He fought in France, was wounded, and was awarded the 2nd class Iron Cross. In 1941 he was sent to the Eastern Front, and in 1942 he went over to the side of the Red Army.
Hessler and Barth had to get to Berlin disguised as soldiers on their way to Germany from the front on a short vacation. Hessler (pseudonym "Franz") was supplied with original documents in the name of Chief Corporal of the Artillery Helmut Wegner. Bart (pseudonym Beck) became sergeant-major of artillery, which corresponded to the military rank in the Wehrmacht sergeant major in the infantry.
On August 5, 1942, Hessler and Bart landed by parachute in a designated area between Bryansk and Gomel. Guides from the partisan detachment took them to the nearest railway station. A week later, the scouts reached Berlin through Bialystok, Warsaw and Poznan.
On instructions from Moscow, they were to establish contact only with the Red Capella organization; there was no talk of a meeting with Breitenbach. However, a plan had been prepared in Moscow that might be required if it were possible to contact him.
"Reference
by d.f. 11858 "Breitenbach" A-201
"Breitenbach", Lehman Wheely
Born in 1884, German, as a young man volunteered to serve in the Navy and served for 12 years. Even before the war he went to work in the police. First he was a policeman, and then he moved to the political police in the counterintelligence department.
Recruited in 1929 by Cornel through Agent A-70, a former political police officer, of whom he was a friend.
During his cooperation with foreign intelligence, he handed over a large number of materials about the personnel and structure of the political police, the Gestapo, military intelligence, warned about the impending arrests of illegal and legal employees of our intelligence, reported information about persons being developed by the Gestapo, made inquiries on investigative cases and informed about military construction in Germany.
Breitenbach worked for our reconnaissance without interruption until the spring of 1939, when communication with him was cut off. In July 1940, Lehmann sent a letter through the A-70 to our embassy in Berlin, in which he asked for the restoration of communication with him. In September 1940, contact with the agent was restored.
In 1940, Breitenbach worked as deputy chief of the Gestapo's industry service. Somewhat later, he was transferred to the counterintelligence department and working in the department for checking candidates enrolled in the security detachments of enterprises of special state importance, and, in addition, he has, according to him, access to many secrets that were of interest before and may be of interest now.
Before the war, Breitenbach was in touch with our intelligence officer Nikolai (B.I. Zhuravlev), and since the German attack on the Soviet Union, communication with the agent was interrupted.
In case of an emergency call from Breitenbach to a meeting in December 1940, the following was envisaged: a person calls him on the phone, calling himself Kollege Preiss, and says that he is passing through Berlin and would like to see him. To this Breitenbach must answer: "Come to my office." This meant: meeting at 5 pm at ymy Berlinerstrasse and Sarlottenburger Ufer on the right hand side, walking from the Brandenburg Gate, near the telephone booth. This was followed by a password and feedback.
There are no other, later conditions for restoring communication with Breitenbach in his case.
Breitenbach's wife does not know about his connection with Soviet intelligence.
Breitenbach's address: Carmen-Silverpgggrasse 21
House. phone: Rumbold 36-42
O / u of the I Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR ml.
l-t state security
Proceeding from the circumstances, if necessary, the NKVD liaison, having the old address (Breitenbach changed his place of residence and telephone number), would probably not have been able to meet with Breitenbach.
It would seem that everything went well. Hessler and Barth made it to Berlin normally, their documents were in order and did not arouse suspicion during a check along the way.
Hessler, in accordance with the assignment, came to Kurt Schumacher's apartment and stayed with him for three weeks, then for about two weeks he lived with the family of Richard Wassensteiner and his wife Hanni in the Schoneburg district on Worgerstrasse, 162.
In the archives of the foreign intelligence service, a certificate on the conditions of communication with Breitenbach has been preserved. First, exchange by phone a password and a review. Call after 6 pm when Lehman gets home from work. The meeting must take place the next day in accordance with the terms of the Kantstrasse connection.
It is possible that such a meeting with Breitenbach on Kantstrasse took place - only instead of Beck (who had already been arrested by that time), a Gestapo official came to it, in all likelihood.
Hessler and Barth came to the attention of the German counterintelligence immediately after they established contact with representatives of the Berlin underground. The Gestapo quickly identified Hessler's whereabouts, but they could not track down the apartment where Bart lived. Moreover, for the time being they did not know that Hessler had a partner. In mid-August, the Center received a radiogram from Hessler: “Everything is all right. The group has grown significantly at the expense of anti-fascists and is actively working. The radio equipment works, but for some unknown reason there is no connection. Upon receipt of a signal from you about the reception of my radiogram, I will report the information of the "Corsican" and "Sergeant Major". "
Hessler was broadcasting from the studio of the underground worker - exotic dancer Oda Schotmüller, and later he was in the apartment of Countess Erica von Brockdorff.
At the end of August 1942, arrests began in Berlin and then in other cities. For several days in prisons on Prinz-Albrechtstrasse, Kantstrasse, Alexanderplatz, as well as in the women's prison on Warnimstrasse, about 119 people were thrown.
Adam Kukhoff (Old Man) was arrested on September 12 in Prague, where at that time he worked at the Barrandov film studio.
Unfortunately, very little is known about the few weeks that Hessler and Barth spent in the city of Berlin.
It is known, for example, that Hessler managed to meet with Kurt Schumacher (Tenor) and Arvid Harnack near the opera house in Unter den Linden. Apparently, Hessler was arrested between 12 and 16 September, Kurt and Elisabeth Schumacher, Erika von Brockdorff and the Weissechptheimer wife, in whose apartments he was staying, were arrested.
All attempts by the Gestapo to persuade Hessler to cooperate were unsuccessful. In all likelihood, he put up strong resistance during interrogations, because he was not tried, like everyone else, and was not executed, but simply shot or beaten to death.
In October, Moscow received a message on behalf of Hessler, transmitted over his D-6 radio, about the arrests that had begun in Berlin. But it was already a radio game, started by Heinrich Müller's deputy Friedrich Panzinger. Moscow did not immediately, but they guessed that the radio station was in the hands of the Gestapo.
The first reliable information about the Berlin tragedy arrived in Moscow about six months later. In April 1943, on the Soviet-German front, the nephew of Arvid Harnak, Wolfgang Hawemann ("Italian"), surrendered. The investigators were unable to prove his affiliation with the "Red Chapel", but just in case they sent him to the front as a penalty box.
As for Bart, there are many unclear things in his case. The Gestapo failed to establish his whereabouts in Berlin, as well as the very fact of his appearance in the city. But the Gestapo conducted secret surveillance of the families and close relatives of the anti-fascists. What if any of the anti-fascists, either as a recruited Soviet agent, or as a deserter, will come into view. And so it happened in this case with the scout Bart.
Bart's family lived in Berlin - a wife and a little son. The wife fell ill and was admitted to a private clinic. The nurse assigned to her was a Gestapo agent. Once in Berlin, Bart could not stand it and either came to his home, or made a phone call. Upon learning that his wife was ill and hospitalized, he came to her clinic, where he was arrested on September 9, 1942. Unlike Hessler, Barth could not withstand intense interrogations and agreed to participate in a radio game with Moscow; one of the most experienced RSHA experts Thomas Ampletzer worked with him. Subsequently, Barth claimed that on October 14 he transmitted a prearranged signal, meaning that he was working under the control of the Gestapo, therefore, was captured.
Unfortunately, the inexperienced radio operator at the Symbol Center did not notice or mistook it for a common technical glitch. Be that as it may, Moscow was misled. On December 4, 1942, Beck was given the password and conditions of communication with Breitenbach.
On December 11, 1942, the Center received a radio message: Beck allegedly phoned Breitenbach. A meeting was arranged, but the agent did not come out to the meeting. Beck allegedly called Breitenbach back the next day. The wife came to the phone and said that the husband was not at home. This ended the radio game.
Well, what happened to Bart? Convinced that Moscow had received his alarming signal, and saving his wife and son from Gestapo repression, he agreed to cooperate under the nickname Brower. In Moscow, they still realized that Bart was arrested, and decided that he had committed an act of treason.
Already at the end of the war in June 1945, Barth, while in the German city of Saarbrücken, appeared at the headquarters of the American army and declared that he was a Soviet intelligence officer. The Americans handed Bart over to the Red Army at the first opportunity.
On June 25, 1945, Robert Barth was arrested by SMERSH employees. Later, during the investigation, he repeatedly repeated that he had transmitted an alarming signal and therefore was sure that in Moscow his subsequent radiograms would be perceived as disinformation.
From a purely human point of view, I want to believe that Bart was telling the truth, otherwise how to explain why he voluntarily came to the Americans, told who he was, which determined his transfer to the Soviet authorities. But he could have stayed in Germany and settled in the western zones of occupation (later the Federal Republic of Germany). Unfortunately, Bartu-Beck was not able to convince the investigation.
On November 14, 1945, a special meeting at the NKVD of the USSR sentenced Robert Bart to death. On November 23, the sentence was carried out. On February 12, 1996, Robert Barth was rehabilitated by the decision of the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office.
Well, how did further events develop in relation to Willie Lehman? If everything went as planned, Beck would not have found Breitenbach right away, since Moscow did not know either his new home address or his home telephone number.
Soviet foreign intelligence knew almost nothing about the last days of the A-201's life. It is not known whether he was hanged, shot, or died of acute heart failure. He was a very sick person. So, nothing but meager and not always reliable facts.
The Gestapo had to maintain complete secrecy. And not so much in order to avoid leakage to Moscow, but in order to prevent a grandiose scandal within the department. Still would! A veteran of the special services, far from being an ordinary Gestapo employee, and suddenly - a Soviet agent with many years of experience. They would have found out about this upstairs, who knows whose heads would fly and whose career would be instantly broken. After all, this is a matter of national importance.
Therefore, Lehman's arrest, most likely, should have been employees who did not personally know him. He was taken to Plötzensee prison, which contains the only short record of the prisoner's delivery. There was no arrest warrant. And why was it not taken to the inner prison at 8 Prinz-Apbrechtstrasse? It’s very simple: there “Uncle Willie” was known by sight and by name every employee. What kind of conspiracy and secrecy can there be?
