The Russian Federation reflects the events of January 1995 on the territory of the Chechen Republic in its capital Grozny. The plan to storm the capital, in which the Dudayevites were concentrated, was developed in a hurry, but this did not bother the military officials. The well-known phrase of Pavel Grachev that Grozny could be captured in two hours was refuted by two months of bloody battles.
Four groups were supposed to enter Grozny under the code names "North", "West", "East" and "North-East". As the chief of staff of the North Caucasus Military District Potapov said in his report, the conduct of long battles for Grozny is not expected. The plan, developed literally a few days before the outbreak of hostilities, had many significant flaws, and the commanders of the groups, consisting of a huge number of new recruits with no relevant experience, unanimously argued that the assault should be postponed for additional preparation. The main miscalculation of the strategists was the almost complete disregard for the ability of the Dudayevites to repulse the federal troops. Nevertheless, the groupings included a small number of assault detachments, consisting mainly of battalions of paratroopers or motorized rifle troops, reinforced by a tank company or anti-aircraft guns. The plan did not contain any indications of the resistance of the militants in the form of fire impact, and the command was strictly forbidden to occupy residential buildings and open fire on them. The Dudayevites dispersed in such buildings. The group was given a goal: to take administrative buildings, including the Presidential Palace and the government building, radio, and the railway station. However, the maps issued the day before by far not everyone turned out to be outdated, and the aerial photography was of poor quality. The assault squads were intended to blockade the neighborhoods and organize safe corridors along which the main force was to follow.
The Western grouping under the command of Major General Valery Petruk was supposed to go to the railway station, and after the building was occupied by federal troops, go to the Presidential Palace and block it from the south. During the assault, the tasks were transferred to the "North" unit. The western group consisted of 6 thousand people, 75 guns, 43 tanks, 50 BMD and 160 BMP. Federal troops "Zapad" entered Grozny at 7:30 am, but during the operation the task of taking the station was canceled, and the forces were sent to the Presidential Palace. Until 12 noon, the Dudayevites did not offer resistance, as subsequent events showed not by chance. Aslan Maskhadov's plan was to pass and block federal forces in the city center. Each of the columns came under heavy fire, snipers worked professionally. The Dudayevites tried to block the escape routes in order to destroy the attackers completely.
At about 2 pm the 693rd SME was suddenly attacked, the column stood near the city market, and a fierce battle ensued. By 18 o'clock the motorized rifles tried to retreat, but were taken into a tight ring near Lenin Park, radio communication with them was lost. In the Andreevskaya Valley, militants opened fire on the consolidated 76th PDP and 21st Airborne Brigade. Unprepared for such a fierce resistance, the western parts were forced to gain a foothold in the southern regions of the city by 13 o'clock and go on the defensive. The group's offensive plan was completely thwarted.
"North" under the command of Major General Pulikovsky consisted of 4,100 people, had 210 infantry fighting vehicles, 80 tanks, as well as 65 mortars and guns. According to the plan of the assault, its main task was to prevent the approach of reinforcements to the militants from Katayama, as well as advance along the designated strip of the city and blockade the Presidential Palace from the northern part. The group entered the city from its direction at exactly 6 o'clock in the morning. The soldiers were greeted with frightening inscriptions: "Welcome to HELL!", Which was not far from the truth. 81 SMR and 131 OMRB moved almost unhindered to the railway station, where they settled down without considering a possible attack. As a result, the enemy managed to concentrate more than 3 thousand people at this point and encircle the federal troops. The battle began at 7 pm and lasted all night. The station was not commissioned, but at the end of the defense, only eight people remained in the building. Part of the detachment tried to break through along the railway, but was almost completely destroyed by the militants.
The northeastern group, which consisted of 2,200 troops, 125 armored vehicles and 7 tanks, 25 guns, and mortars, was led by Lieutenant General Rokhlin. According to the plan, the group was supposed to advance along the Petropavlovskoe highway, but the reconnaissance literally one day before the start of the assault informed Rokhlin that the road was mined with land mines, so the route was changed. In order to mislead the Dudayevites, it was decided to imitate an offensive along the highway, and throw the main forces on a bypass road. As early as December 30, the 33rd SME, under the leadership of Colonel Vereshchagin, occupied the bridge on the Neftyanka River, drawing off a significant part of the Dudayevites. The main offensive began at 6:30 am, by 9 o'clock the 33rd SMP reached the cannery, providing a safe corridor for the advance of the assault companies. By 10.00, the city cemetery was taken, occupied by militants who did not expect an artillery strike on the shrine.