Lehman was doomed. He was deliberately refused to consider his case in court. How he was killed is unknown. There was only a short message in the departmental, closed "Bulletin" of January 29, 1943. It seems that only the month of his death was true in him - December 1942. It turns out that Lehman lived after his arrest for no longer than two weeks.
His wife Margaret Lehman was not subjected to any reprisals. At first she was told that Willie had died on a "secret" business trip. General A.M. Korotkov tracked her down in Berlin in the summer of 1945, and Margaret told him that shortly before the end of the war, one of Willie's former colleagues whispered to her in secret that he had not died due to a sudden attack of illness and the subsequent accident, but was gunned down...
Here is what he writes about the above in his book "His Majesty the Agent", published in Moscow by the publishing house "Printing Traditions", on the basis of recently declassified materials T. Gladkov.
“My friend, Doctor of History Hans Coppi, a man of amazing destiny, lives and works in Berlin. His father, Hans Copies (pseudonym Klein) was the main radio operator of the Berlin anti-fascist organization. Mother, Hilda, is a worthy companion of her husband.
Following the exposure and liquidation of the organization, the Coppies were beheaded by guillotine at Ploetzensee prison. Hans - immediately after the sentencing, Hilda - 3 months after the birth of the child in the prison hospital. The three month old baby was also called Hans and was raised by his grandparents.
Dr. Hans Koppi (Jr.) devoted his entire adult life to the study of the anti-Hitler movement in Germany. He is the author of several books, scripts for many television films.
After this book was written, it became known to me that on the basis of a few testimonies and archival documents, he built the following version ...
When the radio intelligence of the Abwehr intercepted radio transmissions to Moscow on June 22, 1941, by previously unknown Soviet intelligence agents, a special unit was created in Berlin - the Sonderkommando, code-named "Red Chapel". The organization of German anti-fascists Schulze-Boysen-Harnak-Kukhof is known under the same name.
The Sonderkommando "Red Chapel" in Berlin was headed by a very active Gestapo, head of the JVA-2 abstract, Hauptführer SB Criminalamt Horst Kopkov. He received information about Breitenbach, knocked out during the interrogation of the arrested Beck.
Kopkov immediately reported to his boss, Heinrich Müller, who, in turn, reported to the chief of the RSHA.
In an atmosphere of the strictest secrecy, it was decided to send his man to Breitenbach under the guise of a Russian courier. It was the young Gestapo Olenhorst, who had been summoned from the city of Linz.
Olenhorst called Lehmann to a meeting using a password. He came, and everything fell into place: a responsible Gestapo officer for several years was a Soviet agent. Both were arrested. Gestapo - for credibility.
As you know, in the Ploetzensee prison, those arrested were not shot. There they only hanged and beheaded (on a guillotine).
Breitenbach was simply killed. Most likely a shot in the back of the head. Hans Coppi's version does not in the least change the general idea of \u200b\u200bwhat happened in the two weeks of 1942. Absolute secrecy was observed to the point that an official announcement followed about the death of criminal inspector Willie Lehman.
Heydrich had already been dead for 8 months by that time. Ernst Kaltenbrunner was not yet his successor. The list of those killed "for the Fuehrer and the Reich" department employees signed by the acting. Chief of the RSHA SS Brigadefuehrer Major General of Police Erwin Wilhelm Schultz.
During the interrogation on 14.6.50, conducted by an American investigator, Kopkov testified that he was present at the cremation of the body of the criminal inspector Willie Lehman.
Thanks to the Moscow correspondent of the German magazine Der Spiegel, Mr. Uwe Klusman, a photocopy of the declassified document has become known. On January 29, 1943, in the official bulletin of the RSHA, a message was published that in December 1942, the criminal inspector Willie Lehmann “gave his life for the Fuhrer and the Reich”.
So, the exact date of Breitenbach's death has not been established. Colleagues gave Lehman's widow the urn with the ashes of the deceased and some of his personal belongings. Some time later, one of Lehman's friends told the widow, as the greatest secret, that her husband Willie was shot in the basements of the Gestapo. He advised Margaret to keep quiet about it. Throughout the war, the widow, apparently, feared for her life. Margaret told A. Korotkov about the story of her husband's death, who visited her in her Berlin apartment in the summer of 1945.
In 1969, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR awarded Soviet orders to a large group of participants in the German Resistance for their contribution to the joint struggle against Nazism and assistance to the Red Army. Soviet orders were awarded to members of the underground anti-fascist organization "Red Capella". Willie Lehman was not a member of this organization. His widow was presented with a gold watch with the inscription: "As a keepsake from Soviet friends." At that time, Soviet intelligence could not do more in order to adequately celebrate the feat of its most valuable agent.
In 1972, on the eve of the 30th anniversary of the heroic death of Willie Lehmann, with the approval of the chairman of the KGB Yu.V. Andropov, the Soviet writer Yulian Semyonov was familiarized with fifteen volumes of the Breitenbach case. He was shown some materials from the dossier of a prominent Soviet intelligence agent, Alexander Mikhailovich Korotkov, who worked with the agent in the pre-war period and later became the head of the Illegal Intelligence Directorate. Semyonov wrote his famous book "Seventeen Moments of Spring" literally in one breath. It immediately became a bestseller and won great recognition from readers.
Standartenführer Stirlitz became a national hero and today he lives an independent life. Heroism, self-sacrifice, loyalty to duty and love for the Motherland were embodied in the collective image of the Soviet intelligence officer.
Reading time: 10 minutesThe prototype of Stirlitz - what is the similarity and difference between the movie hero and the idealist Willie Lehmann - was understood by the writer Alexei Kurilko.
Intro
Alexey Kurilko
Last time I tried to figure out what was the secret of the charm of the image of Stirlitz from the movie "17 Moments of Spring". As far as I can tell, I managed to cope with this task. (Well done! Take a pie from the shelf!) But I made one gross mistake.
When it came to Stirlitz's prototype, I mentioned that this image is collective, and they say there were several prototypes. At the same time, he did not even deign to name their names, which involuntarily aroused the reader's interest and curiosity. But, having excited, I did not in the least bother to satisfy this curiosity! It's a shame, I know from myself. Here I am to blame, I confess. (Scoundrel! Put the pie back on the shelf! What? Put what's left!).
I even waited for them - complaints about my shortsightedness, because many friends, praising the material, remarked: "But I could still tell about the true prototype of Stirlitz!" I tried to justify myself as best I could. “Why, there were a lot of them! - I explained. - Starting from Yakov Blumkin (his story and part of his biography were used in the first two novels by Yulian Semyonov), and ending with such legendary scouts as Alexander Kuznetsov and Alexander Korotkov. "
And they reasonably answered me: "I would tell you about the most interesting of them." I continued to persist: "They are all interesting in their own way." And then, as if by agreement, they declared: "Then I would tell about the most interesting, in your opinion." And, as my brilliant teacher, Arkady Romanovich Chernovolk, said, what the public wants is God wants! So be it. So, Stirlitz's prototype.
Mueller's protege
The most interesting and saddest fate for me personally seems to be the fate of the intelligence officer, who was closest to the film image more than others and who can be called the "prototype of Stirlitz" - both in terms of the volume of work done and the weight of positions and titles held in the RSHA. And in terms of the length of service - for almost 15 years this man secretly served in Soviet intelligence - he is closest to the protagonist of a series of novels by Yulian Semyonov about the adventures of the legendary Soviet intelligence officer.
Buddy Mueller. "Clarity is one of the forms of sheer deception"
Like Stirlitz, he rose to the point that Heinrich Müller himself was appointed assistant and chief deputy of the young and ambitious Walter Schelenberg - the head of counterintelligence. Like Stirlitz during the Second World War, he was no longer young. Rather, as the British say about men 40-45 years old, was in the last fit of youth. But nevertheless, just like Stirlitz, women liked him, although he was far from being so slender and fit.
Moreover! Stirlitz, as we know, was distinguished by impeccable health, but this is precisely what our hero could not boast of, alas. On the contrary, he was very, very sick, and besides, unlike Stirlitz, he was long and incurably married. And although there was a place of true love in his life, she, as usual, unfortunately had nothing to do with marriage.
Sympathy for the Slavs
Gestapo man Willie Lehmann was considered a true Aryan
His name was Willie Lehman, and he was a real German. Nobody introduced it from our side. Worse, he was never even recruited on purpose! He himself, absolutely voluntarily, turned to the representatives of the Soviet intelligence, expressing a desire to work for them.
The reasons for the act of the Gestapo member Willie Lehman are still debated. According to one version, he badly needed money. A lot was spent on medical treatment and expensive medicines. On the other hand, the ideology of the Nazis, striving for power, was extremely alien to him. Rather, he was impressed by the views of all naive idealists about universal equality, freedom and brotherhood. And he liked these strange Slavs for a long time.
Especially, they say, from the day he, during 12 years of service in the Navy, witnessed their selfless heroism. An indelible impression was made on him how he, from his ship, holding his breath, watched the battle and, in fact, the death of most of the crew of the cruiser Varyag and the small gunboat Koreets in an unequal battle with a whole squadron of 14 Japanese ships in January 1904. The heroism of the sailors during the battle, which was watched by the teams of European ships that did not take part in the battle, instilled sympathy for the Slavs in Lehman's heart for a long time. However, let's take everything in order.
Breathlessly, Lehman watched the battle and, in fact, the death of most of the crew of the cruiser Varyag and the small gunboat Koreets in an unequal battle with a whole squadron of 14 Japanese ships in January 1904
Stirlitz Prototype - Scout Path
In recent years, as many as three books have been published - two historical documentaries and one art genre - about the life and work of Stirlitz's prototype, Willie Lehmann, nevertheless there is not so much reliable information about him yet. Born in the suburbs of Leipzig in 1886 (according to another version - in 1884). Lehman is his real name. At the age of 17 he entered the Navy, where he served for 12 long years.