Kornienko's assault group occupied the cannery and left some of the people to defend it. The main forces moved deeper into Grozny. On Krugovaya and Mayakovskogo, the 255th connected to 81 mr. The task of the 68th orb was to take a position in the hospital complex. The hospital complex was located on Ordzhonikidze Square, in order to occupy his detachment had to break the resistance of the Dudayevites at the crossing of the Sunzha, and then wage a fierce battle on the square itself. As a result, the building was taken, and the detachment went on the defensive. During the battle, the northeastern group came under fire not only from Chechens, but also from other federal troops, there was no clear radio communication, sometimes it completely disappeared, and there were no accurate maps either.
Further, the grouping did not advance, since Rokhlin understood that further movements could deprive the forces entrusted to him of the relatively calm rear, reinforcements and supplies of food and ammunition. Soon, the militants still managed to encircle the troops of the northeastern group, but Rokhlin did not think to retreat, and communication with the rear remained. On January 7, the northern group also entered his command. Two days later, Rokhlin launched an offensive, as a result of which the city airport and the petrochemical plant were taken. Only by the 19th, after long battles, did they manage to occupy the Presidential Palace. For more than two weeks of fighting, federal forces were able to capture only a little more than a third of the city, and the situation in some positions was characterized as very tense and unstable.
The eastern group was originally supposed to act under the command of Rokhlin, but a few days before the assault, Major General Stasko was appointed instead. There were no more than two days to prepare for the operation, and the group consisted of scattered detachments, most of which participated in hostilities for the first time. The task in this direction was as follows: to seize the eastern districts of the city along the borders of the Sunzha River and Leninsky Prospekt and, without setting up checkpoints, or setting them up in extremely important points, move to the Minutka Square. In fact, the Eastern Group was entrusted with the function of depicting the main attack of the federal troops on the city, it was supposed to cover the maximum territory and then leave Grozny.
The troops of "Vostok" moved out at 11 o'clock in the afternoon from the side of the Khankala airport. The movement was carried out in two columns, and their trajectory followed a bypass road. Having passed the suburbs, the assault troops were ambushed on a road bridge. The actions in the convoy were extremely poorly coordinated, communication was constantly interrupted. The fire impact on the convoy of militants caused panic and confusion, so the assault groups were for some time a target for the attackers. The main forces of the grouping were scattered, and Stasko decided to retreat, until January 2, the grouping "Vostok" did not enter the fighting.
Reinforcements were going to the groupings squeezed into a ring, which were successfully blocked by the Dudayevites, largely due to the lack of maps, and the inexperience of the drivers of armored vehicles also played a role. The losses in the first days of the fighting were significant, the lightning-fast assault failed. However, the federal troops soon recovered and deployed not only defensive but also offensive activities. As a result, by February 6, the resistance of the Dudayevites was broken, and on the 26th of the same month, fighting on an organized scale ceased. On March 6, the last area of \u200b\u200bthe rebellious city, Chernorechye, was occupied.
Nevertheless, contrary to the forecasts of the Russian leadership, the war did not end there, the bloodshed continued for a long time. The militants used the tactics of guerrilla warfare, hiding in rugged mountainous terrain.
Paratroopers. The storming of Grozny 1995 in detail (Russia, Grozny) 1995
The video was apparently made by soldiers of the 76th Guards, Airborne Assault Division, but it is possible that the 98th, 104th or 106th as well.
It is well told about the formation of the column, how the paratroopers entered the city, the first battles, the events of the first days of the battles for Grozny.
The video recording is also unique in that for the first time several fighters participate in its creation at once - it is quite clear and intelligible telling what and how happened in early January 1995. In particular, battles in the area of \u200b\u200bthe railway station, battles for individual buildings, the movement of the column and other curious cases on the streets and on the outskirts of the city.
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Spotted Osh S bku Highlight text and press Ctrl + Enter
November 1994
I am a colonel, serving the Fatherland, interrupting with food rations and doing a private taxi on a "kopeck" bought for 200 dollars from a colleague who was in the Western Group of Forces. Every evening, after service - from 22.00 to 03.00. I am in the position of a senior officer of the educational work department of the Leningrad Military District, by virtue of my official duties dealing with personnel issues and studying the mood in the troops.
I have just returned from the Caucasus, where I was on a business trip as part of the Russian peacekeeping force to maintain peace and law and order in South Ossetia. The armed conflict was already abating, our units suffered practically no losses. Apparently, the combat training of the Soviet army affected, the actions were well-coordinated, and the platoons, companies and battalions were commanded by officers who passed Afghanistan.
The troops are openly expressing their dissatisfaction with the policies of Boris Yeltsin. Uniforms, foodstuffs, fuel and ammunition are stolen from army warehouses. Cases of attacks on sentries with the aim of seizing weapons have become more frequent. In many units and formations, officers stopped going into service, preferring to make a living from merchants. The armored vehicles remained motionless, the planes rose into the sky only for combat duty.