After serving in the navy, Lehmann married, settled in Berlin and got a job in the department for combating organized crime in the criminal police, which later became the political police, and with the rise of Hitler to power, the basis for the creation of the Gestapo.
Serving in the criminal police, Lehman was unable to make a brilliant career due to poor health - he had chronic diabetes. Younger and more zealous fellows easily bypassed him in promotion, although they had much lower intellectual abilities and did not know how to properly analyze the information obtained. As he was approaching his forties, Lehman began to experience depression associated with this midlife crisis.
Love front
Relations with his wife deteriorated, God did not give them children, he earned little, he did not see any special prospects for development in the service. Tired of the eternal reproaches of his wife Margaret, the prototype of Stirlitz had a mistress, who, although she was much younger than him, and was quite beautiful and effective Fraulein, nevertheless loved him - this is such an aging, often ill police officer of a low rank. By 1928, Lehman was already completely disillusioned with the policy of the government that existed at that time in the country.
The Nazis, too, did not arouse any sympathy in Lehmann, unlike his friend - from the time of service in the navy - Ernst Kurt, who tried to break into the ranks of close friends of the Nazi bosses. But Kurt put on a leader who was already losing his influence in the Nazi party, and was soon killed altogether. Now Lehman's friend joined the ranks of the many unemployed, and the eternal lack of money prevented him from getting drunk. This is the prototype of Stirlitz, Willie Lehmann, and took advantage of.
Step forward
He could not risk his post in the police, otherwise he would have shared the fate of his unfortunate comrade. Therefore, Stirlitz's prototype, after analyzing the situation, decided to take a chance without attracting special attention to itself. He sent Ernst Kurt with a proposal for cooperation to the Soviet embassy, \u200b\u200bstrictly ordering him not to give out his name and rank. Thus began his service, and soon his friendship with representatives of the Soviet Union. For about two years, the prototype of Stirlitz, Willie Lehman, obtained classified information, and Ernst Kurt passed it on to the Soviet resident.
However, due to the unreasonable behavior of his friend, who too clearly and unwisely spent the huge sums of money received from friends from the Soviets, the cooperation was in real danger of failure. Therefore, the Soviet resident, easily reaching out to Lehman, suggested that he work without the mediation of a friend. Kurt was sent to Switzerland, where, with money issued by Soviet intelligence, he was able to open his own store.
Lehman had to personally participate in the bloody "Night of the Long Knives" in 1934
By that time, Lehmann, on the personal recommendation of Hermann Goering, was transferred to a responsible position in the Gestapo. Moreover, by the summer of 1934, in order not to break away from the majority in the collective, he was forced to join the Nazi party, and on June 30 of the same year, as a loyal member of this party and a Gestapo worker, he personally took part in Operation Night of Long Knives. ...
The very night when the SS men loyal to the Fuehrer personally killed all the remaining unreliable people, and first of all - yesterday's comrades-in-arms and veterans of the party, the so-called "brown shirts", who made up a strong stronghold of the personal army of Ernest Rohm, one of the founders of the Nazi party. By the way, he was killed on the same night.
True Aryan
For the courage shown that night and for further devoted service, the prototype of Stirlitz, Willy Lehmann, in 1936 was promoted and awarded - one of the four lucky ones - a portrait of Hitler in a gold frame with a dedication of the Fuhrer himself. Co-workers began to envy him, but Lehman continued to behave so modestly that no one could suspect him of any ambitious plans. He was not seen as a threat in the internal struggle for power and intrigues, which occupied the majority.
On the contrary, each of his colleagues considered Lehman to be a kind of harmless, quiet, kind, loyal, experienced, but old campaigner who has been kept in the Gestapo for years of exemplary service, whose sharp mind and rich life and service experience may still come in handy. He fully corresponded to the characteristics that could be given in the film and Stirlitz, if he was married. Has a long track record. Always in good and friendly relations with comrades in the service. In treatment he is gentle, honest, respectable. A loyal family man. Married. He had no connections denigrating him. Merciless to the enemies of the Reich. "
Both Stirlitz and Lehman were considered the ideal Gestapo
Hands covered in blood
Stirlitz's prototype demonstrated its ruthlessness towards the enemies of the Reich on the night of massacres - "long knives". He had to stain his hands with blood that night. All of them were divided into groups of two or three people and, given a list of addresses and names, were sent to kill. It was impossible to evade, and Lehman did not try. First, he would have aroused suspicion on the part of his comrades-in-arms and discontent on the part of his superiors. And secondly, that night, as he later told his curator from the Center, some bastards got rid of other bastards. Or, as the ancient Latin saying goes, evil devoured evil.
Scout Vasily Zarubin, with whom Lehman worked, was called an "intelligence artist"
Lehman's work was supervised by Vasily Zarubin himself, a famous Soviet intelligence officer. It was to him that Lehman conveyed detailed information about the structure and personnel of the fourth directorate of the RSHA - the main directorate of imperial security.
And after Lehman was transferred to the Gestapo, he for some time headed the secret department, which was involved in counterintelligence support for the military industry and military-defense construction. From that day on, the information transmitted by Lehman became extremely valuable for the leadership of the Soviet government.
Interrupted connection
Willie Lehman transmitted information about the construction of submarines, new fighters, armored vehicles, a lot of information about a new type of anti-tank guns, informed about the urgent release of new gas masks and the production of synthetic gasoline.
In other words, he transferred important classified information for very symbolic money, for which the Soviets would not be stingy to pay hundreds of thousands, if not millions, in German currency.
But Lehman only asked for the money he needed for his treatment. And in 1936, his wife received a good inheritance, and Lehman could have left the service in the Gestapo altogether for health reasons, and no one would have suspected anything. But Stirlitz's prototype believed that his work for the Soviets would equalize the forces of two ideological opponents and would not lead to World War II.
He, as a participant in the First World War, having seen enough of its horrors, and as a witness to its disastrous consequences for the common people of Germany, was an ardent pacifist at heart. And I saw that the new Germany, or rather the Third Reich, was clearly preparing for revenge and for the "world domination of the Aryans." So, his work made sense and could be useful.
But the most important thing is that Lehman was the person who in advance, with all responsibility, five days before the alleged events, conveyed the time of the start of the war against the USSR, indicating the main direction of the first strike, the exact date and time of the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union.
But that will be in 1941. And before that, something interesting happened. By 1937, communication with Lehman had abruptly ceased - due to the purges arranged by Stalin in the ranks of the NKVD and foreign intelligence.
In that year, repressions began against the commanders of the highest military personnel and many chiefs of intelligence, and therefore against most of the intelligence officers and residents. More than a hundred deeply conspiratorial agents were urgently summoned from abroad to Moscow. The majority, not knowing anything, followed the order. And they returned to their homeland only to be immediately repressed and, in most cases, shot.
Risky letter
Vasily Zarubin was among those who returned to their homeland and were purged. Only a few survived - those who refused to return, and those with whom communication was temporarily unattainable. Among the latter were such experienced scouts as Sudoplatov, who in the future headed the intelligence agencies, and Alexander Korotkov, who will be destined to re-establish contact with Leman by the fortieth year.
Lehman, naturally, knew little about all these repressions and about the situation in the USSR in general. And so for some time he decided that they stopped working with him, since the USSR government completely trusted the Ribbentrop-Molotov non-aggression pact and believed Hitler's word.
But by June 1940, Lehmann, who understood what the Fuehrer's policy was leading to, nevertheless decided to take the risk. And, in despair, he took an extremely dangerous step for him. He managed to quietly drop a letter into the mailbox of the Soviet embassy, \u200b\u200bwhich was addressed to the deputy military attaché of the USSR. Lehman wrote:
“I am in the same position that is well known to the Center. I think I am able to work for the good of the Soviet Union. But if I do not receive any answer, then I will assume that I am of no value to this work. This means that my further work in the Gestapo will lose all meaning for me, and I will be forced to resign. "
Korotkov was urgently sent to Berlin, where, after checking the information, if Lehman had gone over to the side of those with whom he had served side by side for so many years, and resumed uninterrupted work with an extremely important agent Lehman, nicknamed Breitenbach.
Stirlitz's prototype Willy Lehmann was the first to report the exact date of the German attack on the USSR in 1941
But still, after the start of the war, about which Breitenbach managed to warn the Soviet government, the connection with Lehman ceased. Only from time to time did he manage to transfer extremely important information to members of the anti-fascist organization or to random people who, perhaps, could, on occasion, transfer it to reliable representatives of the Soviet intelligence service.
Deadly oversight
In January 1943, Willie Lehman's wife was informed of the death of her husband. And in the Gestapo official bulletin it was reported that the criminal inspector Willie Lehmann at the end of December 1942 gave his life for the Fuhrer and the Reich. The fact that a high-ranking SS officer and an employee of the Gestapo turned out to be a spy was not mentioned not only in the newspapers, it was not even reported to the Fuehrer. Heinrich Müller personally worried about this in order to avoid the scandal and the wrath of Hitler.
In addition, Müller imagined how this information would have pleased Bormann, who led a covert struggle against him. However, Mueller himself was extremely angry. And insulted to the core. The first days he could not recover from surprise. How so? This same Lehman whom he trusted so much? Whom everyone around was called nothing less than kind Uncle Willie, since he was the oldest in age and always lent to young colleagues? No, it can't be!
Last Christmas
The failure of agent Breitenbach was the fault and oversight of Soviet intelligence. In May 1942, a Soviet agent named Beck was sent to Berlin. His main goal was only one - to restore communication with Lehman in order to continue cooperation. However, fearing that he might refuse to cooperate, the agent was supplied with extensive compromising evidence on Lehman. For pressure.
Unfortunately, Beck was arrested a month later. After several months of torture by the Gestapo, he revealed everything he knew about Lehman. On December 30, 1942, he was urgently summoned from vacation, from where he never returned.
The most offensive thing is that of all the anti-fascist heroes, the name of Willie Lehman was hardly mentioned. The Germans could not fall in love with a man who worked for more than 13 years for Soviet intelligence. Only in 1969 was Lehman's widow, Margaret, presented with a gold wristwatch with the inscription "In memory of Soviet friends."
Willie Lehman's name and his activities were officially declassified recently, at the beginning of the 21st century. This means that Lehman could not be the prototype of Stirlitz. And the creators of the film "17 Moments" could not know anything about him in the days when they started shooting. The only one who could know at least something about the life of this amazing man was Yulian Semyonov, who often received information directly from the KGB to work on the book ... But this is only guesswork.
Willie Lehman (German Willy Lehmann; operational pseudonym Breitenbach; March 15, 1884, outskirts of Leipzig, German Empire - December 1942, Berlin, Germany) - Gestapo officer, SS Hauptsturmführer and criminal inspector. A secret agent of Soviet intelligence, who has become one of the most valuable during almost thirteen years of cooperation with it.
Biography
Born into the family of a school teacher. He studied to be a carpenter, at the age of 17 he volunteered for the Navy, where he served for 12 years. From a German ship he watched the battle between the Russian cruiser Varyag and Japanese ships in the battle at Chemulpo on January 27, 1904.
In 1911 he was demobilized and came to Berlin, where he soon met an old friend Ernst Kür, who by that time was working in the Berlin police presidium. Under his patronage, Lehman was recruited into the department for combating org. crime (criminal police), later moved to the political police (which later became the Gestapo), and two years later (in 1913) was hired by the police department for combating espionage, which he later headed. He never was in the Abwehr, since it was an exclusively military, not a police structure.
After the Plenipotentiary Representation of the RSFSR was opened in Berlin in May 1918, Lehmann's counterintelligence department began to monitor its employees. After the coup on November 4, 1918, Willy Lehmann became chairman of the general meeting of Berlin police officers.
In 1920, the authorities of the Weimar Republic re-established the secret political police, to which Lehman and Chur returned. Lehman had to undergo re-certification for further promotion, but due to an attack of diabetes, the exam was postponed. In the meantime, he was appointed acting head of the office of the department, which was engaged in spying on foreign diplomatic missions, that is, in fact, he was in charge of the counterintelligence department of the Berlin police presidium. In 1927, an experienced intelligence officer was appointed to the post of chief, and Lehman's chances of further promotion were greatly diminished. He chose a place for work in the department's filing cabinet, in which all information on employees of foreign embassies was concentrated.
Recruitment (1929)
Over the years of service, Lehman managed to become disillusioned with the policy of the government existing in the country. He decided to offer his services to Soviet foreign intelligence. In March 1929, at his suggestion, Ernst Kur, who by that time was unemployed, visited the Soviet embassy. After a conversation with him, the staff of the OGPU in Soviet intelligence came to the conclusion that it would be advisable to recruit Kura on a material basis. Agent A-70 was planned to be used to collect information about persons of interest to Soviet intelligence, for which he was entitled to a monthly fee depending on the quality of the information provided.
However, to complete the assignment of the USSR, Kur had to turn to Lehman, who was not very happy with this state of affairs. In addition, Kur was unwisely spending the money received from Soviet intelligence, letting them go at noisy parties in Berlin restaurants. Fearing that this would attract the attention of the Berlin police, and then lead to himself, Lehman decided to establish direct contact with the Soviet station.
According to one version, Lehman agreed to cooperate with the USSR because he was a staunch anti-fascist, according to another - for money. Without exception, all German-language sources (both before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall) adhere to a less romantic version of Lehmann's collaboration solely for selfish motives. This is indirectly confirmed by the fact that in the GDR the name of Lehmann was not used at all, and was almost forgotten, while the names of other fighters of the German resistance and spies with immeasurably lesser merit were called streets and in every possible way used them for propaganda purposes.
The name of Willie Lehman was kept secret by the Russian special services for many years and only recently opened the veil of secrecy. In the Gestapo, where Lehman worked, he was called "Uncle Willie". In Soviet intelligence, he is known as a particularly valuable agent of Breitenbach.
It was Lehmann who named the exact date of Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union. This person was even considered the prototype of Stirlitz. But there is a question, the answer to which was not found in any archive. In 42, Lehman stopped communicating. Where did "Uncle Willie" disappear to? And what were the last moments of his life? The most classified story in the channel's documentary investigation.
Strange murder
On the night of December 1942, a phone call rings in Willie Lehman's Berlin apartment - an urgent call to work, of which there have been many over the past couple of years. His desk in the Gestapo is bursting with fresh deeds and denunciations. Willie reluctantly puts on a silver ring with magical runes and a skull. This is Himmler's personal award for distinguished SS members.
"The workload on the political police during the war was colossal. The flow of documents took a lot of time, and Lehman was very often put on the documents. That is, there was nothing like that in the night call. This is a completely normal situation that could not cause any specific doubts ", - says the historian Konstantin Zalessky.
However, Willie will not return home that day, nor will he appear in the following weeks. Finally, the Nazi newspaper publishes a modest obituary: the criminal inspector Willie Lehmann, who worked in the Gestapo since the day of its foundation, gave his life for the Fuhrer and the Reich. What actually happened?
The historian of the special services Oleg Khlobustov became interested in Lehman's story. Shedding light on this confusing case was helped by a dossier recently declassified by intelligence, and primarily the testimony of Lehman's wife contained in it.
"After the war, Lehman's wife, who naturally did not know what he was doing, said that in December 1942, around mid-December, he was urgently summoned to work, left, and she did not know anything else about him. , she began to make inquiries, and after a few weeks she was told that her husband had gone on a business trip, and later they were told that he had died, "says the historian of the special services Oleg Khlobustov.
It turns out that Willie died in December 42nd. But by whose fault and under what circumstances? The dossier does not even contain a hint of where Lehman went on that December night, as if the Nazis did everything to make as little as possible about him known.
"His fate is not entirely clear and understandable, because the documents were destroyed, because it was a compromise of many leaders of the RSHA, from the chief of intelligence Schellenberg to the head of the Gestapo Mueller," says Oleg Khlobustov.
But what did Willie do to make Gestapo chief Mueller fearful? Renowned intelligence historian Alexander Kolpakidi examines Lehman's collaboration with Soviet intelligence. Thanks to the dossier, the circumstances of the recruitment were restored in all details.
“He needed money, obviously, this plan of work for Soviet intelligence came into his head. And he wanted to ventilate, send a friend, see how he will be, whether they will not be thrown, will they pay, will they pay normally, how safe is it whether someone in the Soviet embassy would hand him over, whether they would arrest him right away. And so he decided to check everything out, "says historian Alexander Kolpakidi.
Spy in the rear
1929 year. A middle-aged German appears at the USSR Embassy in Berlin, smells of schnapps from him. He says he works for the police and offers his services as an agent. Ernst Kur - that is the name of the person - immediately falls into the field of vision of Soviet intelligence. They quickly find out that he is not working alone.
Behind him is a friend - Willie Lehman. Moscow is acting wary. Willie is also a policeman, works in the political department. This is, in fact, counterintelligence. Nothing to say, tidbit. And he goes into his own hands. This is all too good to be true.
"This police was involved, among other things, with counterintelligence, that is, catching foreign spies. And the place, let's say, is very dangerous in what sense, that it is very likely that this is a counter-operation, that this is a police operation against our intelligence," - says Konstantin Zalessky.
Finally, Moscow decided to make contact. The rendezvous is scheduled for an evening in one of the Berlin cafes. Leaving doubts, Lehman comes to the meeting with Kur.
"A man of small stature, I would say, very resilient, he began his activity precisely from service in the navy and served there for 10 years, was a typical German burgher, not even a policeman, but a burgher," - the historian of the special services Nikolai Dolgopolov.
Willie, like all Germans, understands well that money loves an account, especially since they are constantly in short supply. Lehman has diabetes, and treatment is expensive. In the late 1920s, many in Germany considered Russia to be almost an ally, which meant that the risk was low. Why not help your comrades and make some money at the same time?
“When he began to cooperate, he did not think that Russia and Germany were enemies. And indeed, he knew perfectly well that there was secret cooperation despite the Versailles Peace Treaty, he knew that for espionage in favor of Russia there were very small punishments, ridiculously small. He knew that they mostly turn a blind eye to it, "says Alexander Kolpakidi.
So Lehman becomes one of the most valuable agents in Moscow. He is given the operational pseudonym Breitenbach. Willie has been working for Soviet intelligence for 12 long years, but then communication with him unexpectedly ends. His wife goes to the Gestapo. There she is informed that Willie became ill during a special operation and he fell out of the train at full speed.
"The most interesting thing in this whole story is that Himmler and Müller hid the whole story from Hitler, specifically initiated even his heroic death, that he died on the battlefield, and the employees were told that he was traveling on a train from Warsaw, he had an attack of diabetes. , he lost consciousness, fell out of the train and crashed, "says Kolpakidi.
The Mystery of Uncle Willie's Death
So how did Willie Lehman die? In some kind of shootout or did he really die of a seizure? But then why did his widow never find out where he was buried? What secret did the Gestapo hide from her? Lehman is a professional with a capital letter. This means that what happened to him is hardly his fault.
The famous writer and historian of the special services Nikolai Dolgopolov believes that Lehman deserves respect, if only because many Soviet intelligence officers owe their lives to Breitenbach.
“The Soviet embassy was also under the tutelage of Willie Lehman. Lehman not only knew that such and such a person would be taken, say, under surveillance, or that such a person would be in danger, because they wanted to develop him and maybe even recruit him. He always managed to do this and was always very careful to warn his Soviet friends, "Nikolai Dolgopolov says.
Moscow understands that Agent Breitenbach is a real gift of fate. One thing remains - to get rid of the Chicken, he is too strongly attached to schnapps and at the same time does not always keep his mouth shut.
“It was decided to send him to Switzerland, where he would also carry out some assignments and tasks, but did not compromise and could not compromise Lehman with his such spree,” says Oleg Khlobustov.
But how to transfer information to Moscow? The radio in the center of Berlin is nonsense. You have to rely on personal meetings with illegal agents. One time American Lucy Booker comes to Willie. She takes photographs of the documents brought by Lehman in order to hand them over to the center.