Under these conditions, in the 45th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, which was located in the village of Kamenka near St. Petersburg, on the basis of the 129th Motorized Rifle Regiment, a unit began to be formed to be sent to a future war in Chechnya. There is not enough human resources, the platoon-company link is being replenished from other parts of the Leningrad Military District. Only one trained full-time motorized rifle battalion is being recruited with difficulty. We need snipers, machine gunners, grenade launchers, drivers, but they are not.
Finally, the 129th rifle regiment with a separate tank battalion and artillery battalion attached to it was formed. The combat review of a unit ready to be sent to war is personally conducted by the commander of the Leningrad Military District, Colonel-General S.P. Seleznev, an experienced and talented military leader. He knows well what lies ahead for these soldiers and officers, does not utter loud words, only asks if they received everything according to the wartime norm. Two days later, the regiment departs for Chechnya. There is no more time to conduct combat coordination. They went to Afghanistan after training, and even in the Great Patriotic War, formed units were given a month to prepare for hostilities before being sent to the front line. And here ... yesterday the cook - today the grenade launcher. There is an order from the Supreme Commander. The soul is disgusting ...
KamAZ of the district song and dance ensemble of Leningrad Military District, by order of the educational work department, travels around small businessmen, collecting donations to collect parcels to the Caucasus.
December 1994
The headquarters created an operational group of the center of combat control of the Leningrad Military District units located in the combat zone in Chechnya. Composition of the group
12 people, divided into three shifts, per day. The command center is located next to the commander's office. Documents (with the exception of the working map of the conduct of hostilities) are kept one day and are destroyed when handing over from one shift to another immediately after the report to Colonel-General S.P. Seleznev.
Dudayev's army, without offering significant resistance, withdraws
to Grozny. A set of LenVO parts is approaching New Year's Eve 1995.
Then the few surviving officers of the 129th mechanized infantry regiment will tell you that the regiment swiftly entered the Chechen defense line on the outskirts of Grozny. The enemy offered no resistance and retreated to the city. Ours did not have ground spotters for communication with aviation, and the pilots were not able to report that the 129th infantry regiment reached the Chechen line ahead of the set time ... As a result, the aviation worked out its combat mission partly for its troops, which, having withstood an air strike, in armored combat formations entered Grozny. Our armored personnel carriers and tanks instantly burst into flames.
January 1995
All New Year's Eve 129 MSP spent in street battles. At dawn, the commander (Colonel Borisov) decided to gather the remaining forces into a single fist and stop the offensive. On January 1, the Central Bank of the Leningrad Military District was frantically looking for a connection with parts of the district in Chechnya. The map showed the situation unchanged when the regiment was stationed at the walls of Grozny.
He no longer stood - crawling through the streets, covering them with the bodies of the dead and wounded. It was possible to get in touch with the regiment only in the middle of the next day. The captain responded in a hoarse voice. I introduced myself and asked to report on the situation. In response, a three-story mat was heard, the captain began to shout that he had not seen this in Afghanistan ... I abruptly cut him off, saying that it was not time to find out who and where fought.
An hour later, the regiment commander got in touch and reported that for a day he was gathering those who remained alive, and the 129th infantry regiment was incapable of combat due to the complete absence of command personnel in the platoon-company link and the mass death of soldiers. Losses in killed and wounded amounted to more than 50 percent, those who remained in the ranks took up defensive positions and are conducting street battles.
After the commander's report to Moscow on the losses incurred, an order came from there no later than January 7th to replenish the regiment with wartime staff and bring them into battle. To the objections of Colonel General Seleznev that there are no trained specialists in the district, Moscow replied: find. And again there was a set of cooks and plumbers, retraining them for machine gunners and snipers in a day ... They took everyone ...
After 25 years of service, I made the decision to resign from the ranks of the Armed Forces. I wrote a report and started a different, non-military life. Behind were the best years of my life and bitter regret for what they had turned my army into. And the unbearable pain for the 129th motorized rifle regiment that has gone into eternity.
Episodes
At the end of January 2005, the deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District summoned one of the staff colonels. “I can't give orders,” the general began, “so you need to go on a business trip to Chechnya as a volunteer… Or find someone else from your colleagues…” There were four colleagues, all in the same rank. Everyone, like the colonel himself, had either the war or liquidated the accident at Chernobyl. Except for one officer, who never went beyond the outskirts of St. Petersburg and shone except on the staff floor.
It all seemed that he should go to Chechnya. But the "parquet" colonel balked, demanding that everyone draw lots. The one who was talking to the general took five pieces of paper, drew a cross on one and put it in the earflaps (the hats were canceled at that time). Each of the colleagues pulled their own destiny. The cross went to the "parquet" one, his face changed and forced everyone to show his piece of paper: what if there was a Chechen mark somewhere else ... Before going to the deputy commander, they advised him to ask for a "warm" position upon returning from a business trip.
"Parquet" flew to Mozdok, and there he sat for three months, not leaving for Chechnya itself, and summoned his subordinates to report even a hundred kilometers away. And everything worked out for him in a wonderful way. And he received the order for his displayed courage, and entered the post of deputy in one of the military schools. And when the time came to say goodbye to the army, the necessary page in the biography allowed the hero to take the high position of a civil servant. True, for some reason he avoids his former colleagues ...
Major Yuri Saulyak was killed by a mine. It would seem that with his considerable combat experience, any stretch is visible from afar. But I did not notice this one, I was very tired - from battle to battle. Only Grozny was taken ... And the mine tore off the Major's leg or arm, not ripped open his stomach - hit right in the head. Therefore, when his headless body was brought to Rostov, they identified the major by the documents that were in his pocket. But this was not enough to be sent home. They contacted the commander of Saulyak, they say, the wife needed to arrive: what if someone else with the major's documents stepped on the mine ...
Friends decided otherwise. Saulyak's relatives were carefully asked if there was a scar on his body or a tattoo. It turned out that the major's appendicitis was excised, long before he was sent to Chechnya. “Come on,” they answered by phone from Rostov, “even if it’s not a wife, but someone who knew the deceased well will fly in for identification, then we’ll issue a cargo-200”. One of the officers from St. Petersburg had to go to document the scar from appendicitis ... Only after that Major Saulyak returned to his homeland in closed zinc. But it might not be known how long to lie in the morgue ...
In January 1995, a teacher from the Omsk Tank School called the Central Bank of Ukraine. It happened a few days after the New Year's storming of Grozny. So, they say, and so. My son, a tankman, serves in Chechnya ... And opposite the son's name in the headquarters it says “Missing” ... An officer on duty in distant Omsk answered that there was no exact information about the fate of the tanker. It is only known that he did not leave the battle. Maybe the wounded man is lying somewhere. Or he makes his way to his own. If only he didn't get captured ...
And a week and a half later, the call at the headquarters rang again. “Thank you,” the teacher from Omsk said to the same officer, “I found my son. You already there ferry that died ... "
After the first conversation, the teacher took a leave of absence for family reasons and went to Grozny. In the midst of the street fighting, he managed to get to his son's comrades, who reported that the tanker burned down along with the tank. But my father had crawled before that tank. In the house next to him, an old Chechen woman told that she had pulled out the burned-out guy and buried him in her garden ... The father of the tankman dug out and went home to Omsk with him, literally dragging him. There for the second time he lowered his son into the ground. And in the headquarters reports there was "Missing".
On the second day after the storming of Grozny, January 2, 1995, the commander of the Leningrad Military District received an order from the Minister of Defense: together with the commander of the division stationed in Kamenka, personally appear in each family of an officer and warrant officer who had just died, and give the children a New Year's gift - tangerines and candy on behalf of the defense department ...
Colonel-General Sergei Seleznev, who was the deputy commander of the 40th Army in Afghanistan, was already distorted from such blasphemy. He imagined how he would walk around the Kamenka completely dressed in mourning and hand out tangerines "for the deceased dad" ... And for the first time the general did not obey the order. And instead of dozens of congratulatory packages, he ordered to organize a memorial ceremony in the village. With all the necessary honors.
Soon a commission was sent from the ministry to St. Petersburg, which confirmed not only the failure to comply with the order, but also the fact of the misappropriation of money at the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, where the tangerines were replaced by a ceremony of farewell to the dead officers and warrant officers.
They did not have time to impose a penalty on Colonel-General Sergei Seleznev; in December 1996, together with his wife, he died in a plane crash.
A month after the start of the first Chechen campaign, St. Petersburg journalists found out that a combat command center had been created at the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, where all information about the course of hostilities was promptly collected. And, accordingly, about what losses the army bears. After difficult approvals, the representatives of the press were allowed into the office, where the journalists were shown a list of dead and wounded servicemen. On one sheet of paper.
Do we have such small losses? " - the correspondents doubted.
So we are fighting well, ”the senior officers answered instructively.
And the journalists did not realize that such a summary was compiled at the headquarters periodically, and then destroyed. At the same time, previous data were not taken into account and were not summed up, so as not to sow panic.
No secrecy stamp was assigned to such lists. A report on the real state of affairs was sent every day to Moscow, where the final calculations were made. From those officers who were admitted to the information about the dead and wounded, they took their word of honor about non-disclosure, without any orders and orders. At the disposal of the editorial board of Nasha Versiya na Neva was a miraculously preserved list of January 30, 1995.