Willie immediately takes the originals with him. And it also happens: he sews papers into the lining of his hat and comes to a cafe to meet with an agent. They put their hats on the table, and imperceptibly change their hats before leaving.
"He met with someone from illegal immigrants, and completely different people: there were also Germans, Erich Take, for example, Karl Gursky, there was an American Lucy Booker, there was a Latvian Herman Klesmet, there were Russian Zarubin and so on, that is, they were very different This illegal took information from him and gave it to an operative from the embassy, \u200b\u200bto a legal intelligence agent, and thus was sent to Moscow, "says Alexander Kolpakidi.
In the 33rd year, fate presents Lehman's curators with another gift. The department of the Berlin Police Presidium, in which Willie works, is fully transferred to the secret political police, which is created on the initiative of the Prime Minister of Prussia, Hermann Goering.
"He dismissed about a quarter to a third of the police, that is, the purge was very thorough. Accordingly, there are not many police officers left. And practically all the Prussian political police entered the Gestapo in full force without any recertification, certification, they even received more and promotion ", - says Konstantin Zalessky.
Reichmarshal Goering talks with Secretary of State Herbert Backe. Photo: TASS
The new police will soon have the name of the Gestapo and a fearsome reputation. The secret police can arrest anyone on the slightest suspicion, use torture, execute them without trial or investigation.
"Unlike other police structures, the Gestapo had the right to pre-trial arrest, that is, to arrest without a court order. Liquidation - formally, this was done, of course, but in reality any death sentence formally had to go through a court, but, on the other hand, this is not always was observed, "says Andrei Martynov.
Nevertheless, a man in the Gestapo is a great success for Moscow. Some people still believe that it was Willie's biography that formed the basis of Yulian Semyonov's book, and that Lehman is nothing but the prototype of Stirlitz.
At home among strangers
“I knew Yulian Semenovich well, we were friends, so I know for sure that he simply did not even suspect the presence of such an agent at that time. They told about him much later, after the death of Yulian Semenov, he died early. And in any case, they are different people. Stirlitz is a Russian person who pretends to be a German, and Willy Lehman was a German, "says Leonid Mlechin.
Of course, a Russian intelligence officer would never have penetrated the Gestapo. It's hard to believe, but the pedigree of candidates for the political police was carefully checked, studied the biographies of their ancestors born up to 1800. But that's not all.
"If some German applied for an officer's position in the Gestapo, he was checked until 1750. Imagine that some very successful, very, I would say, talented, brilliant even Soviet intelligence officer arrives. to learn the language in a way, you can, of course, have some kind of relatives in Germany, you can be a native of Germany, but not so deeply, "Nikolai Dolgopolov believes.
And this does not mean at all that the Gestapo officers are checked once and for all. The control continues, there is no escape from surveillance. In a word, Willie walks on a blade, but he cannot give up espionage, because he is still alive only thanks to subsidies from Moscow.
“He was very seriously ill, they were afraid that he would die, by the way, in the mid-30s, there is a lot about this in the correspondence, that he didn’t seem to have died, and therefore they took great care of his health. And this treatment took a lot of money ", - says Alexander Kolpakidi.
Therefore, many experts consider money to be Lehman's main motive. Leonid Mlechin adheres to the same opinion.
"As a rule, agents work for money. Or there is a very frequent case when people in this business want to be the masters of destinies. Not only does he work in the same intelligence, he wants to run two services, he wants to play on many boards." , - argues Leonid Mlechin.
Leonid Mlechin. Photo: TASS / Valery Sharifulin
And then there's the gray hair in the beard. Already middle-aged Willie falls in love with a young seamstress. The girl barely makes ends meet or just pretends, and Lehman rents an apartment for her, indulges in delicacies.
“For example, renting an apartment in Berlin at that time was about 180 marks, he was paid 580 marks a month. This is decent money. And he spent it carefully, even his wife had no idea,” says Alexander Kolpakidi.
Nevertheless, the famous historian Konstantin Zalessky believes that Lehman was guided by other reasons. He came to the conclusion that Willie was simply tired of being in the last roles all his life. And the respect that Soviet agents show him flatters his pride.
"Soviet intelligence is the most powerful intelligence service of those years, that he is appreciated in such a serious service. That is, while remaining, let's say, a junior officer, a person is somewhat higher than the technical staff, but an ordinary investigator, political intelligence officer - the Gestapo, he at the same time he was becoming highly valued in intelligence ", - believes Konstantin Zalessky.
"Night of the Long Knives"
Indeed, Willie only rose to the rank of criminal police inspector. In Russia, he would be a senior lieutenant. However, it is not excluded that Lehman is guided by completely different considerations, not infringed pride.
"Hitler not only captured the whole country, he made it a country unacceptable for living for such, say, honest people like Lehman, because Lehman was, let's call it all in his own words, an anti-communist. He hunted down the communists, he imprisoned them, This is not written, but it was so. But at the same time, Lehman did not understand why these people came here - the fascists - and they destroy their own? ", - says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
And what is completely incomprehensible to Willie is the witchcraft and obscurantism of the SS chief Himmler. By his order, a special Sonderkommando collects information about the medieval trials of witches. Himmler is restoring Wewelsburg Castle, on which, according to legend, lies an ancient curse. And having surrounded himself with magical runes, occult masses are served there.
Congress of the National Socialist Party. Reich Minister Joseph Goebbels (center) talks with SS Reichsfuehrer Heinrich Himmler (left) and Admiral Wilhelm Canaris. Photo: TASS
Unfortunately, soon the "Black Order", as the SS is now called, will receive absolute power. Only one "Night of the Long Knives" separates Himmler from the complete triumph. Historian Andrei Martynov is trying to understand the background of the events of June 30, 1934, which will go down in history as the "Night of the Long Knives".
"There were attempts on the part of the SA to arrest and, thereby, blackmail Hitler's supporters. And as a result, Hitler decides to liquidate the SA leadership, simply to physically destroy them," says Andrei Martynov.
In short, Hitler fears betrayal by the SA, the National Socialist assault forces. Therefore, SS officers who are subordinate to Himmler and personally to Hitler are sent to crack down on political rivals. This massacre will not do without the Gestapo, in connection with which Lehmann was summoned to the villa of his boss Goering.
"Not that Goering invited him and said:" Willy, you know, now we will kill these stormtroopers ... "No, Goering talked with a lot of people, including a group of police officers, where he was, but he was not the main one among them, he stood somewhere near the door and wondered how he got here, "says Alexander Kolpakidi.
During the "Night of Long Knives", the Nazis kill over a thousand of their compatriots. Among them there are quite a few who fell under the hot hand by accident. For his help in organizing this operation, Gestapo chief Goering submits his police to Himmler.
"Goering did not really go into the affairs of his police, he only headed it. And as a result of" Night of Long Knives "he gave it up altogether. That is, it was one of the prices he paid Himmler for his cooperation in the preparation of" Night of Long Knives " , - explains Konstantin Zalessky.
Not only is the madman Himmler now in charge of the Gestapo's punitive machine, Hitler will not remain in debt for the bloody work done by the SS. He elevates the SS to the rank of an independent organization. From now on, Himmler's Black Order receives endless possibilities. And part of the blame for this lies with him, Willie Lehmane.
“That's when he just stained himself with blood, he was accepted into the party, he became a real SS man, a real Gestapo from the point of view of those who tested him for their bestial loyalty. And maybe this somehow helped Lehman to avoid suspicion, to avoid some unpleasant checks, "Nikolai Dolgopolov thinks.
Meeting of the Presidium of the NSDAP in Munich in 1928. On the podium: Alfred Rosenberg (second from left), Adolf Hitler (center), Heinrich Himmler (far right). Photo: TASS
Massacre reward
For his participation in the massacre, Himmler personally awards Lehman with a silver ring with ancient magical runes. It is received by the most dedicated members of the SS. After their death, all the rings return to Himmler, and he performs his rituals on them, as if he dreams of taking possession of the souls of his subordinates. And it is possible that after these events the pragmatic Willie took a completely different view of his work with Soviet intelligence.
"Even members of the same National Socialist Party and other pro-Nazi structures in their hearts, in general, doubted and were non-conformists, and took part in the same anti-Hitler resistance. For Lehman, cooperation with Soviet intelligence was a form of his resistance," says Oleg Khlobustov.
In the 35th year, Lehman is engaged in counterintelligence at German military factories. Breitenbach without looking back sends to Moscow information about new submarines, the construction of a plant for the production of chemical warfare agents. He conveys descriptions of new types of artillery pieces, armored vehicles, mortars.
"The amount transferred to them is calculated by suitcases, let's say. And the most interesting thing is that Lehman transferred data on 14 types of new weapons. It's hard for me to say what was most useful, but I can still make an assumption: Lehman realized what he had in the country, somewhere behind his back, the most valuable and absolutely new, unprecedented missile weapons are being manufactured, "says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
Fate gives Willie, and hence the Soviet intelligence, another gift. On a denunciation by the Gestapo, he arrested the military engineer Werner von Braun. Lehman decides to help him, and at the same time use his knowledge to his advantage.
"The Gestapo arrested a German engineer directly involved in missile issues. Lehman decided to save him, that is, save his life, release him, let him return to his professional activity, using him as an informant or pretending that he is using him as an informant," says Oleg Khlobustov.
We are talking about the development of the world's first rockets, in fact, future ballistic missiles. Thanks to Willie Lehman, their drawings will be put on the table of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense in the mid-30s.
“It turns out that their development began only in the middle of 35. And even then, in 35, Voroshilov knew about it. Did the People's Commissar of Defense undertake something in order to do something similar at home? and yes, because, as it is believed, work has begun on our Katyushas, \u200b\u200b”says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
How does Lehman do it? Has no one ever suspected him? Willie knows his job well: he deftly escapes surveillance, never risks in vain.
"He was a professional. And since he worked in the secret police, he knew the methodology of the counterintelligence, how to get away from it. But I will say this: in the pre-war years, our agents generally held up very well, there were no failures," says Leonid Mlechin ...