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Commander of the 129th infantry regiment colonel A. Borisov |
December 11 - units of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia entered the territory of Chechnya on the basis of the decree of the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin "On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict." In the late evening of December 14, the Russian Air Force launched bomb-assault strikes on three airfields of the Chechen Republic - Kalinovskaya, Grozny-Severny and Khankala. According to intelligence, D. Dudaev had at his disposal more than 250 aircraft of various classes and purposes, which could be used as bomber aviation. Chronology of events
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November 1994
The troops are openly expressing their dissatisfaction with the policies of Boris Yeltsin. Uniforms, foodstuffs, fuel and ammunition are stolen from army warehouses. Cases of attacks on sentries with the aim of seizing weapons have become more frequent. In many units and formations, officers stopped going into service, preferring to make a living from merchants. The armored vehicles remained motionless, the planes rose into the sky only for combat duty.
Under these conditions, in the 45th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, which was located in the village of Kamenka near St. Petersburg, on the basis of the 129th Motorized Rifle Regiment, a unit began to be formed to be sent to a future war in Chechnya. There is not enough human resources, the platoon-company link is being replenished from other parts of the Leningrad Military District. Only one trained full-time motorized rifle battalion is being recruited with difficulty. We need snipers, machine gunners, grenade launchers, drivers, but they are not.
Finally, the 129th rifle regiment with a separate tank battalion and artillery battalion attached to it was formed. A combat review of a unit ready to be sent to war is personally conducted by the commander of the Leningrad Military District, Colonel-General S.P. Seleznev, an experienced and talented military leader. He knows well what lies ahead for these soldiers and officers, does not utter loud words, only asks if they received everything according to the wartime norm. Two days later, the regiment leaves for Chechnya. There is no more time for combat coordination. They went to Afghanistan after training, and even in the Great Patriotic War, formed units were given a month to prepare for hostilities before being sent to the front line. And here ... yesterday the cook - today the grenade launcher. There is an order from the Supreme Commander. It's disgusting at heart ...
KamAZ of the district song and dance ensemble of Leningrad Military District, by order of the educational work department, travels around small businessmen, collecting donations to collect parcels to the Caucasus.
December 1994
An operational group of the center of combat control of the Leningrad Military District units located in the combat zone in Chechnya has been created at the headquarters. Composition of the group
12 people, divided into three shifts, per day. The command center is located next to the commander's office. Documents (with the exception of the working map of the conduct of hostilities) are kept one day and are destroyed when handing over from one shift to another immediately after the report to Colonel-General S.P. Seleznev.
Dudayev's army, without offering significant resistance, withdraws
to Grozny. A set of LenVO parts is approaching New Year's Eve 1995.
Then the few surviving officers of the 129th mechanized infantry regiment will tell that the regiment swiftly entered the Chechen defense line on the outskirts of Grozny. The enemy offered no resistance and retreated to the city. Ours did not have ground spotters for communication with aviation, and the pilots were not able to report that the 129th infantry regiment reached the Chechen line ahead of the set time ... As a result, the aviation worked out its combat mission partially for its troops, which, having withstood an air strike, in armored combat formations entered Grozny. Our armored personnel carriers and tanks instantly burst into flames.
January 1995
All New Year's Eve 129 MSP spent in street battles. At dawn, the commander (Colonel Borisov) decided to gather the remaining forces into a single fist and stop the offensive. On January 1, the Central Bank of the Leningrad Military District was frantically looking for a connection with parts of the district in Chechnya. The map showed the situation unchanged when the regiment was stationed at the walls of Grozny.
He was no longer standing - he was crawling along the streets, covering them with the bodies of the dead and wounded. It was possible to get in touch with the regiment only in the middle of the next day. The captain responded in a hoarse voice. I introduced myself and asked to report on the situation. In response, a three-story mat was heard, the captain began to shout that he had not seen this in Afghanistan ... I abruptly cut him off, saying that it was not time to find out who and where fought.
An hour later, the regiment commander got in touch and reported that for a day he was gathering those who remained alive, and the 129th mechanized infantry regiment was incapable of combat due to the complete absence of command personnel in the platoon-company link and the mass death of soldiers. Losses in killed and wounded amounted to more than 50 percent, those who remained in the ranks took up defensive positions and are conducting street battles.
After the commander's report to Moscow on the losses incurred, an order came from there no later than January 7th to replenish the regiment with wartime staff and bring them into battle. To the objections of Colonel General Seleznev that there are no trained specialists in the district, Moscow replied: find. And again there was a set of cooks and plumbers, retraining them for machine gunners and snipers in a day ... They took everyone ...
Episodes
At the end of January 2005, the deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District summoned one of the staff colonels. “I can’t give orders,” the general began, “so you need to go on a business trip to Chechnya as a volunteer… Or find someone else from your colleagues…” There were four colleagues, all in the same rank. Everyone, like the colonel himself, had a background either in the war, or liquidated the accident at Chernobyl. Except for one officer, who never went beyond the outskirts of St. Petersburg and shone except on the staff floor.
It all seemed that he should go to Chechnya. But the "parquet" colonel balked, demanding that everyone draw lots. The one who was talking to the general took five pieces of paper, drew a cross on one and put it in the earflaps (the hats were canceled at that time). Each of the colleagues pulled their own destiny. The cross went to the "parquet" one, his face changed and forced everyone to show his piece of paper: what if there was a Chechen mark somewhere else ... Before going to the deputy commander, they advised him to ask for a "warm" position upon returning from a business trip.
"Parquet" flew to Mozdok, and there he sat for three months, not leaving for Chechnya itself, and summoned his subordinates to report even a hundred kilometers away. And everything worked out for him in a wonderful way. And he received the order for his courage, and entered the post of deputy in one of the military schools. And when the time came to say goodbye to the army, the necessary page in the biography allowed the hero to take the high position of a civil servant. True, for some reason he avoids his former colleagues ...
***
Major Yuri Saulyak was killed by a mine. It would seem that with his considerable combat experience, any stretch is visible from afar. But I did not notice this one, I was very tired - from battle to battle. Only Grozny was taken ... And the mine tore off the Major's leg or arm, not ripped open his stomach - hit right in the head. Therefore, when they brought his headless body to Rostov, they identified the major from the documents that were in his pocket. But this was not enough to be sent home. They contacted the commander of Saulyak, they say, the wife needed to arrive: what if someone else with the major's documents stepped on the mine ...
Friends decided otherwise. Saulyak's relatives were carefully asked if there was a scar on his body or a tattoo. It turned out that the major's appendicitis was excised, long before he was sent to Chechnya. “Come on,” they answered by phone from Rostov, “even if it’s not a wife, but someone who knew the deceased well will fly in for identification, then we’ll issue the cargo-200”. One of the officers from St. Petersburg had to go to document the scar from appendicitis ... Only after that Major Saulyak returned to his homeland in closed zinc. But it could not be known how long to lie in the morgue ...
***
In January 1995, a teacher from the Omsk Tank School called the Central Bank of Ukraine. It happened a few days after the New Year's storming of Grozny. So, they say, and so. My son, a tanker, serves in Chechnya ... And opposite the son's surname in the headquarters it says "Missing" ... The duty officer in distant Omsk answered that there was no exact information about the fate of the tanker. It is only known that he did not come out of the battle. Maybe the wounded man is lying somewhere. Or he makes his way to his own. If only he didn't get captured ...
And a week and a half later the call rang again at the headquarters. “Thank you,” the teacher from Omsk said to the same officer, “I found my son. You already there ferry that died ... "
After the first conversation, the teacher took a leave of absence for family reasons and went to Grozny. In the midst of the street fighting, he managed to get to his son's comrades, who reported that the tanker burned down along with the tank. But my father had crawled before that tank. In the house next to him, an old Chechen woman told that she had pulled out the burnt-out guy and buried him in her garden ... The father of the tankman dug out and went home to Omsk with him, literally dragging him. There for the second time he lowered his son into the ground. And in the headquarters reports there was "Missing".
***
On the second day after the storming of Grozny, January 2, 1995, the commander of the Leningrad Military District received an order from the Minister of Defense: together with the commander of the division stationed in Kamenka, personally appear in each family of an officer and warrant officer who had just died, and give the children a New Year's gift - tangerines and candy on behalf of the defense department ...
Colonel-General Sergei Seleznev, who was the deputy commander of the 40th Army in Afghanistan, was already distorted from such blasphemy. He imagined how he would walk around the Kamenka completely dressed in mourning and hand out tangerines “for the deceased daddy” ... And for the first time the general did not comply with the order. And instead of dozens of congratulatory packages, he ordered to organize a memorial ceremony in the village. With all the necessary honors.
Soon a commission was sent from the ministry to St. Petersburg, which confirmed not only the failure to comply with the order, but also the fact of the misappropriation of money at the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, where the tangerines were replaced with a farewell ceremony for the dead officers and warrant officers.
They did not have time to impose a penalty on Colonel-General Sergei Seleznev; in December 1996, together with his wife, he died in a plane crash.
***
A month after the start of the first Chechen campaign, St. Petersburg journalists found out that a combat command center had been created at the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, where all information about the course of hostilities was promptly collected. And, accordingly, about what losses the army bears. After difficult approvals, the representatives of the press were allowed into the office, where the journalists were shown a list of dead and wounded servicemen. On one sheet of paper.
- Do we have such small losses? - the correspondents doubted.
“So we are fighting well,” the senior officers answered instructively.
And the journalists did not realize that such a report was compiled periodically at the headquarters, and then destroyed. At the same time, previous data were not taken into account and were not summed up, so as not to sow panic.
No secrecy stamp was assigned to such lists. A report on the real state of affairs was sent every day to Moscow, where the final calculations were made. From those officers who were admitted to the information about the dead and wounded, they took their word of honor on non-disclosure, without any orders and orders. At the disposal of the editorial board of Nasha Versiya na Neva was a miraculously preserved list of January 30, 1995.