Good man and joker from the Gestapo
Despite his work in the Gestapo, Lehman is reputed to be good-natured and joker. After all, he doesn't conduct interrogations in basements. His abode is a dusty filing cabinet. Uncle Willie is in good standing for everyone - an elderly man who honestly earns his bread.
Well, who would dare to pick on this? But if Willie is so cunning, then where did he disappear so mysteriously back in 39? According to his dossier, it turns out that on the eve of the war, Lehman is mysteriously silent for a whole year. It turns out that he simply has no connection with Soviet intelligence.
“Part of the Soviet foreign intelligence, as well as the military intelligence, was exterminated. First, People's Commissar Yagoda took over the case, then the Iron People's Commissar and executioner Yezhov, who replaced him, completed Beria's business to a lesser extent, because he had no one to take on and no one to clean up. However, it turned out that, unfortunately, Leman was left without contact. There was no one in the embassy who would contact him, "says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
But then amazing things happen. In June 1941, a mysterious letter was found in the mailbox of the Soviet diplomatic mission in Berlin. The author of the message calls himself a valuable agent of Moscow and asks to resume communication. In Moscow, they are perplexed who it might be and, finally, they come to the conclusion: Agent Breitenbach.
“He went to the Soviet embassy, \u200b\u200bby the way, it is not clear how his letter ended up in the mail of the Soviet embassy, \u200b\u200bit ended up in the NKVD, after which they renewed contact with him. I think, on the one hand, this suggests that he was very careful that the Germans did not detect it in any way, the German counterintelligence ", - says Alexander Kolpakidi.
What happened during the time Willie was left without communication? Willie decides to leave the Gestapo. His wife inherited a hotel, and they no longer need money. But something stops Willie. He's almost 60, but what did he do? Throwing people in jail? Carrying out the orders of the mad Himmler? And Lehman writes a letter that will mysteriously end up in the box of the Soviet embassy.
“And since he had a position of active rejection of fascism, he was already looking for the possibility of renewing this connection, purely professionally realizing that he could be useful, that it worked for the good of Germany, as he believed,” says Oleg Khlobustov.
Needless to say, this is a very risky step. And then one day, returning from work, Lehman notices himself being followed. Willie decides to come up and give the password needed to contact the Soviet agent. This person turns out to be Russian intelligence officer Alexander Korotkov.
"Korotkov spoke German, he was charming, young, energetic. And this man by the name of Stepanov was sent to an exhibition in Berlin, and in 1940 he managed to completely unexpectedly even for himself re-establish contact with Lehman," says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
But Korotkov is forced to leave Berlin. Then the Center decides on an adventure. From now on, Breitenbach will keep in touch with the embassy staff.
“People from legal intelligence worked directly with him. The last was Zhuravlev, who met him directly, and there was no illegal between them. That is, I must say that over the years his value increased, and the caution that Moscow showed in working with him , for some unknown reason, decreased. This, as a result, killed him, "says Alexander Kolpakidi.
Combat readiness
On June 19, 1941, Lehman informs Zhuravlev about the war, which will begin on the morning of the 22nd. The Gestapo departments are already on full alert.
"A war with any country is a whole complex of measures. Naturally, the Gestapo, which, by the way, had a branch in the form of the so-called secret field police, naturally, was also preparing to act in the future Soviet occupied territories. And naturally, sooner or later the highest the command staff of these services had to be focused on what is already tomorrow, "- said the historian Mikhail Meltyukhov.
But will Lehman be believed in distant Moscow? The events of June 41st are of main scientific interest for Mikhail Meltyukhov, Doctor of Historical Sciences. According to him, the day before Lehman's meeting with Zhuravlev, Hitler's order to start a war with the USSR was communicated to all the Wehrmacht troops.
"The German command is bringing the order to the attention of the command staff of its units. As I understand it, it is similar to what was later done in the Gestapo. That is, it is clear why he found out at that time," says Mikhail Meltyukhov.
1941 Photo: TASS / Valeria Khristoforova and Boris Kavashkin
Soon Lehman will be left without communication again. The Soviet diplomatic mission will leave Berlin simultaneously with the explosion of the first shell of the Great Patriotic War.
“And again, returning to the last meeting with Breitenbach, he felt that he was a very depressed person, in the end he shook hands with our scout, said:“ Take courage, comrade, hold on. ”The word“ comrade ”was first heard from him he actually chose the side on which he will stand, ”says Oleg Khlobustov.
From now on, it will be possible to contact Lehman only through illegal agents. In 1942, on the instructions of the Intelligence Directorate, two Soviet agents secretly arrive in Berlin. These are German anti-fascists Albert Hesler and Robert Barth.
They must get in touch with the underground resistance movement, and at the same time renew contact with Lehman. Suddenly, Robert Barth learns that his wife is in one of the Berlin clinics. Anxiety for a loved one makes him forget about caution. Meanwhile, dozens of eyes are watching his wife.
"All the wives of prisoners, whether soldiers were killed or missing, it doesn't matter, and the wives of just soldiers who were at the front, they were in the system of a very large, complicated system of social care, that is, an infinite number of organizations took care of them", - explains Konstantin Zalessky.
Bart, who at one time deserted from the front and went over to the side of the Red Army, cannot fail to know this. He will be arrested as soon as he crosses the threshold of the hospital ward. Unfortunately, Robert knows about Lehman. Breitenbach's life hangs in the balance. But what if Willie felt that something was wrong and still managed to escape?
Nikolai Dolgopolov made an incredible discovery. It turns out that Lehman had a fake passport, which he could use in case of danger. Moreover, Dolgopolov personally knew the person who prepared these documents.
"Here I want to appeal to the blessed memory of my kind, good friend Pavel Gromushkin. This man, perhaps, is not so well known to a wide circle of readers and viewers, but to people of a narrow circle he is very well known. Pavel Anatolyevich was the best manufacturer of passports and documents. Pavel Gromushkin prepared any, everything and every scout who went somewhere far away. And this Pavel Gromushkin made passports for the unknown Willie Lehman, of course, in other names, "says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
The end of the fighter
But did Breitenbach really run away, leaving his wife to fend for themselves? At the end of the war, documents are found in the ruins of the Gestapo headquarters, which refer to Lehman's arrest. Its reasons are not specified. But how did the Gestapo manage to expose the Soviet agent? Here Willie's fate turns out to be closely intertwined with the fate of the anti-fascists Hesler and Bart, who were tasked with renewing contact with a valuable agent.
"If Khesler survived, I don't understand how, all the torture, all the bullying, all the torment and never said a word, then the second parachutist, the second person sent to contact the Red Capella, could not stand it," says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
The Gestapo threatens the wife and child of Robert Barth, and he agrees to start a radio game with Moscow. However, Lehman can still be saved. With the first radio broadcast, Bart sends a secret signal that he is working under pressure. But Moscow for some reason does not accept him. And in a response radiogram, the Gestapo receives a password for communication with Lehman.
“According to him, he reported on a radio station to Moscow that he was working under the control of the enemy, that is, he cannot be fully trusted, with him you can only play an operational game beneficial to Soviet intelligence. But Moscow, unfortunately, did not understand this signal and did not attach any importance to this. After that, the conditions of communication with Breitenbach were transferred to him, "says Oleg Khlobustov.
Russian Foreign Intelligence Service literary prize winner Nikolai Dolgopolov at the presentation of his book "Abel - Fisher" from the "ZhZL" series. Photo: TASS / Stanislav Krasilnikov
So what happened to Willie? On the night of Christmas Eve 1942, under pressure from the Gestapo, Bart gets in touch with Lehman and invites him to a meeting. He tells his wife that he was called to the service, and meets with Robert. They exchange passwords, and at the same second Breitenbach is arrested.
"This is called a provocation, but in this case the Gestapo was not a judicial body. It was not going to take Lehman's case to court, and therefore there was no need for evidence," explains Konstantin Zalessky.
What were the last days and minutes of Willie Lehman's life? We will never know. Fearing losing his position, the new chief of the Gestapo, Heinrich Müller, destroys all documents related to Willie. But it is not difficult to guess how the valuable Soviet agent died. He will spend his final days in Pletzensee Prison, an infamous death row.
“He knew perfectly well that there was no way out of the Ploetzensee prison. It was a death row, and the only thing that could, say, save him, was, perhaps, a heart attack, an attempt to force the people who interrogate him to use weapons, because he would die the bullet was still better, "says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
Whether Breitenbach managed to summon a bullet on himself remains to be hoped. Most of the prisoners ended their lives on a rack. Their ashes were buried in the prison yard.
After 18 years, a man will call Margaret Lehman's apartment. He will give Lehman's widow a gold watch with the inscription "From Soviet Friends". Willie himself received another award - the memory of him as a man who challenged the Gestapo.
Wilhelm Lehmann is a man who for 12 years opposed all German counterintelligence.
Photo courtesy of the author
In mid-June 1945, when the ruins of Berlin were still smoking, a handsome young man called Margaret Lehman's modest apartment. When she heard the call, she opened the door. The stranger, who identified himself as Alexander Erdberg, asked if he could talk to his friend Willie, whom they had met before the war, but then parted ways. In response, Margaret burst into tears. Coping with the excitement, she said that her husband had died in December 1942. Only an urn with ashes and personal belongings remained from him. She does not know any details of her husband's death.
The visitor, who spoke German with a pleasant Austrian accent, was the Soviet foreign intelligence resident in Germany, Alexander Korotkov, who worked in Berlin in the early 1940s. Immediately after the end of the war, on behalf of the leadership, he took vigorous measures to establish the fate of valuable and reliable agents of the NKVD, contact with whom was lost during the war years. One such source was Breitenbach - since the creation in April 1933 of the secret German state police (Gestapo), he was an employee of this institution. His real name was Wilhelm Lehmann.
POLICE OFFICER KAISER
In 1884, in the family of a humble school teacher Gustav Lehmann, who lived in the suburbs of Leipzig, a son was born, who at baptism was named Wilhelm in honor of the heir to the throne, the future emperor of Germany Wilhelm II.