November 1994
The troops are openly expressing their dissatisfaction with the policies of Boris Yeltsin. Uniforms, foodstuffs, fuel and ammunition are stolen from army warehouses. Cases of attacks on sentries with the aim of seizing weapons have become more frequent. In many units and formations, officers stopped going into service, preferring to make a living from merchants. The armored vehicles remained motionless, the planes rose into the sky only for combat duty.
Under these conditions, in the 45th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, which was located in the village of Kamenka near St. Petersburg, on the basis of the 129th Motorized Rifle Regiment, a unit began to be formed to be sent to a future war in Chechnya. There is not enough human resources, the platoon-company link is being replenished from other parts of the Leningrad Military District. Only one trained full-time motorized rifle battalion is being recruited with difficulty. We need snipers, machine gunners, grenade launchers, drivers, but they are not.
Finally, the 129th rifle regiment with a separate tank battalion and artillery battalion attached to it was formed. A combat review of a unit ready to be sent to war is personally conducted by the commander of the Leningrad Military District, Colonel-General S.P. Seleznev, an experienced and talented military leader. He knows well what lies ahead for these soldiers and officers, does not utter loud words, only asks if they received everything according to the wartime norm. Two days later, the regiment leaves for Chechnya. There is no more time for combat coordination. They went to Afghanistan after training, and even in the Great Patriotic War, formed units were given a month to prepare for hostilities before being sent to the front line. And here ... yesterday the cook - today the grenade launcher. There is an order from the Supreme Commander. It's disgusting at heart ...
KamAZ of the district song and dance ensemble of Leningrad Military District, by order of the educational work department, travels around small businessmen, collecting donations to collect parcels to the Caucasus.
December 1994
An operational group of the center of combat control of the Leningrad Military District units located in the combat zone in Chechnya has been created at the headquarters. Composition of the group
12 people, divided into three shifts, per day. The command center is located next to the commander's office. Documents (with the exception of the working map of the conduct of hostilities) are kept one day and are destroyed when handing over from one shift to another immediately after the report to Colonel-General S.P. Seleznev.
Dudayev's army, without offering significant resistance, withdraws
to Grozny. A set of LenVO parts is approaching New Year's Eve 1995.
Then the few surviving officers of the 129th mechanized infantry regiment will tell that the regiment swiftly entered the Chechen defense line on the outskirts of Grozny. The enemy offered no resistance and retreated to the city. Ours did not have ground spotters for communication with aviation, and the pilots were not able to report that the 129th infantry regiment reached the Chechen line ahead of the set time ... As a result, the aviation worked out its combat mission partially for its troops, which, having withstood an air strike, in armored combat formations entered Grozny. Our armored personnel carriers and tanks instantly burst into flames.
January 1995
All New Year's Eve 129 MSP spent in street battles. At dawn, the commander (Colonel Borisov) decided to gather the remaining forces into a single fist and stop the offensive. On January 1, the Central Bank of the Leningrad Military District was frantically looking for a connection with parts of the district in Chechnya. The map showed the situation unchanged when the regiment was stationed at the walls of Grozny.
He was no longer standing - he was crawling along the streets, covering them with the bodies of the dead and wounded. It was possible to get in touch with the regiment only in the middle of the next day. The captain responded in a hoarse voice. I introduced myself and asked to report on the situation. In response, a three-story mat was heard, the captain began to shout that he had not seen this in Afghanistan ... I abruptly cut him off, saying that it was not time to find out who and where fought.
An hour later, the regiment commander got in touch and reported that for a day he was gathering those who remained alive, and the 129th mechanized infantry regiment was incapable of combat due to the complete absence of command personnel in the platoon-company link and the mass death of soldiers. Losses in killed and wounded amounted to more than 50 percent, those who remained in the ranks took up defensive positions and are conducting street battles.
After the commander's report to Moscow on the losses incurred, an order came from there no later than January 7th to replenish the regiment with wartime staff and bring them into battle. To the objections of Colonel General Seleznev that there are no trained specialists in the district, Moscow replied: find. And again there was a set of cooks and plumbers, retraining them for machine gunners and snipers in a day ... They took everyone ...
Episodes
At the end of January 2005, the deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District summoned one of the staff colonels. “I can’t give orders,” the general began, “so you need to go on a business trip to Chechnya as a volunteer… Or find someone else from your colleagues…” There were four colleagues, all in the same rank. Everyone, like the colonel himself, had a background either in the war, or liquidated the accident at Chernobyl. Except for one officer, who never went beyond the outskirts of St. Petersburg and shone except on the staff floor.