Willie's father, like thousands of his other brothers in the profession, was not a wealthy man and could not give his son a proper education. After graduating from school, Willie began to study as a carpenter. When the young man was 17 years old, he volunteered for the German Navy, where he served for a total of 12 years. On board a warship of a German squadron, in May 1905, he observed a Russian-Japanese naval battle near the island of Tsushima, in which Russian sailors showed courage and heroism in the fight against superior enemy forces. The courage of the Russian sailors made an indelible impression on Willie. Since then, he has developed a deep respect for Russia and for Russians in general.
Demobilized from the army in 1913, Willie came to Berlin. He settled in a cheap boarding house and began attending meetings of the "Union of Africans", which included participants in the German colonial wars on the African continent. The cruiser Stein, on which Lehmann served, supported the operations of the German ground forces in Africa. At one such meeting, Willie met his old friend Ernst Kür, who by that time was working for the Berlin secret political police. Under his patronage, Lehman was recruited into the police in 1913 as a patrol policeman. A year later, he was enrolled in the counterintelligence department (abwehr) of the police presidium of the city of Berlin as an assistant to the head of the office. Since Lehman was an employee of the secret political police, he was not drafted into the active army.
In May 1918, the Plenipotentiary Representation of the RSFSR was opened in Berlin, whose employees were monitored by Lehmann's counterintelligence department. The October Revolution of 1917 enjoyed sympathy in Germany, so the employees of this department did not show much zeal in spying on the "red diplomats".
On November 4, 1918, a revolution broke out in Germany, overthrowing Kaiser Wilhelm II from the throne. It began with an uprising of sailors in Kiel. The Berlin police were seized by the euphoria of freedom. A committee of police officers was spontaneously formed, and Willie Lehman became the chairman of the general meeting as a former naval sailor. He was entrusted with the affairs of the German fleet. During this period, he became friends with the chairman of the Council of Soldiers and Sailors' Deputies Otto Strubel, with whom they once served on the same ship.
In April 1920, the German authorities recreated the secret political police, and Lehmann and Chur returned to their counterintelligence department. For further growth in the service, Lehman had to pass the "rank exam", and he, along with other employees of the department, began to intensively prepare for it. However, an acute attack of diabetes confined Willie to bed, and the exam was postponed. Paying tribute to the experience and organizational skills of Lehmann, the leadership of the police presidium appointed him acting head of the office of the department, which was engaged in surveillance of foreign diplomatic missions. Here, through the hands of Lehman passed all the correspondence regarding the intelligence activities of foreign missions. In essence, he was in charge of the counterintelligence department of the Berlin policeman presidium.
In 1927, Wilhelm Abdt, an experienced military intelligence officer who spoke Russian and Polish, was appointed head of the department. Willie Lehman realized that he had no chance of getting a promotion, so he chose a quiet place for work in the office's filing cabinet, which concentrated all information on employees of foreign embassies, who for one reason or another came to the attention of the police presidium of Berlin.
OPERATIONAL PSEUDONY BRITENBACH
Over the years of work in the secret political police in Germany, Willy Lehmann became disillusioned with the politics of the country's ruling elite. He carefully studied the materials contained in it on the Soviet representatives in Germany and came to the conclusion that in their pure form they were not engaged in any subversive activities against his country. And Lehman decided to offer his services to Soviet foreign intelligence.
It should be noted that Willie Lehman did not immediately decide on this step. Initially, in March 1929, at his suggestion, Ernst Kur, who was unemployed by that time, but did not lose some connections in the Berlin police, visited the Soviet embassy. After a conversation with Kur of one of the staff of the INO OGPU station, the Center came to the conclusion that it was advisable to recruit him on a material basis. The newly minted agent was assigned the operational index A-70. It was planned to use it to collect information about persons who came into the field of view of Soviet intelligence. Monthly A-70 was paid a monetary remuneration depending on the quality of information.
However, in order to find answers to the questions of his curator about persons of interest to Soviet intelligence, Kur increasingly began to resort to the services of Lehman, whom this state of affairs began to weigh more and more. In addition, having received a reward from Soviet friends, Ernst loved to arrange revels in a restaurant, waste money, and treat everyone. Places like this were full of police informers who might be interested in where the unemployed got such a lot of money and put them under surveillance. This would inevitably lead the Berlin criminal police to Willie himself, and he decided to independently establish contact with Soviet representatives. In turn, Kur's contact with Lehman also interested the INO residency.
OGPU in Berlin. The center decided to go directly to Lehman and find out the possibility of attracting him to work with Soviet intelligence.
The Berlin station assigned Willy Lehmann the operational index A-201 and began its active development.
On September 7, 1929, the head of Soviet foreign intelligence, Meer Abramovich Trilisser, sent an encrypted telegram to the Berlin residency, in which, in particular, he indicated:
“We are very interested in your new source A-201. Our only concern is that you have climbed into one of the most dangerous places, where the slightest carelessness on the part of the A-201 or A-70 can lead to numerous troubles. We consider it necessary to study the issue of special conditions for communication with the A-201 ”.
These recommendations of the Center were accepted for immediate implementation by the Berlin station. Willie Lehmann, who received the operational pseudonym Breitenbach, was transferred to the illegal station, headed by illegal intelligence officer Erich Takke.
IMPORTANT SOURCE OF INFORMATION
Since 1930, the tasks of Lehmann-Breitenbach in working in the counterintelligence unit of the policeman-presidium of Berlin included the development of personnel of the USSR Embassy and the fight against Soviet economic intelligence in the country. The information received from the agent allowed the INO OGPU residency to be aware of the plans of the German counterintelligence and take measures to prevent the failures of the operatives and the sources in their possession.
In order to improve the quality of conspiracy in work with Breitenbach, at the beginning of 1931, the Center decided to involve another illegal intelligence agent, Karl Scilly, who had extensive experience in underground work, in the leadership of the agent. Considering the importance of the source and the information received from it, in the future it was planned to transfer it for communication to an experienced illegal intelligence agent Vasily Zarubin, who was working in France at that time and had to specially move to Germany. To exclude the possibility of failure of the source, a decision is made to take Ernst Kure away from him and use the agent on his own. Later, when Breitenbach “began working for the Gestapo, his friend was transferred to Sweden, where, with the funds of Soviet intelligence, he maintained a small store that served as a“ mailbox ”for the European OGPU residencies.
The situation in Germany was becoming more complicated. The Nazis were openly eager for power. Breitenbach was familiar with many prominent bosses of the Nazi party, including the leader of its assault troops, Ernst Rohm. After Hitler came to power in February 1933, Breitenbach, on the recommendation of Hermann Goering, then Prime Minister of the Prussian government, was transferred to work in the Gestapo. In May 1934 he joined the SS. On June 30 of the same year, as Goering's confidant, Breitenbach took part in Operation Night of the Long Knives to eliminate Ernst Rohm and other leaders of the stormtroopers.
In 1935, on the initiative of Goering, the Gestapo began to purge "unreliable elements." Lehmann, who was reminded of his connection with Otto Streubel, also fell under suspicion. However, thanks to his good performance, the scout managed to retain his post. (In addition, by that time Streubel had switched to the position of Nazism and was Goebbels' deputy in the Ministry of Propaganda.)
Old cadres of the political police were dismissed from the Gestapo. The Nazis believed that they were all infected with the "spirit of liberalism" of the Weimar Republic. Breitenbach, according to the Nazis, also belonged to the "old guard". However, he was left in the Gestapo, since he did not hold leading positions in the criminal police, for many years he worked against Soviet institutions in Germany, which was equated by the leadership with the fight against communism. In addition, his colleagues respected him for his experience and calm disposition.
As a result of the purges of the Prussian police organs, the entire secret police of the country, including the Gestapo, were brought under the control of Himmler. Departments of the political police in the German states, including the secret political police of Prussia, were merged into a single secret police of the Third Reich, headed by Reinhard Heydrich, who was also the head of the Security Service (SD) of the Nazi party. With him to Berlin, he took from Munich about 40 of the most qualified criminologists.
On the initiative of Heydrich, the leading department in the Gestapo became the second department, which was engaged in the fight against the "internal enemies" of the Reich, which he himself headed. Breitenbach worked in the third, counterintelligence, department.
In December 1933, Breitenbach was contacted by Vasily Zarubin, who came to Germany specially for this on an American passport as a representative of one of the American film companies. Zarubin established permanent contact with Breitenbach in July 1934. From the agent, detailed information was received about the structure and personnel of the IV Directorate of the RSHA (Directorate of Imperial Security), its operations, the activities of the Gestapo and the Abwehr (military intelligence), military construction in Germany, Hitler's plans and intentions with respect to neighboring countries. Such information was of particular interest at that time.
A new important stage in his work with Lehmann was his transfer to the Gestapo department, which was in charge of counterintelligence support for the defense industry and the military development of Germany. In time, this coincided with the creation and the first tests of rockets by the German scientist Wernher von Braun, which took place in 1934 near Berlin. It was thanks to Lehmann-Breitenbach in Moscow that they learned about the launches of the Max and Moritz missiles, on the basis of which the long-range V-1 and V-2 missiles were later created.
At the end of 1935, Breitenbach personally attended the test of the first German V-1 liquid fuel rocket at the Peenemünde test site. By the way, already in 1940, missiles of this class were used to bombard British territory. Breitenbach drew up a detailed report on the missile tests and submitted its description to the station. On the basis of this information, Soviet foreign intelligence prepared an analysis of the state of rocketry in Germany on December 17, 1935 for a report to Stalin and the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov.
In addition to questions related to rocketry, the information received from Breitenbach during this period concerned, in particular, the programs of the Nazis for the construction of submarines and armored vehicles, as well as data on the release of new gas masks and the production of synthetic gasoline.
Of course, illegal Zarubin had other sources of information. However, Willie Lehman remained the most important link in his illegal network. Over the course of 12 long years of active cooperation with Soviet intelligence, he risked his life and reported to the Moscow Center extremely valuable information about the development and strengthening of the fascist regime, about its large-scale preparations for establishing world domination, about the active build-up of military potential and the latest technical developments. Important information about the structure of the German special services, their personnel, and methods of work also became the property of Soviet intelligence.
Breitenbach was the "shield" of Soviet intelligence in Germany. All the actions of the Gestapo, possible arrests and provocations against Soviet representatives, "legal" and illegal intelligence officers, he timely warned the Soviet intelligence, which during all this time did not know failure. He regularly informed Zarubin about all changes in the operational situation in the country, planned political actions, behind-the-scenes struggle in the Nazi elite.
It should be emphasized that Breitenbach not only warned Soviet intelligence about the planned provocations of the Gestapo. Using his capabilities in this institution, he sought to draw the attention of the residency to the activities of the Polish special services in Germany. In 1934, the Gestapo arrested a prominent Polish intelligence officer, Jurek von Sosnowski, who was actively involved in recruiting work in the most important departments of the Third Reich. So, Sosnovsky managed to recruit a cipher officer of the General Staff, as well as a typist from the personal office of Alfred Rosenberg, the ideologue of Nazism and the future Reich Minister for the Eastern Territories. He also had his own people at the General Directorate of Imperial Security. Later, while on a business trip in Moscow, Sosnovsky was recruited by Soviet intelligence.
It should be noted that security issues in working with Breitenbach were constantly in the center of attention of both the station and Moscow. At Zarubin's request, the Center prepared a passport for the source in a false name, into which his photograph was pasted. In case of a danger, a detailed scheme of his departure outside Germany was worked out with the agent. Simultaneously, conditional signals were introduced to notify the station in case the Gestapo prepared a sudden raid on the Soviet embassy or planned the arrest of one of its employees.
The center also demanded that the illegal residency observe maximum caution when organizing communication with the source. This was caused both by the general aggravation of the situation in the country in connection with the occupation of the Rhineland by Hitler, and by the deterioration in the health of Breitenbach himself, who suffered from acute renal colic due to diabetes. Sometimes attacks of the disease even led to loss of consciousness. The Center responded to Zarubin's message about Breitenbach's serious illness with an urgent cipher telegram. It emphasized that if the treatment requires a lot of money, it is necessary to help the source financially, having previously worked with him the legend of receiving money. Breitenbach's well-known hobby for racing helped. Once at the hippodrome, after another race, Breitenbach announced in his entourage about a rather large win. At the same time, in a conversation with his acquaintances, he stressed that now he can afford to see an expensive doctor. The further development of the disease was prevented, and Breitenbach's relationship with the scout became even more trusting. However, Breitenbach faced new challenges ahead.
In 1936, our source was summoned for interrogation by the Gestapo and began to inquire about his connections in the Soviet trade mission. Breitenbach replied that by the nature of his service he was only concerned with the affairs of the Soviet embassy, \u200b\u200bhad nothing to do with the trade mission, and knew no one in it. In the course of further proceedings, it turned out that it was about the agent's namesake, who was slandered on the basis of jealousy by his mistress. She was arrested by the Gestapo. All suspicions about Breitenbach fell away after her intense interrogation.
Communicating with leading members of the Gestapo, Breitenbach was able to draw up and transmit to Zarubin detailed descriptions of Heinrich Müller, Walter Schellenberg, Heinrich Himmler, Reinhard Heydrich and other leaders of the German special services. And the following fact speaks about the trust in the agent on the part of the Nazi leadership: on the occasion of the New Year 1937, Lehman received, in a solemn ceremony, among the four best Gestapo officers, a portrait of Adolf Hitler with his autograph in a silver frame.
In the summer of 1936, Breitenbach was also instructed by the leadership of the Gestapo to provide counterintelligence support for a number of additional areas of the country's military industry. From the source, important information began to flow regarding the development of the German military industry: the laying of more than seven dozen submarines of various classes at its shipyards at once and the creation of a classified plant for the production of chemical warfare agents. The agent gave Zarubin a copy of the secret instructions, which listed 14 types of the latest weapons that were in the manufacturing or design stage. He also obtained a copy of the secret report "On the organization of the national defense of Germany." All these materials allowed the Soviet leadership to objectively assess the striking power of the Wehrmacht.
ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATION
In 1937, Zarubin's collaboration with Breitenbach ended. Repressions against the Chekists began in the USSR. By order of the People's Commissar for State Security Yezhov, the operative was recalled to Moscow. Before leaving, Zarubin instructed the agent to keep in touch with the Center. Fortunately, the operative escaped reprisals and later successfully worked in the United States and at the Center, and became generals. But he never returned to Berlin.
The bacchanalia of repression against cadre intelligence officers practically paralyzed all the activities of Soviet intelligence in the late 1930s. This was reflected in the work with Breitenbach. By that time, the only employee remained in the Berlin "legal" residency - Alexander Agayants, who, despite the enormous workload, began to meet with the source. Left without an experienced curator, Breitenbach acted at his own peril and risk, obtaining information that, in his opinion, could be of interest to Soviet intelligence. In one of the letters to the Center, the agent wrote: “I have no cause for concern. I'm sure friends know that everything is done in good faith, everything that can be done. So far, there is no particular urgency in coming to me. If necessary, I will let you know.
However, Breitenbach's enthusiasm gradually began to fade. Hitler was preparing the Anschluss of Austria, the next step was the "Munich Agreement" to dismember Czechoslovakia. Breitenbach had top secret, proactive information on this score, which, undoubtedly, could be of primary interest to the Soviet leadership. Nevertheless, in such a dramatic period in history, he was left practically without contact with Soviet intelligence. By that time, he collaborated with her for ideological reasons. The material side of the matter was of little interest to him, since his wife Margaret inherited a hotel that brought a good income. Of course, he did not refuse material remuneration, because, like any German, he believed that all work should be paid. But this was not the main thing in his cooperation with Soviet intelligence. Working in the Gestapo and having access to the highest secrets of the Reich in his service, Breitenbach saw where the Hitlerite leadership, which was preparing a new world war, could lead the German people.
At the end of November 1938, the last meeting of Agayants with Breitenbach took place. In early December, the operative was hospitalized and soon died in hospital during surgery.
Breitenbach was left without contact with the Center. Concerned about this state of affairs, in June 1940 he dropped a letter into the mailbox of the Soviet embassy, \u200b\u200baddressed to the "military attaché or his deputy." In the letter, the agent offered to immediately restore operational communication with him. "If this does not happen," he wrote, "then my work in the Gestapo will lose all meaning." However, the pause continued until September, when Alexander Korotkov, who had arrived shortly before that in Berlin as a deputy resident of the NKVD, met with the source.
On September 9, 1940, the residency received an instruction from the people's commissar Beria personally, in which it was emphasized: “Breitenbach should not be given any special assignments. For now, it is necessary to take everything that is within his immediate capabilities, and, in addition, everything that he will know about the work of various intelligence services against the USSR, in the form of documents and personal reports of the source. " The direct curator of the source was a young resident officer Boris Zhuravlev, who had recently arrived in Berlin after graduating from the Special Purpose School, which trained personnel for intelligence.
Having received the materials from the source, he photographed them and returned them the next morning, before the agent left for duty. From Breitenbach began to receive a large number of materials testifying to the preparation of Germany for the war against the Soviet Union. So, in March 1941, he reported that the Abwehr urgently expanded the unit engaged in intelligence work against the USSR. It was named "General Command III - Berlin". The head of this unit personally selected candidates for the vacancies.
At a meeting on May 28, the agent informed Zhuravlev that he was ordered to urgently draw up a schedule for round-the-clock duty of his unit's employees. And on June 19, having summoned the operative to an emergency meeting, Breitenbach said that the Gestapo had received the text of Hitler's secret order to German troops stationed along the Soviet border. It prescribed to start military operations against the USSR after 3 am on June 22nd.
On the morning of June 22, 1941, the building of the Soviet embassy on Unter den Linden in the center of Berlin was blocked by the Gestapo. The connection with Willie Lehman was lost forever.
TRAGIC FINAL
At the end of the war, Alexander Korotkov was appointed a resident of the NKVD in Germany. The intelligence officials were tasked with investigating the fate of its pre-war sources, including active members of the Red Chapel anti-fascist organization, who were heroically killed at the hands of Hitler's executioners, by the intelligence officials.
While examining documents in the ruins of the Gestapo headquarters at 8 Prinz-Albrechtstrasse, one of the officers discovered a charred account card for Wilhelm Lehmann, which was marked with a note that he had been arrested by the Gestapo in December 1942. The reasons for the arrest were not specified. This registration card, along with other trophy documents, was sent to the Center. It was quickly established in Moscow that the executed Gestapo officer was an NKVD agent Breitenbach.
Subsequently, Soviet foreign intelligence was able to restore the picture of the death of one of its most valuable sources. Here is how it was.
In May 1942, to restore communication with Breitenbach and continue working with him, Soviet intelligence agent Beck (German communist Robert Barth, who voluntarily surrendered to Soviet captivity) was abandoned in Berlin. The Gestapo soon followed Beck's trail and arrested him. During interrogation under torture, Beck gave the Gestapo the conditions for an appearance with Breitenbach and the information he knew about him. The Gestapo reported the betrayal in their own house to their boss Heinrich Müller. On Christmas Eve 1942, Breitenbach was urgently called into service, from where he never returned.
The Gestapo carried out his arrest and liquidation secretly in order to avoid a public scandal: that a Soviet agent had worked in the Gestapo for many years, Himmler and Müller did not dare to report to Hitler. In the official Gestapo bulletin was placed a notice that "the criminal inspector Willie Lehmann in December 1942 gave his life for the Fuhrer and the Reich." So tragically died one of the best agents of Soviet intelligence, who for many years, selflessly, at a huge risk to his life, honestly informed us about the war prepared by the Nazis against our country.
Willie Lehman was not a communist, but he sympathized with Russia and its people. His life, his contribution to the common Victory over fascism deserve recognition and grateful memory.