It all seemed that he should go to Chechnya. But the "parquet" colonel balked, demanding that everyone draw lots. The one who was talking to the general took five pieces of paper, drew a cross on one and put it in the earflaps (the hats were canceled at that time). Each of the colleagues pulled their own destiny. The cross went to the "parquet" one, his face changed and forced everyone to show his piece of paper: what if there was a Chechen mark somewhere else ... Before going to the deputy commander, they advised him to ask for a "warm" position upon returning from a business trip.
"Parquet" flew to Mozdok, and there he sat for three months, not leaving for Chechnya itself, and summoned his subordinates to report even a hundred kilometers away. And everything worked out for him in a wonderful way. And he received the order for his courage, and entered the post of deputy in one of the military schools. And when the time came to say goodbye to the army, the necessary page in the biography allowed the hero to take the high position of a civil servant. True, for some reason he avoids his former colleagues ...
***
Major Yuri Saulyak was killed by a mine. It would seem that with his considerable combat experience, any stretch is visible from afar. But I did not notice this one, I was very tired - from battle to battle. Only Grozny was taken ... And the mine tore off the Major's leg or arm, not ripped open his stomach - hit right in the head. Therefore, when they brought his headless body to Rostov, they identified the major from the documents that were in his pocket. But this was not enough to be sent home. They contacted the commander of Saulyak, they say, the wife needed to arrive: what if someone else with the major's documents stepped on the mine ...
Friends decided otherwise. Saulyak's relatives were carefully asked if there was a scar on his body or a tattoo. It turned out that the major's appendicitis was excised, long before he was sent to Chechnya. “Come on,” they answered by phone from Rostov, “even if it’s not a wife, but someone who knew the deceased well will fly in for identification, then we’ll issue the cargo-200”. One of the officers from St. Petersburg had to go to document the scar from appendicitis ... Only after that Major Saulyak returned to his homeland in closed zinc. But it could not be known how long to lie in the morgue ...
***
In January 1995, a teacher from the Omsk Tank School called the Central Bank of Ukraine. It happened a few days after the New Year's storming of Grozny. So, they say, and so. My son, a tanker, serves in Chechnya ... And opposite the son's surname in the headquarters it says "Missing" ... The duty officer in distant Omsk answered that there was no exact information about the fate of the tanker. It is only known that he did not come out of the battle. Maybe the wounded man is lying somewhere. Or he makes his way to his own. If only he didn't get captured ...
And a week and a half later the call rang again at the headquarters. “Thank you,” the teacher from Omsk said to the same officer, “I found my son. You already there ferry that died ... "
After the first conversation, the teacher took a leave of absence for family reasons and went to Grozny. In the midst of the street fighting, he managed to get to his son's comrades, who reported that the tanker burned down along with the tank. But my father had crawled before that tank. In the house next to him, an old Chechen woman told that she had pulled out the burnt-out guy and buried him in her garden ... The father of the tankman dug out and went home to Omsk with him, literally dragging him. There for the second time he lowered his son into the ground. And in the headquarters reports there was "Missing".
***
On the second day after the storming of Grozny, January 2, 1995, the commander of the Leningrad Military District received an order from the Minister of Defense: together with the commander of the division stationed in Kamenka, personally appear in each family of an officer and warrant officer who had just died, and give the children a New Year's gift - tangerines and candy on behalf of the defense department ...
Colonel-General Sergei Seleznev, who was the deputy commander of the 40th Army in Afghanistan, was already distorted from such blasphemy. He imagined how he would walk around the Kamenka completely dressed in mourning and hand out tangerines “for the deceased daddy” ... And for the first time the general did not comply with the order. And instead of dozens of congratulatory packages, he ordered to organize a memorial ceremony in the village. With all the necessary honors.
Soon a commission was sent from the ministry to St. Petersburg, which confirmed not only the failure to comply with the order, but also the fact of the misappropriation of money at the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, where the tangerines were replaced with a farewell ceremony for the dead officers and warrant officers.
They did not have time to impose a penalty on Colonel-General Sergei Seleznev; in December 1996, together with his wife, he died in a plane crash.
***
A month after the start of the first Chechen campaign, St. Petersburg journalists found out that a combat command center had been created at the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, where all information about the course of hostilities was promptly collected. And, accordingly, about what losses the army bears. After difficult approvals, the representatives of the press were allowed into the office, where the journalists were shown a list of dead and wounded servicemen. On one sheet of paper.
- Do we have such small losses? - the correspondents doubted.
“So we are fighting well,” the senior officers answered instructively.
And the journalists did not realize that such a report was compiled periodically at the headquarters, and then destroyed. At the same time, previous data were not taken into account and were not summed up, so as not to sow panic.
No secrecy stamp was assigned to such lists. A report on the real state of affairs was sent every day to Moscow, where the final calculations were made. From those officers who were admitted to the information about the dead and wounded, they took their word of honor on non-disclosure, without any orders and orders. At the disposal of the editorial board of Nasha Versiya na Neva was a miraculously preserved list of January 30, 1995.